Constitutional Law 1 - File No. 3

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 File No. 3 4. GOVERNMENT a) Definition, distinguished from administration Government - is the agency of instrumentality through which the will of the State is formulated, expressed and realized. Administration – is distinguished from government, as the aggregate the aggregate of persons in whose hands the reigns of government are for the time being (the Chief ministries or heads of departments. But the terms are often interchanged. Government of the Republic of the Philippines - is the corporate governmental entity through which the functions of government are exercised throughout the Philippines, including the various arms which political authority is made effective, whether pertaining to the autonomous regions, the provincial, city or barangay subdivisions or other forms of local government (Sec. 2 (10, E.O. 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987). CASES •

We understand, in modern political science... by the term “government”, that institution or aggregate of institutions by which an independent society makes and carries out those rules of action which are necessary to enable men to live in a social state, or which are imposed upon the people forming that society by those who possess the power or authority of prescribing them. Government is the aggregate of authorities which rule a society. By “administration” , we understand... the aggregate of those persons in whose hands the reins of government are for the time being (the chief ministers or heads of departments. But the Court adds that the terms “government” and “administration” are often used interchangeably (US vs. Dorr, 2 Phil 332).

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The AFP-RSBS was created by Presidential Decree No. 361. Its purpose is akin to those of the GSIS and the SSS, as in fact it is the system that manages the retirement and pension funds of those in the military service. Its enabling law further mandates that the

System shall be administered by the Chief of Staff of the AFP through an agency, group, committee or board, which may be created and organized by him and subject to such rules and regulations governing the same as he may, subject to the approval of the Secretary of National Defense, promulgate from time to time. Moreover, the investment of funds of the System shall be decided by the Chief of Staff of the AFP with the approval of the Secretary of the Secretary of the National Defense. While it may be true that there have been no appropriations for the contribution of funds to the AFP-RSBS, the Government is not precluded from later on adding to the funds in order to provide additional benefits to the men in uniform. These above considerations indicate that the character and operations of the AFP-RSBS are imbued with public interest. As such, the Court held that the same is government entity and its funds are in the nature of public funds (People vs. Sandiganbayan, GR 145951, August 12, 2003). •

Issue: Whether the ACA is engaged in governmental or proprietary functions. The Court held that ACA is a government office or agency engaged in governmental, not proprietary functions. These functions may not be strictly what President Wilson described as "constituent" (as distinguished from "ministrant"), such as those relating to the maintenance of peace and the prevention of crime, those regulating property and property rights, those relating to the administration of justice and the determination of political duties of citizens, and those relating to national defense and foreign relations. Under this traditional classification, such constituent functions are exercised by the State as attributes of sovereignty, and not merely to promote the welfare, progress and prosperity of the people — these latter functions being ministrant, the exercise of which is optional on the part of the government. The growing complexities of modern society, however, have rendered this traditional classification of the functions of government quite unrealistic, not to say obsolete. The areas which used to be left to private enterprise and initiative and which the government was called upon to enter optionally, and only "because it was better equipped to administer for the public welfare than is any private individual or group of individuals" continue to lose their well-defined boundaries and to be absorbed within activities that the government must undertake in its sovereign capacity if it is to meet the increasing social challenges of the times. Here as almost everywhere else the tendency is undoubtedly towards a greater socialization of economic forces (ACCFA vs. CUGCO, 30 SCRA 649).

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An informed citizenry with access to the diverse currents in political, moral and artistic thought and data relative to them, and the free exchange of ideas and discussion of issues thereon, is vital to the democratic government envisioned under our Constitution. The cornerstone of this republican system of government is delegation of power by the people to the State. In this system, governmental agencies and institutions operate within the limits of the authority conferred by the people. Denied access to information on the inner workings of government, the citizenry can become prey to the whims and caprices of those to whom the power had been delegated. The postulate of public office as a public trust, institutionalized in the Constitution (in Art. XI, Sec. 1) to protect the people from abuse of governmental power, would certainly be mere empty words if access to such information of public concern is denied, except under limitations prescribed by implementing legislation adopted pursuant to the Constitution. As stated in Legaspi, the people's right to information is limited to "matters of public concern", and is further "subject to such limitations as may be provided by law." Similarly, the State's policy of full disclosure is limited to "transactions involving public interest", and is "subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law."As observed in Legaspi: In determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern there is no rigid test which can be applied. "Public concern" like "public interest" is a term that eludes exact definition. Both terms embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine on a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public (Valmonte vs. Belmonte, 170 SCRA 256). b)

Classification i) facto

de

jure

or

de

De Jure - has a rightful title but no power or control, either because the same has been withdrawn from it or because it has not yet actually entered into the exercise thereof. De Facto actually exercises power or control but without legal title (Lawyers League for a Better Philippines v. Aquino, GR No 73748, May 22, 1986).

i. De facto proper – government that gets possession and control of, or usurps, by force or by the vice of the majority, the rightful legal government and maintains itself against the will of the latter, ii. Government of paramount force – established and maintained by military forces who invade and occupy a territory of the enemy in the course of war; and iii. Independent government – established by the inhabitants of the country who rise in insurrection against the parent state (Ko Kim Cham v. Valdez Tan Keh, 75 Phil. 113). ii) unitary or federal Federal government – is formed when a group of political units, such as states or provinces or together in a federation, surrendering their individual sovereignty and many powers to the central government. While retaining or reserving other limited powers. As a result, two or more levels of government exist within an established geographic territory. The body of law of the common central government is the federal law. Federal law is a body of law created by the federal government of a country. iii) monarchy, democracy

