Consti-2-bill-of-rights-first-52-cases.pdf

II. BILL OF RIGHTS •

CONCEPT AND ORIGIN

•

CLASSIFICATION OF RIGHTS ARTICLE III. – THE BILL OF RIGHTS

Art. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. From Nachura: A. Bill of Rights In general. 1. Definition. The set of prescriptions setting forth the fundamental civil and political rights of the individual, and imposing limitations on the powers of government as a means of securing the enjoyment of those rights. The Bill of Rights is designed to preserve the ideals of liberty, equality and security “against the assaults of opportunism, the expediency of the passing hour, the erosion of small encroachments, and the scorn and derision of those who have no patience with general principles” [quoted in PBM Employees Organization v. Philippine Blooming Mills, 51 SCRA 189]. Generally, any governmental action in violation of the Bill of Rights is void. These provisions are also generally self-executing. a) Civil Rights. Those rights that belong to every citizen of the state or country, or, in a wider sense, to all its inhabitants, and are not connected with the organization or administration of government. They include the rights to property, marriage, equal protection of the laws, freedom of contract, etc. They are rights appertaining to a person by virtue of his citizenship in a state or community. Such term may also refer, in its general sense, to rights capable of being enforced or redressed in a civil action. ' b) Political Rights. They refer to the right to participate, directly or indirectly, in the establishment or administration of government, e.g., the right of suffrage, the right to hold public office, the right to petition and, in general the rights appurtenant to citizenship vis-a-visthe management of government [Simon v. Commission on Human Rights, G.R. No. 100150, January 5, 1994]. 2. In Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 104768, July 21, 2003, the Supreme Court held that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not operative from the actual and effective take-over of power by the revolutionary government following the EDSA revolution until the adoption, on March 24, 1986, of the Provisional (Freedom) Constitution. During this period, the directives and orders of the revolutionary government were the supreme law, because no constitution limited the extent and scope of such directives and orders. Thus, during the interregnum, a person could not invoke any exclusionary right under the Bill of Rights, because there was neither a constitution nor a Bill of Rights at the time. However, the protection accorded to individuals under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) remained in effect during the interregnum. •

DOCTRINE OF PREFERRED FREEDOM (HIERARCHY OF RIGHTS)

Q. Do life and property enjoy identical protection from the Constitution? A. No. The primacy of human rights over property rights is recognized. In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly occupy a preferred position as they are essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutions. "The superiority of these freedoms over property rights is underscored by the fact that a mere reasonable or rational relation between the means employed by the law and its object or purpose —that the law is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory nor oppressive —would suffice to validate a law which restricts or impairs property rights. On the other hand, a constitutional or valid infringement of human rights requires a more stringent criterion, namely existence of a grave and immediate danger of a substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent." [Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization v. Philippine Blooming Mills Co. Inc.,50 SCRA 189,202-3(1973)].

Q. What is the extent of the authority of the state to regulate public assemblies? A. In Navarro v. Villegas, 31 SCRA 731 (1970), where the petitioner wanted the use of Plaza Miranda whereas the Mayor would allow only the use of the Sunken Gardens, the Supreme Court ruled that the Mayor possessed "reasonable discretion to determine or specify the streets or public places to be used for the assembly in order to secure convenient use thereof by others and provide adequate and proper policing to minimize the risks of disorder and maintain public safety and order." Navarro v. Pilegas, 31 SCRA 721 (1970). A later case, Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization v. Philippine Blooming Mills Co. Inc., 51 SCRA 189 (1973), started when the petitioner labor unions, against the wishes of management and in order to be able to stage a mass demonstration against alleged abuses of local police, did not report for work. The Court of Industrial Relations adjudged their "concerted act and the occurrence of a temporary stoppage of work" a violation of the collective bargaining agreement and upheld the dismissal of some union leaders. The Supreme Court reversed saying through Justice Makasiar that: "As heretofore stated, the primacy of human rights —freedom of expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of grievances — over property rights has been sustained. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501; Tucker v. Texas, 326 U.S. 517." Q. Do all societies and associations enjoy the same constitutional protection? A. As already seen, under Section 1, the Constitution recognizes a hierarchy of values. Philippine Blooming Mills Employees v. Philippine Blooming Mills, 51 SCRA 189, 2200-3 (1973). Hence, the degree of protection an association enjoys depends on the position which the association's objective or activity occupies in the constitutional hierarchy of values. Thus, for instance, where the object of an association is the advancement of a common political belief such as racial equality, any law that either has the effect of limiting membership in such association or blunting its effectivity must satisfy the more stringent standards for allowable limitation of expression and belief. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963). In the latter cases, the standards discussed in Section 4 are applicable. (1) PBM Employees Org. vs. PBM Co., Inc. 51 SCRA 189 (1973) FACTS: Philippine Blooming Employees Organization (PBMEO) decided to stage a mass demonstration in front of Malacañang to express their grievances against the alleged abuses of the Pasig Police. The parties stipulated that the company, after learning the mass demonstration, informed the union panel that they even if the demonstration is an inalienable right granted by the Constitution, it should not unduly prejudice the normal operation of the company. As such, they warned the PBMEO representatives that workers who will participate in the demonstration and the officers present who are the organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to report for work the following morning (March 4, 1969) shall be dismissed, because such failure is a violation of the existing CBA provision on NO LOCKOUT — NO STRIKE article and, therefore, would be amounting to an illegal strike. However, the Union proceeded to the strike despite pleas from the Company. PBMEO contended that they did not violate the existing CBA because they gave the respondent Company prior notice of the mass demonstration and that the said mass demonstration was a valid exercise of their constitutional freedom of speech against the alleged abuses of some Pasig policemen; and that their mass demonstration was not a declaration of strike because it was not directed against the respondent firm. PBMEO was charged by the court of industrial relations guilty of bargaining in bad faith as directly responsible for perpetrating the said unfair labor practice were considered to have lost their status as employees of the respondent Company. ISSUE: Whether the mass demonstration of PBMEO constitutes a violation in the CBA hence, the dismissal is legal RULING: No. The pretension of their employer that it would suffer loss or damage by reason of the absence of its employees is a plea for the preservation merely of their property rights. Such apprehended loss or damage would not spell the difference between the life and death of the firm or its owners or its management. While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights over property rights is recognized. Because these freedoms are “delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society” and the “threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions,” they “need breathing space to survive,” permitting government regulation only “with narrow specificity.”

Apart from violating the constitutional guarantees of free speech and assembly as well as the right to petition for redress of grievances of the employees, the dismissal constitutes a denial of social justice likewise assured by the fundamental law to these lowly employees. A. DUE PROCESS A. DUE PROCESS • Art. III, Sec. 1 Limitations on police power. — The basic limitations of due process and equal protection are found in the following provisions of our Constitution: SECTION 1. (1) No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. (Article III, Phil. Constitution) These constitutional guarantees which embody the essence of individual liberty and freedom in democracies, are not limited to citizens alone but are admittedly universal in their application, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality. The equal protection clause. The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation, which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exists for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not. The due process clause. The due process clause has to do with the reasonableness of legislation enacted in pursuance of the police power. Is there public interest, a public purpose; is public welfare involved? Is the Act reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the legislature's purpose; is it not unreasonable, arbitrary or oppressive? Is there sufficient foundation or reason in connection with the matter involved; or has there not been a capricious use of the legislative power? Can the aims conceived be achieved by the means used, or is it not merely an unjustified interference with private interest? These are the questions that we ask when the due process test is applied. The conflict, therefore, between police power and the guarantees of due process and equal protection of the laws is more apparent than real. Properly related, the power and the guarantees are supposed to coexist. THE BALANCING IS THE ESSENCE or, shall it be said, the indispensable means for the attainment of legitimate aspirations of any democratic society. There can be no absolute power, whoever exercise it, for that would be tyranny. Yet there can neither be absolute liberty, for that would mean license and anarchy. So the State can deprive persons of life, liberty and property, provided there is due process of law; and persons may be classified into classes and groups provided everyone is given the equal protection of the law. The test or standard, as always, is reason. The police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist between purposes and means. And if distinction and classification has been made, there must be a reasonable basis for said distinction. •

Art. III, Sec. 14 (1) SECTION 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process

of law. •

Definition, Nature, Scope and Evolution Origin.

By the 39th chapter of the Magna Carta wrung by the barons from King John, the despot promised that “no man shall be taken or imprisoned or disseized or outlawed, or in any manner destroyed; nor shall we go upon him, nor send upon him, but by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land [per legemterraef].

Definition. “A law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial” [Darmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheaton 518], “Responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice” [Ermita-Malate Hotel & Motel Operators Association v. City of Manila, 20 SCRA 849].“The embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play” [Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Holmes and the Supreme Court, pp 32-33]. Who are protected? Universal in application to all persons, without regard to any difference in race, color or nationality. Artificial persons are covered by the protection but only insofar as their property is concerned [Smith Bell &Co. v. Natividad, 40 Phil. 163]. The guarantee extends to aliens and includes the means of livelihood [Villegas v. HiuChiong, 86 SCRA 275]. •

Meaning of Life, Liberty, and Property

a) Life includes the right of an individual to his body in its completeness, free from dismemberment, and extends to the use of God-given faculties which make life enjoyable [Justice Malcolm, Philippine Constitutional Law, pp. 320321]. See: Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200. b) Liberty includes “the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary personal restraint or servitude, x xx (It) includes the right of the citizen to be free to use his faculties in all lawful ways x xx” [Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil 660], c) Property is anything that can come under the right of ownership and be the subject of contract. It represents more than the things a person owns; it includes the right to secure, use and dispose of them [Torraco v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197]. i) i) Public office is not property; but one unlawfully ousted from it may institute an action to recover the same, flowing from the de jure officer’s right to office [Nunez v. Averia, 57 SCRA 726], Indeed, the Court while public office is not property to which one may acquire a vested right, it is nevertheless a protected right [Bince v. Commission on Elections, 218 SCRA 782]. One’s employment, profession or trade or calling is a property right, and the wrongful interference therewith is an actionable wrong. Thus, an order of suspension, without opportunity for hearing, violates property rights [Crespo v. Provincial Board, 160 SCRA 66]. But its proper regulation has been upheld as a legitimate subject of the police power of the State, particularly when its conduct affects either the execution of legitimate governmental functions, the preservation of the State, the public health and welfare, and public morals [JMM Promotion and Management v. Court of Appeals, supra.]. ii) A mining license that contravenes a mandatory provision of law under which it is granted is void. Being a mere privilege, a license does not vest absolute rights in the holder. Thus, without offending the due process and the non- impairment clauses of the Constitution, it can be revoked by the State in the public interest [Republic v. Rosemoor Mining & Development Corporation, G.R. No. 149927, March 30, 2004]. Mere privileges, such as the license to operate a cockpit, are not property rights and are revocable at will [Pedro v. Provincial Board of Rizal, 53 Phil 123]. iii) The license to carry a firearm is neither a property nor a property right. Neither does it create a vested right. A permit to carry a firearm outside one’s residence may be revoked at any time. Even if it were a property right, it cannot be considered as absolute as to be placed beyond the reach of police power [Chavez v. Romulo, 431 SCRA 534], iv)The mandatory suspension from office of a public official pending criminal prosecution for violation of RA 3019 cannot amount to deprivation of property without due process of law [Libanan v. Sandiganbayan, 233 SCRA 163]. •

Art. II, Sec. 11 (respect for human rights) The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human

rights. •

Writ of Amparo

(2) Sec. of National Defense vs. Manalo G.R. No. 180906 October 7, 2008

FACTS: The case at bar is the first petition for a writ of Amparo filed before this Court. CONTENTION OF RESPONDENTS: Feb 14, 2006 - Brothers Raymond and Reynaldo were abducted and physically beaten up by several armed soldiers. They were taken to a house they didn't know. They were beaten and interrogated by soldiers. Days later, Raymond's interrogators were high officials. After three weeks of detention and beatings, Raymond attempted to escape. He managed to free from the chains and jumped through the window. Women along the way told him that he was in Fort Magsaysay. However, some soldiers spotted him, he was caught and beaten up and was returned to where they were detained. For about three and a half months, the respondents were detained there. The respondents were transferred to another location (Sapang) and same thing, they were beaten and interrogated. They were again transferred to another location where Raymond met Gen. Palparan where the latter made a bargain that Raymond's parents should not attend hearings, rallies and meet with human rights groups if they want to be safe. Respondent agreed out of fear. Then, they were brought to their parents’ house. In the presence of soldiers, Raymond relayed to his parents what Gen. Palparan told him. They acceded in fear. Soldiers threatened the parents that if they continued to join human rights rallies, they would never see their children again. The respondents were then brought back to Sapang. From November 2006 to June 2007, the brothers were transferred from one place to another and were made to work for the soldiers while still being interrogated and tortured every time, throughout the period. June 13, 2007, Raymond and Reynaldo were brought to a farm in Pangasinan. Respondents started to plan their escape. One night, Raymond and Reynaldo proceeded towards the highway, leaving behind their drunk sleeping guards. They boarded a bus bound for Manila and were thus freed from captivity. DEFENSE OF PETITIONER: 1. Petitioners Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo were not at any time arrested, forcibly abducted, detained, held incommunicado, disappeared or under the custody by the military. 2. That no evidence was introduced to establish their personal involvement in the taking of the Manalo brothers. ISSUE: The CA erred in granting the petition for Writ of Amparo in favor of the respondents by believing and giving full faith and credit to the incredible uncorroborated, contradicted, and obviously scripted, rehearsed and self-serving affidavit/testimony of respondents. COURT'S RULING: Petition was granted. CA ruling affirmed. The Writ of Amparo October 24, 2007, the Court promulgated the Amparo Rule in light of the prevalence of extralegal killing and enforced disappearances. It was intended to address the problem of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances or to threats thereof. Extralegal killings are killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings. On the other hand, enforced disappearances are attended by the following characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a government official or organized groups or private individuals acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the protection of law. Amparo literally means "protection' in Spanish. The writ originated from Mexico. 1987 Constitution and the Importance of the Writ in cases involving extralegal killings and enforced disappearances The 1987 Constitution does not explicitly provide for the writ of Amparo, but some Amparo protections are guaranteed by our charter. The second paragraph of Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, the Grave Abuse Clause, provides for the judicial power to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any

branch or instrumentality of the Government. Amparo libertad (Liberty Amparo) is comparable to the remedy of habeas corpus found in several provisions of the 1987 Constitution. While constitutional rights can be protected under the Grave Abuse Clause through remedies of injunction or prohibition and a petition for habeas corpus, these remedies may not be adequate to address the pestering problem of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. However, with the swiftness required to resolve a petition for a writ of amparo through summary proceedings and the availability of appropriate interim and permanent reliefs under the Amparo Rule, this offers a better remedy to extralegal killings and enforced disappearances and threats. The remedy provides rapid judicial relief as it partakes of a summary proceeding that requires only substantial evidence to make the appropriate reliefs available to the petitioner; it is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring preponderance of evidence, or administrative responsibility requiring substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive proceedings. The writ of amparo serves both preventive and curative roles in addressing the problem of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. It is preventive in that it breaks the expectation of impunity in the commission of these offenses; it is curative in that it facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators as it will inevitably yield leads to subsequent investigation and action. In the long run, the goal of both the preventive and curative roles is to deter the further commission of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. Measure of the Court for granting or denying grant of Writ Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides for the following causes of action: "The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity. The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. " Sections 17 and 18, provide for the degree of proof required: "The parties shall establish their claims by substantial evidence. If the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate; otherwise, the privilege shall be denied. Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. In this case, the abduction, detention, torture, and escape of the respondents were narrated by respondent Raymond Manalo in a clear and convincing manner. His account is dotted with countless candid details of respondents harrowing experience and tenacious will to escape, captured through his different senses and etched in his memory. The SC was convinced that the reason for the abduction was the suspicion that the petitioners were either members or sympathizers of the NPA. Gen. Palparan's participation in the abduction was also established. At the very least, he was aware of the petitioners’ captivity at the hands of men in uniform assigned to his command. In fact, he or any other officer tendered no controversion to the firm claim of Raymond that he (Gen. Palparan) met them in person in a safe house in Bulacan and told them what he wanted them and their parents to do or not to be doing. Gen. Palparans direct and personal role in the abduction might not have been shown but his knowledge of the dire situation of the petitioners during their long captivity at the hands of military personnel under his command bespoke of his indubitable command policy that unavoidably encouraged and not merely tolerated the abduction of civilians without due process of law and without probable cause.

It is clear, through the respondent's affidavits that the participation of some military personnel in the abduction and forced disappearance of the petitioners was established. In a foreign jurisprudence entitled Ortiz v. Guatemala, similar evidence was considered, in finding that complainant Sister Diana Ortiz was abducted and tortured by agents of the Guatemalan government. In this case, Sister Ortiz was kidnapped and tortured in early November 1989. The Commission’s findings of fact were mostly based on the consistent and credible statements, written and oral, made by Sister Ortiz regarding her ordeal. The personal testimonies therefore of those subjected to torture or those whose rights were violated in cases like this are the ones in the best position to testify or provide evidence. Are the respondents entitled to the Writ? Yes. Even if the enforced disappearance of both respondents Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo has now passed as they have escaped from captivity and surfaced, and respondents admit that they are no longer in detention and are physically free, they assert that they are not free in every sense of the word as their movements continue to be restricted for fear that people they have named in their Judicial Affidavits and testified against (in the case of Raymond) are still at large and have not been held accountable in any way. These people are directly connected to the AFP and are, thus, in a position to threaten respondents’ rights to life, liberty and security. Respondents claim that they are under threat of being once again abducted, kept captive or even killed, which constitute a direct violation of their right to security of person. Right to Security and Right of Liberty (Expanded interpretation of Right to Security) Respondents point out that n; it is also seen as an expansion of rights based on the prohibition against torture and cruel and unusual punishment. Conceding that there is no right to security expressly mentioned in Article III Section 2, they submit that their rights to be kept free from torture and from incommunicado detention and solitary detention places fall under the general coverage of the right to security of person under the writ of Amparo. They submit that the Court ought to give an expansive recognition of the right to security of person in view of the State Policy under Article II of the 1987 Constitution which enunciates that, The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights. Finally, to justify a liberal interpretation of the right to security of person, respondents cite the teaching in Moncupa v. Enrile that the right to liberty may be made more meaningful only if there is no undue restraint by the State on the exercise of that liberty such as a requirement to report under unreasonable restrictions that amounted to a deprivation of liberty or being put under monitoring and surveillance. In sum, respondents assert that their cause of action consists in the threat to their right to life and liberty, and a violation of their right to security. Under Art. III Sec. 2: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge At the core of this guarantee is the immunity of one’s person, including the extensions of his/her person houses, papers, and effects against government intrusion. Section 2 not only limits the state’s power over a person’s home and possessions, but more importantly, protects the privacy and sanctity of the person himself. The purpose of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures is to prevent violations of private security in person and property and unlawful invasion of the security of the home by officers of the law acting under legislative or judicial sanction and to give remedy against such usurpation when attempted. The right to privacy is an essential condition to the dignity and happiness and to the peace and security of every individual, whether it be of home or of persons and correspondence. The constitutional inviolability of this great fundamental right against unreasonable

searches and seizures must be deemed absolute as nothing is closer to a mans soul than the serenity of his privacy and the assurance of his personal security. Any interference allowable can only be for the best causes and reasons. Right to Security vs Right to Life While the right to life under Article III, Section 1 guarantees essentially the right to be alive - upon which the enjoyment of all other rights is preconditioned - the right to security of person is a guarantee of the secure quality of this life: The life to which each person has a right is not a life lived in fear that his person and property may be unreasonably violated by a powerful ruler. Rather, it is a life lived with the assurance that the government he established and consented to, will protect the security of his person and property. The ideal of security in life and property pervades the whole history of man. It touches every aspect of man’s existence. In a broad sense, the right to security of person emanates in a person’s legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his health, and his reputation. It includes the right to exist, and the right to enjoyment of life while existing, and it is invaded not only by a deprivation of life but also of those things which are necessary to the enjoyment of life according to the nature, temperament, and lawful desires of the individual. Right to Security in International Laws The right to security of person is freedom from fear. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) enunciates that a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people. Article 9(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) also provides for the right to security of person: Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are established by law. The Philippines is a signatory to both the UDHR and the ICCPR. What then is the Writ of Amparo and its scope throughout other Constitutional Rights? 1. Under Section 1 of the Amparo Rule, freedom from fear is the right and any threat to the rights to life, liberty or security is the actionable wrong. Fear is a state of mind, a reaction; threat is a stimulus, a cause of action. Fear caused by the same stimulus can range from being baseless to well-founded as people react differently. The degree of fear can vary from one person to another with the variation of the prolificacy of their imagination, strength of character or past experience with the stimulus. Thus, in the amparo context, it is more correct to say that the right to security is actually the freedom from threat. Viewed in this light, the threatened with violation Clause in the latter part of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule is a form of violation of the right to security mentioned in the earlier part of the provision. 2. The right to security of person is a guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity or security. Article III, Section II of the 1987 Constitution guarantees that, as a general rule, ones body cannot be searched or invaded without a search warrant. Physical injuries inflicted in the context of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances constitute more than a search or invasion of the body. It may constitute dismemberment, physical disabilities, and painful physical intrusion. As the degree of physical injury increases, the danger to life itself escalates. Notably, in criminal law, physical injuries constitute a crime against persons because they are an affront to the bodily integrity or security of a person. Physical torture, force, and violence are a severe invasion of bodily integrity. When employed to vitiate the free will such as to force the victim to admit, reveal or fabricate incriminating information, it constitutes an invasion of both bodily and psychological integrity as the dignity of the human person includes the exercise of free will. (IN RELATION TO TOPIC ON DUE PROCESS) Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution more specifically proscribes bodily and psychological invasion. Also under this provision, threat and intimidation that vitiate the free will - although not involving invasion of bodily

integrity - nevertheless constitute a violation of the right to security in the sense of freedom from threat as afore-discussed. Article III, Section 12 guarantees freedom from dehumanizing abuses of persons under investigation for the commission of an offense. Victims of enforced disappearances who are not even under such investigation should all the more be protected from these degradations. 3. The right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of ones rights by the government. In the context of the writ of amparo, this right is built into the guarantees of the right to life and liberty and the right to security of person (as freedom from threat and guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity). The right to security of person in this third sense is a corollary of the policy that the State guarantees full respect for human rights under Article II, Section 11. As the government is the chief guarantor of order and security, the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and security of person is rendered ineffective if government does not afford protection to these rights especially when they are under threat. While the right to security of person appears in conjunction with the right to liberty, the right to security of person can still exist independently of the right to liberty. In other words, there need not necessarily be a deprivation of liberty for the right to security of person to be invoked. The right to security arises only in the context of arrest and detention. However, there is no evidence that it was intended (in the UDHR) to narrow the concept of the right to security only to situations of formal deprivation of liberty. At the same time, States parties have undertaken to guarantee the rights enshrined in the Covenant. It cannot be the case that, as a matter of law, States can ignore known threats to the life of persons under their jurisdiction, just because that he or she is not arrested or otherwise detained. States parties are under an obligation to take reasonable and appropriate measures to protect them. An interpretation of article 9 which would allow a State party to ignore threats to the personal security of non-detained persons within its jurisdiction would render totally ineffective the guarantees of the Covenant. Was there a violation of the respondents' right to security? Yes. The violation of the right to security as freedom from threat to respondents’ life, liberty and security. While respondents were detained, they were threatened that if they escaped, their families, including them, would be killed. Then, respondents have finally escaped. The condition of the threat to be killed has come to pass. It should be stressed that they are now free from captivity not because they were released by virtue of a lawful order or voluntarily freed by their abductors. It ought to be recalled that towards the end of their ordeal, sometime in June 2007 when respondents were detained in a camp in Bataan, respondents’ captors even told them that they were still deciding whether they should be executed. With their escape, this continuing threat to their life is apparent, moreso now that they have surfaced and implicated specific officers in the military not only in their own abduction and torture, but also in those of other persons known to have disappeared. Understandably, since their escape, respondents have been under concealment and protection by private citizens because of the threat to their life, liberty and security. The threat vitiates their free will as they are forced to limit their movements or activities. Precisely because respondents are being shielded from the perpetrators of their abduction, they cannot be expected to show evidence of overt acts of threat such as face-to-face intimidation or written threats to their life, liberty and security. Nonetheless, the circumstances of respondents abduction, detention, torture and escape reasonably support a conclusion that there is an apparent threat that they will again be abducted, tortured, and this time, even executed. These constitute threats to their liberty, security, and life, actionable through a petition for a writ of amparo. Was there a violation of the respondents' right to protection by the government?

Yes. Apart from the failure of military elements to provide protection to respondents by themselves perpetrating the abduction, detention, and torture, they also miserably failed in conducting an effective investigation of respondents’ abduction. The one-day investigation conducted was very limited, superficial, and one-sided. To this day, however, almost a year after the policy directive for investigation of the incident was issued by petitioner Secretary of National Defense, respondents have not been furnished the results of the investigation which they now seek through the instant petition for a writ of amparo. The petitioners directed to comply with reliefs. ON DUE PROCESS (in connection with the topic) The taking of the brothers was illegal since there was no warrant. Thus they were confiscated of their right to due process. They were subjected to extralegal interrogation and all that (you know). Under Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, the protection of the people from the unreasonable intrusion of the government is provided, not a protection of the government from the demand of the people such as respondents. •

Writ of Habeas Data A.M. No. 08-01-16-SC January 22, 2008

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC A. M. No. 08-1-16-SC January 22, 2008 THE RULE ON THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA RESOLUTION Acting on the recommendation of the Chairperson of the Committee on Revision of the Rules of Court submitting for this Court’s consideration and approval the proposed Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data, the Court Resolved to APPROVE the same. This Resolution shall take effect on February 2, 2008, following its publication in three (3) newspapers of general circulation. January 22, 2008. THE RULE ON THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA SECTION 1. Habeas Data. - The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party. SEC. 2. Who May File. - Any aggrieved party may file a petition for the writ of habeas data. However, in cases of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, the petition may be filed by: (a) Any member of the immediate family of the aggrieved party, namely: the spouse, children and parents; or (b) Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the aggrieved party within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity, in default of those mentioned in the preceding paragraph; or SEC. 3. Where to File. - The petition may be filed with the Regional Trial Court where the petitioner or respondent resides, or that which has jurisdiction over the place where the data or information is gathered, collected or stored, at the option of the petitioner. The petition may also be filed with the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals or the Sandiganbayan when the action concerns public data files of government offices.

SEC. 4. Where Returnable; Enforceable. - When the writ is issued by a Regional Trial Court or any judge thereof, it shall be returnable before such court or judge. When issued by the Court of Appeals or the Sandiganbayan or any of its justices, it may be returnable before such court or any justice thereof, or to any Regional Trial Court of the place where the petitioner or respondent resides, or that which has jurisdiction over the place where the data or information is gathered, collected or stored. When issued by the Supreme Court or any of its justices, it may be returnable before such Court or any justice thereof, or before the Court of Appeals or the Sandiganbayan or any of its justices, or to any Regional Trial Court of the place where the petitioner or respondent resides, or that which has jurisdiction over the place where the data or information is gathered, collected or stored. The writ of habeas data shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. Sec. 5. Docket Fees. - No docket and other lawful fees shall be required from an indigent petitioner. The petition of the indigent shall be docked and acted upon immediately, without prejudice to subsequent submission of proof of indigency not later than fifteen (15) days from the filing of the petition. SEC. 6. Petition. - A verified written petition for a writ of habeas data should contain: (a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner and the respondent; (b) The manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it affects the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party; (c) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to secure the data or information; (d) The location of the files, registers or databases, the government office, and the person in charge, in possession or in control of the data or information, if known; (e) The reliefs prayed for, which may include the updating, rectification, suppression or destruction of the database or information or files kept by the respondent. In case of threats, the relief may include a prayer for an order enjoining the act complained of; and (f) Such other relevant reliefs as are just and equitable. SEC. 7. Issuance of the Writ. - Upon the filing of the petition, the court, justice or judge shall immediately order the issuance of the writ if on its face it ought to issue. The clerk of court shall issue the writ under the seal of the court and cause it to be served within three (3) days from the issuance; or, in case of urgent necessity, the justice or judge may issue the writ under his or her own hand, and may deputize any officer or person serve it. The writ shall also set the date and time for summary hearing of the petition which shall not be later than ten (10) work days from the date of its issuance. SEC. 8. Penalty for Refusing to Issue or Serve the Writ. - A clerk of court who refuses to issue the writ after its allowance, or a deputized person who refuses to serve the same, shall be punished by the court, justice or judge for contempt without prejudice to other disciplinary actions. SEC. 9. How the Writ is Served. - The writ shall be served upon the respondent by a judicial officer or by a person deputized by the court, justice or judge who shall retain a copy on which to make a return of service. In case the writ cannot be served personally on the respondent, the rules on substituted service shall apply. SEC. 10. Return; Contents. - The respondent shall file a verified written return together with supporting affidavits within five (5) working days from service of the writ, which period may be reasonably extended by the Court for justifiable reasons. The return shall, among other things, contain the following: (a) The lawful defenses such as national security, state secrets, privileged communications, confidentiality of the source of information of media and others; (b) In case of respondent in charge, in possession or in control of the data or information subject of the petition; (i) a disclosure of the data or information about the petitioner, the nature of such data or information, and the purpose for its collection; (ii) the steps or actions taken by the respondent to ensure the security and confidentiality of the data or information; and, (iii) the currency and accuracy of the data or information held; and, (c) Other allegations relevant to the resolution of the proceeding. A general denial of the allegations in the petition shall not be allowed. SEC. 11. Contempt. - The court, justice or judge may punish with imprisonment or fine a respondent who commits contempt by making a false return, or refusing to make a return; or any person who otherwise disobeys or resist a lawful process or order of the court. SEC. 12. When Defenses May be Heard in Chambers. - A hearing in chambers may be conducted where the respondent invokes the defense that the release of the data or information in

question shall compromise national security or state secrets, or when the data or information cannot be divulged to the public due to its nature or privileged character. Sec. 13. Prohibited Pleadings and Motions. - The following pleadings and motions are prohibited: (a) Motion to dismiss; (b) Motion for extension of time to file return, opposition, affidavit, position paper and other pleadings; (c) Dilatory motion for postponement; (d) Motion for a bill of particulars; (e) Counterclaim or cross-claim; (f) Third-party complaint; (g) Reply; (h) Motion to declare respondent in default; (i) Intervention; (j) Memorandum; (k) Motion for reconsideration of interlocutory orders or interim relief orders; and (l) Petition for certiorari, mandamus or prohibition against any interlocutory order. SEC. 14. Return; Filing. - In case the respondent fails to file a return, the court, justice or judge shall proceed to hear the petition ex parte, granting the petitioner such relief as the petition may warrant unless the court in its discretion requires the petitioner to submit evidence. SEC. 15. Summary Hearing. - The hearing on the petition shall be summary. However, the court, justice or judge may call for a preliminary conference to simplify the issues and determine the possibility of obtaining stipulations and admissions from the parties. SEC. 16. Judgment. - The court shall render judgment within ten (10) days from the time the petition is submitted for decision. If the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence, the court shall enjoin the act complained of, or order the deletion, destruction, or rectification of the erroneous data or information and grant other relevant reliefs as may be just and equitable; otherwise, the privilege of the writ shall be denied. Upon its finality, the judgment shall be enforced by the sheriff or any lawful officers as may be designated by the court, justice or judge within five (5) working days. SEC. 17. Return of Service. - The officer who executed the final judgment shall, within three (3) days from its enforcement, make a verified return to the court. The return shall contain a full statement of the proceedings under the writ and a complete inventory of the database or information, or documents and articles inspected, updated, rectified, or deleted, with copies served on the petitioner and the respondent. The officer shall state in the return how the judgment was enforced and complied with by the respondent, as well as all objections of the parties regarding the manner and regularity of the service of the writ. SEC. 18. Hearing on Officer’s Return. - The court shall set the return for hearing with due notice to the parties and act accordingly. SEC. 19. Appeal. - Any party may appeal from the final judgment or order to the Supreme Court under Rule 45. The appeal may raise questions of fact or law or both. The period of appeal shall be five (5) working days from the date of notice of the judgment or final order. The appeal shall be given the same priority as in habeas corpus and amparo cases. SEC. 20. Institution of Separate Actions. - The filing of a petition for the writ of habeas data shall not preclude the filing of separate criminal, civil or administrative actions. SEC. 21. Consolidation. - When a criminal action is filed subsequent to the filing of a petition for the writ, the latter shall be consolidated with the criminal action. When a criminal action and a separate civil action are filed subsequent to a petition for a writ of habeas data, the petition shall be consolidated with the criminal action. After consolidation, the procedure under this Rule shall continue to govern the disposition of the reliefs in the petition. SEC. 22. Effect of Filing of a Criminal Action. - When a criminal action has been commenced, no separate petition for the writ shall be filed. The relief under the writ shall be available to an aggrieved party by motion in the criminal case. The procedure under this Rule shall govern the disposition of the reliefs available under the writ of habeas data. SEC. 23. Substantive Rights. - This Rule shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. SEC. 24. Suppletory Application of the Rules of Court. - The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily insofar as it is not inconsistent with this Rule.

