Consti 2 Right Of The Accused.docx

Sayson vs. People “Right to be Heard and to Counsel and Present Evidence;Waiver of such Right” Facts: An information for the crime of Estafa through Falsification of a Commercial Document was filed against petitioner, Ramon F. Sayson. The said accused having come in possession of a blank US dollar check, with intent to defraud Ernesto Rufino, Sr. and/or Bank of America. Accused wrote certain words in figures in the check. Among others, he forged the signature of the Asst. Cashier, Manager of the Bank of America, made it appear that the said check was duly issued by the said bank, when in truth and in fact, as the accused well knew, that it did not; that thereafter, said accused wrote or affixed; the signature “Norberto Perez” on the back of said check as indorser: and that by means of false and fraudulent representations he also made it appear that he is “Atty. Norberto Perez” who is the payee of the said Check. The appellant has raised the issue of due process, alleging denial of his right to be heard and to present evidence. Petitioner claims though that he was not waiving such right; on the contrary, he was vigorously asserting his right to be heard by counsel and to present evidence in his verbal motion for postponement due to absence of his counsel de parte. He thus assails the denial of his motion as it in effect deprived him of his day in court. Issue: Whether or not the right to be heard by counsel and to present evidence is waived. Ruling: Yes. Constitutional Law; Due Process; Waiver of Rights of the Accused; Case at bar.—The right to be heard by himself and counsel is one of the constitutional rights of the accused. But while the accused has the right to be heard by himself and counsel and to present evidence for his defense by direct constitutional grant, such right is not exempt from the rule on waiver as long as the waiver is not contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or good customs or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law [Article 6, Civil Code.] There is nothing in the Constitution nor in any law prohibiting such waiver. Accordingly, denial of due process cannot be successfully invoked where a valid waiver of rights has been made, as in this case. Petitioner’s plea that it was incumbent upon the trial judge to appoint a counsel de oficio for him when he appeared without his counsel, utterly without merit.- The duty of the court to appoint a counsel de oficio when the accused has no counsel of choice and desires to employ the services of one is mandatory only at the time of arraignment [Rule 116, Section 6, Revised Rules of Court.] This is no longer so where the accused has proceeded with the arraignment and the trial with a counsel of his choice but when the time for the presentation of the evidence for the defense has arrived, he appears by himself alone and the absence of his counsel was inexcusable. His failure to appear with counsel of his choice at the hearing of the case, notwithstanding repeated postponements and warnings that failure to so appear would be deemed a waiver on the part of the appellant to present his evidence and the case would be deemed submitted for decision upon the evidence presented by the prosecution. A counsel de officio (counsel de oficio) is an attorney appointed by the court to defend an indigent defendant in a criminal action or to represent a destitute party in a case. The term connotes little or no other choice than the acceptance by the indigent party of whoever is appointed as his counsel and unless excused therefrom by the court, the discharge by the designated attorney of the duty to faithfully and conscientiously render effective legal assistance in favor of such party. (Agpalo, Legal and Judicial Ethics, p. 3) A counsel de parte is an attorney retained by a party litigant, usually for a fee, to prosecute or defend his cause in court. The term implies freedom of choice either on the part of the attorney to decline or accept the employment or on the part of the litigant to continue or terminate the retainer at any time. (Agpalo, Legal and Judicial Ethics, p. 3-4)

People vs. Quitlong “Right to be informed of the Nature of the Accusation” Facts: An information of murder was filed against Ronnie Quitlong and his co-accused. The Victim here is Jonathan Calpito. On the night of the incident, Calpito was with his friends Gosil and Adjaro when they walked home along Harrison Road. They bought fishballs, but when Calpito received the change from his 100 peso bill, he felt that he was shortchanged by the vendor. A jeep driven by Soriano passed by and was hailed by one of Calpito’s friends, but Calpito was still having an argument so they ignored boarding. Moments later, the jeepney driver and Adjaro saw eight men rushing towards Gosil and Calpito from the direction of the taxicab-stand behind his jeep. Four men succeeded in cornering Calpito. Soriano saw Calpito fall to the ground and thought that the latter had just been weakened by the men’s punches but, when Calpito was carried on board his jeep, Soriano realized that Calpito had been stabbed. Police officers were attracted by the commotion along Harrison Road. One of the policemen drew out his service firearm and told the attackers to freeze. Seeing that the victim had bloodstains on his left chest, Patacsil advised the victim’s companions to rush him to the hospital. Soriano, Gosil and Adjaro took Calpito to the Baguio General Hospital on board Soriano’s jeep. Nevertheless Calpito died on the same night. One of the accused in the case contends that the trial court has erred in finding conspiracy among them and argues upon their liability whether or not they are guilty as co-principals. Issue: WoN the nature and accusation of the offense in the information was valid Ruling: Constitutional Law; Criminal Procedure; Informations; Conspiracy; Right to be Informed; Rationale of; Due Process; Article III, Section 14, of the 1987 Constitution mandates that no person shall be held answerable for a criminal offense without due process of law and that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall first be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him evidence of conspiracy is not enough for an accused to bear and to respond to all its grave legal consequences; it is equally essential that such accused has been apprised when the charge is made conformably with prevailing substantive and procedural requirements. “When is an information valid? What should the information contain?” An information, in order to ensure that the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of his accusation is not violated, must state the name of the accused; the designation given to the offense by the statute; a statement of the acts or omissions so complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time and date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense has been committed the information must set forth the facts and circumstances that have a bearing on the culpability and liability of the accused so that the accused can properly prepare for and undertake his defense. One such fact or circumstance in a complaint against two or more accused persons is that of conspiracy. Conspiracy must be alleged, not just inferred, in the information on which basis an accused can aptly enter his plea, a matter that is not to be confused with or likened to the adequacy of evidence that may be required to prove it.