oligarchy,

theocracy,

Monarchy – is a form of government in which supreme power is absolutely or nominally lodged with an individual, who is the head of state, often for life or until abdication, and “is wholly set apart from all other members of the state.” The person who heads a monarchy is called Monarch. Oligarchy – is a form of government where power effectively rests with a small elite segment of society distinguished by royal, wealth, family, military or religious hegemony. The word oligarchy is from the Greek words for “few” and “rule. Such states are often controlled by politically powerful families whose children are heavily conditioned and monitored to be heirs of the power of the oligarchy. Oligarchies have been tyrannical throughout history, being completely a public servitude to exist. Theocrary – is a form of government in which a god or deity is recognized as the State’s supreme civil rules, or in a broader sense, a form of government in which a state is governed by immediate divine

guidance or by officials who are regarded as divinely guided. For believers, theocracy is a form of government in which divine power governs a earhy human state, either in a personal incarnation or more often, via religious institutional representatives (i.e. church), replacing or dominating civil government. Theocratic government enact theonomic laws. Democracy – is a form of government in which state power is held by the majority of citizens within a country or a state. It is derived from the Greek “popular government”, which was coined from “people” and “rule, strength” in the middle of the fifth-fourth century BC to denote the political systems then existing in some Greek City – states. iv) Presidential or Parliamentary Presidential form of Government  It is first adopted under the 1935 Constitution and borrowed from American system.  Its principal identifying feature is what is called the “separation of powers.” Legislative power is given to the Legislature; executive power is given to a separate Executive; and judicial power is held independent Judiciary.  The system is founded on the belief that, by establishing equilibrium among the three power holders, harmony will result, power will not to concentrated, and thus tyranny will be avoided.  Because of the prominent position, however, which the system gives to the President as chief executive, it is designated as a presidential form of government. Parliamentary form of Government  

It is the original 1973 Constitution that has adopted a still-born parliamentary system. The difference lies in certain essential features which are found in all varieties of the parliamentary form, such as the following: 1. The members of the government or cabinet or the executive arm are, simultaneously members of the legislature. 2. The government or cabinet, consisting of the political leaders of the majority party or of a coalition who are also members of the legislature. 3. The government or cabinet has a pyramidal structure at the apex of which is the Prime Minister or his equivalent.

4. The government or cabinet remains in power only for as long as it enjoy the support of majority of the legislature. 5. Both government and legislature are possessed o control devices with which each can demand of the other immediate political responsibility. 

In the hands of the legislature is the vote of non-confidence (censure) whereby the government may be ousted. In hands of the government is the power to dissolve the legislature and call for new elections.



Briefly, therefore, while the presidential system embodies interdependence by separation and coordination. Parliamentarism embodies interdependence by integration. v) Others CASES

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The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter. It belongs to the realm of politics where only the people of the Philippines are the judge. And the people have made the judgment; they have accepted the government of President Corazon C. Aquino which is in effective control of the entire country so that it is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government. Moreover, the community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the present government (In re: Bermudez, 145 SCRA 160).

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It is a legal truism in political and international law that all acts and proceedings of the legislative, executive, and judicial department of a de facto government are good and valid. There are several kinds of de facto governments. The first, or government de facto in a proper legal sense, is that government that gets possession and control of, or usurps, by force or by the voice of the majority, the rightful legal government and maintains itself against the will of the latter, such government of England under the Commonwealth, first by Parliament and later by Cromwell as Protector. The second is that which is established and maintained by military forces who invade and occupy a territory of the enemy in the course of war, and which is denominated a government of paramount force, as the cases of Castine, in Maine,

which was reduced to British possession in the war of 1812, and of Tampico, Mexico, occupied during the war with Mexico, by the troops of the United States. And the third is that established as an independent government of the Southern Confederacy in revolt against the Union during the war of secession (Co Kim Chao vs. Valdez Tan Keh, 75 Phil 113). c) Historical survey of Philippine government CASES •

Under the American Regime: The Government of the Philippine Islands is not a State or a Territory, although its form and organization somewhat resembles that of both. It stands outside of the constitutional relation which unites the States and Territories into the Union. The authority for its creation and maintenance is derived from the Constitution of the United States, which, however, operates on the President and Congress, and not directly on the Philippine Government. It is the creation of the United States, acting through the President and Congress, both deriving power from the same source, but from different parts thereof. For its powers and the limitations thereon the Government of the Philippines looked to the orders of the President before Congress acted and the Acts of Congress after it assumed control. Its organic laws are derived from the formally and legally expressed will of the President and Congress, instead of the popular sovereign constituency which lies back of American constitutions. The power to legislate upon any subject relating to the Philippines is primarily in Congress, and when it exercises such power its act is from the viewpoint of the Philippines the legal equivalent of an amendment of a constitution in the United States. Within the limits of its authority the Government of the Philippines is a complete governmental organism with executive, legislative, and judicial departments exercising the functions commonly assigned to such departments. The separation of powers is as complete as in most governments. In neither Federal nor State governments is this separation such as is implied in the abstract statement of the doctrine. For instance, in the Federal Government the Senate exercises executive powers, and the President to some extent controls legislation through the veto power. In a State the governor is not a member of the legislative body, but the veto power enables him to exercise much control over legislation. The Governor-General, the head of the executive department in the

Philippine Government, is a member of the Philippine Commission, but as executive he has no veto power. The President and Congress framed the government on the model with which Americans are familiar, and which has proven best adapted for the advancement of the public interests and the protection of individual rights and privileges (US vs. Bull, 15 Phil 259). •

It is a doctrine too well established to need citation of authorities, that political questions are not within the province of the judiciary, except to the extent that power to deal with such questions has been conferred upon the courts by express constitutional or statutory provision. (16 C. J.S 431.) This doctrine is predicated on the principle of the separation of powers, a principle also too well known to require elucidation or citation of authorities. The difficulty lies in determining what matters fall within the meaning of political question. The term is not susceptible of exact definition, and precedents and authorities are not always in full harmony as to the scope of the restrictions, on this ground, on the courts to meddle with the actions of the political departments of the government (Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil 1).

