Crim Rev 4-11.docx

CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY 1. Beltran v People Doctrine: In a case for concubinage, the accused, like the herein petitioner need not present a final judgment declaring his marriage void for he can adduce evidence in the criminal case of the nullity of his marriage other than proof of a final judgment declaring his marriage void Emergency Recit: Husband Beltran filed a petition for nullity of marriage in the ground of psychological incapacity. Wife Beltran alleged that husband beltran cohabited with his mistress. Wife Beltran then filed a criminal complaint for concubinage against husband beltran and mistress. Husband Beltran filed a Motion to defer criminal proceedings; however, it was denied by RTC. Husband Beltran argued that the pendency of the civil case for declaration of nullity of his marriage posed a prejudicial question to the determination of the criminal case. SC affirmed RTC decision. FACTS:  Petitioner Meynardo Beltran and Charmaine E. Felix were married for 24 years.  Petitioner filed a petition for nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity.  In wife’s Answer to the said petition, she alleged that it was petitioner who abandoned the conjugal home and lived with a certain woman named Milagros Salting.  Charmaine then filed a criminal complaint for concubinage under Art 334 of RPC against petitioner and his paramour. The prosecutor’s office found probable cause and ordered the filing of an Information against them.  Petitioner then filed a Motion to Defer Proceedings Including the Issuance of the Warrant of Arrest in the criminal case.  Petitioner argued that the pendency of the civil case for declaration of nullity of his marriage posed a prejudicial question to the determination of the criminal case.  Judge Alden Vasquez Cervantes denied the motion. MR was also denied.  Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari before RTC Makati, which was also denied. MR was also denied.  Petitioner then filed the instant petition for review.  Petitioner contends that the pendency of the petition for nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code is a prejudicial question that should merit the suspension of the criminal case for concubinage filed against him by his wife. Petitioner contends that if the petition for nullity of his marriage has been granted, then he cannot be convicted of the crime of concubinage since he was never before a married man.

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2. Vera Neri v People, 203 SCRA 750 (1991) DOCTRINES 1. For either consent or pardon to benefit the accused, it must be given prior to the filing of a criminal complaint. Also, while the crime of adultery cannot be prosecuted without the offended spouse's complaint, once the complaint has been filed, the control of the case passes to the public prosecutor. 2. Pari delicto does not apply to criminal cases. It is consent which bars the institution of the criminal proceedings. EMERGENCY RECIT Dr. Jorge charged his wife Ruby and her lover Eduardo with adultery. The latter were convicted. Upon appeal, however, Dr. Jorge executed several documents pardoning the two. These, however, cannot warrant the dismissal of the criminal case, since these documents were made already after the filing of the criminal case. Furthermore, these documents could not bar Dr. Jorge from filing the criminal case because there was no showing in these documents that he consented the illicit affair. FACTS  

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ISSUE: W/N the criminal case should be suspended HELD: No.  The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It has two essential elements: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.  The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of petitioner’s marriage is not a prejudicial question to the concubinage case. For a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of the latter pending the final determination of the civil case, it must appear not only that the said civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.  In a case for concubinage, the accused, like the herein petitioner need not present a final judgment declaring his marriage void for he can adduce evidence in the criminal case of the nullity of his marriage other than proof of a final judgment declaring his marriage void.  With regard to petitioner's argument that he could be acquitted of the charge of concubinage should his marriage be declared null and void, suffice it to state that even a subsequent pronouncement that his marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense.

Assuming that the first marriage was null and void on the ground alleged by petitioner, that fact would not be material to the outcome of the criminal case. Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of the competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.

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Ruby Vera Neri is married to Dr. Jorge Neri. One day, Ruby, along with companions Linda Sare and a certain Jabunan, were in the condominium of the Sps. Neri at Mines View Park Condominium, Baguio. Their unit had a sala and a master’s bedroom downstairs o At around 7pm, Eduardo Arroyo arrived at the condominium. He then went to the master's bedroom where Ruby and Linda were. On Ruby's request, Linda left the master's bedroom, leaving the two. About 45 minutes later, Eduardo came up and told Linda that she could already come down. Sometime thereafter, Dr. Jorge surprised his wife while she was looking at some photographs in their bedroom in their house in Makati. Ruby then turned pale and started for the door. o Struck by this unusual behavior, Dr. Jorge started looking around the dressing room and he came upon a Kodak envelope with film negatives inside. He took the negatives for printing. the photographs showed his wife in intimate bedroom poses with another man, both of them half-naked. o A few days later, Dr. Jorge confronted her with these photographs. It was at this point that Ruby admitted that Eduardo was her lover and that they went to bed during the time that they were in Baguio. Dr. Jorge filed a complaint against Ruby and Eduardo for adultery. The latter were then criminally charged in court for the said crime. RTC: Convicted Ruby and Eduardo. CA: NOTE: During the proceedings here, Dr. Jorge filed an affidavit of desistance, stating that “he pardons Ruby and Eduardo, and that he filed the complaint out of pure misunderstanding”. In another civil case where Dr. Jorge and Ruby are also parties, they entered into a compromise agreement containing the same statements made in the affidavit. Affirmed the RTC. SC: NOTE: The current case is a motion for reconsideration of an SC decision. Now, during the proceedings here, on May 14, 1991, Dr. Jorge filed a manifestation, praying that the case against Ruby and Eduardo be dismissed as he had "tacitly

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consented" to his wife's infidelity. This manifestation was signed on August 23, 1991. Affirmed the RTC. Ruby and Eduardo filed motions for reconsideration of the SC decision, alleging that: 1. Dr. Jorge’s affidavit of desistance casts doubt on his credibility as a witness; 2. Ruby’s right against self-incrimination was violated when she admitted to Dr. Jorge her affair; 3. Dr. Jorge married another woman while this case was pending; thus, he should be held in pari delicto, precluding him from filing the complaint; and 4. The case should be dismissed, or they should at least be granted a new trial, by virtue of the documents filed by Dr. Jorge. NOTE: During all these proceedings, Dr. Jorge had married another woman.

ISSUES 1. WON the case should be dismissed, or at least a new trial be held? [relevant] 2. WON Dr. Jorge’s is precluded from filing the complaint due to pari delicto? [relevant] 3. WON Dr. Jorge’s affidavit of desistance casts doubt on his credibility? 4. WON Ruby’s right against self-incrimination was violated? HELD: 1. 

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NO. People v. Follantes: Recantation by witnesses of the prosecution does not necessarily entitle the accused to a new trial. x x x Recanting testimony is exceedingly unreliable, and it is the duty of the court to deny a new trial where it is not satisfied that such testimony is true. o In this case, the truthfulness of Dr. Jorge’s recantation in his manifestation is doubtful.  He had 2 occasions to make the claim that he consented to the affair: (1) the compromise agreement; and (2) his affidavit. These 2 documents, however, merely stated that he had pardoned Ruby and Eduardo, and that the complaint was filed out of "pure misunderstanding". The same did not state that Dr. Jorge knew of the adulterous relations at the time he filed the complaint.  Furthermore, while the manifestation was made in May 1991, it was signed only in August of that year. People v. Infante: For either consent or pardon to benefit the accused, it must be given prior to the filing of a criminal complaint. o Sec. 5, Rule 110: While the crime of adultery cannot be prosecuted without the offended spouse's complaint, once the complaint has been filed, the control of the case passes to the public prosecutor. o In the present case, the documents were executed only after the trial court had already convicted Ruby and Eduardo. NO. People v. Guinucud (the case cited by Ruby and Eduardo) refers not to pari delicto, but to consent, as that which bars the institution of the criminal proceedings. In the present case, no such acquiescence can be implied. Ruby did not enter into any agreement with Dr. Jorge allowing each other to cohabit with others. Dr. Jorge promptly filed his complaint after discovering the illicit affair. Moreover, pari delicto is not found in the Revised Penal Code, but only in the Civil Code, which relates only to contracts with illegal consideration. he case at bar does not involve any illegal contract. NO. Aguirre v. People: Findings of fact of the lower court, including its conclusions on credibility of witnesses, are generally not disturbed.

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In this case, therefore, the SC should not disturb the finding of the RTC that Dr. Jorge is a credible witness.

NO. Gamboa v. Cruz: The right against self-incrimination in custodial investigation attaches upon the start of an investigation, i.e., when the investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information. o In the present case, Dr. Jorge was not an investigating officer conducting a custodial interrogation. Hence, Ruby cannot claim that her admission should have been rejected.

3. TIBONG v. PEOPLE | GR No. 191000 | Acts of Lasciviousness DOCTRINE: While rape and acts of lasciviousness have the same nature, they are fundamentally different. For in rape, there is the intent to lie with a woman, whereas in acts of lasciviousness, this element is absent. ER: Tibong was charged with attempted rape of AAA but contends that his actions did not merit an attempt of rape since there was no commencement of insertion of organs (see Perez v. CA as cited here). SC found guilty of attempted rape since acts constituted an intent to pursue carnal knowledge. FACTS:  Tibong was indicted for attempted rape against AAA, an 18yo, 3rd civil degree relative of Tibong  AAA lived at the house owned by Tibong’s parents where she was boarding. She occupied a room at the 3-bedroom basement. One of the rooms was occupied by Tibong and his wife. The third bedroom was unoccupied  Tibong arrived home when AAA was sleeping.  AAA woke up to someone undressing her and saw Tibong wearing only briefs and crouching over on top of her bed and pulling down her garments  AAA tried to resist but Tibong mashed her breasts and told her to lie down. Tibongtold AAA that they will watch a “bold” movie  Tibong then went to the CD player to insert a CD. AAA found the opportunity to escape.  Tibong denied the following facts stating that he was drinking the entire time and came home drunk  RTC: guilty of attempted rape  CA: affirmed  Tibong cites Perez v. CA which held that “the acts of embracing and kissing her, mashing her breasts, inserting his hand inside her panty and touching her sexual organ, while admittedly obscene and detestable acts, do not constitute attempted rape absent any showing that petitioner actually commenced to force his penis into the complainant’s sexual organ” ISSUE: Whether Tibong is guilty of attempted rape HELD: YES.  Tibong’s acts, as narrated by AAA, far from being mere obscene or lewd, indisbutably show that he intended to have, and was bent on comnsummating, carnal knowledge of AAA.  Under Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, there is an attempt to commit a felony when the offender commences its commission directly by overt acts but does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.  Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code provides: Any person who shall commit any act of lasciviousness upon the other person of either sex, under any of the circumstances mentioned in the preceding article [referring to Article 335 on rape], shall be punished by prision correccional.  While rape and acts of lasciviousness have the same nature, they are fundamentally different. For in rape, there is the intent to lie with a woman, whereas in acts of lasciviousness, this element is absent. 4. People v Javier Doctrine:

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Well-settled is the rule that physical resistance need not be established in rape when intimidation is exercised upon the victim and the latter submits herself against her will to the rapists embrace because of fear for life and personal safety. The force and violence required in rape cases is relative and need not be overpowering or irresistible when applied. For rape to exist, it is not necessary that the force or intimidation be so great or be of such character as could not be resisted it is only necessary that the force or intimidation be sufficient to consummate the purpose which the accused had in mind. Even assuming that the prosecution failed to prove the use of force, the accused cannot be convicted of qualified seduction. It is only when the complaint for rape contains allegations for qualified seduction that the accused may be convicted of the latter in case the prosecution fails to prove the use of force by the accused. To do otherwise would be violating the constitutional rights of the accused to due process and to be informed of the accusation against him. The accused charged with rape cannot be convicted of qualified seduction under the same information. Then, too, rape and qualified seduction are not identical offenses.

Facts: Julia Javier, in one afternoon, was grabbed by Amado Javier, her father. She shouted for help, but nobody came to her rescue from neighbors who was about 60 meters away. Amado boxed her abdomen resulting to her unconsciousness. When she regained consciousness, she felt pain in her vagina which was bleeding and wet with some sticky fluids. She cried but was warned by the accused that should she make an outcry and report the incident to her mother, he will kill her. Out of fear, and knowing that accused has a handgun, she held her outcry. Amado repeated the sexual assault by applying the same force and intimidation. Out of fear, she kept the incident to herself until she felt some unusual pain in her body and when she can no longer manage said situation, she finally broke her silence by going to her grandmother. She was asked by her grandmother, Librada, about the author of her pregnancy, she answered that it was her father, Amado. On cross-examination, Julia admitted that she had a sweetheart and were engaged for one year already prior to the incident. Her sweetheart, Michael Apduhan, pays her a visit at times but on Saturday afternoon only with her mother around. She alleged that there was no occasion that she met her sweetheart alone for either her mother is around in the house or went out with her sweetheart with her barkada during disco dances on the eve of fiestas. Julia gave birth to a baby boy and was held under supervision of DSWD. Amado denied all allegations against him and that the same was engineered by Librada who despised him. Amado questions the credibility of Julia mainly because she has a sweetheart and used to attend discos and benefit dances which lasted until midnight. He tries to portray a picture of Julia as an unchaste and impure woman who was impregnated by her sweetheart at the tender age of 16. Issue: W/N Amado Javier is guilty of Rape and guilty of Qualified Seduction Held: Yes. Amado is guilty of the such crimes.  The force and violence required in rape cases is relative and need not be overpowering or irresistible when applied. For rape to exist, it is not necessary that the force or intimidation be so great or be of such character as could not be resisted it is only necessary that the force or intimidation be sufficient to consummate the purpose which the accused had in mind. Amado, being the father, undoubtedly exerted a strong moral influence over Julia. In rape committed by a father against his own daughter, the formers moral ascendancy and influence over the latter may substitute for actual physical violence and intimidation.  Well-settled is the rule that physical resistance need not be established in rape when intimidation is exercised upon the victim and the latter submits herself against her will to the rapists embrace because of fear for life and personal safety. Obviously, the use of threat of death by Amado against Julia constituted sufficient intimidation to cow her into obedience.

