Consti-start-sec.12.docx

PEOPLE v MORIAL FACTS: Two of the three appellants herein were sentenced to death by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Southern Leyte for Robbery with Homicide. The other was sentenced to suffer only the penalty of reclusion perpetua on account of minority. The judgment of conviction is now before this Court on automatic review. Victims were Paula Bandibas and Albert Bandibas. P11,000 was stolen. Upon arraignment, the three accused pleaded not guilty. The prosecution theorized that the accused committed the robbery in the early evening of January 6, 1996 so they would have money to spend for the dance later that night. To obtain the money or to silence any witnesses, the accused killed the occupants of the house, Paula Bandibas and her threeyear old grandson Albert. In proving its theory, the prosecution offered the testimonies of Gabriel Guilao, Benjamin Morial, SPO4 Antonio Macion and Dr. Teodulo Salas.Outside the house, Benjamin (Paula Bandibas' commonlaw husband) disclosed to the officers his three suspects, the accused in this case. He advised them, however, to bring only Leonardo and Edwin Morial into custody and not to include Nonelito Abion, who had many relatives in Cagnituan. As a former barangay captain of 22 years, he knew that the Abions were "most feared" in Cagnituan. Benjamin did not tell the police that Gabriel Guilao had witnessed the incident. The police found Edwin and Leonardo Morial in the house of Nonelito Abion and invited the two to the police station, where they were turned over to SPO4 Andres Fernandez. The investigation conducted by SPO4 Fernandez yielded an extra-judicial confession from accused Leonardo Morial, who was assisted by Atty. Tobias Aguilar. Leonardo Morial's Interrogation: "Leonardo was then seated and his gag removed. The police told Leonardo to confess to the killings. Leonardo professed that he did not witness the incident and could not tell them anything about it. Again, they gagged his mouth and the same policeman who had hit him then boxed him twice, this time on his right side. Thereafter, they released their hold and advised him to confess so they would not kill him. Leonardo repeated that he did not know anything about the incident. When a policeman attempted to box him again, Leonardo finally admitted that Nonelito Abion and Edwin Morial were responsible for the death of Paula Bandibas. Leonardo's interrogation lasted one and a half to two hours. Asked in court to identify the uniformed policemen who beat him up, Leonardo said he could not recall their faces. He did not look at the policemen during his interrogation and did not see their nameplates. Leonardo did not ask the police for a physician to examine him nor did he tell anyone about his injuries because he did not know he was permitted to do so.

Leonardo's statements were then reduced into writing. A policeman informed him that they were going to contact a lawyer to assist him during the investigation. Leonardo was told that his counsel would be a certain Atty. Aguilar whose office was very near the police station. Leonardo consented. Having prepared Leonardo's statement, the police then told Leonardo to come with them to Atty. Aguilar's office, which was about 50 meters from the police station. There, he saw Atty. Aguilar for the first time. The lawyer read to him the document and asked him whether its contents were true. The police had instructed Leonardo to answer "yes" if he was asked that question, and Leonardo heeded the instructions. Leonardo denied that Atty. Aguilar examined his body for any injuries. Atty. Aguilar did ask Leonardo if he was forced or intimidated to execute the extrajudicial confession. Leonardo, however, did not tell his lawyer about his injuries since a police officer had warned him that he would be mauled again should he do so. Leonardo then signed the extra-judicial confession, after which Atty. Aguilar affixed his. The signing over, Leonardo was brought back to the police station. Later in court, Leonardo claimed that he merely made up all the statements in the document because he was afraid. After trial, the RTC rendered a decision convicting all the three accused. ISSUE: Whether or not Leonardo Morial was deprived of his right to counsel during the custodial investigation, thus, making his extra-judicial confession invalid HELD: YES. The Court has stressed that an accused under custodial interrogation must continuously have a counsel assisting him from the very start thereof. In People vs. Lucero, where the suspect's counsel left just when the interrogation was starting, this Court chastised both counsel and the trial court for their lack of zeal in safeguarding the rights of the accused. SPO4 Fernandez cannot justify Atty. Aguilar's leaving by claiming that when the lawyer left, he knew very well that the suspect had already admitted that he (Leonardo) and his companions committed the crime. Neither can Atty. Aguilar rationalize his abandoning his client by saying that he left only after the latter had admitted the "material points," referring to the three accused's respective participation in the crime. For even as the person under custodial investigation enjoys the right to counsel from its inception, so does he enjoy such right until its termination -indeed, "in every phase of the investigation. An effective and vigilant counsel "necessarily and logically requires that the lawyer be present and able to advise and assist his client from the time the confessant answers the first question asked by the investigating officer until the signing of the extrajudicial confession."