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Issue [1]: Whether the Court has authority to pass upon the validity of Presidential Decree 73.Held [1]: Presidential Decree 73 purports to have the force and effect of a legislation, so that the issue on the validity thereof is manifestly a justiciable one, on the authority, not only of a long list of cases in which the Court has passed upon the constitutionality of statutes and/or acts of the Executive, 1 but, also, of no less than that of Subdivision (1) of Section 2, Article VIII of the 1935 Constitution, which expressly provides for the authority of the Supreme Court to review cases involving said issue. Issue [2]: Whether the President has the authority to issue PD 73 to submit to the People the Constitution proposed by the Convention. Held [2]: As regards the authority of the President to issue Presidential Decree 73, "submitting to the Filipino people (on January 15, 1973) for ratification or rejection the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention and appropriating funds therefor," it is unnecessary, for the time being, to pass upon such question, because the plebiscite ordained in said Decree has been postponed. In any event, should the plebiscite be scheduled to be held at any time later, the proper parties may then file such action as the circumstances may justify. Issue [3]: Whether martial law per se affects the validity of a submission to the people for ratification of specific proposals for

amendment of the Constitution. Held [3]: Said question has not been adequately argued by the parties in any of these cases, and it would not be proper to resolve such a transcendental question without the most thorough discussion possible under the circumstances (Planas vs. COMELEC, 49 SCRA 105). •

It is now an ancient rule that the valid source of a statute — Presidential Decrees are of such nature — may be contested by one who will sustain a direct injury as a result of its enforcement. At the instance of taxpayers, laws providing for the disbursement of public funds may be enjoined, upon the theory that the expenditure of public funds by an officer of the State for the purpose of executing an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds. The interest of the petitioners as taxpayers in the lawful expenditure of these amounts of public money sufficiently clothes them with that personality to litigate the validity of the Decrees appropriating said funds. The amending process both as to proposal and ratification, raises a judicial question. This is especially true in cases where the power of the Presidency to initiate the amending process by proposals of amendments, a function normally exercised by the legislature, is seriously doubted. Under the terms of the 1973 Constitution, the power to propose amendments to the Constitution resides in the interim National Assembly during the period of transition (Sec. 15, Transitory Provisions). After that period, and the regular National Assembly in its active session, the power to propose amendments becomes ipso facto the prerogative of the regular National Assembly (Sec. 1, pars. 1 and 2 of Art. XVI, 1973 Constitution). The normal course has not been followed. Rather than calling the interim National Assembly to constitute itself into a constituent assembly, the incumbent President undertook the proposal of amendments and submitted the proposed amendments thru Presidential Decree 1033 to the people in a Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16. Unavoidably, the regularity of the procedure for amendments, written in lambent words in the very Constitution sought to be amended, raises a contestable issue. The implementing Presidential Decree Nos. 991, 1031, and 1033, which commonly purport to have the force and effect of legislation are assailed as invalid, thus the issue of the validity of said Decrees is plainly a justiciable one, within the competence of this Court to pass upon. Section 2 (2) Article X of the new Constitution provides: "All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, executive agreement, or law shall be heard and decided by the Supreme Court en banc and no treaty, executive agreement, or law may be declared unconstitutional without the concurrence of at least ten

Members. . . .." The Supreme Court has the last word in the construction not only of treaties and statutes, but also of the Constitution itself. The amending, like all other powers organized in the Constitution, is in form a delegated and hence a limited power, so that the Supreme Court is vested with that authority to determine whether that power has been discharged within its limits. Political questions are neatly associated with the wisdom, not the legality of a particular act. Where the vortex of the controversy refers to the legality or validity of the contested act, that matter is definitely justiciable or non-political. What is in the heels of the Court is not the wisdom of the act of the incumbent President in proposing amendments to the Constitution, but his constitutional authority to perform such act or to assume the power of a constituent assembly. Whether the amending process confers on the President that power to propose amendments is therefore a downright justiciable question. Should the contrary be found, the actuation of the President would merely he a brutum fulmen. If the Constitution provides how it may be amended, the judiciary as the interpreter of that Constitution, can declare whether the procedure followed or the authority assumed was valid or not. Whether, therefore, that constitutional provision has been followed or not is indisputably a proper subject of inquiry, not by the people themselves — of course — who exercise no power of judicial review, but by the Supreme Court in whom the people themselves vested that power, a power which includes the competence to determine whether the constitutional norms for amendments have been observed or not. And, this inquiry must be done a priori not a posteriori, i.e., before the submission to and ratification by the people. As to the question on whether or not the Pres. Marcos may propose amendments to the Constitution in the absence of a grant of such constituent power to the President, the Court held that he could. If the President has been legitimately discharging the legislative functions of the Interim Assembly, there is no reason why he cannot validly discharge the function of that Assembly to propose amendments to the Constitution, which is an adjunct, although peculiar, to its gross legislative power (Sanidad vs. COMELEC, 73 SCRA 333). •