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Finally, the Court has also ruled that if resistance would nevertheless be futile because of a continuing intimidation, then offering none at all would not mean consent to the assault as to make the victims participation in the sexual act voluntary. Moreover, assuming that the prosecution failed to prove the use of force by Amado, the latter cannot be convicted of qualified seduction. It is only when the complaint for rape contains allegations for qualified seduction that the accused may be convicted of the latter in case the prosecution fails to prove the use of force by the accused. To do otherwise would be violating the constitutional rights of the accused to due process and to be informed of the accusation against him. The accused charged with rape cannot be convicted of qualified seduction under the same information. Then, too, rape and qualified seduction are not identical offenses. While the two felonies have one common element which is carnal knowledge of a woman, they significantly vary in all other respects. What the trial court should have done was to dismiss the charges for rape in Criminal Cases Nos. 95-147 and 95148, if indeed, in its opinion, the prosecution failed to sufficiently establish the existence of force and intimidation, and order instead the filing of the appropriate information. The Court, however, believes and is fully convinced that Amado is guilty as well of these two other counts of rape.

5. People v Egan (2002) DOCTRINE: The sexual abuse which accused-appellant forced upon Lenie constitutes the lewd design inherent in forcible abduction and is thus absorbed therein. The indecent molestation cannot form the other half of a complex crime since the record does not show that the principal purpose of the accused was to commit any of the crimes against chastity and that her abduction would only be a necessary means to commit the same. What we discern from the evidence is that the intent to seduce the girl forms part and parcel of her forcible abduction and shares equal importance with the other element of the crime which was to remove the victim from her home or from whatever familiar place she may be and to take her to some other. Stated otherwise, the intention of accusedappellant as the evidence shows was not only to seduce the victim but also to separate her from her family, especially from her father Palmones, clearly tell-tale signs of forcible abduction. EMERGENCY RECIT: Lito, a 36-yo, forcibly abducted 12-yo Lenie. He was charged with forcible abduction with rape. He contends that such abduction was within the Manabo rites. The SC court held that such defense is untenable. Also, since rape was not proven, he is only liable for forcible abduction. [See doctrine] FACTS:  Lito Egan, 36-yo, was an avid admirer of a 12-yo girl named Lenie T. Camad.  They were both part of the Manobo indegenious cultural community in Mindanao.  On 6 January 1997 Lenie and her cousin Jessica Silona were fetching water at a deep well.  At 2PM, Lito appeared from nowhere and forcibly dragged and pushed Lenie towards Sitio Dalag and threatened to kill her if she resisted.  Before leaving the site of the deep well, he likewise terrorized Jessica by brandishing his hunting knife which forced the girl to scamper for safety.  At 5PM, the search for Lenie started going on.  For their part, Lito and Lenie stayed that same night in a house in Sitio Dalag.  The next day, Lito forced Lenie to move to a house in Sitio Salaysay where Lito allegedly raped Lenie.  Lenie was then released with help of 3 Datus.  For 4 months, the datus attempted a customary settlement of the abduction in accordance with Manobo traditions.  Lito agreed 2 horses to the family of Lenie in exchange for her hand in marriage.  Upon failure to give the horses, the father insisted on the unconditional return of his daughter to his custody.  Since the amicable settlement was not realized, the accused forcibly relocated Lenie to Cabalantian, Kataotao, Bukidnon, where she was eventually rescued on 15 May 1997.  Hence, his father filed a complaint before the police.

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During trial, the accused tried to prove that he and Lenie had actually been living together under Manobo rites in the house of her father. RTC – guilty.

ISSUE: W/N Egan is guilty of forcible abduction with rape? – Forcible abduction only. HELD: 

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All the elements of forcible abduction were proved in this case. The victim, who is a young girl, was taken against her will as shown by the fact that at knife-point she was dragged and taken by accused-appellant to a place far from her abode. At her tender age, Lenie could not be expected to physically resist considering the fact that even her companion, Jessica Silona, had to run home to escape accused-appellant's wrath as he brandished a hunting knife. Fear gripped and paralyzed Lenie into helplessness as she was manhandled by accusedappellant who was armed and twenty-four (24) years her senior. The evidence likewise shows that the taking of the young victim against her will was done con miras deshonestas or in furtherance of lewd and unchaste designs. The word lewd is defined as obscene, lustful, indecent, lascivious, lecherous. It signifies that form of immorality which has relation to moral impurity; or that which is carried on in a wanton manner. Such lewd designs were established by the prurient and lustful acts which accused-appellant displayed towards the victim after she was abducted. This element may also be inferred from the fact that while Lenie was then a naive twelve (12)-year old, accused-appellant was thirty-six (36) years old and although unmarried was much wiser in the ways of the world than she. Accused-appellant would however insist that he and Lenie had been engaged under Manobo rituals to marry each other and that her companionship was willful and voluntary. Proof of this, he said, was the alleged dowry of one (1) horse, two (2) pigs, ten (10) sacks of palay, and P2,000.00, with two (2) wild horses forthcoming, he had given her father in exchange for her hand in marriage. In moving from one place to another to look for the horses which the old man Palmones had demanded, it was allegedly only his intention to realize his matrimonial aspiration with Lenie. The testimony of the victim negated this contrived posture of accused-appellant which in reality is simply a variation of the sweetheart defense. If they were, surely, Lenie would not have jeopardized their relationship by accusing him of having held her against her will and molesting her and, on top of it all, by filing a criminal charge against him. If it had been so, Lenie could have easily told her father after the latter had successfully traced their whereabouts that nothing untoward had happened between her and the accused. Her normal reaction would have been to cover-up for the man she supposedly loved and with whom she had a passionate affair. But, on the contrary, Lenie lost no time in denouncing accused-appellant and exposing to her family and the authorities the disgrace that had befallen her. If they had indeed been lovers, Lenie's father would not have shown so much concern for her welfare and safety by searching for the couple for four (4) months, desperately wanting to rescue her from captivity and seeking the intervention of the datus in resolving the matter. Coming now to the charge of rape, we rule that although the prosecution has proved that Lenie was sexually abused, the evidence proffered is inadequate to establish carnal knowledge. Sexual abuse cannot be equated with rape. In the case at bar, there is no evidence of entrance or introduction of the male organ into the labia of the pudendum. Under the circumstances, the criminal liability of accusedappellant is only for forcible abduction under Art. 342 of The Revised Penal Code. [See doctrine]

6. People v Shareff Ali El Akhtar | Forcible Abduction Doctrine: Forcible abduction is absorbed in the crime of rape if the main objective of the appellant is to rape the victim

ER: Ali forcibly abducted Gina and raped her multiple times in his home before releasing her. He claims that they were sweethearts. Ali was charged with the crime of rape. SC ruled that Ali was guilty of 3 counts of rape and that forcible abduction is deemed absorbed in the crime of rape if the main objective of Ali was to rape the victim. Facts:              

Accused was a 30yo married, Libyan national, charged with the rape of Gina Rozon, 17 yo, a high school graduate Gina was on vacation and staying with her aunt. Accused occupied the ground floor. Gina and Accused became friends but Accused then moved. Gina was on her way to the Lagro Post Office when she saw Accused behind her. Accused grabbed her hand and pushed her inside a tricycle, which sped away. Accused brought Gina to a house where he made her drink something that made Gina fall asleep Gina woke up naked and having pains in her vagina. Accused brought her food and drinks (spiked) which made Gina fall asleep again. She would wake up feeling pains in her vagina everytime (happened 3x). She tried to escape multiple times but since Accused was always there, and Gina was in a weakened state, she was not able to escape. Gina’s relatives were already suspicious of Accused and decided to visit Accused to ask whether he knew of Gina’s whereabouts. On the 10th day, Gina was allowed to leave but first had to write love letters to Accused to make it seem that they were lovers. Accused denied these allegations stating that he was Gina’s lover RTC: found him guilty of rape; forcible abduction is absorbed in the crime of rape if the main objective of the appellant is to rape the victim Accused assails the credibility of Gina considering her conduct during the alleged abduction wherein she did not even resist nor shout for help, proving that they were sweethearts.

Issue: Which crime is the Accused guilty of Held: Three counts of rape. While appellant was charged with the crime of Forcible Abduction with Rape, he was convicted by the trial court of the crime of rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of R.A. No. 7659 which provides: Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. — Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of woman under any of the following circumstances: (1) By using force or intimidation; (2) When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and (3) When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented As to the crime committed by the appellant, we have held that "forcible abduction is absorbed in the crime of rape if the main objective of the appellant is to rape the victim. As can be gleaned from the testimony of complainant, she was raped by Accused no less than 3x.. Appellant should therefore be held responsible for as many rapes as were committed by him which were duly proven during trial. 7. People v Fortich Doctrine: Any subsequent acts of intercourse would be only separate acts of rape and can no longer be considered separate complex crimes of forcible abduction with rape. 1. On the evening of March 31, 1983, after attending mass, sisters Marilou and Maritess Nobleza, together with their friends Rolly Imperio and Luis Tumang, proceeded to Alta Tierra Hotel in Carmen Hill using an Isuzu pick-up owned by latter's mother. 2. After a while the group decided to go home. Suddenly, two men armed with handguns who were later identified as appellants emerged from the rear end of the vehicle and fired a single shot which hit the left side of the pick-up. They introduced themselves as members of the New People's Army

(NPA) and ordered the sisters to get inside the vehicle while Imperio and Tumang were instructed to strip. 3. Gaid thumped Imperio on the head with a .38 caliber revolver causing him to fall down, while Tumang was hit several times by Fortich in various parts of the body and momentarily lost consciousness. 4. Tumang was divested of his wallet and other belongings 5. The accused drove the pick-up, with Marilou and Maritess at the back seat, 6. All the time, the sisters were consistently threatened with summary execution. Marilou pleaded for their freedom and told them to just take the pick-up. 7. At his juncture, Gaid had transferred to the backseat with Marilou while Maritess was made to sit up in front with Fortich. Gaid poked his gun at the right side of Marilou's neck and ordered her to remove her pants under pain of death. Aware that she was biding her time, he himself removed her pants with the gun still pointed at her. 8. She implored that she be spared but Gaid, who was obviously much stronger, forced her legs apart, positioned himself on top of her, kissed and fondled her, and succeeded in consummating his bestial act. 9. Maritess, on the other hand, was ravaged by Fortich. 10. The accused switched victims twice before divesting them of their watches, a handbag containing P15.00 in cash, a shirt, toilet tissue and toothbrush, and the pick-up's stereo and tools. 11. They then drove down the highway and left the sisters at a gasoline station some three kilometers from the city. Unable to contact the police, the victims proceeded to the Cagayan de Oro Medical Center (CMC) and submitted themselves to medical examination. 12. The accused were each charged with two counts of forcible abduction with rape, one count of robbery with frustrated homicide and one count of robbery. 13. RTC Convicted the accused of the charges From this judgment, appellants interposed the instant appeal. Issue: 1. 2. 3.

WON the aggravating circumstance of use of Motor Vehicle should be appreciated – No. WON the trial court correctly charged each of the accused with TWO COUNTS of Forcible abduction with rape WON the other charges are proven – Yes.