People vs Labtan Facts: Accused-Appellant Henry Feliciano, together with accused Orlando Labtan and Jonelto Labtan, were convicted of highway robbery and robbery with homicide. Feliciano was convicted on the basis of a sworn statement which he repudiated during the trial. The prosecution’s case was mainly anchored on the three-page sworn statement executed by Feliciano, originally in Visayan dialect, before the Cagayan de Oro City Police Station. According to the prosecution, prior to the propounding of questions to the accusedappellant, he was informed of his constitutional rights and he even signed the confession in the presence of Atty. Pepito Chavez, Attorney de Officio provided to the accused. When the defense presented its case, only accused Henry Feliciano testified for his behalf. His defense consisted of an alibi and a repudiation of his sworn statement. He Testified that he was brought to the police station, was mauled for two hours, and was forced to sign a document. He was also brought to the office of Atty. Chavez and saw the latter sign the documents. He did not know what was happening.Atty. Chavez did not even talk to him before signing the document. Then he was brought back to Jail. He appealed to the higher court alleging that the court a quo erred un admitting in evidence the tainted extra-judicial confession he executed in the absence of an effective and vigilant counsel. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the sworn-statement executed by accused Feliciano in the absence of a competent counsel of his choice, is admissible in evidence. 2. Did Atty. Chavez provide the accused the kind of counseling required by the Constitution? HELD: The appeal is meritorious. Under Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution, the rights of persons under custodial investigation are provided. In People vs Gamboa 13, the Court stated that: " [T]he right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation, i.e. when the investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or confessions or admissions from the respondent/accused. At such point or

stage, the person being interrogated must be assisted by counsel to avoid the pernicious practice extorting false or coerced admissions or confessions from the lips of the person undergoing interrogation, for the commission of an offense. The moment there is a move or even urge of said investigators to elicit admissions or confessions or even plain information which may appear innocent or inocuous at the time, from said suspect, he should then and there be assisted by counsel, unless he waives the right, but the waiver shall be made in writing and in the presence of counsel."cralaw virtua1aw library We find that accused-appellant Feliciano had been denied of his right to have a competent and independent counsel when he was questioned in the Cagayan de Oro City Police Station. SPO1 Alfonso Cuarez testified that he started questioning Feliciano at 8:00 a.m. of April 22, 1993 regarding his involvement in the killing of jeepney driver Florentino Bolasito, notwithstanding the fact that he had not been apprised of his right to counsel. In Navallo v. Sandiganbayan, 15 we said that a person is deemed under custodial investigation where the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has began to focus on a particular suspect who had been taken into custody by the police who carry out a process of interrogation that lends itself to elicit incriminating statements.anrobles law library : red 2.The right to counsel is a fundamental right and contemplates not a mere presence of the lawyer beside the accused. Atty. Chavez did not provide the kind of counselling required by the Constitution. He did not explain to accused-appellant the consequences of his action — that the sworn statement can be used against him and that it is possible that he could be found guilty and sent to jail. "Ideally, therefore, a lawyer engaged for an individual facing custodial investigation (if the latter could not afford one) ‘should be engaged by the accused (himself), or by the latter’s relative or person authorized by him to engage an attorney or by the court, upon proper petition of the accused or person authorized by the accused to file such petition. Lawyers engaged by the police, whatever testimonials are given as proof of their probity and supposed independence, are generally suspect, as in many areas, the relationship between lawyers and law enforcement authorities can be symbiotic.’"

