Controlling Access to Indecent Images: Mediated Internet Communications
Professor Ian Walden Centre for Commercial Law Studies, Queen Mary, University of London Vice-chair, Internet Watch Foundation
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Introductory remarks ●
Filtering communications & law enforcement – As crime prevention (blocking) ●
From virus scanning to child sexual abuse images
– As criminal investigation (monitoring) ●
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Monitoring content & traffic data
Interference with rights – Freedom of expression & censorship ●
Impartation & receipt
– Privacy ●
Case study: Internet Watch Foundation (IWF)
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IWF ●
Self-regulatory (charitable status) – Over 80 member companies (since 1996)
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Remit – Child sexual abuse images anywhere in the world ●
Pseudo-photographs, tracings (CGI ?)
– Obscene publications in the UK ●
Extreme pornography provisions
– Racist (hate speech) material in the UK ●
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Religious hatred and sexual orientation
Objectives – Remove content/availability & support law enforcement?
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Notice & Take Down ●
‘Hotline’ reporting service – Analysis & investigation of source/location
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Domestic content - notification to ISP ‘host’ – From 18% to < 1%
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Foreign content – Mainly located in the US – INHOPE Network ●
Over 30 members
– Law enforcement agencies ●
e.g. US FTC action against Pricewert LLC (June 2009)
– But not (currently) foreign hosts
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Blocking access ●
Filtering database – ‘the CAIC list’ – URLs for child sexual abuse images – Taken by ISPs & search engines, e.g. BT’s ‘Cleanfeed’ ●
95% of domestic internet access service providers – Government threat of mandation – Children’s Charities Coalition On Internet Safety, Digital Manifesto – EU proposal for a framework decision (March 2009), art. 18
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Filtering web-based traffic, not P2P & other services Deterrent, not a policing tool – Target population: inadvertent & casual users
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Investigate creator/distributors or remove content? – Take-down times
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Other initiatives ●
Domain names – Registries & registrars ●
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75% of commercial child sexual abuse domains are linked to just 10 Registries/ Registrars
Payment providers – Commercial ‘pay-per-view’ & organised crime ● ●
IWF 2008 Annual Report: 3000 sites Pre-paid credit cards
– European Financial Coalition ●
Combating the commercial distribution of child abuse
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Data integrity ●
Source – Reports received – Internal investigations
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Determination of potential criminal illegality – Law enforcement trained (e.g. CEOP) ● ●
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Court endorsed 5-level categorisation Indecent v obscene material
Accuracy – Minimising collateral intrusion ●
Wikipedia incident (December 2008) – Text & image data – Communication attributes
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Transparency ●
User notification – Prior notice ●
Data protection obligations – e.g. The Telecommunications (Lawful Business Practice) (Interception of Communications) Regulations 2000
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Publish scheme FAQ & list of participants
– Splash pages ●
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http://404 (technical error) or http://403 (prohibited page)
List appeal mechanism – e.g. Wikipedia incident (Scorpions album cover) ●
contextual considerations
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Accountability ●
Independent board – Majority non-industry representatives ●
e.g. child protection, legal
– External oversight ●
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Periodic independent reviews
Public function/authority? – Judicial review, subject to FOI laws – Public law enforcement activity? ●
Child Exploitation and Online Protection Centre (CEOP)
– Democratic mandate ●
‘prescribed by law’
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Concluding remarks