Held: 1. No. In the case at bar, the offenses of robbery and forcible abduction with rape could have been effected even without the aid of a motor vehicle. In the case of People v. Mil it was held that use of a motor vehicle is not aggravating where it was not used to facilitate the crime or that the crime could not have been committed without it. In People v. Garcia, the use of motor vehicle was deemed aggravating if its use was merely incidental and was not purposely sought to facilitate the commission of the offense or to render the escape of the offender easier and his apprehension difficult. 2. No. In the case of People v. Julian however, it was ruled that when the first act of rape was committed by appellant, the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape was then consummated. Any subsequent acts of intercourse would be only separate acts of rape and can no longer be considered separate complex crimes of forcible abduction with rape. Accordingly, a modification of trial court's decision is in order. Hence, each of them shall be charged with Forcible abduction with rape and three counts of rape 3. Yes. The trial court, however, erred in designating the crime committed as robbery with frustrated homicide. There is no such crime. There should have been two separate informations: one for robbery and another for frustrated homicide. Notwithstanding the erroneous charge in the information, the Court finds no reason to overturn the conviction of appellants for the crime of simple robbery. As regards the injuries suffered by Tumang, we subscribe to the finding of the lower court that Tumang's credible testimony bolstered by documentary evidence, such as progress payments and professional fees for neurological management and craniotomy excision of depressed fracture, proved that the latter suffered less serious physical injuries.

With respect to the charge of frustrated homicide, the trial court correctly observed that the element of intent to kill was not present. It must be stressed that while Fortich was armed with a handgun, he never shot Tumang but merely hit him on the head with it. In Mondragon v. People, it was held that the intent to kill being an essential element of the offense of frustrated or attempted homicide, said element must be proved by clear and convincing evidence and with the same degree of certainty as is required of the other elements of the crime. The inference of intent to kill should not be drawn in the absence of circumstances sufficient to prove such intent beyond reasonable doubt. The trial court correctly disregarded the aggravating circumstances of nighttime, uninhabited place, and use of a motor vehicle. The mitigating circumstance of intoxication, however, was erroneously appreciated in favor of both appellants. Thus, the accused are convicted of: Forcible abduction with rape and 3 counts of rape and Robbery 8. Pilapil v Ibay-Somera Doctrine: Rule that the crime of adultery as well as four other crimes against chastity cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse, a jurisdictional requirement it is indispensable that the status and capacity of the complainant to commence the action be definitely established and, as already demonstrated, such status or capacity must indubitably exist as of the time he initiates the action. ER: Private respondent (Geiling), a German national filed a complaint for adultery against Pilapil. Geiling and Pilapil was validly married in Germany. After 3 yers, Geiling obtained a divorce before the court of Germany. Subsequently, he filed this criminal case, alleging that during the time He and Pilapil was married, Pilapil had an afair with the coaccused Chua. Issue is WON complaint should prosper. SC said no. The fact that Petitioner and respondent is divorced at the time of the filing of the complaint means that the court has no jurisdiction. Art. 344 RPC specifically provides that the crime of adultery, as well as four other crimes against chastity, cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse. Since at the time the complaint is filed, the marriage is already dissolved by divorce, Geiling is not anymore an offended spouse in contemplation of the law. FACTS 

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Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were married before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler in the Federal Republic of Germany. After about three and a half years of marriage, such connubial disharmony eventuated in private respondent initiating a divorce proceeding against petitioner in German. More than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, private respondent filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still married to said respondent, petitioner had an affair with a certain William Chia as early as 1982 and with yet another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983. Petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order, seeking the annulment of the order of the lower court denying her motion to quash. The petition is anchored on the main ground that the court is without jurisdiction „to try and decide the charge of adultery, which is a private offense that cannot be prosecuted de officio (sic), since the purported complainant, a foreigner, does not qualify as an offended spouse having obtained a final divorce decree under his national law prior to his filing the criminal complaint.

ISSUE: WON the criminal complaint should be dismissed – YES. HELD 

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Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of adultery, as well as four other crimes against chastity, cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse. Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily follows that such

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initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. This policy was adopted out of consideration for the aggrieved party who might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather than go through the scandal of a public trial. It is indispensable that the status and capacity of the complainant to commence the action be definitely established and, as already demonstrated, such status or capacity must indubitably exist as of the time he initiates the action. It would be absurd if his capacity to bring the action would be determined by his status before or subsequent to the commencement thereof, where such capacity or status existed prior to but ceased before, or was acquired subsequent to but did not exist at the time of, the institution of the case. Stated differently and with reference to the present case, the inquiry would be whether it is necessary in the commencement of a criminal action for adultery that the marital bonds between the complainant and the accused be unsevered and existing at the time of the institution of the action by the former against the latter. We are convinced that in cases of such nature, the status of the complainant vis-a-vis the accused must be determined as of the time the complaint was filed. Thus, the person who initiates the adultery case must be an offended spouse, and by this is meant that he is still married to the accused spouse, at the time of the filing of the complaint. CRIMES AGAINST CIVIL STATUS

1 - Santiago v. People, 764 SCRA 54 (2015) DOCTRINE: Only if the second spouse had knowledge of the previous undissolved marriage of the accused could she be included in the information as a co-accused; The second spouse, if indicted in the crime of bigamy, is liable only as an accomplice. EMERGENCY RECIT: Nicanor Santos first married Estela Galang in 1974. Then, in 1997, Nicanor Santos married Leonila Santiago (petitioner). Four years after Santos and Santiago got married, they faced a criminal information for bigamy. Santos “escaped criminal suit” (di sinabi pano) and Santiago pleaded not guilty with the affirmative defense that her marriage to Santos was void ab initio because they did not have a marriage license and that she had no prior knowledge of the previous marriage to Galang. The SC found that evidence supports the fact that Santiago knew of the previous marriage and that there was no marriage license because Santiago and Santos lied to the solemnizing officer that they have been cohabiting for 5 years prior to the marriage (which exempts them from the marriage license requirement). Hence, Santiago is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six months of arresto mayor as minimum to four years of prisión correccional as maximum plus accessory penalties provided by law. FACTS   

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Four months after the solemnization of their marriage on 29 July 1997, Leonila G. Santiago and Nicanor F. Santos faced an Information for bigamy. Santiago pleaded not guilty, while her putative husband escaped the criminal suit. Santiago, who was a 43-year-old widow then, married Santos despite the advice of her brother-in-law and parents-in-law that if she wanted to remarry, she should choose someone who was “without responsibility” Santiago asserted her affirmative defense that she could not be included as an accused in the crime of bigamy, because she had been under the belief that Santos was still single when they got married. Santiago also averred that for there to be a conviction for bigamy, his second marriage to her should be proven valid by the prosecution; but in this case, she argued that their marriage was void due to the lack of a marriage license. Eleven years after the inception of this criminal case, the first wife, Estela Galang, testified for the prosecution. Galang alleged that she had met Santiago as early as March and April 1997, on which occasions the former introduced herself as the legal wife of Santos. Santiago denied this. RTC: found that Santiago is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy

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Galang’s account is more credible indeterminate penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day of Prisión Correccional as minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day of Prisión Mayor as maximum. CA: affirmed Santiago’s conviction; lack of a marriage license was a vain attempt to put the validity of her marriage to Santos in question

ISSUE: W/N Santiago is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy? HELD: YES.  The crime of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code provides: The penalty of prisión mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.  The crime of bigamy does not necessary entail the joint liability of two persons who marry each other while the previous marriage of one of them is valid and subsisting. As explained in Nepomuceno: In the crime of bigamy, both the first and second spouses may be the offended parties depending on the circumstances, as when the second spouse married the accused without being aware of his previous marriage. Only if the second spouse had knowledge of the previous undissolved marriage of the accused could she be included in the information as a co-accused.  Therefore, the lower courts correctly ascertained Santiago’s knowledge of Santos’s marriage to Galang. Both courts consistently found that she knew of the first marriage as shown by the totality of the following circumstances: (1) when Santos was courting and visiting Santiago in the house of her in-laws, they openly showed their disapproval of him; (2) it was incredible for a learned person like Santiago to not know of his true civil status; and (3) Galang, who was the more credible witness compared with Santiago who had various inconsistent testimonies, straightforwardly testified that she had already told Santiago on two occasions that the former was the legal wife of Santos.  Given that Santiago knew of the first marriage, the SC concurs with the ruling that she was validly charged with bigamy. However, they disagree with the lower court’s imposition of the principal penalty on her. To recall, the RTC, which the CA affirmed, meted out to her the penalty within the range of prisión correccional as minimum to prisión mayor as maximum.  Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the penalty for a principal in the crime of bigamy is prisión mayor, which has a duration of six years and one day to twelve years. Since the criminal participation of Santiago is that of an accomplice, the sentence imposable on her is the penalty next lower in degree, prisión correccional, which has a duration of six months and one day to six years. There being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, this penalty shall be imposed in its medium period consisting of two years, four months and one day to four years and two months of imprisonment. Applying ISL, Santiago shall be entitled to a minimum term, to be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, arresto mayor, which has a duration of one month and one day to six months imprisonment.  The evidence on record shows that Santiago and Santos had only known each other for only less than four years. Thus, it follows that the two of them could not have cohabited for at least five years prior to their marriage. Santiago and Santos, however, reflected the exact opposite of this.  Although the records do not show that they submitted an affidavit of cohabitation as required by Article 34 of the Family Code, it appears that the two of them lied before the solemnizing officer and misrepresented that they had actually cohabited for at least five years before they married each other. Unfortunately, subsequent to this lie was the issuance of the Certificate of Marriage, in which the solemnizing officer stated under oath that no marriage license was necessary, because the marriage was solemnized under Article 34 of the Family Code.

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The SC thus faces an anomalous situation wherein Santiago seeks to be acquitted of bigamy based on her illegal actions of (1) marrying Santos without a marriage license despite knowing that they had not satisfied the cohabitation requirement under the law; and (2) falsely making claims in no less than her marriage contract. The SC chastises this deceptive scheme that hides what is basically a bigamous and illicit marriage in an effort to escape criminal prosecution. The SC cannot countenance Santiago’s illegal acts of feigning a marriage and, in the same breath, adjudge her innocent of the crime. For the SC to do so would only make a mockery of the sanctity of marriage. In violation of our law against illegal marriages, Santiago married Santos while knowing fully well that they had not yet complied with the five-year cohabitation requirement under Article 34 of the Family Code. Consequently, it will be the height of absurdity for the SC to allow Santiago to use her illegal act to escape criminal conviction.

2. - Nollora v. People, (2011) DOCTRINE: Even if a person is of Muslim faith, he can still be liable for bigamy if his marriages were not solemnized in accordance with Muslim laws. EMERGENCY RECIT: Atilano Nollora married Jesusa Nollora. He then contracted a subsequent marriage with Rowena. Atilano alleged that he was a Muslim but when he married Jesus and Rowena he did not even disclose such fact and he did not comply with the requirements of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws when he contracted his marriages. A criminal case for bigamy was filed against him and the SC ruled that he is guilty of bigamy. The Court found that all the elements of Bigamy are present in this case. Atilano contracted a subsequent marriage while he was still validly married. The Court ruled that even if Atilano was indeed a Muslim, such fact will not be considered in his favor since his marriage was not solemnized in accordance to Muslim Laws. FACTS 

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A criminal information for Bigamy was filed against Atilano Nollora and Rowena Geraldino. Atilano Nollora had a first marriage with Jesusa Nollora. They met in Saudi Arabia and got married on 1999. While Jesusa was working in a hospital in Saudi Arabia, she heard news that her husband has another wife. Jesusa went back to the Philippines. It was alleged that Rowena knew about the marriage between Jesusa and Atiliano since she was there when Atiliano introduced Jesusa to his parents. Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. admitted having contracted 2 marriages, the first with Jesusa and the second with Rowena. He, however, claimed that he was a Muslim convert way back on January 10, 1992, even before he contracted the first marriage with Jesusa. As a Muslim convert, he is allegedly entitled to marry 4 wives as allowed under the Muslim or Islam belief. Atiliano presented a certificate of conversion issued by one Hadji Abdul Kajar Madueño and approved by one Khad Ibrahim A. Alyamin. He claimed that Jesusa knew that he was a Muslim convert prior to their marriage because he told this fact when he was courting her in Saudi Arabia and the reason why Jesusa filed the instant case was due to hatred having learned of his second marriage with Rowena. In the marriage contract between Atiliano and Jesusa it was indicated that Atiliano was a Catholic Pentecostal. While in his marriage contract with Rowena it was indicated that he was a Catholic. He also indicated that he was 'single' despite his first marriage to keep said first marriage a secret. The marriage with Rowena was solemnized under Catholic procedures but they subsequently married her under the Muslim laws. Hadji Abdul Qasar Madueño declared that a Muslim convert could marry more than one according to the Holy Koran. However, before marrying his second, third and fourth wives, it is required that the consent of the first Muslim wife be secured. Thus, if the first wife is not a Muslim, there is no necessity to secure her consent. He further testified that if a Muslim convert gets married not in accordance with the Muslim faith, the same is contrary to the teachings of the Muslim faith. A Muslim also can marry up to four times but he should be able to treat them equally. He claimed that he was not aware of the first marriage but was aware of the second. Since his second marriage with Rowena

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was not in accordance with the Muslim faith, he advised Atilano to re-marry Rowena in accordance with Muslim marriage celebration, otherwise, he will not be considered as a true Muslim. Both lower courts convicted him of Bigamy.