People vs. Manalo “Right to a speedy, impartial and public trial” “Right to Counsel” “Convict committing offense while serving sentence” Facts: Accused here is Ruben Manalo and he was convicted for murder. Ruben Manalo is a prisoner serving sentence in the National Bilibid Prison, was at the visiting area of the prison waiting for transfer to the San Ramon Penal Colony. Alfredo de la Cruz, Jolly Hilario and Reynaldo Cariso, all convicted prisoners serving their respective sentences, were similarly waiting in the same visiting area for transfer to the same penal colony. While at the visiting area, appellant engaged another convict in a betting game called "honkiang,". During this conversation, appellant attacked dela Cruz with a knife, inflicting two fatal stab wounds on the latter's back. Immediately after the stabbing, appellant voluntarily surrendered to the prison authorities and handed over the fan knife (balisong) he used in killing dela Cruz. “Right to Impartial trial” Appellant contends that he was deprived of his constitutional right to due process, to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, to an impartial trial and to counsel, by reason of the lower court's partiality, bias and lack of objectivity during the trial. The appellant urges that since the trial court was not an impartial tribunal, all the proceedings before it should be set aside as null and void. The lack of impartiality and of objectivity on the part of the trial judge was clearly shown when he intervened in the cross-examination of the physician who had carried out the autopsy of the victims as witnesses for the prosecution. That the judge had already concluded that appellant was guilty of murder and had resolved to convict him; that the trial court had functioned "both as judge and prosecutor" asking questions of witnesses "calculated to establish treachery, premeditation and motive”. “Right to Counsel” The appellant also claims that he was denied his constitutional right to counsel. The appellant admits that he was assisted by counsel de oficio from the time of arraignment and throughout the trial of the case. However, he asserts that his right to counsel was "but a sham," that by appointing multiple counsel de oficio the trial court did not effectively provide him with the assistance and protection required by the Constitution. Issue/s: 1. WoN the accused was denied of the right to impartial trial by the trial judge 2. WoN he was denied of the right to counsel. Ruling: No and No. 1st Issue: No. Trial judge's intervention in the cross-examination does not constitute lack of impartiality and objectivity.- A judge may examine or cross-examine a witness. He may seek to draw out relevant and material testimony though that testimony may tend to support or rebut the position taken by one or the other party. In the first instance, the court has pointed out, "the extent to which such examination may be conducted rests in the discretion of the judge, the exercise of which will not he controlled unless his discretion has clearly been abused to the prejudice of either party It appears to us that the judge merely sought to clarify to himself whether or not treachery and evident premeditation had indeed attended the killing of Alfredo dela Cruz, as alleged by the prosecution. All that the questions propounded by the judge indicates to us is that he was not particularly skillful in cross-examination and that he found it difficult to operationalize words which themselves imported conclusions.

The questions raised by the trial judge sought to draw forth answers which did not relate to whether or not the appellant had in fact killed dela Cruz. The appellant had not only entered an intelligent and valid plea of guilty; that he had killed his fellow convict dela Cruz was established by independent and overwhelming evidence. 2nd Issue: No. Right to counsel; The fact that several different counsels de officio were appointed during the different hearings is not a denial of the constitutional right to counsel.—The appellant's argument is novel and interesting but, once more, we are not persuaded that there has here been a deprivation of a constitutional right which requires annulment of all the proceedings before the trial court. We do not believe that the fact that a particular counsel de officio did not or could not consistently appear in all the hearings of the case, is effectively a denial of the right to counsel, especially so where, as in the instant case, there is no showing that the several appointed counsel de officio in any way neglected to perform their duties to the appellant and to the trial court and that the defense had suffered in any substantial sense therefrom. People vs. Tampus “Venue and arraignment in prison” “Can venue of arraignment and trial be in prison?” “Right to remain silent and when is there is a valid waiver?” “During trial, who should be the one to appraise accused of his rights? Judge? Prosecution? His parents?” Facts: Accused Jose Tampus and his co- accused were convicted of murder. The evidence shows that in the morning Celso Saminado a prisoner in the national penitentiary at Muntinlupa, Rizal went to the toilet to answer a call of nature and to fetch water. The accused, Tampus and Avila, prisoners in the same penal institution followed Saminado to the toilet and, by means of their bladed weapons, assaulted him. Saminado died on that same morning in the prison hospital. After emerging from the toilet, Tampus and Avila surrendered to a prison guard with their knives. The motive of the killing was revenge. Tampus and Avila, both members of the Oxo gang, avenged the stabbing of their gang mate by a member of another gang that were hostile to theirs. Two days after the killing, the prison guard investigated Tampus and Avila and obtained their extrajudicial confessions wherein they admitted that they assaulted Saminado with the assistance of counsel de oficio, they pleaded guilty to the charge of murder. defendant Tampus, contends that he was denied his right to a public trial because the arraignment and hearing were held at the state penitentiary. The other contention of counsel de oficio is that the confession of Tampus was taken in violation of Article III of the Constitution He points out that before the confession was taken by investigator at that alleged custodial interrogation, Tampus was not informed as to his rights to have counsel and to remain silent. Issues: 1. WoN the venue for arraignment and trial can be in prison and; 2. WoN the accused is denied of the Right to remain silent Ruling: Yes. And No.