People vs Januario

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Vicente Pons story: o March 1988: Cid went to the house of prosecution witness Vicente Pons, Cid's cousin. He asked Pons if he wanted to buy a jeep. Pons said he had no money but he could look for a buyer who can pay 50,000. o So Pons offered to look for a buyer provided that Cid would entrust the jeep to him. o He offered it to Myrna Temporas who agreed to buy it for 65,000, which later became 48,500 only. Myrna Temporas story: o According to her, Pons told her that the jeep belonged to her niece, Doris Wolf. o Pons, upon Doris Wolf's instruction, borrowed from Myrna 48,500 and used the jeep as collateral. o Pons failed to pay back the 48,500, and also failed to produce a deed of sale covering the jeep. Myrna filed a complaint. She just found out during the complaint that the driver and the conductor of the jeep had been killed by kidnappers.

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Upon NBI's investigation, they found that the carnapping of the jeep and the killing of the driver and the conductor were done by Januario, Canape, Sarita and Sarinos. The jeep was disposed of through Cid.

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From an oral investigation of Januario and Canape, NBI found out that the driver and the conductor were killed inside a sugar plantation. A lawyer who was just around, Atty. Carlos Saunar, was asked to assist the two during the investigation.

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Confession of Januario: o Januario said that 2 weeks before September, he was in the house of Canape to procure chicken and kalawit for his business. He also went there because his new friends, Sarita and Samera, with Canape, wanted him to look for a buyer of a jeep. He asked for a photo of the jeep but he was told that

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he'll have it later that night after they have drinks at Toto's house. o At about 5am, the group hailed a jeep. Here, Januario described how Canape, Sarita and Sarinos tied up the conductor and the driver of the jeep and took control of the vehicle. The jeep stopped after a while, and brought the conductor and driver down a sugar plantation. Januario described how he heard growls, but did not witness what happened. He also saw the bloodied hand Sarita and Sarinos. o Upon reaching Libmanan, Januario said they went to Cid with whom Januario had earlier conferred regarding the sale of the jeep. He got 1,000 cash and rice and eggs worh 600. Januario signed this statement and swore berfore NBI Executive Director Salvador Ranin. Also signed by Atty. Carlos Saunar as counsel. Confession of Canape: o Sarita and Sarinos told him to look for a buyer of a jeep. He looked for a buyer with Januario. They saw Cid as an interested buyer. o They told Sarita and Sarinos about it. They drank, then at 5am, hailed a jeep, wrote it and was asked by Sarita and Sarinos to take out a knife and point at the driver and conductor of the jeep. o They stopped at a certain point. Januario, Sarita and Sarinos brought the driver and the conductor down the jeep at a sugar plantation, with Sarita later saying that everything was already fixed "Ayos na". o After this, they went to Cid and gave the jeep to him for 25,000. o He also said that Cid and Pons knew that the jeep was just going to be stolen. He also admitted that he himself knew that when they were looking for a buyer, the jeep they will be selling will also be just stolen. Canape signed, subscribed and swore to this statement.

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Issue:

12 September 1989: Prosecution offered evidence, which the court admitted. Defense manifested its intention to file a demurrer to evidence. 21 November 1989: Since defense has not presented Cid yet, the court ordered the cancellation of his bail bond and gave his surety 30 days within which to show cause why judgement against the bond should not be rendered. 22 December 1989: Court issued an order stating that the demurrer to evidence may not be allowed anymore for failure to appear at the scheduled hearings. 26 December 1989: Defense mailed a demurrer to evidence or motion to dismiss on insufficiency of evidence. 10 January 1990: Trial Court dismissed the motion, since the demurrer failed to contain a compelling reason to recall the previous order. 6 February 1990: The court issued an order considering the cases terminated against Januario and Canape, but granted a reservation to present evidence as regards Cid. 9 March 1990: Defense presented Cid as witness. He said that a certain Raul Repe, Toto Sarita and Digo Sarreal approached him about the sale of a jeep. He referred them to Vicente Pons who he thought would buy the jeep. 27 March 1990: The court denied defense counsel’s motion to cancel the hearing that day. Since Atty. Saunar was present, the trial court ordered that his testimony be heard that day. Here, Saunar said that Atty. Vela, an NBI agent, approached him. Vela, along with Atty. Toribio told him that Januario, Canape and Sid verbally confessed to participation in a crime, and they were about the execute their sworn statements, so they needed his assistance. Saunar agreed and explained to the three the consequences of their confession. He told them their constitutional rights, the Miranda rights, specifically. Prosecution reminded the court that Saunar can’t be presented as witness, so they consider him only as “additional evidence for the prosecution and/or rebuttal” testimony. 11 May 1990: Defense manifested that it was closing its case.

