Constitutional Law 2 Cases.pdf

EMINENT DOMAIN

Athena Jeunnesse Mae Martinez Tria 1.

Moday v. Court of appeals, 268 scra 368 (1997)

FACTS: • On July 23, 1989, the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Bunawan in Agusan del Sur passed Resolution No. 43-89, “Authorizing the Municipal Mayor to Initiate the Petition for Expropriation of a One (1) Hectare Portion of Lot No. 6138-Pls-4 Along the National Highway Owned by Percival Moday for the Site of Bunawan Farmers Center and Other Government Sports Facilities. • In due time, Resolution No. 43-89 was approved by then Municipal Mayor Anuncio C. Bustillo and transmitted to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan for its approval • Sangguniang Panlalawigan disapproved said Resolution and returned it with the comment that “expropriation is unnecessary considering that there are still available lots in Bunawan for the establishment of the government center.” • The Municipality of Bunawan, herein public respondent, subsequently filed a Petition for Eminent Domain against petitioner Percival Moday before the RTC • , public respondent municipality filed a Motion to Take or Enter Upon the Possession of Subject Matter of This Case stating that it had already deposited with the municipal treasurer the necessary amount in accordance with Section 2, Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court and that it would be in the government’s best interest for public respondent to be allowed to take possession of the property •

the Regional Trial Court granted respondent municipality’s motion to take possession of the land

o

that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan’s failure to declare the resolution invalid leaves it effective.

o that the duty of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is merely to review the ordinances and resolutions passed by the Sangguniang Bayan under the old LGC o that the exercise of eminent domain is not one of the two acts enumerated in Section 19 thereof requiring the approval of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan CA upheld the trial court. Meanwhile, the Municipality of Bunawan had erected three buildings on the subject property. ISSUE: whether a municipality may expropriate private property by virtue of a municipal resolution which was disapproved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. HELD: YES. Eminent domain, the power which the Municipality of Bunawan exercised in the instant case, is a fundamental State power that is inseparable from sovereignty. It is government’s right to appropriate, in the nature of a compulsory sale to the State, private property for public use or purpose. Inherently possessed by the national legislature the power of eminent domain may be validly delegated to local governments, other public entities and public utilities. For the taking of private property by the government to be valid, the taking must be for public use and there must be just compensation The Municipality of Bunawan’s power to exercise the right of eminent domain is not disputed as it is expressly provided for in Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, the Local Government Code 18 in force at the time expropriation proceedings were initiated. Section 9 of said law states:.

“Section 9.Eminent Domain. — A local government unit may, through its head and acting pursuant to a resolution of its sanggunian, exercise the right of eminent domain and institute condemnation proceedings for public use or purpose.” POLITICAL LAW; LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE (B.P. 337); POWER OF THE SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN TO REVIEW ORDINANCES, RESOLUTIONS AND EXECUTIVE ORDERS PROMULGATED BY THE MUNICIPAL MAYOR; DECLARATION OF INVALIDITY MUST BE ON THE SOLE GROUND THAT IT IS BEYOND THE POWER OF THE SANGGUNIAN BAYAN OR MAYOR TO ISSUE THE RESOLUTION, ORDINANCE OR ORDER UNDER REVIEW. — The Sangguniang Panlalawigan’s disapproval of Municipal Resolution No. 43-89 is an infirm action which does not render said resolution null and void. The law, as expressed in Section 153 of B.P. BLG. 337, grants the Sangguniang Panlalawigan the power to declare a municipal resolution invalid on the sole ground that it is beyond the power of the Sangguniang Bayan or the Mayor to issue. Although pertaining to a similar provision of law but different factual milieu then obtaining, the Court’s pronouncements in Velazco vs. Blas, where we cited significant early jurisprudence, are applicable to the case at bar. “The only ground upon which a provincial board may declare any municipal resolution, ordinance, or order invalid is when such resolution, ordinance, or order is ‘beyond the powers conferred upon the council or president making the same.’ Absolutely no other ground is recognized by the law. A strictly legal question is before the provincial board in its consideration of a municipal resolution, ordinance, or order. The provincial (board’s) disapproval of any resolution, ordinance, or order must be premised specifically upon the fact that such resolution, ordinance, or order is outside the scope of the legal powers conferred by law. If a provincial board passes these limits, it usurps the legislative functions of the municipal council or president. Such has been the consistent course of executive authority.” Thus, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was without the authority to disapprove Municipal Resolution No. 43-89 for the Municipality of Bunawan clearly has the power to exercise the right of eminent domain and its Sangguniang Bayan the capacity to promulgate said resolution, pursuant to the earlier-quoted Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337. Perforce, it follows that Resolution No. 43-89 is valid and binding and could be used as lawful authority to petition for the condemnation of petitioners’ property.

2.

Sps. Yasay v. CA GR. 156684

Overview: In this case, the Mandaluyong City adopted a resolution authorizing the City Mayor to expropriate a parcel of land belonging to the herein petitioners. The petitioners were alarmed. Before the City Mayor could take the necessary steps for the expropriation of the land, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in the RTC against the Sanguniang Panglungsod of Mandaluyong. Will the petition prosper? Are the petitioners aggrieved, considering no expropriation proceeding took place? Facts proper: The petitioners owned a parcel of land with an area of 1,044 square meters situated between Nueve de Febrero Street and Fernandez Street in Barangay Mauway, Mandaluyong City. On October 2, 1997, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Mandaluyong City adopted Resolution No. 552, Series of 1997, to authorize then City Mayor Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr. to take the necessary legal steps for the expropriation of the land of the petitioners for the purpose of developing it for low cost housing for the less privileged but deserving city inhabitants. Notwithstanding that the enactment of Resolution No. 552 was but the initial step in the City’s exercise of its power of eminent domain granted under Section 19 of the Local Government Code of 1991, the petitioners became alarmed, and filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in the RTC, praying for the annulment of Resolution No. 552 due to its being unconstitutional, confiscatory, improper, and without force and effect. On January 31, 2001, the RTC ruled in favor of the City and dismissed the petition for lack of merit, opining that certiorari did not lie against a legislative act of the City Government. However, on

February 19, 2002, the RTC, acting upon the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration, set aside its decision and declared that Resolution No. 552 was null and void. The RTC held that the petition was not premature because the passage of Resolution No. 552 would already pave the way for the City to deprive the petitioners and their heirs of their only property. Aggrieved, the City appealed to the CA. In its decision promulgated on October 18, 2002, the CA concluded that the reversal of the January 31, 2001 decision by the RTC was not justified because Resolution No. 552 deserved to be accorded the benefit of the presumption of regularity and validity absent any sufficient showing to the contrary. The petitioners moved for reconsideration, but the CA denied their motion. Thus, they appeal to the Court Issue: 1. WON A MERE RESOLUTION OF SANGGUNIANG PANGLUNGSOD IS SUFFIECIENT FOR THE PURPOSE OF INITIATING AN EXPROPRIATION PROCEEDING 2. WON AN ACTION FOR PROHIBITION WILL LIE AGAINST EXPROPRIATION. 1. NO. A resolution like Resolution No. 552 that merely expresses the sentiment of the Sangguniang Panglungsod is not sufficient for the purpose of initiating an expropriation proceeding. Indeed, in Municipality of Parañaque v. V.M. Realty Corporation,12 a case in which the Municipality of Parañaque based its complaint for expropriation on a resolution, not an ordinance, the Court ruled so: (PLEASE SEE DIGESTED CASE OF PARANAQUE VS VM REALTY, THE RULING HERE IS COPIED FROM IT IN TOTO). 2. NO Prohibition does not lie against eminent domain – Verily, there can be no prohibition against a procedure whereby the immediate possession of the land under expropriation proceedings may be taken, provided always that due provision is made to secure the prompt adjudication and payment of just compensation to the owner. This bar against prohibition comes from the nature of the power of eminent domain as necessitating the taking of private land intended for public use, and the interest of the affected landowner is thus made subordinate to the power of the State. Once the State decides to exercise its power of eminent domain, the power of judicial review becomes limited in scope, and the courts will be left to determine the appropriate amount of just compensation to be paid to the affected landowners. Only when the landowners are not given their just compensation for the taking of their property or when there has been no agreement on the amount of just compensation may the remedy of prohibition become available. Here, however, the remedy of prohibition was not called for, considering that only a resolution expressing the desire of the Sangguniang Panglungsod to expropriate the petitioners’ property was issued. As of then, it was premature for the petitioners to mount any judicial challenge, for the power of eminent domain could be exercised by the City only through the filing of a verified complaint in the proper court. Before the City as the expropriating authority filed such verified complaint, no expropriation proceeding could be said to exist. Until then, the petitioners as the owners could not also be deprived of their property under the power of eminent domain. WHEREFORE, we affirm the decision promulgated on October 18, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 70618.

3.

Rp V.PLDT 26 scra 620 (scra)

FACTS: Public petitioner commenced a suit against private respondent praying for the right of the Bureau of Telecommunications to demand interconnection between the Government Telephone System and that of PLDT, so that the Government Telephone System could make use of the lines and facilities of the PLDT. Private respondent contends that it cannot be compelled to enter into a contract where no agreement is had between them. ISSUE: Whether or not interconnection between PLDT and the Government Telephone System can be a valid object for expropriation. HELD: Yes, in the exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain, the Republic may require the telephone company to permit interconnection as the needs of the government service may require, subject to the payment of just compensation. The use of lines and services to allow inter-service connection between the both telephone systems, through expropriation can be a subject to an easement of right of way. 4.

NIA v. Rural Bank GR. 185124

FACTS: NIA is a government-owned-and-controlled corporation created under R.A. 3601. It is primarily responsible for irrigation development and management in the country. To carry out its purpose, NIA was specifically authorized under P.D. 552 to exercise the power of eminent domain. NIA needed some parcels of land for the purpose of constructing the Malitubog-Marigadao Irrigation Project. On 08 September 1994, it filed with the RTC of Kabacan, Cotabato a Complaint for the expropriation of a portion of three (3) parcels of land covering a total of 14,497.91 square meters. NIA filed a Second Amended Complaint to allege properly the area sought to be expropriated, the exact address of the expropriated properties and the owners thereof. NIA further prayed that it be authorized to take immediate possession of the properties after depositing with the Philippine National Bank the amount of ₱19,246.58 representing the provisional value thereof. Respondents filed their Answer with Affirmative and Special Defenses and Counterclaim. They alleged that NIA had no authority to expropriate portions of their land, because it was not a sovereign political entity; that it was not necessary to expropriate their properties, because there was an abandoned government property adjacent to theirs, where the project could pass through; that Lot No. 3080 was no longer owned by the Rural Bank of Kabacan; that NIAs valuation of their expropriated properties was inaccurate because of the improvements on the land that should have placed its value at ₱5 million; and that NIA never negotiated with the landowners before taking their properties for the project, causing permanent and irreparable damages to their properties valued at ₱250,000. ISSUE/S 1. WON THE FINDING OF JUST COMPENSATION OF THE LAND AND THE IMPROVEMENTS THEREON BASED ON THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS IS CORRECT. 2.

WON THE PAYMENT OF JUST COMPENSATION FOR LOT NO. 3080 SHOULD BE MADE TO RESPONDENTS MARGARITA TABOADA AND PORTIA CHARISMA RUTH ORTIZ.

HELD​:

WHEREFORE​, the Petition is ​PARTLY GRANTED​. The 12 August 2008 CA Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 65196, awarding just compensation to the defendants as owners of the expropriated properties and deleting the inclusion of the value of the excavated soil, is hereby ​AFFIRMED with ​MODIFICATION​. The case is hereby ​REMANDED to the trial court for the reception of evidence to establish the present owner of Lot No. 3080. RATIO: On the first issue, in expropriation proceedings, just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The commissioners properly determined the just compensation to be awarded to the landowners whose properties were expropriated by petitioner. The records show that the trial court dutifully followed the procedure under Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure when it formed a committee that was tasked to determine the just compensation for the expropriated properties. The first set of committee members made an ocular inspection of the properties, subject of the expropriation. They also determined the exact areas affected, as well as the kinds and the number of improvements on the properties. When the members were unable to agree on the valuation of the land and the improvements thereon, the trial court selected another batch of disinterested members to carry out the task of determining the value of the land and the improvements. The new committee members even made a second ocular inspection of the expropriated areas. They also obtained data from the BIR to determine the zonal valuation of the expropriated properties, interviewed the adjacent property owners, and considered other factors such as distance from the highway and the nearby town center.Further, the committee members also considered Provincial Ordinance No. 173, which was promulgated by the Province of Cotabato on 15 June 1999, and which provide for the value of the properties and the improvements for taxation purposes. We can readily deduce from these established facts that the committee members endeavored a rigorous process to determine the just compensation to be awarded to the owners of the expropriated properties. We cannot, as petitioner would want us to, oversimplify the process undertaken by the committee in arriving at its recommendations, because these were not based on mere conjectures and unreliable data. On the second issue, the Petition is meritorious. The CA affirmed the ruling of the trial court, which had awarded the payment of just compensation intended for Lot No. 3080 registered in the name of the Rural Bank of Kabacan to the defendants-intervenors on the basis of the non-participation of the rural bank in the proceedings and the latters subsequent Manifestation that it was no longer the owner of that lot. The appellate court erred on this matter. It should be noted that eminent domain cases involve the expenditure of public funds. In this kind of proceeding, we require trial courts to be more circumspect in their evaluation of the just compensation to be awarded to the owner of the expropriated property. Thus, it was imprudent for the appellate court to rely on the Rural Bank of Kabacans mere declaration of non-ownership and non-participation in the expropriation proceeding to validate defendants-intervenors claim of entitlement to that payment. The law imposes certain legal requirements in order for a conveyance of real property to be valid. It should be noted that Lot No. 3080 is a registered parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-61963. In order for ​ the reconveyance of real property to be valid, the conveyance must be embodied in a public document and registered in the office of the Register of Deeds where the property is situated. We have scrupulously examined the records of the case and found no proof of conveyance or evidence of transfer of ownership of Lot No. 3080 from its registered owner, the Rural Bank of Kabacan, to defendants-intervenors. As it is, the TCT is still registered in the name of the said rural bank. It is not disputed that the bank did not participate in the expropriation proceedings, and that it manifested that it no longer owned Lot No. 3080. The trial court should have nevertheless required the rural bank and the defendants-intervenors to show proof or evidence pertaining to the conveyance of the subject lot. The court

cannot rely on mere inference, considering that the payment of just compensation is intended to be awarded solely owner based on the latters proof of ownership.

5.

Republic Vs. Castelvi 58 SCRA 336 (1974)

FACTS: After the owner of a parcel of land that has been rented and occupied by the government in 1947 refused to extend the lease, the latter commenced expropriation proceedings in 1959. During the assessment of just compensation, the government argued that it had taken the property when the contract of lease commenced and not when the proceedings begun. The owner maintains that the disputed land was not taken when the government commenced to occupy the said land as lessee because the essential elements of the “taking” of property under the power of eminent domain, namely (1) entrance and occupation by condemnor upon the private property for more than a momentary period, and (2) devoting it to a public use in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property, are not present. ISSUE: Whether or not the taking of property has taken place when the condemnor has entered and occupied the property as lesse. HELD: No, the property was deemed taken only when the expropriation proceedings commenced in 1959. The essential elements of the taking are: (1) Expropriator must enter a private property, (2) for more than a momentary period, (3) and under warrant of legal authority, (4) devoting it to public use, or otherwise informally appropriating or injuriously affecting it in such a way as (5) substantially to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof. In the case at bar, these elements were not present when the government entered and occupied the property under a contract of lease.

Regz Luancing Gibson 6.

​City Govt. Of Quezon City vs Ericta 122 SCRA 759 (1983)

Facts​: ​An ordinance was promulgated in Quezon city which approved the the regulation of

establishment of private cemeteries in the said city. According to the ordinance, 6% of the total area of the private memorial park shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of QC. Himlayang Pilipino, a private memorial park, contends that the taking or confiscation of property restricts the use of property such that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose and deprives the owner of all beneficial use of his property. It also contends that the taking is not a valid exercise of police power, since the properties taken in the exercise of police power are destroyed and not for the benefit of the public. Issue​: Whether or not the ordinance made by Quezon City is a valid taking of private property? HELD​: No, the ordinance made by Quezon City is not a valid way of taking private property.

There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent of the total area of an private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit

paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries. State's exercise of the power of expropriation requires payment of just compensation. Passing the ordinance without benefiting the owner of the property with just compensation or due process, would amount to unjust taking of a real property. Since the property that is needed to be taken will be used for the public's benefit, then the power of the state to expropriate will come forward and not the police power of the state.

7.