SEC. 25. Effectivity. - This Rule shall take effect on February 2, 2008, following its publication in three (3) newspapers of general circulation. [PUBLISHED IN THE MANILA BULLETIN, THE PHILIPPINE STAR AND THE PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER ON 25 JANUARY 2008] (3) DR. JOY MARGATE LEE v. P/SUPT. NERI A. ILAGAN G.R. No. 203254 October 08, 2014 FACTS: Neri, a police officer, filed a petition for the issuance of Writ of Habeas Data against Joy, her former common law partner. According to him, sometime in July 2011, he visited Joy’s condominium and rested for a while. When he arrived at his office, he noticed his digital camera missing. On August 23, 2011, Joy confronted him about a purported sex video she discovered from the digital camera showing him and another woman. He denied the video and demanded the return of the camera, but she refused. The had an altercation where Neri allegedly slammed Joy’s head against a wall and then walked away. Because of this, Joy filed several cases against him, including a case for violation of Republic Act 9262 and administrative cases before the Napolcom, utilising the said video. The use of the same violated his life to liberty, security and privacy and that of the other woman, thus he had no choice but to file the petition for issuance of the writ of habeas data. After finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the RTC issued the writ and directed Joy to appear before the RTC and produce Neri’s digital camera, as well as the original and copies of the video, and to make a return within five days from receipt. In her return,. Joy admitted keeping the memory card of the digital camera and reproducing the video but only for use as evidence in the cases she filed against Neri. Neri’s petitions should be dismissed because its filing was only aimed at suppressing the evidence in the cases she filed against him; and she is not engaged in the gathering, collecting, or storing of data regarding the person of Neri. The RTC granted Neri’s petition and ordered the turn-over of the video to Neri and enjoined Joy from reproducing the same. It disregarded Joy’s defense that she is not engaged in the collection, gathering and storage of data, and that her acts of reproducing the same and showing it to other persons (Napolcom) violated Neri’s right to privacy and humiliated him. It clarified that it ruling only on the return of the video and not on its admissibility as evidence. Dissatisfied, Joy filed the instant petition before the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether the filing of the petition for issuance of the writ of habeas data was proper RULING: NO. A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC, or the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data (Habeas Data Rule), was conceived as a response, given the lack of effective and available remedies, to address the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances. It was conceptualized as a judicial remedy enforcing the right to privacy, most especially the right to informational privacy of individuals, which is defined as “the right to control the collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination of data about oneself.” As defined in Section 1 of the Habeas Data Rule, the writ of habeas data now stands as “a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home, and correspondence of the aggrieved party.” Thus, in order to support a petition for the issuance of such writ, Section 6 of the Habeas Data Rule essentially requires that the petition sufficiently alleges, among others, “[t]he manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it affects the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party.” In other words, the petition must adequately show that there exists a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other. Corollarily, the allegations in the petition must be supported by substantial evidence showing an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim. In this relation, it bears pointing out that the writ of habeas data will not issue to protect purely property or commercial concerns nor when the grounds invoked in support of the petitions therefor are vague and doubtful. In this case, the Court finds that Ilagan was not able to sufficiently allege that his right to privacy in life, liberty or security was or would be violated through the supposed reproduction and threatened dissemination of the subject sex video. While Ilagan purports a privacy interest in the suppression of this video – which he fears would somehow find its way to Quiapo or be uploaded in the internet for public consumption – he failed to explain the connection between such interest and any violation of his right to life, liberty or security. Indeed, courts cannot speculate or contrive versions

of possible transgressions. As the rules and existing jurisprudence on the matter evoke, alleging and eventually proving the nexus between one’s privacy right to the cogent rights to life, liberty or security are crucial in habeas data cases, so much so that a failure on either account certainly renders a habeas data petition dismissible, as in this case. In fact, even discounting the insufficiency of the allegations, the petition would equally be dismissible due to the inadequacy of the evidence presented. As the records show, all that Ilagan submitted in support of his petition was his self-serving testimony which hardly meets the substantial evidence requirement as prescribed by the Habeas Data Rule. This is because nothing therein would indicate that Lee actually proceeded to commit any overt act towards the end of violating Ilagan’s right to privacy in life, liberty or security. Nor would anything on record even lead a reasonable mind to conclude that Lee was going to use the subject video in order to achieve unlawful ends – say for instance, to spread it to the public so as to ruin Ilagan’s reputation. Contrastingly, Lee even made it clear in her testimony that the only reason why she reproduced the subject video was to legitimately utilize the same as evidence in the criminal and administrative cases that she filed against Ilagan. Hence, due to the insufficiency of the allegations as well as the glaring absence of substantial evidence, the Court finds it proper to reverse the RTC Decision and dismiss the habeas data petition. •

Purpose of the guaranty

Justice Isagani Cruz - Due process is a guaranty against any arbitrariness on the part of the government, whether committed by the legislative, the executive, or the judiciary. The due process clause was kept intentionally vague so it would remain also conveniently resilient. This was felt necessary because due process is not, like some provisions of the fundamental law, an "iron rule" laying down an implacable and immutable command for all seasons and all persons. Flexibility must be the best virtue of the guaranty. The very elasticity of the due process clause was meant to make it adapt easily to every situation, enlarging or constricting its protection as the changing times and circumstances may require. The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing which, generally speaking, may not be dispensed with because they are intended as a safeguard against official arbitrariness. It is a gratifying commentary on our judicial system that the jurisprudence of this country is rich with applications of this guaranty as proof of our fealty to the rule of law and the ancient rudiments of fair play. We have consistently declared that every person, faced by the awesome power of the State, is entitled to "the law of the land," which Daniel Webster described almost two hundred years ago in the famous Dartmouth College Case, as "the law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial." It has to be so if the rights of every person are to be secured beyond the reach of officials who, out of mistaken zeal or plain arrogance, would degrade the due process clause into a worn and empty catchword. (4) Hurtado v. California 110 US 516, 1884 The purpose of the guaranty is to protect individual’s right to life, liberty, and property against the encroachment of powers delegated to the government. Hence, it shall also serve as a limitation to the government’s power. NOTE: The Constitution of California authorizes prosecutions for felonies by information, after examination and commitment by a magistrate, without indictment by a grand jury, in the discretion of the legislature. Facts: The district Atty. Of Sacramento County (A prosecutor in the case) filed an information against Joseph Hurtado charging him with the crime of murder in the killing of one Jose Antonio Stuardo. He was found guilty of murder in the first degree punishable by death. Petitioner strongly hold that California denied him an indictment by a grand jury when he was prosecuted based only on information. Thus, further asserting that he was denied due process, which is violative of the 14th Amendment’s due process clause. Issue: Whether the petitioner’s prosecution based on an information is violative of the due process clause?

Held: No, The Constitution is a document written for an expanding and undefined future. The broad concept of “due process of law” should not be held static by requiring a certain legal process over another. Thus, even though his case wasn’t presented to a grand jury, nevertheless, petitioner was afforded due process since the legal proceeding on California afforded him security of his liberty and justice. It was stated on California Law that; “…authorizes prosecutions for felonies by information, after examination and commitment by a magistrate, without indictment by a grand jury, in the discretion of the legislature.” The Penal Code of the State makes provision for an examination by a magistrate, in the presence of the accused, who is entitled to the aid of counsel and the right of cross-examination of witnesses, whose testimony Is to be reduced to writing, and upon a certificate thereon by the magistrate that a described offence has been committed, and that there is sufficient cause to believe the accused guilty thereof, and an order holding him to answer thereto, requires an information to be filed against the accused in the Superior Court of the county in which the offence is triable, in the form of an indictment for the same offence. Moreover, the words "due process of law" in the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States do not necessarily require an indictment by a grand jury in a prosecution by a State for murder. The 14th Amendment was designed not to confine the States to a particular mode of procedure in judicial proceedings, and prohibit them from prosecuting for felonies by information instead of by indictment, if they chose to abolish the grand jury system. And the words ' due process of law' in the amendment do not mean and have not the effect to limit the powers of State governments to prosecutions for crime by indictment; but these words do mean law in its regular course of administration, according to prescribed forms, and in accordance with the general rules for the protection of individual rights. It would further mean that it shall also serve as a limitation upon the powers of the government, brought into being by the Constitution, it has now been added as an additional security to the individual against oppression by the States themselves; that one of these institutions is that of the grand jury, an indictment or presentment by which against the accused in cases of alleged felonies is an essential part of due process of law, in order that he may not be harassed or destroyed by prosecutions founded only upon private malice or popular. •

Void for Vagueness/Over breadth

What are the two facial challenge on the constitutionality of a statute? 1. Void-for-Vagueness Rule 2. Overbreadth Doctrine What is the Void-for-Vagueness Rule? When a statute forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that man of common intelligence must necessarily guess as to its meaning and differ as to its application, that law is deemed void. Such kind of statute violates the first essential requisite of due process of law because it denies the accused the right to be informed of the charged against him (Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan, G. R. No, 148560, November 19, 2001) What is the Overbreadth Doctrine? A facial challenge of the statute when a governmental purpose may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms. (Ibid) Does the two facial challenge applies to penal statute? Why? No. The overbreadth and the vagueness doctrines have special application only to freespeech cases, and are not appropriate for testing the validity of penal statutes.It added that, at any rate, the challenged provision, under which the therein petitioner was charged, is not vague. A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible "chilling effect" upon protected speech. The theory is that "[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow specificity." The possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of others may be deterred and

perceived grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes. This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorism effect resulting from their very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech. The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only to free speech cases. They are inapt for testing the validity of penal statutes. As the U.S. Supreme Court put it, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, "we have not recognized an 'overbreadth' doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment." Claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words and, again, that "overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct." For this reason, it has been held that "a facial challenge to a legislative act is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid." As for the vagueness doctrine, it is said that a litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possible applications. "A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others." (5) David vs. Arroyo G.R. No. 171390, May 3, 2006 FACTS: On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency, thus: “NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution which states that: “The President. . . whenever it becomes necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed forces to prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . .,” and in my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; and as provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency.” On the same day, the President issued G. O. No. 5 implementing PP 1017. Seven (7) petitions challenging the constitutionality of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 were filed against the respondents. Three (3) of these petitions impleaded President Arroyo as respondent. Petitioners contend that PP 1017 is void on its face because of its “overbreadth.” They claim that its enforcement encroached on both unprotected and protected rights under Section 4, Article III of the Constitution and sent a “chilling effect” to the citizens. ISSUES: 1. Whether PP 107 is void because of its “overbreadth” 2. Whether PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional. HELD: 1. No. A plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily directed to speech or even speechrelated conduct. It is actually a call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence. That PP 1017 pertains to a spectrum of conduct, not free speech, which is manifestly subject to state regulation. Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing the validity of a law that “reflects legitimate state interest in maintaining comprehensive control over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct.” Undoubtedly, lawless violence, insurrection and rebellion are considered “harmful” and “constitutionally unprotected conduct.” Overbreadth doctrine is a principle of Judicial Review that holds that a law is invalid if it punishes constitutionally protected speech or conduct along with speech or conduct that the government may limit to further a compelling government interest. Legislatures sometimes pass laws that infringe on the First Amendment (American Law) freedoms of religion, speech, press, and peaceable assembly. When a legislature passes such a law,

a person with a sufficient interest affected by the legislation may challenge its constitutionality by bringing suit against the federal, state, or local sovereignty that passed it. One common argument in First Amendment challenges is that the statute is overbroad. Under the overbreadth doctrine, a statute that affects First Amendment rights is unconstitutional if it prohibits more protected speech or activity than is necessary to achieve a compelling government interest. The excessive intrusion on First Amendment rights, beyond what the government had a compelling interest to restrict, renders the law unconstitutional. If a statute is overbroad, the court may be able to save the statute by striking only the section that is overbroad. If the court cannot sever the statute and save the constitutional provisions, it may invalidate the entire statute. Thus, claims of facial overbreadth are entertained in cases involving statutes which seek to regulate only “spoken words”. A writer and scholar in Constitutional Law explains: “The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is that it marks an exception to some of the usual rules of constitutional litigation. Ordinarily, a particular litigant claims that a statute is unconstitutional as applied to him or her; if the litigant prevails, the courts carve away the unconstitutional aspects of the law by invalidating its improper applications on a case to case basis. Moreover, challengers to a law are not permitted to raise the rights of third parties and can only assert their own interests. In overbreadth analysis, those rules give way; challenges are permitted to raise the rights of third parties; and the court invalidates the entire statute “on its face,” not merely “as applied for” so that the overbroad law becomes unenforceable until a properly authorized court construes it more narrowly. The factor that motivates courts to depart from the normal adjudicatory rules is the concern with the “chilling;” deterrent effect of the overbroad statute on third parties not courageous enough to bring suit. The Court assumes that an overbroad law’s “very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression.” An overbreadth ruling is designed to remove that deterrent effect on the speech of those third parties.” In other words, a facial challenge using the overbreadth doctrine will require the Court to examine PP 1017 and pinpoint its flaws and defects, not on the basis of its actual operation to petitioners, but on the assumption or prediction that its very existence may cause others not before the Court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression. In Younger v. Harris, it was held that: “The tasks of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring correction of these deficiencies before the statute is put into effect, is rarely if ever an appropriate task for the judiciary. The combination of the relative remoteness of the controversy, the impact on the legislative process of the relief sought, and above all the speculative and amorphous nature of the required lineby-line analysis of detailed statutes ordinarily results in a kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory for deciding constitutional questions, whichever way they might be decided.” A facial challenge on the ground of overbreadth is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that there can be no instance when the assailed law may be valid. Here, petitioners did not even attempt to show whether this situation exists. A facial review of PP 1017 on the ground of vagueness is likewise unwarranted. Related to the “overbreadth” doctrine is the “void for vagueness doctrine” which holds that “a law is facially invalid if men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.” It is subject to the same principles governing overbreadth doctrine. For one, it is also an analytical tool for testing “on their faces” statutes in free speech cases. And like overbreadth, it is said that a litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possible applications. Again, petitioners did not even attempt to show that PP 1017 is vague in all its application. They also failed to establish that men of common intelligence cannot understand the meaning and application of PP 1017.

2. The Petitions are partly granted. The Court rules that PP 1017 is CONSTITUTIONAL as it constitutes a call by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence. However, the provisions of PP 1017 commanding the AFP to enforce laws not related to lawless violence, as well as decrees promulgated by the President, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. In addition, the provision in PP 1017 declaring national emergency under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution is CONSTITUTIONAL, but such declaration does not

authorize the President to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest without prior legislation. G.O. No. 5 is CONSTITUTIONAL since it provides a standard by which the AFP and the PNP should implement PP 1017, i.e. whatever is “necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless violence.” Considering that “acts of terrorism” have not yet been defined and made punishable by the Legislature, such portion of G.O. No. 5 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The warrantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; the dispersal and warrantless arrest of the KMU and NAFLU-KMU members during their rallies, in the absence of proof that these petitioners were committing acts constituting lawless violence, invasion or rebellion and violating BP 880; the imposition of standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press, as well as the warrantless search of the Tribune offices and whimsical seizure of its articles for publication and other materials, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. (06) ONG v. SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. No. 126858 FACTS: Congressman Bonifacio H. Gillego filed a complaint claiming that petitioner Jose U. Ong, then Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), has amassed properties worth disproportionately more than his lawful income. It was alleged in the complaint that Ong declared P750,000.00 as his cash on hand and in banks. Within a short period thereafter, he was able to acquire prime real estate properties mostly in the millionaires’ choice areas in Alabang, Muntinglupa, Metro Manila costing millions of pesos, which is obviously disproportionate to his income of just a little more than P200,000.00 per year. Ong filed a Counter-Affidavit, submitting his SALN for the years 1988-1990, income tax return, bank certificate showing that he obtained a loan from Allied Banking Corporation, certificate from SGV & Co. (SGV) showing that he received retirement benefits from the latter, a document entitled Acknowledgement of Trust showing that he acquired one of the questioned assets for his brother-inlaw, and other documents explaining the sources of funds with which he acquired the questioned assets. A Resolution was issued directing the Ombudsman, in collaboration with the OSG to file a petition for recovery of ill-gotten/unexplained wealth under RA 1379, in relation to RAs 3019 and 6770, against Ong and all other persons concerned. The accused presented several affirmative defenses, such as the Petition allegedly failed to state a cause of action because RA 1379 is unconstitutional as it is vague and does not sufficiently define ill-gotten wealth. ISSUE: Whether RA 1379 is vague, violates the presumption of innocence and the right against selfincrimination, and breaches the authority and prerogative of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. RULING: The law is not vague as it defines with sufficient particularity unlawfully acquired property of a public officer or employee as that which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property. It also provides a definition of what is legitimately acquired property. Based on these parameters, the public is given fair notice of what acts are proscribed. The law, therefore, does not offend the basic concept of fairness and the due process clause of the Constitution. Neither is the presumption of innocence clause violated by Sec. 2 of RA 1379 which states that property acquired by a public officer or employee during his incumbency in an amount which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property shall be presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully acquired. As elaborated by Fr. Joaquin Bernas, under the principle of presumption of innocence, it is merely required of the State to establish a prima facie case, after which the burden of proof shifts to the accused. The constitutional assurance of the right against self-incrimination likewise cannot be invoked by petitioners. The right is a prohibition against the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from the accused. It is simply a prohibition against legal process to extract from the accused’s own lips, against his will, admission of his guilt. In this case, petitioners are not compelled to present themselves as witnesses in rebutting the presumption established by law. They may present documents evidencing the purported bank loans, money market placements and other fund sources in their defense.

As regards the alleged infringement of the Courts authority to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, suffice it to state that there is no showing that the Ombudsman or the OSG is about to grant immunity to anyone under RA 1379. The question, therefore, is not ripe for adjudication. (7) Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan GR No. 148560, Nov. 19, 2001 FACTS: The undersigned Ombudsman accuses former PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Joseph Ejercito Estrada, a.k.a. 'ASIONG SALONGA' and a.k.a. 'JOSE VELARDE,' together with Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada, Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, and John DOES & Jane Does, of the crime of Plunder, defined and penalized under R.A. No. 7080, as amended by Sec. 12 of R.A. No. 7659. It was alleged that during Estrada’s term, he together with the individuals mentioned above willfully, unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and acquire by himself, directly or indirectly, ill-gotten wealth amounting to P4, 097, 804,173.17, thereby unjustly enriching himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines. Under RA 7080, the crime of plunder is defined as an act of any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, usiness associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or a series of acts described in Sec 1(d) hereof in the aggregate amount or total value of at least 50M and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Estrada questions the validity of the law for it is void for vagueness. He bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition of the terms and combination and series in the key phrase “a combination or series of overt or criminal acts” found in Sec 1. ISSUE: Whether the Plunder Law is unconstitutional because it suffers from the vice of vagueness? RULING: The Plunder Law does not suffer vagueness. A statute may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. Series could be clearly understood as a repetition of the same predicate act in any of the acts under Sec.1 (d) and Combination contemplates the commission of act at least any two different predicate acts. The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practice. An act will not be held invalid merely because it might have more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions, especially where, because of the nature of the act, it would be impossible to provide all the details in advance as in all other statutes. Furthermore, the doctrine of vagueness cannot be invoked where the assailed statute is clear and free from ambiguity, as in this case. (8) BLAS F. OPLE, petitioner, vs. RUBEN D. TORRES G.R. No. 127685. July 23, 1998 FACTS: The petition at seeks to prevent the shrinking of the right to privacy. Petitioner Ople prays that we invalidate Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System" on two important constitutional grounds, viz: one, it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and two, it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of privacy. A.O. No. 308 was issued by President Fidel V. Ramos on December 12, 1996. It was published in four newspapers of general circulation on January 22, 1997 and January 23, 1997. Respondents counter-argue that THE INSTANT PETITION IS NOT A JUSTICIABLE CASE AS WOULD WARRANT A JUDICIAL REVIEW; A.O. NO. 308 [1996] WAS ISSUED WITHIN THE EXECUTIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT WITHOUT ENCROACHING ON THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF CONGRESS; and A.O. NO. 308 [1996] PROTECTS AN INDIVIDUAL'S INTEREST IN PRIVACY. ISSUE: Whether AO No 308 violates the right to privacy RULING: Yes. Assuming, arguendo, that A.O. No. 308 need not be the subject of a law, still it cannot pass constitutional muster as an administrative legislation because facially it violates the right to

privacy. The essence of privacy is the "right to be let alone." In the 1965 case of Griswold v. Connecticut, the United States Supreme Court gave more substance to the right of privacy when it ruled that the right has a constitutional foundation. It held that there is a right of privacy which can be found within the penumbras of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Amendments: "Specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras formed by emanations from these guarantees that help give them life and substance . . . Various guarantees create zones of privacy. The right of association contained in the penumbra of the First Amendment is one, as we have seen. The Third Amendment in its prohibition against the quartering of soldiers 'in any house' in time of peace without the consent of the owner is another facet of that privacy. The Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the 'right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.' The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination Clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not force him to surrender to his detriment. The Ninth Amendment provides: 'The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.'" In the 1968 case of Morfe v. Mutuc, we adopted the Griswold ruling that there is a constitutional right to privacy. Speaking thru Mr. Justice, later Chief Justice, Enrique Fernando, we held: The Griswold case invalidated a Connecticut statute which made the use of contraceptives a criminal offense on the ground of its amounting to an unconstitutional invasion of the right of privacy of married persons; rightfully it stressed "a relationship lying within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees." It has wider implications though. The constitutional right to privacy has come into its own. So it is likewise in our jurisdiction. The right to privacy as such is accorded recognition independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional protection. The language of Prof. Emerson is particularly apt: 'The concept of limited government has always included the idea that governmental powers stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen. This is indeed one of the basic distinctions between absolute and limited government. Ultimate and pervasive control of the individual, in all aspects of his life, is the hallmark of the absolute state. In contrast, a system of limited government safeguards a private sector, which belongs to the individual, firmly distinguishing it from the public sector, which the state can control. Protection of this private sector — protection, in other words, of the dignity and integrity of the individual — has become increasingly important as modern society has developed. All the forces of a technological age — industrialization, urbanization, and organization — operate to narrow the area of privacy and facilitate intrusion into it. In modern terms, the capacity to maintain and support this enclave of private life marks the difference between a democratic and a totalitarian society.'" Indeed, if we extend our judicial gaze we will find that the right of privacy is recognized and enshrined in several provisions of our Constitution. It is expressly recognized in Section 3(1) of the Bill of Rights: "Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law." Other facets of the right to privacy are protected in various provisions of the Bill of Rights, viz: "Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. •

Substantive Due Process

Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. vs. Anti-Terrorism Council Case Doctrine: In constitutional litigations, the power of judicial review is limited by four exacting requisites, viz: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b) petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lismota of the case. Locus standi or legal standing requires a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. A party who assails the constitutionality of a statute must have a direct and personal interest. It must show not only that the law or any governmental act is invalid, but also that it sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that it suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must show that it has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which it is lawfully entitled or that it is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of.

For a concerned party to be allowed to raise a constitutional question, it must show that (1) it has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government, (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action, and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. (emphasis and underscoring supplied.) While in our jurisdiction there is still no judicially declared terrorist organization, the United States of America[17] (US) and the European Union[18] (EU) have both classified the CPP, NPA and Abu Sayyaf Group as foreign terrorist organizations. The Court takes note of the joint statement of Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita and Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales that the Arroyo Administration would adopt the US and EU classification of the CPP and NPA as terrorist organizations. Such statement notwithstanding, there is yet to be filed before the courts an application to declare the CPP and NPA organizations as domestic terrorist or outlawed organizations under RA 9372. Again, RA 9372 has been in effect for three years now. From July 2007 up to the present, petitioner-organizations have conducted their activities fully and freely without any threat of, much less an actual, prosecution or proscription under RA 9372. The mere invocation of the duty to preserve the rule of law does not, however, suffice to clothe the IBP or any of its members with standing. The IBP failed to sufficiently demonstrate how its mandate under the assailed statute revolts against its constitutional rights and duties. Moreover, both the IBP and CODAL have not pointed to even a single arrest or detention effected under RA 9372. RA 9372 is a penal statute and does not even provide for any appropriation from Congress for its implementation, while none of the individual petitioner-citizens has alleged any direct and personal interest in the implementation of the law. It bears to stress that generalized interests, albeit accompanied by the assertion of a public right, do not establish locus standi. Evidence of a direct and personal interest is key. Petitioners’ obscure allegations of sporadic “surveillance” and supposedly being tagged as “communist fronts” in no way approximate a credible threat of prosecution. From these allegations, the Court is being lured to render an advisory opinion, which is not its function. Without any justiciable controversy, the petitions have become pleas for declaratory relief, over which the Court has no original jurisdiction. Then again, declaratory actions characterized by “double contingency,” where both the activity the petitioners intend to undertake and the anticipated reaction to it of a public official are merely theorized, lie beyond judicial review for lack of ripeness. The possibility of abuse in the implementation of RA 9372 does not avail to take the present petitions out of the realm of the surreal and merely imagined. Such possibility is not peculiar to RA 9372 since the exercise of any power granted by law may be abused. Allegations of abuse must be anchored on real events before courts may step in to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable. A facial invalidation of a statute is allowed only in free speech cases, wherein certain rules of constitutional litigation are rightly excepted. Petitioners assail for being intrinsically vague and impermissibly broad the definition of the crime of terrorism under RA 9372 in that terms like “widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace” and “coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand” are nebulous, leaving law enforcement agencies with no standard to measure the prohibited acts. The overbreadth and the vagueness doctrines have special application only to freespeech cases, and are not appropriate for testing the validity of penal statutes. It added that, at any rate, the challenged provision, under which the therein petitioner was charged, is not vague. A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible "chilling effect" upon protected speech. The theory is that "[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow specificity." The possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of others may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes. This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorism effect resulting from their very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this

reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech. The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only to free speech cases. They are inapt for testing the validity of penal statutes. As the U.S. Supreme Court put it, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, "we have not recognized an 'overbreadth' doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment." Claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words and, again, that "overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct." For this reason, it has been held that "a facial challenge to a legislative act is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid." As for the vagueness doctrine, it is said that a litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possible applications. "A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others." In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First Amendment cases. They cannot be made to do service when what is involved is a criminal statute. With respect to such statute, the established rule is that "one to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional." As has been pointed out, "vagueness challenges in the First Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges typically produce facial invalidation, while statutes found vague as a matter of due process typically are invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a particular defendant." Consequently, there is no basis for petitioner's claim that this Court review the Anti-Plunder Law on its face and in its entirety. Indeed, "on its face" invalidation of statutes results in striking them down entirely on the ground that they might be applied to parties not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally protected. It constitutes a departure from the case and controversy requirement of the Constitution and permits decisions to be made without concrete factual settings and in sterile abstract contexts. To be sure, the doctrine of vagueness and the doctrine of overbreadth do not operate on the same plane. A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. The overbreadth doctrine, meanwhile, decrees that a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms. As distinguished from the vagueness doctrine, the overbreadth doctrine assumes that individuals will understand what a statute prohibits and will accordingly refrain from that behavior, even though some of it is protected. A “facial” challenge is likewise different from an “as-applied” challenge. Distinguished from an as-applied challenge which considers only extant facts affecting real litigants, a facial invalidation is an examination of the entire law, pinpointing its flaws and defects, not only on the basis of its actual operation to the parties, but also on the assumption or prediction that its very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or activities. The vagueness and overbreadth doctrines, as grounds for a facial challenge, are not applicable to penal laws. A litigant cannot thus successfully mount a facial challenge against a criminal statute on either vagueness or overbreadth grounds. The allowance of a facial challenge in free speech cases is justified by the aim to avert the “chilling effect” on protected speech, the exercise of which should not at all times be abridged. As reflected earlier, this rationale is inapplicable to plain penal statutes that generally bear an “in terrorem effect” in deterring socially harmful conduct. In fact, the legislature may even forbid and penalize acts formerly considered innocent and lawful, so long as it refrains from diminishing or dissuading the exercise of constitutionally protected rights.