ISSUE: WON Atiliano was guilty of bigamy HELD: YES  The elements of the crime of bigamy are: 1. That the offender has been legally married. 2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code. 3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage. 4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.  Here, the elements of bigamy are present. (1) Atiliano is legally married to Jesusa; (2) Atiliano and Jesusa's marriage has not been legally dissolved prior to the date of the second marriage; (3) Atiliano admitted the existence of his second marriage to Rowena; and (4) Atiliano and Rowena's marriage has all the essential requisites for validity except for the lack of capacity of Atiliano due to his prior marriage.  As to the defense that Atiliano was a Muslim, Granting Atiliano cannot deny that both marriage ceremonies were not conducted in accordance with the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, or Presidential Decree No. 1083. Article 13 (2) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws states that "in case of a marriage between a Muslim and a non-Muslim, solemnized not in accordance with Muslim law or this Code, the Family Code shall apply." Regardless of Atiliano’s professed religion, he cannot claim exemption from liability for the crime of bigamy.  Atiliano’s asserted in his marriage certificate with Rowena that his civil status is "single." Moreover, both of Atiliano's marriage contracts do not state that he is a Muslim. Although the truth or falsehood of the declaration of one's religion in the marriage certificate is not an essential requirement for marriage, such omissions are sufficient proofs of Atiliano’s liability for bigamy. Atiliano's false declaration about his civil status is thus further compounded by these omissions. 3 – Teves v. People, 656 SCRA 307 (2011) Doctrine: Parties to a void marriage are required to secure a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void before they can be allowed to marry again and not be liable for bigamy. Emergency Recit: Cenon was married to Thelma on 26 Nov. 1992. He contracted another marriage with Edita on 10 Dec. 2001 while his marriage with Thelma was still subsisting. On 27 June 2006, the RTC declared that Cenon’s marriage with Thelma is null and void. The SC said that the declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is first required before contracting a second or subsequent marriage. Here, such declaration of the nullity of the previous marriage was only decided with finality on 27 June 2006 or 5 years after his second marriage to Edita. It cannot retroact to the date of the bigamous marriage which was on 10 Dec. 2001. Hence, the SC declared Cenon guilty of the crime of bigamy. FACTS  

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26 Nov. 1992 – Cenon Teves and Thelma contracted marriage. After the marriage, Thelma left to work abroad and would only come home to the PH for vacations. In 2002 – Thelma was informed that her husband had contracted marriage with Edita. As per the Certificate of Marriage she secured from NSO, it indicated that the said marriage took place on 10 Dec. 2001 in Bulacan. Thelma’s uncle filed a complaint for bigamy against Cenon, and Cenon was charged with bigamy in an Information. 27 June 2006 – During the pendency of the criminal case for bigamy, the RTC of Caloocan rendered a decision declaring the marriage of Cenon and Thelma null and void on the ground that Thelma is physically incapacitated to comply with her essential marital obligations under Art. 36 of the Family Code, which decision became final. 15 Aug. 2007 – RTC of Bulacan rendered a decision finding Cenon guilty of bigamy. CA affirmed.

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Cenon claims that since his previous marriage was declared null and void, there is in effect no marriage at all, and thus, there is no bigamy to speak of. He differentiates a valid or voidable marriage from a marriage null and void ab initio, and posits that: o Valid or voidable marriage requires a judicial dissolution before on can validly contract a second marriage, o But a void marriage need not be judicially determined

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 ISSUE: W/N Cenon is guilty of bigamy HELD: YES Cenon’s contention that he cannot be charged with bigamy in view of the declaration of nullity of his first marriage is bereft of merit. The Family Code has settled that a declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required. Parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void even if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed to marry again. With that, the person who marries again cannot be charged with bigamy. In this case, all the elements of the crime of bigamy are present. Cenon was legally married to Thelma on 26 Nov. 1992; he contracted a second marriage with Edita on 10 Dec. 2001; at the time of his second marriage with Edita his marriage with Thelma was legally subsisting; finality of the decision declaring the nullity of his first marriage with Thelma was only on 27 June 2006 or about 5 years after his second marriage to Edita; and finally, the second or subsequent marriage with Edita has all the essential requisites for validity.  The crime of bigamy was committed by Cenon on 10 December 2001 when he contracted a second marriage with Edita. The finality on 27 June 2006 of the judicial declaration of the nullity of his previous marriage to Thelma cannot be made to retroact to the date of the bigamous marriage. Hence, Cenon is guilty of the crime of bigamy. 4 – Morigo v. People (2004) DOCTRINES: (1) The elements of bigamy are as follows: (1) the offender has been legally married; (2) the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse has not been judicially declared presumptively dead; (3) he contracts a subsequent marriage; and (4) the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been for the existence of the first. (2) The declaration of the first marriage as void ab initio retroacts to the date of the celebration of the first marriage. EMERGENCY RECIT: Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete became sweethearts and later got married while Lucia in the Philippines. Lucio then left for Canada where she worked and there, she obtained a divorce decree. Lucio, on the other hand, married Maria Lumbago and subsequently filed a complaint for the judicial declaration of nullity of marriage with Lucia. Meanwhile, a case for bigamy was filed against Lucio. The RTC found Lucio guilty of bigamy and this was affirmed by the CA. The SC reversed the lower courts, ruling that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between Lucio and Lucia by a solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere signing of the marriage contract by the two, without the presence of a solemnizing officer. Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of and the first element of bigamy is absent. FACTS:  Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at the Catalina Tortor at Bohol for a period of 4 years.  In 1984, Lucia received a card from Lucio from Singapore and after an exchange of letters, they became sweethearts. Lucia returned to the Philippines but left again for Canada to work there. While in Canada, they maintained constant communication.  In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and she got married to Lucio. In the same year, Lucia went back to Canada for work, leaving Lucio behind.  A year later, Lucia obtained a divorce decree in the Ontario Court.

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Lucio then married Maria Lumbago and subsequently, he filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage in the RTC on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place. Meanwhile, a complaint for bigamy was filed against Lucio. Lucio moved for the suspension of the arraignment on the ground that the civil case for judicial nullification of his marriage with Lucia posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case. RTC (bigamy case) Lucio was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Want of a valid marriage ceremony is not a defense in a charge of bigamy. RTC (declaration of nullity case) Declared the marriage between Lucio and Lucia void ab initio since no marriage ceremony actually took place. CA (bigamy case) Affirmed the RTC. The subsequent declaration of nullity of Lucio’s marriage to Lucia could not acquit Lucio. The reason is that what is sought to be punished by Art. 349 of the RPC is the act of contracting a second marriage before the first marriage had been dissolved. Hence, the fact that the first marriage was void from the beginning is not a valid defense in a bigamy case.

ISSUE: WON Lucio Morigo committed bigamy? HELD: NO.  The elements of bigamy are as follows: a. The offender has been legally married; b. The first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse has not been judicially declared presumptively dead; c. He contracts a subsequent marriage; and d. The subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been for the existence of the first.  In the present case, the trial court found that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between Lucio and Lucia by a solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere signing of the marriage contract by the two, without the presence of a solemnizing officer. The trial court thus held that the marriage is void ab initio, in accordance with Arts. 3 and 4 of the Family Code.  The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been legally married. But in this case, legally speaking, the petitioner was never married to Lucia. Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of. Under the principle of retroactivity of a marriage being declared void ab initio, the two were never married “from the beginning.” The contract of marriage is null; it bears no legal effect. Therefore, Lucio must be acquitted of the instant charge. 5. - Arthur Te v. CA and Liliana DOCTRINE: The outcome of [a] civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to private respondent had no bearing upon the determination of petitioner’s innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted. EMERGENCY RECIT: Engr. Te contracted two marriages. His first wife filed a criminal complaint (Fiscal) and an administrative complaint (PRC). He sought to have the first marriage annulled. During pendency of the proceedings, he sought to suspend the PRC proceedings and have the Bigamy case dismissed in the RTC where it was later filed. SC said nullity or annulment of marriage is immaterial; the act sought to be punished has already been committed. FACTS   

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Te and Choa (first wife) got married. Later, Te and Santella (second wife) got married. Aggrieved, first wife filed o A criminal complaint for Bigamy against Te with the Prosecutor’s Office o An administrative complaint against Te with the PRC (Te is an Engineer) An information was later filed by the Fiscal charging Te of Bigamy with the RTC

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In response, Te o CIVIL | Filed a civil complaint for annulment of marriage based on  Her concealment of pregnancy by another man at the time of their marriage  Psychological incapacity o CRIMINAL |after Prosecution’s presentation of evidence, filed a Motion for Demurrer to Evidence o ADMINISTRATIVE | Filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings (prejudicial question) Civil case—by the time it reached SC, it was already terminated (but the SC decision didn’t really say what happened) RTC and PRC: MOTION DENIED CA: R65 Certiorari on the two motions DENIED

ISSUE: WON RTC and PRC should have suspended (PRC) / dismissed (RTC) the case of bigamy HELD: NO.  The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to private respondent had no bearing upon the determination of petitioner’s innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted.  The ruling in People vs. Mendoza that no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a marriage which is void ab initio is overturned.  ADMIN (Prejudicial question) | Neither did the filing of said civil case for annulment necessitate the suspension of the administrative proceedings before the PRC Board. As discussed above, the concept of prejudicial question involves a civil and a criminal case. We have previously ruled that there is no prejudicial question where one case is administrative and the other is civil.  CRIM (Demurrer) | he grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is left to the sound discretion of the trial court, and its ruling on the matter shall not be disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse of such discretion.  In this case, the CA did not find any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, which based its denial of the demurrer on two grounds: first, the prosecution established a prima facie case for bigamy against the petitioner; and second, petitioner’s allegations in the demurrer were insufficient to justify the grant of the same. It has been held that the appellate court will not review in a special civil action for certiorari the prosecution’s evidence and decide in advance that such evidence has or has not yet established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. CRIMES AGAINST HONOR 1. Bautista v Pangilinan EMERGENCY RECIT: Petitioners Bautista and Alcantara were the Editor and Assistant Editors of the tablod Bandera. Two articles were published by the tabloid degrading the reputation and honor of Sharon Cuneta-Pangilinan, which were written by co-accused Ampoloquio (see facts for the verbatim remarks). Petitioners filed a demurrer to evidence claiming that the prosecution failed to establish malice. Hence, the articles were not libelous. RTC granted the demurrer. CA reversed the order and ordered the trial court to receive evidence of petitioners. SC granted the petition. Although in libel cases, the wordings of Art. 360 of the Revised Penal Code, the author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the editor or business manager of a daily newspaper, magazine or serial publication, indicate that they shall be responsible for the defamation contained therein to the same extent as if he were the author thereof. The liability which attaches to petitioners is, thus, statutory in nature. By virtue of Article 360 would have made petitioners Bautista and Alcantara, being the Editor and Assistant Editor, respectively, of Bandera Publishing Corporation, answerable with Ampoloquio, for the latter’s alleged defamatory writing, as if they were the authors thereof. When an alleged libelous article is published in a newspaper, such fact

alone sufficient evidence to charge the editor or business manager with the guilt of its publication. However, due to procedural defect that the petition for certiorari was not taken by the State particularly the OSG, but it was private respondents who filed with respect to the criminal aspect of the case. This violates petitioner’s right to double jeopardy. DOCTRINE: The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the editor or business manager of a daily newspaper, magazine or serial publication, shall be responsible for the defamation contained therein to the same extent as if he were the author thereof. FACTS Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City filed two (2) informations with the RTC Mandaluyong City, against Pete G. Ampoloquio, Jr. (Ampoloquio), and petitioners Bautista and Alcantara, for the crime of libel, committed by publishing defamatory articles against respondent Sharon Cuneta-Pangilinan in the tabloid Bandera. In the tabloid, the following remarks are made in order to ridicule and dishonor respondent Sharon. Some of the imputable statements are quoted: “Sharon Cuneta, the mega-taba singer-actress, I’d like to believe, is really brain-dead. Mukhang totoo yata yung sinasabi ng kaibigan ni Pettizou Tayag na ganyan siya. Hayan at buong ingat na sinulat namin yung interview sa kaibigan ng may-ari ng Central Institute of Technology at ni isang side comment ay wala kaming ginawa and all throughout the article, we’ve maintained our objectivity, pero sa interview sa aparadoric singer-actress in connection with an album launching, ay buong ningning na sinabi nitong she’s supposedly looking into the item that we’ve written and most probably would take some legal action.... XXX Dios mio perdon, what she gets to see are those purportedly biting commentaries about her katabaan and kaplastikan but she has simply refused to acknowledge the good reviews we’ve done on her. XXX Going back to this seemingly disoriented actress who’s desperately trying to sing even if she truly can’t, itanggi mo na hindi mo kilala si Pettizou Tayag gayung nagkasama raw kayo ng tatlong araw sa mother’s house ng mga Aboitiz sa Cebu more than a month ago, in connection with one of those political campaigns of your husband.” In another published tabloid, another imputing remarks were also made in the verbatim: NABURYONG SA KAPLASTIKAN NI SHARON ANG MILYONARY[A]NG SUPPORTER NI KIKO! FREAKOUT pala kay Sharon Cuneta ang isa sa mga loyal supporters ni Kiko Pangilinan na si Pettizou Tayag, a multimillionaire who owns Central Institute of Technology College in Sampaloc, Manila XXX Now, nang makara[t]ing na raw sa Bulacan si Mega nagtatarang daw ito at binadmouth si Pettizou. Kesyo ang kulit-kulit daw nito, atribida, mapapel at kung anu-ano pang mga derogatory words na nakarating siyempre sa kinauukulan. Anyhow, if it’s true that Ms. Pettizou has been most financially supportive of Kiko, how come Sharon seems not to approve of her? “She doesn’t want kasi her husband to win as a senator because when that happens, mawawalan siya ng hold sa kanya, XXX “In public,” our source goes on tartly, “pa kiss-kiss siya. Paembrace-embrace pero kung silang dalawa [na] lang parang kung sinong sampid kung i-treat niya si Kiko.” My God Pete, Harvard graduate si Kiko. He’s really intelligent as compared to Sharon who appears to be brain dead most of the time. XXX Another thing, I guess it’s high time that she goes on a diet [again]. Jesus, she looks 6’11 crosswise! XXX