City of Manila v. Laguio GR 118127 Apr. 12 2005

FACTS​: Private respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) is a corporation engaged in the business of operating hotels, motels, hostels and lodging houses. It built and opened Victoria Court in Malate which was licensed as a motel although duly accredited with the DOT as a hotel. On 28 June 1993, MTDC filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order7 with the lower court impleading as defendants, herein petitioners City of Manila, Hon. Alfredo S. Lim (Lim), Hon. Joselito L. Atienza, and the members of the City Council of Manila (City Council). MTDC prayed that the Ordinance, insofar as it includes motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional. Enacted by the City Council and approved by petitioner City Mayor, the said Ordinance is entitled– AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. Judge Laguio rendered the assailed Decision (in favour of respondent). ISSUE​: WON the ordinance is unconstitutional. HELD​: The Court is of the opinion, and so holds, that the lower court did not err in declaring the Ordinance, as it did, ultra vires and therefore null and void. The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable. The enactment of the Ordinance was an invalid exercise of delegated power as it is unconstitutional and repugnant to general laws.The police power granted to LGUs must always be exercised with utmost observance of the rights of the people to due process and equal protection of the law. Due

process requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the person to his life, liberty and property. Requisites for the valid exercise of Police Power are not met: To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the enactment of the Ordinance, and to free it from the imputation of constitutional infirmity, not only must it appear that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with private rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.60 It must be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. A reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the police measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded. Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights a violation of the due process clause. It is readily apparent that the means employed by the Ordinance for the achievement of its purposes, the governmental interference itself, infringes on the constitutional guarantees of a person’s fundamental right to liberty and property. Modality employed is unlawful taking.​ It is an ordinance which permanently restricts the use of property that it can not be used for any reasonable purpose goes beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property without just compensation.78 It is intrusive and violative of the private property rights of individuals. There are two different types of taking that can be identified. A “possessory” taking occurs when the government confiscates or physically occupies property. A “regulatory” taking occurs when the government’s regulation leaves no reasonable economically viable use of the property. What is crucial in judicial consideration of regulatory takings is that government regulation is a taking if it leaves no reasonable economically viable use of property in a manner that interferes with reasonable expectations for use. When the owner of real property has been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of the common good, that is, to leave his property economically idle, he has suffered a taking. The Ordinance gives the owners and operators of the “prohibited” establishments three (3) months from its approval within which to “wind up business operations or to transfer to any place outside of the Ermita-Malate area or convert said businesses to other kinds of business allowable within the area.” The directive to “wind up business operations” amounts to a closure of the establishment, a permanent deprivation of property, and is practically confiscatory. Unless the owner converts his establishment to accommodate an “allowed” business, the structure which housed the previous business will be left empty and gathering dust. It is apparent that the Ordinance leaves no reasonable economically viable use of property in a manner that interferes with reasonable expectations for use. The second and third options to transfer to any place outside of the Ermita-Malate area or to convert into allowed businessesare confiscatory as well. The penalty of permanent closure in cases of subsequent violations found in Section 4 of the Ordinance is also equivalent to a “taking” of private property.

Petitioners cannot therefore order the closure of the enumerated establishments without infringing the due process clause. These lawful establishments may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying on their business.

8.

RP (NAPOCOR) v Heirs of Borbon CA

FACTS: N​APOCOR entered a property located in Barangay San Isidro, Batangas City in order to construct and maintain transmission lines for the 230 KV Mahabang Parang-Pinamucan Power Transmission Project. Respondents heirs of Saturnino Q. Borbon owned the property. NAPOCOR filed a COMPLAINT in the RTC-Batangas seeking an acquisition of an easement of right of way over a portion of the property involving an area of only 6,326 square meters, more or less, alleging that it had negotiated with the respondents for the acquisition of the easement but they had failed to reach any agreement; and that, nonetheless, it was willing to deposit the amount of ₱9,790.00 representing the assessed value of the portion sought to be expropriated. The respondents staunchly maintained that NAPOCOR had not negotiated with them before entering the property and that the entry was done without their consent in the process, destroying some fruit trees without payment, and installing five transmission line posts and five woodpoles for its project; that the area being expropriated only covered the portion directly affected by the transmission lines; that the remaining portion of the property was also affected because the transmission line passed through the center of the land, thereby dividing the land into three lots; that the presence of the high tension transmission line had rendered the entire property inutile for any future use and capabilities;that, nonetheless, they tendered no objection to NAPOCOR’s entry provided it would pay just compensation not only for the portion sought to be expropriated but for the entire property whose potential was greatly diminished, if not totally lost, due to the project;and that their property was classified as industrial land. PRE-TRIAL was conducted and the parties stipulated on the location, number of heirs, names of the person upon whom title to the property was issued, and the ownership & possession of the property.RTC constituted the panel of 3 commissioners. the RTC ordered NAPOCOR to pay the respondents: (1) just compensation for the whole area of 14,257 square meters at the rate of ₱550.00/square meter; (2) legal rate of interest from May 5, 1995 until full payment; and (3) the costs of suit. On appeal, CA affirmed the RTC’s decision. ISSUE: ​Whether or not the expropriation proceedings should be discontinued or dismissed pending appeal? HELD:​The dismissal of the proceedings for expropriation at the instance of NAPOCOR is proper, but, conformably with Section 4,Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the dismissal or discontinuance of the proceedings must be upon such terms as the court deems just and equitable. Public use is the fundamental basis for the action for expropriation; hence, NAPOCOR’s motion to discontinue the proceedings is warranted and should be granted. The right of eminent domain is "the ultimate right of the sovereign power to appropriate, not only the public but the private property of all citizens within the territorial sovereignty, to public purpose."But the exercise of such right is not unlimited, for two mandatory requirements should underlie the Government’s exercise of the power of eminent domain, namely: (1) that it is for a particular public purpose; and (2) that just compensation be paid to the property owner.These

requirements partake the nature of implied conditions that should be complied with to enable the condemnor to keep the property expropriated. In Asia's Emerging Dragon Corporation v. Department of Transportation and Communications,Justice Corona, in his dissenting opinion said that: To be valid, the taking must be for public use. The meaning of the term "public use" has evolved over time in response to changing public needs and exigencies. Public use which was traditionally understood as strictly limited to actual "use by the public" has already been abandoned. "Public use" has now been held to be synonymous with "public interest," "public benefit," and "public convenience." It is essential that the element of public use of the property be maintained throughout the proceedings for expropriation. The right of eminent domain is the right which the Government or the people retains over the estates of individuals to resume them for public use. It is the right of the people, or the sovereign, to dispose, in case of public necessity and for the public safety, of all the wealth contained in the state.Indeed, public use is the fundamental basis for the action for expropriation; hence, NAPOCOR’s motion to discontinue the proceedings is warranted and should be granted. In the present case the petitioner admits that the expropriation of the land in question is no longer necessary for public use. Had that admission been made in the trial court the case should have been dismissed there. It now appearing positively, by resolution of the plaintiff, that the expropriation is not necessary for public use, the action should be dismissed even without a motion on the part of the plaintiff. The moment it appears in whatever stage of the proceedings that the expropriation is not for a public use the complaint should be dismissed and all the parties thereto should be relieved from further annoyance or litigation. In this case, NAPOCOR seeks to discontinue the expropriation proceedings on the ground that the transmission lines constructed on the respondents’ property had already been retired. Verily, the retirement of the transmission lines necessarily stripped the expropriation proceedings of the element of public use. To continue with the expropriation proceedings despite the definite cessation of the public purpose of the project would result in the rendition of an invalid judgment in favor of the expropriator due to the absence of the essential element of public use. the Court grants the motion to discontinue the proceedings, and requires the return of the property to the respondents. Having said that, we must point out that NAPOCOR entered the property without the owners’ consent and without paying just compensation to the respondents. Neither did it deposit any amount as required by law prior to its entry. Considering that in the process of installing transmission lines, NAPOCOR destroyed some fruit trees and plants without payment, and the installation of the transmission lines went through the middle of the land as to divide the property into three lots, thereby effectively rendering the entire property inutile for any future use, it would be unfair for NAPOCOR not to be made liable to the respondents for the disturbance of their property rights from the time of entry until the time of restoration of the possession of the property. Wherefore, the Court DISMISSES the expropriation proceedings due to the intervening cessation of the need for public use

9.

Nopocor vs Gutierrez 193 SCRA

FACTS:​ ​National Power Corporation, a government owned and controlled entity, in accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 120, is invested with the power of eminent domain for the purpose

of pursuing its objectives, which among others is the construction, operation, and maintenance of electric transmission lines for distribution throughout the Philippines. For the construction of its 230 KV Mexico-Limay transmission lines, plaintiff's lines have to pass the lands belonging to defendants Matias Cruz, Heirs of Natalia Paule and spouses Misericordia Gutierrez and Ricardo Malit. Plaintiff initiated negotiations for the acquisition of right of way easements over the aforementioned lots for the construction of its transmission lines but unsuccessful in this regard, said corporation was constrained to file eminent domain proceedings. Upon filing of the corresponding complaint, plaintiff corporation deposited the amount of P973.00 with the Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga, tendered to cover the provisional value of the land of the defendant spouses Ricardo Malit and Misericordia Gutierrez. And by virtue of which, the plaintiff corporation was placed in possession of the property of the defendant spouses so it could immediately proceed with the construction of its Mexico-Limay 230 KV transmission line. In this connection, by the trial court's order of September 30, 1965, the defendant spouses were authorized to withdraw the fixed provisional value of their land in the sum of P973.00. ISSUE​: Whether or not petitioner should be made to pay simple easement fee or full compensation for the land traversed by its transmission lines? HELD:​ The resolution of this case hinges on the determination of whether the acquisition of a mere right-of-way is an exercise of the power of eminent domain contemplated by law.​ 1âwphi1

The trial court's observation shared by the appellate court show that ". . . While it is true that plaintiff are (sic) only after a right-of-way easement, it nevertheless perpetually deprives defendants of their proprietary rights as manifested by the imposition by the plaintiff upon defendants that below said transmission lines no plant higher than three (3) meters is allowed. Furthermore, because of the high-tension current conveyed through said transmission lines, danger to life and limbs that may be caused beneath said wires cannot altogether be discounted, and to cap it all plaintiff only pays the fee to defendants once, while the latter shall continually pay the taxes due on said affected portion of their property."

The trial court's observation shared by the appellate court show that ". . . While it is true that plaintiff are (​sic​) only after a right-of-way easement, it nevertheless perpetually deprives defendants of their proprietary rights as manifested by the imposition by the plaintiff upon defendants that below said transmission lines no plant higher than three (3) meters is allowed. Furthermore, because of the high-tension current conveyed through said transmission lines, danger to life and limbs that may be caused beneath said wires cannot altogether be discounted, and to cap it all plaintiff only pays the fee to defendants once, while the latter shall continually pay the taxes due on said affected portion of their property." The foregoing facts considered, the acquisition of the right-of-way easement falls within the purview of the power of eminent domain. the easement of right-of-way is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain. Considering the nature and effect of the installation of the 230 KV Mexico-Limay transmission lines, the limitation imposed by NPC against the use of the land for an indefinite period deprives private respondents of its ordinary use. Private respondents recognize the inherent power of eminent domain being exercised by NPC when it finally consented to the expropriation of the said portion of their land, subject however to payment of just compensation. No matter how laudable NPC's purpose is, for which expropriation was sought, it is just and equitable that they be compensated the fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained, which is the measure of the indemnity, not whatever gain would accrue to the expropriating entity.It appearing that the trial court did not act capriciously and arbitrarily in setting the price of P5.00 per square meter of the affected property, the said award is proper and not unreasonable. WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

10. NAPOCOR VS San pedro gr. No. 170945

FACTS: ​Petitioner for the construction of its Transmission Line and Tower negotiated with respondents for an easement right of way over her property. Respondent executed a Right of Way Grant in favor of NP. The payment voucher for the residential portion for the lot valued was the processed. However, NPC Board of Directors approved Board Resolution stating that it would pay only for easement over agricultural lands, adopt median or average if there are several amounts involved. NPC filed a complaint for eminent domain in the RTC against Maria and other landowners. According to NPC, in order to construct and maintain its Northwestern Luzon Transmission Line Project it was necessary to acquire several lots for an easement of right of way. The RTC rendered judgement, declaring as well-grounded, fair and reasonable the compensation for the property. NPC appealed the amended decision to the CA, asserting that the RTC gravely erred in the fixing of just compensation for Respondents. The CA rendered judgement dismissing the appeal. ISSUE: ​Whether or not the right of way easement resulting to the deprivation og use of the property is considered taking? HELD: ​YES. the right of way easement resulting in a restriction or limitation on property rights over the land traversed by transmission lines, as in the present case, also falls within the ambit of the term “expropriation”. While it is true that petitioner only after a right of way easement, it nevertheless perpetually deprives respondents of their property rights as manifested by the imposition by the petitioner upon respondents that below said transmission lines. Normally, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of title to, and possession of, the expropriated property, but no cogent reason appears why said power may not be availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of condemned property, without loss of title and possession. It is unquestionable that real property may, through expropriation, be subjected to an easement right of way.

11. US V. CAUSBY 328 U.S 256 (1946) Facts: Respondents own 2.8 acres near an airport outside of Greensboro, North Carolina. Respondents’ property contained a house and a chicken farm. The end of one of the runways of the airport was 2,220 feet from Respondents’ property, and the glide path passed over the property at 83 feet, which is 67 feet above the house, 63 feet above the barn, and 18 feet above the highest tree. The use by the United States of this airport is pursuant to a lease beginning June 1, 1942, and ending June 30, 1942, with provisions for renewal until June 30, 1967, or six months after the end of the national emergency, whichever is earlier. The United States’ four motored bombers make loud noises when flying above the property, and have very bright lights. Respondents’ chicken farm production had to stop, because 150 chickens were killed by flying into walls from fright. In the Court of Claims, it was found that the United States had taken an easement over the property on June 1, 1942, and that the value of the property depreciation as the result of the easement was $2,000.00. The United States petitioned for certiorari, which was granted.

Issue: Whether the Respondents’ property been taken within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment? Held:

Yes. But the case is remanded for a determination of the value of the easement and whether the easement was permanent or temporary. The court noted the common law doctrine of ownership of land extending to the sky above the land. However, the court notes that an act of Congress had given the United States exclusive national sovereignty over the air space. The court noted that common sense made the common law doctrine inapplicable. However, the court found that the common law doctrine did not control the present case. The United States had conceded in oral argument that if flights over the Respondents’ property rendered it uninhabitable then there would be a taking compensable under the Fifth Amendment. The measure of the value of the property taken is the owner’s loss, not the taker’s gain. The airspace is a public highway. But it is obvious that if the landowner is to have the full enjoyment of his land, he must have exclusive control of the immediate reaches of the enveloping atmosphere. If this were not true then landowners could not build buildings, plant trees or run fences. The airspace, apart from the immediate reaches above the land, is part of the public domain. The court does not set the precise limits of the line of demarcation. Flights over private land are not a taking, unless, like here, they are so low and frequent as to be a direct and immediate interference with the enjoyment of the land. The Court of Claims must, upon remand, determine the value of the easement and whether it is a temporary or permanent easement. 12. PPI V. COMELEC 244 SCRA 272 (1995) Facts: COMELEC issued resolution 2772 directing newspapers to provide provide free print space of not less than one half (1/2) page for use as “Comelec Space” which shall be allocated by the Commission, free of charge, among all candidates within the area in which the newspaper, magazine or periodical is circulated to enable the candidates to make known their qualifications, their stand on public issues and their platforms and programs of government. Philippine Press Institute, a non-stock, non-profit organization of newspaper and magazine publishers asks the Court to declare said resolution unconstitutional and void on the ground that it violates the prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon the government, and any of its agencies, against the taking of private property for public use without just compensation. The Office of the Solicitor General, on behalf of Comelec alleged that the resolution does not impose upon the publishers any obligation to provide free print space in the newspapers. It merely established guidelines to be followed in connection with the procurement of “Comelec space”. And if it is viewed as mandatory, the same would nevertheless be valid as an exercise of the police power of the State- a permissible exercise of the power of supervision or regulation of the Comelec over the communication and information operations of print media enterprises during the election period to safeguard and ensure a fair, impartial and credible election. Issue: Whether the resolution was a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain? Held: The Supreme Court declared the Resolution as unconstitutional. It held that to compel print media companies to donate “Comelec space” amounts to “taking” of private personal property without payment of the just compensation required in expropriation cases. The threshold requisites for a lawful taking of private property for public use are the necessity for the taking and the legal authority

to effect the taking. The element of necessity for the taking has not been established by respondent Comelec considering that the newspapers were not unwilling to sell advertising space. The taking of private property for public use is authorized by the constitution, but not without payment of just compensation. Also Resolution No. 2772 does not constitute a valid exercise of the police power of the state. In the case at bench, there is no showing of existence of a national emergency to take private property of newspaper or magazine publishers. However, Sec 8 still stands as it is within the power of COMELEC to control the media influences of candidates to prevent unequal campaigns.

