Consti-2-bill-of-rights-first-4-case-digests.docx

II. BILL OF RIGHTS  DOCTRINE OF PREFERRED FREEDOM (HIERARCHY OF RIGHTS) (1) PBM Employees Org. vs. PBM Co., Inc. 51 SCRA 189 (1973) FACTS: Philippine Blooming Employees Organization (PBMEO) decided to stage a mass demonstration in front of Malacañang to express their grievances against the alleged abuses of the Pasig Police. The parties stipulated that the company, after learning the mass demonstration, informed the union panel that they even if the demonstration is an inalienable right granted by the Constitution, it should not unduly prejudice the normal operation of the company. As such, they warned the PBMEO representatives that workers who will participate in the demonstration and the officers present who are the organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to report for work the following morning (March 4, 1969) shall be dismissed, because such failure is a violation of the existing CBA provision on NO LOCKOUT — NO STRIKE article and, therefore, would be amounting to an illegal strike. However, the Union proceeded to the strike despite pleas from the Company. PBMEO contended that they did not violate the existing CBA because they gave the respondent Company prior notice of the mass demonstration and that the said mass demonstration was a valid exercise of their constitutional freedom of speech against the alleged abuses of some Pasig policemen; and that their mass demonstration was not a declaration of strike because it was not directed against the respondent firm. PBMEO was charged by the court of industrial relations guilty of bargaining in bad faith as directly responsible for perpetrating the said unfair labor practice were considered to have lost their status as employees of the respondent Company. ISSUE: Whether the mass demonstration of PBMEO constitutes a violation in the CBA hence, the dismissal is legal

RULING: No. The pretension of their employer that it would suffer loss or damage by reason of the absence of its employees is a plea for the preservation merely of their property rights. Such apprehended loss or damage would not spell the difference between the life and death of the firm or its owners or its management. While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights over property rights is recognized. Because these freedoms are “delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society” and the “threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions,” they “need breathing space to survive,” permitting government regulation only “with narrow specificity.” Apart from violating the constitutional guarantees of free speech and assembly as well as the right to petition for redress of grievances of the employees, the dismissal constitutes a denial of social justice likewise assured by the fundamental law to these lowly employees. A. DUE PROCESS  Writ of Amparo (2) Sec. of National Defense vs. Manalo G.R. No. 180906 October 7, 2008 FACTS: The case at bar is the first petition for a writ of Amparo filed before this Court. CONTENTION OF RESPONDENTS: Feb 14, 2006 - Brothers Raymond and Reynaldo were abducted and physically beaten up by several armed soldiers. They were taken to a house they didn't know. They were beaten and interrogated by soldiers. Days later, Raymond's interrogators were high officials. After three weeks of detention and beatings, Raymond attempted to escape. He managed to free from the chains and jumped through the window. Women along the way told him that he was in Fort Magsaysay. However, some soldiers spotted him, he was caught and

beaten up and was returned to where they were detained. For about three and a half months, the respondents were detained there. The respondents were transferred to another location (Sapang) and same thing, they were beaten and interrogated. They were again transferred to another location where Raymond met Gen. Palparan where the latter made a bargain that Raymond's parents should not attend hearings, rallies and meet with human rights groups if they want to be safe. Respondent agreed out of fear. Then, they were brought to their parents’ house. In the presence of soldiers, Raymond relayed to his parents what Gen. Palparan told him. They acceded in fear. Soldiers threatened the parents that if they continued to join human rights rallies, they would never see their children again. The respondents were then brought back to Sapang. From November 2006 to June 2007, the brothers were transferred from one place to another and were made to work for the soldiers while still being interrogated and tortured every time, throughout the period. June 13, 2007, Raymond and Reynaldo were brought to a farm in Pangasinan. Respondents started to plan their escape. One night, Raymond and Reynaldo proceeded towards the highway, leaving behind their drunk sleeping guards. They boarded a bus bound for Manila and were thus freed from captivity. DEFENSE OF PETITIONER: 1. Petitioners Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo were not at any time arrested, forcibly abducted, detained, held incommunicado, disappeared or under the custody by the military. 2. That no evidence was introduced to establish their personal involvement in the taking of the Manalo brothers. ISSUE: The CA erred in granting the petition for Writ of Amparo in favor of the respondents by