The rule established in our jurisdiction is, only statutes on free speech, religious freedom, and other fundamental rights may be facially challenged. Under no case may ordinary penal statutes be subjected to a facial challenge. The rationale is obvious. If a facial challenge to a penal statute is permitted, the prosecution of crimes may be hampered. No prosecution would be possible. A strong criticism against employing a facial challenge in the case of penal statutes, if the same is allowed, would effectively go against the grain of the doctrinal requirement of an existing and concrete controversy before judicial power may be appropriately exercised. A facial challenge against a penal statute is, at best, amorphous and speculative. It would, essentially, force the court to consider third parties who are not before it. As I have said in my opposition to the allowance of a facial challenge to attack penal statutes, such a test will impair the State’s ability to deal with crime. If warranted, there would be nothing that can hinder an accused from defeating the State’s power to prosecute on a mere showing that, as applied to third parties, the penal statute is vague or overbroad, notwithstanding that the law is clear as applied to him (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) It is settled, on the other hand, that the application of the overbreadth doctrine is limited to a facial kind of challenge and, owing to the given rationale of a facial challenge, applicable only to free speech cases. By its nature, the overbreadth doctrine has to necessarily apply a facial type of invalidation in order to plot areas of protected speech, inevitably almost always under situations not before the court, that are impermissibly swept by the substantially overbroad regulation. Otherwise stated, a statute cannot be properly analyzed for being substantially overbroad if the court confines itself only to facts as applied to the litigants. In restricting the overbreadth doctrine to free speech claims, the Court, in at least two cases, observed that the US Supreme Court has not recognized an overbreadth doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment, and that claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words. In Virginia v. Hicks, it was held that rarely, if ever, will an overbreadth challenge succeed against a law or regulation that is not specifically addressed to speech or speech-related conduct. Attacks on overly broad statutes are justified by the “transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected expression.” American jurisprudence instructs that “vagueness challenges that do not involve the First Amendment must be examined in light of the specific facts of the case at hand and not with regard to the statute's facial validity.” In this jurisdiction, the void-for-vagueness doctrine asserted under the due process clause has been utilized in examining the constitutionality of criminal statutes. In at least three cases, the Court brought the doctrine into play in analyzing an ordinance penalizing the non-payment of municipal tax on fishponds, the crime of illegal recruitment punishable under Article 132(b) of the Labor Code, and the vagrancy provision under Article 202 (2) of the Revised Penal Code. Notably, the petitioners in these three cases, similar to those in the two Romualdez and Estrada cases, were actually charged with the therein assailed penal statute, unlike in the present case. From the definition of the crime of terrorism in the earlier cited Section 3 of RA 9372, the following elements may be culled: (1) the offender commits an act punishable under any of the cited provisions of the Revised Penal Code, or under any of the enumerated special penal laws; (2) the commission of the predicate crime sows and creates a condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace; and (3) the offender is actuated by the desire to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand. Before a charge for terrorism may be filed under RA 9372, there must first be a predicate crime actually committed to trigger the operation of the key qualifying phrases in the other elements of the crime, including the coercion of the government to accede to an “unlawful demand.” Given the presence of the first element, any attempt at singling out or highlighting the communicative component of the prohibition cannot re-categorize the unprotected conduct into a protected speech. As earlier reflected, petitioners have established neither an actual charge nor a credible threat of prosecution under RA 9372. Even a limited vagueness analysis of the assailed definition of “terrorism” is thus legally impermissible. The Court reminds litigants that judicial power neither contemplates speculative counseling on a statute’s future effect on hypothetical scenarios nor allows the courts to be used as an extension of a failed legislative lobbying in Congress. (9) SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE v. ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL G.R NO. 178552, OCTOBER 5, 2010

FACTS: The case consists of 6 petitions challenging the constitutionality of RA 9372, “An Act to Secure the State and Protect our People from Terrorism,” aka Human Security Act of 2007. Petitioner-organizations assert locus standi on the basis of being suspected “communist fronts” by the government, whereas individual petitioners invoke the “transcendental importance” doctrine and their status as citizens and taxpayers. Petitioners claim that RA 9372 is vague and broad, in that terms like “widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace” and “coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand” are nebulous, leaving law enforcement agencies with no standard to measure the prohibited acts. ISSUE: Whether or not a penal statute may be assailed for being vague as applied to petitioners. HELD: No. A limited vagueness analysis of the definition of “terrorism” in RA 9372 is legally impossible absent an actual or imminent charge against them. A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lack comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. A “facial” challenge is likewise different from an “as applied” challenge. “Facial” challenge is an examination of the entire law, pinpointing its flaws and defects, not only on the basis of its actual operation to the parties, but also on the assumption or prediction that its very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or activities. Under no case may ordinary penal statutes be subjected to a facial challenge. If facial challenge to a penal statute is permitted, the prosecution of crimes may be hampered. No prosecution would be possible. (10) Knights of Rizal v. DMCI FACTS: DMCI-PDI 7,716.60-square meter lot in the City of Manila, located near Taft Avenue, Manila's Office of the Building Official granted DMCI-PDI a Building Permit, allowing it to build a "Forty Nine (49) Storey Torre de Manila. City Council of Manila issued Resolution No. 121 enjoining the Office of the Building Official to temporarily suspend the Building Permit of DMCI-PDI, citing among others, that "the Torre de Manila Condominium, based on their development plans, upon completion, will rise up high above the back of the national monument, to clearly dwarf the statue of our hero, and with such towering heights, would certainly ruin the line of sight of the Rizal Shrine from the frontal Roxas Boulevard vantage point. Knights Of Rizal, a "civic, patriotic, cultural, nonpartisan, non-sectarian and non-profit organization" created under Republic Act No. 646. The KOR argues that the subject matter of the present suit is one of "transcendental importance, paramount public interest, of overarching significance to society, or with far-reaching implication" involving the desecration of the Rizal Monument. Torre de Manila structure will stick]out like a sore thumb, dwarf all surrounding buildings within a radius of two kilometer/s" and "forever ruin the sightline of the Rizal Monument in Luneta Park. The despoliation of the sight view of the Rizal Monument is a situation that annoy's or offends the senses' of every Filipino who honors the memory of the National Hero Jose Rizal, ISSUE: Can the Court issue a writ of mandamus against the officials of the City of Manila to stop the construction of DMCI-PDI's Torre de Manila project? HELD: There is no law prohibiting the construction of the Torre de Manila. In Manila Electric Company v. Public Service Commission, the Court held that "what is not expressly or impliedly prohibited by law may be done, except when the act is contrary to morals, customs and I public order. In this case, there is no allegation or proof that the Torre de Manila project is "contrary to morals, customs, and public order" or that it brings harm, danger, or hazard to the community. On the contrary, the City of Manila has determined that DMCI-PDI complied with the standards set under the pertinent laws and local ordinances to construct its Torre de Manila project. There is one fact that is crystal clear in this case. There is no law prohibiting the construction of the Torre de Manila due to its effect on the background "view, vista, sightline, or setting" of the Rizal Monument. Specifically, In Section 47 reads:. Historical Preservation and Conservation Standards. - Historic site and facilities shall be conserved and preserved. These shall, to the extent possible, be made accessible for the educational and cultural enrichment of the general public. Section 47 of Ordinance No. 8119 specifically regulates the "development of historic sites and facilities."Section 48 regulates "large commercial signage and/or pylon." There is nothing in Sections 47 and 48 of Ordinance No. 8119 that disallows the construction of a building outside the boundaries of a historic site or facility, where such building may affect the1 background of a historic site. In this

case, the Torre de Manila stands 870 meters outside and to the rear of the Rizal Monument and "cannot possibly obstruct the front view of the [Rizal] Monument The main purpose of zoning is the protection of public safety, health, convenience, and welfare. There is no indication that the Torre de Manila project brings any harm, danger, or hazard to the people in the surrounding areas except that the building allegedly poses an unsightly view on the taking of photos or the visual appreciation of the Rizal Monument by locals and tourists.Torre de Manila is Not a Nuisance Per Se.. Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a nuisance as any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of property, or anything else which: (1) injures or endangers the health or safety of others; (2) annoys or offends the senses; (3) shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; (4) obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or street, or any body of water; or (5) hinders or impairs the use of property. Bonus: Rizal History by SC It had been Rizal’s wish to die facing the rising sun. In his Mi Ultimo Adios, the poem he left for his family the night before he was executed, Rizal wrote: Yo muero cuando veo que el cielo se colora Y al fin anuncia el dia tras lobrego capuz 108 [Ako’y mamamatay, ngayong namamalas na sa Silanganan ay namamanaag yaong maligayang araw na sisikat sa likod ng luksang nagtabing na ulap.] 109 [I die just when I see the dawn break, Through the gloom of night, to herald the day] 110 Yet at the point of his execution, he was made to stand facing West towards Manila Bay, with his back to the firing squad, like the traitor the colonial government wished to portray him. He asked to face his executioners, facing the East where the sun would be rising since it was early morning, but the Spanish captain did not allow it. As he was shot and a single bullet struck his frail body, Rizal forced himself, with his last remaining strength, to turn around to face the East and thus he fell on his back with] his face to the sky and the rising sun. Then, the Spanish captain approached Rizal and finished him off with one pistol shot to his head. Before his death, Rizal wrote a letter to his family. He asked for a simple tomb, marked with a cross and a stone with only his name and the date of his birth and death; no anniversary celebrations; and interment at Paang Bundok (now, the Manila North Cemetery). Rizal never wanted his grave to be a burden to future generations. The letter never made it to his family and his wishes were not carried out. The letter was discovered many years later, in 1953. By then, his remains had been entombed at the Rizal Monument, countless anniversaries had been . celebrated, with memorials and monuments built throughout the world. Rizal's wish was unmistakable: to be buried without pomp or pageantry; to the point of reaching oblivion or obscurity in the future. 111 For Rizal's life was never about fame or vainglory, but for the country he loved dearly and for which he gave up his life. The Rizal Monument is expressly against Rizal' s own wishes. That Rizal's statue now stands facing West towards Manila Bay, with Rizal's back to the East, adds salt to the wound. If we continue the present orientation of Rizal's statue, with Rizal facing West, we would be like the Spanish captain who refused Rizal's request to die facing the rising sun in the East. On the other hand, if Rizal' s statue is made to face East, as Rizal had desired when he was about to be shot, the background - the blue sky above Manila Bay - would forever be clear of obstruction, and we would be faithful to Rizal's dying wish. (11) MAYOR ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS v. HIU CHIONG TSAI PAO HO and JUDGE FRANCISCO ARCA G.R. No. L-29646, November 10, 1978 Who are protected under the due process clause? Due process applies and protects all persons, without regard to any difference of race, color, or nationality. Artificial persons are covered by the protection but only insofar as their property is concerned. Smith Bell and Co v. Natividad. It includes aliens and their means of livelihood. Villegas vs. Hui Cheng FACTS: Ordinance No. 6537, was passed by the Municipal Board of Manila and signed by the herein petitioner Mayor Antonio J. Villegas, prohibits aliens from being employed or to engage or participate

in any position or occupation or business enumerated therein, whether permanent, temporary or casual, without first securing an employment permit from the Mayor of Manila and paying the permit fee of P50.00 except persons employed in the diplomatic or consular missions of foreign countries, or in the technical assistance programs of both the Philippine Government and any foreign government, and those working in their respective households, and members of religious orders or congregations, sect or denomination, who are not paid monetarily or in kind. Private respondent Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho who was employed in Manila, filed a petition to stop the enforcement of such ordinance as well as to declare the same null and void on the ground that is discriminatory and violative of the rule of the uniformity in taxation and it is arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable, being applied only to aliens who are thus, deprived of their rights to life, liberty and property and therefore, violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. Respondent Judge rendered judgment declaring said Ordinance null and void, hence this case. ISSUE: Whether said Ordinance violates due process of law and equal protection rule of the Constitution. RULING: The ordinance in question violates the due process of law and equal protection rule of the Constitution. The contention that Ordinance No. 6537 is not a purely tax or revenue measure because its principal purpose is regulatory in nature has no merit. There is no logic or justification in exacting P50.00 from aliens who have been cleared for employment. It is obvious that the purpose of the ordinance is to raise money under the guise of regulation. The P50.00 fee is unreasonable not only because it is excessive but because it fails to consider valid substantial differences in situation among individual aliens who are required to pay it. Although the equal protection clause of the Constitution does not forbid classification, it is imperative that the classification should be based on real and substantial differences having a reasonable relation to the subject of the particular legislation. Furthermore, Ordinance No. 6537 is void because it does not contain or suggest any standard or criterion to guide the mayor in the exercise of the power which has been granted to him by the ordinance. It has been held that where an ordinance of a municipality fails to state any policy or to set up any standard to guide or limit the mayor's action, expresses no purpose to be attained by requiring a permit, enumerates no conditions for its grant or refusal, and entirely lacks standard, thus conferring upon the Mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to grant or deny the issuance of building permits, such ordinance is invalid, being an undefined and unlimited delegation of power to allow or prevent an activity per se lawful. Lastly, requiring a person before he can be employed to get a permit from the City Mayor of Manila who may withhold or refuse it at will is tantamount to denying him the basic right of the people in the Philippines to engage in a means of livelihood. While it is true that the Philippines as a State is not obliged to admit aliens within its territory, once an alien is admitted, he cannot be deprived of life without due process of law. This guarantee includes the means of livelihood. The shelter of protection under the due process and equal protection clause is given to all persons, both aliens and citizens. (12) Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro G.R. No. L-14078, March 7, 1919 What is meant by liberty? Liberty includes the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary personal restraint or servitude. It includes the right of the citizen to be free to use facilities in all lawful ways. Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro FACTS: The case is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other Manguianes of the Province of Mindoro. It is alleged that the Maguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial officials of that province. Rubi and his companions are said to be held on the reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos is said to be held under the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away from the reservation. The provincial governor of Mindoro and the provincial board thereof directed the Manguianes in question to take up their habitation in Tigbao, a site on the shore of Lake Naujan, selected by the provincial governor and approved by the provincial board. The action was taken in accordance with section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917, and was duly approved by the Secretary of the Interior as required by said action. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 reads as follows:

SEC. 2145. Establishment of non-Christian upon sites selected by provincial governor. — With the prior approval of the Department Head, the provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him an approved by the provincial board. Petitioners, however, challenge the validity of this section of the Administrative Code. ISSUE: Does section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 constitute an unlawful delegation of legislative power by the Philippine Legislature to a provincial official and a department head, therefore making it unconstitutional? HELD: No. The Philippine Legislature has here conferred authority upon the Province of Mindoro, to be exercised by the provincial governor and the provincial board. In determining whether the delegation of legislative power is valid or not, the distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the later no valid objection can be made. Discretion may be committed by the Legislature to an executive department or official. The Legislature may make decisions of executive departments of subordinate official thereof, to whom it has committed the execution of certain acts, final on questions of fact. The growing tendency in the decision is to give prominence to the "necessity" of the case. In enacting the said provision of the Administrative Code, the Legislature merely conferred upon the provincial governor, with the approval of the provincial board and the Department Head, discretionary authority as to the execution of the law. This is necessary since the provincial governor and the provincial board, as the official representatives of the province, are better qualified to judge “when such as course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order”. As officials charged with the administration of the province and the protection of its inhabitants, they are better fitted to select sites which have the conditions most favorable for improving the people who have the misfortune of being in a backward state. Hence, Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is not an unlawful delegation of legislative power by the Philippine Legislature to provincial official and a department head. (17) Rubi vs. Prov. Board of Mindanao 39 Phil. 660 (1919) FACTS: This is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other Manguianes of the Province of Mindoro. It is alleged that the Maguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial officials of that province. Rubi and his companions are said to be held on the reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, On February 1, 1917, the provincial board of Mindoro adopted resolution No. 25 which is as follows: "Whereas it is deemed necessary to obliged them to live in one place in order to make a permanent settlement, "Whereas the provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and approved by the provincial board. "Whereas the provincial governor is of the opinion that the sitio of Tigbao on Lake Naujan is a place most convenient for the Mangyanes to live on, The action was taken in accordance with section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917, and was duly approved by the Secretary of the Interior which reads: Establishment of non-Christina upon sites selected by provincial governor. — With the prior approval of the Department Head, the provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him an approved by the provincial board. ISSUE: 1) Whether or not the legislature cannot delegate this power to provincial authorities.

2) Whether or not section 2145 of the Administrative is unconstitutional because it discriminates between individuals based on their religious beliefs. RULING: 1) No. Sec. 2145 of the Administrative Code is not an unlawful delegation of legislative power by the Philippine Legislature to provincial official and a department head. As quoted, “Who but the provincial governor and the provincial board, as the official representatives of the province, are better qualified to judge "when such as course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order? Who but they are better fitted to select sites which have the conditions most favorable for improving the people who have the misfortune of being in a backward state?” The Philippine Legislature has here conferred authority upon the Province of Mindoro, to be exercised by the provincial governor and the provincial board. 2) No. We hold that the term "non-Christian" refers to natives of the Philippines Islands of a low grade of civilization, and that section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917, does not discriminate between individuals an account of religious differences. In general, it may be said that Liberty means the opportunity to do those things which are ordinarily done by free men. None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due process of law. "Due process of law" means simply . . . "first, that there shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general powers of the legislative department of the Government; second, that this law shall be reasonable in its operation; third, that it shall be enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and fourth, that it shall be applicable alike to all the citizens of the state or to all of a class." The pledge that no person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws is not infringed by a statute which is applicable to all of a class. It is to be noted that the legislative intent for the resolution is to educate the Manguianes through obliging them to live in a permanent settlement which was the only successful method, to introduce to them civilized customs, and to protect the public forests in which they roam. What the Government wished to do by bringing than into a reservation was to gather together the children for educational purposes, and to improve the health and morals. Segregation really constitutes protection for the manguianes. Certainly, their living together in Tigbao does not make them slaves or put them in a condition compelled to do services for another. They do not work for anybody but for themselves. There is, therefore, no involuntary servitude. (13) BINAY v. DOMINGO G.R. NO. 92389, September 11, 1991 FACTS: Petitioner Municipality of Makati, through its Council, approved Resolution No. 60 which extends P500 burial assistance to bereaved families whose gross family income does not exceed P2,000.00 a month. The funds are to be taken out of the unappropriated available funds in the municipal treasury. The Metro Manila Commission approved the resolution. Thereafter, the municipal secretary certified a disbursement of P400, 000.00 for the implementation of the program. However, the Commission on Audit disapproved said resolution and the disbursement of funds for the implementation thereof for the following reasons: (1) The resolution has no connection to alleged public safety, general welfare, safety, etc. of the inhabitants of Makati; (2) Government funds must be disbursed for public purposes only; and, (3) It violates the equal protection clause since it will only benefit a few individuals. The Burial Assistance Program (Resolution No. 60 – assisting those who only earn less ISSUES: 1. Whether Resolution No. 60, re-enacted under Resolution No. 243, of the Municipality of Makati is a valid exercise of police power under the general welfare clause 2. Whether the questioned resolution is for a public purpose 3. Whether the resolution violates the equal protection clause HELD: 1. Resolution No. 60 of the Municipality of Makati is a valid exercise of police power under the general welfare clause.

The police power is a governmental function, an inherent attribute of sovereignty, which was born with civilized government. It is founded largely on the maxims, “Sic utere tuo et ahenum non laedas” (use your property so as not to impair others) and “Salus populi est suprema lex” (the welfare of the people is the supreme law). Its fundamental purpose is securing the general welfare, comfort and convenience of the people. Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people. It is the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers. In a sense it is the greatest and most powerful attribute of the government. It is elastic and must be responsive to various social conditions. The care for the poor is generally recognized as a public duty. The support for the poor has long been an accepted exercise of police power in the promotion of the common good. 2. Police power is not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all comprehensiveness. Its scope, over-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits. The police power of a municipal corporation is broad, and has been said to be commensurate with, but not to exceed, the duty to provide for the real needs of the people in their health, safety, comfort, and convenience as consistently as may be with private rights. It extends to all the great public needs, and, in a broad sense includes all legislation and almost every function of the municipal government. It covers a wide scope of subjects, and, while it is especially occupied with whatever affects the peace, security, health, morals, and general welfare of the community, it is not limited thereto, but is broadened to deal with conditions which exists so as to bring out of them the greatest welfare of the people by promoting public convenience or general prosperity, and to everything worthwhile for the preservation of comfort of the inhabitants of the corporation. Thus, it is deemed inadvisable to attempt to frame any definition which shall absolutely indicate the limits of police power. Public purpose is not unconstitutional merely because it incidentally benefits a limited number of persons. As correctly pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General, "the drift is towards social welfare legislation geared towards state policies to provide adequate social services, the promotion of the general welfare, social justice as well as human dignity and respect for human rights." The care for the poor is generally recognized as a public duty. The support for the poor has long been an accepted exercise of police power in the promotion of the common good. 3. There is no violation of the equal protection clause. Paupers may be reasonably classified. Different groups may receive varying treatment. Precious to the hearts of our legislators, down to our local councilors, is the welfare of the paupers. Thus, statutes have been passed giving rights and benefits to the disabled, emancipating the tenant-farmer from the bondage of the soil, housing the urban poor, etc. Resolution No. 60, re-enacted under Resolution No. 243, of the Municipality of Makati is a paragon of the continuing program of our government towards social justice. The Burial Assistance Program is a relief of pauperism, though not complete. The loss of a member of a family is a painful experience, and it is more painful for the poor to be financially burdened by such death. Resolution No. 60 vivifies the very words of the late President Ramon Magsaysay 'those who have less in life, should have more in law." This decision however must not be taken as a precedent, or as an official go-signal for municipal governments to embark on a philanthropic orgy of inordinate dole-outs for motives political or otherwise. (14) ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL. vs. JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL. G.R. No. L-14639 March 25, 1919 In 1918, the mayor of Manila had 170 "women of ill repute" forcibly rounded up, put on a ship, and sent to Davao as laborers. A writ of habeas corpus was filed against him. The Supreme Court said that the women were not chattels but Filipino citizens who had the fundamental right not to be forced to change their place of residence. This case justifies one of the basic rights of citizen, the right of domain. FACTS: Justo Lukban as Manila City's Mayor together with Anton Hohmann, the city's Chief of Police, took custody of about 170 women at the night of October 25 beyond the latters consent and knowledge and thereafter were shipped to Mindanao specifically in Davao where they were signed as laborers. Said women are inmates of the houses of prostitution situated in Gardenia Street, in the district of Sampaloc.

He claimed that the prostitutes were sent to Davao, purportedly, to work for an haciendero Feliciano Ynigo. The prostitutes were confined in houses from October 16 to 18 of that year before being boarded, at the dead of night, in two boats bound for Davao. The women were under the assumption that they were being transported to another police station while Ynigo, the haciendero from Davao, had no idea that the women being sent to work for him were actually prostitutes. The families of the prostitutes came forward to file charges against Lukban, Anton Hohmann, the Chief of Police, and Francisco Sales, the Governor of Davao. They prayed for a writ of habeas corpus to be issued against the respondents to compel them to bring back the 170 women who were deported to Mindanao against their will. During the trial, it came out that, indeed, the women were deported without their consent. In effect, Lukban forcibly assigned them a new domicile. Most of all, there was no law or order authorizing Lukban's deportation of the 170 prostitutes. That when the petitioner filed for habeas corpus, the respondent moved to dismiss the case saying that those women were already out of their jurisdiction and that, it should be filed in the city of Davao instead. The court ruled in favor of the petitioner with the instructions; For the respondents to have fulfilled the court's order, three optional courses were open: (1) They could have produced the bodies of the persons according to the command of the writ; or (2) they could have shown by affidavit that on account of sickness or infirmity those persons could not safely be brought before the court; or (3) they could have presented affidavits to show that the parties in question or their attorney waived the right to be present. ISSUE: The writ of Habeas Corpus was filed by the petitioner, with the prayer that the respondent produce around 170 women whom Justo Lukban et, al deported to Davao. Liberty of abode was also raised versus the power of the executive of the Municipality in deporting the women without their knowledge in his capacity as Mayor. HELD: The court concluded the case by granting the parties aggrieved the sum of 400 pesos each, plus 100 pesos for nominal damage due to contempt of court. Reasoning further that if the chief executive of any municipality in the Philippines could forcibly and illegally take a private citizen and place him beyond the boundaries of the municipality, and then, when called upon to defend his official action, could calmly fold his hands and claim that the person was under no restraint and that he, the official, had no jurisdiction over this other municipality. We believe the true principle should be that, if the respondent is within the jurisdiction of the court and has it in his power to obey the order of the court and thus to undo the wrong that he has inflicted, he should be compelled to do so. Even if the party to whom the writ is addressed has illegally parted with the custody of a person before the application for the writ is no reason why the writ should not issue. If the mayor and the chief of police, acting under no authority of law, could deport these women from the city of Manila to Davao, the same officials must necessarily have the same means to return them from Davao to Manila. The respondents, within the reach of process, may not be permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty by forcing her to change her domicile and to avow the act with impunity in the courts, while the person who has lost her birthright of liberty has no effective recourse. The great writ of liberty may not thus be easily evaded. •

Procedural Due Process

(15) Tua v. Mangrobang G.R. No. 170701, January 22, 2014 RALPH P. TUA, vs. HON. CESAR A. MANGROBANG, Presiding Judge, Branch 22, Regional Trial Court, Imus, Cavite; and ROSSANA HONRADO-TUA, FACTS: Respondent and petitioner were married on January 10, 1998 in Makati City. They have three children, namely, Joshua Raphael born on February 9, 1999, Jesse Ruth Lois, born on June 27, 2000, and Jezreel Abigail, born on December 25, 2001. Respondent claimed, among others, that: there was a time when petitioner went to her room and cocked his gun and pointed the barrel of his gun to his head as he wanted to convince her not to proceed with the legal separation case she filed; she hid her fears although she was scared; there was also an instance when petitioner fed her children with the fried chicken that her youngest daughter had chewed and spat out; in order to stop his child from crying, petitioner would threaten him with a belt; when she told petitioner that she felt

unsafe and insecure with the latter's presence and asked him to stop coming to the house as often as he wanted or she would apply for a protection order, petitioner got furious and threatened her of withholding his financial support and even held her by the nape and pushed her to lie flat on the bed; and, on May 4, 2005, while she was at work, petitioner with companions went to her new home and forcibly took the children and refused to give them back to her. Respondent thus filed a Petition for the issuance of a protection order, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9262 or the Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004, against her husband, petitioner. The Petition was for herself and in behalf of her minor children. The RTC issued ex parte a Temporary Protection Order (TPO). Petitioner assailed the constitutionality of RA 9262 and sought to lift the TPO. Without awaiting the resolution of the RTC on the foregoing, Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the CA assailing the TPO issued for violating the due process clause of the Constitution. ISSUE: 1. Whether Section 15 of RA 9262, allowing ex parte application of a TPO, violate the due process clause? 2. Is there an invalid delegation of legislative power to the court and to barangay officials to issue protection orders? Ruling: 1. No. The court is authorized to issue a TPO on the date of the filing of the application after ex parte determination that there is basis for the issuance thereof. Ex parte means that the respondent need not be notified or be present in the hearing for the issuance of the TPO. Thus, it is within the court's discretion, based on the petition and the affidavit attached thereto, to determine that the violent acts against women and their children for the issuance of a TPO have been committed. Since "time is of the essence in cases of VAWC if further violence is to be prevented," the court is authorized to issue ex parte a TPO after raffle but before notice and hearing when the life, limb or property of the victim is in jeopardy and there is reasonable ground to believe that the order is necessary to protect the victim from the immediate and imminent danger of VAWC or to prevent such violence, which is about to recur. There need not be any fear that the judge may have no rational basis to issue an ex parte order. The victim is required not only to verify the allegations in the petition, but also to attach her witnesses' affidavits to the petition. The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be challenged as violative of the right to due process. Just like a writ of preliminary attachment which is issued without notice and hearing because the time in which the hearing will take could be enough to enable the defendant to abscond or dispose of his property, in the same way, the victim of VAWC may already have suffered harrowing experiences in the hands of her tormentor, and possibly even death, if notice and hearing were required before such acts could be prevented. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due process must yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests, among which is protection of women and children from violence and threats to their personal safety and security. It should be pointed out that when the TPO is issued ex parte, the court shall likewise order that notice be immediately given to the respondent directing him to file an opposition within five (5) days from service. Moreover, the court shall order that notice, copies of the petition and TPO be served immediately on the respondent by the court sheriffs. The TPOs are initially effective for thirty (30) days from service on the respondent. SDTaHc Where no TPO is issued ex parte, the court will nonetheless order the immediate issuance and service of the notice upon the respondent requiring him to file an opposition to the petition within five (5) days from service. The date of the preliminary conference and hearing on the merits shall likewise be indicated on the notice. The opposition to the petition which the respondent himself shall verify, must be accompanied by the affidavits of witnesses and shall show cause why a temporary or permanent protection order should not be issued. It is clear from the foregoing rules that the respondent of a petition for protection order should be apprised of the charges imputed to him and afforded an opportunity to present his side. . . . . The essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of one's defense. "To be heard" does not only mean verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process. Petitioner also assails that there is an invalid delegation of legislative power to the court and to barangay officials to issue protection orders.

2. No. Section 2 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides that "the Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 hereof." Hence, the primary judge of the necessity, adequacy, wisdom, reasonableness and expediency of any law is primarily the function of the legislature. The act of Congress entrusting us with the issuance of protection orders is in pursuance of our authority to settle justiciable controversies or disputes involving rights that are enforceable and demandable before the courts of justice or the redress of wrongs for violations of such rights. As to the issuance of protection order by the Punong Barangay, Section 14 pertinently provides: SEC. 14. Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs); Who May Issue and How. — Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs) refer to the protection order issued by the Punong Barangay ordering the perpetrator to desist from committing acts under Section 5 (a) and (b) of this Act. A Punong Barangay who receives applications for a BPO shall issue the protection order to the applicant on the date of filing after ex parte determination of the basis of the application. If the Punong Barangay is unavailable to act on the application for a BPO, the application shall be acted upon by any available Barangay Kagawad. If the BPO is issued by a Barangay Kagawad, the order must be accompanied by an attestation by the Barangay Kagawad that the Punong Barangay was unavailable at the time of the issuance of the BPO. BPOs shall be effective for fifteen (15) days. Immediately after the issuance of an ex parte BPO, the Punong Barangay or Barangay Kagawad shall personally serve a copy of the same on the respondent, or direct any barangay official to effect its personal service. The parties may be accompanied by a non-lawyer advocate in any proceeding before the Punong Barangay. Hence, the issuance of a BPO by the Punong Barangay or, in his unavailability, by any available Barangay Kagawad, merely orders the perpetrator to desist from (a) causing physical harm to the woman or her child; and (2) threatening to cause the woman or her child physical harm. Such function of the Punong Barangay is, thus, purely executive in nature, in pursuance of his duty under the Local Government Code to "enforce all laws and ordinances," and to "maintain public order in the barangay." Doctrine laid out by the Supreme Court. Judicial power; issuance of protection orders is in pursuance of the Court’s authority to settle justiciable controversies or disputes involving rights that are enforceable and demandable before the courts of justice or the redress of wrongs for violations of such rights. The provision in R.A. 9262 allowing the issuance of protection orders is not an invalid delegation of legislative power to the court and to barangay officials to issue protection orders. Section 2 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides that “the Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 hereof.” Hence, the primary judge of the necessity, adequacy, wisdom, reasonableness and expediency of any law is primarily the function of the legislature. The act of Congress entrusting us with the issuance of protection orders is in pursuance of our authority to settle justiciable controversies or disputes involving rights that are enforceable and demandable before the courts of justice or the redress of wrongs for violations of such rights. (16) SEN. JINGGOY ESTRADA v. OMBUDSMAN G.R. Nos. 212140-41, January 21, 2015 FACTS: Sometime in November and December 2013, the Ombudsman served on Sen. Estrada two (2) criminal complaints for plunder, among others. Eighteen (18) of Sen. Estrada’s co-respondents in the two complaints filed their counter-affidavits between 9 December 2013 and 14 March 2014. On 20 March 2014, Sen. Estrada filed his “Request to be furnished with copies of Counter-Affidavits of the Other Respondents, Affidavits of New Witnesses and Other Filings” (the “Request”). Sen. Estrada’s request was made “[pursuant to the right of a respondent ‘to examine the evidence submitted by the complainant which he may not have been furnished’ (Section 3b, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court) and to ‘have access to the evidence on record’ (Section 4[c], Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman).” The Ombudsman denied Sen. Estrada’s Request, which is not the subject of the present certiorari case. ISSUE: Whether petitioner Estrada was denied due process of law HELD: NO. The denial did not violate Sen. Estrada’s constitutional right to due process.