13. Republic v Sps Llamas (Illegal Taking of Subdivision Roads) Jan 25, 2017 Facts: On April 23, 1990, the Department of Public Works and Highways initiated an action for expropriation for the widening of Dr. A. Santos Ave. (also known as Sucat Road) in what was then the Municipality of Parañaque, Metro Manila. This action was brought against 26 defendants, none of whom are respondents in this case. On November 2, 1993, the Commissioners appointed by the Regional Trial Court in the expropriation case submitted a resolution recommending that just compensation for the expropriated areas be set to P12,000.00 per square meter. On January 27, 1994, the Llamas Spouses filed before the Regional Trial Court a "Most Urgent and Respectful Motion for Leave to be Allowed Intervention as Defendants-Intervenors-Oppositors." They claimed that they were excluded from the expropriation case despite having properties affected by the road widening project. After a hearing on this Motion, the Regional Trial Court allowed the Llamas Spouses to file their Answer-in-Intervention. The Llamas Spouses filed their Answer-in-Intervention on March 21, 1994. In it, they claimed that a total area of 298 square meters was taken from them during the road widening project. The Llamas Spouses filed a "Most Urgent Motion for the Issuance of an Order Directing the Immediate Payment of 40% of Zonal Value of Expropriated Land and Improvements." On December 9, 1994, the Department of Public Works and Highways filed its Comment/Opposition to the Llamas Spouses' Motion. On May 29, 1996, the Regional Trial Court issued the Order directing the payment of the value of the lots of the defendants in the expropriation case. After years of not obtaining a favorable ruling, the Llamas Spouses filed a "Motion for Issuance of an Order to Pay and/or Writ of Execution. The Department of Public Works and Highways and the Llamas Spouses filed a Joint Manifestation and Motion seeking to suspend the Llamas Spouses' pending Motions. In an August 8, 2005 hearing, the Department of Public Works and Highways manifested that the non-payment of the Llamas Spouses' claims was due to their continued failure to comply with their undertaking. On the same date, the Llamas Spouses filed a Manifestation seeking the payment of their claims. The Department of Public Works and Highways then filed a Comment/Opposition. On October 8, 2007, the Regional Trial Court issued the Order directing the payment to the Llamas Spouses of just compensation. It denied payment for areas covered by TCT No. In the Order dated May 19, 2008, the Regional Trial Court denied the Llamas Spouses' Motion for Reconsideration. The Llamas Spouses then filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari. The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the assailed Orders of the Regional Trial Court and ordered the Department of Public Works and Highways to pay the Llamas Spouses just compensation for a total of 237 square meters across three (3) lots, inclusive of the portions excluded by the Regional Trial Court. The Court of Appeals

added that the amount due to the Llamas Spouses was subject to 12% interest per annum from the time of the taking. Issue: ​Whether or not just compensation must be paid to respondents Francisco and Carmelita Llamas for the subdivision road lots covered by TCT No. 179165?

Ruling: Yes. ​Petitioner's reliance on the 1991 White Plains Decision is misplaced. The same 1991 Decision was not the end of litigation relating to the widening of Katipunan Road. The owner and developer of White Plains Subdivision, Quezon City Development and Financing Corporation (QCDFC), went on to file motions for reconsideration. The second of these motions was granted in this Court's July 27, 1994 Resolution. This Resolution expressly discarded the compulsion underscored by the Department of Public Works and Highways, and the dispositive portion of the 1991 White Plains Decision was modified accordingly. As this Court recounted in its 1998 Decision in White Plains Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals. The 1998 White Plains Decision unequivocally repudiated the 1991 White Plains Decision's allusion to a compulsion on subdivision developers to cede subdivision road lots to government, so much that it characterized such compulsion as an "illegal taking." It did away with any preference for government's capacity to compel cession and, instead, emphasized the primacy of subdivision owners' and developers' freedom in retaining or disposing of spaces developed as roads. The Department of Public Works and Highways makes no claim here that the road lots covered by TCT No. 179165 have actually been donated to the government or that their transfer has otherwise been consummated by respondents. It only theorizes that they have been automatically transferred. Neither has expropriation ever been fully effected. Precisely, we are resolving this expropriation controversy only now. Respondents have not made any positive act enabling the City Government of Parañaque to acquire dominion over the disputed road lots. Therefore, they retain their private character. Accordingly, just compensation must be paid to respondents as the government takes the road lots in the course of a road widening project. WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The assailed October 14, 2010 Decision of the Fifth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 104178 is AFFIRMED. 14. Bartolata v. Republic GR 223534 Jan 7, 2017 FACTS: Bartolata acquired ownership over a parcel of land by virtue of an Order of Award from the Bureau of Lands. Subsequently, respondents acquired 223 sq. m. of petitioner’s property for the development of the Metro Manila Skyway Project. The parties agreed that in exchange for the acquisition, petitioner would be paid just compensation for the appraised value of the property, an aggregate of ₱l2,265,000 for the entire affected area. Subsequently, respondents appropriated ₱l,480,000 in favor of petitioner as partial payment.

Since the date of initial payment, petitioner continuously demanded from respondents the balance but the latter refused to settle their outstanding obligation prompting petitioner to file a Complaint for a sum of money. Respondents raised that the Order of Award from the Bureau of Lands granting title to petitioner over the subject property states that the “land shall be subject to the easement and servitudes provided for in Section 109-114 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended.” They also then argued that pursuant to Section 112 of CA 141 the government is entitled to an easement of right of way not exceeding 60 meters in width, without need of payment for just compensation, save for the value of improvements existing and any payment for the government’s use of the easement, unless made to compensate the landowner for the value of the improvements affected, is unwarranted. Thus, they prayed, that the ₱l,480,000 partial payment made to petitioner for the acquisition of the latter’s property, which was well within the 60-meter threshold width, be returned to the government. Petitioner contended that PD 2004 which amended RA 730 allegedly removed the statutory lien attached to the subject property. Respondents, however, countered that petitioner could not have benefited from PD 2004 since the removal of restrictions and encumbrances contained in PD 2004 only applies to public land sold by the government for residential purposes without public auction, whereas petitioner was awarded the subject property through a public auction sale. ISSUE # 1: Whether or not the property acquired by virtue of an Order of Award is subject easement of right of way in favor of the government despite the enactment of PD 2004. YES​. ​First, ​no less than the Order of Award granting petitioner title over the subject property reads that the parcel of land conferred to him is subject to the restrictions contained under Sec. 109-114 of CA 141, which necessarily includes the easement provided in Sec. 112. Notably, petitioner was awarded the subject property in 1987, while PD 2004, which allegedly removed all encumbrances and restrictions from awarded properties, was signed into law much earlier in 1985. This alone raises suspicion on the applicability of PD 2004 to the subject property. Second, t​ he Court finds no reversible error in the RTC and CA’s interpretation of the coverage of PD 2004 and RA 730. The title of RA 730 itself supports the rulings of the courts ​a quo that the laws petitioner relied upon only cover the sale of public lands for residential purposes and to qualified applicants without public auction. Xxx x x x RA 730 was crafted as an exception to Secs. 61 and 67 of CA 141. These provisions govern the mode of disposition of the alienable public lands enumerated under Sec. 59 of the same law. Synthesizing the provisions, CA 141 provides that public lands under Sec. 59 can only be disposed for residential, commercial, industrial, and other similar purposes through lease or sale, in both cases, ​“to the highest bidder. ​” The conduct of an auction is then required under Secs. 61 and 67.

By way of exception, however, RA 730 now allows the sale of public lands without public auction to qualified applicants. It is through this exceptional case of purchase of public land without public auction wherein PD 2004 would apply. Under its plain meaning, only public lands acquired by qualified applicants without public auction and for residential purposes are free from any restrictions against encumbrance or alienation. The provision is inapplicable to petitioner’s property which was awarded to petitioner not in accordance with RA 730, but through public auction. What is more, the easement of right of way under Sec. 112 of CA 141 is not subsumed in the phrase ​“restrictions against encumbrance or alienation” ​appearing in the amendment introduced by PD 2004. xxx ISSUE # 2: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to just compensation. NO. The seminal case of ​Andaya l​ ikewise involved property subject to the statutory lien under Sec. 112 of CA 141. Xxx The Court affirmed the CA’s interpretation of Sec. 112 of CA 141 and ruled that the Republic was under no obligation to pay therein respondent Andaya just compensation in enforcing its right of way. Be that as it may, the Court did not foreclose the possibility of the property owner being entitled to just compensation if the enforcement of the right of way resulted in the ​“taking” o​ f the portions not subject to the legal easement. Jurisprudence teaches us that ​“taking,” ​in the exercise of the power of eminent domain, “occurs not only when the government actually deprives or dispossesses the property owner of his property or of its ordinary use, but also when there is a practical destruction or material impairment of the value of his property.​” xxx To recapitulate, two elements must concur before the property owner will be entitled to just compensation for the remaining property under Sec. 112 of CA 141: (1) that the remainder is not subject to the statutory lien of right of way; and (2) that the enforcement of the right of way results in the practical destruction or material impairment of the value of the remaining property, or in the property owner being dispossessed or otherwise deprived of the normal use of the said remainder. ISSUE # 3​: Whether or not the petitioner should return the initial payment made by the respondents in the amount of ₱l,480,000.

NO. Respondents are barred by estoppel from recovering the initial payment of ₱l,480,000 from petitioner Guilty of reiteration, Sec. 112 of CA 141 precludes petitioner from claiming just compensation for the government’s enforcement of its right of way. The contract allegedly entered by the parties for the government’s acquisition of the affected portion of the property in exchange for just compensation is then void ​ab initio ​for being contrary to law. Consequently, petitioner has no right to collect just compensation for the government’s use of the 223 square meter lot. Anent the ₱l,480,000 partial payment already made by respondents, such amount paid shall be governed by the provisions on ​solutio indebiti ​or unjust enrichment. Xxx Regardless, respondents’ action to compel petitioner to return what was mistakenly delivered is now barred by the doctrine of estoppel. The doctrine is based upon the grounds of public policy, fair dealing, good faith and justice, and its purpose is to forbid one to speak against his own act, representations, or commitments to the injury of one to whom they were directed and who reasonably relied thereon. The doctrine of estoppel springs from equitable principles and the equities in the case. As a general rule, the State cannot be barred by estoppel by the mistakes or errors of its officials or agents. But as jurisprudence elucidates, the doctrine is subject to exceptions, viz: Estoppels against the public are little favored. They should not be invoked except [in rare] and unusual circumstances, and may not be invoked where they would operate to defeat the effective operation of a policy adopted to protect the public. They must be applied with circumspection and should be applied only in those special cases where the interests of justice clearly require it. Nevertheless, the government must not be allowed to deal dishonorably or capriciously with its citizens, and must not play an ignoble part or do a shabby thing; and subject to limitations … , the doctrine of equitable estoppel may be invoked against public authorities as well as against private individuals. 15. Mosqueda et al v. Pilipino banana Growers & Exporters Association GR. NO. 189185 Facts: After several committee hearings and consultations with various stakeholders, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Davao City enacted Ordinance No. 0309, Series of 2007, to impose a ban against aerial spraying as an agricultural practice by all agricultural entities within Davao City The Pilipino Banana Growers and Exporters Association, Inc. (PBGEA) and two of its members, namely: Davao Fruits Corporation and Lapanday Agricultural and Development Corporation (PBGEA, et al.), filed their petition in the RTC to challenge the constitutionality of the ordinance They alleged that the ordinance exemplified the unreasonable exercise of police power; violated the equal protection clause; amounted to the confiscation of property without due process of law; and lacked publication pursuant] to Section 511[6] of Republic Act No. 7160 On September 22, 2007, after trial, the RTC rendered judgment declaring Ordinance No. 0309-07 valid and constitutional

The RTC opined that the City of Davao had validly exercised police power[13] under the General Welfare Clause of the Local Government Code;[14] that the ordinance, being based on a valid classification, was consistent with the Equal Protection Clause; that aerial spraying was distinct from other methods of pesticides application because it exposed the residents to a higher degree of health risk caused by aerial drift;[15] and that the ordinance enjoyed the presumption of constitutionality, and could be invalidated only upon a clear showing that it had violated the Constitution. On January 9, 2009, the CA promulgated its assailed decision reversing the judgment of the RTC.[22] It declared Section 5 of Ordinance No. 0309-07 as void and unconstitutional for being unreasonable and oppressive; The CA did not see any established relation between the purpose of protecting the public and the environment against the harmful effects of aerial spraying, on one hand, and the imposition of the ban against aerial spraying of all forms of substances, on the other. Issues: Whether or not Ordinance No. 0309-07 is unconstitutional on due process and equal protection grounds for being unreasonable and oppressive, and an invalid exercise of police power: (a) in imposing a ban on aerial spraying as an agricultural practice in Davao City under Section 5; (b) in decreeing a 3-month transition-period to shift to other modes of pesticide application under Section 5; and (c) in requiring the maintenance of the 30-meter buffer zone under Section 6 thereof in all agricultural lands in Davao City. Ruling: The Sangguniang Bayan of Davao City enacted Ordinance No. 0309-07 under its corporate powers... the right to a balanced and healthful ecology under Section 16 is an issue of transcendental importance with intergenerational implications. It is under this milieu that the questioned ordinance should be appreciated. Advancing the interests of the residents who are vulnerable to the alleged health risks due to their exposure to pesticide drift justifies the motivation behind the enactment of the ordinance. The City of Davao has the authority to enact pieces of legislation that will promote the general welfare, specifically the health of its constituents. Such authority should not be construed, however, as a valid license for the City of Davao to enact any ordinance it deems fit to discharge its mandate. A thin but well-defined line separates authority to enact legislations from the method of accomplishing the same. Ordinance No. 0309-07 violates the Due Process Clause A valid ordinance must not only be enacted within the corporate powers of the local government and passed according to the procedure prescribed by law. In order to declare it as a valid piece of local legislation, it must also comply with the following substantive requirements, namely: (1) it must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) it must be fair, not oppressive; (3) it must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) it must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) it must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) it must not be unreasonable.In the State's exercise of police power, the property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the Government. A local government unit is considered to have properly exercised its police powers only if it satisfies the following requisites, to wit: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State; and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object sought to be

accomplished and not unduly oppressive.The first requirement refers to the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution; the second, to the Due Process Clause of the Constitution. Substantive due process requires that a valid ordinance must have a sufficient justification for the Government's action. This means that in exercising police power the local government unit must not arbitrarily, whimsically or despotically enact the ordinance regardless of its salutary purpose. So long as the ordinance realistically serves a legitimate public purpose, and it employs means that are reasonably necessary to achieve that purpose without unduly oppressing the individuals regulated, the ordinance must survive a due process challenge. The required civil works for the conversion to truck-mounted boom spraying alone will consume considerable time and financial resources given the topography and geographical features of the plantations. As such, the conversion could not be completed within the short timeframe of three months. Requiring the respondents and other affected individuals to comply with the consequences of the ban within the three-month period under pain of penalty like fine, imprisonment and even cancellation of business permits would definitely be oppressive as to constitute abuse of police power. The respondents posit that the requirement of maintaining a buffer zone under Section 6 of the ordinance violates due process for being confiscatory; and that the imposition unduly deprives all agricultural landowners within Davao City of the beneficial use of their property that amounts to taking without just compensation. The position of the respondents is untenable. In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., we have thoroughly explained that taking only becomes confiscatory if it substantially divests the owner of the beneficial use of its property Ordinance No. 0309-07 violates the Equal Protection Clause The constitutional right to equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. The guaranty equal protection secures every person within the State's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the State's duly constituted authorities. The concept of equal justice under the law demands that the State governs impartially, and not to draw distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to the legitimate governmental objective. Equal treatment neither requires universal application of laws to all persons or things without distinction,[120] nor intends to prohibit legislation by limiting the object to which it is directed or by the territory in which it is to operate.[121] The guaranty of equal protection envisions equality among equals determined according to a valid classification.[122] If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from another.[123] In other word, a valid classification must be: (1) based on substantial distinctions; (2) germane to the purposes of the law; (3) not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) equally applicable to all members of the class. In our view, the petitioners correctly argue that the rational basis approach appropriately applies herein. Under the rational basis test, we shall: (1) discern the reasonable relationship between the means and the purpose of the ordinance; and (2) examine whether the means or the prohibition against aerial spraying is based on a substantial or reasonable distinction. A reasonable classification includes all persons or things similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the law.