believing and giving full faith and credit to the incredible uncorroborated, contradicted, and obviously scripted, rehearsed and self-serving affidavit/testimony of respondents. COURT'S RULING: Petition was granted. CA ruling affirmed. The Writ of Amparo October 24, 2007, the Court promulgated the Amparo Rule in light of the prevalence of extralegal killing and enforced disappearances. It was intended to address the problem of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances or to threats thereof. Extralegal killings are killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings. On the other hand, enforced disappearances are attended by the following characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a government official or organized groups or private individuals acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the protection of law. Amparo literally means "protection' in Spanish. The writ originated from Mexico. 1987 Constitution and the Importance of the Writ in cases involving extralegal killings and enforced disappearances The 1987 Constitution does not explicitly provide for the writ of Amparo, but some Amparo protections are guaranteed by our charter. The second paragraph of Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, the Grave Abuse Clause, provides for the judicial power to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or

excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. Amparo libertad (Liberty Amparo) is comparable to the remedy of habeas corpus found in several provisions of the 1987 Constitution. While constitutional rights can be protected under the Grave Abuse Clause through remedies of injunction or prohibition and a petition for habeas corpus, these remedies may not be adequate to address the pestering problem of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. However, with the swiftness required to resolve a petition for a writ of amparo through summary proceedings and the availability of appropriate interim and permanent reliefs under the Amparo Rule, this offers a better remedy to extralegal killings and enforced disappearances and threats. The remedy provides rapid judicial relief as it partakes of a summary proceeding that requires only substantial evidence to make the appropriate reliefs available to the petitioner; it is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring preponderance of evidence, or administrative responsibility requiring substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive proceedings. The writ of amparo serves both preventive and curative roles in addressing the problem of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. It is preventive in that it breaks the expectation of impunity in the commission of these offenses; it is curative in that it facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators as it will inevitably yield leads to subsequent investigation and action. In the long run, the goal of both the preventive and curative roles is to deter the further commission of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. Measure of the Court for granting or denying grant of Writ

Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides for the following causes of action: "The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity. The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. " Sections 17 and 18, provide for the degree of proof required: "The parties shall establish their claims by substantial evidence. If the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate; otherwise, the privilege shall be denied. Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. In this case, the abduction, detention, torture, and escape of the respondents were narrated by respondent Raymond Manalo in a clear and convincing manner. His account is dotted with countless candid details of respondents harrowing experience and tenacious will to escape, captured through his different senses and etched in his memory. The SC was convinced that the reason for the abduction was the suspicion that the petitioners were either members or sympathizers of the NPA. Gen. Palparan's participation in the abduction was also established. At the very least, he was aware of the petitioners’ captivity at the hands of men in uniform assigned to his

command. In fact, he or any other officer tendered no controversion to the firm claim of Raymond that he (Gen. Palparan) met them in person in a safe house in Bulacan and told them what he wanted them and their parents to do or not to be doing. Gen. Palparans direct and personal role in the abduction might not have been shown but his knowledge of the dire situation of the petitioners during their long captivity at the hands of military personnel under his command bespoke of his indubitable command policy that unavoidably encouraged and not merely tolerated the abduction of civilians without due process of law and without probable cause. It is clear, through the respondent's affidavits that the participation of some military personnel in the abduction and forced disappearance of the petitioners was established. In a foreign jurisprudence entitled Ortiz v. Guatemala, similar evidence was considered, in finding that complainant Sister Diana Ortiz was abducted and tortured by agents of the Guatemalan government. In this case, Sister Ortiz was kidnapped and tortured in early November 1989. The Commission’s findings of fact were mostly based on the consistent and credible statements, written and oral, made by Sister Ortiz regarding her ordeal. The personal testimonies therefore of those subjected to torture or those whose rights were violated in cases like this are the ones in the best position to testify or provide evidence. Are the respondents entitled to the Writ? Yes. Even if the enforced disappearance of both respondents Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo has now passed as they have escaped from captivity and surfaced, and respondents admit that they are no longer in detention and are physically free, they assert that they are not