First. There is no law or rule which requires the Ombudsman to furnish a respondent with copies of the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents. The SC cited in its decision Sections 3 and 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as well as Rule II of Administrative Order No. 7, Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, for ready reference. Sen. Estrada claims that the denial of his Request for the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents violates his constitutional right to due process. Sen. Estrada, however, fails to specify a law or rule which states that it is a compulsory requirement of due process in a preliminary investigation that the Ombudsman furnish a respondent with the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents. Neither Section 3(b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure nor Section 4(c), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman supports Sen. Estrada’s claim. What the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman require is for the Ombudsman to furnish the respondent with a copy of the complaint and the supporting affidavits and documents at the time the order to submit the counter-affidavit is issued to the respondent. This is clear from Section 4(b), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman when it states, "After such affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses have been secured, the investigating officer shall issue an order, attaching thereto a copy of the affidavits and other supporting documents, directing the respondent to submit, within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, his counter-affidavits." At this point, there is still no counter-affidavit submitted by any respondent. Clearly, what Section 4(b) refers to are affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses, not the affidavits of the co-respondents. Obviously, the counteraffidavits of the co-respondents are not part of the supporting affidavits of the complainant. No grave abuse of discretion can thus be attributed to the Ombudsman for the issuance of the 27 March 2014 Order which denied Sen. Estrada’s Request. Second, it should be underscored that the conduct of a preliminary investigation is only for the determination of probable cause, and “probable cause merely implies probability of guilt and should be determined in a summary manner. A preliminary investigation is not a part of the trial and it is only in a trial where an accused can demand the full exercise of his rights, such as the right to confront and cross-examine his accusers to establish his innocence.” Thus, the rights of a respondent in a preliminary investigation are limited to those granted by procedural law. A preliminary investigation is defined as an inquiry or proceeding for the purpose of determining whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime cognizable by the Regional Trial Court has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. The quantum of evidence now required in preliminary investigation is such evidence sufficient to “engender a well-founded belief” as to the fact of the commission of a crime and the respondent’s probable guilt thereof. A preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties’ evidence; it is for the presentation of such evidence only as may engender a wellgrounded belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. We are in accord with the state prosecutor’s findings in the case at bar that there exists prima facie evidence of petitioner’s involvement in the commission of the crime, it being sufficiently supported by the evidence presented and the facts obtaining therein. Third, the technical rules on evidence are not binding on the fiscal who has jurisdiction and control over the conduct of a preliminary investigation. If by its very nature a preliminary investigation could be waived by the accused, we find no compelling justification for a strict application of the evidentiary rules. Fourth, the quantum of evidence in preliminary investigations is not akin to those in administrative proceedings as laid down in the landmark doctrine of Ang Tibay. The quantum of evidence needed in Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, is greater than the evidence needed in a preliminary investigation to establish probable cause, or to establish the existence of a prima facie case that would warrant the prosecution of a case. Ang Tibay refers to “substantial evidence,” while the establishment of probable cause needs “only more than ‘bare suspicion,’ or ‘less than evidence which would justify conviction’.” In the United States, from where we borrowed the concept of probable cause, the prevailing definition of probable cause is this: In dealing with probable cause, however, as the very name implies, we deal with probabilities. These are not technical; they are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act. The standard of proof is accordingly correlative to what must be proved. Thus, probable cause can be established with hearsay evidence, as long as there is substantial basis for crediting the hearsay. Hearsay evidence is admissible in determining probable cause in a preliminary investigation because such investigation is merely preliminary, and does not finally adjudicate rights and obligations of parties. However, in administrative cases, where rights and obligations are finally adjudicated, what is required is “substantial evidence” which cannot rest entirely or even partially on hearsay evidence. Substantial basis is not the same as substantial evidence

because substantial evidence excludes hearsay evidence while substantial basis can include hearsay evidence. To require the application of Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, in preliminary investigations will change the quantum of evidence required in determining probable cause from evidence of likelihood or probability of guilt to substantial evidence of guilt. Actually, the Ombudsman went beyond legal duty and even furnished Sen. Estrada with copies of the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents whom he specifically named, as well as the counteraffidavits of some of other co-respondents. In the 4 June 2014 Joint Order, the Ombudsman even held in abeyance the disposition of the motions for reconsideration because the Ombudsman granted Sen. Estrada five days from receipt of the 7 May 2014 Joint Order to formally respond to the claims made by his co-respondents. The Ombudsman faithfully complied with the existing Rules on preliminary investigation and even accommodated Sen. Estrada beyond what the Rules required. Thus, the Ombudsman could not be faulted with grave abuse of discretion. Since this is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, the Petition fails in the absence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman. The constitutional due process requirements mandated in Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, are not applicable to preliminary investigations which are creations of statutory law giving rise to mere statutory rights. A law can abolish preliminary investigations without running afoul of the constitutional requirements of due process as prescribed in Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS. The present procedures for preliminary investigations do not comply and were never intended to comply, with Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS. Preliminary investigations do not adjudicate with finality rights and obligations of parties, while administrative investigations governed by Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, so adjudicate. Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, requires substantial evidence for a decision against the respondent in the administrative case.In preliminary investigations, only likelihood or probability of guilt is required. To apply Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, to preliminary investigations will change the quantum of evidence required to establish probable cause. The respondent in an administrative case governed by Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, has the right to an actual hearing and to cross-examine the witnesses against him. In preliminary investigations, the respondent has no such rights. Also, in an administrative case governed by Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, the hearing officer must be impartial and cannot be the fact-finder, investigator, and hearing officer at the same time. In preliminary investigations, the same public officer may be the investigator and hearing officer at the same time, or the fact-finder, investigator and hearing officer may be under the control and supervision of the same public officer, like the Ombudsman or Secretary of Justice. This explains why Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, does not apply to preliminary investigations. To now declare that the guidelines in Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, are fundamental and essential requirements in preliminary investigations will render all past and present preliminary investigations invalid for violation of constitutional due process. This will mean remanding for reinvestigation all criminal cases now pending in all courts throughout the country. No preliminary investigation can proceed until a new law designates a public officer, outside of the prosecution service, to determine probable cause. Moreover, those serving sentences by final judgment would have to be released from prison because their conviction violated constitutional due process. (17) Diona v. Balangue G.R. No. 173559, January 7, 2013 FACTS: Respondents obtained a loan of ₱45,000.00 from petitioner payable in six months and secured by a Real Estate Mortgage over their 202-square meter property. Respondents failed to pay notwithstanding demand. Petitioners then filed a complaint against them for the payment of the principal obligation, for actual damages, attorney’s fee, foreclosure of the said land, and costs of the suit. Respondents were served summons and despite their motion to extend period to answer, they failed to file any responsive pleadings. RTC then declared them in default and decided in favor of the petitioners. They granted the interest rate of 5% monthly when the petitioners merely sought 12% per annum. In a following order, RTC granted respondents’ order and modified the interest rate from 5% monthly to 12% per annum. Respondents were displeased with the previous Order and elevated the matter to the CA. CA pronounced that the RTC gravely abused its discretion. The part of this judgment by the RTC was then annulled including the transfer of title for the land. ISSUE: Whether CA committed grave and serious error of law when it granted the annulment of judgment despite the fact that said decision has become final and already executed.

RULING: No. We agree with respondents that the award of 5% monthly interest violated their right to due process and, hence, the same may be set aside in a Petition for Annulment of Judgment filed under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court. Annulment of judgment under Rule 47 is an exception to the final judgment rule where the other party is without fault on his part, failed to avail of the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief, or other appropriate remedies. It also recognizes due process as additional ground to annul a judgment based on jurisprudence. Also in this case, the respondents’ former counsel was grossly negligent in handling the case, it is not through the own fault of the respondents. Said counsel allowed the requested extension to pass without filing an answer. He also did not question the awer of 5% monthly interest rate. Grant of 5% monthly interest is way beyond the 12% per annum interest sought in the Complaint and smacks of violation of due process. When petitioner filed her Complaint before the RTC, she alleged that respondents borrowed from P45,000 with interest thereon at the rate of 12% per annum. She did not allege or pray for the disputed 5% monthly interest. Neither did she present evidence nor testified thereon. Clearly, the RTC’s award of 5% monthly interest or 60% per annum lacks basis and disregards due process. It violated the due process requirement because respondents were not informed of the possibility that the RTC may award 5% monthly interest. They were deprived of reasonable opportunity to refute and present controverting evidence as they were made to believe that the complainant petitioner was seeking for what she merely stated in her Complaint. To repeat, the court’s grant of relief is limited only to what has been prayed for in the Complaint or related thereto, supported by evidence, and covered by the party’s cause of action.43 Besides, even assuming that the awarded 5% monthly or 60% per annum interest was properly alleged and proven during trial, the same remains unconscionably excessive and ought to be equitably reduced in accordance with applicable jurisprudence. (18) MAYOR EMMANUEL L. MALIKSI v. COMELEC and HOMER T. SAQUILAYAN G.R. No. 203302, April 13, 2013 FACTS: During the 2010 Elections, the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed Saquilayan the winner for the position of Mayor of Imus, Cavite. Maliksi, the candidate who garnered the second highest number of votes, brought an election protest in the RTC in Imus alleging that there were irregularities in the counting of votes in 209 clustered precincts. Subsequently, the RTC held a revision of the votes, and, based on the results of the revision, declared Maliksi as the duly elected Mayor of Imus commanding Saquilayan to cease and desist from performing the functions of said office. Saquilayan appealed to the COMELEC. In the meanwhile, the RTC granted Maliksi’s motion for execution pending appeal, and Maliksi was then installed as Mayor. In resolving the appeal, the COMELEC First Division, without giving notice to the parties, decided to recount the ballots through the use of the printouts of the ballot images from the CF cards. Thus, it issued an order dated March 28, 2012 requiring Saquilayan to deposit the amount necessary to defray the expenses for the decryption and printing of the ballot images. Later, it issued another order dated April 17, 2012 for Saquilayan to augment his cash deposit. On August 15, 2012, the First Division issued a resolution nullifying the RTC’s decision and declaring Saquilayan as the duly elected Mayor. Maliksi filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that he had been denied his right to due process because he had not been notified of the decryption proceedings. He argued that the resort to the printouts of the ballot images, which were secondary evidence, had been unwarranted because there was no proof that the integrity of the paper ballots had not been preserved. On September 14, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc resolved to deny Maliksi’s motion for reconsideration. Maliksi then came to the Court via petition for certiorari, reiterating his objections. On March 12, 2013, the Court dismissed Maliksi’s petition for certiorari. The Court concluded that Maliksi had not been denied due process because: (a) he had received notices of the decryption, printing, and examination of the ballot images by the First Division — referring to the orders of the First Division directing Saquilayan to post and augment the cash deposits for the decryption and printing of the ballot images; and (b) he had been able to raise his objections to the decryption in his motion for reconsideration. The Court then pronounced that the First Division did not abuse its discretion in deciding to use the ballot images instead of the paper ballots, explaining that the printouts of the ballot images were not secondary images, but considered original documents with the same evidentiary value as the official ballots under the Rule on Electronic Evidence; and irregularities had been fully established by the large number of cases of double-shading discovered during the revision. Thus, Maliksi filed an Extremely Urgent Motion for Reconsideration.

ISSUE: Whether Maliksi was deprived of due process when the COMELEC First Division ordered on appeal the decryption, printing, and examination of the ballot images in the CF cards. RULING: The Court grants Maliksi’s Extremely Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, and reverses the decision promulgated on March 12, 2013 on the ground that the First Division of the COMELEC denied to him the right to due process by failing to give due notice on the decryption and printing of the ballot images. Consequently, the Court annuls the recount proceedings conducted by the First Division with the use of the printouts of the ballot images. The disregard of Maliksi’s right to be informed of the decision to print the picture images of the ballots and to conduct the recount proceedings during the appellate stage cannot be brushed aside by the invocation of the fact that Maliksi was able to file, after all, a motion for reconsideration. To be exact, the motion for reconsideration was actually directed against the entire resolution of the First Division, while Maliksi’s claim of due process violation is directed only against the First Division’s recount proceedings that resulted in the prejudicial result rendered against him. Notably, the First Division did not issue any order directing the recount. Without the written order, Maliksi was deprived of the chance to seek any reconsideration or even to assail the irregularly-held recount through a seasonable petition for certiorari in this Court. In that context, he had no real opportunity to assail the conduct of the recount proceedings. The service of the First Division orders requiring Saquilayan to post and augment the cash deposits for the printing of the picture images did not sufficiently give Maliksi notice of the First Division’s decision to print the picture images. The said orders did not meet the requirements of due process because they did not specifically inform Maliksi that the ballots had been found to be tampered. Nor did the orders offer the factual bases for the finding of tampering. Hence, to leave for Maliksi to surmise on the factual bases for finding the need to print the picture images still violated the principles of fair play, because the responsibility and the obligation to lay down the factual bases and to inform Maliksi as the party to be potentially prejudiced thereby firmly rested on the shoulders of the First Division. Moreover, due process of law does not only require notice of the decryption, printing, and recount proceedings to the parties, but also demands an opportunity to be present at such proceedings or to be represented therein. Maliksi correctly contends that the orders of the First Division simply required Saquilayan to post and augment his cash deposit. The orders did not state the time, date, and venue of the decryption and recount proceedings. Clearly, the First Division had no intention of giving the parties the opportunity to witness its proceedings. The Court, by this resolution, does not intend to validate the victory of any of the parties in the 2010 Elections. That is not the concern of the Court as yet. The Court simply does not want to countenance a denial of the fundamental right to due process, a cornerstone of our legal system. After all, it is the Court’s primary duty to protect the basic rights of the people vis-à-vis government actions. WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES the Court's decision promulgated on March 12, 2013; and DIRECTS the COMELEC en banc to conduct proceedings for the decryption of the picture images of the ballots involved in the protest after due authentication, and for the recount of ballots by using the printouts of the ballot images, with notice to and in the presence of the parties or their representatives in accordance with the procedure laid down by Rule 15 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804, as amended by Resolution No. 9164. (19) ALEN ROSS RODRIGUEZ and REGIDOR TULALI v. The Hon. BIENVENIDO BLANCAFLOR FACTS: PROVINCIAL PROSECUTORS OF PALAWAN ALEN ROSS B. RODRIGUEZ and PROSECUTOR REGIDOR TULALI as both guilty of direct contempt and for violation of their oath of office as member of the bar and as officer of the Court. Previously pending before Judge Blancaflor was Criminal Case No. 22240 for arson. During the pendency of the case, Tulali was implicated in a controversy involving an alleged bribery initiated by Randy Awayan (Awayan), the driver assigned to Judge Blancaflor to assure the acquittal of the accused. Tulali filed an Ex-Parte Manifestation withdrawing his appearance in the said case to prevent any suspicion of misdemeanor and collusion. Judge Blancaflor summoned several witnesses including Tulali and heard their testimonies. Also summoning Rodriguez. Then he filed his Motion for Clarification as to the purpose of Judge Blancaflor’s continued inquiries considering that the decision in the arson case had already been promulgated, Judge Blancaflor informed the petitioners that he was proceeding against them for direct contempt and violation of their oath of office. PETITIONERS DEFENSE: Petitioners argue that the contempt proceedings are null and void for contravening their rights to due process of law. They claim that they were denied their rights to be

informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them, to confront the witnesses and present their own evidence HELD: Direct contempt is any misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same, including disrespect toward the court, offensive personalities toward others, or refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully required to do so.The power to punish a person in contempt of court is inherent in all courts to preserve order in judicial proceedings and to uphold the orderly administration of justice. However, judges are enjoined to exercise the power judiciously and sparingly, with utmost restraint, and with the end in view of utilizing the same for correction and preservation of the dignity of the court, and not for retaliation or vindictiveness. It bears stressing that the power to declare a person in contempt of court must be exercised on the preservative, not the vindictive principle; and on the corrective, not the retaliatory, idea of punishment. Such power, being drastic and extraordinary in its nature, should not be resorted to unless necessary in the interest of justice.Tulali’s voluntary withdrawal from the arson case to dispel any suspicion of collusion between him and the accused. Petitioners also fault Judge Blancaflor for non-observance of due process in conducting the contempt proceedings. It must be emphasized that direct contempt is adjudged and punished summarily pursuant to Section 1, Rule 71 of the Rules. Hence, hearings and opportunity to confront witnesses are absolutely unnecessary; the petitioners’ alleged "vilification campaign" against Judge Blancaflor cannot be regarded as direct contempt. At most, it may constitute indirect contempt, as correctly concluded by the OSG. Sec. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing) any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice. As a public servant, a judge should perform his duties in accordance with the dictates of his conscience and the light that God has given him. A judge should never allow himself to be moved by pride, prejudice, passion, or pettiness in the performance of his duties. He should always bear in mind that the power of the court to punish for contempt should be exercised for purposes that are impersonal, because that power is intended as a safeguard not for the judges as persons but for the functions that they exercise Accordingly, an order of direct contempt is not immediately executory or enforceable. The contemnor must be afforded a reasonable remedy to extricate or purge himself of the contempt. Where the person adjudged in direct contempt by any court avails of the remedy of certiorari or prohibition, the execution of the judgment shall be suspended pending resolution of such petition provided the contemnor files a bond fixed by the court which rendered the judgment and conditioned that he will abide by and perform the judgment should the petition be decided against him (20) TAÑADA v. TUVERA 146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986) PUBLICATION AS PART OF DUE PROCESS In Tanada v. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446, the Court held that publication is imperative to the validity of laws, presidential decrees and executive orders, administrative rules and regulations, and is an indispensable part of due process. Thus, in Republic {National Telecommunications Commission) v. Express Telecommunications, G.R. No. 147096, January 15, 2002, the National Telecommunciations Commission, in granting Bayantel the provisional authority to operate, applied the 1978 Rules of Practice and Procedure, and not the 1993 Revised Rules, because the latter had not yet been published (although the same had already been filed with the National Administrative Register). MAY A LAW BE GIVEN EFFECT IF IT WAS NOT PUBLISHED? WHY? No. The publication requirement goes into the due process clause. It is unfair to the people if law would take effect without them knowing the said laws through their publication Tañada v. Tuvera, for publication gives the people presumptive knowledge of the law. Q. May the publication of laws prior to their effectivity be dispensed with? A. No. Publication in every case is indispensable. Total omission of publication would be a denial of due process in that the people would not know what laws to obey. Tanada v. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446 (1986).

FACTS: This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April 24, 1985. Respondent argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was “otherwise” as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not as to their publication; 2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general circulation. HELD: The clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or in any other date, without its previous publication. “Laws” should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking, all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. A law without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest eve if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole. All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to inform the public of the content of the law. Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity. The Supreme Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if it finds it impractical. The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible. J. Cruz: Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot faint, parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn. [ALTERNATIVE DIGEST] Tanada v. Tuvera 146 SCRA 446 (1986) G.R. No. L-63915 December 29, 1986 FACTS: Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding the disclosure of a number of presidential decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by law. The government argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was “otherwise provided,” as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval. In the decision of this case on April 24, 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity for the publication of some of these decrees, orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect. The petitioners are now before us again, this time to move for reconsideration/clarification of that decision. Specifically, they ask the What is meant by “law of public nature” or “general applicability”? Must a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not? What is meant by “publication”? Where is the publication to be made? When is the publication to be made? the petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction between laws of general applicability and those which are not; that publication means complete publication; and that the publication must be made forthwith in the Official Gazette ISSUE: Whether the Publication of Laws and Decrees in the Official Gazette and Newspaper of General Circulation is a mandatory requirement of the Constitution?

HELD: Yes, Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed with altogether. The reason. is that such omission would offend due process insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern the legislature could validly provide that a law e effective immediately upon its approval notwithstanding the lack of, it is not unlikely that persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a result and they would be so not because of a failure to comply with but simply because they did not know of its existence, Significantly, this is not true only of penal laws as is commonly supposed. One can think of many non-penal measures, like a law on prescription, which must also be communicated to the persons they may affect before they can begin to operate. The conclusive presumption that every person knows the law, which of course presupposes that the law has been published if the presumption is to have any legal justification at all. It is no less important to remember that Section 6 of the Bill of Rights recognizes “the right of the people to information on matters of public concern,” and this certainly applies to, among others, and indeed especially, the legislative enactments of the government. (21) PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL TRADING CORPORATION v. HON PRESIDING JUDGE ZOSIMO Z. ANGELES, BRANCH 58, RTC, MAKATI; REMINGTON INDUSTRIAL SALES CORPORATION; AND FIRESTONE CERAMIC, INC. G.R. No. 108461, October 21, 1996 Q. What is the rationale of the grant of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers to administrative bodies? A. "[A]s a result of the growing complexity of the modern society, it has become necessary to create more and more administrative bodies to help in the regulation of its ramified activities. Specialized in the particular field assigned to them, they can deal with the problems thereof with more expertise and dispatch than can be expected from the legislature or the courts of justice." Philippine International Trading Corporation v. Angeles, G.R. No. 108461, October 21, 1996, 263 SCRA 421,444-45 (citing Solid Homes Inc. v Payawal, 177 SCRA 72 [1989]). FACTS: The controversy springs from the issuance by the PITC of Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01, under which, applications to the PITC for importation from the Peoples Republic of China (PROC) must be accompanied by a viable and confirmed Export Program of Philippine Products to PROC carried out by the importer himself or through a tie-up with a legitimate importer in an amount equivalent to the value of the importation from PROC being applied for, or, simply, at one is to one ratio. Subsequently, for failing to comply with their undertakings to submit export credits equivalent to the value of their importations, further import applications were withheld by petitioner PITC from private respondents, such that the latter both barred from importing goods from PROC. Consequently, Remington filed a Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus, with prayer for issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction on January 20, 1992, against PITC in the RTC Makati Branch 58.[4] The court issued a Temporary Restraining Order on January 21, 1992, ordering PITC to cease from exercising any power to process applications of goods from PROC.[5] Hearings on the application for writ of preliminary injunction ensued. Desiring to make importations from PROC, private respondents Remington and Firestone, both domestic corporations, organized and existing under Philippines laws, individually applied for authority to import from PROC with the petitioner, They were granted such authority after satisfying the requirements for importers, and after they executed respective undertakings to balance their importations from PROC with corresponding export of Philippine products to PROC. Private respondent Firestone was allowed to intervene in the petition on July 2, 1992,[6] thus joining Remington in the latter’s charges against PITC. It specifically asserts that the questioned Administrative Order is an undue restrictions of trade, and hence, unconstitutional. The court ruled that PITCs authority to process and approve applications for imports from SOCPEC and to issue rules and regulations pursuant to LOI 444 and P.D. No. 1071, has already been repealed by EO No. 133, issued on February 27, 1987 by President Aquino. ISSUE: Whether the Administrative Order issued by the PITC is valid HELD: No. While PITCs power to engage in commercial import and export activities is expressly recognized and allowed under Section 16 (d) of EO 133, the same is now limited only to new or nontraditional products and markets not normally pursued by the private business sector. There is no indication in the law of the removal of the powers of the PITC to exercise its regulatory functions in

the area of importations from SOCPEC countries. Though it does not mention the grant of regulatory power, EO 133, as worded, is silent as to the abolition or limitation of such powers, previously granted under P.D. 1071, from the PITC. The PITC, on the other hand, was attached as an integral part to DTI as one of its line agencies, and was given the focal task of implementing the departments programs. The absence of the regulatory power formerly enshrined in the Special Provisions of LOI 444, from Section 16 of EO 133, and the limitation of its previously wide range of functions, is noted. This does not mean, however, that PITC has lost the authority to issue the questioned Administrative Order. It is our view that PITC still holds such authority, and may legally exercise it, as an implementing arm, and under the supervision of, the Department of Trade and Industry. The grant of quasi-legislative powers in administrative bodies is not unconstitutional. It has become necessary to create more and more administrative bodies to help in the regulation of its ramified activities. Specialized in the particular field assigned to them, they can deal with the problems thereof with more expertise and dispatch than can be expected from the legislature or the courts of justice. Evidently, in the exercise of such powers, the agency concerned must commonly interpret and apply contracts and determine the rights of private parties under such contracts. One thrust of the multiplication of administrative agencies is that the interpretation of contracts and the determination of private rights thereunder is no longer uniquely judicial function, exercisable only by our regular courts. (Antipolo Realty Corporation vs. National Housing Authority, G.R. No. L- 50444, August 31, 1987, 153 SCRA 399). So the need to create a large number of specialized administrative agencies and to give them broader powers than administrators had traditionally exercised. These included the power to issue regulations having the force of law, and the power to hear and decide cases powers that had previously been reserved to the legislatures and the courts. (Houghteling/Pierce, Lawmaking by Administrative Agencies, p. 166.) In sum, the PITC was legally empowered to issue Administrative Orders, as a valid exercise of a power ancillary to legislation. This does not imply however, that the subject Administrative Order is a valid exercise of such quasi-legislative power. The original Administrative Order was not published in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. The questioned Administrative Order, legally, until it is published, is invalid within the context of Article 2 of Civil Code. The fact that the amendments to Administrative Order were filed with, and published by the UP Law Center in the National Administrative Register, does not cure the defect related to the effectivity of the Administrative Order. We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws. The Administrative Order under consideration is one of those issuances which should be published for its effectivity, since its purpose is to enforce and implement an existing law pursuant to a valid delegation, i.e., P.D. 1071, in relation to LOI 444 and EO 133. (22) REPUBLIC V. EXTELCOM GR 147096, January 15, 2002 FACTS: On December 29, 1992, International Communications Corporation (now Bayan Telecommunications, Inc. or Bayantel) filed an application with the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) for a Certificate of Public Convenience or Necessity (CPCN) to install, operate and maintain a digital Cellular Mobile Telephone System/Service (CMTS) with prayer for a Provisional Authority (PA). Respondent Express Telecommunication Co., Inc. (Extelcom) filed in NTC Case No. 92-486 an Opposition (With Motion to Dismiss) praying for the dismissal of Bayantels application. Bayantel was awarded with the PA. In granting Bayantel the provisional authority to operate a CMTS, the NTC applied Rule 15, Section 3 of its 1978 Rules of Practice and Procedure, which provides: Sec. 3. Provisional Relief. --- Upon the filing of an application, complaint or petition or at any stage thereafter, the Board may grant on motion of the pleader or on its own initiative, the relief prayed for, based on the pleading, together with the affidavits and supporting documents attached thereto, without prejudice to a final decision after completion of the hearing which shall be called within thirty (30) days from grant of authority asked for. (underscoring ours) Respondent Extelcom, however, contends that the NTC should have applied the Revised Rules which were filed with the Office of the National Administrative Register on February 3, 1993. These Revised Rules deleted the phrase on its own initiative; accordingly, a provisional authority may be issued only upon filing of the proper motion before the Commission. ISSUE: Whether the grant of PA to Bayantel should be based on 1978 Rules of Practice and Procedure for it to be valid?