Kunsabagay, she was only being most consistent. Yang si Sharon daw ay talagang mega-brat, mega-sungit. But who does she think she is? Her wealth, dear, would pale in comparison with the Tayag’s millions. Kunsabagay, she’s brain dead most of the time. Petitioners Bautista and Alcantara were Editor and Associate Editor, respectively, of the publication Bandera, and their co-accused, Ampoloquio, was the author of the alleged libelous articles which were published therein. Petitoners filed a Demurrer to Evidence claiming that the prosecution failed to establish their participation as Editor and Associate Editor, respectively, of the publication Bandera; that they were not properly identified by respondent herself during her testimony; and that the subject articles written by Ampoloquio were not libelous due to absence of malice. RTC granted the Demurrer to Evidence. Respondent filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. CA reversed only insofar as it pertains to the grant of petitioners’ Demurrer to Evidence, and ordered that the case be remanded to the trial court for reception of petitioners’ evidence. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: W/N active participation of the Editor and Publisher is required before they can be held liable for libel. HELD: NO.  According to the wordings of Art. 360 of the Revised Penal Code, the author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the editor or business manager of a daily newspaper, magazine or serial publication, shall be responsible for the defamation contained therein to the same extent as if he were the author thereof. The liability which attaches to petitioners is, thus, statutory in nature.  Court stressed that an editor or manager of a newspaper, who has active charge and control over the publication, is held equally liable with the author of the libelous article. This is because it is the duty of the editor or manager to know and control the contents of the paper, and interposing the defense of lack of knowledge or consent as to the contents of the articles or publication definitely will not prosper.  Accordingly, Article 360 would have made petitioners Bautista and Alcantara, being the Editor and Assistant Editor, respectively, of Bandera Publishing Corporation, answerable with Ampoloquio, for the latter’s alleged defamatory writing, as if they were the authors thereof. When an alleged libelous article is published in a newspaper, such fact alone sufficient evidence to charge the editor or business manager with the guilt of its publication. This sharing of liability with the author of said article is based on the principle that editors and associate editors, by the nature of their positions, edit, control and approve the materials which are to be published in a newspaper.  Nevertheless, petitioners could no longer be held liable in view of the procedural infirmity that the petition for certiorari was not undertaken by the OSG, but instead by respondent in her personal capacity. Although the conclusion of the trial court may be wrong, to reverse and set aside the Order granting the demurrer to evidence would violate petitioners’ constitutionally-enshrined right against double jeopardy. Had it not been for this procedural defect, the Court could have seriously considered the arguments advanced by the respondent in seeking the reversal of the Order of the RTC.  Petition Granted. Criminal cases against petitioners dismissed. 2. Bonifacio v RTC DOCTRINE: Venue of libel cases where the complaint is a private individual is limited to only either of two places, namely: 1) where the complainant actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense; OR 2) where the alleged defamatory article was printed and first published.

If the circumstances as to where the libel was printed and first published are used by the offended party as basis for the venue in criminal action, the Information must allege with particularity where the defamatory article was printed and first published, as evidence or supported by, for instance, the address of their editorial or business offices in the case of newspaper, magazines or serial publications. FACTS: 1. Gimenez filed on behalf of the Yuchengco Family and of Malayan Insurance Co., a criminal complaint for 13 counts of libel againt Piccio et al., who are officers of Parents Enabling Parents Coalition, Inc. (PEPCI), PEPCI trustees, Monsod, and John Doe, the administrator of the website: www.pepcoalition.com. 2. PEPCI was formed by large group of disgruntled planholders of Pacific Plans, Inc (PPI). 3. Decrying PPI’s refusal/inability to honor its obligations under the educational pre-need plans, PEPCI sought to provide a forum by which planholders could seek redress for their pecuniary loss under the policies through www.pepcoalition.com, in addition to other websites owned by PEPCI. 4. Gimenez alleged that said websites contain numerous (13) articles which maliciously and recklessly caused to be published by the accused containing highly derogatory statements and false accusations against the Yuchengco family, YGC, and Malayan. 5. Prosecutor’s Office: found probable cause and filed the information. 6. Petitioners filed before RTC-Makati a motion to quash on the ground that RTC is devoid of jurisdiction because the Information failed to allege that the libelous articles were printed and first published in Makati and that the prosecution erroneously laid the venue in the place where the online article was accessed. ISSUE: Should the motion to quash be granted? HELD: Yes. [See Doctrine]. 1. The Information herein tried to lay the venue by stating that the offending article was first published and accessed by the Gimenez in Makati City. 2. If the circumstances as to where the libel was printed and first published are used by the offended party as basis for the venue in the criminal action, the Information must allege with particularity where the defamatory article was printed and first published. 3. However, this measure is inapplicable in case of a defamatory material appearing on a website on the internet because there would be no way of determining the situs of its printing and first publication. 4. Chaos would ensue in situations where the website’s author or writer, a blogger or anyone who posts messages therein could be sued for libel anywhere in the Philippines that the private complainant may have allegedly accessed the offending website. 5. For the court to hold that the Amended Information sufficiently vested jurisdiction in the courts of Makati simply because the defamatory article was accessed therein would open the floodgates to the libel suit being filed in all other locations where the PEPCI website is likewise accessed or capable of being accessed. 6. These limitations imposed on libel actions filed by private persons are hardly onerous, especially as they still allow such persons to file the civil or criminal complaint in their respective places of residence, in which situation there is no need to embark on a quest to determine with precision where the libelous matter was printed and first published. 7. IN FINE, the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners motion to quash the Amended Information. 8. Accordingly, the case may be instituted where the complainant actually resides, without need of proof where the article was first published. 3. Tulfo v. People, 2008 DOCTRINE: The doctrine of fair comment means that while in general every discreditable imputation publicly made is deemed false, because every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially proved, and every false imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the discreditable imputation is directed against a public person in his public capacity, it is not necessarily actionable. EMERGENCY RECIT: Erwin Tulfo, in his column, wrote about Atty. Carlos So alleging that the latter had allegedly committed acts of

corruption in the Bureau of Customs’ Intelligence Unit. Tulfo had no actual evidence to support his claim, as the same was only backed by the word of an unnamed source. Atty. So filed a libel case against Tulfo along with the other officers of the news company Remate under Article 360 of the RPC. Tulfo, as a defense, claims that his statements were privileged as the same were concerning a public officer under Article 354 of the RPC. The court ruled that Tulfo and the officers of Remate are liable for libel, as Tulfo was not able to substantiate his claims in any way. Considering this, Tulfo cannot claim the defense under Article 254. FACTS 

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Erwin Tulfo, in his column in Remate, published four articles in different dates regarding one Atty. Carlos “Ding” So of Bureau of Customs Intelligence Unit in South Harbor and his alleged corruption. Subsequently, Atty. So filed a libel case against Tulfo and the editors and president of Remate. He further testified that he included in his complaint for libel the officers of Remate such as the publisher, managing editor, city editor, and national editor because under Article 360 of the RPC they are equally responsible and liable to the same extent as if they were the author of the articles. He also testified that “Ding” is his nickname and that he is the only person in the entire Bureau of Customs who goes by the name of Atty. Carlos T. So or Atty. Carlos “Ding” So. In his defense, petitioner Tulfo testified that he did not write the subject articles with malice, that he neither knew Atty. So nor met him before the publication of the articles. He testified that his criticism of a certain Atty. So of the South Harbor was not directed against the complainant, but against a person by the name of Atty. “Ding” So at the South Harbor. Tulfo claimed that it was the practice of certain people to use other people’s names to advance their corrupt practices. He also claimed that his articles had neither discredited nor dishonored the complainant because as per his source in the Bureau of Customs, Atty. So had been promoted. He further testified that he did not do any research on Atty. So before the subject articles, because as a columnist, he had to rely on his source, and that he had several sources in the Bureau of Customs, particularly in the South Harbor. The other co-accused claimed that none of them edited the columns of Tulfo and that it is Tulfo’s responsibility to publish and edit his own work. RTC: The trial court convicted Tulfo and his colleagues in Remate and the same was affirmed by the Court of Appeals hence, the petition wherein Tulfo claims for the first time that the assailed articles are privileged.

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04. Fermin vs. People 550 SCRA 132 (2008) DOCTRINE/S: Proof of knowledge of and participation in the publication of the offending article is not required, if the accused has been specifically identified as author, editor, or proprietor or printer/publisher of the publication. EMERGENCY RECIT: Fermin, as publisher of Gossip Tabloid, was charged with the crime of libel for the printing and circulation of an article about Annabelle Rama and Eddie Gutierrez. The article states that the spouses converted for their personal use the money paid to them by fellow Filipinos in America in their business of distributing high-end cookware; that the spouses and their family returned to the Philippines to evade prosecution in America; and that Annabelle lost the earnings from their business through irresponsible gambling in casinos. RTC convicted Fermin. CA affirmed. Before the SC, Fermin claims that she should be acquitted because she had no hand in the preparation and publication of the offending article, nor in the review, editing, examination, and approval of the articles published in Gossip Tabloid. SC held that knowledge of and participation in the publication of the offending article is not required, if the accused has been specifically identified as author, editor, or proprietor or printer/publisher of the publication. Thus, Fermin’s conviction was upheld. FACTS 

ISSUE: WON Tulfo and his co-accused are liable for libel HELD: YES. They are all liable for libel.  The supreme court ruled that in order that the publication of a report of an official proceeding may be considered privileged under the second paragraph of Article 354 of the RPC, the following conditions must exist: (a) That it is a fair and true report of a judicial, legislative, or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of a statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by a public officer in the exercise of his functions; (b) That it is made in good faith; and (c) That it is without any comments or remarks.  The articles clearly are not the fair and true reports contemplated by the provision. They provide no details of the acts committed by the subject, Atty. So. They are plain and simple baseless accusations, backed up by the word of one unnamed source. Good faith is lacking, as Tulfo failed to substantiate or even attempt to verify his story before publication. Tulfo goes even further to attack the character of the subject, Atty. So, even calling him a disgrace to his religion and the legal profession.  None of the elements of the second paragraph of Art 354 is present in the articles of Tulfo and his failure to verify the information on which he based his writings he therefore failed to meet the test laid down in “reckless disregard test” as laid down in New York Times vs Sullivan and reiterated in Flor vs

People. Thus, it cannot be argued that they are qualified privileged communications under the RPC. On the other hand, the editors and the president of Remate were also held liable as laid down in the provision of Article 360 of the RPC which states that: Any person who shall publish, exhibit, or cause the publication or exhibition of any defamation in writing or by similar means, shall be responsible for the same. The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the editor or business manager of a daily newspaper, magazine or serial publication, shall be responsible for the defamations contained therein to the same extent as if he were the author thereof. The Court stated that the provision in the RPC does not provide absence of participation as a defense, but rather plainly and specifically states the responsibility of those involved in publishing newspapers and other periodicals. It is not a matter of whether or not they conspired in preparing and publishing the subject articles, because the law simply so states that they are liable as they were the author.