free in every sense of the word as their movements continue to be restricted for fear that people they have named in their Judicial Affidavits and testified against (in the case of Raymond) are still at large and have not been held accountable in any way. These people are directly connected to the AFP and are, thus, in a position to threaten respondents’ rights to life, liberty and security. Respondents claim that they are under threat of being once again abducted, kept captive or even killed, which constitute a direct violation of their right to security of person. Right to Security and Right of Liberty (Expanded interpretation of Right to Security) Respondents point out that n; it is also seen as an expansion of rights based on the prohibition against torture and cruel and unusual punishment. Conceding that there is no right to security expressly mentioned in Article III Section 2, they submit that their rights to be kept free from torture and from incommunicado detention and solitary detention places fall under the general coverage of the right to security of person under the writ of Amparo. They submit that the Court ought to give an expansive recognition of the right to security of person in view of the State Policy under Article II of the 1987 Constitution which enunciates that, The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights. Finally, to justify a liberal interpretation of the right to security of person, respondents cite the teaching in Moncupa v. Enrile that the right to liberty may be made more meaningful only if there is no undue restraint by the State on the exercise of that liberty such as a requirement to report under unreasonable restrictions that amounted to a deprivation of liberty or being put under monitoring and surveillance.

In sum, respondents assert that their cause of action consists in the threat to their right to life and liberty, and a violation of their right to security. Under Art. III Sec. 2: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge At the core of this guarantee is the immunity of one’s person, including the extensions of his/her person houses, papers, and effects against government intrusion. Section 2 not only limits the state’s power over a person’s home and possessions, but more importantly, protects the privacy and sanctity of the person himself. The purpose of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures is to prevent violations of private security in person and property and unlawful invasion of the security of the home by officers of the law acting under legislative or judicial sanction and to give remedy against such usurpation when attempted. The right to privacy is an essential condition to the dignity and happiness and to the peace and security of every individual, whether it be of home or of persons and correspondence. The constitutional inviolability of this great fundamental right against unreasonable searches and seizures must be deemed absolute as nothing is closer to a mans soul than the serenity of his privacy and the assurance of his personal security. Any interference allowable can only be for the best causes and reasons. Right to Security vs Right to Life

While the right to life under Article III, Section 1 guarantees essentially the right to be alive - upon which the enjoyment of all other rights is preconditioned - the right to security of person is a guarantee of the secure quality of this life: The life to which each person has a right is not a life lived in fear that his person and property may be unreasonably violated by a powerful ruler. Rather, it is a life lived with the assurance that the government he established and consented to, will protect the security of his person and property. The ideal of security in life and property pervades the whole history of man. It touches every aspect of man’s existence. In a broad sense, the right to security of person emanates in a person’s legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his health, and his reputation. It includes the right to exist, and the right to enjoyment of life while existing, and it is invaded not only by a deprivation of life but also of those things which are necessary to the enjoyment of life according to the nature, temperament, and lawful desires of the individual. Right to Security in International Laws The right to security of person is freedom from fear. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) enunciates that a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people. Article 9(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) also provides for the right to security of person: Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are established by law.

The Philippines is a signatory to both the UDHR and the ICCPR. What then is the Writ of Amparo and its scope throughout other Constitutional Rights? 1. Under Section 1 of the Amparo Rule, freedom from fear is the right and any threat to the rights to life, liberty or security is the actionable wrong. Fear is a state of mind, a reaction; threat is a stimulus, a cause of action. Fear caused by the same stimulus can range from being baseless to well-founded as people react differently. The degree of fear can vary from one person to another with the variation of the prolificacy of their imagination, strength of character or past experience with the stimulus. Thus, in the amparo context, it is more correct to say that the right to security is actually the freedom from threat. Viewed in this light, the threatened with violation Clause in the latter part of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule is a form of violation of the right to security mentioned in the earlier part of the provision. 2. The right to security of person is a guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity or security. Article III, Section II of the 1987 Constitution guarantees that, as a general rule, ones body cannot be searched or invaded without a search warrant. Physical injuries inflicted in the context of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances constitute more than a search or invasion of the body. It may constitute dismemberment, physical disabilities, and painful physical intrusion. As the degree of physical injury increases, the danger to life itself escalates. Notably, in criminal law, physical injuries constitute a crime against persons because they are an affront to the bodily integrity or security of a person. Physical torture, force, and violence are a severe invasion of bodily integrity. When employed to vitiate the free will such as to force