1. Was the admission of the testimony of Atty. Carlos Saunar proper?

2. Were the extra judicial confessions of Januario and Canape admissible as evidence? Held Rationale: Rule 119 of the Rules of Court shows the order of trial. The order is followed, but strict observance of the rules depends upon the circumstances of the case, at the discretion of the trial judge. Therefore, the court may 1. Yes. allow the prosecutor to still present involuntarily omitted evidence. Saunar's testimony was considered as a rebuttal witness with respect to Cid, so it was considered. - Atty. Saunar was not the choice of Januario as his custodial investigation counsel. - Even if he can be considered as a competent counsel, he is not independent because at that time, he was applying for a position in the NBI, so his loyalty would not be to the accused but to NBI. - Section 12(1) of Article II of the Constitution states that admission of facts related to a crime must be obtained with assistance of counsel, otherwise it would be inadmissible. An admission, under Section 26 of Rule 130 is "an act, declaration, or omission of a party as to a relevant fact". This is different from a confession, which 2. No. is defined in Section 33 as a "declaration of an accused acknowledging guilt of he offense. - Januario and Canape made verbal admissions of complicity in the crime. But such verbal admissions must be made with assistance of counsel. They were not made with assistance of counsel when they made it in Naga City. - People vs Alicando: There is a "libertarian exclusionary rule known as the fruit of the poisonous tree, where once the primary source (the ‘tree’) is shown to have been unlawfully attained, any secondary or derivative evidence (the ‘fruit’) derived from it is also inadmissible. Judgement: Judgement: Januario and Canape are acquitted. -

PEOPLE FACTS:

OF

THE

PHILIPPINES

vs

EDNA MALNGAN

y MAYO

On or about January 2, 2001, in the City of Manila,the said accused, with intent to cause damage, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and deliberately set fire upon the two-storey residential house of ROBERTO SEPARA and family mostly made of wooden materials, by lighting crumpled newspaper with the use of disposable lighter inside said house knowing the same to be an inhabited house and situated in a thickly populated place and as a consequence thereof a conflagration ensued and the said building, together with some seven (7) adjoining residential houses, were razed by fire; that by reason and on the occasion of the said fire resulted to the death of Roberto Separa, Sr. and Virginia Separa together with their four (4) children whom sustained burn injuries which were the direct cause of their death immediately thereafter. Brgy. Chairman Bernardo and his tanods apprehended Edna and they immediately brought her to the Barangay Hall for investigation. At the Barangay Hall, Mercedita Mendoza, neighbor of Roberto Separa, Sr. and whose house was also burned, identified the woman as accused-appellant EDNA who was the housemaid of Roberto Separa, Sr. Upon inspection, a disposable lighter was found inside accused-appellant EDNA’s bag. Thereafter, accused-appellant EDNA confessed to Brgy. Chairman Bernardo in the presence of multitudes of angry residents outside the Barangay Hall that she set her employer’s house on fire because she had not been paid her salary for about a year and that she wanted to go home to her province but her employer told her to just ride a broomstick in going home. Accused-appellant EDNA was then turned over to arson investigators headed by S[F]O4 Danilo Talusan, who brought her to the San Lazaro Fire Station in Sta. Cruz, Manila where she was further investigated and then detained. When Mercedita Mendoza went to the San Lazaro Fire Station to give her sworn statement, she had the opportunity to ask accused-appellant EDNA at the latter’s detention cell why she did the burning of her employer’s house and accused-appellant EDNA replied that she set the house on fire because when she asked permission to go home to her province and narrated how she did the burning of her employer’s house.When interviewed by Carmelita Valdez, a reporter of ABS-CBN Network, accused-appellant EDNA while under detention was heard by SFO4 Danilo Talusan as having admitted the crime and even narrated the manner how she accomplished it. SFO4 Danilo Talusan was able to hear the same confession, this time at his home, while watching the television program “True Crime” hosted by Gus Abelgas also of ABS-CBN Network.