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On complaint of spouses Annabelle Rama and Eddie Gutierrez, 2 criminal informations for libel were filed against Cristy Fermin, as publisher, and Bogs Tugas, as editor-inchief of Gossip Tabloid, for publicly printing and circulating Gossip Tabloid, with the following materials:  “MAS MALAKING HALAGA ANG NADISPALKO NILA SA STATES, MAY MGA NAIWAN DING ASUNTO DOON SI ANNABELLE”  IMPOSIBLENG NASA AMERIKA NGAYON SI ANNABELLE DAHIL SA KALAT DIN ANG ASUNTO NILA DU’N, BUKOD PA SA NAPAKARAMING PINOY NA HUMAHANTING SA KANILA MAS MALAKING PROBLEMA ANG KAILANGAN NIYANG HARAPIN SA STATES DAHIL SA PERANG NADISPALKO NILA, NAGHAHANAP LANG NG SAKIT NG KATAWAN SI ANNABELLE KUNG SA STATES NGA NIYA MAIISIPANG PUMUNTA NGAYON PARA LANG TAKASAN NIYA SI LIGAYA SANTOS AT ANG SINTENSIYA SA KANYA” The subject article narrates that, when Eddie and Annabelle were living in the States in the 1990’s, they were selling mamahaling kaldero on commission basis. However, they did not remit the sale proceeds (which amounted to millions) to the company because the same were spent by Annabelle in the casinos. It also states that the couple is indebted to many Pinoys in the States, which is why it is impossible that Annabelle would go to the States now for refuge. RTC: Convicted both Fermin and Tugas for the crime charged CA: Affirmed Fermin’s conviction; but acquitted Tugas on account of non-participation in the publication of the libelous article Before the SC, Fermin posits that:

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To sustain a conviction for libel, the publisher must have knowingly participated in or consented to the preparation and publication of the libelous article. She claims that she had no hand in the preparation and publication of the offending article, nor in the review, editing, examination, and approval of the articles published in Gossip Tabloid; thus, she is entitled to an acquittal The subject article is not libelous per se and is covered by the mantle of press freedom, and is merely in the nature of a fair and honest comment

ISSUE/S and HELD: Main Issue: Whether Fermin should be acquitted on the ground of her non-participation in the publication and preparation of the libelous article. – NO.  Proof of knowledge of and participation in the publication of the offending article is not required, if the accused has been specifically identified as “author, editor, or proprietor” or “printer/publisher” of the publication, as Fermin and Tugas are in this case.  In this case, Fermin was not only the “publisher” of Gossip Tabloid, but also its “president” and “chairperson” as she herself admitted. She also testified that she handled the business aspect of the publication, and assigns editors to take charge of everything. Obviously, she had full control over the publication of articles in the said tabloid. Her excuse of lack of knowledge, consent, or participation in the release of the libelous article fails to persuade.  Fermin’s criminal guilt should be affirmed, whether or not she had actual knowledge and participation, having furnished the means of carrying on the publication of the article purportedly prepared by the members of the Gossip Reportorial Team, who were employees under her control and supervision. As to Tugas The CA erred in acquitting Tugas. Tugas cannot feign lack of participation in the publication of the questioned article. His testimony, in fact, confirms his actual participation in the preparation and publication of the controversial article and his approval thereof as it was written. But, of course, his conviction cannot be reinstated as it would run afoul his constitutional right against double jeopardy. Minor Issues: Whether the article is libelous. – YES.  A libel is defined as a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary; or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead.  Here, there is evident imputation of the crime of malversation (that the complainants converted for their personal use the money paid to them by fellow Filipinos in America in their business of distributing high-end cookware); of vices or defects for being fugitives from the law (that complainants and their family returned to the Philippines to evade prosecution in America); and of being a wastrel (that Annabelle lost the earnings from their business through irresponsible gambling in casinos). The attribution was made publicly, considering that Gossip Tabloid had a nationwide circulation. The victims were identified and identifiable. More importantly, the article reeks of malice, as it tends to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of the complainants. Whether Fermin can take refuge in the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech and of the press. — NO.  Although a wide latitude is given to critical utterances made against public officials in the performance of their official duties, or against public figures on matters of public interest, such criticism does not automatically fall within the ambit of constitutionally protected speech. If the utterances are false, malicious or unrelated to a public officer’s performance of his duties or irrelevant to matters of public interest involving public figures, the same may give rise to criminal and civil liability.  In this case, while complainants are considered public figures for being personalities in the entertainment business, media people, including gossip and intrigue writers and

commentators such as Fermin, do not have the unbridled license to malign their honor and dignity by indiscriminately airing fabricated and malicious comments, whether in broadcast media or in print, about their personal lives. Penalty  The SC issued Administrative Circular No. 08-2008, entitled Guidelines in the Observance of a Rule of Preference in the Imposition of Penalties in Libel Cases, which expresses a preference for the imposition of a fine rather than imprisonment in convictions for libel. Also, if the penalty imposed is merely a fine but the convict is unable to pay the same, the RPC provisions on subsidiary imprisonment should apply. However, the Circular likewise allows the court, in the exercise of sound discretion, the option to impose imprisonment as penalty, whenever the imposition of a fine alone would depreciate the seriousness of the offense, work violence on the social order, or otherwise be contrary to the imperatives of justice.  Here, in light of the relatively wide latitude given to utterances against public figures such as private complainants, and consonant with Administrative Circular No. 08-2008, the Court deems it proper to modify the penalty of imprisonment to a fine in the amount of P6,000, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; plus moral damages. 5. Binay v SOJ 6.Guingguing vs People Doctrine: If the statements made against the public figure are essentially true, then no conviction for libel can be had. Emergency Recit: Lim published the criminal cases and photos of Choy being arrested in Sunday post as a self-defense against Choy. Choy is a journalist, hence, a punlic figure. RTC and CA held that Lim and petitioner wwre guilty of Libel. SC reversed. FACTS 

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A criminal complaint for libel filed by Cirse "Choy" Torralba (Complainant) against Lim and petitioner. Choy was a broadcast journalist who handled 2 programs aired over a large portion of Visayas and Mindanao. Lim published on a one-page advertisement in Sunday Post, a weekly publication edited and published by petitioner, records of criminal cases filed against complainant and the photographs of the latter being arrested for crimes of estafa, serious physical injuries, and malicious mischief. Choy asserted that he had been acquitted from the cases. Hence, he sought Lim and petitioner’s conviction for libel. He also argued that the publication placed him in public contempt and ridicule and that the publication was designed to degrade and malign his person and destroy him as a broadcast journalist. Lim, in his defense, claimed that complainant was allegedly making scurrilous attacks against him and his family over the airwaves. Since Lim had no access to radio time, he opted for paid advertisements via newspaper to answer the attacks, as a measure of self-defense. Lim also argued that complainant, as a media man and member of the fourth estate, occupied a position almost similar to a public functionary and should not be onion-skinned and be able to absorb the thrust of public scrutiny. RTC: Publication libelous. The lower court also declared that that malice is the most important element of libel and was present in the case because every defamatory publication prima facie implies malice on the part of the author and publisher towards the person subject thereof. Also, RTC held that Complainant’s status as a mediaman to the prosecution of the libel was irrelevant. The publication of a calumny even against public offices or candidates for public office is an offense most dangerous to people. Plus, publication is not a self-defense. CA AFFIRMED. CA also asserted that the purpose of selfdefense in libel is to repair, minimize or remove the effect of the damage caused to him but it does not license the defendant to utter blow-for-blow scurrilous language in return for what he received. Once the defendant hits back with equal or more scurrilous remarks unnecessary for his defense, the

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retaliation becomes an independent act for which he may be liable. Petitioner prays before the SC for reversal of CA ruling. Petitioner contends that as editor-publisher of the Sunday Post and as a member of the fourth estate, the lower courts’ finding of guilt against him constitutes an infringement of his constitutional right to freedom of speech and of the press.

ISSUE: W/N the publication subject matter of the instant case is indeed libelous. HELD: No.  Under our law, criminal libel is defined as a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead. Thus, the elements of libel are: (a) imputation of a discreditable act or condition to another; (b) publication of the imputation; (c) identity of the person defamed; and, (d) existence of malice.  SC has accepted the proposition that the actual malice standard governs the prosecution of criminal libel cases for punlic offical and public figures. In Adiong v. COMELEC, the Court held the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open and that it may well include vehement, caustic and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.  In Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd. v. Capulong, a public figure has been defined as a person who, by his accomplishments, fame, or mode of living, or by adopting a profession or calling which gives the public a legitimate interest in his doings, his affairs, and his character, has become a ‘public personage.’ He is, in other words, a celebrity. Obviously to be included in this category are those who have achieved some degree of reputation by appearing before the public, as in the case of an actor, a professional baseball player, a pugilist, or any other entertainer. The list is broader than this. It includes public officers, famous inventors and explorers, war heroes and even ordinary soldiers, an infant prodigy, and no less a personage than the Grand Exalted Ruler of a lodge. It includes, in short, anyone who has arrived at a position where public attention is focused upon him as a person.  Complainant is a broadcast journalist hosting two radio programs aired over a large portion of the Visayas and Mindanao. Considering the definition above, he qualifies as a public figure.  Since complainant was a public figure, it was the prosecution that has the burden to prove actual malice on the part of Lim and petitioner for the publication. The prosecution must have established beyond reasonable doubt that the defendants knew the statements in the advertisement was false or nonetheless proceeded with reckless disregard as to publish it whether or not it was true.  It should proceed that if the statements made against the public figure are essentially true, then no conviction for libel can be had. Any statement that does not contain a provably false factual connotation will receive full constitutional protection. An examination of the records of this case showed that the précis of information contained in the questioned publication were actually true.  In convicting Lim and petitioner, the lower courts paid particular heed to Art 354 of the RPC, which provides that "every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown…". We hold that this provision, as applied to public figures complaining of criminal libel, must be construed in light of the constitutional guarantee of free expression, and this Court’s precedents upholding the standard of actual malice with the necessary implication that a statement regarding a public figure if true is not libelous. The provision allows for such leeway, accepting as a defense "good intention and justifiable motive." The exercise of free expression, and its concordant assurance of commentary on public affairs and public figures, certainly qualify as "justifiable motive," if not "good intention."

7. Macasaet v People, 452 SCRA 255 (2005) DOCTRINE: The criminal action in cases of written defamations shall be filed with the RTC where the libelous article is printed and first published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense. EMERGENCY RECIT: Macasaet, et al. were charged by Trinidad with libel for an article first published in Manila. The latter's complaint stated that, at the time of first publication, he resided in Marikina. Trinidad, however, filed the case in Quezon City. The Supreme Court held that the RTC of Quezon City had no territorial jurisdiction over the offense. His attempts to cure this defect in 2 instances (first, when he filed his reply-affidavit during preliminary investigation; and second, when he attached the affidavit of his lessor a supplemental motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of the case) would still warrant the dismissal of the case since jurisdiction is determined only by the allegations in the complaint or information. FACTS  An Abante article read as follows: “Humarap sa ilang reporters si Jordan Castillo hindi para magkaroon ng writeups kundi para ituwid lang ang ilang bagay na baluktot at binaluktot pang lalo ng isang Toto Trinidad. Hindi namin naging barkada si Joey Trinidad. Bah, Toto na pala siya ngayon. Anong palagay niya sa sarili niya, si Direk Toto Natividad siya? Nakikibuhat lang talaga yang taong yan sa amin sa Liberty Ave. noon. Ni hindi nga pinapansin ni Tito Alfie yan dahil nga sa amoy-pawis siya pagkatapos mag-barbell. Kami naka-shower na, si Joey punas lang nang punas sa katawan niya ng T-shirt niyang siya ring isusuot niya pagkatapos na gawing pamunas! Madalas ngang makikain sa amin yan noon. Galit na galit nga ang mayordoma naming si Manang Hilda noon dahil nagkukulang ang rasyon namin dahil dagdag pakainin nga yang si Joey. Tamang-tama nga lang sa amin ang kanin at ulam, pero sinusugod pa niya ang kaldero para magkayod ng natitirang tutong sa kaldero. Naaawa nga ako madalas diyan kaya sineshare ko na lang ang pagkain ko sa kanya. Ewan ko kung anong naisipan ng taong yan at pagsasalitaan pa niya ng masama si Tito Alfie. Hindi man lang siya tumanaw ng utang na loob na kahit konti at kahit na sandali ay naitawid ng gutom niya. Hindi ko alam kung may kunsenya pa ang gangyang klaseng tao, pero sana naman ay makunsensya ka, Pare! Madalas nga itinatago ka na nga namin ni Tito Alfie para hindi mahighblood sa iyo, ganyan pa ang gagawin mo. Napupuyat nga si Manang Hilda sa pagbabantay sa iyo at hindi makatulog ang matanda hanggat hindi ka pa umuuwi, magsasalita ka pa ng mga inimbento mo. Pati nga si Eruel ay madalas mabanas sa iyo, natatandaan mo pa ba, dahil sa kakulitan mo! Pilit mo kaming binubuyo na sabihin kay Tito Alfie na tulungan ka rin tulad ng tulong na ibinibigay ni Tito Alfie na pagaalaga sa amin. Pero hate na hate ka nga ni Tito Alfie dahil sa masamang ugali, natatandaan mo pa ba yun? Kaya tiyak ko na imbento mo lang ang lahat ng pinagsasabi mo para makaganti ka kay Tito Alfie, ani Jordan sa mga nag-interbyu sa kanyang legitimate writers. Hindi na siguro namin kailangan pang dagdagan ang mga sinabi ng sinasabi ni Toto Trinidad na mga barkada niya at kapwa niya kuno Liberty Boys!”  Alfie Lorenzo (columnist of Abante), Allen Macasaet (publisher), Nicolas Quijano (managing editor), Roger Parajes (editor), and a certain Jordan Castillo were charged by Trinidad with the crime of libel before the RTC of Quezon City.  Lorenzo, Macasaet, and Quijano filed a motion to dismiss the case, on the ground that the RTC of Quezon City had no territorial jurisdiction. In the complaint, Trinidad stated that, at the time the article was first published, he resided in Marikina. The article was first published in Manila.  Trinidad opposed, claiming that, in his reply-affidavit during the preliminary investigation, he stated that his residence is in Quezon City. This affidavit therefore cured the defect in the complaint. RTC:  Dismissed the criminal case. CA: (Note: It was the public prosecutor and Trinidad who appealed the dismissal.)  Reversed; ruled that the affidavit, as well as the affidavit of his lessor in Quezon City attached in the supplemental motion for reconsideration filed before the RTC, cured the defect in the complaint.