the victim to admit, reveal or fabricate incriminating information, it constitutes an invasion of both bodily and psychological integrity as the dignity of the human person includes the exercise of free will. (IN RELATION TO TOPIC ON DUE PROCESS) Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution more specifically proscribes bodily and psychological invasion. Also under this provision, threat and intimidation that vitiate the free will - although not involving invasion of bodily integrity nevertheless constitute a violation of the right to security in the sense of freedom from threat as afore-discussed. Article III, Section 12 guarantees freedom from dehumanizing abuses of persons under investigation for the commission of an offense. Victims of enforced disappearances who are not even under such investigation should all the more be protected from these degradations. 3. The right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of ones rights by the government. In the context of the writ of amparo, this right is built into the guarantees of the right to life and liberty and the right to security of person (as freedom from threat and guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity). The right to security of person in this third sense is a corollary of the policy that the State guarantees full respect for human rights under Article II, Section 11. As the government is the chief guarantor of order and security, the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and security of person is rendered ineffective if government does not afford protection to these rights especially when they are under threat. While the right to security of person appears in conjunction with the right to liberty, the right to security of person can still exist independently of the right to liberty. In other words, there need not necessarily be a

deprivation of liberty for the right to security of person to be invoked. The right to security arises only in the context of arrest and detention. However, there is no evidence that it was intended (in the UDHR) to narrow the concept of the right to security only to situations of formal deprivation of liberty. At the same time, States parties have undertaken to guarantee the rights enshrined in the Covenant. It cannot be the case that, as a matter of law, States can ignore known threats to the life of persons under their jurisdiction, just because that he or she is not arrested or otherwise detained. States parties are under an obligation to take reasonable and appropriate measures to protect them. An interpretation of article 9 which would allow a State party to ignore threats to the personal security of nondetained persons within its jurisdiction would render totally ineffective the guarantees of the Covenant. Was there a violation of the respondents' right to security? Yes. The violation of the right to security as freedom from threat to respondents’ life, liberty and security. While respondents were detained, they were threatened that if they escaped, their families, including them, would be killed. Then, respondents have finally escaped. The condition of the threat to be killed has come to pass. It should be stressed that they are now free from captivity not because they were released by virtue of a lawful order or voluntarily freed by their abductors. It ought to be recalled that towards the end of their ordeal, sometime in June 2007 when respondents were detained in a camp in Bataan, respondents’ captors even told them that they were still deciding whether they should be executed. With their escape, this continuing threat to their life is apparent, moreso now that they

have surfaced and implicated specific officers in the military not only in their own abduction and torture, but also in those of other persons known to have disappeared. Understandably, since their escape, respondents have been under concealment and protection by private citizens because of the threat to their life, liberty and security. The threat vitiates their free will as they are forced to limit their movements or activities. Precisely because respondents are being shielded from the perpetrators of their abduction, they cannot be expected to show evidence of overt acts of threat such as face-to-face intimidation or written threats to their life, liberty and security. Nonetheless, the circumstances of respondents abduction, detention, torture and escape reasonably support a conclusion that there is an apparent threat that they will again be abducted, tortured, and this time, even executed. These constitute threats to their liberty, security, and life, actionable through a petition for a writ of amparo. Was there a violation of the respondents' right to protection by the government? Yes. Apart from the failure of military elements to provide protection to respondents by themselves perpetrating the abduction, detention, and torture, they also miserably failed in conducting an effective investigation of respondents’ abduction. The one-day investigation conducted was very limited, superficial, and one-sided. To this day, however, almost a year after the policy directive for investigation of the incident was issued by petitioner Secretary of National Defense, respondents have not been furnished the results of the investigation which they now seek through the instant petition for a writ of amparo.