Davao City justifies the prohibition against aerial spraying by insisting that the occurrence of drift causes inconvenience and harm to the residents and degrades the environment. Given this justification, does the ordinance satisfy the requirement that the classification must rest on substantial distinction?We answer in the negative. The occurrence of pesticide drift is not limited to aerial spraying but results from the conduct of any mode of pesticide application. Even manual spraying or truck-mounted boom spraying produces drift that may bring about the same inconvenience, discomfort and alleged health risks to the community and to the environment.[141] A ban against aerial spraying does not weed out the harm that the ordinance seeks to achieve.[142] In the process, the ordinance suffers from being "underinclusive" because the classification does not include all individuals tainted with the same mischief that the law seeks to eliminate.[143] A classification that is drastically underinclusive with respect to the purpose or end appears as an irrational means to the legislative end because it poorly serves the intended purpose of the law. WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the consolidated petitions for review on certiorari for their lack of merit; AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on January 9, 2009 in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 01389-MIN. declaring Ordinance No. 0309-07 UNCONSTITUTIONAL;

Silvina Tomines 16. Heirs of Juancho Adorna vs. Reyes 125 SCRA 220 (1983) 17. Manosca v. Court of Appeals 252 SCRA 412 (1996) 18. Estate of Jimenez v. Peza GR. No. 106804 19. NHA v. Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo GR No. 154411 20. NPC & Pobre v. CA Gr No. 106804 AT Tyron 21. Mactan Cebu Airport Authority V. CA GR 139495 Nov 27, 2000 22. Mun. Of Meycayauan vs IAC 157 scra 640 (1998) 23. De Knecht vs Bautista 100 SCRA 660 (1980) 24. Republic vs De Knecht GR 87351 25. De la Paz Masiklip v. Judge Legazpi GR. No. 136349

Vlaznake Viola 26. JIL v. Municipality of Pasig GR. No. 152230 FACTS: The Municipality of Pasig needed an access road from E. R. Santos Street, a municipal

road

near

the Pasig Public Market, to Barangay Sto. Tomas

Bukid, Pasig. The Municipality then decided to acquire 51 square meters of the property of Lorenzo Ching Cuanco, Victor Ching Cuanco and Ernesto Ching Cuanco Kho. The ​Sangguniang Bayan of Pasig approved an Ordinance authorizing the municipal mayor to initiate expropriation proceedings to acquire ordinance

the

said

stated

property that

the

and

appropriate

property

owners

the

fund

were

therefor.

notified

of

The the

municipality’s

intent

to

purchase the property for public use as an

access road but they rejected the offer. The plaintiff caused the annotation of a notice of ​lis pendens at the dorsal portion of TCT No. PT-92579 under the name of the Jesus Is Lord Christian School

Foundation,

Incorporated

(JILCSFI)

which

had

purchased

the

property. Thereafter, the plaintiff constructed therein a cemented road with a width of three meters. The defendants claimed that, as early as February 1993, they had sold the said property to JILCSFI as evidenced by a deed of sale bearing the signature of defendant Ernesto Ching Cuanco Kho and his wife. JILCSFI averred the plaintiff’s exercise of eminent domain was only for a particular class and not for the benefit of the poor

and

the

expropriated

landless. is

not

It

the

alleged

best

that

portion

the

for

property

the

road

sought and

the

to

be

least

burdensome to it. JILCSFI also averred that it has been denied the use and enjoyment of its property because the road was constructed in the middle portion and that the plaintiff was not the real party-in-interest. Rolando Togonon, plaintiffs messenger testified that he served a letter of Engr. Jose Reyes, the Technical Assistant to the Mayor on Infrastructure, to

Lorenzo Ching Cuanco at his store. A lady received the same and

brought it inside the store. When she returned the letter to him, it already bore the signature of Luz Bernarte. He identified a photocopy of the letter as similar to the one he served at the store but admitted that he never met Luz Bernarte. Edgardo del Rosario, a resident of Sto. Tomas Bukid, declared that he would pass through a wooden bridge to go to E. R. Santos Street. At times, the bridge would be slippery and many had met accidents while walking along the bridge. Because of this, they requested Mayor Vicente Eusebio to construct a road therein. He attested that after the construction of the cemented access road, the residents had water and electricity. Augusto Paz of the City Engineers Office testified that, sometime in 1992, the plaintiff constructed a road perpendicular from E. R. Santos Street to

Sto.

Tomas

Bukid;

he

was

the

Project

Engineer

for

the

said

undertaking. Before the construction of the road, the lot was raw and they

had

to

put

filling

materials

so

that

vehicles

could

use

it.

According to him, the length of the road which they constructed was 70 meters long and 3 meters wide so that a fire truck could pass through. He

averred that there is no other road through which a fire truck could pass to go to Sto. Tomas Bukid. Manuel Tembrevilla, the Fire Marshall, averred that he had seen the new road, that is, Damayan Street, and found that a fire truck could pass through it. He also stated that it is the only road in the area. ISSUE: (1)Whether

the

definite

respondent

offer

to

complied with the requirement of a valid and

acquire

the

property

prior

to

the

filing

of

the

complaint (2) Whether its property which is already intended to be used for public purposes may still be expropriated by the respondent HELD: (1)

NO. The respondent failed to prove that before it filed its complaint, it made a written definite and valid offer to acquire the property for public use as an access road. The letter is not a valid and definite offer to purchase a specific portion of the property for a price certain. It is merely an invitation for only one of the co-owners, Lorenzo Ching Cuanco, to a conference to

discuss

the

project

and

the

price

that

may

be

mutually

acceptable to both parties. Article 35 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code provides: ARTICLE 35. Offer to Buy and Contract of Sale. (a) The offer to buy private property for public use or purpose shall be in writing.

It

shall

specify

the

property

sought to be acquired, the

reasons for its acquisition, and the price offered. (b) If the owner or owners accept the offer in its entirety, a contract of sale shall be executed and payment forthwith made. (c) If the owner or owners are willing to sell their property but at a price higher than that offered to them, the local chief executive shall call them to a conference for the purpose of reaching an agreement on the

selling

price.

The

chairman

of

the

appropriation

or

finance

committee

of the sanggunian, or in his absence, any member of the

sanggunian duly chosen as its representative, shall participate in the conference. When an agreement is reached by the parties, a contract of sale shall be drawn and executed. (d) The contract of sale shall be supported by the following documents: (1) Resolution of the sanggunian authorizing the local chief executive to enter into a contract of sale. The resolution shall specify the terms and conditions to be embodied in the contract; (2) Ordinance appropriating the amount specified in the contract; and (3)

Certification

of

the

local

treasurer

as to availability of funds

together with a statement that such fund shall not be disbursed or spent for any purpose other than to pay for the purchase of the property involved. (2)

Yes. The taking to be valid must be for public use. As long as the purpose of the taking is public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play. As just noted, the constitution in at least

two

cases,

expropriation resale through

at

what public use is. One is the

of lands to be subdivided into small lots for

cost

the

determines to

exercise

individuals. of

this

The

other

power,

of

is

the

utilities

transfer, and

other

private enterprise to the government. It is accurate to state then that at present whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirements of public use.

27. Filstream International v CA 284 SCRA 716 (1998) ​FACTS: Filstream International Inc., is the registered owner of the properties land situated

in

Antonio

Rivera

Street,

Tondo

II,

Manila,

who

filed

an

ejectment suit against the occupants of the abovementioned parcels of land on the grounds of termination of the lease contract and non-payment of rentals. Private respondents appealed the decision to the Regional

Trial Court and subsequently to the Court of Appeals, both RTC and CA affirmed with the decision of the MTC. The City Government approved Ordinance No. 7813 authorizing Mayor Alfredo S. Lim to initiate the acquisition by negotiation, expropriation, purchase, or other legal means certain parcels of land which formed part of the properties

of

petitioner

then

occupied

by

private

respondents.

Subsequently, the City of Manila approved Ordinance No. 7855 declaring the expropriation of certain parcels of land and were to be sold and distributed to qualified tenants of the area pursuant to the Land Use Development Program of the City of Manila. Respondent filed a complaint for eminent domain before the RTC of Manila seeking to expropriate the aforecited parcels of land owned by petitioner Filstream wherein trial court issued a Writ of Possession in favor of the former which ordered the transfer of possession over the disputed premises to the respondent. Petitioner Filstream filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for eminent domain dismiss

and a motion to quash the writ of possession. The motion to was

premised

on the following grounds: (1)no valid cause of

action; (2)the petition does not satisfy the requirements of public use and a mere clandestine maneuver to circumvent the writ execution issued by

the

RTC

of

constitutional

Manila

in

guarantee

contract;(4)price

the

against

offered

was

too

ejectment

suit;(3)violation

non-impairment low

hence

of

of

the

obligation

and

violative

of

the

just

compensation provision of the constitution and the said amount is without the certification of the City Treasurer for availability of funds. With respect to the motion to quash the writ of possession, petitioner raised the following objections: (1)failure to comply with Section 2 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, Ordinance No. 7813 is a void enactment for it was approved without a public hearing and violative of the constitutional guarantee against impairment of obligation and contracts;(2)the price is too low and unconscionable violating the just compensation provision of the

constitution,(3)and

the

said

writ

is

tainted

with

infirmity

considering the absence of a certification from the City of Manila that there is an immediately available fund for the subject expropriation. The RTC then denied the defendants motion to dismiss and motion to quash writ of

possession.

Petitioner

filed

a

subsequent motion but both were denied.

motion

for

reconsideration

and

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals seeking to set aside the order of the RTC of Manila. However, CA issued a resolution dismissing the petition in this wise: It appearing that the above-entitled petition is insufficient in form and substance -- it does not comply with Section 2(a), Rule 6 of the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals which requires that the petition shall be x x x accompanied by x x x other pertinent documents and papers, aside from the fact that copies of the pleadings attached to the petition are blurred and unreadable. Petitioner Filstream is now before this Court via a Petition for ​Certiorari seeking to nullify the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals which granted herein

private

respondents

prayer for a TRO and Writ of Preliminary

Injunction, the same being null and void for having been issued in grave abuse of discretion. The issue raised is purely procedural and technical matter. Respondent appellate court seriously erred in giving more premium to form rather than the substance. A strict adherence to the technical and procedural rules in this case would defeat rather than meet the ends of justice as it would result in the violation of the substantial rights of petitioner. At stake in the appeal

filed

by

petitioner

before

the

CA

is

the

exercise

of

their

property rights over the disputed premises which have been expropriated and have in fact been ordered condemned in favor of the City of Manila. The dismissal of their appeal in the expropriation proceedings based on the aforementioned grounds is tantamount to a deprivation of property without

due

process

expropriation

of

proceedings

law

as

it

based

would

automatically

the

aforementioned

on

validate grounds

the is

tantamount to a deprivation of property without due process of law as it would

automatically

petitioner substantial

is

validate

still

rights

the

disputing.

are

affected,

expropriation It as

must in

be this

proceedings emphasized case,

which that

the

the

where

stringent

application of procedural rules may be relaxed if only to meet the ends of substantial justice.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the City of Manila complied with the proper proceedings in exercising its power of eminent domain. HELD: No. City of Manila did not comply with the proper proceedings in exercising its

power

of

eminent

domain.

The

State has a paramount interest in

exercising its power of eminent domain for the general good considering that the right of the State to expropriate private property as long as it is for public use always takes precedence over the interest of private property owners. However we must not lose sight of the fact that the individual entitled

rights

to

affected

protection,

by

the

bearing

in

exercise mind

of

that

such the

right

are

also

exercise

of

this

superior right cannot override the guarantee of due process extended by the law to owners of the property to be expropriated. Section 19 of the 1991 Local Government Code is very explicit that it must comply with the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws, to wit: SECTION 19. Eminent Domain. A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws. The governing law that deals with the subject of expropriation for purposed of

urban

land

reform

and

housing

in

Republic

Act

No.

7279

(Urban

Development and Housing Act of 1992) and Sections 9 and 10 of which specifically provide as follows: Sec. 9. ​Priorities in the acquisition of Land Lands for socialized housing shall be acquired in the following order: (a)

Those

owned

by

the

Government

or

any

of

its

sub-divisions,

instrumentalities, or agencies, including government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries; (b) Alienable lands of the public domain;

(c) Unregistered or abandoned and idle lands; (d)

Those

within

the

declared

Areas

of

Priority

Development,

Zonal

Improvement sites, and Slum Improvement and Resettlement Program sites which have not yet been acquired; (e) Bagong Lipunan Improvement sites and Services or BLISS sites which have not yet been acquired; and (f) Privately-owned lands. Where on-site development is found more practicable and advantageous to the beneficiaries, the priorities mentioned in this section shall not apply. The

local

government

units

shall

give

budgetary

priority

to on-site

modes

acquiring lands for

development of government lands. Sec.

10.

​Modes

of

Land

Acquisition.

T ​ he

of

purposes of this Act shall include, among others, ​community mortgage, land swapping, land assembly or consolidation, land banking, donation to the

Government,

joint

venture

agreement,

negotiated

purchase,

and

expropriation: Provided, however, That expropriation shall be resorted to only when other modes of acquisition have been exhausted: Provided further, That where expropriation is resorted to, parcels of land owned by small property owners shall be exempted for purposes of this Act: Provided, finally, That abandoned property, as herein defined, shall be reverted and escheated to the State in a proceeding analogous to the procedure laid down in Rule 91 of the Rules of Court.

28. Heirs of Feliciano, Jr. V. Landbank (DAR Formula) gr. 215290 January 11, 2017 G.R. No. 215290

HEIRS OF PABLO FELICIANO, JR., namely: LOURDES FELICIANO TUDLA, GLORIA FELICIANO CAUDAL, GABRIELA FELICIANO BAUTISTA, ANGELA FELICIANO LUCAS, DONNA CELESTE FELICIANO-GATMAITAN, CYNTHIA CELESTE FELICIANO, and HECTOR REUBEN FELICIANO, represented by its assignee, VICTORIA ALDA REYES ESPIRITU,, Petitioners, vs. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. FACTS: The heirs of Pablo Feliciano, are co-owners of a 300 hectare parcel of agricultural land situated at Camarines Sur. In 1972, a portion of the afore-mentioned land was classified as un-irrigated Riceland and placed under the coverage of Presidential Decree No.27. The Certificates of Land Transfer were distributed to the 84 tenant-beneficiaries in 1973 who were issued Emancipation Patents in 1989. The Department of Agrarian Reform valued the subject land at P1,301,498.09 inclusive of interests, but Feliciano heirs rejected the said valuation. LBP filed a petition for the determination of just compensation before the Regional Trial Court of Naga City which was initially dismissed, but eventually reinstated. The

RTC then ​(a) f ​ ixed the just compensation for the subject land at ₱7,725,904.05; and ​(b) d ​ irected the LBP ​(i) t ​ o pay Espiritu the said amount, less amounts already paid to and received by the Feliciano heirs, and ​(ii) ​to pay 12% interest p.a. on the unpaid balance of the just compensation, computed from January 1, 2010 until full payment. It observed that the subject land, which was expropriated pursuant to PD 27, fell under the coverage of Administrative Orders (​DAR AO 13 series of 1994, AO 2 series of 2004 and AO 6 series of 2008) ​ that provided for the payment of 6% annual interest for any delay in the payment of just compensation. Since DAR AO 06-2008 was effective only until December 31, 2009, the RTC imposed 12% interest p.a. on the unpaid just compensation from January 1, 2010 until full payment. Both parties moved for reconsideration, which were denied in an Order dated November 24, 2011, modifying the reckoning of the 12% interest p.a. from the finality of the Decision until its satisfaction.

Feliciano heirs elevated the matter before the CA, whom, fixed the just compensation for the subject land at ₱7,725,904.05, plus legal interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) p.a., computed from July 1, 2009 up to the finality of the Decision, or the total amount of ₱8,316,876,97, and directed the LBP to pay the said amount to Espiritu. It ruled that the DAR AOs are no longer applicable to the instant case since the subject land was revalued based on the July 1, 2009 values pursuant to DAR AO 1, Series of 2010. It further held that interest at 12% p.a. was proper considering the delay in the payment of just compensation. But

then was amended and pointed out that since the LBP had already paid petitioners the total amount of ₱7,725,904.05 on December 13, 2011, it is only liable for the payment of 12% interest p.a., accruing from July 1, 2009 up to the said date, or the amount of P1,892,471.01. Accordingly, it ordered the LBP to pay Espiritu the said amount, which shall thereafter earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%) p.a. from the finality of the said Decision until full payment. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA's determination of just compensation is correct. HELD: NO. Neither the RTC nor the CA considered the date when the claim folder was received nor explained their reasons for deviating from the DAR formula. They should have utilized the basic formula prescribed and laid down in pertinent DAR regulations existing prior to the passage of RA 9700, in determining the just compensation for the subject land. When the acquisition process under PD 27 is still incomplete just compensation should be determined and the process be concluded under Republic Act No. (RA) 6657, otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988. Just compensation must be valued at the time of taking, ​or the time when the owner was deprived of the use and benefit of his property, in this case, when emancipation patents were issued in the names of the farmer-beneficiaries in 1989. Hence, the evidence to be presented by the parties before the RTC for the valuation of the subject land must be based on the values prevalent on such time of taking for like agricultural lands. Just compensation must be arrived at pursuant to the guidelines set forth in Section 17 of RA 6657, as amended, prior to its amendment by RA 9700. However, the RTC is reminded that while it should take into account the different formula created by the DAR in arriving at the just compensation for the subject land, it is not strictly bound thereto if the situations before it do not warrant their application. In any event, should the RTC find the said guidelines to be inapplicable, it must clearly explain the reasons for deviating therefrom, and for using other factors or formula in arriving at the reasonable just compensation for the acquired property. Interest may be awarded as may be warranted by the circumstances of the case and based on prevailing jurisprudence. ​In previous cases, the Court has allowed the grant of legal interest in expropriation cases where there is delay in the payment since the just compensation due to the landowners was deemed to be an effective forbearance on the part of the

State. Legal interest on the unpaid balance shall be pegged at the rate of 12% p.a. from the time of taking in 1989 when Emancipation Patents were issued, until June 30, 2013 only. Thereafter, or beginning July 1, 2013, until fully paid, the just compensation due the landowners shall earn interest at the new legal rate of 6% p.a.

29. Esteban v. De Onorio GR. No. 146062 G.R. No. 146062 June 28, 2001 SANTIAGO ESLABAN, JR., in his capacity as Project Manager of the National Irrigation Administration, petitioner, vs. CLARITA VDA. DE ONORIO, respondent. FACTS: Clarita Vda. De Onorio is the owner of the land in Barangay M. Roxas, Sto. Nino, South Cotabato. Such land is the subject for the construction of an irrigation canal of the National Irrigation Administration(NIA). Mr. Santiago Eslaban Jr. is the project manager of NIA. The parties agreed to the construction of the canal provided that the government will pay for the area that has been taken. A right-of-way agreement was entered into by the parties in which respondent was paid the amount of P4, 180.00 as right of way damages. Subsequently, respondent executed an Affidavit of Waiver of Rights and Fees which waives her rights for the damage to the crops due to construction of the right of way. After which, respondent demands that petitioner pay P 111, 299.55 for taking her property but the petitioner refused. Petitioner states that the government had not consented to be sued and that the respondent is not entitled for compensation by virtue of the homestead patent under CA no. 141. The RTC held that the NIA should pay respondent the amount of P107, 517.60 as just compensation for the 24,660 sq meters that have been used for the construction of the canal. The Court of Appeals also affirmed the decision of the RTC. ISSUES: Whether or Not the CA is correct in affirming the decision of the RTC.