ISSUES 1. WON the RTC of Quezon City has territorial jurisdiction? [relevant] 2. WON Trinidad had legal personality to appeal the dismissal of the criminal case? HELD: 1. 



2. 

NO. Art. 360, Revised Penal Code: The criminal action x x x in cases of written defamations x x x shall be filed x x x with the [RTC] x x x where the libelous article is printed and first published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense. o In this case, the article was printed and first published in Manila. At that time, Trinidad resided in Marikina. Jurisprudence: Jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is determined by the allegations of the complaint or information. In resolving a motion to dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction, the facts contained in the complaint or information should be taken as they are. o In this case, therefore, the determination of territorial jurisdiction shall be limited to only the allegations in the complaint or information. The court should not consider the reply-affidavit filed during preliminary investigation, nor the affidavit of Trinidad’s lessor. YES. Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV, Revised Administrative Code: The OSG has the function to represent the government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings. In such capacity, it only takes over a criminal case after the same has reached the appellate courts. o Sec. 9, Rule 41: In appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of the appeals filed in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties. o Applied to the case at bar, when the notice of appeal was filed, it was the RTC which still had jurisdiction over the case. Thus, the public prosecutor and Trinidad still had legal personality to appeal the dismissal.

8. ROBERTO BRILLANTE v CA DOCTRINE: To be liable for libel, the following elements must be shown to exist: (a) the allegation of a discreditable act or condition concerning another; (b) publication of the charge; (c) identity of the person defamed; and (d) existence of malice. ER: Brillante was charged with libel for releasing an open letter addressing the allegations raised by him against Binay. SC ruled that Brillante is guilty of libel. FACTS:  Brillante, then a candidate for the position of Councilor in Makati, held a press conference at the Makati Sports Club which was attended by some 50 journalists. In the course of the press conference, o Brillante accused Binay of plotting the assassination of Syjuco o Accused Binay of terrorism, intimidation and harassment of the Makati electorate o Circulated among the journalists copies of an open letter to President Aquino which discussed in detail his charges against Binay.  Several journalists who attended the press conference wrote news articles about the same.  Five informations were filed against Brillante by Binay and Prudente filed four complaints for libel against Brillante  RTC: guilty of libel on four counts  Brillante contended that the open letter which he wrote an caused to be published was not defamatory and was without malice  CA: affirmed. ISSUE: Whether Brillante is guilty of libel

HELD: YES.  Libel is defined under Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code as "a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead."  To be liable for libel, the following elements must be shown to exist: (a) the allegation of a discreditable act or condition concerning another; (b) publication of the charge; (c) identity of the person defamed; and (d) existence of malice.  There could be no dispute as to the existence of the first three elements of libel in the cases at bar.  An allegation made by a person against another is considered defamatory if it ascribes to the latter the commission of a crime; the possession of a vice or defect, whether real or imaginary; or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance which tends to dishonor or discredit or put him in contempt, or which tends to blacken the memory of one who is dead.  The element of publication was likewise established. There is publication if the defamatory material is communicated to a third person, i.e., a person other than the person to whom the defamatory statement refers.  The determination of Brillante’s culpability for libel hinges on the question of whether his statements were made with malice.  Malice is a term used to indicate the fact that the offender is prompted by personal ill-will or spite and speaks not in response to duty, but merely to injure the reputation of the person defamed; it implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm.  It is present when it is shown that the author of the libelous remarks made such remarks with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard as to the truth or falsity thereof. Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code states, as a general rule, that every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if true, if no good intention and justifiable motive is shown. As an exception to the rule, the presumption of malice is done away with when the defamatory imputation qualifies as privileged communication.  In order to prove that a statement falls within the purview of a qualifiedly privileged communication under Article 354, No. 1, the following requisites must concur: (1) the person who made the communication had a legal, moral, or social duty to make the communication, or at least, had an interest to protect, which interest may either be his own or of the one to whom it is made; (2) the communication is addressed to an officer or a board, or superior, having some interest or duty in the matter, and who has the power to furnish the protection sought; and (3) the statements in the communication are made in good faith and without malice.  In the cases at bar, although the open letter was primarily addressed to then President Aquino, the communication thereof was not limited to her alone. It was also published in several newspapers of general circulation and was thus made known to the general public. Even if the interest sought to be protected belongs not just to Brillante but to the public in general, certainly, the general public does not have the power to remedy the alleged dangers sought to be prevented by Brillante in publishing the open letter or in uttering similar statements during the January 7, 1988 press conference. Brillante employed the shotgun approach to disseminate the information which essentially destroyed the reputations of the complainants. His lack of selectivity is indicative of malice and is anathema to his claim of privileged communication. 9. Jalandoni v Drilon Facts:  Ledesma and his group filed an administrative complaint for violation of RPC and Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act against Jalandoni. News articles were published for two consecutive days regarding the complaint. It was published in five major daily newspapers. Exactly one year after, Jalandoni filed a complaint for libel before the Prov. Prosecutor of Rizal, for the crime of libel against Ledesma and his group.

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The publications contained allegations that Jalandoni, who was then the PCGG Commissioner, committed illegal and unauthorized acts which constitute as graft and corruption regarding the transactions entered into by Piedras Petroleum Co., with RCBC. IF ASKED, here is the full publication:

My administration will prove that government is not avoidly corrupt — and that bureaucracy is not necessarily corrupt. Graft and corruption, we will confront more with action than with words. — PRESIDENT FIDEL V. RAMOS, Inaugural Address, June 30, 1992 AN URGENT APPEAL TO JUSTICE SECRETARY FRANKLIN DRILON (and) PCGG CHAIRMAN MAGTANGGOL GUNIGUNDO Please stop the unauthorized and illegal acts of PCGG officials led by former Chairman DAVID CASTRO and Commissioner MARIO JALANDONI which will allow the attempt of hostile vested interest groups to gain entry into the board of Oriental Petroleum & Minerals Corporation. 1. The PCGG openly defied Malacañang orders issued by former Executive Secretary Franklin Drilon on the sale of Oriental Petroleum shares. In spite of its claims that the disposal of OPMC shares held by Piedras Petroleum was approved by the Office of the President, documented proofs belie the PCGG's statements. No less than Justice Secretary Franklin Drilon, who was Executive Secretary at the time PCGG Chairman David Castro sought approval for the OPMC-Piedras Petroleum deal, thumbed down Castro's request. Clearly, the sale of OPMC shares held by Piedras Petroleum to the RCBC-Yuchengco Group for P101 million was unauthorized and illegal. 2. The PCGG officials involved in the unauthorized and illegal sale of Oriental Petroleum shares committed grave abuse of authority. Their acts defrauded government of better prices for Oriental Petroleum shares which they undervalued and sold to favored buyers — Pacific Basin and RCBC, both identified with the Yuchengco group. At the time the Piedras deal was closed the PCGG as evidenced by the minutes of the Board Meeting of Piedras Petroleum on October 31, 1991, with PCGG Commissioner Mario Jalandoni as acting Chairman, the sale of 2.054 billion OPMC Class A shares and 789.45 million B shares, OPMC shares were sold for the giveaway price of P0.035/share. This compares with prevailing market price of P0.042 for A shares and P0.049 for the B shares. This means that the RCBC-Yuchengco Group already earned P25 million at the time of the transaction. 3. The PCGG proceeded without any legal authority to sell Oriental Petroleum shares in total violation of the Public Bidding Law and other government rules and regulations pertaining to the disposal of government assets. The PCGG, particularly Commissioner Mario Jalandoni, should be made to account for the PCGG-Piedras-RCBC transaction as it was consummated without transparency, in violation of the Public Bidding Law and without approval from the government. 4. The PCGG last year illegally used Philcomsat cash dividends to avail itself of an OPMC stock subscription to pay for the subscription rights of JY Campos and Piedras Petroleum. Even before the PCGG transacted the questionable Piedras-RCBC deal, it was sued by a Philcomsat stockholder before the Sandiganbayan for diverting P76 million in cash dividends. The anti-graft court ordered the cash dividends deposited in an escrow account in 1989. However, the funds were used by the PCGG to pay for subscription rights for OPMC shares. This case is related to the Piedras deal because the additional OPMC shares were part of those sold to the RCBC-Yuchengco Group. 5. The PCGG diverted the proceeds on the authorized sale of Oriental Petroleum shares in violation of the law requiring proceeds of the sale of assets by the PCGG going to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). In addition to the litany of illegal transactions entered into by the PCGG, the officials of the anti-graft body also violated provisions of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, specifically Section 63, which states that "the following shall serve as source of funding or appropriations for the implementation of the said law; b) All receipts from assets recovered and sales of ill-gotten wealth recovered through the Presidential Commission on Good Government.

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After this Asst. Prosec. Bautista issued a Memorandum, which was approved by Prov. Prosec. Castro, recommending that Ledesma’s group be charged of the crime of libel. Sec. Of Justice Franklin Drilon approved the appeal of the Ledesma’s group thereby ordering the withdrawal of the information filed.

Issue: W/N Ledesma’s group is guilty of libel? Held: No.  The questioned “conclusion” in the open letter addressed to the stockholders of the OPMC merely stated the insinuations going on about the deal between Jalandoni, in his capacity as PCGG Commissioner and RCBC and the explanation for the press releases concerning the writer, respondents and the OPMC.  The question is whether from the fact that the statements were defamatory, malice can be presumed so that it was incumbent upon petitioner to overcome such presumption. Under Art. 361 of the Revised Penal Code, if the defamatory statement is made against a public official with respect to the discharge of his official duties and functions and the truth of the allegation is shown, the accused will be entitled to an acquittal even though he does not prove that the imputation was published with good motives and for justifiable ends.  Moreover, in libel cases against public officials, for liability to arise, the alleged defamatory statement must relate to official conduct, even if the defamatory statement is false, unless the public official concerned proves that the statement was made with actual malice, that is, with knowledge that it was false or not. Jalandoni failed to prove actual malice on the part of the Ledesma’s group.  Nor did the Court believed that the same was written to cast aspersion on the good name of Jalandoni. The paid advertisement merely served as a vehicle to inform the stockholders of the going-ons in the business world and only exposed the irregularities surrounding the PCGG and RCBC deal and the parties involved.  The interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public affairs. Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech. The sharp incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life may suffer under a hostile and an unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged with the balm of a clear conscience. A public officer must not be too thin-skinned with reference to comment upon his official acts. Only thus can the intelligence and dignity of the individual be exalted. Of course, criticism does not authorize defamation. Nevertheless, as the individual is less than the State, so must expected criticism be born for the common good. Rising superior to any official or set of officials, to the Chief Executive, to the Legislature, to the Judiciary — to any or all the agencies of Government — public opinion should be the constant source of liberty and democracy. 10. Vasquez v CA (1999) DOCTRINE: Under Art. 361 of the Revised Penal Code, if the defamatory statement is made against a public official with respect to the discharge of his official duties and functions and the truth of the allegation is shown, the accused will be entitled to an acquittal even though he does not prove that the imputation was published with good motives and for justifiable ends. EMERGENCY RECIT: Vasquez was charged with libel upon publication of a newspaper article allegedly imputing the reputation of a Barangay Chariman. The SC ruled he is not guilty because [See doctrine] FACTS:  Rodolfo R. Vasquez is a resident of the Tondo Foreshore Area.  Sometime in April 1986, he and some 37 families from the area went to see then National Housing Authority (NHA) General Manager Lito Atienza regarding their complaint against their Barangay Chairman, Jaime Olmedo.