The petitioners directed to comply with A. QUISUMBING LEONARDO reliefs. Associate Justice

CONSUELO YNARES-SAN Associate Justice

ON DUE PROCESS (in connection(Sgd.) with the ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ topic) Associate Justice The taking of the brothers was illegal (Sgd.) since there was no warrant. Thus MA. theyALICIA were AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ confiscated of their right to due process. They Justice Associate were subjected to extralegal interrogation and (Sgd.) all that (you know). Under Article III, Section 2 of CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES the 1987 Constitution, the protection Associate of the Justice people from the unreasonable intrusion of the (Sgd.)of the government is provided, not a protection DANTE O. TINGA government from the demand of the people Associate Justice such as respondents. (Sgd.) PRESBITERO J. VELASCO JR.  Writ of Habeas Data Associate Justice A.M. No. 08-01-16-SC January 22, 2008 (Sgd.) RUBEN T. REYES TERESITA J. Republic of the Philippines Associate Justice

(Sgd.) ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice

SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC A. M. No. 08-1-16-SC January 22, 2008 THE RULE ON THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA RESOLUTION Acting on the recommendation of the Chairperson of the Committee on Revision of the Rules of Court submitting for this Court’s consideration and approval the proposed Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data, the Court Resolved to APPROVE the same. This Resolution shall take effect on February 2, 2008, following its publication in three (3) newspapers of general circulation. January 22, 2008.

S. PUNO ce (Sgd.)

(Sgd.) RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice (Sgd.) ADOLFO S. AZCUNA Associate Justice

(ON OFFICIAL LEAVE) MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice

(Sgd.) ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NA Associate Justice (Sgd.) LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice

---------------------------------------------------------------------------THE RULE ON THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA SECTION 1. Habeas Data. - The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party. SEC. 2. Who May File. - Any aggrieved party may file a petition for the writ of habeas data. However, in cases of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, the petition may be filed by: (a) Any member of the immediate family of the aggrieved party, namely: the spouse, children and parents; or (b) Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the aggrieved

party within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity, in default of those mentioned in the preceding paragraph; or SEC. 3. Where to File. - The petition may be filed with the Regional Trial Court where the petitioner or respondent resides, or that which has jurisdiction over the place where the data or information is gathered, collected or stored, at the option of the petitioner. The petition may also be filed with the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals or the Sandiganbayan when the action concerns public data files of government offices. SEC. 4. Where Returnable; Enforceable. - When the writ is issued by a Regional Trial Court or any judge thereof, it shall be returnable before such court or judge. When issued by the Court of Appeals or the Sandiganbayan or any of its justices, it may be returnable before such court or any justice thereof, or to any Regional Trial Court of the place where the petitioner or respondent resides, or that which has jurisdiction over the place where the data or information is gathered, collected or stored. When issued by the Supreme Court or any of its justices, it may be returnable before such Court or any justice thereof, or before the Court of Appeals or the Sandiganbayan or any of its justices, or to any Regional Trial Court of the place where the petitioner or respondent resides, or that which has jurisdiction over the place where the data or information is gathered, collected or stored. The writ of habeas data shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. Sec. 5. Docket Fees. - No docket and other lawful fees shall be required from an indigent petitioner. The petition of the indigent shall be docked and acted upon immediately, without prejudice to subsequent submission of proof of indigency not later than fifteen (15) days from the filing of the petition. SEC. 6. Petition. - A verified written petition for a writ of habeas data should contain: (a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner and the respondent; (b) The manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and

how it affects the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party; (c) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to secure the data or information; (d) The location of the files, registers or databases, the government office, and the person in charge, in possession or in control of the data or information, if known; (e) The reliefs prayed for, which may include the updating, rectification, suppression or destruction of the database or information or files kept by the respondent. In case of threats, the relief may include a prayer for an order enjoining the act complained of; and (f) Such other relevant reliefs as are just and equitable. SEC. 7. Issuance of the Writ. - Upon the filing of the petition, the court, justice or judge shall immediately order the issuance of the writ if on its face it ought to issue. The clerk of court shall issue the writ under the seal of the court and cause it to be served within three (3) days from the issuance; or, in case of urgent necessity, the justice or judge may issue the writ under his or her own hand, and may deputize any officer or person serve it. The writ shall also set the date and time for summary hearing of the petition which shall not be later than ten (10) work days from the date of its issuance. SEC. 8. Penalty for Refusing to Issue or Serve the Writ. - A clerk of court who refuses to issue the writ after its allowance, or a deputized person who refuses to serve the same, shall be punished by the court, justice or judge for contempt without prejudice to other disciplinary actions. SEC. 9. How the Writ is Served. - The writ shall be served upon the respondent by a judicial officer or by a person deputized by the court, justice or judge who shall retain a copy on which to make a return of service. In case the writ cannot be served personally on the respondent, the rules on substituted service shall apply. SEC. 10. Return; Contents. - The respondent shall file a verified written return together with supporting affidavits within five