When arraigned, accused-appellant with assistance of counsel de oficio, pleaded “Not Guilty” to the crime charged. Thereafter, trial ensued. However, she was held guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Due to the death penalty imposed by the RTC, the case was directly elevated to this Court for automatic review. The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the decision of the RTC. ISSUE: W/N the court erred in allowing and giving credence to the hearsay evidence and uncounselled admissions allegedly given by the accused. HELD: We have held that the provision of Art. Section 12 (1) and (3) applies to the stage of custodial investigation – when the investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but starts to focus on a particular person as a suspect. Said constitutional guarantee has also been extended to situations in which an individual has not been formally arrested but has merely been “invited” for questioning. To be admissible in evidence against an accused, the extrajudicial confessions made must satisfy the following requirements: (1)it must be voluntary;(2) it must be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel;(3) it must be express; and(4) it must be in writing. The barangay tanods, including the Barangay Chairman, in this particular instance, may be deemed as law enforcement officers for purpose of applying by Article III, Section 12. When accused-appellant was brought to the barangay hall in, she was already a suspect, actually the only one, in the fire that destroyed several houses as well as killed the whole family of Separa. She was, therefore, already under custodial investigation and the rights guaranteed by Article III, Section 12(1), of the Constitution should have already been observed or applied to her. Accused-appellant’s confession to Barangay Chairman Remigio Bernardo was made in response to the “interrogation” made by the latter – admittedly conducted without first informing accused-appellant of her rights under the Constitution or done in the presence of counsel. For this reason, the confession of accusedappellant, given to Barangay Chairman Remigio Bernardo, as well as the lighter found by the latter in her bag are inadmissible in evidence against her as such were obtained in violation of her constitutional rights.

However, the inadmissibility of accused-appellant’s confession to Barangay Chairman Remigio Bernardo and the lighter as evidence do not automatically lead to her acquittal. It should well be recalled that the constitutional safeguards during custodial investigations do not apply to those not elicited through questioning by the police or their agents but given in an ordinary manner whereby the accused verbally admits to having committed the offense as what happened in the case at bar when accused-appellant admitted to Mercedita Mendoza, one of the neighbors of Roberto Separa, Sr., to having started the fire in the Separas’ house. The testimony of Mercedita Mendoza recounting said admission is, unfortunately for accusedappellant, admissible in evidence against her and is not covered by the aforesaid constitutional guarantee. Article III of the Constitution, or the Bill of Rights, solely governs the relationship between the individual on one hand and the State (and its agents) on the other; it does not concern itself with the relation between a private individual and another private individual – as both accused-appellant and prosecution witness Mercedita Mendoza undoubtedly are.[44] Here, there is no evidence on record to show that said witness was acting under police authority, so appropriately, accused-appellant’s uncounselled extrajudicial confession to said witness was properly admitted by the RTC. IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision of the Court of Appeals, is hereby AFFIRMED insofar as the conviction of accused-appellant EDNA MALNGAN Y MAYO is concerned. The sentence to be imposed and the amount of damages to be awarded, however, are MODIFIED. So ordered.