Pres. Marcos’ term was supposed to end on June 30, 1987. However, he submitted a letter of conditional resignation claiming that he would vacate his position effective only when election’s

held & after winner’s proclaimed & qualified as Pres by taking his oath of office 10 days after his proclamation. He claims that he is calling for the new elections to seek a new mandate to assess his policies & programs as demanded by the opposition. He further stressed that his term will be shortened but in the name of public accountability he believes that the final settlement of these issues can only be done thru a presidential election. B.P. Blg. 883: enacted by the Batasang Pambansa calling for special national elections on Feb. 7, 1986 for Pres & VP. Different sectors were against the special elections. Among the contentions are: 1. Such is unconstitutional because there was no vacancy in the presidency thus there’s no need to call for a special election. This is pursuant to Art. VII, Sec. 9 of the Constitution which requires an actual vacancy before an special election can be called and in such cases, the Speaker of the House will be the Acting Pres until a new one has been elected. 2. Unconstitutional because it allows the Pres to continue holding office after calling of the special election. Cutting his term short is valid but he should actually vacate the office. The Supreme Court voted 7 to dismiss petitions and deny prayer for issuance of injunction restraining respondents from holding election and 5 declared BP 883 unconstitutional & voted to grant the injunction. Since there are less than the required 10 votes to declare BP 883 unconstitutional, petitions are considered dismissed & writs prayed for denied. Justices filed separate opinions since only a resolution was issued. The Supreme Court voted 7 to dismiss petitions & deny prayer for issuance of injunction restraining respondents from holding election and 5 declared BP 883 unconstitutional & voted to grant the injunction. Since there are less than the required 10 votes to declare BP 883 unconstitutional, petitions are considered dismissed & writs prayed for denied. Justices filed separate opinions since only a resolution was issued (PBA vs. COMELEC, 140 SCRA 455). •

The lifting of PP 1017 through the issuance of PP 1021 – a supervening event – would have normally rendered this case moot and academic. However, while PP 1017 was still operative, illegal acts were committed allegedly in pursuance thereof. Besides, there is no guarantee that PP 1017, or one similar to it, may not again be issued. The transcendental issues raised by the parties should not

be “evaded;” they must now be resolved to prevent future constitutional aberration. The Court finds and so holds that PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it constitutes a call by the President for the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence. The proclamation is sustained by Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution and the relevant jurisprudence discussed earlier. However, PP 1017’s extraneous provisions giving the President express or implied power (1) to issue decrees; (2) to direct the AFP to enforce obedience to all laws even those not related to lawless violence as well as decrees promulgated by the President; and (3) to impose standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press, are ultra vires and unconstitutional. The Court also rules that under Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution, the President, in the absence of a legislation, cannot take over privately-owned public utility and private business affected with public interest. In the same vein, the Court finds G.O. No. 5 valid. It is an Order issued by the President – acting as Commander-in-Chief – addressed to subalterns in the AFP to carry out the provisions of PP 1017. Significantly, it also provides a valid standard – that the military and the police should take only the “necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless violence.” But the words “acts of terrorism” found in G.O. No. 5 have not been legally defined and made punishable by Congress and should thus be deemed deleted from the said G.O. While “terrorism” has been denounced generally in media, no law has been enacted to guide the military, and eventually the courts, to determine the limits of the AFP’s authority in carrying out this portion of G.O. No. 5 (David vs. Macapagal – Arroyo, GR 171396, May 3, 2006). d) Democratic government

and

republican

Republican State – it is one wherein all government authority emanates form the people and is exercised by representatives chosen by the people. Democratic State – this merely emphasizes that the Philippines has some aspect of direct democracy such as initiative and referendum.

i) Nemo est supra leges – “No one is above the Law” CASES •

The primary question is: Shall the judiciary permit a government of the men instead of a government of laws to be set up in the Philippine Islands? The Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban ordered the segregated district for women of ill repute, which had been permitted for a number of years in the city of Manila, closed. Between October 16 and October 25, 1918, the women were kept confined to their houses in the district by the police. Presumably, during this period, the city authorities quietly perfected arrangements with the Bureau of Labor for sending the women to Davao, Mindanao, as laborers. The women were given no opportunity to collect their belongings, and apparently were under the impression that they were being taken to a police station for an investigation. They had no knowledge that they were destined for a life in Mindanao. They had not been asked if they wished to depart from that region and had neither directly nor indirectly given their consent to the deportation. With this situation, a court would next expect to resolve the question. By authority of what law did the Mayor and the Chief of Police presume to act in deporting by duress these persons from Manila to another distant locality within the Philippine Islands? One can search in vain for any law, order, or regulation, which even hints at the right of the Mayor of the city of Manila or the chief of police of that city to force citizens of the Philippine Islands and these women, despite their being in a sense lepers of society, are nevertheless not chattels but Philippine citizens protected by the same constitutional guaranties as are other citizens to change their domicile from Manila to another locality. On the contrary, Philippine penal law specifically punishes any public officer who, not being expressly authorized by law or regulation, compels any person to change his residence (Villavicencio vs. Lukban, 39 Phil 778). ii) suffrage

(right

and

Universal duty), popular election, rule of

the majority iii)

Bill of rights

Bill of Rights – is a set prescriptions setting forth the fundamental civil and political rights of the individual, and imposing limitations on the powers of the government as a leans of securing the enjoyment of those rights. Classification of Rights: 1. Political rights – granted by law to members of community in relation to their direct or indirect participation in the establishment or administration of the government. 2. Civil rights – rights which municipal law will enforce at the instance of private individuals for the purpose of securing them the enjoyment of their means of happiness; 3. Social and economic rights; and 4. Human rights. iv) Public Officials

Accountability

of

Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must, at all times, be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency; act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives. Section 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment. Section 3. (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment. (2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution or endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such

referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof. (3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded. (4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed. (5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year. (6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate. (7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and punishment, according to law. (8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section. Section 4. The present anti-graft court known as the Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law. Section 5. There is hereby created the independent Office of the Ombudsman, composed of the Ombudsman to be known as Tanodbayan, one overall Deputy and at least one Deputy each for Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao. A separate Deputy for the military establishment may likewise be appointed.