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After their meeting with Atienza and other NHA officials, petitioner and his companions were met and interviewed by newspaper reporters at the NHA compound concerning their complaint. The next day, the following news article appeared in the newspaper Ang Tinig ng Masa: o Nananawagan kahapon kay pangulong Corazon Aquino ang 38 mahihirap na pamilya sa Tondo Foreshore Area na umanoy inagawan ng lupa ng kanilang barangay chairman sa pakikipagsabwatan sa ilang pinuno ng National Housing Authority sapul 1980. o Sinabi nila na nakipagsabwatan umano si Chairman Jaime Olmedo ng barangay 66, Zone 6, Tondo Foreshore Area sa mga project manager ng NHA upang makamkam ang may 14 na lote ng lupa sa naturang lugar. o x x x Pawang lupa ng gobyerno ang mga lupa at ilegal man na patituluhan, nagawa ito ni Olmedo sa pakikipagsabwatan sa mga project manager at legal officers ng NHA, sabi ni Vasquez. o Sinabi rin ng mga pamilya na protektado ng dating pinuno ng city hall ng Maynila, MHS Minister Conrado Benitez, at ilang pinuno ng pulisya ang barangay chairman kaya nakalusot ang mga ginawa nitong katiwalian. o Bukod sa pagkamkam ng mga lupaing gobyerno, kasangkot din umano si Olmedo sa mga ilegal na pasugalan sa naturang lugar at maging sa mga nakawan ng manok. x x x Based on the newspaper article, Olmedo filed a complaint for libel against petitioner alleging that the latters statements cast aspersions on him and damaged his reputation.

ISSUE: W/N Vasquez is guilty of libel – No. HELD: 

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   





To find a person guilty of libel under Art. 353 of the Revised Penal Code, the following elements must be proved: (a) the allegation of a discreditable act or condition concerning another; (b) publication of the charge; (c) identity of the person defamed; and (d) existence of malice. In this case, there is no doubt that the first three elements are present. The statements that Olmedo, through connivance with NHA officials, was able to obtain title to several lots in the area and that he was involved in a number of illegal activities (attempted murder, gambling and theft of fighting cocks) were clearly defamatory. There is no merit in his contention that landgrabbing, as charged in the information, has a technical meaning in law. The question is whether from the fact that the statements were defamatory, malice can be presumed so that it was incumbent upon petitioner to overcome such presumption. [See doctrine] In this case, contrary to the findings of the trial court, on which the Court of Appeals relied, petitioner was able to prove the truth of his charges against the barangay official. It was error for the trial court to hold that petitioner only tried to prove that the complainant [barangay chairman] is guilty of the crimes alluded to; accused, however, has not proven that the complainant committed the crimes. For that is not what petitioner said as reported in the Ang Tinig ng Masa. The fact that charges had been filed against the barangay official, not the truth of such charges, was the issue. In denouncing the barangay chairman in this case, petitioner and the other residents of the Tondo Foreshore Area were not only acting in their self-interest but engaging in the performance of a civic duty to see to it that public duty is discharged faithfully and well by those on whom such duty is incumbent. The recognition of this right and duty of every citizen in a democracy is inconsistent with any requirement placing on him the burden of proving that he acted with good motives and for justifiable ends. For that matter, even if the defamatory statement is false, no liability can attach if it relates to official conduct, unless the public official concerned proves that the statement was made

with actual malice that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. 11. Rogelio Pader v. People Doctrine: In determining where defamatory words would fall(slight/grave), not only the the sense, grammatical significance and accepted ordinary meaning would be considered but also the special circumstances of the case, the antecedents or relationship between the party and offender, which might tend to prove the intention of the offender at the time he uttered the defamatory words. Facts: 

    

On April 20, 1995, Atty. Benjamin Escolangco was conversing with his political leaders at the terrace of his house when Petitioner Rogelio Pader appeared at the gate and shouted “PUTANG INA MO atty. Escolango. NAPAKAWALANG HIYA MO.” Escolangco was dumbfounded and embarrassed. He was a candidate for vice mayor for morong, bataan at that time. Atty. Escolangco filed a complaint against petitioner for grave oral defamation, to which petitioner pleaded not guilty. MTC: Found petitioner guilty of grave oral defamation. RTC: Affirmed the decision of MTC. CA: Affirmed RTC but with modification as to penalty imposed. ( From 1 month and 1 day - 1 year naging 4months and 1 day)

Issue: WON petitioner is guilty of grave oral defamation Held: NO. Although the words uttered were defamatory, it was only slight. The Court does not agree with the Trial Court in arriving at its decision when it considered that the defamation was done to destroy Atty. Escolango’s reputation since the parties were political opponents. The trial court failed to appreciate the fact that the parties were also neighbors, that Petitioner was drunk at the time he uttered the words, and the fact that petitioner’s anger was instigated by what Atty. Escolango did when petitioner’s father died.(walang mention kung ano ginawa) In which case, the oral defamation was not of serious or insulting nature. The expression “PUTANG INA MO” is a common utterance in the dialect that is often employed, not really to slander but to rather express anger or displeasure. In fact, more often, it is just an expletive that punctuates one's expression of profanity. We do not find it seriously insulting that after a previous incident involving his father, a drunk Rogelio Pader on seeing Atty. Escolango would utter words expressing anger. Obviously, the intention was to show his feelings of resentment and not necessarily to insult the latter. Being a candidate running for vice mayor, occasional gestures and words of disapproval or dislike of his person are not uncommon. THEREFORE, Rogelio Pader is only guilty of slight oral defamation and his penalty is only a fine of 200PHP. 12. Noel Villanueva vs. People and Yolanda Castro FACTS: 1.

2.

3.

4.

The accused Villanueva (a municipal councilor) went to the Vice-Mayor’s office (herein private complainant) for the application for monetized leaves. The petitioner’s application was not immediately acted upon by the petitioner for no reason. This inaction on the part of the petitioner resulted to a barrage of insults from Villanueva. The petitioner uttered the following "Ibuatdaka ken, inabudakakengawang, e baling masukulnaku." (I will lift you from there and I will throw you out of the window and I don’t care if I will go to jail), "Magmaliniska, enaka man malinis, garapalka." "Balamumansanaskangmalutu, pero king kilubularanka, tiktakkarinat" (You are pretending to be clean and honest yet you are not clean and honest, you are corrupt. You are like red apple, you are worm infested inside and extremely dirty). Villanueva also made a “dirty finger” to the private respondent. These circumstances prompted Castro to file a criminal case of grave oral defamation and slander by deed against Villanueva.

5.

The MCTC ruled in favor of private respondent, RTC and CA also ruled in favor of the PR, with some modifications as to the penalty.

ISSUE: WON Villanueva is guilty of grave oral defamation and slander by deed RULING: As to the grave oral defamation, It is our considered view that the slander committed by petitioner can be characterized as slight slander following the doctrine that uttering defamatory words in the heat of anger, with some provocation on the part of the offended party, constitutes only a light felony. In fact, to be denied approval of monetization of leave without valid justification, but as an offshoot of a political dissension may have been vexing for petitioner and may have been perceived by him as provocation that triggered him to blow his top and utter those disparaging words. In hindsight, to be denied monetization of leave credits must have stirred upon the petitioner a feeling akin to begging for money that he was legally entitled to. This oppressive conduct on the part of complainant must have scarred petitioner’s self-esteem, too, to appear as begging for money. But again, this is not an excuse to resort to intemperate language no matter how such embarrassment must have wreaked havoc on his ego. As to the slander by deed; Pointing a dirty finger ordinarily connotes the phrase "Fuck You," which is similar to the expression "Puta" or "Putang Ina mo," in local parlance. Such expression was not held to be libelous in Reyes v. People,38where the Court said that: "This is a common enough expression in the dialect that is often employed, not really to slander but rather to express anger or displeasure. It is seldom, if ever, taken in its literal sense by the hearer, that is, as a reflection on the virtues of a mother." Following Reyes, and in light of the fact that there was a perceived provocation coming from complainant, petitioner’s act of pointing a dirty finger at complainant constitutes simple slander by deed, it appearing from the factual milieu of the case that the act complained of was employed by petitioner "to express anger or displeasure" at complainant for procrastinating the approval of his leave monetization. While it may have cast dishonor, discredit or contempt upon complainant, said act is not of a serious nature. Petitioner is guilty of slight oral defamation and simple slander by deed. Yes, complainant was then a Vice-Mayor and a lady at that, which circumstances ordinarily demanded respect from petitioner. But, it was, likewise, her moral obligation springing from such position to act in a manner that is worthy of respect. In the case at bar, complainant’s demeanor of refusing to sign the leave monetization of petitioner, an otherwise valid claim, because of a political discord smacks of a conduct unbecoming of a lady and a Vice-Mayor at that. Moreover, it appears that she had, indeed, thrown a bottle of coke at petitioner, which actuation reveals that she, too, had gone down to petitioner’s level. Holding an esteemed position is never a license to act capriciously with impunity. The fact that there was a squabble between petitioner and complainant, both high-ranking local public officials, that a verbal brawl ostensibly took place, speaks very poorly of their self-control and public relations. For this, they both deserve to be censured and directed to conduct themselves in a more composed manner and keep their pose as befits ranking officials who officially deal with the public. To be worthy of respect, one must act respectably, remembering always that courtesy begets courtesy. In a similar fashion, considering that petitioner and complainant belong to warring political camps, occasional gestures and words of disapproval or dislike are among the hazards of the job. Considering this political reality and the fact that the Court of Appeals concluded, based on evidence on records, that petitioner himself was a victim of complainant’s indiscretion, her claim for damages and attorney’s fees must, likewise, fail. Akin to the principle that “he who comes to court must have clean hands,” each of the parties, in the case at bar, must bear his own loss. Ratio: There is grave slander when it is of a serious and insulting nature. The gravity of the oral defamation depends not only (1) upon the expressions used, but also (2) on the personal relations of the accused and the offended party, and (3) the circumstances surrounding the case. Indeed,

it is a doctrine of ancient respectability that defamatory words will fall under one or the other, depending not only upon their sense, grammatical significance, and accepted ordinary meaning judging them separately, but also upon the special circumstances of the case, antecedents or relationship between the offended party and the offender, which might tend to prove the intention of the offender at the time. In our previous rulings, we held that the social standing and position of the offended party are also taken into account and thus, it was held that the slander was grave, because the offended party had held previously the Office of Congressman, Governor, and Senator and was then a candidate for Vice-President, for which no amount of sophistry would take the statement out of the compass of grave oral defamation. However, we have, likewise, ruled in the past that uttering defamatory words in the heat of anger, with some provocation on the part of the offended party constitutes only a light felony. In the case at bar, as a public official, petitioner, who was holding the position of Councilor at that time, is hidebound to be an exemplar to society against the use of intemperate language particularly because the offended party was a Vice-Mayor. However, we cannot keep a blind eye to the fact that such scathing words were uttered by him in the heat of anger triggered by the fact, as found by the Court of Appeals, that complainant refused, without valid justification to approve the monetization of accrued leave credits of petitioner. In a manner of speaking, she sowed the wind that reaped the storm. Slander by deed is a crime against honor, which is committed by performing any act, which casts dishonor, discredit, or contempt upon another person. The elements are (1) that the offender performs any act not included in any other crime against honor, (2) that such act is performed in the presence of other person or persons, and (3) that such act casts dishonor, discredit or contempt upon the offended party. Whether a certain slanderous act constitutes slander by deed of a serious nature or not, depends on the social standing of the offended party, the circumstances under which the act was committed, the occasion, etc. It is libel committed by actions rather than words. The most common examples are slapping someone or spitting on his/her face in front of the public market, in full view of a crowd, thus casting dishonor, discredit, and contempt upon the person of another. In a similar fashion, considering that petitioner and complainant belong to warring political camps, occasional gestures and words of disapproval or dislike are among the hazards of the job. Considering this political reality and the fact that the Court of Appeals concluded, based on evidence on records, that petitioner himself was a victim of complainant’s indiscretion, her claim for damages and attorney’s fees must, likewise, fail. Akin to the principle that “he who comes to court must have clean hands,” each of the parties, in the case at bar, must bear his own loss.