Can venue of arraignment and trial be in prison? 1st issue: Yes. Criminal Law; Murder; Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Venue; Venue of arraignment and hearing of a criminal case at the New Bilibid Prison valid; Reasons.—The New Bilibid Prison was the venue of the arraignment and hearing, and not the trial court’s session hall at Makati, Rizal, because this Court in its resolution where Rodolfo Avila was one of the accused-

appellants, refused, for security reasons, to allow him to be brought to Makati. So, this Court directed that the arraignment and trial in the instant case, where Avila was a co-accused of Tampus, be held at the National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa. The record does not show that the public was actually excluded from the place where the trial was held or that the accused was prejudiced by the holding of the trial in the national penitentiary. There is a ruling that the fact that for the convenience of the witnesses a case is tried in Bilibid Prison without any objection on the part of the accused is not a ground for reversal of the judgment of conviction (U.S. vs. Mercado, 4 Phil. 304). “Right to remain silent and when is there is a valid waiver?” 2nd issue: No. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Right to remain silent and to counsel; Waiver of right of the accused to remain silent and to counsel due to spontaneous statement admitting their guilt.—The two accused, by means of that statement given freely on the spur of the moment without any urging or suggestion, waived their right to remain silent and to have the right to counsel. That admission was confirmed by their extrajudicial confession, plea of guilty and testimony in court. They did not appeal from the judgment of conviction.

“During trial, who should be the one to appraise accused of his rights? Judge? Prosecution? His parents?”

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Courts; Courts not duty bound to apprise accused of his constitutional right to remain silent, but such duly devolves upon his counsel to claim the rights considering the accused’s confession and plea of guilty.—It is further contended that after the fiscal had presented the prosecution’s evidence and when counsel de oficio called upon Tampus to testify, the trial court should have advised him of his constitutional right to remain silent. That contention is not well-taken considering that Tampus pleaded guilty and had executed an extrajudicial confession (U.S. vs. Binayoh, 35 Phil. 23). The court during the trial is not dutybound to apprise the accused that he has the right to remain silent. It is his counsel who should claim that right for him. If he does not claim it and he calls the accused to the witness stand, when he waives that right.

People vs. Dela Cruz, 124 SCRA 229 “Right to confrontation of witnesses.” Facts: An information for murder was filed on against six (6) accused persons including Accused Abundio Dela Cruz, For killing the victim Pedro Sorreta, a lawyer. One of the Accused went to Sorreta for legal advice concerning the wife of the other co- accused. He casually asked Atty. Sorreta where he was going that afternoon and Atty. Sorreta said that he was going to the sea to fish. Sorreta’s family got worried that that he did not return and searched for him, the search lasted 3 days. Eventually they found the body of Atty. Sorreta washed ashore and was already decomposing. The motive behind the killing was because the appellants accused Atty. Sorreta for being a “land grabber”. Years have passed since the case. The accused-appellant was at the scene of the crime during its commission and that, contrary to his protestations, he had something to do with the killing. However, because of unavoidable difficulties or unfortunate lapses on the part of the prosecution, the only evidence directly the incriminating the appellant — confession of the convicted earlier — happens to be inadmissible against him. Issue: WoN the extrajudicial confession of an accused in implicating another co-accused is valid enough to convict him. Ruling: No.

An extrajudicial confession of a co-accused which the lower court used not as circumstantial evidence of the guilt of appellant, but as principal evidence thereof cannot be used against the latter unless repeated in court.—If the above confession were merely corroborative of other facts which tend to establish the guilt of the appellant, then it could be admitted against him. (People v. Puesca, 87 SCRA 130), It could also be allowed as circumstantial evidence to show the probability that the appellant actually participated in the commission of the crime. (People v. Lumahang, 94 Phil. 1048). The confession of Eriberto Cenon, however, is not simply corroborative but is the principal evidence against Abundio de la Cruz. It was not utilized by the lower court merely as circumstantial evidence. Same; Same.—Consequently, we apply the rule that extra-judicial statements of an accused implicating a co-accused cannot be used against the latter unless repeated in open court. The right to confrontation of witnesses found in Section 19, Article IV, Constitution is violated.