RULING: Administrative rules and regulations must be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation. The only exceptions are interpretative regulations, those merely internal in nature, or those so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules and guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties. Hence, the 1993 Revised Rules should be published in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation before it can take effect. The absence of publication, coupled with the certification by the Commissioner of the NTC stating that the NTC was still governed by the 1978 Rules, clearly indicate that the 1993 Revised Rules have not taken effect at the time of the grant of the provisional authority to Bayantel. The fact that the 1993 Revised Rules were filed with the UP Law Center on February 3, 1993 is of no moment. There is nothing in the Administrative Code of 1987 which implies that the filing of the rules with the UP Law Center is the operative act that gives the rules force and effect. In any event, regardless of whether the 1978 Rules or the 1993 Revised Rules should apply, the records show that the amended application filed by Bayantel in fact included a motion for the issuance of a provisional authority. Hence, it cannot be said that the NTC granted the provisional authority motu proprio. In the case at bar, the said application was ordered archived because of lack of available frequencies at the time, and made subject to reinstatement upon availability of the requisite frequency. To be sure, there was nothing irregular in the revival of the application after the condition therefor was fulfilled. •

IMPARTIAL COURT TRIBUNAL

(23) TANADA V. PHILIPPINE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION G.R. No. 70632 FACTS: The PAEC, now the Philippine Nuclear Research Institute (PNRI) is a government agency under the DOST mandated to undertake research and development activities in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, institute regulations on the said uses, and carry out the enforcement of said regulations to protect the health and safety of radiation workers and the general public. The PAEC exercises both quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers. The objects of dispute in this case are the pamphlets issued by PAEC which clearly indicate the pre-judgment that Philippine Nuclear Power Plant-1 (PNPP-1) in Bataan, the only nuclear plant under construction in the Philippines, is safe. The pamphlets were in relation to the NPC’s motion for a license to operate the said power plant. One pamphlet gives an overview specifically of PNPP-1, lauds the safety of nuclear power, and concludes with a statement of the benefits to be derived when the PNPP-1 start operation. “…When the PNPP-1 starts operating, it will generate a power of 620 megawatts enough to supply 15 percent of the electricity needs in Luzon. This is estimated to result in savings of US $ 160 million a year, representing the amount of oil displaced. Aside from being a reliable source of electricity, nuclear power has an excellent safety record and has been found to result in lower occupational and public risks than fossil fired (coal or oil) stations.” Another pamphlet states that nuclear power is working now in other countries and "it should work for us too" because it is "safe" and economical". A third pamphlet states that the power plant will not adversely affect the public or the flora or fauna in the area. ISSUE: Whether the respondents PAEC Commissioners are prejudiced and biased in their judgment on the safety of the PNPP-1. RULING: Yes. Having thus prejudged the safety of the PNPP-1 respondent PAEC Commissioners would be acting with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction were they to sit in judgment upon the safety of the plant, absent the requisite objectivity that must characterize such an important inquiry. The Court ruled that the conduct of the inquiry into the safety aspects of PNPP-1 should be characterized by sufficient latitude, the better to achieve the end in view, unfettered by technical rules of evidence, and in keeping with the requirements of due process in administrative proceedings, the Court Resolved to Order respondent PAEC (once reconstituted) to re-open the hearing on PNPP-1. Dissenting Opinions:

1. The instant case of G.R. No. 70632 should be dismissed because the petitioners have no cause of action for prohibition and injunction. The PAEC has been acting within its jurisdiction. Prohibition does not lie against it. 2. The matter of the operation of a nuclear plant is a political question. It is a question of policy as to which the Executive Department has discretional authority. 3. The pamphlets and articles published by PAEC regarding the safety of nuclear plants which have not been shown to have been prepared by the Commissioners themselves can be taken as evidence of bias in favor of granting the license to operate the nuclear plant in question. The said articles refer to the safety of nuclear plants per se and not particularly to the Bataan nuclear plant. The respondent Commissioners can still be objective in their disposition of the petition pending before them and can decide the same on the basis of the evidence presented during the continuation of the hearing. From their decision the aggrieved party can appeal to the Intermediate Appellate Court. (24) Anzaldo vs. Clave 119 SCRA 353 (1982) FACTS: The Science Research Supervisor II position was vacant and both Dr Felicidad Anzaldo and Dr Eulalia Venzon were next-in-rank for the said position. Venzon was recommended for the position to which Anzaldo protested. The position was not filled up until National Institute of Science and Technology (NIST) Officer-In-Charge Doctor Pedro G. Afable appointed Anzaldo to that position (Doctor Afable, in his letter dated January 20, 1978, explained that the appointment was made after a thorough study and screening of the qualifications of Doctors Anzaldo and Venzon and upon the recommendation of the NIST Staff Evaluation Committee that gave 88 points to Doctor Anzaldo and 61 points to Doctor Venzon ). The same was approved by Civil Service Commission. Venzon contested this and appealed to the Office of the President. This protest was sent to Civil Service Commission and was decided in favour of Venzon by CSC Chairman Jacobo Clave. CSC Chairman Clave and Commissioner Jose A. R. Melo recommended in Resolution No. 1178 dated August 23, 1979 that Doctor Venzon be appointed to the contested position, a recommendation which is in conflict with the 1978 appointment of Doctor Anzaldo which was duly attested and approved by the Civil Service Commission. The resolution was made pursuant to section 19(6) of the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines, Presidential Decree No. 807 (which took effect on October 6, 1975) and which provides that "before deciding a contested appointment, the Office of the President shall consult the Civil Service Commission." Anzaldo filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied and she appealed to Office of the President to which Clave is concurrently Presidential Executive Assistant. Appeal was revoked and ruled as “as recommended by the Civil Service Commission.” ISSUE: Whether or not Clave denied due process to Anzaldo on the ground of grave abuse of discretion? RULING: Yes, it is evident that Doctor Anzaldo was denied due process of law when Presidential Executive Assistant Clave concurred with the recommendation of Chairman Clave of the Civil Service Commission. It was held that the decision of Presidential Executive Assistant Clave affirming his own decision when he is still Chairman of the Civil Service Commission was void because it was rendered with grave abuse of discretion and was a mockery of administrative justice as per the court’s decision in Zambales Chromite Mining case (where it was held that the decision of Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Benjamin M. Gozon, affirming his own decision in a mining case as Director of Mines was void because it was rendered with grave abuse of discretion and was a mockery of administrative justice). Due process of law means fundamental fairness. It is not fair to Doctor Anzaldo that Presidential Executive Assistant Clave should decide whether his own recommendation as Chairman of the Civil Service Commission, as to who between Doctor Anzaldo and Doctor Venzon should be appointed Science Research Supervisor II, should be adopted by the President of the Philippines. Common sense and propriety dictate that the commissioner in the Civil Service Commission, who should be consulted by the Office of the President, should be a person different from the person in the Office of the President who would decide the appeal of the protestant in a contested appointment. In this case, the person who acted for the Office of the President is the same person in the Civil Service Commission who was consulted by the Office of the President: Jacobo C. Clave. The Civil Service Decree could not have contemplated that absurd situation for, as held in the Zambales Chromite case, that would not be fair to the appellant.

Decision of respondent set aside and Anzaldo’s appointment declared valid. (25) CAYETANO A. TEJANO, JR. v. THE HON. OMBUDSMAN and the HON. SANDIGANBAYAN Procedural. This serves as a restriction on actions of judicial and quasi-judicial agencies of government. REQUISITES: i) An impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it. In Tejano v. Ombudsman, G.R.No. 159190, June 30, 2005, the petitioner attributed partiality to Ombudsman Desierto for having participated in the reinvestigation of the instant case despite his having earlier participated in the initial preliminary investigation of the same when he was Special Prosecutor. The Supreme Court agreed with the petitioner, saying that it is a steadfast rule that the officer who reviews a case on appeal should not be the same person whose decision is under review judges. In Tabuena v. Sandiganbayan, 268 SCRA 332, reiterated in Imelda Romualdez Marcos v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 126995, October 6, 1998, the Supreme Court held that when the Court cross-examined the accused and witnesses, it acted with over-zealousness, assuming the role of both magistrate and advocate, and thus denied the accused due process of law. ii) Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant and over the property which is the subject matter of the proceeding. iii) The defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard. Due process is satisfied as long as the party is accorded the opportunity to be heard. If it is not availed of, it is deemed waived or forfeited without violating the constitutional guarantee [Bautista v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 157219 May 28, 2004]. Neither is the respondent entitled to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. PD 1069 affords an extraditee sufficient opportunity to meet the evidence against him once the petition is filed in court. The time for the extraditee to know the basis of the request for extradition is merely moved to the filing in court of the formal petition for extradition. The extraditee’s right to know is momentarily withheld during the evaluation stage to accommodate the more compelling interest of the state to prevent escape of potential extraditees which can be precipitated by premature information on the basis of the request for extradition. No less compelling at that stage of the extradition proceedings is the need to be more deferential to the judgment of a co- equal branch of the government, the Executive, which has been endowed by our Constitution with greater powers over matters involving our foreign relations [Secretary of Justice v. Judge Lantion, G.R. No. 139465, October 17, 2000; Cuevas v. Munoz, G.R. No. 140520, December 18, 2000]. iv) Judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing. This is necessary, because otherwise, the right to a hearing would be rendered meaningless. Relate this to Sec. 14, Art. VIII, which provides that no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. FACTS: Tejano (Petitioner), and spouses Juana and Vicente dela Cruz of V&G was alleged as persons involved in the irregular withdrawal of P2.2 million of PNB funds. During the initial preliminary investigation, Aniano A. Desierto, then the Special Prosecutor, participated herein by concurring the approval of Ferrer (Deputy Special Prosecutor) in the recommendation for the filing of the information for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 before the Sandiganbayan. Few weeks later, after the information was filed. Petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan an Urgent Motion for a Period of Time to File Motion for Reinvestigation. Subsequently, the reinvestigation was approved. Reinvestigation ensue, Special Prosecution Officer III Micael was convinced that no probable cause existed to indict petitioner Tejano, and spouses Juana and Vicente dela Cruz, He then recommended the dismissal of the case. The recommendation was approved by Deputy Special Prosecutor Robert E. Kallos and concurred in by Special Prosecutor Leonardo P. Tamayo. However, Now Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto, who earlier participated in the initial preliminary investigation as Special Prosecutor, disapproved the recommendation for the dismissal of the case with the marginal note assign the case to another prosecutor to prosecute the case aggressively. Thus, the present case. ISSUE: Whether or not Ombudsman Desierto exhibited partiality in exercising his judgment?

HELD: Yes, Steadfastly, we have ruled that the officer who reviews a case on appeal should not be the same person whose decision is under review. Having participated in the initial preliminary investigation of the instant case and having recommended the filing of an appropriate information, it behooved Ombudsman Desierto to recuse himself from participating in the review of the same during the reinvestigation. He should have delegated the review to his Deputies pursuant to Section 15 of Rep. Act No. 6770. In earlier recommending the filing of information, then Special Prosecutor Desierto was already convinced, from that moment, that probable cause exists to indict the accused. It becomes a farfetched possibility that in a subsequent review of the same, Ombudsman Desierto would make a turnabout and take a position contradictory to his earlier finding. Due process dictates that one called upon to resolve a dispute may not review his decision on appeal. We take our bearings from Zambales Chromite Mining Co. V. Court of Appeals which succinctly explained that: In order that the review of the decision of a subordinate officer might not turn out to be farce, the reviewing officer must perforce be other than the officer whose decision is under review; otherwise, there could be no different view or there would be no real review of the case. The decision of the reviewing officer would be a biased view; inevitably, it would be the same view since being human, he would not admit that he was mistaken in his first view of the case. In Cojuangco, Jr. v. Presidential Commission on Good Government concedes the applicability of the prohibition on the reviewing officer to handle a case he earlier decided, thus: Where the circumstances do not inspire confidence in the objectivity and impartiality of the judge, such judge should inhibit voluntarily or if he refuses, he should be prohibited from handling the case. A judge must not only be impartial but must also appear impartial as an assurance to the parties that his decision will be just. His actuation must inspire that belief. This is an instance when appearance is as important as reality. The fact that the motion for reconsideration of Ombudsman Desiertos disapproval of the 03 November 1999 memorandum of Special Prosecutor Jesus Micael recommending the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 21654 was denied by another reviewing officer, Ombudsman Marcelo, does not cure the infirmity of Ombudsman Desiertos actuation. As stressed in Singson v. NLRC: . . . The infirmity of the resolution was not cured by the fact that the motion for reconsideration of the petitioner was denied by two commissioners and without the participation of Commissioner Aquino. The right of petitioner to an impartial review of his appeal starts from the time he filed his appeal. He is not only entitled to an impartial tribunal in the resolution of his motion for reconsideration. Moreover, his right is to an impartial review of three commissioners. The denial of petitioners right to an impartial review of his appeal is not an innocuous error. It negated his right to due process. (Underlining supplied) (26) Tumey vs. Ohio 273 US 510, 7 March 1927 FACTS: Tumey was arrested at White Oak, and was brought before Mayor Pugh, of the village of North College Hill, charged with unlawfully possessing intoxicating liquor. He moved for his dismissal because of the disqualification of the mayor to try him under the 14th Amendment. The mayor denied the motion, proceeded to the trial, convicted Tumey of unlawfully possessing intoxicating liquor within Hamilton county as charged, fined him $100, and ordered that he be imprisoned until the fine and costs were paid. Tumey obtained a bill of exceptions and carried the case on error to the court of common pleas of Hamilton county. That court heard the case and reversed the judgment, on the ground that the mayor was disqualified as claimed. The state sought review by the Court of Appeals of the First Appellate District of Ohio, which reversed the common pleas and affirmed the judgment of the mayor. On 4 May 1926, the state Supreme Court refused Tumey’s application to require the Court of Appeals to certify its record in the case. Tumey then filed a petition in error in that court as of right, asking that the judgment of the mayor’s court and of the appellate court be reversed on constitutional grounds. On 11 May 1926, the Supreme Court adjudged that the petition be dismissed for the reason that no debatable constitutional question was involved in the cause. The judgment was then brought to the US Supreme Court upon a writ of error allowed by the Chief Justice of the state Supreme Court, to which it was rightly directed. ISSUE: Whether the pecuniary interest of the Mayor and his village, and the system of courts in prosecuting violations of the Prohibition Act, renders the mayor disqualified from hearing the case.

HELD: All questions of judicial qualification may not involve constitutional validity. Thus, matters of kinship, personal bias, state policy, remoteness of interest would seem generally to be matters merely of legislative discretion. But it certainly violates the 14th Amendment and deprives a defendant in a criminal case of due process of law to subject his liberty or property to the judgment of a court, the judge of which has a direct, personal, substantial pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion against him in his case. Herein, the mayor has authority, which he exercised in the case, to order that the person sentenced to pay a fine shall remain in prison until the fine and costs are paid. The mayor thus has a direct personal pecuniary interest in convicting the defendant who came before him for trial, in the $12 of costs imposed in his behalf, which he would not have received if the defendant had been acquitted. This was not exceptional, but was the result of the normal operation of the law and the ordinance. The system by which an inferior judge is paid for his service only when he convicts the defendant has not become so embedded by custom in the general practice, either at common law or in this country, that it can be regarded as due process of law, unless the costs usually imposed are so small that they may be properly ignored as within the maxim de minimis non curat lex. The Court cannot regard the prospect of receipt or loss of such an emolument in each case as a minute, remote, trifling, or insignificant interest. It is certainly not fair to each defendant brought before the mayor for the careful and judicial consideration of his guilt or innocence that the prospect of such a prospective loss by the mayor should weigh against his acquittal. But the pecuniary interest of the mayor in the result of his judgment is not the only reason for holding that due process of law is denied to the defendant here. The statutes were drawn to stimulate small municipalities, in the country part of counties in which there are large cities, to organize and maintain courts to try persons accused of violations of the Prohibition Act everywhere in the county. The inducement is offered of dividing between the state and the village the large fines provided by the law for its violations. The trial is to be had before a mayor without a jury, without opportunity for retrial, and with a review confined to questions of law presented by a bill of exceptions, with no opportunity by the reviewing court to set aside the judgment on the weighing of evidence, unless it should appear to be so manifestly against the evidence as to indicate mistake, bias, or willful disregard of duty by the trial court. Thus, no matter what the evidence was against him, the defendant had the right to have an impartial judge. He seasonably raised the objection, and was entitled to halt the trial because of the disqualification of the judge, which existed both because of his direct pecuniary interest in the outcome, and because of his official motive to convict and to graduate the fine to help the financial needs of the village. There were thus presented at the outset both features of the disqualification. (27) PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. PEDRO S. ESPINA, CRISTETA REYES, JOHNY SANTOS, ANTONIO ALEGRO, ROGELIO MENGUIN, PETE ALVERIO, ROGEN DOCTORA and JANE GO FACTS: This is a petition for restraining order which seeks to: (a) annul and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals in the case "People of the Philippines vs. Hon. Pedro S. Espina et al.", insofar as it denied the People's prayer to inhibit respondent Judge Pedro S. Espina of the RTC of Tacloban City from hearing Criminal Cases entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Cristeta Reyes, et al." and "People of the Philippines vs. Jane C. Go"; and (b) enjoin respondent judge from conducting further proceedings in the aforesaid criminal cases. In view of his previous decision in Special Civil Action No. 92-11-219, Judge Espina enjoined the preliminary investigation at the Regional State Prosecutor's Office level against herein respondent Jane Go, the principal accused in the killing of her husband Dominador Go. ISSUE: Should the petition be granted. RULING: One of the essential requirements of procedural due process in a judicial proceeding is that there must be an impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it. Thus, every litigant, including the State, is entitled to the cold neutrality of an impartial judge which was explained in Javier vs. Commission of Elections (144 SCRA 194 [1986]), in the following words: This Court has repeatedly and consistently demanded "the cold neutrality of an impartial judge" as the indispensable imperative of due process. To bolster that requirement, we have held that the judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial as an added assurance to the parties that his decision will be just. The litigants are entitled to no less than that. They should be

sure that when their rights are violated, they can go to a judge who shall give them justice. They must trust the judge, otherwise they will not go to him at all. They must believe in his sense of fairness, otherwise they will not seek his judgment. Without such confidence, there would be no point in invoking his action for the justice they expect. Due process is intended to ensure that confidence by requiring compliance with what Justice Frankfurter calls the rudiments of fair play. Fair play calls for equal justice. There cannot be equal justice where a suitor approaches a court already committed to the other party and with a judgment already made and waiting only to be formalized after the litigants shall have undergone the charade of a formal hearing. Judicial (and also extrajudicial) proceedings are not orchestrated plays in which the parties are supposed to make the motions and reach the denoucement according to a prepared script. There is no writer to foreordain the ending. The Judge will reach his conclusions only after all the evidence is in and all the arguments are filed, on the basis of the established facts and the pertinent law. In the case at bar, Judge Pedro Espina, as correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, cannot be considered to adequately possess such cold neutrality of an impartial judge as to fairly assess both the evidence to be adduced by the prosecution and the defense in view of his previous decision in Special Civil Action No. 92-11-219 wherein he enjoined the preliminary investigation at the Regional State Prosecutor's Office level against herein respondent Jane Go, the principal accused in the killing of her husband Dominador Go. Judge Espina's decision in favor of respondent Jane Go serves as sufficient and reasonable basis for the prosecution to seriously doubt his impartiality in handling the criminal cases. Verily, it would have been more prudent for Judge Espina to have voluntarily inhibited himself from hearing the criminal cases. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. No. 31733 is hereby SET ASIDE and The Honorable Pedro Espina, Presiding Judge of Branch 7 of the Regional Trial Court of the 8th Judicial Region stationed in Tacloban is hereby declared disqualified from taking cognizance of Criminal Cases No. 93-01-38 and 93-01-39. It is further ordered that these criminal cases be re-raffled to another branch of the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban City. (28) Luis A. Tabuena, et al. v. Sandiganbayan 268 SCRA 332, February 17, 1997 Procedural. This serves as a restriction on actions of judicial and quasi- judicial agencies of government. REQUISITES: i) An impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it. In Tejano v. Ombudsman, G.R.No. 159190, June 30, 2005, the petitioner attributed partiality to Ombudsman Desierto for having participated in the reinvestigation of the instant case despite his having earlier participated in the initial preliminary investigation of the same when he was Special Prosecutor. The Supreme Court agreed with the petitioner, saying that it is a steadfast rule that the officer who reviews a case on appeal should not be the same person whose decision is under review judges. In Tabuena v. Sandiganbayan, 268 SCRA 332, reiterated in Imelda Romualdez Marcos v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 126995, October 6, 1998, the Supreme Court held that when the Court cross-examined the accused and witnesses, it acted with over-zealousness, assuming the role of both magistrate and advocate, and thus denied the accused due process of law. ii) Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant and over the property which is the subject matter of the proceeding. iii) The defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard. Due process is satisfied as long as the party is accorded the opportunity to be heard. If it is not availed of, it is deemed waived or forfeited without violating the constitutional guarantee [Bautista v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 157219 May 28, 2004]. Neither is the respondent entitled to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. PD 1069 affords an extraditee sufficient opportunity to meet the evidence against him once the petition is filed in court. The time for the extraditee to know the basis of the request for extradition is merely moved to the filing in court of the formal petition for extradition. The extraditee’s right to know is momentarily withheld during the evaluation

stage to accommodate the more compelling interest of the state to prevent escape of potential extraditees which can be precipitated by premature information on the basis of the request for extradition. No less compelling at that stage of the extradition proceedings is the need to be more deferential to the judgment of a co- equal branch of the government, the Executive, which has been endowed by our Constitution with greater powers over matters involving our foreign relations [Secretary of Justice v. Judge Lantion, G.R. No. 139465, October 17, 2000; Cuevas v. Munoz, G.R. No. 140520, December 18, 2000]. iv) Judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing. This is necessary, because otherwise, the right to a hearing would be rendered meaningless. Relate this to Sec. 14, Art. VIII, which provides that no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.

FACTS: Then Pres. Ferdinand Marcos instructed Luis Tabuena, General Manager of the Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA), over the phone to pay directly to the president’s office and in cash what the MIAA owes the Phil. National Construction Corp. The verbal instruction was reiterated in a Presidential memorandum. In obedience to Pres. Marcos’ instruction, Tabuena, with the help of Gerardo Dabao and Adolfo Peralta, the Asst. Gen. Mgr. and the Acting Finance Services Mgr. of MIAA,respectively, caused the release of P55M of MIAA funds of three (3) withdrawals and delivered the money to Mrs. Fe Roa-Gimenez, private secretary of Marcos. Gimenez issued a receipt for all the amounts she received from Tabuena. Later, it turned out that PNCCnever received the money. The case involves two (2) separate petitions for review by Luis Tabuena and Adolfo Peralta. They appeal the Sandiganbayan decision convicting them of malversation of MIAA funds inthe amount of P55M. Further, petitioners claimed that they were charged with intentional malversation, as alleged in the amended information, but it would appear that they were convicted for malversation with negligence. Hence, their conviction of a crime different from that charged violated their constitutional right to be informed of the accusation. ISSUE: Whether the Sandiganbayan acted as an impartial court in the conviction of the accused. RULING: Tabuena acted in strict compliance with the MARCOS Memorandum and in good faith. The order emanated from the Office of the President and bears the signature of the President himself, the highest official of the land. It carries with it the presumption that it was regularly issued. And on its face, the memorandum is patently lawful for no law makes the payment of an obligation illegal. This fact, coupled with the urgent tenor for its execution constrains one to act swiftly without question. However, a more compelling reason for the ACQUITTAL is the violation of the accused's basic constitutional right to due process. Records show that the Sandiganbayan actively took part in the questioning of a defense witness and of the accused themselves. The questions of the court were in the nature of cross examinations characteristic of confrontation, probing and insinuation. Tabuena and Peralta may not have raised the issue as an error, there is nevertheless no impediment for the court to consider such matter as additional basis for a reversal since the settled doctrine is that an appeal throws the whole case open to review, and it becomes the duty of the appellate court to correct such errors as may be found in the judgment appealed from whether they are made the subject of assignments of error or not. The "cold neutrality of an impartial judge" requirement of due process was certainly denied Tabuena and Peralta when the court, with its overzealousness, assumed the dual role of magistrate and advocate. Time and again the Court has declared that due process requires no less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. That the judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial, to give added assurance to the parties that his decision will be just. The parties are entitled to no less than this, as a minimum guaranty of due process. HENCE, Luis Tabuena and Adolfo Peralta are acquitted of the crime of malversation. •

PREJUDICIAL PUBLICITY

Cite two (2) tests in determining whether a court was prejudiced by an over publicity of a crime. 1. Possibility of Prejudice test where the day-to-day or gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by itself prove that the publicity so permeated the mind of the trial judge and impaired his partiality. The

test was rejected in People v. Teehankee, Jr, and in Martelino v. Alejandro, where it was said that our judges are learned in the law and trained to disregard off-court evidence and on-camera performances of parties to a litigation. Their mere exposure to publications and publicity stunts does not per se fatally infect their impartiality. 2. Test of actual prejudice where, to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. The totality of the circumstances in a case must be considered in order to determine the prejudice in the mind of the court through the barrage of publicity. (29) Sheppard v. Maxwell 384 U.S. 333 (1966) FACTS: In 1954, Cleveland-area physician Sam Sheppard was arrested for the murder of his pregnant wife Marilyn. During the entire pretrial period, virulent and incriminating publicity about petitioner and the murder made the case notorious, and the news media frequently aired charges and countercharges besides those for which petitioner was tried. The case came to trial two weeks before the November election. The chief prosecutor was a candidate for municipal judge, and the presiding judge was a candidate for reelection. Judge Edward J. Blythin allowed free rein for the media. This included publication of the addresses of the witnesses, photographs of all 12 jurors, prominent seating in the courtroom for the press, and radio and television broadcasts from the courthouse. Radio and press pundits aired all sorts of gossip as if it were credible evidence. Even as they deliberated, jurors were allowed to phone their friends. Despite his claims of innocence and what some saw as a lack of physical evidence, the jury found Sheppard guilty of second-degree murder, and he was sentenced to life in prison. Sheppard petitioned for habeas corpus on the grounds that he was denied a fair trial due to the prejudice to jurors caused by pretrial publicity. ISSUE: Whether prejudicial publicity interfere with defendant’s Fifth Amendment due process right to a fair trial RULING: The court found that Sheppard had been denied due process and reversed his murder conviction. The decision noted that “the state trial judge did not fulfill his duty to protect Sheppard from the inherently prejudicial publicity which saturated the community and to control disruptive influences in the courtroom.” The [trial] judge should have adopted stricter rules governing the use of the courtroom by newsmen. The decision also noted the balance between the First Amendment’s freedom of the press and the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of a fair trial: “Collaboration between counsel and the press as to information affecting the fairness of a criminal trial is not only subject to regulation, but is highly censurable and worthy of disciplinary measures.” (30) HUBERT J. P. WEBB v. HONORABLE RAUL E. DE LEON G.R. No. 121234 August 23, 1995 MICHAEL A. GATCHALIAN v. HONORABLE RAUL E. DE LEON G.R. No. 121245 August 23, 1995 ANTONIO L. LEJANO v. HONORABLE RAUL E. DE LEON G.R. No. 121297 August 23, 1995 FACTS: June 19, 1994, the NBI filed with the Department of Justice a letter-complaint charging petitioners Hubert Webb, Michael Gatchalian, Antonio J. Lejano and six (6) other persons, with the crime of Rape with Homicide. Forthwith a preliminary investigation was conducted of those charged with the rape and killing on June 30, 1991 of Carmela N. Vizconde; her mother Estrellita NicolasVizconde, and her sister Anne Marie Jennifer in their home. Before submitting his counter-affidavit, petitioner Webb filed with the DOJ Panel a Motion for Production And Examination of Evidence and Documents. The motion was granted by the DOJ Panel and the NBI submitted photocopies of the documents. Petitioner Webb claimed during the preliminary investigation that he did not commit the crime at bar as he went to the United States on March 1, 1991 and returned to the Philippines on October 27, 1992. To further support his defense, he submitted documentary evidences. On August 8, 1995, the DOJ Panel issued a 26-page Resolution "finding probable cause to hold respondents for trial" and recommending that an Information for rape with homicide be filed against petitioners and their co-respondents, On the same date, it filed the corresponding Information against petitioners and their co-accused with the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque. The

case was presided by respondent judge Zosimo V. Escano. It was, however, the respondent judge Raul de Leon, pairing judge of Judge Escano, who issued the warrants of arrest against the petitioners. On August 11, 1995, Judge Escano voluntarily inhibited himself from the case to avoid any suspicion about his impartiality considering his employment with the NBI before his appointment to the bench. The case was re-raffled to Branch 274, presided by Judge Amelita Tolentino who issued new warrants of arrest against the petitioners and their co-accused. On August 11, 1995, petitioner Webb voluntarily surrendered to the police authorities at Camp Ricardo Papa Sr., in Bicutan, Taguig. Petitioners Gatchalian and Lejano likewise gave themselves up to the authorities after filing their petitions before us. Petitioners fault the DOJ Panel for its finding of probable cause. They insist that the May 22, 1995 sworn statement of Jessica Alfaro, the principal witness is inherently weak and uncorroborated. They hammer on alleged material inconsistencies between her April 28, 1995 and May 22, 1995 sworn statements. They assail her credibility for her misdescription of petitioner Webb's hair as semiblonde. They also criticize the procedure followed by the DOJ Panel when it did not examine witnesses to clarify the alleged incredulities and inconsistencies in the sworn statements of the witnesses for the NBI. Petitioners charge that respondent Judge Raul de Leon and, later, respondent Judge Amelita Tolentino issued warrants of arrest against them without conducting the required preliminary examination. Petitioners also complain about the denial of their constitutional right to due process and violation of their right to an impartial investigation. They decry their alleged hasty and malicious prosecution by the NBI and the DOJ Panel. They also assail the prejudicial publicity that attended their preliminary investigation. ISSUES: (1) Whether respondent Judges de Leon and Tolentino gravely abused their discretion when they failed to conduct a preliminary examination before issuing warrants of arrest against them; (2) Whether the DOJ Panel likewise gravely abused its discretion in holding that there is probable cause to charge them with the crime of rape with homicide; (3) Whether the DOJ Panel denied them their constitutional right to due process during their preliminary investigation; and (4) Whether the DOJ Panel unlawfully intruded into judicial prerogative when it failed to charge Jessica Alfaro in the Information as an accused. RULING: We find the petitions bereft of merit. 1. No. DOJ Panel did not gravely abuse its discretion when it found probable cause against the petitioners. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has been committed and was committed by the suspects. Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. As well put in Brinegar v. United States, while probable cause demands more than "bare suspicion," it requires "less than evidence which would justify . . . conviction." A finding of probable cause merely binds over the suspect to stand trial. It is not a pronouncement of guilt. 2. No. In arrest cases there must be probable cause that a crime has been committed and that the person to be arrested committed it, which of course can exist without any showing that evidence of the crime will be found at premises under that person's control." Worthy to note, our Rules of Court do not provide for a similar procedure to be followed in the issuance of warrants of arrest and search warrants. With respect to warrants of arrest, section 6 of Rule 112 simply provides that "upon filing of an information, the Regional Trial Court may issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused." 3. No. The DOJ Panel precisely allowed the parties to adduce more evidence in their behalf and for the panel to study the evidence submitted more fully. 4. No. Petitioner's argument lacks appeal for it lies on the faulty assumption that the decision whom to prosecute is a judicial function, the sole prerogative of courts and beyond executive and legislative interference. In truth, the prosecution of crimes appertains to the executive department of government whose principal power and responsibility is to see that our laws are faithfully executed. A necessary component of this power to execute our laws is the right to prosecute their violators. Panel believes that the inconsistencies in Alfaro's two sworn statements have been sufficiently explained especially specially so where there is no showing that the inconsistencies were deliberately made to distort the truth.

Petitioners raise the effect of prejudicial publicity on their right to due process while undergoing preliminary investigation. We find no procedural impediment to its early invocation considering the substantial risk to their liberty while undergoing a preliminary investigation. In the case at bar, we find nothing in the records that will prove that the tone and content, of the publicity that attended the investigation of petitioners fatally infected the fairness and impartiality of the DOJ Panel. Petitioners cannot just rely on the subliminal effects of publicity on the sense of fairness of the DOJ Panel, for these are basically unbeknown and beyond knowing. (31) PEOPLE v. SANCHEZ G.R. No. 121039, October 18, 2001 FACTS: This is a review on the Pasig City Regional Trial Court’s decision on the “Allan GomezEileen Sarmenta rape-slay” case that drew strong condemnation from an outraged populace in the middle of 1993. After a protracted and grueling 16-month trial, all those charged appellants herein were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide on seven counts and sentenced each one of them to suffer the maximum penalty of reclusion perpetua for each of the seven offenses or a total of seven reclusion perpetua for each accused. In addition, the Court ordered all the accused to jointly and severally pay the victims’ respective families by way of civil indemnities. ISSUE: Whether the publicity given to this case impaired their right to a fair trial of the appellants? HELD: No. The Supreme Court cannot sustain their claim that they were denied the right to impartial trial due to prejudicial publicity. It is true that the print and broadcast media gave the case at bar pervasive publicity, just like all high profile and high-stake criminal trials, but the right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press. Responsible reporting enhances an accused’s right to a fair trial. The press does not simply publish information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism. Our judges are learned in the law and trained to disregard off-court evidence and on camera performances of parties to a litigation. Their mere exposure to publications and publicity stunts does not per se fatally infect their impartiality. To warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced by the barrage of publicity. Records herein do not show that the trial judge developed actual bias against Mayor Sanchez, et. al., because of the extensive media coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his case. •

NOTICE AND HEARING

What are the minimum requirements of due process? The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing which, generally speaking, may not be dispensed with because they are intended as a safeguard against official arbitrariness. Are Notice and Hearing imperative meaning indispensable? Yes. Absolute? No. What are the exceptions? 1. The conclusive presumption, for example, bars the admission of contrary evidence as long as such presumption is based on human experience or there is a rational connection between the fact proved and the fact ultimately presumed therefrom. 2. In the summary abatement of a nuisance per se, like a mad dog on the loose, which may be killed on sight because of the immediate danger it poses to the safety and lives of the people. Pornographic materials, contaminated meat and narcotic drugs are inherently pernicious and may be summarily destroyed. 3. The passport of a person sought for a criminal offense may be cancelled without hearing, to compel his return to the country he has fled. 4. Filthy restaurants may be summarily padlocked in the interest of the public health and bawdy houses to protect the public morals. Reason for non-requirement of notice and Hearing? Because of the nature of the property involved or the urgency of the need to protect the general welfare from a clear and present danger. MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS OF DUE PROCESS.