Section 6. The officials and employees of the Office of the Ombudsman, other than the Deputies, shall be appointed by the Ombudsman, according to the Civil Service Law. Section 7. The existing Tanodbayan shall hereafter be known as the Office of the Special Prosecutor. It shall continue to function and exercise its powers as now or hereafter may be provided by law, except those conferred on the Office of the Ombudsman created under this Constitution. Section 8. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall be naturalborn citizens of the Philippines, and at the time of their appointment, at least forty years old, of recognized probity and independence, and members of the Philippine Bar, and must not have been candidates for any elective office in the immediately preceding election. The Ombudsman must have, for ten years or more, been a judge or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines. During their tenure, they shall be subject to the same disqualifications and prohibitions as provided for in Section 2 of Article 1X-A of this Constitution. Section 9. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least six nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council, and from a list of three nominees for every vacancy thereafter. Such appointments shall require no confirmation. All vacancies shall be filled within three months after they occur. Section 10. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall have the rank of Chairman and Members, respectively, of the Constitutional Commissions, and they shall receive the same salary which shall not be decreased during their term of office. Section 11. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall serve for a term of seven years without reappointment. They shall not be qualified to run for any office in the election immediately succeeding their cessation from office. Section 12. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees of the Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled

corporations, and shall, in appropriate cases, notify the complainants of the action taken and the result thereof. Section 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and duties: (1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient. (2) Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any public official or employee of the Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, as well as of any government-owned or controlled corporation with original charter, to perform and expedite any act or duty required by law, or to stop, prevent, and correct any abuse or impropriety in the performance of duties. (3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or employee at fault, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith. (4) Direct the officer concerned, in any appropriate case, and subject to such limitations as may be provided by law, to furnish it with copies of documents relating to contracts or transactions entered into by his office involving the disbursement or use of public funds or properties, and report any irregularity to the Commission on Audit for appropriate action. (5) Request any government agency for assistance and information necessary in the discharge of its responsibilities, and to examine, if necessary, pertinent records and documents. (6) Publicize matters covered by its investigation when circumstances so warrant and with due prudence. (7) Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape, mismanagement, fraud, and corruption in the Government and make recommendations for their elimination and the observance of high standards of ethics and efficiency.

(8) Promulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such other powers or perform such functions or duties as may be provided by law. Section 14. The Office of the Ombudsman shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Its approved annual appropriations shall be automatically and regularly released. Section 15. The right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees, from them or from their nominees or transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, laches, or estoppel. Section 16. No loan, guaranty, or other form of financial accommodation for any business purpose may be granted, directly or indirectly, by any government-owned or controlled bank or financial institution to the President, the VicePresident, the Members of the Cabinet, the Congress, the Supreme Court, and the Constitutional Commissions, the Ombudsman, or to any firm or entity in which they have controlling interest, during their tenure. Section 17. A public officer or employee shall, upon assumption of office and as often thereafter as may be required by law, submit a declaration under oath of his assets, liabilities, and net worth. In the case of the President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, the Congress, the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Commissions and other constitutional offices, and officers of the armed forces with general or flag rank, the declaration shall be disclosed to the public in the manner provided by law. Section 18. Public officers and employees owe the State and this Constitution allegiance at all times and any public officer or employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant of another country during his tenure shall be dealt with by law. v)

Legislature cannot pass irrepealable laws

vi) Powers

Separation

of

Purpose of the separation of powers: to prevent the concentration of authority in one person or group of persons that might lead to irreparable error or abuse in the exercise to the detriment of republican institution. CASES •

The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. For example, the Chief Executive under our Constitution is so far made a check on the legislative power that this assent is required in the enactment of laws. This, however, is subject to the further check that a bill may become a law notwithstanding the refusal of the President to approve it, by a vote of two-thirds or three-fourths, as the case may be, of the National Assembly. The President has also the right to convene the Assembly in special session whenever he chooses. On the other hand, the National Assembly operates as a check on the Executive in the sense that its consent through its Commission on Appointments is necessary in the appointment of certain officers; and the concurrence of a majority of all its members is essential to the conclusion of treaties. Furthermore, in its power to determine what courts other than the Supreme Court shall be established, to define their jurisdiction and to appropriate funds for their support, the National Assembly controls the judicial department to a certain extent. The Assembly also exercises the judicial power of trying impeachments. And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution. The Court held: 1. That the government established by the Constitution follows fundamentally the theory of separation of powers into the legislative, the executive and the judicial.

2. That the system of checks and balances and the overlapping of functions and duties often makes difficult the delimitation of the powers granted. 3. That in cases of conflict between the several departments and among the agencies thereof, the judiciary, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, is the only constitutional mechanism devised finally to resolve the conflict and allocate constitutional boundaries. 4. That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and appropriate cases and controversies, and is the power and duty to see that no one branch or agency of the government transcends the Constitution, which is the source of all authority. 5. That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation with specific powers and functions to execute and perform, closer for purposes of classification to the legislative than to any of the other two departments of the government. 6. That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly. 7. That under the organic law prevailing before the present Constitution went into effect, each house of the legislature was respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of their elective members. 8. That the present Constitution has transferred all the powers previously exercised by the legislature with respect to contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of its members, to the Electoral Commission. 9. That such transfer of power from the legislature to the Electoral Commission was full, clear and complete, and carried with it ex necesitate rei the implied power inter alia to prescribe the rules and regulations as to the time and manner of filing protests. 10. That the avowed purpose in creating the Electoral Commission was to have an independent constitutional organ pass upon all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, devoid of partisan influence or consideration, which object would be frustrated if the National Assembly were to retain the power to prescribe rules and regulations regarding the manner of conducting said contests.