DECISION: The CA is correct in affirming the decision of the RTC. PD NO. 1529 provides that the owner is required to recognize in favor of the government the easement of a “public highway, way, private way established by law, or any government canal where the certificate of title does not state that the boundaries thereof have been pre-determined. In the case at bar, the irrigation canal was constructed

on Oct 1981 after the property had been registered in May of 1976. In this case, prior expropriation proceedings must be filed and just compensation shall be paid to the owner before the land could be taken for public use. Just compensation is defined as not only the correct amount to be paid but the reasonable time for the Government to pay the owner. The CA erred in this point by stating that the market value (just compensation) of the land is determined in the filing of the complaint in 1991.The determination of such value should be from the time of its taking by the NIA in 1981. The petitioner cannot argue that the Affidavit of waiver of rights and fees executed by the respondent pertains to the payment of the value of the land therefore exempting NIA to pay the value of the land taken. Such waiver pertains only to the crops and improvements that were damage due to the construction of the right-of-way not the value of the land.

30. EPZA vs. Dulay 149 SCRA 305 (1987) G.R. No. L-59603 April 29, 1987 EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. HON. CEFERINO E. DULAY, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch XVI, Lapu-Lapu City, and SAN ANTONIO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents, Elena M. Cuevas for respondents. GUTIERREZ, JR., ​J.: FACTS: On January 15, 1979, Proclamation No. 1811 was issued, which reserves four (4) parcels of land of the public domain situated in the City of Lapu-Lapu, Island of Mactan, Cebu for the establishment of an export processing zone by petitioner Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA). Private respondent San Antonio Development Corporation, in which these lands are registered under, claimed that the lands were expropriated to the government without them reaching the agreement as to the compensation. Respondent Judge Dulay then issued an order of condemnation declaring the petitioner as having the lawful right to take the properties sought to be condemned, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the filing of the complaint, and for the appointment of the commissioners to determine the just compensation. The three commissioners submitted their consolidated report recommending the amount of P15.00 per square meter as the fair and reasonable value of just compensation for the properties, which was objected to by the petitioner contending that under PD 1533, the basis of just compensation shall be fair and according to the fair market value declared by the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, or by the assessor, whichever is lower. Such objection and

the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration were denied and hearing was set for the reception of the commissioner’s report. EPZA then filed this petition for certiorari and mandamus enjoining the respondent from further hearing the case. ISSUES: Whether or Not the exclusive and mandatory mode of compensation in PD 1533 is valid and constitutional?

determining

just

DECISION: The Supreme Court ruled that the mode compensation in PD 1533 is unconstitutional.

of

determination

of

just

The method of ascertaining just compensation constitutes impermissible encroachment to judicial prerogatives. It tends to render the courts inutile in a matter in which under the Constitution is reserved to it for financial determination. The valuation in the decree may only serve as guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just compensation, but it may not substitute the court’s own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such amount. The determination of just compensation is a judicial function. The executive department or the legislature may make the initial determination but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that the private party may not be taken for public use without just compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the court’s findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from looking into the justness of the decreed compensation.

Rafael Ian Larioza Andal 31. LAND BANK OF THE PHIL. V. Yatco Agricultural GR. 172551 Facts: Respondent Yatco Agricultural Enterprises (Yatco) was the registered owner of a parcel of agricultural land in Laguna. In 1999, the government placed the property under the coverage of its Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). Pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) No. 405,7 the LBP valued the property at ₱1,126,132.89. Yatco did not find this valuation acceptable and thus elevated the matter to the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD), which computed the value of the property at ₱16,543,800.00. The PARAD used the property’s current market value (as shown in the tax declaration that Yatco submitted) and applied the formula "Market Value x 2." The PARAD noted that the LBP did not present any verified or authentic document to back up its computation; hence, it brushed aside the LBP’s valuation.

Not satisfied, LBP filed with the RTC-Special Agrarian Court (SAC) a petition for the judicial determination of just compensation. The RTC-SAC fixed the just compensation for the property at ₱200.00 per square meter (₱55,146,000.00), relying on the valuation by RTC Branch 36 in an

eminent domain case it decided. The RTC-SAC further pointed out that the LBP failed to prove that it complied with the prescribed procedure and likewise failed to consider the valuation factors provided in Section 17 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 (CARL). The RTC-SAC subsequently denied the LBP’s motion for reconsideration. The LBP appealed to the CA. The CA dismissed the LBP’s appeal. As the determination of just compensation is essentially a judicial function, the CA thus affirmed the RTC-SAC’s valuation. The LBP filed the present petition after the CA denied its motion for reconsideration in the CA’s May 3, 2006 resolution. Hence, a Rule 45 petition for review on certiorari to the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether or not the RTC-SAC’s determination of just compensation for the property was proper. Held: The determination of just compensation is essentially a judicial function that the Judiciary exercises within the parameters of the law. Section 57 of R.A. No. 6657 explicitly vests the RTC-SAC the original and exclusive power to determine just compensation for lands under CARP coverage and enumerates the factors required to be taken into account to correctly determine just compensation. CARL likewise empowers the DAR to issue rules for its implementation. The DAR thus issued DAR AO 5-98 incorporating the law’s listed factors in determining just compensation into a basic formula that contains the details that take these factors into account. When acting within the parameters set by the law itself, the RTC-SACs, however, are not strictly bound to apply the DAR formula to its minute detail, and, they may, in the exercise of their discretion, relax the formula’s application to fit the factual situations before them. The situation where a deviation is made in the exercise of judicial discretion should at all times be distinguished from a situation where there is utter and blatant disregard of the factors spelled out by law and by the implementing rules. For in such a case, the RTC-SAC’s action already amounts to grave abuse of discretion for having been taken outside of the contemplation of the law. The RTC-SAC fully disregarded Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 and DAR AO 5-98 and thus acted outside the contemplation of the law. Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 reads: Section 17. Determination of Just Compensation. – In determining just compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land, the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the assessment made by government assessors shall be considered. The social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers and by the Government to the property as well as the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on the said land shall be considered as additional factors to determine its valuation. The RTC-SAC did not point to any specific evidence or cite the values and amounts it used in arriving at the ₱200.00 per square meter valuation. it did not indicate the formula that it used in arriving at its valuation or which led it to believe that Branch 36’s valuation was applicable to this case and it did not conduct an independent assessment and computation using the considerations required by the law and the rules Under these circumstances – i.e., the insufficiency of the evidence presented by both the LBP and Yatco on the issue of just compensation - the more judicious approach that the RTC-SAC could have

taken was to exercise the authority granted to it by Section 58 of R.A. No. 6657, which provides that the RTC-SAC may appoint one or more Commissioners to ascertain and report to it the facts necessary for the determination of the just compensation for the property. Remanded to the RTC-SAC for factual determination of just compensation. 32. Republic v. Macabagdal (definition) GR. 227215 Facts: In 2008, the Republic of the Philippines (petitioner), represented by the Department of Public Works and Highways, filed before the RTC a complaint against an unknown owner for the expropriation of a 200 sqm lot located in Valenzuela City for the construction of the C-5 Northern Link Road Project, otherwise known as North Luzon Expressway (NLEX) Segment 8.1. Petitioner thereafter applied for, and was granted a writ of possession over the subject lot and was required to deposit with the court the amount of ₱550,000.00 (i.e., at ₱2,750.00/sqm.) representing the zonal value thereof. In 2012, respondent received the provisional deposit and did not oppose the expropriation. The RTC appointed a board of commissioners to determine the just compensation for the subject lot. The board submitted its Commissioners' Report in 2014, recommending a fair market value of ₱9,000.00/sqm. as the just compensation for the subject lot, taking into consideration its location, neighborhood and land classification, utilities, amenities, physical characteristics, occupancy and usage, highest and best usage, current market value offerings, as well as previously decided expropriation cases of the same RTC involving properties similarly situated in the same barangay. The RTC found the recommendation of the commissioners to be reasonable and just, and accordingly: (a) fixed the just compensation for the subject lot at ₱9,000.00/sqm.; (b) directed petitioner to pay the same, less the provisional deposit of ₱550,000.00; and (c) imposed legal interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) p.a. on the unpaid balance, computed from the time of the taking of the subject lot until full payment. Dissatisfied, petitioner appealed before the CA, questioning the just compensation of ₱9,000.00/sq. m. and the award of twelve percent (12%) interest rate p.a., instead of six percent (6%) p.a.17 as provided under Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Monetary Board (BSP-MB) Circular No. 799, Series of 2013. The CA affirmed the RTC Decision, holding that the findings of the RTC was amply supported by the evidence on record. Hence a petition for review on certiorari to the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether or not the CA committed reversible error in affirming the RTC's imposition of interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) p.a. on the unpaid balance, computed from the time of the taking of the subject lot until full payment. Held: The petition is partly meritorious. The purpose of just compensation is not to reward the owner for the property taken, but to compensate him for the loss thereof. As such, the true measure of the property, as upheld in a plethora of cases, is the market value at the time of the taking, when the loss resulted. In addition, the Court also recognizes that the owner's loss is not only his property, but also its income-generating potential. The value of the landholdings should be equivalent to the principal sum of the just compensation due, and interest is due and should be paid to compensate for the unpaid balance of this principal sum after taking has been completed.

Petitioner had only paid a provisional deposit in the amount of ₱550,000.00 (i.e., at ₱2,750.00/sq. m.). Thus, this left an unpaid balance of the "principal sum of the just compensation," warranting the imposition of interest. However, as aptly pointed out by petitioner, the twelve percent (12%) p.a. rate of legal interest is only applicable until June 30, 2013. Thereafter, legal interest shall be at six percent (6%) p.a. in line with BSP-MB Circular No. 799, Series of 2013. Nonetheless, it bears to clarify that legal interest shall run not from the date of the filing of the complaint but from the date of the issuance of the Writ of Possession, since it is from this date that the fact of the deprivation of property can be established. CA decision affirmed with modification as to the reckoning date when interest started to accrue and the applicable interest rates for the periods before and after the effectivity of the BSP-MB Circular. 33. Napocor v. Sps Chiong (Consequential Damage and benefit) GR. 152436 Facts: NAPOCOR filed a complaint for eminent domain with the RTC of Iba, Zambales. It sought the acquisition of an easement of right-of-way and certain portions of agricultural lands owned by respondents, to be used in its Northwestern Luzon Transmission Line Project. NAPOCOR prayed for the issuance of a writ of possession and an order of expropriation, the appointment of three (3) commissioners to determine the just compensation, and to adjudge NAPOCOR as having a lawful right to enter, take, and acquire an easement of right-of-way over portions of the properties owned by herein respondents. In their answer, the respondents did not dispute the purpose of NAPOCOR in instituting the expropriation proceedings. However, they pointed out that NAPOCOR had already entered and taken possession of a portion of their realty and wanted to occupy another portion of the adjacent property. Respondents averred that the fair market value for both properties was P1,100.00 per square meter or a total of P8,800,000.00 and prayed that the trial court direct NAPOCOR to pay them said amount. NAPOCOR filed an ex parte motion for the issuance of a writ of possession, which the trial court granted. The trial court appointed commissioners to determine the fair market value of the land, as well as the total area taken by petitioner from respondents. After considering the reports of the Commissioners, the trial court gave due course to the same and directed the petitioner to pay the respondents their land containing an area of 4,000 square meters at P500.00 per square meter and an interest of six (6%) percent per annum from April 16, 1998 until fully paid. Dissatisfied, NAPOCOR filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA but the latter dismissed the same for lack of merit. Hence this petition for review on certiorari Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the Order of the RTC by dismissing NAPOCOR’s petition for certiorari. Held: In eminent domain or expropriation proceedings, the general rule is that the just compensation to which the owner of condemned property is entitled to is the market value. Market value is that sum of money which a person desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner willing but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given and received therefor. The aforementioned rule, however, is modified where only a part of a certain property is expropriated. In such a case the owner is not restricted to compensation for the portion actually taken. In addition to the market value of the portion taken, he is also entitled to recover for the consequential damage, if any, to the remaining part

of the property. At the same time, from the total compensation must be deducted the value of the consequential benefits. Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals gravely erred in upholding the RTC order requiring it to pay the full market value of the expropriated properties, notwithstanding the fact that the petitioner was only acquiring an easement of right-of-way. However, a perusal of its complaint shows that petitioner also stated that it would erect structures for its transmission lines on portions of the expropriated property. In other words, the expropriation was not to be limited for the purpose of easement of right-of-way. In finding that the trial court did not abuse its authority in evaluating the evidence and the reports placed before it nor did it misapply the rules governing fair valuation, the Court of Appeals found the majority reports valuation of P500 per square meter to be fair. Said factual finding of the Court of Appeals, absent any showing that the valuation is exorbitant or otherwise unjustified, is binding on the parties as well as this Court. Petition is denied for lack of merit. CA decision affirmed. 34. Ansaldo vs Tantuico GR. 50147 Facts: Two lots of private ownership were taken by the Government and used for the widening of a road more than forty-three years ago, without benefit of an action of eminent domain or agreement with its owners, albeit without protest by the latter. The lots, belonging to the petitioners, were taken from them some time in 1947 by the Department of Public Work, Transportation and Communication and made part of what used to be Sta. Mesa Street and is now Ramon Magsaysay Avenue at San Juan, Metro Manila. Said owners made no move whatever until twenty-six years later. They wrote to ask for compensation for their land. Their claim was referred to the Secretary of Justice, who thus advised that the corresponding expropriation suit be forthwith instituted to fix the just compensation to be paid to the Ansaldos. Pursuant to this opinion, the Commissioner of Public Highways requested the Provincial Assessor of Rizal to make a redetermination of the market value of the Ansaldos' property. The new valuation was made, after which the Auditor of the Bureau of Public Highways forwarded the Ansaldos' claim to the Auditor General with the recommendation that payment be made on the basis of the current and fair market value and not on the fair market value at the time of taking. The Commission on Audit, however, declined to adopt the recommendation. The Acting Chairman ruled that the amount of compensation to be paid to the claimants is to be determined as of the time of the taking of the subject lots. The ruling was reiterated by the Commission, and again when it denied the Ansaldos' motion for reconsideration. It is these rulings of the Commission on Audit that the Ansaldos have appealed to this Court. Issue: Whether the precise time at which just compensation should be fixed is as of the time of actual taking of possession by the expropriating entity or only after conveyance of title to the expropriator pursuant to expropriation proceedings duly instituted. Held: In the context of the State's inherent power of eminent domain, there is a "taking" when the owner is actually deprived or dispossessed of his property; when there is a practical destruction or a

material impairment of the value of his property or when he is deprived of the ordinary use thereof. Where the owner is deprived of the ordinary and beneficial use of his property or of its value by its being diverted to public use, there is taking within the Constitutional sense. There was undoubtedly a taking of the Ansaldos' property when the Government obtained possession thereof and converted it into a part of a thoroughfare for public use. It is as of the time of such a taking, to repeat, that the just compensation for the property is to be established. The reason for the rule is that the value thereof may be enhanced by the public purpose for which it is taken; the entry by the plaintiff upon the property may have depreciated its value thereby; or, there may have been a natural increase in the value of the property from the time the complaint is filed, due to general economic conditions. The owner of private property should be compensated only for what he actually loses; it is not intended that his compensation shall extend beyond his loss or injury. And what he loses is only the actual value of his property at the time it is taken. This is the only way that compensation to be paid can be truly just not only to the individual whose property is taken but, to the public, which is to pay for it. Petition denied. COA decision affirmed. 35. NAPOCOR V. TIANGCO GR. 170846 Facts: Respondents, all surnamed Tiangco, are the owners of a parcel of land with an area of 152,187 square meters at Tanay, Rizal. On the other hand, petitioner NPC is a government-owned and controlled corporation created for the purpose of undertaking the development and generation of power from whatever source. NPCs charter (Republic Act No. 6395) authorizes the corporation to acquire private property and exercise the right of eminent domain. NPC requires 19,423 square meters of the respondents aforementioned property, across which its 500Kv Kalayaan-San Jose Transmission Line Project will traverse. NPCs Segregation Plan for the purpose shows that the desired right-of-way will cut through the respondents land. After repeated unsuccessful negotiations with the respondents, NPC filed with the RTC of Tanay, Rizal a complaint for expropriation against them. In time, the respondents filed their answer. The trial court issued a Condemnation Order, granting NPC the right to take possession of the area sought to be expropriated. In the same Order, the court directed the parties to nominate their respective commissioners, with a third member to be nominated and appointed by the court itself, to determine the proper amount of just compensation to be paid to the respondents. The trial court issued an order directing NPC to pay and deposit with the Rizal Provincial Treasurer the amount of P81,204.00, representing the temporary provisional value of the area subject of the expropriation prior to the taking of possession thereof. With NPC having complied with the deposit requirement, a writ of possession was issued in its favor. NPC filed an amended complaint to acquire only 19,423 square meters of the respondents property. The original area of 20,220 square meters initially sought to be expropriated under the original complaint turned out to be in excess of the area required.