The closed mind has no place in the open society. It is part of the sporting idea of fair play to hear "the other side" before an opinion is formed or a decision is made by those who sit in judgment. Obviously, one side is only one-half of the question; the other half must also be considered if an impartial verdict is to be reached based on an informed appreciation of the issues in contention. It is indispensable that the two sides complement each other, as unto the bow the arrow, in leading to the correct ruling after examination of the problem not from one or the other perspective only but in its totality. A judgment based on less that this full appraisal, on the pretext that a hearing is unnecessary or useless, is tainted with the vice of bias or intolerance or ignorance, or worst of all, in repressive regimes, the insolence of power. The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing which, generally speaking, may not be dispensed with because they are intended as a safeguard against official arbitrariness. It is a gratifying commentary on our judicial system that the jurisprudence of this country is rich with applications of this guaranty as proof of our fealty to the rule of law and the ancient rudiments of fair play. We have consistently declared that every person, faced by the awesome power of the State, is entitled to "the law of the land," which Daniel Webster described almost two hundred years ago in the famous Dartmouth College Case, as "the law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial." It has to be so if the rights of every person are to be secured beyond the reach of officials who, out of mistaken zeal or plain arrogance, would degrade the due process clause into a worn and empty catchword. This is not to say that notice and hearing are imperative in every case for, to be sure, there are a number of admitted exceptions. The conclusive presumption, for example, bars the admission of contrary evidence as long as such presumption is based on human experience or there is a rational connection between the fact proved and the fact ultimately presumed therefrom. There are instances when the need for expeditious action will justify omission of these requisites, as in the summary abatement of a nuisance per se, like a mad dog on the loose, which may be killed on sight because of the immediate danger it poses to the safety and lives of the people. Pornographic materials, contaminated meat and narcotic drugs are inherently pernicious and may be summarily destroyed. The passport of a person sought for a criminal offense may be cancelled without hearing, to compel his return to the country he has fled. Filthy restaurants may be summarily padlocked in the interest of the public health and bawdy houses to protect the public morals. In such instances, previous judicial hearing may be omitted without violation of due process in view of the nature of the property involved or the urgency of the need to protect the general welfare from a clear and present danger. Q. Does the Comelec have jurisdiction over intra-party disputes? A. The COMELEC correctly stated that "the ascertainment of the identity of [a] political party and its legitimate officers" is a matter that is well within its authority. The source of this authority is no other than the fundamental law itself, which vests upon the COMELEC the power and function to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election. In the exercise of such power and in the discharge of such function, the Commission is endowed with ample "wherewithal" and "considerable latitude in adopting means and methods that will ensure the accomplishment of the great objectives for which it was created to promote free, orderly and honest elections." To resolve this simple issue, the COMELEC need only to turn to the Party Constitution. It need not go so far as to resolve the root of the conflict between the party officials. It need only resolve such questions as may be necessaxy in the exercise of its enforcement powers. LDP v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 161265, February 24,2004; Atienza, et al. v. Comelec, G.R. No. 188920, February 16,2010. (32) ATIENZA v. COMELEC GR No. 188920 FACTS: Drilon, the former president of the Liberal Party (LP) announced his party withdrew support for the administration of former Pres. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. However, Atienza, LP Chairman, alleged that Drilon made the announcement without consulting first the party. Atienza hosted a party conference which resulted to the election of new officers, with Atienza as LP President. Drilon immediately filed a petition with the COMELEC to nullify the said election claiming that it was illegal considering that the party’s electing bodies, NECO and NAPOLCO, were not properly convened. The COMELEC held that the election of Atienza and others was invalid since the electing assembly did not convene in accordance with the LP Constitution. Subsequently, the LP held a NECO meeting to elect new party leaders before Drilon’s term expired which resulted to the election of Roxas as the new LP President. As for the validity of Atienza, et al.’s expulsion as LP

members, they argue that it is a violation of their constitutionality-protected right to due process of law. They claim that the NAPOLCO and the NECO should have first summoned them to a hearing before expelling them from the party. The COMELEC observed that this was a membership issue that related to disciplinary action within the political party. The COMELEC treated it as an internal party matter that was beyond its jurisdiction to resolve. ISSUE: Whether Roxas, et al violated Atienza, et al.’s constitutional right to due process by the latter’s expulsion from the party. RULING: No, political parties is a private organization not a state instrument. The discipline of members by a political party does no involve the right to life, liberty or property within the meaning of due process clause. An individual has no vested right, as against the state, to be accepted or to prevent his removal by a political party. The only rights, if any, that the party members may have correspond to those that may have been freely agreed upon among themselves through their charter. Members whose rights under their charter may have been violated have recourse to courts for the enforcement of those rights, but not as a due process issue against the government or any of its agencies. (33) SUSIE CHAN-TAN v. JESSE C. TAN G.R. No. 167139 FACTS: Petitioner and respondent were married and were blessed with two children but later on, the former filed for the annulment of their marriage. They presented to the court a compromise agreement between them containing provisions regarding custody, support, visitation rights etc. which was later on granted by the court including the grant of the annulment of the marriage. But the petitioner violated some of the provisions of the said agreement which made the respondent to file a omnibus motion seeking in the main custody of the children as well as the turnover of titles and documents in possession of the petitioner to the respondent. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration alleging denial of due process on account of accident, mistake, or excusable negligence. She alleged she was not able to present evidence because of the negligence of her counsel. Such motion, which was filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period, was denied by the court. Again, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss and a motion for reconsideration of the prior resolution. She claimed she was no longer interested in the suit. She prayed that an order be issued vacating all prior orders and leaving the parties at the status quo ante the filing of the suit. The trial court denied both the motions filed by petitioner. It held that the prior decision had become final and executory upon the lapse of the 15-day reglementary period without any timely appeal having been filed by either party. DEFENSE OF THE PETITIONER: She contends that she was denied due process when her counsel failed to file pleadings and appear at the hearings for respondents’ omnibus motion ISSUE: Whether the decision of the court which was made final and executory due to absence of an appeal within the 15-day can be vacated RULING: In the present case, the previous resolutions of the trial court had become final and executory upon the lapse of the 15-day period to appeal. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was clearly filed out of time. Applying the doctrine laid down in Tuason, the alleged negligence of counsel resulting in petitioner’s loss of the right to appeal is not a ground for vacating the trial courts judgments. Further, petitioner cannot claim that she was denied due process. While she may have lost her right to present evidence due to the supposed negligence of her counsel, she cannot say she was denied her day in court as the records show that her counsel tried to call her, regarding the motion filed by the respondent, but failed. Clearly, despite her counsels’ efforts to reach her, petitioner showed utter disinterest in the hearings on respondent’s motion seeking, among others, custody of the children. The trial judge was left with no other recourse but to proceed with the hearings and rule on the motion based on the evidence presented by respondent. Petitioner cannot now come to the Court crying denial of due process. (34) SUMMARY DISMISSAL BOARD VS TORCITA 330 SCRA 153 (2000)

Police officer Torcita was charged on twelve counts of conduct of unbecoming an officer. The twelve counts were dismissed but he was convicted of Simple Irregularity in the Performance of Duty of having alcohol in his breath. Proper? No. While the definition of the more serious offense is broad, and almost all-encompassing, a finding of guilt for an offense, no matter how light, for which one is not properly charged and tried cannot be countenanced without violating the rudimentary requirements of due process. Summary Dismissal Board v. Torcita FACTS: On 26 April 1994, a red Cortina Ford, driven by C/Insp. Lazaro Torcita, with his aide, PO2 Java, in the front seat and his wife with two ladies at the backseat, were overtaken by a Mazda pickup owned by Congressman Manuel Puey and driven by one Reynaldo Consejo with four (4) passengers in the persons of Alex Edwin del Rosario, Rosita Bistal, Carmen Braganza and Cristina Dawa. After the Mazda pick-up has overtaken the red Cortina Ford, and after a vehicular collision almost took place, it accelerated speed and proceeded to Hacienda Aimee, a sugarcane plantation owned by the congressman. The red Cortina Ford followed also at high speed until it reached the hacienda where Torcita and Java alighted and the confrontation with del Rosario and Jesus Puey occurred. Torcita identified himself but the same had no effect. PO2 Java whispered to him that there are armed men around them and that it is dangerous for them to continue. That at this point, they radioed for back-up. Torcita, upon the arrival of the back-up force of PNP Cadiz City, proceeded to the place where Capt. Jesus Puey and Alex Edwin del Rosario were. On 6 July 1994, 12 verified administrative complaints were filed against Torcita for Conduct Unbecoming of a Police Officer, Illegal Search, Grave Abuse of Authority and Violation of Domicile, and Abuse of Authority and Violation of COMELEC Gun Ban. The 12 administrative complaints were consolidated into 1 major complaint for conduct unbecoming of a police officer. The Summary Dismissal Board, however, did not find sufficient evidence to establish that Torcita threatened anybody with a gun, nor that a serious confrontation took place between the parties, nor that the urinating incident took place, and held that the charges of violation of domicile and illegal search were not proven. Still, while the Board found that Torcita was "in the performance of his official duties" when the incident happened, he allegedly committed a simple irregularity in performance of duty (for being in the influence of alcohol while in performance of duty) and was suspended for 20 days and salary suspended for the same period of time. Torcita appealed his conviction to the Regional Appellate Board of the Philippine National Police (PNP, Region VI, Iloilo City), but the appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Whereupon, Torcita filed a petition for certiorari in the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City (Branch 31), questioning the legality of the conviction of an offense for which he was not charged (lack of procedural due process of law). The Board filed a motion to dismiss, which was denied. The RTC granted the petition for certiorari and annulled the dispositive portion of the questioned decision insofar as it found Torcita guilty of simple irregularity in the performance of duty. The Board appealed from the RTC decision, by petition of review to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the same for the reason that the respondent could not have been guilty of irregularity considering that the 12 cases were eventually dismissed. The Board filed the petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court. ISSUE: May Torcita be proceeded against or suspended for breach of internal discipline, when the original charges against him were for Conduct Unbecoming of a Police Officer, Illegal Search, Grave Abuse of Authority and Violation of Domicile, and Abuse of Authority and Violation of COMELEC Gun Ban? RULING: NO. Notification of the charges contemplates that respondent be informed of the specific charges against him. Torcita was entitled to know that he was being charged with being drunk while in the performance of duty, so that he could traverse the accusation squarely and adduce evidence in his defense. Although he was given an opportunity to be heard on the multiple and broad charges initially filed against him, the absence of specification of the offense for which he was eventually found guilty is not a proper observance of due process. There can be no short-cut to the legal process (Alonte vs. Savellano Jr., 287 SCRA 245). It is a requirement of due process that the parties be informed of how the litigation was decided with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the Court (ABD Overseas Manpower Corp. vs. NLRC, 286 SCRA 454). Memorandum Circular No. 92-006 specifically prescribes that the decision shall contain "a brief statement of the material facts and the findings of the summary dismissal authority as well as the disposition thereof" (Sec. 6). The records do not bear out the specific acts or conduct constituting the charge/offense in the twelve cases which were consolidated at the pre-hearing conference into a single case of "Conduct Unbecoming of a Police

Officer." Notably, there is no indication or warning at all in the summary dismissal proceedings that C/Insp. Torcita was also being charged with breach of internal discipline consisting of taking alcoholic drinks while in the performance of his duties. The cursory conclusion of the Dismissal Board that Torcita "committed breach of internal discipline by taking drinks while in the performance of same" should have been substantiated by factual findings referring to this particular offense. The Court of Appeals correctly pointed out that even if he was prosecuted for irregular performance of duty, he could not have been found to have the odor or smell of alcohol while in the performance of duty because he was not on duty at the time that he had a taste of liquor; he was on a private trip fetching his wife. (35) SECRETARY OF JUSTICE v. HON. RALPH C. LANTION, and MARK B. JIMENEZ G.R. No. 139465. January 18, 2000 Procedural. This serves as a restriction on actions of judicial and quasi- judicial agencies of government. REQUISITES: i) An impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it. In Tejano v. Ombudsman, G.R.No. 159190, June 30, 2005, the petitioner attributed partiality to Ombudsman Desierto for having participated in the reinvestigation of the instant case despite his having earlier participated in the initial preliminary investigation of the same when he was Special Prosecutor. The Supreme Court agreed with the petitioner, saying that it is a steadfast rule that the officer who reviews a case on appeal should not be the same person whose decision is under review judges. In Tabuena v. Sandiganbayan, 268 SCRA 332, reiterated in Imelda Romualdez Marcos v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 126995, October 6, 1998, the Supreme Court held that when the Court cross-examined the accused and witnesses, it acted with over-zealousness, assuming the role of both magistrate and advocate, and thus denied the accused due process of law. ii) Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant and over the property which is the subject matter of the proceeding. iii) The defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard. Due process is satisfied as long as the party is accorded the opportunity to be heard. If it is not availed of, it is deemed waived or forfeited without violating the constitutional guarantee [Bautista v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 157219 May 28, 2004]. Neither is the respondent entitled to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. PD 1069 affords an extraditee sufficient opportunity to meet the evidence against him once the petition is filed in court. The time for the extraditee to know the basis of the request for extradition is merely moved to the filing in court of the formal petition for extradition. The extraditee’s right to know is momentarily withheld during the evaluation stage to accommodate the more compelling interest of the state to prevent escape of potential extraditees which can be precipitated by premature information on the basis of the request for extradition. No less compelling at that stage of the extradition proceedings is the need to be more deferential to the judgment of a co- equal branch of the government, the Executive, which has been endowed by our Constitution with greater powers over matters involving our foreign relations [Secretary of Justice v. Judge Lantion, G.R. No. 139465, October 17, 2000; Cuevas v. Munoz, G.R. No. 140520, December 18, 2000]. iv) Judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing. This is necessary, because otherwise, the right to a hearing would be rendered meaningless. Relate this to Sec. 14, Art. VIII, which provides that no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. Availability of due process in extradition proceedings Neither the treaty nor the extradition law precludes these rights from a prospective extradite. An application of the basic twin due process rights of notice and hearing will not go against the treaty or the implementing law. (Sec. of Justice v. Lantion)

FACTS: On January 13, 1977 President Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1069 "Prescribing the Procedure for the Extradition of Persons Who Have Committed Crimes in a Foreign Country". The Decree is founded on: the doctrine of incorporation. On November 13, 1994, Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon signed RP-US Extradition Treaty. On June 18, 1999, U.S. sent a request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jimenez to the United States. Attached to the extradition request is the warrant of arrest issued by the U.S. District Court, Southern District of Florida, and other supporting documents for said extradition. Based on the papers submitted, private respondent appears to be charged in the United States with violation of the following provisions of the United States Code (USC): Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United States Attempt to evade or defeat tax Fraud by wire, radio, or television False statement or entries Election contributions in name of another Private respondent wrote a letter dated July 1, 1999 requesting petitioner to furnish him copies of the official extradition request from the U. S. Government and that he be given ample time to comment on the request after he shall have received copies of the requested papers. Private respondent also requested that the proceedings on the matter be held in abeyance in the meantime. Petitioner denied requests because it is still premature to give respondent copies of the extradition papers. Petitioner is merely determining whether the procedures and requirements under Presidential Decree No. 1069 and RP-US treaty have been complied with by the Requesting Government. The constitutionally guaranteed rights of the accused in all criminal prosecutions are therefore not available. The preliminary investigation that petitioner is doing is not akin to preliminary investigation of criminal cases. When can he request? It is only after the filing of the petition for extradition when the person sought to be extradited will be furnished by the court with copies of the petition, request and extradition documents and this Department will not pose any objection to a request for ample time to evaluate said documents. Private respondent filed with the RTC a petition against the Secretary of Justice for mandamus (to compel petitioner to furnish private respondent the extradition documents, to give him access thereto, and to afford him an opportunity to comment on, or oppose, the extradition request, and thereafter to evaluate the request impartially, fairly and objectively); certiorari and prohibition. ISSUE: Is private respondent entitled to the two basic due process rights of notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings. HELD: Yes, we must apply the rules of fair play. An application of the basic twin due process rights of notice and hearing will not go against the RP-US Treaty or the Extradition law. Neither the Treaty nor the Extradition Law precludes these rights from a prospective extraditee. Similarly, American jurisprudence and procedures on extradition pose no proscription. In fact, in interstate extradition proceedings as explained above, the prospective extraditee may even request for copies of the extradition documents from the governor of the asylum state, and if he does, his right to be supplied the same becomes a demandable right (35 C.J.S. 410). The basic principles of administrative law instruct us that "the essence of due process in administrative proceedings is an opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the actions or ruling complained of (Mirano vs. NLRC, 270 SCRA 530) In the case at bar, private respondent does not only face a clear and present danger of loss of property or employment, but of liberty itself, which may eventually lead to his forcible banishment to a foreign land. The convergence of petitioner’s favorable action on the extradition request and the deprivation of private respondent’s liberty is easily comprehensible. We have ruled time and again that this Courts equity jurisdiction, which is aptly described as "justice outside legality," may be availed of only in the absence of, and never against, statutory law or judicial pronouncements (Smith Bell & Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 267 SCRA 530 [1997]; DavidChan vs. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 677 [1997]). The constitutional issue in the case at bar does not even call for "justice outside legality," since private respondent’s due process rights, although not guaranteed by statute or by treaty, are protected by constitutional guarantees. We would not be true to the organic law of the land if we choose strict construction over guarantees against the deprivation of liberty. That would not be in keeping with the principles of democracy on which our Constitution is premised. The basic rights of notice and hearing pervade not only in criminal and civil proceedings, but in administrative proceedings as well. Non-observance of these rights will invalidate the proceedings.

Individuals are entitled to be notified of any pending case affecting their interests, and upon notice, they may claim the right to appear therein and present their side and to refute the position of the opposing parties (Cruz, Phil. Administrative Law, 1996 These twin rights may, however, be considered dispensable in certain instances, such as: 1. In proceedings where there is an urgent need for immediate action, like the summary abatement of a nuisance per se (Article 704, Civil Code), the preventive suspension of a public servant facing administrative charges (Section 63, Local Government Code, B. P. Blg. 337), the padlocking of filthy restaurants or theaters showing obscene movies or like establishments which are immediate threats to public health and decency, and the cancellation of a passport of a person sought for criminal prosecution; 2. Where there is tentativeness of administrative action, that is, where the respondent is not precluded from enjoying the right to notice and hearing at a later time without prejudice to the person affected, such as the summary distraint and levy of the property of a delinquent taxpayer, and the replacement of a temporary appointee; and 3. Where the twin rights have previously been offered but the right to exercise them had not been claimed. Applying the above principles to the case at bar, the query may be asked: Does the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings fall under any of the described situations mentioned above? (36) People vs. Estrada G.R. No. 130487, June 19, 2000 FACTS: In November 1994, Roberto Estrada entered St John’s Cathedral in Dagupan City. He sat on the Bishop’s chair while the Bishop was leading a confirmation service. The assistant requested Estrada to vacate the chair but the he declined. Someone called the security guard Rogelio Mararac to assist. Upon approaching and tapping Estrada to vacate the chair, he was then stabbed to death by the same. Counsel for accused-appellant filed a “Motion to Confine Accused for Physical, Mental and Psychiatric Examination.” Appellant’s counsel informed the court that accused-appellant had been exhibiting abnormal behavior for the past weeks. This was denied and during hearing did not take the witness stand. His counsel presented instead testimony of Dr. Maria Soledad Gawidan, a resident physician in the Department of Psychiatry at the Baguio General Hospital. She confirmed that appellant had been confined at the BGH and that he suffered from “Schizophrenic Psychosis, Paranoid Type—schizophrenia, paranoid, chronic, paranoid type. Regional Trial Court found Estrada guilty of the crime murder. ISSUE: Whether the hearing/ proceeding is null on the ground of violating the requirements of due process? RULING: SC vacated the RTC decision and remanded the mental examination of accused. The fact that accused-appellant was able to answer the questions asked by the trial court is not conclusive evidence that he was competent enough to stand trial and assist in his defense. The trial court took it solely upon itself to determine the sanity of accused-appellant. The trial judge is not a psychiatrist or psychologist or some other expert equipped with the specialized knowledge of determining the state of a person’s mental health. To determine the accused-appellant’s competency to stand trial, the court, in the instant case, should have at least ordered the examination of accused-appellant, especially in the light of the latter’s history of mental illness. By depriving appellant of mental examination, the trial court effectively deprived appellant of a fair trial and the proceedings before the court are therefore nullified. He who invokes insanity as an exempting circumstance must prove it by clear and positive evidence. The absence of direct proof however, does not entirely discount the probability that accused was not of sound mind at that time. In passing the question of the propriety of suspending the proceedings, the test is found in the question whether the accused would have a fair trial with the assistance which the law secures or gives. There are 2 distinct matters to be determined under this test (1) whether the defendant is sufficiently coherent to provide his counsel with information necessary or relevant to constructing a defense and (2) whether he is able to comprehend the significance of the trial and his relation to it. The determination of whether a sanity investigation or hearing should be ordered rests generally in the discretion of the trial court. In the case, the trial court took it solely upon itself to determine the sanity of the accused. The trial judge however is not a psychiatrist or psychologist or some other expert equipped with the specialized knowledge of determining the state of a person’s mental health. The court should have ordered the examination of the accused, especially in the light of the latter’s history of mental health.

(37) Lim vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 11397, 2002 Procedural. This serves as a restriction on actions of judicial and quasi- judicial agencies of government. REQUISITES: i) An impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it. In Tejano v. Ombudsman, G.R.No. 159190, June 30, 2005, the petitioner attributed partiality to Ombudsman Desierto for having participated in the reinvestigation of the instant case despite his having earlier participated in the initial preliminary investigation of the same when he was Special Prosecutor. The Supreme Court agreed with the petitioner, saying that it is a steadfast rule that the officer who reviews a case on appeal should not be the same person whose decision is under review judges. In Tabuena v. Sandiganbayan, 268 SCRA 332, reiterated in Imelda Romualdez Marcos v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 126995, October 6, 1998, the Supreme Court held that when the Court cross-examined the accused and witnesses, it acted with over-zealousness, assuming the role of both magistrate and advocate, and thus denied the accused due process of law. ii) Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant and over the property which is the subject matter of the proceeding. iii) The defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard. Due process is satisfied as long as the party is accorded the opportunity to be heard. If it is not availed of, it is deemed waived or forfeited without violating the constitutional guarantee [Bautista v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 157219 May 28, 2004]. Neither is the respondent entitled to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. PD 1069 affords an extraditee sufficient opportunity to meet the evidence against him once the petition is filed in court. The time for the extraditee to know the basis of the request for extradition is merely moved to the filing in court of the formal petition for extradition. The extraditee’s right to know is momentarily withheld during the evaluation stage to accommodate the more compelling interest of the state to prevent escape of potential extraditees which can be precipitated by premature information on the basis of the request for extradition. No less compelling at that stage of the extradition proceedings is the need to be more deferential to the judgment of a co- equal branch of the government, the Executive, which has been endowed by our Constitution with greater powers over matters involving our foreign relations [Secretary of Justice v. Judge Lantion, G.R. No. 139465, October 17, 2000; Cuevas v. Munoz, G.R. No. 140520, December 18, 2000]. In Lim v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 111397, August 12, 2002, Supreme Court said that the closure of Bistro violated the due process clause. Instead of arbitrarily closing down the establishment’s business operations, Mayor Lim should have given Bistro an opportunity to rebut the allegations that it violated the conditions of its license. iv) Judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing. This is necessary, because otherwise, the right to a hearing would be rendered meaningless. Relate this to Sec. 14, Art. VIII, which provides that no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. FACTS: Bistro filed before the trial court a petition for mandamus and prohibition, with prayer for temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction, against Mayor Alfredo Lim. Policemen under Lim’s instructions inspected and investigated Bistro’s license as well as the work permits and health certificates of its staff. This caused the stoppage of work in Bistro’s night club and restaurant operations. Lim also refused to accept Bistro’s application for a business license, as well as the work permit applications of Bistro’s staff. At the hearing, the parties submitted their evidence in support of their respective positions. The trial court granted Bistros application for a writ of prohibitory preliminary injunction. However Lim issued closure of Bistro operations, even sending policemen to carry out his closure order and filed motion to dissolve the injunction order. The trial court and the Court of Appeals denied Lims motion to dissolve the injunction and to dismiss the case. However, on July 1, 1993, Manila City Ordinance No. 7783 took effect. On the same day, Lim ordered the Western Police District Command to permanently close down the operations of Bistro, which order the police implemented at once.

ISSUE: Whether the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the prohibitory preliminary injunction [NO] and whether Mayor Lim violated the due process clause of the constitution on the acts he ordered {YES] RULING: SC uphold the findings of the Court of Appeals. In denying Lims petition, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion since it issued the writ after hearing on the basis of the evidence adduced. The Court of Appeals reasoned thus: A writ of preliminary injunction may issue if the act sought to be enjoined will cause irreparable injury to the movant or destroy the status quo before a full hearing can be had on the merits of the case. A writ of preliminary injunction, as an ancillary or preventive remedy, may only be resorted to by a litigant to protect or preserve his rights or interests and for no other purpose during the pendency of the principal action. It is primarily intended to maintain the status quo between the parties existing prior to the filing of the case. From the language of the two laws, it is clear that the power of the mayor to issue business licenses and permits necessarily includes the corollary power to suspend, revoke or even refuse to issue the same. However, the power to suspend or revoke these licenses and permits is expressly premised on the violation of the conditions of these permits and licenses. The laws specifically refer to the violation of the condition(s) on which the licenses and permits were issued. Similarly, the power to refuse to issue such licenses and permits is premised on non-compliance with the prerequisites for the issuance of such licenses and permits. The mayor must observe due process in exercising these powers, which means that the mayor must give the applicant or licensee notice and opportunity to be heard. True, the mayor has the power to inspect and investigate private commercial establishments for any violation of the conditions of their licenses and permits. However, the mayor has no power to order a police raid on these establishments in the guise of inspecting or investigating these commercial establishments. Lim has no authority to close down Bistros business or any business establishment in Manila without due process of law. Lim cannot take refuge under the Revised Charter of the City of Manila and the Local Government Code. There is no provision in these laws expressly or impliedly granting the mayor authority to close down private commercial establishments without notice and hearing, and even if there is, such provision would be void. The due process clause of the Constitution requires that Lim should have given Bistro an opportunity to rebut the allegations that it violated the conditions of its licenses and permits. The regulatory powers granted to municipal corporations must always be exercised in accordance with law, with utmost observance of the rights of the people to due process and equal protection of the law. Such power cannot be exercised whimsically, arbitrarily or despotically. In the instant case, we find that Lim’s exercise of this power violated Bistros property rights that are protected under the due process clause of the Constitution. •

OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD

PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION AND DUE PROCESS. It is doctrinally settled that the right to preliminary investigation is not a constitutional right, but is merely a right conferred by statute [Serapio v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148468, January 28, 2003]. The absence of a preliminary investigation does not impair the validity of the information or otherwise render the same defective. The denial of the motion for reinvestigation cannot likewise invalidate the information or oust the court of its jurisdiction over the case [Budiongan v. De la Cruz, G.R. No. 170288, September 22, 2006]. The right may be waived expressly or by failure to invoke it [Benedicto v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125359, September 4, 2001]. It may be forfeited by inaction, and cannot be invoked for the first time on appeal [People v. Lagao, G.R. No. 118457, April 8, 1997]. (38) Budiongan v. De la Cruz G.R. No. 170288, September 22, 2006 FACTS: Petitioners were charged with violation of Section 3 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 for allegedly misappropriating P450,000.00 funds, originally for the purchase of a road roller for the municipality, which was then realigned for the asphalt laying of a portion of the Tan Modesto Bernaldez Street. Thereafter, upon the commencement with the project, it was discovered that there was yet no ordinance approving the realignment of the funds.