11. That section 4 of article VI of the Constitution repealed not only section 18 of the Jones Law making each house of the Philippine Legislature respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns and qualifications of its elective members, but also section 478 of Act No. 3387 empowering each house to prescribe by resolution the time and manner of filing contests against the election of its members, the time and manner of notifying the adverse party,and bond or bonds, to be required, if any, and to fix the costs and expenses of contest. 12. That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any member, irrespective of whether his election is contested or not, is not essential before such member-elect may discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges of a member of the National Assembly. 13. That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any member against whom no protest had been filed prior to said confirmation, does not and cannot deprive the Electoral Commission of its incidental power to prescribe the time within which protest against the election of any member of the National Assembly should be filed (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil 139). •

Issue: Is Pres. Nixon's right to safeguard certain information, using his "executive privilege" confidentiality power, entirely immune from judicial review? No. The Court held that neither the doctrine of separation of powers, nor the generalized need for confidentiality of high-level communications, without more, can sustain an absolute, unqualified, presidential privilege. The Court granted that there was a limited executive privilege in areas of military or diplomatic affairs, but gave preference to "the fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair administration of justice." Therefore, the president must obey the subpoena and produce the tapes and documents. Nixon resigned shortly after the release of the tapes (US vs Nixon, 418 US 683).  Principle of Blending of Powers

Instance when powers are not confined exclusively within one department but are assigned to or shared by shared by several departments.  Principle of Checks and Balances

Allows one department to resist encroachments upon its prerogatives or to rectify mistakes or excesses committed by the other departments. CASES •

Issue: Did President Truman have the constitutional authority to seize and operate the steel mills? In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that the President did not have the authority to issue such an order. The Court found that there was no congressional statute that authorized the President to take possession of private property. The Court also held that the President's military power as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces did not extend to labor disputes. The Court argued that "the President's power to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker (Youngstown Co, vs. Sawyer, 343 US 579, 96 L.Ed. 1153).”

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The Congress cannot control the execution of its laws; since it doesn’t possess this power, it can’t delegate it to its agents. The CG is an agent of the Legislature because Congress can remove him by a process other than impeachment. The CG exercises executive power. Thus, the Act is unconstitutional.The CG’s function under the Act is the “very essence” of execution of the laws since (1) it entails interpreting the Act to determine precisely what kind of budgetary calculations are required and (2) the CG commands the President to carry out, without variation, the CG’s directive regarding the budget resolutions. Interpreting a law enacted by Congress is the “very essence” of executions of the laws. Once Congress passes legislation, it can only influence its execution by passing new laws or through impeachment. The Constitution only explicitly provides Congress the power to remove executive officers by impeachment. Also, the Constitutional Convention explicitly rejected language that would have permitted impeachment for “maladministration,” with Madison arguing that “so vague a term will be equivalent to a tenure during pleasure of the Senate.” Thus, Congress can only remove a member of the executive branch through impeachment (Bowsher vs. Synar, 478 US 714).

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Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefor and why it must be respected. The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade congressional requests for information without need of clearly asserting a right to

do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated. That is impermissible. For what republican theory did accomplish?was to reverse the old presumption in favor of secrecy, based on the divine right of kings and nobles, and replace it with a presumption in favor of publicity, based on the doctrine of popular sovereignty. Resort to any means then by which officials of the executive branch could refuse to divulge information cannot be presumed valid. Otherwise, we shall not have merely nullified the power of our legislature to inquire into the operations of government, but we shall have given up something of much greater value ? our right as a people to take part in government (Senate vs. Ermita (E.O. 464), GR 169777). vii) powers •

Non-delegation of

The fixing of rates is essentially a legislative power. When he issued E.O. No. 1088, President Marcos was authorized under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution to exercise legislative power, just as he was under the original 1973 Constitution, when he issued P.D. NO. 857 which created the PPA, endowing it with the power to regulate pilotage service in Philippine ports. Although the power to fix rates for pilotage had been delegated to the PPA, it became necessary to rationalize the rates of charges fixed by it through the imposition of uniform rates. That is what the President did in promulgating E.O. No. 1088. As the President could delegate the ratemaking power to the PPA, so could he exercise it in specific instances without thereby withdrawing the power vested by P.D. No. 857, Section 20(a) in the PPA "to impose, fix, prescribe, increase or decrease such rates, charges or fees... for the services rendered by the Authority or by any private organization within a Port District (Philippine Interisland Shipping Ass'n vs. CA, GR 100481, Jan. 22, 1997).”

 General Rule: Potestas delegate non potest delegare Premised on the ethical principle that delegated power constitutes not only a right but also a duty to be performed by the delegate through the instrumentality of his own judgment and not through the intervening mind of another.  Permissible Delegation

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The constitutionality of Act No. 4221 which provides for a system of probation for persons eighteen years of age or over who are convicted of crime is challenged on three principal grounds: (1) That said Act encroaches upon the pardoning power of the Executive; (2) that it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power and (3) that it denies the equal protection of the laws. As already stated, the Jones Law vests the pardoning power exclusively in the Chief Executive. But, probation and pardon are not coterminous; nor are they the same. In probation, the probationer is in no true sense, as in pardon, a free man. He is not finally and completely exonerated. He is not exempt from the entire punishment which the law inflicts. The Court held that the Probation Act does not conflict with the pardoning power of the Executive. The pardoning power, in respect to those serving their probationary sentences, remains as full and complete as if the Probation Law had never been enacted. The President may yet pardon the probationer and thus place it beyond the power of the court to order his rearrest and imprisonment. The power to make laws or the legislative power is vested in a bicameral Legislature by the Jones Law (sec. 12) and in a unicamiral National Assembly by the Constitution (Act. VI, sec. 1, Constitution of the Philippines. The Philippine Legislature or the National Assembly may not escape its duties and responsibilities by delegating that power to any other body or authority. Any attempt to abdicate the power is unconstitutional and void, on the principle that potestas delegata non delegare potest. The rule, however, which forbids the delegation of legislative power is not absolute and inflexible. It admits of exceptions. An exceptions sanctioned by immemorial practice permits the central legislative body to delegate legislative powers to local authorities. In testing whether a statute constitute an undue delegation of legislative power or not, it is usual to inquire whether the statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the hands of the legislature so that nothing was left to the judgment of any other appointee or delegate of the legislature (People vs. Vera, 65 Phil 56). a. Tariff Powers to the President (Sec. 28 (2), Art. VI; (2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or

imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government. b. Emergency Powers to the President (Section 23 (2), Art VI) (2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.