For its part, NPC made it clear that it is interested only in acquiring an easement of right-of-way over the respondents property and that ownership of the area over which the right-of-way will be established shall remain with the respondents. From the evidence before it, the trial court made a determination that the market value of the property is P2.09 per square meter, or P40,594.07 for the entire 19,423 square meters needed by NPC, and not the P30.00 per square meter claimed by the respondents. The respondents moved for reconsideration. Respondents maintain that the price of P30.00 per square meter for the needed area of 19,423 square meters is the reasonable amount and should be the basis for fixing the amount of just compensation due them. The trial court denied the motion. From the aforesaid decision of the trial court, both NPC and the respondents went on appeal to the CA whereat the separate appeals were consolidated and docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 53576. The appellate court found merit in the respondents appeal, and disregarded the P2.09 per square meter valuation of the trial court, which was based on a 1984 tax declaration. Instead, the CA placed reliance upon a 1993 tax declaration, being only two years removed from the time of taking. The appellate court determined the time of taking to be in 1991. Thus, the greater value of P913,122.00 as declared in Tax Declaration No. 011-2667 dated July 23, 1993 should be the basis for determining just compensation. NPC moved for reconsideration, but its motion was denied by the appellate court. Issue: What amount is just by way of compensation for the 19,423 square-meter portion of the respondents property. Held: The trial court fixed the value of the property at its 1984 value, while the CA, at its 1993 worth. Neither of the two determinations is correct. In eminent domain cases, the time of taking is the filing of the complaint, if there was no actual taking prior thereto. Hence, in this case, the value of the property at the time of the filing of the complaint on November 20, 1990 should be considered in determining the just compensation due the respondents. There is no issue as to the improvements. Since the P325,025.00 valuation therefor is the very price set by the NPC commissioner, to which the corporation did not object but otherwise adopts, the Court fixes the amount of P325,025.00 as just compensation for the improvements. Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the takers gain, but the owners loss. In the determination of such value, the court is not limited to the assessed value of the property or to the schedule of market values determined by the provincial or city appraisal committee. The nature and character of the land at the time of its taking is the principal criterion for determining how much just compensation should be given to the landowner. All the facts as to the condition of the property and its surroundings, as well as its improvements and capabilities, should be considered. Neither of the two determinations made by the courts below is therefore correct. A new one must be arrived at, taking into consideration the foregoing pronouncements. Petitioner further claims that it should not be made to pay compensation for the entirety of the land since what is claims to expropriate is only an easement of right of way and not ownership thereof. This cannot be sustained. If the easement is intended to perpetually or indefinitely deprive the owner of his proprietary rights through the imposition of conditions that affect the ordinary use, free

enjoyment and disposal of the property or through restrictions and limitations that are inconsistent with the exercise of the attributes of ownership, or when the introduction of structures or objects which, by their nature, create or increase the probability of injury, death upon or destruction of life and property found on the land is necessary, then the owner should be compensated for the monetary equivalent of the land. Petition is partially granted. CA decision is set aside as it pertains to the determination of just compensation for the subject property. Case is remanded to the court a quo for proper determination of just compensation. CA decision is affirmed as it pertains to the award for the improvements.

Eve Villaruel 36. CITY of Cebu vs Spouses Dedamo GR. 142971

CITY OF CEBU v. SPS. APOLONIO AND BLASA DEDAMO, GR No. 142971, 2002-05-07 Facts: Petitioner City of Cebu filed... a complaint for eminent domain against respondents spouses Apolonio and Blasa Dedamo.The petitioner alleged therein that it needed the following parcels of land of respondents... for a public purpose for the construction of a public road. The total area sought to be expropriated is 1,624 square meters with an assessed value of P1,786,400. Petitioner deposited with the Philippine National Bank the amount of P51,156 representing 15% of the fair market value of the property to... enable the petitioner to take immediate possession of the property pursuant to Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160. Respondents, filed a motion to dismiss the complaint because the purpose for which their property was to be expropriated was not for a public purpose but for benefit of a single private entity, the Cebu Holdings, Inc. Petitioner could simply buy directly from them the... property at its fair market value if it wanted to, just like what it did with the neighboring lots. Besides, the price offered was very low in light of the consideration of P20,000 per square meter, more or less, which petitioner paid to the neighboring lots. Petitioner filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of possession The motion was granted by the trial court... the parties executed and submitted to the trial court an Agreement... wherein they declared that they have partially settled the case and in consideration thereof they agreed Pursuant to said agreement, the trial court appointed three commissioners to determine the just compensation of the lots sought to be expropriated. Thereafter, the commissioners submitted their report, which contained their respective assessments of and recommendation as to the valuation of the property. Plaintiff is directed to pay Spouses Apolonio S. Dedamo and Blasa Dedamo the sum of pesos: P24,865.930.00... the commissioners submitted an amended assessment... and fixed it at P12,824.10 per square meter, or in the amount of P20,826,339.50.

The assessment was approved as the just compensation thereof by the trial court Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals... petitioner alleged that... just compensation should be based on the prevailing... market price of the property at the commencement of the expropriation proceedings. Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court. Petitioner filed with us the petition for review in the case at bar. Issues: Whether just compensation should be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. Ruling: Just compensation shall be determined as of the time of actual taking. We explicitly stated... that although the general rule in determining just compensation in eminent domain is the value of the property as of the date of the filing of the complaint, the rule "admits of an exception: where this Court fixed the value of the property as of the date it was taken and not at... the date of the commencement of the expropriation proceedings." Also, the trial court followed the then governing procedural law on the matter, which was Section 5 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, which provided as follows: SEC. 5. Ascertainment of compensation. -- Upon the entry of the order of condemnation, the court shall appoint not more than three (3) competent and disinterested persons as commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just compensation for the... property sought to be taken. The order of appointment shall designate the time and place of the first session of the hearing to be held by the commissioners and specify the time within which their report is to be filed with the court. the parties, by a solemn document freely and voluntarily agreed upon by them, agreed to be bound by the report of the commission and approved by the trial court. The agreement is a contract between the parties. It has the force of law between... them and should be complied with in good faith. Furthermore, during the hearing, petitioner did not interpose a serious objection. It is therefore too late for petitioner to question the valuation now without violating the principle of equitable estoppel. Records show that petitioner consented to conform with the valuation recommended by the commissioners. It cannot detract from its agreement now and... assail correctness of the commissioners' assessment. 37. ASSOC OF SMALL LANDOWNERS v. DAR 175 SCRA 343 (1998)

FACTS:

The following are consolidated cases: 1. A petition alleging the constitutionality of PD No. 27, EO 228 and 229 and RA 6657. Subjects of the petition are a 9-hectare and 5 hectare Riceland worked by four tenants. Tenants were declared full owners by EO 228 as qualified farmers under PD 27. The petitioners now contend that President Aquino usurped the legislature‘s power. 2. A petition by landowners and sugar planters in Victoria‘s Mill Negros Occidental against Proclamation 131 and EO 229. Proclamation 131 is the creation of Agrarian Reform Fund with initial fund of P50Billion. 3. A petition by owners of land which was placed by the DAR under the coverage of Operation Land Transfer. 4. A petition invoking the right of retention under PD 27 to owners of rice and corn lands not exceeding seven hectares.

ISSUE: Whether the aforementioned EO‘s, PD, and RA were constitutional. HELD: The promulgation of PD 27 by President Marcos was valid in exercise of Police power and eminent domain. The power of President Aquino to promulgate Proc. 131 and EO 228 and 229 was authorized under Sec. 6 of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution. Therefore it is a valid exercise of Police Power and Eminent Domain RA 6657 is likewise valid. The carrying out of the regulation under CARP becomes necessary to deprive owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain for which payment of just compensation is imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of the title and the physical possession of said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favour of the farmer-beneficiary. The Court declares that the content and manner of the just compensation provided for in Section 18 of the CARP Law is not violative of the Constitution. 38. DAR V. CA 249 SCRA 149 (1995) 39. SEC OF DPWH AND ENGR. CONTRERAS V. SPS. TECSON GR. 179334 40. Republic v Lim GR. 161656

Jella Capadocia 41. Napocor vs Heirs of Sangkay (Inverse Condemnation) GR. 165828

FACTS:​ National Power Corporation (NPC) undertook the Agus River Hydroelectric Power Plant Project to generate electricity for Mindanao. It included the construction of several underground tunnels to be used in diverting the water flow from the Agus River to the hydroelectric plants. On 1997, Respondents sued NPC for recovery of damages of the property and a prayer for just compensation. They alleged that the tunnel deprived them of the agricultural, commercial, industrial and residential value of their land; and that their land had also become an unsafe place for habitation, forcing them and their workers to relocate to safer grounds. ISSUE:​ Whether the Heirs of Sangkay have the right to just compensation RULING:​ Just compensation is the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. It has the objective to recover the value of property taken in fact by the governmental defendant, even though no formal exercise of the power of eminent domain has been attempted by the taking agency. The underground tunnels impose limitations on respondents’ use of the property for an indefinite period and deprive them of its ordinary use. Hence, respondents are clearly entitled to the payment of just compensation. Notwithstanding the fact that petitioner only occupies the sub-terrain portion, it is liable to pay not merely an easement fee but rather the full compensation for land. It is settled that the taking of private property for public use, to be compensable, need not be an actual physical taking or appropriation. This is so because in this case, the nature of the easement practically deprives the owners of its normal beneficial use. Compensable taking includes destruction, restriction, diminution, or interruption of the rights of ownership or of the common and necessary use and enjoyment of the property in a lawful manner, lessening or destroying its value.

42. Meralco v Pineda 206 SCRA 196 (1992)

FACTS:​ ​MERALCO wanted to construct a 230 KV Transmission line from Barrio Malaya to

Tower at Pililla, Rizal in the real estate property of Teofilo Arayon Sr., Gil de Guzman, Lucito Santiago and Teresa Bautista. Parties attempt negotiations but failed to reach an agreement and offers to pay compensation. Respondents then filed a complaint for eminent domain with the trial court and won the case granting them rights to expropriate the property needed. Unfortunately, the petitioner sold to NAPOCOR its power plant and transmission lines including the property disputed herein. The court then ordered the appraisal of the land in answer for the motion for withdrawal of deposit which respondents were entitled to. However, the apprisal by the commissioners were never completed due to the suspension when petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss due to the said sale to NAPOCOR. Later, respondents file another motion for for payment and the court granted them another sum for the compensation. Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration that at this stage the respondents are not yet entitled to payment of just compensation as there is no appraisal yet and that court, upon awarding a fraction of sum, based it only on a witness of a credible realestate broker instead of employing the assistance of three commissioners to determine just compensation.

ISSUE: ​W/N the employment of three commissioners in the ascertainment of just compensat ion is dispensable

RULING:​ The judge's act of determining and ordering the payment of just compensation without the assistance of a Board of Commissioners is a flagrant violation of MERALCO's constitutional right to due process and is a gross violation of the mandated rule established by the Revised Rules of Court.In an expropriation case where the principal issue is the determination of just compensation, a trial before the Commissioners is indispensable to allow the parties to present evidence on the issue of just compensation. The appointment of at least 3 competent persons as commissioners to ascertain just compensation for the property sought to be taken is a mandatory requirement in expropriation cases. While it is true that the findings of commissioners may be disregarded and the court may substitute its own estimate of the value, the latter may only do so for valid reasons: 1. where the Commissioners have applied illegal principles to the evidence submitted to them; 2. where they have disregarded a clear preponderance of evidence; 3. where the amount allowed is either grossly inadequate or excessive. Thus, trial with the aid of the commissioners is a substantial right that may not be done away with capriciously or for no reason at all. Moreover, in such instances, where the report of the commissioners may be disregarded, the trial court may make its own estimate of value from competent evidence that may be gathered from the record.

43. NPC v. Henson GR NO. 129998

FACTS: On 21 March 1990, the National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) originally instituted with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Third Judicial District, Branch 46, San Fernando, Pampanga a complaint for eminent domain, later amended on 11 October 1990, for the taking for public use of 5 parcels of land, owned or claimed by Lourdes Henson (married to Eugenio Galvez), Josefina Henson (married to Petronio Katigbak, Jesusa Henson, Corazon Henson (married to Jose Ricafort), Alfredo Tanchiatco, Bienvenido David, Maria Bondoc Capili (married to Romeo Capili), and Miguel Manoloto, with a total aggregate area of 58,311 square meters, for the expansion of the NAPOCOR Mexico Sub-Station. On 28 March 1990, NAPOCOR filed an urgent motion to fix the provisional value of the subject parcels of land. On 20 April 1990, Henson, et. al. filed a motion to dismiss. They did not challenge NAPOCOR's right to condemn their property, but declared that the fair market value of their property was from P180.00 to P250.00 per square meter. On 10 July 1990, the trial court denied Henson, et. al.'s motion to dismiss, but the court did not declare that NAPOCOR had a lawful right to take the property sought to be expropriated. However, the court fixed the provisional value of the land at P100.00 per square meter, for a total area of 63,220 square meters of Henson, et. al.'s property, to be deposited with the Provisional Treasurer of Pampanga. NAPOCOR deposited the amount on 29 August 1990. On 5 September 1990, the trial court issued a writ of possession in favor of NAPOCOR, and, on 11 September 1990, the court's deputy sheriff placed NAPOCOR in possession of the subject land. On 22 November 1990, and 20 December 1990, the trial court granted the motions of Henson, et. al. to withdraw the deposit made by NAPOCOR of the provisional value of their property amounting to P5,831,100.00, with a balance of P690,900.00, remaining with the Provisional Treasurer of Pampanga. On 5 April 1991, the trial court issued an order appointing 3 commissioners to aid the in the reception of evidence to determine just compensation for the taking of subject property. After receiving the evidence and conducting an ocular inspection, the commissioners submitted to the court their individual reports. However, the trial court did not conduct a hearing on any of the reports. On 19 May 1993, the trial court rendered judgment fixing the amount of just compensation to be paid by the NAPOCOR for the taking of the entire area of 63,220 squares meters at P400.00 per square meter, with legal interest thereon computed from 11 September 1990, when NAPOCOR was placed in possession of the land, plus attorney's fees of P20,000.00, and costs of the proceedings. In due time, NAPOCOR appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 23 July 1997, the Court of Appeals rendered decision affirming that of the Regional Trial Court, except that the award of P20,000.00 as attorney's fees was deleted. NAPOCOR filed a petition for review before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: ​Whether the determination of the court would be valid without hearing on the report of the Commissioners. RULING: The trial court and the Court of Appeals fixed the value of the land at P400.00 per square meter, which was the selling price of lots in the adjacent fully developed subdivision, the Santo Domingo Village Subdivision. The parcels of land sought to be expropriated, however, are undeniably idle, undeveloped, raw agricultural land, bereft of any improvement. Except for the Henson family, all the other landowners were admittedly farmer beneficiaries under operation land transfer of the Department of Agrarian Reform. However, the land has been reclassified as residential. The nature and character of the land at the time of its taking is the principal criterion to determine just compensation to the landowner. Unfortunately, the trial court, after creating a board of commissioners to help it determine the market value of the land did not conduct a hearing on the report of the commissioners. The trial court fixed the fair market value of subject land in an amount equal to the value of lots in the adjacent fully developed subdivision. This finds no support in the evidence. The valuation was even higher than the recommendation of anyone of the commissioners (Commissioner Mariano C. Tiglao fixed the fair market value at P350.00 per square meter, while Commissioner Arnold P. Atienza fixed it at P375.00 per square meter, and Commissioner Victorino Oracio fixed it at P170.00 per square meter). Commissioner Atienza's recommendation appears to be the closest valuation to the market value of lots in the adjoining fully developed subdivision. Considering that the subject parcels of land are undeveloped raw land, the price of P375.00 per square meter would appear to the Court as the just compensation for the taking of such raw land.