YAP vs. CA Right to Bail, Section 13 (Excessive if equal to civil liability) FACTS Petitioner was convicted of estafa for misappropriating amounts equivalent to P5,500,000.00. He filed a notice of appeal, and moved to be allowed provisional liberty under the cash bond he had filed earlier in the proceedings. The motion was denied by the RTC. Petitioner filed with the CA a Motion to Fix Bail for the Provisional Liberty of Accused Appellant Pending Appeal, invoking the last paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court. The Solicitor General opined that the petitioner may be allowed to post bail in the amount of P5.5 million and be required to secure a certification/guaranty from the Mayor of the place of his residence that he is a resident of the area and that he will remain to be so until final judgment is rendered or in case he transfers residence, it must be with prior notice to the court and private complainant. The CA upheld the Solicitor General’s recommendation. A motion for reconsideration was filed, seeking the reduction of the amount of bail fixed by CA, but was denied. ISSUES 1) W/N the CA committed GADLEJ in fixing the bail in the amount of P5.5 million based on the petitioner’s civil liability 2) W/N the CA unduly restricted petitioner’s constitutional liberty of abode and travel in imposing the other conditions for the grant of bail. HELD 1) Yes. The Rules of Court never intended for the civil liability of the accused to be a guideline or basis for determining the amount of bail. The amount should be high enough to assure the presence of the accused when required but no higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfil this purpose. To bail at an amount equivalent to the civil liability of which petitioner is charged is to permit the impression that the amount paid as bail is an exaction of the civil liability that accused is charged of. Bail is not intended as a punishment nor as a satisfaction of civil liability which should necessarily await the judgment of the appellate court. Imposing bail in an excessive amount could render meaningless the right to bail. The Court will not hesitate to exercise its supervisory powers over lower courts should the latter, after

holding the accused entitled to bail, effectively deny the same by imposing a prohibitory sum or exacting unreasonable conditions. Section 9, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure advises courts to consider the following factors in the setting of amount of bail: a) Financial ability of the accused to give bail b) Nature and circumstances of the offense c) Penalty for the offense charged d) Character and reputation of the accused e) Age and health of the accused f) Weight of the evidence against the accused g) Probability of the accused appearing at the trial h) Forfeiture of other bail i) The fact that the accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested j) Pendency of other cases where the accused is on bail 2) No. The condition imposed is simply consistent with the nature and function of a bail bond, which is to ensure that petitioner will make himself available at all times whenever the Court requires his presence. Besides, petitioner is not prevented from changing abode, he is merely required to inform the court in case he does so.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. ANTONIO LAUGA Y PINA ALIAS TERIO, Accused-Appellant. Principle: The extrajudicial confession of appellant, which was taken without a counsel, inadmissible in evidence. FACTS: Appellant Lauga was charged of qualified rape by his daughter. Testimonies revealed that the victim was left alone at home while his father was having drinking spree at the neighbor’s place. Her mother decided to leave because appellant has the habit of mauling her mother every time he gets drunk. Her only brother also went out with some neighbors. At around 10pm, appellant woke up the victim, removed his pants and slid inside the blanket covering the victim and removed her pants and underwear. Appellant had warned the victim not to shout for help. He proceeded to have carnal knowledge of her daughter by threatening her with his fist and a knife. Soon after, the victim’s brother arrived and saw her crying. Appellant claimed he scolded the victim for staying out late. The two decided to leave the house. While on their way to their maternal grandmother’s house, victim recounted to her brother what happened to her. They later told the incident to their grandmother and uncle who sought the assistance of Moises Boy Banting. Banting found appellant in his house wearing only his underwear. He was invited to the police station to which he obliged. Appellant admitted to Banting that he indeed raped her daughter because he was unable to control himself. The trial court convicted the accused for qualified rape. Upon appeal, the CA affirmed with modification the ruling of the trial court. Hence this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not appellant’s extrajudicial confession without counsel admissible in evidence?

HELD: Negative. Barangay-based volunteer organizations in the nature of watch groups, as in the case of the "bantay bayan," are recognized by the local government unit to perform functions relating to the preservation of peace and order at the barangay level. Thus, without ruling on the legality of the actions taken by Moises Boy Banting, and the specific scope of duties and responsibilities delegated to a "bantay bayan," particularly on the authority to conduct a custodial investigation, any inquiry he makes has the color of a state-related function and objective insofar as the entitlement of a suspect to his constitutional rights provided for under Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution, otherwise known as the Miranda Rights, is concerned. Even if the extrajudicial confessions were not admitted as evidence, it does not warrant the acquittal of the accused. The appellant’s conviction is upheld because of the strong evidence showing his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.