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Commonwealth Act No. 671 does not in term fix the duration of its effectiveness. The intention of the Act has to be sought for in its nature, the object to be accomplish, the purpose to be subserved, and its relation to the Constitution. Article VI of the Constitution provides that any law passed by virtue thereof should be "for a limited period." "Limited" has been defined to mean "restricted; bounded; prescribed; confined within positive bounds; restrictive in duration, extent or scope." The words "limited period" as used in the Constitution are beyond question intended to mean restrictive in duration. Emergency, in order to justify the delegation of emergency powers, "must be temporary or it can not be said to be an emergency." The assertion that new legislation is needed to repeal the act would not be in harmony with the Constitution either. If a new and different law were necessary to terminate the delegation, the period for the delegation, it has been correctly pointed out, would be unlimited, indefinite, negative and uncertain; "that which was intended to meet a temporary emergency may become permanent law,"; for Congress might not enact the repeal, and even if it would, the repeal might not meet the approval of the President, and the Congress might not be able to override the veto. Furthermore, this would create the anomaly that, while Congress might delegate its powers by simple majority, it might not be able to recall them except by a two-third vote. In other words, it would be easier for Congress to delegate its powers than to take them back. This is not right and is not, and ought not to be, the law.

More anomalous than the exercise of legislative function by the Executive when Congress is in the unobstructed exercise of its authority is the fact that there would be two legislative bodies operating over the same field, legislating concurrently and simultaneously, mutually nullifying each other's actions. Even if the emergency powers of the President, as suggested, be suspended while Congress was in session and be revived after each adjournment, the anomaly would not be limited. Congress by a two-third vote could repeal executive orders promulgated by the President during congressional recess, and the President in turn could treat in the same manner, between sessions of Congress, laws enacted by the latter. This is not a fantastic apprehension; in two instances it materialized. In entire good faith, and inspired only by the best interests of the country as they saw them, a former President promulgated an executive order regulating house rentals after he had vetoed a bill on the subject enacted by Congress, and the present Chief Executive issued an executive order on export control after Congress had refused to approve the measure. What then was the contemplated period? President Quezon in the same paragraph of his autobiography furnished part of the answer. He said he issued the call for a special session of the National Assembly "when it became evident that we were completely helpless against air attack, and that it was most unlikely the Philippine Legislature would hold its next regular session which was to open on January 1, 1942." It is our considered opinion, and we so hold, that Commonwealth Act No. 671 became inoperative when Congress met in regular session on May 25, 1946, and that Executive Orders Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226 were issued without authority of law. In so far as it is insinuated that the Chief Executive has the exclusive authority to say that war not ended, and may act on the strength of his opinion and findings in contravention of the law as the courts have construed it, no legal principle can be found to support the proposition. There is no pretense that the President has independent or inherent power to issue such executive orders as those under review. After the convening of Congress new legislation had to be approved if the continuation of the emergency powers, or some of them, was desired. In the light of the conditions surrounding the approval of the Emergency Power Act, we are of the opinion that the "state of total emergency as a result of war" envisaged in the preamble referred to the impending invasion and occupation of the Philippines by the enemy and the consequent total disorganization of the Government, principally the impossibility for the National Assembly to act. The state of affairs was one which called for

immediate action and with which the National Assembly would would not be able to cope. The war itself and its attendant chaos and calamities could not have necessitated the delegation had the National Assembly been in a position to operate (First Emergency Powers Cases, 84 Phil 368). •

As the Act was expressly in pursuance of the constitutional provision, it has to be assumed that the National Assembly intended it to be only for a limited period. If it be contended that the Act has not yet been duly repealed, and such step is necessary to a cessation of the emergency powers delegated to the President, the result would be obvious unconstitutionality, since it may never be repealed by the Congress, or if the latter ever attempts to do so, the President may wield his veto. This eventuality has in fact taken place when the President disapproved House Bill No. 727, repealing all Emergency Powers Acts. The situation will make the Congress and the President or either as the principal authority to determine the indefinite duration of the delegation of legislative powers, ? in palpable repugnance to the constitutional provision that any grant thereunder must be for a limited period, necessarily to be fixed in the law itself and not dependent upon the arbitrary or elastic will of either the Congress or the President. Although House Bill No. 727, had been vetoed by the President and did not thereby become a regular statute, it may at least be considered as a concurrent resolution of the Congress formally declaring the termination of the emergency powers. To contend that the Bill needed presidential acquiescence to produce effect, would lead to the anomalous, if not absurd, situation that, "while Congress might delegate its power by a simple majority, it might not be able to recall them except by two-third vote. In other words, it would be easier for Congress to delegate its powers than to take them back. This is not right and is not, and ought not to be the law." Insofar as the Congress had shown its readiness or ability to act on a given matter, the emergency powers delegated to the President had been pro tanto withdrawn, Executive Orders Nos. 545 and 546 must be declared as having no legal anchorage. We can take judicial notice of the fact that the Congress has since liberation repeatedly been approving acts appropriating funds for the operation of the Government, public works, and many others purposes, with the result that as to such legislative task the Congress must be deemed to have long decided to assume the corresponding power itself and to withdraw the same from the President. Shelter may not be sought in the proposition that the