44. Napocor v. Sps. De La Cruz GR. No. 156093

FACTS:​ Petitioner NAPOCOR is a government-owned and controlled corporation created under Republic Act No. 6395, as amended, with the mandate of developing hydroelectric power, producing transmission lines, and developing hydroelectric power throughout the Philippines. NAPOCOR decided to acquire an easement of right-of-way over portions of land within the areas of Dasmariñas and Imus, Cavite for the construction and maintenance of the proposed Dasmariñas-Zapote 230 kV Transmission Line Project. On November 27, 1998, petitioner led a Complaint for eminent domain and expropriation of an easement of right-of-way against respondents as registered owners of the parcels of land sought to be expropriated. The affected areas were 51.55, 18.25, and 14.625 square meters, respectively, or a total of 84.425 square meters. After respondents led their respective answers to petitioner’s Complaint, petitioner deposited PhP 5,788.50 to cover the provisional value of the land in accordance with Section 2, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. Then, on February 25, 1999, petitioner led an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Possession, which the trial court granted in its March 9, 1999 Order However, the trial court dropped the Dela Cruz spouses and

their mortgagee, Metrobank, as parties-defendants in its May 11, 1999 Order, 6 in view of the Motion to Intervene led by respondent/intervenor Virgilio M. Saulog, who claimed ownership of the land sought to be expropriated from respondents spouses Dela Cruz.The trial court terminated the pre-trial in so far as respondent Ferrer was concerned, considering that the sole issue was the amount of just compensation. As to the just compensation for the property of Saulog, successor-in- interest of the Dela Cruz spouses, the trial court ordered the latter and petitioner to submit their compromise agreement. The commissioners conducted an ocular inspection of S.K. Dynamics’ property, and on October 8, 1999, they submitted a report to the trial court and recommended that the property of S.K. Dynamics to be expropriated by petitioner be valued at PhP 10,000.00 per square meter. The records show that the commissioners did not afford the parties the opportunity to introduce evidence in their favor, nor did they conduct hearings before them. In fact, the commissioners did not issue notices to the parties to attend hearings nor provide the concerned parties the opportunity to argue their respective causes. Upon the submission of the commissioners’ report, petitioner was not notied of the completion or ling of it nor given any opportunity to le its objections to it. On December 1, 1999, respondent Ferrer led a motion adopting in toto the commissioners’ report with respect to the valuation of his property. On December 28, 1999, the trial court consequently issued the Order approving the commissioners’ report, and granted respondent Ferrer’s motion to adopt the subject report. Subsequently, the just compensation for the disparate properties to be expropriated by petitioner for its project was uniformly pegged at PhP 10,000.00 per square meter. Incidentally, on February 11, 2000, respondent S.K. Dynamics led a motion informing the trial court that in addition to the portion of its property covered by TCT No. T-454278 sought to be expropriated by petitioner, the latter also took possession of an 8.55-square meter portion of S.K. Dynamics’ property covered by TCT No. 503484 for the same purpose––to acquire an easement of right-of-way for the construction and maintenance of the proposed Dasmariñas- Zapote 230 kV Transmission Line Project. Respondent S.K. Dynamics prayed that said portion be included in the computation of the just compensation to be paid by petitioner.The Imus, Cavite RTC granted S.K. Dynamics’ motion to have the 8.55-square meter portion of its property included in the computation of just compensation. The Regional Trial Court xed the just compensation to be paid by petitioner at PhP 10,000.00 per square meter. On January 20, 2000, petitioner led a Motion for Reconsideration of the above mentioned Order, but said motion was denied in the trial court’s March 23, 2000 Order. Unsatised with the amount of just compensation, petitioner led an appeal before the CA. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of RTC.

ISSUE:​ Whether or not the valuation of just compensation herein was not based from the evidence on record and other authentic documents.

RULING:​ ​The legal basis for the determination of just compensation was insufficient

In this case, it is not disputed that the commissioners recommended that the just compensation be pegged at PhP 10,000.00 per square meter. The commissioners arrived at the gure in question after their ocular inspection of the property, wherein they considered the surrounding structures, the property’s location and, allegedly, the prices of the other, contiguous real properties in the area. Furthermore, based on the commissioners’ report, the recommended just compensation was determined as of the time of the preparation of said report on October 5, 1999. In B.H. Berkenkotter & Co. v. Court of Appeals, we held, thus:

Just compensation is dened as the full and fair equivalent of the property sought to be expropriated. The measure is not the taker’s gain but the owner’s loss. The compensation, to be just, must be fair not only to the owner but also to the taker. Even as undervaluation would deprive the owner of his property without due process, so too would its overvaluation unduly favor him to the prejudice of the public. To determine just compensation, the trial court should rst ascertain the market value of the property, to which should be added the consequential damages after deducting therefrom the consequential benets which may arise from the expropriation. If the consequential benets exceed the consequential damages, these items should be disregarded altogether as the basic value of the property should be paid in every case. The market value of the property is the price that may be agreed upon by parties willing but not compelled to enter into the contract of sale. Not unlikely, a buyer desperate to acquire a piece of property would agree to pay more, and a seller in urgent need of funds would agree to accept less, than what it is actually worth. x x x

Among the factors to be considered in arriving at the fair market value of the property are the cost of acquisition, the current value of like properties, its actual or potential uses, and in the particular case of lands, their size, shape, location, and the tax declarations thereon. It is settled that just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the taking, which usually coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings. Where the institution of the action precedes entry into the property, the just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the ling of the complaint. We note that in this case, the ling of the complaint for expropriation preceded the petitioner’s entry into the property. Therefore, it is clear that in this case, the sole basis for the determination of just compensation was the commissioners’ ocular inspection of the properties in question, as gleaned from the commissioners’ October 5, 1999 report. The trial court’s reliance on the said report is a serious error considering that the recommended compensation was highly speculative and had no strong factual moorings. For one, the report did not indicate the fair market value of the lots occupied by the Orchard Golf and Country Club, Golden City Subdivision, Arcontica Sports Complex, and other business establishments cited. Furthermore, the commissioners’ report itself is awed considering that its recommended just compensation was pegged as of October 5, 1999, or the date when the said report was issued, and not the just compensation as of the date of the ling of the complaint for expropriation, or as of November 27, 1998. Clearly, the legal basis for the determination of just compensation in this case is insufficient as earlier enunciated.

45. Leca Realty v. Republic GR No. 155605

FACTS: ​On 18 March 1996, the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), filed a complaint for eminent

domain for the taking of some portions of the properties of Leca Realty Corp. (Leca), Leeleng Realty Inc. (Leeleng), Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. (Metrobank), Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI), and Cityland Inc. (Cityland). The said properties would be affected by the construction of the EDSA-Shaw Boulevard Overpass Project in Shaw Boulevard, Mandaluyong City, a public purpose to be undertaken by the DPWH. Attached to the complaint is, among other things, Resolution No. 94-1 of the City Appraisal Committee of Mandaluyong, which was created to appraise the properties that would be affected by the construction of the project in question. In the said resolution, the City Appraisal Committee fixed the fair market values of defendants' properties, as follows: '1. All lots situated along Shaw Boulevard from Edsa going westward towards Manila up to Samat Street, that City, at THIRTY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P35,000) per square meter[.] The property of defendant-appellant Leca is approximately 297.00 meters from the intersection of Shaw Boulevard and EDSA On October 7, 1997, the court a quo appointed three (3) competent and disinterested persons; namely, Atty. Benjamin C. Angeles, Mr. Joselito E. Gunio and Mr. Melchor Savillo as commissioners to ascertain and report the just compensation of the properties sought to be taken. On January 9, 1998, the commissioners submitted their report dated January 8, 1998, and recommended the fair market value of the subject properties as follows: '1. Properties of Leca Realty Corporation and Leeleng Realty Inc.: P50,000 per sq.m. In arriving at the said Report, the Commissioners took into consideration the following factors: property location, identification[,] neighborhood data, community facilities and utilities, highest and best use, valuation and reasonable indication of land values within the vicinity. ISSUE: WON the Commissioner’s report with regards to the valuation of the properties of Leca Realty Corp is valid.

RULING:​ ​ No. The values arrived at in the Commissioners' Report were not supported by sufficient evidence. Moreover, they were allegedly based on newspaper

listings of advertisements,​29​ which the commissioners deemed to be reasonable indices of the fair market value. Further, mere offers of sale -- not consummated transactions In expropriation proceedings in general, the market value is the just compensation to which the owner of a condemned property is entitled. More precisely, ​market value is "that sum of money which a person desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner willing but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given and received therefor. The Commissioners' Report relied heavily on newspaper advertisements of offers of sale of properties in the vicinity. Clearly, these offers were merely asking prices. By their very nature, they are subject to negotiations in which a buyer may ask for a lower price; understandably, it is customary for the owner to raise the price offer.

Cristine Chuck 46. 47. 48. 49. 50.

NPC VS ANGAS 208 SCRA 196 (1992) Wycoco v. Judge Caspillo GR. 146733 City of Manila v. Oscar Serrano GR. 142304 Republic v. Gingoyon GR. No. 166429 CIR VS. ALGUE INC 158 SCRA 9 (1998)

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION VS. ANGAS [GR 60225-26, 8 MAY 1992] Second Division, Paras (J): 4 concur Facts: On 13 April and 3 December 1974, the National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR), a government owned and controlled corporation and the agency through which the government undertakes the on-going infrastructure and development projects throughout the country, filed two complaints for eminent domain with the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Lanao del Sur (against Lacsamana Batugan, and/or Guimba Shipping & Development Corporation, Magancong Digayan, Moctara Lampaco, Lampaco Pasandalan, Dimaporo Subang, Hadji Daluma Kinidar, Dimaampao Baute, Pangonotan Cosna Tagol, Salacop Dimacaling, Hadji Sittie Sohra Linang Batara, Bertudan Pimping And/Or Cadurog Pimping, Butuan Tagol, Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 41 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Disangcopan Marabong, and Hadji Salic Sawa in Civil Case 2248; and against Mangorsi Casan, Casnangan Batugan, Pundamarug Atocal, Pasayod Pado, Dimaampao Baute, Casnangan Baute, Dimaporo Subang, Tambilawan Ote, Manisun Atocal, and Masacal Tomiara in Civil Case 2277). The complaint which sought to expropriate certain specified lots situated at Limogao, Saguiaran, Lanao del Sur was for the purpose of the development of hydro-electric power and production of electricity as well as the erection to such subsidiary works and constructions as may be necessarily connected therewith. Both cases were jointly tried upon agreement of the parties. After a series of hearings were held, on 15 June 1979, a consolidated decision was rendered by the lower court, declaring and confirming that the lots mentioned and described in the complaints have entirely been lawfully condemned and expropriated by NAPOCOR, and ordering the latter to pay the landowners certain sums of money as just compensation for their lands expropriated "with legal

interest thereon until fully paid. Two consecutive motions for reconsideration of the consolidated decision were filed by NAPOCOR. The same were denied by the court. NAPOCOR did not appeal on the consolidated decision, which became final and executory. Thus, on 16 May 1980, one of the landowners (Sittie Sohra Batara) filed an ex-parte motion for the execution of the decision, praying that petitioner be directed to pay her the unpaid balance of P14, 300.00 for the lands expropriated from her, including legal interest which she computed at 6% per annum. The said motion was granted by the lower court. Thereafter, the lower court directed the petitioner to deposit with its Clerk of Court the sums of money as adjudged in the joint decision dated 15 June 1979. NAPOCOR complied with said order and deposited the sums of money with interest computed at 6% per annum. On 10 February 1981, another landowner (Pangonatan Cosna Tagol) filed with the trial court an exparte motion praying, for the first time, that the legal interest on the just compensation awarded to her by the court be computed at 12% per annum as allegedly "authorized under and by virtue of Circular 416 of the Central Bank issued pursuant to Presidential Decree 116 and in a decision of the Supreme Court that legal interest allowed in the judgment of the courts, in the absence of express contract, shall be computed at 12% per annum." On 11 February 1981, the lower court granted the said motion allowing 12% interest per annum. Subsequently, the other landowners filed motions also praying that the legal interest on the just compensation awarded to them be computed at 12% per annum, on the basis of which the lower court issued on 10 March 1981 and 28 August 1981 orders bearing similar import. NAPOCOR moved for the reconsideration of the lower court's last order dated 28 August 1981, which the court denied on 25 January 1982. NAPOCOR filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether, in the computation of the legal rate of interest on just compensation for expropriated lands, the rate applicable as legal interest is 6% (Article 2209 of the Civil Code) or 12% (Central Bank Circular 416). Held: Article 2209 of the Civil Code, which provides that "If the obligation consists in the payment of a sum of money, and the debtor incurs a delay, the indemnity for damages, there being no stipulation to the contrary, shall be the payment of the interest agreed upon, and in the absence of stipulation, the legal interest, which is six percent per annum," and not Central Bank Circular 416, is the law applicable. The Central Bank circular applies only to loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits and to judgments involving such loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits. This is evident not only from said circular but also from Presidential Decree 116, which amended Act 2655, otherwise known as the Usury Law. On the other hand, Article 2209 of the Civil Code applies to transactions requiring the payment of indemnities as damages, in connection with any delay in the performance of the obligation arising therefrom other than those covering loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits. Herein, the transaction involved is clearly not a loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits but expropriation of certain parcels of land for a public purpose, the payment of which is without stipulation regarding interest, and the interest adjudged by the trial court is in the nature of indemnity for damages. The legal interest required to be paid on the amount of just compensation for the properties expropriated is manifestly in the form of indemnity for damages for the delay in the payment thereof. Therefore, since the kind of interest involved in the joint judgment of the lower court sought to be enforced in this case is interest by way of damages, and not by way of earnings from loans, etc. Article 2209 of the Civil Code shall apply. WYCOCO V. JUDGE CASPILLO [G.R. No. 146733, January 13, 2004] FACTS: Felciano Wycoco owned 94.1690 hectares unirrigated and untenanted rice land. TCT No. NT.206422 and voluntarily offered to sell the land to Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) in line with the (CARP) for P14.9M. A notice of intention to acquire 84.5690 hectares for P1, 342, 667.46 by the DAR sent to him. The amount raised to P2,594,045.39 and later modified to P2,280,159.82 excluded the idle areas. He refused and prompted the DAR to indorse the case to DARAB, fixing the just compensation. DARAB requested the LBP to open a trust account for Wycoco and deposited the compensation offered by the DAR and the properties were distributed to the beneficiaries. On April

30, 93 he filed a manifestation in VOS case no. 232 NE 93 while Cabanatuan Court acting as the Special Agrarian Court. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the RTC of Cabanatuan has jurisdiction over the case. 2. Whether or not there was a just compensation offered to the plaintiff. HELD: Point out that there‘s no need for Wycoco to present an evidence in support of the land valuation in as much as it is in public knowledge that the prevailing market value of agricultural lands in Nueva Ecija is from P135,000.00 to P150,000.00 per hectare. So the curt fixed the compensation of: P142,500.00 per hectare 94.1690, hectares (land size) P13,428,082 and a total compensation + actual damages P29,663,235.00 for unrealized profits and P8,475,210.00 legal interest. This must be paid by DAR. DAR and LBP filed a separate petition before the CA and dismissed on May 29,97. Final execution June 6,07 and Feb. 9,99 respectively. The dismissal prompted Wycoco to file a petition for mandamus before SC praying the execution of Cabanatuan court‘s decision and compelled Judge Caspillon to inhibit himself from the hearing of the case. CA modified the decision, deducted the compensation due to Wycoco the amount corresponding to 3.372 hectares for it was found to have been previously sold to Republic. Sec 50 and 57 of R.A. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform law of 1988). DAR as an administrative agency cannot be granted jurisdiction over the cases of eminent domain and over criminal cases. The valuation of property in eminent domain is essentially a judicial function which is vested with the Special Agrarian Courts and cannot lodge with administrative agencies. Rule XIII Sec.II of New Rules of Procedures of DARAB Sec.II... just compensation shall not be appealable to the Board but shall be brought directly to the RTC designated as Special Agrarian Court. So, RTC or Cabanatuan has jurisdiction over the case at bar because it is the designated as SAC. RTC should have allowed the parties to present evidences so a fair compensation shall be determined. There are factors to be considered such as the cost of acquisition, size, shape, location and tax declaration, for ignoring the said factors, remand of the case for determination is necessary. This case be remanded to RTC for the determination of just compensation

REPUBLIC VS GINGOYON FACTS: The construction of the NAIA 3 had spawned controversies that had its roots with the promulgation of the Court‘s decision in Agan vs PIATCO (2003 decision), which nullified the contract between the Government and the contractor (PIATCO) for being contrary to law and public policy. At the time of the promulgation of the 2003 decision, the NAIA 3 facilities had already been built by PIATCO and were nearing completion and several respondents filed their respective motions for the reconsideration of the 2003 Decision but were denied by the Court in its Resolution dated 21 January 2004. However, the Court this time squarely addressed the issue of the rights of PIATCO to refund, compensation or reimbursement for its expenses in the construction of the NAIA 3 facilities. After the promulgation of the rulings in Agan, the NAIA 3 facilities have remained in the possession of PIATCO. On December 21, 2004, the Government filed a Complaint for expropriation with the Pasay City Regional Trial Court (RTC).The Government sought for the issuance of a writ of possession authorizing it to take immediate possession and control over the NAIA 3 facilities. The Government also declared that it had deposited 3 Billion in cash with the Land Bank of the Philippines, representing the assessed value for taxation purposes. This was the case now presided by Honorable Gingoyon. On the same day that the complaint was filed, the RTC issued an Order directing the issuance of a writ of possession to the Government, authorizing it to "take or enter upon the possession" of the NAIA 3 facilities. This decision was based on Section 2, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which prescribes that the initial deposit be equivalent to the assessed value of the property for purposes of taxation, however this was amended by