A complaint against the petitioners was filed before the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for alleging illegality in the conduct of the bidding, award and notice to commence work since there was no fund appropriated for the purpose. The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas found probable cause and recommended the filing of an information for violation of Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code against the petitioners. Upon review, the Case Assessment, Review and Reinvestigation Bureau of the Office of the Special Prosecutor, the charge was modified from violation of Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code to (1) violation of Section 3 of R.A. No. 3019 against petitioners. Thereafter, petitioners filed a Motion to Quash the information charging them with violation of Sec. 3 of R.A. No. 3019. The Sandiganbayan granted the motion to quash and remanded the case to the Office of the Ombudsman for amendment of the Information. Finding that the Amended Information contains all the material averments necessary to make out a case for the first mode of violating Section 3 of R.A. No. 3019, the Sandiganbayan admitted the Amended Information in its Resolution. Petitioners filed with the Sandiganbayan a Motion for Leave of Court to File Motion for Reinvestigation arguing that the above Informations were filed without affording them the opportunity to file counter-affidavits to answer/rebut the modified charges. The Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying the motion but granted leave to the petitioners to file with the Office of the Special Prosecutor a motion for reconsideration (not a motion for reinvestigation) which was denied for lack of merit. Hence, petitioners filed a petition. They maintain that the modification of the charge from violation of Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code to violation of Sections 3(e) and 3(h) of R.A. No. 3019 denied their rights to due process since they were not given the opportunity to answer and present evidence on the new charge in a preliminary investigation. Furthermore, the petitioners argue that public respondents committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the challenged resolutions finding probable cause for violation of R.A. No. 3019. ISSUE: Whether the petitioners were denied their rights to due process? RULING: No, the petitioners were not deprived of due process. The right to a preliminary investigation is not a constitutional right, but is merely a right conferred by statute. The absence of a preliminary investigation does not impair the validity of the Information or otherwise render the same defective. It does not affect the jurisdiction of the court over the case or constitute a ground for quashing the Information. If absence of a preliminary investigation does not render the Information invalid nor affect the jurisdiction of the court over the case, then the denial of a motion for reinvestigation cannot likewise invalidate the Information or oust the court of its jurisdiction over the case. Petitioners were not deprived of due process because they were afforded the opportunity to refute the charges by filing their counter-affidavits. The modification of the offense charged did not come as a surprise to the petitioners because it was based on the same set of facts and the same alleged illegal acts. Moreover, petitioners failed to aver newly discovered evidence nor impute commission of grave errors or serious irregularities prejudicial to their interest to warrant a reconsideration or reinvestigation of the case as required under Section 8, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman. Thus, the modification of the offense charged, even without affording the petitioners a new preliminary investigation, did not amount to a violation of their rights. Furthermore, the right to preliminary investigation is deemed waived when the accused fails to invoke it before or at the time of entering a plea at arraignment. Petitioner Budiongan was arraigned in Criminal Case No. 28076 on March 28, 2005. He was also arraigned together with the rest of the petitioners under the Amended Information in Criminal Case No. 28075 on December 2, 2005. The purpose of a preliminary investigation is merely to determine whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the person accused of the crime is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has been committed and was committed by the suspect. Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt." (39) Alejandro C. Almendras, Jr. v. Alexis C. Almendras G.R No. 179491

FACTS: Petitioner sent letters with similar contents on February 7, 1996 to House Speaker Jose de Venecia, Jr., and on February 26, 1996 to Dr. Nemesio Prudente, President of Oil Carriers, Inc. The letter contains malicious words against respondent. These letters were allegedly printed, distributed, circulated and published by petitioner, assisted by Atty. Roberto Layug, in Digos, Davao del Sur and Quezon City, with evident bad faith and manifest malice to destroy respondent Alexis C. Almendras’ good name. Hence, the latter filed an action for damages arising from libel and defamation against petitioner. (Ruling of the RTC): Petitioner failed to present any evidence, except his answer, despite several rescheduling of hearings at his instance. RTC ruled that respondent was libeled and defamed. Petitioner moved for reconsideration and/or new trial, but the same was denied by the trial court. (Ruling of the CA): Petitioner was not denied due process. It noted that petitioner was given full opportunity to present his evidence, but he vehemently disregarded the proceedings by merely absenting himself from trials without valid excuses. He was, as maintained by the respondent, sending open libelous and unsealed letters, duly published and circulated in Digos. Consequently, the CA upheld the damages awarded by the trial court. ISSUE: Whether petitioner was deprived due process HELD: Petitioner was NOT deprived of his right to due process. On the denial of his motion for reconsideration and/or new trial, he maintains that his own counsel Atty. Leonardo D. Suario categorically admitted that he did not know of petitioner’s ailment and thus did not make the proper manifestations in Court. His failure to attend the hearing was not of his own volition, but because of his doctor’s strict advice since he earlier underwent a quadruple coronary artery bypass at the St. Luke’s Medical Center-Heart Institute in Quezon City on July 16, 2001, just a day before the Motion for Reconsideration and/or New Trial was filed. While his counsel represents him, the latter’s mistakes should not deprive him of his day in court to present his side. The SC found no reason to depart from the general rule that a client is bound by the mistakes of his counsel. Petitioner was given several opportunities to present his evidence or to clarify his medical constraints in court, but he did not do so, despite knowing full well that he had a pending case in court. For petitioner to feign and repeatedly insist upon a lack of awareness of the progress of an important litigation is to unmask a penchant for the ludicrous. Although he rightfully expected counsel to amply protect his interest, he cannot just sit back, relax and await the outcome of the case. In keeping with the normal course of events, he should have taken the initiative “of making the proper inquiries from his counsel and the trial court as to the status of his case.” For his failure to do so, he has only himself to blame. The Court cannot allow petitioner the exception to the general rule just because his counsel admitted having no knowledge of his medical condition. To do so will set a dangerous precedent of never-ending suits, so long as lawyers could allege their own fault or negligence to support the client’s case and obtain remedies and reliefs already lost by the operation of law. (40) EDELBERT C. UYBOCO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES FACTS: The petitioner was the President of Gaikoku a private individual and his co-accused Rodolfo G. Valencia as a public offer authorized by the Sanggunian Panlalawigan to purchase dumptrucks from Gaikoku Company were found guilty for violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act before the Sandiganbayan for conspiring with the overpricing in the purchase of dump trucks from Japan and not considering due process in accordance with Section 369 of the Local Government Code on negotiated purchase, which required that there must have been at least two failed public biddings before a contract for a negotiated purchase may be entered into. The defense failed to present any substantial evidence of the two failed biddings. In fact, it was proved by presented evidence that the alleged failed biddings were merely simulated. Uyboco though a private individual bear to reiterate the settled rule that private persons, when acting in conspiracy with public officers, may be indicted and, if found guilty, held liable for the pertinent offenses under Section 3 of R.A. 3019 Uyboco aggrieved, filed before the SC a petition for certiorari alleging that his constitutional rights to procedural and substantive due process and of law and to competent counsel were violated. He further contends that: 1. his former counsel failed to cross examine the main prosecution witness because counsel was absent on the trial date.

2. Counsel failed to prepare and file a memorandum 3. Counsel merely relied on the defense presented by the lawyers of co-accused Valencia and Maramot by adopting the defenses of the other accused and all their pleadings and manifestations, even when these were clearly not applicable to petitioner’s defense." ISSUE: Whether Uyboco is denied the opportunity to be heard. HELD: NO, Uyboco was never denied of due process and opportunity to be heard due to his former counsel’s error, abuse of discretion or gross incompetence, We find no merit in this claim. The general rule is that a client is bound by the acts, even mistakes, of his counsel in the realm of procedural technique. The basis is the tenet that an act performed by counsel withinthe scope of a "general or implied authority" is regarded as an act of the client. While the application of this general rule certainly depends upon the surrounding circumstances of a given case, there are exceptions recognized by this Court: "(1) where reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law; (2) when its application will result in outright deprivation of the client’s liberty or property;or (3) where the interests of justice so require. UYBOCO'S CASE DOES NOT FALL IN ANY OF THE EXCEPTIONS. In Amil v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that "to fall within the exceptional circumstance relied upon x x x, it mustbe shown that the negligence of counsel must be so gross that the client is deprived of his day in court. Thus, where a party was given the opportunity to defend its interests in due course, it cannot be said to have been denied due process of law, for this opportunity to be heard is the very essence of due process." To properly claim gross negligence on the part of the counsel, the petitioner must show that the counsel was guilty of nothing short of a clear abandonment of the client’s cause. In the present case, Uyboco’s clear admission that "he had been given the opportunity to present his evidence" and despite said opportunity, he and his counsel decided/opted not to present any evidence for his defense, as shown by their written Manifestatio ndated November 20, 2012, that "after earnest assessment and evaluation, the accused EDELBERT C. UYBOCO has deemed it unnecessary to present further evidence in his defense, thus he is waiving his right to present further testimonial and documentary evidence," militates against his claim of miscarriage of justice, and hence, his motion to reopen proceedings must likewise fail. The Office of the Special Prosecutor correctly pointed out that petitioner was given an opportunity tobe heard during trial. This opportunity to be heard is the essence of due process. (41) Roxas v. Vasquez G.R. No. 114944, June 19, 2001 FACTS: Petitioners Roxas and Nacpil were Chairman and Member, respectively, of the Bids and Awards Committee of the PC-INP. The PC-INP invited bids for the supply purchase of sixty five (65) units of fire trucks. Accordingly, the public bidding was held. By majority vote, Nikki-Hino of the Tahei Co., Ltd. was voted as the lower bidder. Thereafter, the Contract of Purchase and Sale of sixty-five units of Nikki-Hino fire trucks was executed between Gen. Nazareno, on behalf of the PC-INP, and Tahei Company, Ltd. The Commission on Audit discovered the irregularities in the bidding, awarding and purchase of the sixty-five fire trucks, thus prompting then DILG Secretary Rafael Alunan III to file a complaint for violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 before the Ombudsman. The Deputy Ombudsman for the Military conducted a preliminary investigation where respondents submitted their respective counter-affidavits and it recommended the indictment of all respondents, except for one. On review, the Office of the Special Prosecutor Review Committee recommended the dismissal of the complaints against petitioners. This latter recommendation was approved by the Special Prosecutor and the Ombudsman in a Memorandum and filed before the Sandiganbayan. However, a reinvestigation was conducted by the Office of the Special Prosecutor. Without any notice to or participation of petitioners, the Office of the Special Prosecutor issued the first assailed Order, recommending that herein petitioners be likewise indicted. Deputy Special Prosecutor de Ferrer voted for the approval of the recommendation, while Ombudsman Vasquez approved the recommendation. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration. The Review Committee of the Office of the Special Prosecutor recommended that the Motion be granted and the charge against the movants be dismissed. However, Deputy Special Prosecutor de Ferrer and Ombudsman Vasquez disapproved the recommendation in the second assailed Order. Thus, the Office of the Ombudsman filed an Amended Information with respondent Sandiganbayan impleading petitioners as additional accused.

ISSUE: Whether petitioners indictment, on reinvestigation was without notice nor participation of petitioners, null and void for being violative of their constitutional right to due process. RULING: Neither do the lack of notice to, or participation of, petitioners at the reinvestigation render the questioned issuances of respondent Office of the Ombudsman null and void. This was firmly settled in the recent case ofEspinosa v. Office of the Ombudsman, where we held as follows -- xxx. And even without such notice, we agree with the observations of the Sandiganbayan that under the Rules of Procedures of the Office of the Ombudsman [Administrative Order No. 07], particularly Sec. 7, in relation to Sec. 4, while complainants in preliminary investigation before the Ombudsman actively participated therein, their participation is no longer accorded to them as a matter of right in the stage of the reinvestigation. In administrative proceedings, moreover, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied; administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense. (underscoring ours) At any rate, petitioners cannot argue that they have been deprived of due process. The rule is well established that due process is satisfied when the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy or an opportunity to move for a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. In the case at bar, the record clearly shows that petitioners not only filed their respective Counter-Affidavits during the preliminary investigation, they also filed separate Motions for Reconsideration of the October 19, 1993 Order of the Ombudsman impleading them as accused in Criminal Case No. 18956. (42) BAILINANG P. MAROHOMBSAR v. JUDGE SANTOS B. ADIONG 465 Phil. 599 Procedural. This serves as a restriction on actions of judicial and quasi- judicial agencies of government. REQUISITES: i) An impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it. In Tejano v. Ombudsman, G.R.No. 159190, June 30, 2005, the petitioner attributed partiality to Ombudsman Desierto for having participated in the reinvestigation of the instant case despite his having earlier participated in the initial preliminary investigation of the same when he was Special Prosecutor. The Supreme Court agreed with the petitioner, saying that it is a steadfast rule that the officer who reviews a case on appeal should not be the same person whose decision is under review judges. In Tabuena v. Sandiganbayan, 268 SCRA 332, reiterated in Imelda Romualdez Marcos v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 126995, October 6, 1998, the Supreme Court held that when the Court cross-examined the accused and witnesses, it acted with over-zealousness, assuming the role of both magistrate and advocate, and thus denied the accused due process of law. ii) Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant and over the property which is the subject matter of the proceeding. iii) The defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard. Due process is satisfied as long as the party is accorded the opportunity to be heard. If it is not availed of, it is deemed waived or forfeited without violating the constitutional guarantee [Bautista v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 157219 May 28, 2004]. Neither is the respondent entitled to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. PD 1069 affords an extraditee sufficient opportunity to meet the evidence against him once the petition is filed in court. The time for the extraditee to know the basis of the request for extradition is merely moved to the filing in court of the formal petition for extradition. The extraditee’s right to know is momentarily withheld during the evaluation stage to accommodate the more compelling interest of the state to prevent escape of potential extraditees which can be precipitated by premature information on the basis of the request for extradition. No less compelling at that stage of the extradition proceedings is the need to be more deferential to the judgment of a co- equal branch of the government, the Executive, which has been endowed by our Constitution with greater powers over matters involving our foreign relations [Secretary of Justice v. Judge Lantion, G.R. No. 139465, October 17, 2000; Cuevas v. Munoz, G.R. No. 140520, December 18, 2000].

In Lim v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 111397, August 12, 2002, Supreme Court said that the closure of Bistro violated the due process clause. Instead of arbitrarily closing down the establishment’s business operations, Mayor Lim should have given Bistro an opportunity to rebut the allegations that it violated the conditions of its license. The filing of a motion for reconsideration cures the defect of absence of a hearing [Chua v. Court of Appeals, 287 SCRA 33; reiterated in Marohombsar v. Judge Adiong, A.M. No. RTJ-02-1674, January 22, 2004]. The essence of due process in administrative proceedings is an opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of [Emin v. De Leon, supra.]. In Quintos v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 149800, November 21, 2002, it was held that petitioner was not denied due process because he subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration which the COMELEC considered and acted upon, albeit unfavorably. iv) Judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing. This is necessary, because otherwise, the right to a hearing would be rendered meaningless. Relate this to Sec. 14, Art. VIII, which provides that no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. FACTS: Judge Santos B. Adiong of the Marawi Regional Trial Court was charged with gross ignorance of law, abuse of discretion and conduct unbecoming of a judge in connection with his issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and a preliminary restraining order in a Civil Case. Marohombsar was the defendant in the Civil Case. The case was filed on March Yasmira Pangadapun, daughter of Judge Yusoph Pangadapun of RTC, Marawi City. In the said complaint, Pangadapun questioned the legality of Marohombsar’s appointment as provincial social welfare officer V of the DSWD-ARMM. Prior to Marohombsar’s appointment, Pangadapun used to occupy said position as officer-in-charge. Upon the filing of the said complaint, respondent judge issued a TRO and set the hearing on the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction on April 6, 1999. Summons, together with a copy of the complaint and a notice indicating that a preliminary conference would be held on March 22, 1999, was also served on both parties. On March 18, 1999, Marohombsar filed an ex parte urgent motion to dissolve the TRO. Pangadapun was given until March 26, 1999 to comment and, pending the filing of the same, the TRO was extended up to said date. On March 22, 1999, respondent issued an order stating that a preliminary conference had been held and that both parties had waived the raffle of the case. He reset the hearing on the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction from April 6, 1999 to April 5, 1999 at 2:00 p.m. On March 29, 1999, respondent gave Pangadapun up to April 5, 1999 to file her comment and again, the TRO was extended to that date. During the hearing on the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction on April 5, 1999, none of the lawyers appeared. Hence, respondent considered it submitted for resolution and issued the preliminary injunction the following day. ISSUE: Whether respondent judge denied the petitioner his right to due process denied due process because the preliminary injunction was issued without hearing. RULING: NO. Respondent judge is absolved of all the charges against him. Complainant’s assertion that she was denied due process because the preliminary injunction was issued without hearing is untenable. In applications for preliminary injunction, the dual requirement of prior notice and hearing before injunction may issue has been relaxed to the point that not all petitions for preliminary injunction need undergo a trial-type hearing, it being doctrinal that a formal or trial-type hearing is not, at all times and in all instances, essential to due process. The essence of due process is that a party is afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard and to present any evidence he may have in support of his defense. In the present case, complainant was able to move for a reconsideration of the order in question, hence her right to due process was not in anyway transgressed. We have ruled that a party cannot claim that he has been denied due process when he was availed of the opputunity to present his position. •

EXCEPTIONS TO NOTICE AND HEARING REQUIREMENTS What are the minimum requirements of due process?

The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing which, generally speaking, may not be dispensed with because they are intended as a safeguard against official arbitrariness.

Are Notice and Hearing imperative meaning indispensable? Yes. Absolute? No. What are the exceptions? 1. The conclusive presumption, for example, bars the admission of contrary evidence as long as such presumption is based on human experience or there is a rational connection between the fact proved and the fact ultimately presumed therefrom. 2. In the summary abatement of a nuisance per se, like a mad dog on the loose, which may be killed on sight because of the immediate danger it poses to the safety and lives of the people. Pornographic materials, contaminated meat and narcotic drugs are inherently pernicious and may be summarily destroyed. 3. The passport of a person sought for a criminal offense may be cancelled without hearing, to compel his return to the country he has fled. 4. Filthy restaurants may be summarily padlocked in the interest of the public health and bawdy houses to protect the public morals. Reason for non-requirement of notice and Hearing? Because of the nature of the property involved or the urgency of the need to protect the general welfare from a clear and present danger. Philippine Communications Satellite Corp. vs. Alcuaz [G.R. No. 84818, December 18, 1989] RATE FIXING POWER EXERCISED IN A QUASI-JUDICIAL MANNER REQUIRES PRIOR NOTICE AND HEARING. While respondents may fix a temporary rate pending final determination of the application of petitioner, such rate-fixing order, temporary though it may be, is not exempt from the statutory procedural requirements of notice and hearing, as well as the requirement of reasonableness. Assuming that such power is vested in NTC, it may not exercise the same in an arbitrary and confiscatory manner. Categorizing such an order as temporary in nature does not perforce entail the applicability of a different rule of statutory procedure than would otherwise be applied to any other order on the same matter unless otherwise provided by the applicable law. In the case at bar, the applicable statutory provision is Section 16(c) of the Public Service Act which provides: "Section 16. Proceedings of the Commission, upon notice and hearing. — The Commission shall have power, upon proper notice and hearing in accordance with the rules and provisions of this Act, subject to the limitations and exceptions mentioned and saving provisions to the contrary: (c) To fix and determine individual or joint rates, . . . which shall be imposed, observed and followed thereafter by any public service" "Moreover, although the rule-making power and even the power to fix rates — when such rules and/or rates are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the Philippines — may partake of a legislative character, such is not the nature of the order complained of. Indeed, the same applies exclusively to petitioner herein. What is more, it is predicated upon the finding of fact — based upon a report submitted by the General Auditing Office — that petitioner is making a profit of more than 12% of its invested capital, which is denied by petitioner. Obviously, the latter is entitled to crossexamine the maker of said report, and to introduce evidence to disprove the contents thereof and/or explain or complement the same, as well as to refute the conclusion drawn therefrom by the respondent. In other words, in making said finding of fact, respondent performed a function partaking of a quasi-judicial character, the valid exercise of which demands previous notice and hearing." This rule was further explained in the subsequent case of The Central Bank of the Philippines vs. Cloribel, et al. to wit: "It is also clear from the authorities that where the function of the administrative body is legislative, notice of hearing is not required by due process of law (See Oppenheiner, Administrative Law, 2 Md. L.R. 185, 204, supra, where it is said: If the nature of the administrative agency is essentially legislative, the requirements of notice and hearing are not necessary. The validity of a rule of future action which affects a group, if vested rights of liberty or property are not involved, is not determined according to the same rules which apply in the case of the direct application of a policy to a specific individual) . . . It is said in 73 C.J.S. Public Administrative Bodies and Procedure, sec. 130, pages 452 and 453: Aside from statute, the necessity of notice and hearing in an administrative proceeding depends on the character of the proceeding and the circumstances involved. In so far as generalization is possible in view of the great variety of administrative proceedings, it may be stated as a general rule that notice and hearing are not essential to the validity of administrative action where the administrative body acts in the exercise of executive, administrative, or legislative functions; but where a public administrative body acts in a judicial or

quasi-judicial matter, and its acts are particular and immediate rather than general and prospective, the person whose rights or property may be affected by the action is entitled to notice and hearing. (43) PHILCOMSAT VS. ALCUAZ 180 SCRA 218 FACTS: Herein petitioner, Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation, is engaged in providing for services involving telecommunications. Charging rates for certain specified lines that were reduced by order of herein respondent Jose Alcuaz Commissioner of the National Telecommunications Commission. The rates were ordered to be reduced by fifteen percent (15%) due to Executive Order No. 546 which granted the NTC the power to fix rates. Said order was issued without prior notice and hearing. ISSUE: Whether or Not E.O. 546 is unconstitutional because it violates procedural due process for having been issued without prior notice and hearing and that the rate reduction it imposes is unjust, unreasonable and confiscatory, thus constitutive of a violation of substantive due process. HELD: The order in question which was issued by respondent Alcuaz no doubt contains all the attributes of a quasi-judicial adjudication. Foremost is the fact that said order pertains exclusively to petitioner and to no other. Further, it is premised on a finding of fact, although patently superficial, that there is merit in a reduction of some of the rates charged- based on an initial evaluation of petitioner's financial statements-without affording petitioner the benefit of an explanation as to what particular aspect or aspects of the financial statements warranted a corresponding rate reduction. No rationalization was offered nor were the attending contingencies, if any, discussed, which prompted respondents to impose as much as a fifteen percent (15%) rate reduction. It is not far-fetched to assume that petitioner could be in a better position to rationalize its rates vis-a-vis the viability of its business requirements. The rates it charges result from an exhaustive and detailed study it conducts of the multifaceted intricacies attendant to a public service undertaking of such nature and magnitude. We are, therefore, inclined to lend greater credence to petitioner's ratiocination that an immediate reduction in its rates would adversely affect its operations and the quality of its service to the public considering the maintenance requirements, the projects it still has to undertake and the financial outlay involved. Notably, petitioner was not even afforded the opportunity to cross examine the inspector who issued the report on which respondent NTC based its questioned order. While respondents may fix a temporary rate pending final determination of the application of petitioner, such rate fixing order, temporary though it may be, is not exempt from the statutory procedural requirements of notice and hearing, as well as the requirement of reasonableness. Assuming that such power is vested in NTC, it may not exercise the same in an arbitrary and confiscatory manner. Categorizing such an order as temporary in nature does not perforce entail the applicability of a different rule of statutory procedure than would otherwise be applied to any other order on the same matter unless otherwise provided by the applicable law. It is thus clear that with regard to rate-fixing, respondent has no authority to make such order without first giving petitioner a hearing, whether the order be temporary or permanent, and it is immaterial whether the same is made upon a complaint, a summary investigation, or upon the commission's own motion as in the present case. WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is GRANTED and the order of respondents is hereby SET ASIDE. ALTERNATIVE DIGEST: PHILIPPINE COMMUNICATION SATELLITE CORP. V. ALCUAZ G.R. NO. 84818, DEC 18, 1989 Without conducting any hearing the National Telecommunications Communication ordered PHILCOMSAT to reduce its rates by 15% Valid? Changing existing rates is quasi-judicial in nature. Hence it must be preceded by a hearing. The fact of the order being merely interlocutory does not alter the situation because for all practical purposes it is final as to the period covered. PHILCOMSAT v. Alcuaz

FACTS: By virtue of Republic Act 5514, the Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT) was granted “a franchise to establish, construct, maintain and operate in the Philippines, at such places as the grantee may select, station or stations and associated equipment and facilities for international satellite communications.” Since 1968, it has been leasing its satellite circuits to PLDT, Philippine Global Communications, and other telecommunication companies. It was exempt from the jurisdiction of the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC). However, pursuant to Executive Order (EO) 196, it was placed under the jurisdiction, control and regulation of NTC, including all its facilities and services and the fixing of rates. Implementing said executive order, NTC required PHILCOMSAT to apply for the requisite certificate of public convenience. On 9 September 1987, PHILCOMSAT filed with NTC an application for authority to continue operating and maintaining the same facilities, to continue providing the international satellite communications services, and to charge the current rates applied for in rendering such services. Pending hearing, it also applied for a provisional authority so that it can continue to operate and maintain the facilities, provide the services and charge therefor the aforesaid rates therein applied for. The NTC extended the provisional authority of PHILCOMSAT, but it directed PHILCOMSAT to charge modified reduced rates through a reduction of 15% on the present authorized rates. PHILCOMSAT assailed said order. ISSUE: Whether the NTC is required to provide notice and hearing to PHILCOMSAT in its rate-fixing order, which fixed a temporary rate pending final determination of PHILCOMSAT’s application. HELD: YES. The order in question which was issued by respondent Alcuaz no doubt contains all the attributes of a quasi-judicial adjudication. Foremost is the fact that said order pertains exclusively to petitioner and to no other. Further, it is premised on a finding of fact although patently superficial, that there is merit in a reduction of some rates charged based on initial evaluation of petitioner’s financial statements- without affording petitioner the benefit of an explanation as to what particular aspect or aspects of the financial statements warranted a corresponding reduction rate. No rationalization was offered nor were the attending contingencies, if any, discussed, which prompted respondents to impose as much as a fifteen percent (15%) rate reduction. It is not far-fetched to assume that petitioner could be in a better position to rationalize its rates vis-a-vis the viability of its business requirements. The rates it charges result from an exhaustive and detailed study it conducts of the multifaceted intricacies attendant to a public service undertaking of such nature and magnitude. We are, therefore, inclined to lend greater credence to petitioner's ratiocination that an immediate reduction in its rates would adversely affect its operations and the quality of its service to the public considering the maintenance requirements, the projects it still has to undertake and the financial outlay involved. Notably, petitioner was not even afforded the opportunity to cross-examine the inspector who issued the report on which respondent NTC based its questioned order. At any rate, there remains the categorical admission made by respondent NTC that the questioned order was issued pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions. It, however, insists that notice and hearing are not necessary since the assailed order is merely incidental to the entire proceedings and, therefore, temporary in nature. This postulate is bereft of merit. The NTC, in the exercise of its rate-fixing power, is limited by the requirements of public safety, public interest, reasonable feasibility and reasonable rates, which conjointly more than satisfy the requirements of a valid delegation of legislative power. The NTC order violates procedural due process because it was issued motopropio without notice to PHILCOMSAT and without the benefit of a hearing. Said order was based merely on an “initial evaluation,” which is a unilateral evaluation, but had PHILCOMSAT been given an opportunity to present its side before the order in question was issued, the confiscatory nature of the rate reduction and the consequent deterioration of the public service could have been shown and demonstrated to NTC. Reduction of rates was made without affording PHILCOMSAT the benefit of an explanation as to what particular aspect or aspects of the financial statements warranted a corresponding rate reduction. PHILCOMSAT was not even afforded the opportunity to cross-examine the inspector who issued the report on which NTC based its questioned order. While NTC may fix a temporary rate pending final determination of the application of PHILCOMSAT, such rate-fixing order, temporary though it may be, is not exempt from the statutory procedural requirements of notice and hearing, as well as the requirement of reasonableness. (44) Suntay v. People G.R. No. L-9430; 29 Jun 1957; 101 Phil 833

Procedural. This serves as a restriction on actions of judicial and quasi- judicial agencies of government. REQUISITES: i) An impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it. In Tejano v. Ombudsman, G.R.No. 159190, June 30, 2005, the petitioner attributed partiality to Ombudsman Desierto for having participated in the reinvestigation of the instant case despite his having earlier participated in the initial preliminary investigation of the same when he was Special Prosecutor. The Supreme Court agreed with the petitioner, saying that it is a steadfast rule that the officer who reviews a case on appeal should not be the same person whose decision is under review judges. In Tabuena v. Sandiganbayan, 268 SCRA 332, reiterated in Imelda Romualdez Marcos v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 126995, October 6, 1998, the Supreme Court held that when the Court cross-examined the accused and witnesses, it acted with over-zealousness, assuming the role of both magistrate and advocate, and thus denied the accused due process of law. ii) Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant and over the property which is the subject matter of the proceeding. iii) The defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard. Due process is satisfied as long as the party is accorded the opportunity to be heard. If it is not availed of, it is deemed waived or forfeited without violating the constitutional guarantee [Bautista v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 157219 May 28, 2004]. Neither is the respondent entitled to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. PD 1069 affords an extraditee sufficient opportunity to meet the evidence against him once the petition is filed in court. The time for the extraditee to know the basis of the request for extradition is merely moved to the filing in court of the formal petition for extradition. The extraditee’s right to know is momentarily withheld during the evaluation stage to accommodate the more compelling interest of the state to prevent escape of potential extraditees which can be precipitated by premature information on the basis of the request for extradition. No less compelling at that stage of the extradition proceedings is the need to be more deferential to the judgment of a co- equal branch of the government, the Executive, which has been endowed by our Constitution with greater powers over matters involving our foreign relations [Secretary of Justice v. Judge Lantion, G.R. No. 139465, October 17, 2000; Cuevas v. Munoz, G.R. No. 140520, December 18, 2000]. In Lim v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 111397, August 12, 2002, Supreme Court said that the closure of Bistro violated the due process clause. Instead of arbitrarily closing down the establishment’s business operations, Mayor Lim should have given Bistro an opportunity to rebut the allegations that it violated the conditions of its license. The filing of a motion for reconsideration cures the defect of absence of a hearing [Chua v. Court of Appeals, 287 SCRA 33; reiterated in Marohombsar v. Judge Adiong, A.M. No. RTJ-02-1674, January 22, 2004]. The essence of due process in administrative proceedings is an opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of [Emin v. De Leon, supra.]. In Quintos v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 149800, November 21, 2002, it was held that petitioner was not denied due process because he subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration which the COMELEC considered and acted upon, albeit unfavorably. There are cases in which notice and hearing may be dispensed with without violating due process. Among these are the cancellation of the passport of a person sought for the commission of a crime [Suntay v. People, 101 Phil 833]. iv) Judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing. This is necessary, because otherwise, the right to a hearing would be rendered meaningless. Relate this to Sec. 14, Art. VIII, which provides that no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. FACTS: On or about June 21, 1954, the Suntay took Alicia Nubla from St. Paul's Colleges in Quezon City with lewd design and took her to somewhere near the U.P. compound in Diliman, Quezon City and was then able to have carnal knowledge of her. Alicia Nubla is a minor of 16 years. On January 10, 1955, petitioner Emilio Suntay applied for and was granted a passport by the Department of Foreign Affairs. On January 20, 1955, he left the Philippines for San Francisco, California, U.S.A., where he is at present enrolled in school. The respondent Secretary on March 7,