President should be allowed to exercise emergency powers for the sake of speed and expediency in the interest and for the welfare of the people, because we have the Constitution, designed to establish a government under a regime of justice, liberty and democracy. In line with such primordial objective, our Government is democratic in form and based on the system of separation of powers. Unless and until changed or amended, we shall have to abide by the letter and spirit of the Constitution and be prepared to accept the consequences resulting from or inherent in disagreements between, inaction or even refusal of the legislative and executive departments. Much as it is imperative in some cases to have prompt official action, deadlocks in and slowness of democratic processes must be preferred to concentration of powers in any one man or group of men for obvious reasons. The framers of the Constitution, however, had the vision of and were careful in allowing delegation of legislative powers to the President for a limited period "in times of war or other national emergency." They had thus entrusted to the good judgment of the Congress the duty of coping with any national emergency by a more efficient procedure; but it alone must decide because emergency in itself cannot and should not create power. In our democracy the hope and survival of the nation lie in the wisdom and unselfish patriotism of all officials and in their faithful adherence to the Constitution (2nd Emergency Powers Cases, 92 Phil 603).

c. Delegation to the People (Sec. 32, Art. VI; Sec. 10, Art X; Sec. 2, Art. XVII; RA 6735); Section 32. The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a system of initiative and referendum, and the exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can directly propose and enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part thereof passed by the Congress or local legislative body after the registration of a petition therefor signed by at least ten per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters thereof. Section 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to

approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. Section 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter. The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.

d. Delegation to Local Government Units (Art. X; RA 7160); e.

Delegation to the Administrative Bodies 1.1.1 Power of Legislation

Subordinate

CASES •

The power of administrative officials to promulgate rules and regulations in the implementation of a statute is necessarily limited only to carrying into effect what is provided in the legislative enactment. The questioned administrative orders are reasonably directed to the accomplishment of the purposes of the law under which they were issued and were intended to secure the paramount interest of the public, their economic growth and welfare. The validity and constitutionality of Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82 are sustained, and their force and effect upheld (Miners Assn vs. Factoran, GR 98332, Jan. 16, 1995).

1.1.2

Principle of Sub-delegation of Powers

1.1.3 Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency or Alter Ego Principle

•

f.

Acts of the Secretaries of Executive departments when performed and promulgated in the regular course of business or unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive are presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive (Villena v. Sec’y of Interior, 67 Phil 451). Tests for valid delegation

1.1.1 •

Law must be complete in all its essential terms and conditions so that there is nothing for the delegate to do except to enforce it.

1.1.2 •

Completeness Test

Sufficient Standard Test

Maps out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority by defining the legislative policy and indicating the circumstances under which it is to be pursued. CASES

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The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing which may not be dispensed with because they are intended as a safeguard against official arbitrariness. It is a gratifying commentary on our judicial system that the jurisprudence of this country is rich with applications of this guaranty as proof of our fealty to the rule of law and the ancient rudiments of fair play. This is not to say that notice and hearing are imperative in every case for, to be sure, there are a number of admitted exceptions in view of the nature of the property involved or the urgency of the need to protect the general welfare from a clear and present danger. The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of the police power which both restraints and is restrained by due process. The police power is simply defined as the power inherent in the State to regulate liberty and property for the promotion of the general welfare. By reason of its function, it extends to all the great public needs and is described as the most pervasive, the least limitable and the most demanding of the three inherent powers of the State, far outpacing taxation and eminent domain (Ynot vs. IAC, 148 SCRA 659).

1.1.3

Legislative standard need not be expressed CASES

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Did the President's executive orders and the power delegated to the military authorities discriminate against Americans and resident aliens of Japanese descent in violation of the Fifth Amendment which restrains discriminatory legislation by Congress as amounts to denial of due process? The Court found the President's orders and the implementation of the curfew to be constitutional. Chief Justice Stone, writing for the unanimous Court, took into account the great importance of military installations and weapons production that occurred on the West Coast and the "solidarity" that individuals of Japanese descent felt with their motherland. He reasoned that restrictions on Japanese actions served an important national interest. The Court ducked the thorny relocation issue and focused solely on the curfew, which the Court viewed as a necessary "protective measure." Stone argued that racial discrimination was justified since "in time of war residents having ethnic affiliations with an invading enemy may be a greater source of danger than those of a different ancestry (Hirabayashi vs US, 320 US 81).”

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The creation and subsequent reorganization of administrative regions have been by the President pursuant to authority granted to him by law. The choice of the President as delegate is logical because the division of the country into regions is intended to facilitate not only the administration of local governments but also the direction of executive departments which the law requires should have regional offices. The regions themselves are not territorial and political divisions like provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays but are "mere groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes." There is, therefore, no abdication by Congress of its legislative power in conferring on the President the power to merge administrative regions. The question is whether Congress has provided a sufficient standard by which the President is to be guided in the exercise of the power granted and whether in any event the grant of power to him is included in the subject expressed in the title of the law. On the question of standard. A legislative standard need not be expressed. It may simply be gathered or implied. Nor need it be found in the law challenged

because it may be embodied in other statutes on the same subject as that of the challenged legislation. With respect to the power to merge existing administrative regions, the standard is to be found in the same policy underlying the grant to the President in R.A. No. 5435 of the power to reorganize the Executive Department, to wit: "to promote simplicity, economy and efficiency in the government to enable it to pursue programs consistent with national goals for accelerated social and economic development and to improve the service in the transaction of the public business." Indeed, as the original eleven administrative regions were established in accordance with this policy, it is logical to suppose that in authorizing the President to "merge [by administrative determination] the existing regions" in view of the withdrawal from some of those regions of the provinces now constituting the Autonomous Region, the purpose of Congress was to reconstitute the original basis for the organization of administrative regions (Chionbian vs. Orbos, 245 SCRA 253).