Republic Act No. 8974. RA 8974 provides that as the relevant standard for initial compensation, the market value of the property as stated in the tax declaration or the current relevant zonal valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), whichever is higher, and the value of the improvements and/or structures using the replacement cost method. On the basis of RA 8974, the RTC directed first, that the Land Bank of the Philippines, Baclaran Branch, immediately release the amount of US$62,343,175.77 to PIATCO. Second, the Government was directed to submit to the RTC a Certificate of Availability of Funds signed by authorized officials to cover the payment of just compensation. Third, the Government was directed "to maintain, preserve and safeguard" the NAIA 3 facilities or "perform such as acts or activities in preparation for their direct operation" of the airport terminal, pending expropriation proceedings and full payment of just compensation. The Government was also not allowed to perform acts of ownership like leasing any part of NAIA 3 to other parties. The Government filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration on the assailed January 4, 2005 order. On 7 January 2005, the RTC issued another Order, the second now assailed before this Court, which appointed 3 Commissioners to ascertain the amount of just compensation for the NAIA 3 Complex. And on the same day the Government issued a Motion for Inhibition of Hon. Gingoyon. These motions were heard by the RTC but were denied in an Omnibus Order dated January 10, 2005. Thus the present petition for Certiorari for the nullification of the RTC orders dated January 4, 7 and 10, 2005 and for the inhibition of Hon. Gingoyon from taking further action on the expropriation case. ISSUE: Whether Rule 67 of the Rules of Court or Rep. Act No. 8974 governs the expropriation proceedings in this case. HELD: Rep. Act No. 8974 applies in this case, particularly insofar as it requires the immediate payment by the Government of at least the proffered value of the NAIA 3 facilities to PIATCO and provides certain valuation standards or methods for the determination of just compensation. Since funds have been spent by PIATCO in their construction, for the take over the said facility, it has to compensate respondent PIATCO as builder of the said structures. The compensation must be just and in accordance with law and equity for the government cannot unjustly enrich itself at the expense of PIATCO and its investors. Sec 2 Rule 67, states that plaintiff shall have the right to take or enter upon the possession of the real property involved if he deposits with the authorized government depositary an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property for purposes of taxation to be held by such bank subject to the orders of the court. In contrast, Section 4 of Rep. Act No. 8974 relevantly states: Upon the filing of the complaint, and after due notice to the defendant, the implementing agency shall immediately pay the owner of the property the amount equivalent to the sum of one hundred percent of the value of the property based on the current relevant zonal valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue; and the value of the improvements and/or structures as determined under Section 7. If Sec2 Rule 67 applies then PIATCO would be enjoined from receiving a single centavo as just compensation before the Government takes over the NAIA 3 facility by virtue of a writ of possession. Hence the Court ruled that just compensation should be made before the Government may take over the NAIA 3. CITY OF MANILA, VS. SERRANO [GR 142304, 20 JUNE 2001] Second Division, Mendoza (J): 4 concur Facts:

On 21 December 1993, the City Council of Manila enacted Ordinance 7833, authorizing the expropriation of certain properties in Manila's First District in Tondo, covered by TCTs 70869, 105201, 105202, and 138273 of the Register of Deeds of Manila, which are to be sold and distributed to qualified occupants pursuant to the Land Use Development Program of the City of Manila. One of the properties sought to be expropriated, denominated as Lot 1-C, consists of 343.10 square meters, and was in the name of Feliza de Guia. Lot 1-C was assigned to Edgardo De Guia, one of the heirs of Alberto De Guia, in turn one of the heirs of Feliza de Guia. On 29 July 1994, the said property was transferred to Lee Kuan Hui, in whose name TCT 217018 was issued. The property was subsequently sold on 24 January 1996 to Demetria De Guia to whom TCT 226048 was issued. On 26 September 1997, the City of Manila filed an amended complaint for expropriation (Civil Case 94-72282) with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Manila, against the supposed owners of the lots covered by TCTs 70869 (including Lot 1-C), 105201, 105202, and 138273, which included herein respondents Oscar, Felicitas, Jose, Benjamin, Estelita, Leonora, Adelaida, all surnamed Serrano. On 12 November 1997, the Serranos filed a consolidated answer, praying the exemption of Lot 1-C from expropriation. Upon motion by the City, the trial court issued an order, dated 9 October 1998, directing the City to deposit the amount of P1,825,241.00 equivalent to the assessed value of the properties. After the City had made the deposit, the trial court issued another order, dated 15 December 1998, directing the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the City. The Serranos filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. On 16 November 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision holding that although Lot 1-C is not exempt from expropriation because it undeniably exceeds 300 square meters which is no longer considered a small property within the framework of RA 7279, the other modes of acquisition of lands enumerated in §§59-10 of the law must first be tried by the city government before it can resort to expropriation, and thus enjoined the City from expropriating Lot 1-C. In its resolution, dated 23 February 2000, the Court of Appeals likewise denied two motions for reconsideration filed by the City. The City filed a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether it was premature to determine whether the requirements of RA 7279, §§9-10 have been complied with. Held: Rule 67, §2 provides that "Upon the filing of the complaint or at any time thereafter and after due notice to the defendant, the plaintiff shall have the right to take or enter upon the possession of the real property involved if he deposits with the authorized government depositary an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property for purposes of taxation to be held by such bank subject to the orders of the court. Such deposit shall be in money, unless in lieu thereof the court authorizes the deposit of a certificate of deposit of a government bank of the Republic of the Philippines payable on demand to the authorized government depositary. If personal property is involved, its value shall be provisionally ascertained and the amount to be deposited shall be fixed by the court. After such deposit is made the court shall order the sheriff or other proper officer to forthwith place the plaintiff in possession of the property involved and promptly submit a report thereof to the court with service of copies to the parties." Thus, a writ of execution may be issued by a court upon the filing by the government of a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance and upon deposit made by the government of the amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property subject to expropriation. Upon compliance with these requirements, the issuance of the writ of possession becomes ministerial. Herein, these requirements were satisfied and, therefore, it became the ministerial duty of the trial court to issue the writ of possession. The distinction between the Filstream and the present case is that in the former, the judgment in that case had already become final while herein, the trial court has not gone beyond the issuance of a writ of possession. Hearing is still to be held to determine whether or not petitioner indeed complied with the requirements provided in RA 7279. Whether the City has complied with these provisions requires the presentation of evidence, although in its amended complaint petitioner did allege that it had complied with the requirements. The determination of this question must await the hearing on the complaint for expropriation, particularly the hearing for the condemnation of the properties sought to be expropriated. Expropriation proceedings consists of two stages: first, condemnation of the property after it is determined that its acquisition will be for a public purpose or public use and, second, the determination of just compensation to be paid for the taking of private property to be made by the court with the assistance of not more than three commissioners.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE VS. ALGUE INC. GR No. L-28896 | Feb. 17, 1988 Facts: Algue Inc. is a domestic corp engaged in engineering, construction and other allied activities. On Jan. 14, 1965, the corp received a letter from the CIR regarding its delinquency income taxes from 1958-1959, amounting to P83,183.85. A letter of protest or reconsideration was filed by Algue Inc on Jan 18. On March 12, a warrant of distraint and levy was presented to Algue Inc. thru its counsel, Atty. Guevara, who refused to receive it on the ground of the pending protest. Since the protest was not found on the records, a file copy from the corp was produced and given to BIR Agent Reyes, who deferred service of the warrant. On April 7, Atty. Guevara was informed that the BIR was not taking any action on the protest and it was only then that he accepted the warrant of distraint and levy earlier sought to be served. On April 23, Algue filed a petition for review of the decision of the CIR with the Court of Tax Appeals. CIR contentions: the claimed deduction of P75,000.00 was properly disallowed because it was not an ordinary reasonable or necessary business expense and payments are fictitious because most of the payees are members of the same family in control of Algue and that there is not enough substantiation of such payments. CTA: 75K had been legitimately paid by Algue Inc. for actual services rendered in the form of promotional fees. These were collected by the Payees for their work in the creation of the Vegetable Oil Investment Corporation of the Philippines and its subsequent purchase of the properties of the Philippine Sugar Estate Development Company. Issue: W/N the Collector of Internal Revenue correctly disallowed the P75,000.00 deduction claimed by Algue as legitimate business expenses in its income tax returns Ruling: Taxes are the lifeblood of the government and so should be collected without unnecessary hindrance, made in accordance with law. RA 1125: the appeal may be made within thirty days after receipt of the decision or ruling challenged. During the intervening period, the warrant was premature and could therefore not be served. Originally, CIR claimed that the 75K promotional fees to be personal holding company income, but later on conformed to the decision of CTA. There is no dispute that the payees duly reported their respective shares of the fees in their income tax returns and paid the corresponding taxes thereon. CTA also found, after examining the evidence, that no distribution of dividends was involved. CIR suggests a tax dodge, an attempt to evade a legitimate assessment by involving an imaginary deduction. Algue Inc. was a family corporation where strict business procedures were not applied and immediate issuance of receipts was not required. at the end of the year, when the books were to be closed, each payee made an accounting of all of the fees received by him or her, to make up the total of P75,000.00. This arrangement was understandable in view of the close relationship among the persons in the family corporation. The amount of the promotional fees was not excessive. The total commission paid by the Philippine Sugar Estate Development Co. to Algue Inc. was P125K. After deducting the said fees, Algue still had a balance of P50,000.00 as clear profit from the transaction. The amount of P75,000.00 was 60% of the total commission. This was a reasonable proportion, considering that it was the payees who did practically everything, from the formation of the Vegetable Oil Investment Corporation to the actual purchase by it of the Sugar Estate properties. Sec. 30 of the Tax Code: allowed deductions in the net income – Expenses - All the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business, including a reasonable allowance for salaries or other compensation for personal services actually rendered. The burden is on the taxpayer to prove the validity of the claimed deduction. In this case, Algue Inc. has proved that the payment of the fees was necessary and reasonable in the light of the efforts exerted by the payees in inducing investors and prominent businessmen to venture in an experimental enterprise and involve themselves in a new business requiring millions of pesos. Taxes are what we pay for civilization society. Without taxes, the government would be paralyzed for lack of the motive power to activate and operate it. Hence, despite the natural reluctance to surrender part of one's hard earned income to the taxing authorities, every person who is able to must contribute his share in the running of the government. The government for its part, is expected to respond in the form of tangible and intangible benefits intended to improve the lives of the people and enhance their moral

and material values. Taxation must be exercised reasonably and in accordance with the prescribed procedure. If it is not, then the taxpayer has a right to complain and the courts will then come to his succor Algue Inc.’s appeal from the decision of the CIR was filed on time with the CTA in accordance with Rep. Act No. 1125. And we also find that the claimed deduction by Algue Inc. was permitted under the Internal Revenue Code and should therefore not have been disallowed by the CIR.

Lloyd Alfred Espiña Carpio 51. Commissioner vs Makasiar 177 SCRA 27 (1989) Facts: On 7 December 1978, the then Court of First Instance of Manila (herein referred to as CFI-MANILA) issued Search and Seizure Warrants in Criminal Case Nos. 8602 and 8603 entitled “People of the Philippines vs. Howard J. Sosis,, et al.,” for violation of Section 11 (a) and/or 11(e) of Republic Act No. 3720, * and violation of Article 188 of the Revised Penal Code (captioned as “Substituting and altering trademarks, tradenames, or service marks”), respectively, and ordering the seizure. Team from the Ministry of Finance Bureau of Investigation and Intelligence, the Bureau of Customs and the Integrated National Police enforced the search and seizure warrant. The said items remained in the Hercules compound guarded. the Collector of Customs for the Port of Manila, issued a warrant of seizure and detention, in Seizure Identification No. 2-79, and ordered the immediate seizure and turnover of the seized items to its Auction and Cargo Disposal Division at the Port of Manila. CFI-MANILA issued an order authorizing the transfer and delivery of the seized articles to the customs warehouse. Hercules objected to the continuation by the Collector of Customs of the seizure proceedings claiming, among others, that these proceedings would hamper or even jeopardize the preliminary investigation being conducted by the fiscal. Hercules filed a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order with another sala. RTC decided in favour of Hercules hence the petition. Issue: Whether or not respondent judge may enjoin the Collector of Customs from continuing with its seizure and forfeiture proceedings over goods earlier seized by virtue of search warrants issued by the CFI-MANILA? Held: Decision reversed. The Court must emphasize at this point that the instant case does not involve a conflict of jurisdictions. Proceedings before the regular courts for criminal prosecutions against Howard Sosis, et al., and seizure and forfeiture proceedings for the subject goods conducted by the Bureau of Customs may be maintained simultaneously and independently of each other. For the nature of the two proceedings are entirely different such that a resolution in one is not decisive of the issue in the other. The latter, which is administrative and civil in nature, is directed against the res or articles imported and entails a determination of the legality of its importation. The former is directed against those persons who may be held liable for violating the penal laws in connection with the importation. 52. City of Pasig & Crispina Salumbre v. Meralco GR. 181710

Facts: On 26 December 1992, the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Pasig enacted Ordinance No. 25 which, under its Article 3, Section 32, imposed a franchise tax on all business venture operations carried out through a franchise within the municipality. By virtue of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7829, which took effect on 25 January 1995, the Municipality of Pasig was converted into a highly urbanized city to be known as the City of Pasig. On 24 August 2001, the Treasurer's Office of the City Government of Pasig informed the Manila Electric Company (MERALCO), a grantee of a legislative franchise,4 that it is liable to pay taxes for the period 1996 to 1999, pursuant to Municipal Ordinance No. 25. The city, thereafter, on two separate occasions, demanded payment of the said tax in the amount of P435,332,196.00, exclusive of penalties. On 8 February 2002, MERALCO protested the validity of the demand. MERALCO instituted an action before the RTC for the annulment of the said demand with prayer for a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction. The RTC ruled in favor of the City of Pasig. Issue: Whether the CA was correct in ruling that the City of Pasig had no valid basis for its imposition of franchise tax for the period 1996 to 1999. Held: We answer in the affirmative. I. Unlike a city, a municipality is bereft of authority to levy franchise tax, thus, the ordinance enacted for that purpose is void. The conversion of the municipality into a city does not lend validity to the void ordinance. Neither does it authorize the collection of the tax under said ordinance. The power to impose franchise tax belongs to the province by virtue of Section 137 of the LGC. On the other hand, the municipalities are prohibited from levying the taxes specifically allocated to provinces. Consequently, the CA was correct when it declared that the demand of the City of Pasig upon MERALCO for the payment of the disputed tax was devoid of legal basis. It bears emphasizing that the DOJ and the RTC of Pasig City had previously declared Section 32 of Municipal Ordinance No. 25 as void ab initio. Even the City of Pasig, it seems, does not contest the

invalidity of said ordinance. 53. YMCA VS VIR 33 PHIL 217 (1916) Facts: YMCA is a non-stock, non-profit institution which conducts various programs and activities that are beneficial for the public, especially the young people pursuant to its religious, educational and charitable objectives. YMCA earned an income from leasing a portion of its premises to small shop owners and from parking fees collected from non-members, upon w/c CIR assessed taxes. YMCA protested the assessment and got denied. This led to filing for petition for review with Court of Tax Appeals. CTA decided in favour of YMCA citing that the income from the lease and fees are reasonably incidental to and reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the objectives of YMCA. The earnings from these for the use of recreational facilities constitute the bulk of its income w/c is used to support its many activities to attain its objectives. CIR elevated the case to CA w/c reversed CTA decision. Issue: Whether or not income of YMCA from lease and fee are exempt from tax? Held: The income is not exempt from tax. Under NIRC, the income received by civic league or clubs not organized for profit are exempt from tax in respect to income received by them. The exemption does not apply to income derived from any of their properties or any activities conducted for profit regardless of the disposition made of such income. Because taxes are the lifeblood of the nation, stict interpretation in construing tax exemptions should be applied. Exemption “must be granted in a statute stated in a language too clear to be mistaken.” 54. Province of Abra vs. Hernando 107 SCRA 104 (1989) Facts: The provincial assessor made a tax assessment on the properties of the Roman Catholic Bishop of Bangued. The bishop claims tax exemption from real estate tax, through an action for declaratory relief. A summary judgment was made granting the exemption without hearing the side of the Province of Abra. Issue: Whether the properties of the Bishop of Bangued are tax-exempt. Held: The 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions differ in language as to the exemption of religious property from taxes as tehy should not only be “exclusively” but also “actually” and “directly” used for religious purposes. Herein, the judge accepted at its face the allegation of the Bishop instead of demonstrating that there is compliance with the constitutional provision that allows an exemption. There was an allegation of lack of jurisdiction and of lack of cause of action, which should have compelled the judge to accord a hearing to the province rather than deciding the case immediately in favor of the Bishop. Exemption from taxation is not favored and is never presumed, so that if granted, it must be strictly construed against the taxpayer. There must be proof of the actual and

direct use of the lands, buildings, and improvements for religious (or charitable) purposes to be exempted from taxation. 55. Abra vs Valley College vs Aquino 162 SCRA 106 (1988) Facts: Abra Valley College is an educational corporation and institution of higher learning in Bangued, Abra. In 1974, the CFI ordered for the seizure and sale of the subject school property for non-payment of real estate taxes and penalties. Private respondents stated that the college lot and building in question are not only used for educational purposes of the college, but also as the permanent residence of the President and Director, Mr. Pedro V. Borgonia, and his family including his in-laws and grandchildren; while the ground floor of the college building is being used and rented by a commercial establishment. ISSUE: Whether or not the lot and building in question are used exclusively for educational purposes and thus exempted from paying taxes. HELD: The 1935 Philippine Constitution, Art. VI, par. 3 Sec. 22, expressly grants exemption from realty taxes for “Cemeteries, churches and parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, and all lands, buildings, and improvements used exclusively for religious, charitable or educational purposes…. Thus, the use of the second floor of the main building for residential purposes of the Director and his family, may find justification under the concept of incidental use, which is complimentary to the main or primary purpose–educational. The lease of the first floor, however, by a commercial establishment cannot be considered incidental to the purpose of education. Under the 1935 Constitution, the trial court correctly arrived at the conclusion that the school building as well as the lot where it is built, should be taxed, not because the second floor of the same is being used by the Director and his family for residential purposes, but because the first floor thereof is being used for commercial purposes.

Alexandrhea Toledo 56. CIR VS DLSU GR. 196596 57. PUNZALAN vs municipal board 58. City of Manila v. Cosmos Bottlin Company Corp. GR. 196681 59. Physical Therapy Org. Vs Municipal Board GR. 10448 60. Corona v. United HArbor Pilots Association of the Phils. 283 SCRA 31 Dec 12, 1997