1955 instructed the Ambassador to the United States to order the Consul General in San Francisco to cancel the passport issued to the petitioner and to compel him to return to the Philippines to answer the criminal charges against him. ISSUE: Whether the cancellation of the petitioner’s passport without hearing violates his constitutional right to due process. RULING: NO. Hearing would have been proper and necessary if the reason for the withdrawal or cancellation of the passport were not clear but doubtful. But where the holder of a passport is facing a criminal charge in our courts and left the country to evade criminal prosecution, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, in the exercise of his discretion to revoke a passport already issued, cannot be held to have acted whimsically or capriciously in withdrawing and cancelling such passport. Due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing. When discretion is exercised by an officer vested with it upon an undisputed fact, such as the filing of a serious criminal charge against the passport holder, hearing may be dispensed with by such officer as a prerequisite to the cancellation of his passport; lack of such hearing does not violate the due process of law clause of the Constitution; and the exercise of the discretion vested in him cannot be deemed whimsical and capricious because of the absence of such hearing. If hearing should always be held in order to comply with the due process of law clause of the Constitution, then a writ of preliminary injunction issued ex parte would be violative of the said clause. (45) GEORGE DE BISSCHOP v. EMILIO L. GALANG, IN HIS CAPACITY AS COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION G.R. No. L-18365, May 31, 1963 FACTS: Petitioner-appellee George de Bisschop, an American citizen, was allowed to stay in this country for three years, expiring 1 August 1959, as a prearranged employee of the Bissmag Production, Inc., of which he is president and general manager. He applied for extension of stay with the Bureau of Immigration. In view, however, of confidential and damaging reports of Immigration Office, Benjamin de Mesa to the effect that the Bissmag Production, Inc., is more of a gambling front than the enterprise for promotions of local and imported shows that it purports to be, and that De Bisschop is suspected of having evaded payment of his income tax, the Commissioner of Immigration, in a communication advised him that his application for extension of stay as a prearranged employee has been denied by the Board of Commissioners, and that he should depart within 5 days. Thereafter, counsel of de Bisschop requested for a copy of the adverse decision of said Board, but the legal officer of the Bureau of Immigration replied, on 11 September 1959. No request for reinvestigation was made with the Bureau of Immigration. Instead, to forestall his arrest and the filing of the corresponding deportation proceedings, De Bisschop filed the present case on 18 September 1959. Pending resolution of the main case for prohibition, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued ex-parte by the court a quo on the same day ordering herein respondentappellant to desist from arresting and detaining petitioner-appellee. During the hearing, only documentary evidence was presented. In his brief, appellant Commissioner raises two main issues: That the lower court erred (a) in holding that the Commissioners of Immigration are required by law to conduct formal hearing on all applications for extension of stay of aliens; and (b) in ruling that said Commissioners are enjoined to promulgate written decisions in such cases. ISSUE: Whether the due process clause (notice and hearing requirements) is violated in this case. RULING: NO. The administration of immigration laws is the primary and exclusive responsibility of the Executive branch of the government. Extension of stay of aliens is purely discretionary on the part of immigration authorities. Since Commonwealth Act No. 613, otherwise known as the Philippines Immigration Act of 1940, is silent as to the procedure to be followed in these cases, we are inclined to uphold the argument that courts have no jurisdiction to review the purely administrative practice of immigration authorities of not granting formal hearings in certain cases as the circumstances may warrant, for reasons of practicability and expediency. This would not violate the due process clause if we take into account that, in this particular case, the letter of appellant-commissioner advising de Bisschop to depart in 5 days is a, mere formality, a preliminary step, and, therefore, far from final, because, as alleged in paragraph 7 of appellant's answer to the complaint, the "requirement to leave before the start of the deportation proceedings is only an advice to the party that unless he departs voluntarily, the State will be

compelled to take steps for his expulsion". It is already a settled rule in this jurisdiction that a day in court is not a matter of right in administrative proceedings. "The fact should not be lost sight of that we are dealing with an administrative proceeding and not with a judicial proceeding. As Judge Cooley, the leading American writer on Constitutional Law, has well said, due process of law is not necessarily judicial process; much of the process by means of which the Government is carried on, and the order of society maintained, is purely executive or administrative, which is as much due process of law as is judicial process. While a day in court is a matter of right in judicial proceedings, in administrative proceedings, it is otherwise since they rest upon different principles. * * * in certain proceedings, therefore, of an administrative character, it may be stated, without fear of contradiction, that the right to a notice and hearing are not essential to due process of law." (Cornejo vs. Gabriel and Provincial Board of Rizal, 41 Phil. 188, 193-194) There is nothing in the immigration law which provides that the Board of Commissioners must render written decisions on petitions for extension of stay. (46) Var Orient Shipping Co., Inc. v. Achacoso 161 SCRA 232 (1988) G.R. No. 81805, May 31, 1988 FACTS: The petitioners filed a complaint with the Workers’ Assistance and Adjudication Office, Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) against the private respondents, crew members of the MPV “Silver Reefer,” for having allegedly violated their Contracts of Employment with the petitioners which supposedly resulted in damages arising from the interdiction of the vessel by the International Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF) at Kiel Canal, Germany, in March 1986. After joinder of the issues, the case was heard on March 4, 1987 where the parties agreed to submit their respective position papers and thereafter the case would be submitted for decision. Only the private respondents submitted a position paper. On the basis of the pleadings and memoranda the public respondent rendered a decision on September 9,1987 the dispositive part of which Dismiss of the instant case.A copy of the decision was sent by registered mail and delivered by the postman to the petitioners’ counsel through the receptionist but According to Attorney Figura, he did not receive the envelope containing the decision. Petitioners allegedly learned about the decision only when the writ of execution was served on them by NLRC Deputy Sheriff. Petitioners, through new counsel, filed an ‘urgent Motion to Recall Writ of Execution’ on the ground that the decision had not been received by the petitioners, hence, it was not yet final and executory. ISSUE: Whether the Petitioner were denied due process of law because the respondent POEA Administrator resolved the case without any formal hearing?adrianantazo.wordpress.com HELD: NO, the petitioners’ allegation that the issuance of the writ of execution was premature because the decision had not been received by their counsel is unconvincing. Petitioners failed to submit an affidavit of the receptionist Marlyn Aquino explaining what she did with the decision which she received for Atty. Figura. Under the circumstances, the respondent Administrator’s ruling that the decision had been properly served on petitioners’ counsel and that it is now final and unappealable, should be sustained. Equally unmeritorious is the petitioners ‘allegation that they were denied due process because the decision was rendered without a formal hearing. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. The fact is that at the hearing of the case on March 4,1987, it was agreed by the parties that they would file their respective memoranda and thereafter consider the case submitted for decision. This procedure is authorized by law to expedite the settlement of labor disputes. However, only the private respondents submitted memoranda. The petitioners did not. On June 10, 1987, the respondents filed a motion to resolve. The petitioners’ counsel did not oppose either the “Motion to Resolve” or the respondents “Motion for Execution of Decision” dated October 19, 1987, both of which were furnished them through counsel. If it were true, as they now contend, that they had been denied due process in the form of a formal hearing, they should have opposed both motions. ALTERNATIVE DIGEST: Var Orient Shipping Co., Inc. v. Achacoso 161 SCRA 232 (1988) G.R. No. 81805, May 31, 1988

FACTS: Var-Orient Shipping Co filed a complaint with POEA against crewmembers for having allegedly violated their Contracts of Employment with the petitioners that supposedly resulted in damages. the case was heard and the parties agreed to submit their respective position papers and thereafter the case would be submitted for decision. On the basis of the pleadings and memoranda, Tomas Achacoso, POEA Administrator rendered decision in favour of the crew. A copy of the decision was sent by registered mail and delivered by the postman to the petitioners’ counsel. Petitioners allegedly learned about the decision only when the writ of execution was served on them by the Sherriff. Petitioner filed filed an ‘urgent Motion to Recall Writ of Execution’ on the ground that the decision had not been received by the petitioners, hence, it was not yet final and executory. ISSUE: Whether petitioner was denied due process of law because the respondent Administrator resolved the case without any formal hearing? RULING: Petition denied. Equally unmeritorious is the petitioners ‘allegation that they were denied due process because the decision was rendered without a formal hearing. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. The fact is that at the hearing of the case it was agreed by the parties that they would file their respective memoranda and thereafter consider the case submitted for decision. This procedure is authorized by law to expedite the settlement of labor disputes. •

ADMINISTRATIVE DUE PROCESS

In AngTibay v. CIR, 69 Phil 635, the Court enumerated the requisites of administrative due process, as follows: (a) The right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one’s case and submit evidence in support thereof; (b) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented; (c) The decision must have something to support itself; (d) The evidence must be substantial; (e) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties; (f) The tribunal or any of its judges must act on its or his own independent consideration of the facts and the law of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision; and (g) The board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding will know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decision. Due process in quasi-judicial proceedings before the COMELEC requires notice and hearing. The proclamation of a winning candidate cannot be annulled if he has not been notified of any motion to set aside his proclamation. In Namil v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 150540, October 28, 2003, the COMELEC issued the questioned order annulling the proclamation on the basis of private respondent’s allegations and the recommendation of the law department, without giving notice to the candidate proclaimed. Thus, the COMELEC order was declared void. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASES Q. What are the essential requirements of procedural due process before administrative agencies? A. Briefly, the following are required: "(1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may affect a respondent's legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in one's favor, and to defend one's rights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or contained the records or made known to the parties affected." Fabella v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110379, November 28, 1997, 282 SCRA 256, 267 (citing Air Manila, Inc. v. Balatbat, 38 SCRA 489, 492 [1971]); Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, 69 Phil. 635 (1940).

(47) Ang Tibay vs. CIR GR No. 46496, February 27, 1940 FACTS: Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay, a leather company which supplies the Philippine Army. Due to alleged shortage of leather, Toribio caused the layoff of a number of his employees. However, the National Labor Union, Inc. (NLU) questioned the validity of said lay off as it averred that the said employees laid off were members of NLU while no members of the rival labor union National Workers Brotherhood (NWB) were laid off. NLU claims that NWB is a company dominated union and Toribio was merely busting NLU. The case reached the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) where Toribio and NWB won. Eventually, NLU went to the Supreme Court invoking its right for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence. The Supreme Court agreed with NLU. The Solicitor General, arguing for the CIR, filed a motion for reconsideration. ISSUE: Whether the National Labor Union, Inc. was denied a due process by the Court of Industrial Relations. RULING: The records show that the newly discovered evidence or documents obtained by NLU, which they attached to their petition with the SC, were evidence so inaccessible to them at the time of the trial that even with the exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations. Further, the attached documents and exhibits are of such far-reaching importance and effect that their admission would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the judgment rendered (said newly obtained records include books of business/inventory accounts by Ang Tibay which were not previously accessible but already existing). The SC also outlined that administrative bodies, like the CIR, although not strictly bound by the Rules of Court must also make sure that they comply to the requirements of due process. For administrative bodies, due process can be complied with by observing the following: 1. right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. 2. tribunal must consider the evidence presented. 3. have something to support the decision 4. evidence must be "substantial." - such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind accepts as adequate to support a conclusion." 5. The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. Only by confining the administrative tribunal to the evidence disclosed to the parties, can the latter be protected in their right to know and meet the case against them. 6. The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. It may be that the volume of work is such that it is literally Relations personally to decide all controversies coming before them. 7. The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decision rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it. The motion for new trial is granted. (48) MONTEMAYOR v. ARANETA UNIVERSITY FOUNDATION Q. Montemayor was a full-time professor. Charged with immoral advances he was investigated with the assistance of counsel, and dismissed in accordance with the Manual of Policies of the University. On appeal to the National Labor Relations Board he was ordered reinstated. Should he be reinstated? A. No. Removal was with due process. Montemayor v. Araneta University, L-44251,31 May 1977 (77 SCRA 321). NOTE: The Court later clarified that the Montemayor decision did not find Montemayor guilty of immoral conduct. Its sole import was that there was no violation of due process in the labor

proceeding but that it did not preclude Montemayor from suing the University for damages. Araneta University v. Argel, G.R. No. 48076, March 13,1980. Later, on November 9, 1983, in a suit for damages filed before the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan, Montemayor won a judgment for damages against the University. The case later went to the Intermediate Appellate Court and Montemayor won it there on September 3,1985 and again on March 21,1986. Thus ends Montemayor's struggle for vindication of his honor. FACTS: Felix Montemayor was a fulltime professor of respondent Araneta University Foundation. A complaint for immorality lodged against him by the Chaplain of the Araneta University Foundation was instituted. President, Dr. Juan Salcedo, Jr., created a committee to investigate such charge. The first hearing as scheduled was moved by the petitioner to a later date where it was conducted and the accusation centered on conversations on sex and immoral advances committed against the person of Leonardo de Lara. The report and recommendation of the investigating committee found the petitioner morally responsible for the act complained of and recommended for his demotion in rank by one degree. Subsequently, on November 8, 1974 new charges was instituted against the petitioner for conduct unbecoming of a faculty member, another committee was appointed. Then came his preventive suspension, ordered to last until the administrative investigation was concluded. There was a motion by petitioner for the postponement of the hearing set for November 18 and 19, 1974, but the same was denied. The hearing proceeded in his absence. The University, on December 12, 1974, filed with the National Labor Relations Commission a report of his suspension and application for clearance to terminate his employment. Meanwhile, on November 21, 1974, petitioner in turn lodged a complaint with the National Labor Relations Commission against private respondents for reinstatement and payment of back wages and salaries, with all the privileges, benefits and increments attendant thereto. Both the labor arbiter and the National Labor Relations Commission found in favor of petitioner. He was ordered reinstated to his former position with back wages and without loss of seniority and other privileges. Private respondents appealed to respondent Secretary of Labor who, on July 14, 1976, set aside the Commission's order for his reinstatement. Dissatisfied, the petitioner filed this petition for certiorari. ISSUE: Whether the case of petitioner was handled with administrative due process. RULING: It does appear therefore that the members of such investigating committee failed to show full awareness of the demands of procedural due process. A motion by petitioner for postponement of the hearing, apparently the first one made, was denied. What is worse, in his absence the matter was heard with the committee losing no time in submitting its report finding the charges against petitioner to have been sufficiently established and recommending his removal. If that were all, respondent Secretary of Labor cannot be sustained. certiorari would lie. But such deficiency was remedied, as pointed out in the same comment of the Solicitor General, by the fact "that petitioner was able to present his case before the Labor Commission " The entire record of the administrative proceedings, including the transcript of the stenographic notes taken therein, was elevated to the Labor Commission for review. The legal aspect as to the procedural due process having been satisfied was then summarized by the Solicitor General thus: "All the foregoing clearly shows that petitioner was afforded his day in court. Finally, and more significant, is the fact that petitioner claims denial of due process in the proceeding had before the investigating committees and not in the proceedings before the NLRC wherein, as shown heretofore, he was given the fullest opportunity to present his case." (49) MERALCO v. PSC 11 SCRA 317, 1964 FACTS: The Manila Electric Company (Meralco for short), filed two applications with the Public Service Commission for revision and reduction of its rates for commercial and other non-residential customers for general lighting, heating and/or power purposes (P.S.C. Case No. 85889) and the other for revision and reduction of its residential meter rate (P.S.C. Case No. 85890). These applications were approved by the Commission in a decision. On August 24, 1955, the Meralco filed another application for revision and reduction of its general power rate, Schedule GP-2 (P.S.C. Case No. 89293), which was provisionally approved. On June 9, 1954, upon petition of Dr. Pedro Gil, the Commission requested the Auditor General to cause an audit and examination of Meralco's books of accounts. The General Auditing Office (GAO) examined and audited the books and under date of May 11, 1956 and presented a report which was submitted to the Commission. On May 30, 1956, the Commission, thru

Commissioner Feliciano Ocampo, reset the hearing of case Nos. 85889, 85890 and 89893, for June 22, 1956 "for the purpose of considering such further revision of applicant's rates as may be found reasonable." On said date, the parties appeared and Atty. Venancio L. de Peralta, Technical Assistant and Chief of the Finance and Rate Division of the Commission, who was duly authorized to receive the evidence of the parties, announced that the hearing was an "informal hearing", and its purpose was to hear any remarks or statements of the parties and to define the issues "so that at the hearing we know exactly what are disputed at this informal hearing". Without having (1) first reset the said 3 cases for hearing; (2) Without having given the Meralco an opportunity, as requested by it, to cross-examine the officers of the GAO who prepared the report dated May 11, 1956, on which report the Commission based its decision; and (3) Without having given the Meralco an opportunity, as requested by it, to present evidence in support of its answer to refute the facts alleged in said report and controverted by Meralco, on December 27, 1957, the said Commission handed down a decision that the reductions adverted to are just, reasonable and equitable among the various groups of customers and thus, the petition for reduction of rates in these cases should granted. According to MERALCO, Th PSC erred in the rendering its decision without a previous hearing; without giving petitioner an opportunity to present evidence in support of its answer; and in basing its decision on the report of the General Auditing Office dated May 11, 1956, without having given petitioner an opportunity to refute the facts (In holding that for rate base purposes, the appraised value as of petitioner's pre-war property, plant and equipment should be considered as the present fair value of said properties, GAO's readjustment of the reserves for depreciation of petitioner's property, plant and equipment, In disallowing legitimate operating expenses in the determination of petitioner's working capital, In not taking into consideration the value of materials and supplies carried in stock in the determination of petitioner's rate base, In not giving effect to the contract between petitioner and the Philippine Power and Development Company, In ordering petitioner to reduce its rates) alleged in the said report of the General Auditing Office and controverted by petitioner. ISSUE: Was there a due process of law? RULING: It was alleged therein that: The decision was null and void having been rendered without any hearing; the Commission could not validly make findings of fact without affording petitioner the right to cross-examine and confront witnesses, as well as the right to present its evidence; the decision contained findings contrary to law and at any event, the decision was based on obsolete allegations of fact, and since the submission of the audit report of the GAO, on whose allegations the decision was predicated, there had occurred recent developments which had substantially altered the situation of the Meralco and which have to be taken into account by the Commission, in fixing just and reasonable rates, such as: (1) Government restrictions and changing policies (2) higher rate base (3) higher cost of production and other changes. These grounds were and still vital to the issues in the case, even if taken only on their face value. They should have merited the attention of the Commission. But two of the Commissioners denied the motion stating, among other things, "The desire of the Meralco to cross-examine witnesses and present oral testimonies may just lead to more years of protracted and delayed hearings, which will undoubtedly affect adversely the public interest. Hence, the procedure followed by the Commission in deciding these cases was the usual practice long adopted by the Commission in fixing rates of electric power plants". If the practice of the Commission alluded to is what is revealed in the record of this case, then it is not a good practice, nay, it is unlawful, because it breaches the guarantees of due process. There should be no short cuts in the disposition of the time-honored principle that no one should be deprived of his life, liberty and property, without due process of law. Considering the fact that the reduction of rates herein sought might involve huge amounts of money and the errors, alleged to have been committed, if true, would affect likewise not only the right of the petitioner but also public interest, it would have been a better part of valor and wisdom to have delayed a little bit the final resolution of the controversy. And moreover, when the Commission finally decided the cases, making its decision effective as of 1958, indeed many great changes (as enumerated in the petitioner's brief), had already taken place. Acording to the PSC, their proceedings are administrative, not judicial, and administrative agencies have three functions — adjudication, rule-making and enforcement; that in legislative or rule-making function there is no constitutional right to any hearing whatsoever; that rate fixing is a legislative function; that the requirement of "proper notice and hearing" provided by section 16, par.

(c) of the Public Service Act had been complied with, not in "auditory hearing", but in the "canned method" or the submitted of prepared forms issued by the agency, or the submission of pleadings, briefs, and memorandums or even by mere inspection; that the Commission is not bound by strict rules of evidence and it can make use of its own independent surveys of the situation to acquire an understanding of the problem before it. But the cold fact remains, after a panoramic perusal of the record and circumstances surrounding these cases, that the petitioner had not been given its day in court. We need not be reminded that it is the cardinal right of a party in trials and administrative proceedings to be heard, which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof and to have such evidence presented considered by the tribunal (Comm. of Immigration vs. Fernandez, et al., L-22696, May 29, 1964 and cases cited therein). "Even if the Commission is not bound by the rules of judicial proceedings, it must how its head to the constitutional mandate that no person shall be deprived of right without due process of law", which binds not only the government of the Republic, but also each and everyone of its branches, agencies, etc. "Due process of law guarantees notice and opportunities to be heard to persons who would be affected by the order or act contemplated" (50) ATENEO v. CA 145 SCRA 100 (1986) Q. How does due process for students affect the academic freedom of schools? A. "While it is true that the students are entitled to the right to pursue their education, the USC as an educational institution is also entitled to pursue its academic freedom and, in the process, has the concomitant right to see to it that this freedom is not jeopardized. "True, an institution of learning has a contractual obligation to afford its students a fair opportunity to complete the course they seek to pursue. However, when a student commits a serious breach of discipline or fails to maintain the required academic standard, he forfeits his contractual right; and the court should not review the discretion of university authorities." Licup v. University of San Carlos, October 19, 1989, citing Magtibay v. Garcia, 120 SCRA 370 (1983) and also Ateneo de Manila University v. Court of Appeals, 145 SCRA 100 (1986). NOTE: The right to education is also limited by the right of schools to dismiss, after due process, for disciplinary reasons. Ateneo de Manila University v. Court of Appeals, 145 SCRA 100 (1986). NOTE: Non v. Judge Dames, G.R. No. 89317, May 20, 1990, reversed the doctrine in Alcuaz v. PSBA, 161 SCRA 7 (May 2,1988) which had said that students enroll from semester to semester and may be denied re-enrollment in any given new semester. The Court said that the established rules for due process must be observed together with the right of students to free speech and assembly. Although the relation between student and school is contractual, the contract is for the duration of the course until graduation, subject to the right of the school to dismiss students for academic or disciplinary reason. FACTS: On 12 December 1967, Juan Ramon Guanzon (from Bacolod, son of Romeo Guanzon and Teresita Regalado), first year student of AdMU Loyola Heights, and boarder at the Cervini Hall) struck at the left temple of Carmelita Mateo, a waitress in the Cervini Hall cafeteria. Other boarders held him from striking again, but the boarders hid the incident from Fr. Campbell. The university conducted an investigation of the slapping incident. On the basis of the investigation results, Juan Ramon was dismissed from the university. The dismissal of Juan Ramon triggered off the filing of a complaint for damages by his parents against the university in the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Negros Occidental at Bacolod City. The complaint states that Juan Ramon was expelled from school without giving him a fair trial in violation of his right to due process and that they are prominent and well known residents of Bacolod City, with the unceremonious expulsion of their son causing them actual, moral, and exemplary damages as well as attorney's fees. In its answer, the university denied the material allegations of the complaint and justified the dismissal of Juan Ramon on the ground that his unbecoming behavior is contrary to good morals, proper decorum, and civility, that such behavior subjected him as a student to the university's disciplinary regulations' action and sanction and that the university has the sole prerogative and authority at any time to drop from the school a student found to be undesirable in order to preserve and maintain its integrity and discipline so indispensable for its existence as an institution of learning.

After due trial, the lower court found for the Guanzons and ordered the university to pay them P92.00 as actual damages; P50,000.00 as moral damages; P5,000.00 as attorney's fees and to pay the costs of the suit. Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals by the university, the trial court's decision was initially reversed and set aside. However, upon motion for reconsideration filed by the Guanzons, the appellate court reversed its decision and set it aside through a special division of five. The motion for reconsideration had to be referred to a special division of five in view of the failure to reach unanimity on the resolution of the motion, the vote of the regular division having become 2 to 1. Hence, the University filed a petition for review before the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether the absence of notice to the dismissed student’s parents negates the compliance of the requirements of administrative due process. HELD: Besides the administrative body undertaking a fair and objective investigation of the incident, due process in administrative proceedings also requires consideration of the evidence presented and the existence of evidence to support the decision. Herein, the original Court of Appeals decision (penned by Justice Gancayco) showed that the procedures in the expulsion case were fair, open, exhaustive, and adequate. There were nothing in the records to reverse the findings in the reconsideration. Clearly, there was absolutely no indication of malice, fraud, and improper or wilful motives or conduct on the part of the Ateneo de Manila University. Juan Ramon was given notice of the proceedings. He actually appeared to present his side. The investigating board acted fairly and objectively. All requisites of administrative due process were met. It cannot be negated by the fact that the parents of Juan Ramon were not given any notice of the proceedings. Juan Ramon, who at the time was 18 years of age, was already a college student, intelligent and mature enough to know his responsibilities. He was fully cognizant of the gravity of the offense he committed as he asked if he could be expelled for what he did. When informed about the 19 December 1967 meeting of the Board of Discipline, he was asked to seek advice and assistance from his guardian and or parents. The fact that he chose to remain silent and did not inform them about his case, not even when he went home to Bacolod City for his Christmas vacation, was not the fault of the University. (51) ALCUAZ v. PSBA 161 SCRA 7 (1988) THE RIGHT TO CROSS-EXAMINATION IS NOT INCLUDED IN THE GUARANTEE OF DUE PROCESS. Respondent students may not use the argument that since they were not accorded the opportunity to see and examine the written statements which became the basis of petitioners' February 14, 1991 order, they were denied procedural due process. Granting that they were denied such opportunity, the same may not be said to detract from the observance of due process, for disciplinary cases involving students need not necessarily include the right to cross examination. An administrative proceeding conducted to investigate students' participation in a hazing activity need not be clothed with the attributes of a judicial proceeding. A closer examination of the March 2, 1991 hearing which characterized the rules on the investigation as being summary in nature and that respondent students have no right to examine affiants-neophytes, reveals that this is but a reiteration of our previous ruling in Alcuaz vs. PSBA, Q.C. Branch, 161 SCRA 20. FACTS: Bundoc, John Carmona, Anna Shiela Dinoso, Rafael Encarnacion, et. al., are all bonafide students of the Philippine School of Business Administration (PSBA) Quezon City. As early as 22 March 1986, the students and the PSBA, Q.C. had already agreed on certain matters which would govern their activities within the school. In spite of the agreement, the students felt the need to hold dialogues. Among others they demanded the negotiation of a new agreement, which demand was turned down by the school, resulting in mass assemblies and barricades of school entrances. Subsequently dialogues proved futile. Finally, on 8 October 1996, the students received uniform letters from PSBA giving them 3 days to explain why the school should not take/mete out any administrative sanction on their direct participation and/or conspiring with others in the commission of tumultuous and anarchic acts on October 2, 3, and 7. On 22 October 1982, the letter was answered by the counsel for the students in a reply letter. During the regular enrollment period, the students were allegedly blacklisted and denied admission for the second semester of SY 1986-1987. On 28 October 1986 the President of the Student Council filed a complaint with the Director of the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports (MECS) against the PSBA for barring the enrollment of the Student Council Officers and student leaders. Simultaneously

on the same date, the student council wrote the President, Board of Trustees, requesting for a written statement of the school’s final decision regarding their enrollment. Another demand letter was made by Counsel for the students Atty. Alan Romullo Yap, also to the President, Board of Trustees, to enroll his clients within 48 hours. All these notwithstanding, no relief appeared to be forthcoming. The students filed a petition for review on certiorari and prohibition with preliminary mandatory injunction. ISSUE: Whether the students were deprived of due process in the refusal of PSBA to readmit them. HELD: After the close of the first semester, the PSBA-QC no longer has any existing contract either with the students or with the intervening teachers. The contract having been terminated, there is no more contract to speak of. The school cannot be compelled to enter into another contract with said students and teachers. The right of the school to refuse re-enrollment of students for academic delinquency and violation of disciplinary regulations has always been recognized by the Court, as it is sanctioned by law. Section 107 of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools considers academic delinquency and violation of disciplinary regulations as valid grounds for refusing re-enrollment of students. Due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail proceedings and hearings similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of justice. Such proceedings may be summary and cross-examination is not even an essential part thereof. Accordingly, the minimum standards laid down by the Court to meet the demands of procedural due process are: (1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them; (2) they shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired: (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them; (4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case. Herein, conditions 3, 4 and 5 had not been complied with. The Court, however, ordered an investigation to be conducted by the school authorities in the interest of justice. Further, it is well settled that by reason of their special knowledge and expertise gained from the handling of specific matters falling under their respective jurisdictions, the Court ordinarily accords respect if not finality to factual findings of administrative tribunals, unless the factual findings are not supported by evidence; where the findings are vitiated by fraud, imposition or collusion; where the procedure which led to the factual findings is irregular; when palpable errors are committed; or when a grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, or capriciousness is manifest. Herein, a careful scrutiny of the Report and Recommendation of the Special Investigating Committee shows it does not fall under any of the above exceptions. Thus, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition, but in the light of compassionate equity, students who were, in view of the absence of academic deficiencies, scheduled to graduate during the school year when the petition was filed, should be allowed to re-enroll and to graduate in due time. (52) ARIEL NON v. HON. DANES G.R. NO. 89317, May 20, 1990 FACTS: Petitioners, students in private respondent Mabini Colleges, Inc. in Daet, Camarines Norte, were not allowed to re-enroll by the school for the academic year 1988-1989 for leading or participating in student mass actions against the school in the preceding semester. The subject of the protests is not, however, made clear in the pleadings. Petitioners filed a petition in the court a quo seeking their readmission or re-enrollment to the school, but the trial court dismissed the petition stating the fact that the ruling in the Alcuaz vs. PSBA is exactly on the point at issue in this case but the authority of the school regarding admission of students is a matter of compassionate equity. A motion for reconsideration was filed, but this was denied by the trial court According to the trial court, Petitioners' claim of lack of due process cannot prosper in view of their failure to specifically deny respondent's affirmative defenses that "they were given all the chances to air their grievances on February 9, 10, 16, and 18, 1988, and also on February 22, 1988 during which they were represented by Atty. Jose L. Lapak" and that on February 22, 1988, the date of the resumption of classes at Mabini College, petitioners continued their rally picketing, even though without any renewal permit, physically coercing students not to attend their classes, thereby disrupting the scheduled classes and depriving a great majority of students of their right to be present

in their classes. Also, the petitioners waived their privilege to be admitted for re-enrollment with respondent college when they adopted, signed, and used its enrollment form which states that the Mabini College reserves the right to deny admission of students whose scholarship and attendance are unsatisfactory and to require withdrawal of students whose conduct discredits the institution and/or whose activities unduly disrupts or interfere with the efficient operation of the college. Lastly, the case being a mere privilege and not a legal right for a student to be enrolled or reenrolled, respondent Mabini College is free to admit or not admit the petitioners for re-enrollment in view of the academic freedom enjoyed by the school in accordance with the Supreme Court rulings. ISSUE: Whether there was due process. RULING: In Guzman, the imposition of disciplinary sanctions requires observance of procedural due process. Thus: There are minimum standards which must be met to satisfy the demands of procedural due process; and these are, that (1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them; (2) they shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them; (4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case. Moreover, the penalty imposed must be proportionate to the offense committed. As stated in Malabanan, "[i]f the concept of proportionality between the offense committed and sanction imposed is not followed, an element of arbitrariness intrudes." It does not appear that the petitioners were afforded due process, in the manner expressed in Guzman, before they were refused re-enrollment. In fact, it would appear from the pleadings that the decision to refuse them re-enrollment because of failing grades was a mere afterthought. It is not denied that what incurred the ire of the school authorities was the student mass actions conducted in February 1988 and which were led and/or participated in by petitioners. Certainly, excluding students because of failing grades when the cause for the action taken against them undeniably related to possible breaches of discipline not only is a denial of due process but also constitutes a violation of the basic tenets of fair play. However, these should not be taken to mean that no disciplinary action could have been taken against petitioners for breach of discipline if the facts had so warranted. In line with the Court's ruling in Malabanan, petitioners could have been subjected to disciplinary proceedings in connection with the February 1988 mass actions. But the penalty that could have been imposed must be commensurate to the offense committed and, as set forth in Guzman, it must be imposed only after the requirements of procedural due process have been complied with. This is explicit from the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, which provides in Paragraph 145 that "[n]o penalty shall be imposed upon any student, except for cause as defined in this Manual and/or in the school's rules and regulations duly promulgated and only after due investigation shall have been conducted." But this matter of disciplinary proceedings and the imposition of administrative sanctions have become moot and academic. Petitioners, who have been refused readmission or re-enrollment and who have been effectively excluded from respondent school for four (4) semesters, have already been more than sufficiently penalized for any breach of discipline they might have committed when they led and participated in the mass actions that, according to respondents, resulted in the disruption of classes.