(5) working days from service of the writ, which period may be reasonably extended by the Court for justifiable reasons. The return shall, among other things, contain the following: (a) The lawful defenses such as national security, state secrets, privileged communications, confidentiality of the source of information of media and others; (b) In case of respondent in charge, in possession or in control of the data or information subject of the petition; (i) a disclosure of the data or information about the petitioner, the nature of such data or information, and the purpose for its collection; (ii) the steps or actions taken by the respondent to ensure the security and confidentiality of the data or information; and, (iii) the currency and accuracy of the data or information held; and, (c) Other allegations relevant to the resolution of the proceeding. A general denial of the allegations in the petition shall not be allowed. SEC. 11. Contempt. - The court, justice or judge may punish with imprisonment or fine a respondent who commits contempt by making a false return, or refusing to make a return; or any person who otherwise disobeys or resist a lawful process or order of the court. SEC. 12. When Defenses May be Heard in Chambers. - A hearing in chambers may be conducted where the respondent invokes the defense that the release of the data or information in question shall compromise national security or state secrets, or when the data or information cannot be divulged to the public due to its nature or privileged character. Sec. 13. Prohibited Pleadings and Motions. - The following pleadings and motions are prohibited: (a) Motion to dismiss; (b) Motion for extension of time to file return, opposition, affidavit, position paper and other pleadings;

(c) Dilatory motion for postponement; (d) Motion for a bill of particulars; (e) Counterclaim or cross-claim; (f) Third-party complaint; (g) Reply; (h) Motion to declare respondent in default; (i) Intervention; (j) Memorandum; (k) Motion for reconsideration of interlocutory orders or interim relief orders; and (l) Petition for certiorari, mandamus or prohibition against any interlocutory order. SEC. 14. Return; Filing. - In case the respondent fails to file a return, the court, justice or judge shall proceed to hear the petition ex parte, granting the petitioner such relief as the petition may warrant unless the court in its discretion requires the petitioner to submit evidence. SEC. 15. Summary Hearing. - The hearing on the petition shall be summary. However, the court, justice or judge may call for a preliminary conference to simplify the issues and determine the possibility of obtaining stipulations and admissions from the parties. SEC. 16. Judgment. - The court shall render judgment within ten (10) days from the time the petition is submitted for decision. If the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence, the court shall enjoin the act complained of, or order the deletion, destruction, or rectification of the erroneous data or information and grant other relevant reliefs as may be just and equitable; otherwise, the privilege of the writ shall be denied. Upon its finality, the judgment shall be enforced by the sheriff or any lawful officers as may be designated by the court, justice or judge within five (5) working days. SEC. 17. Return of Service. - The officer who executed the final judgment shall, within three (3) days from its enforcement, make a verified return to the court. The return shall contain a full statement of the proceedings under the writ and a complete inventory of the database or information, or documents and articles inspected, updated,

rectified, or deleted, with copies served on the petitioner and the respondent. The officer shall state in the return how the judgment was enforced and complied with by the respondent, as well as all objections of the parties regarding the manner and regularity of the service of the writ. SEC. 18. Hearing on Officer’s Return. - The court shall set the return for hearing with due notice to the parties and act accordingly. SEC. 19. Appeal. - Any party may appeal from the final judgment or order to the Supreme Court under Rule 45. The appeal may raise questions of fact or law or both. The period of appeal shall be five (5) working days from the date of notice of the judgment or final order. The appeal shall be given the same priority as in habeas corpus and amparo cases. SEC. 20. Institution of Separate Actions. - The filing of a petition for the writ of habeas data shall not preclude the filing of separate criminal, civil or administrative actions. SEC. 21. Consolidation. - When a criminal action is filed subsequent to the filing of a petition for the writ, the latter shall be consolidated with the criminal action. When a criminal action and a separate civil action are filed subsequent to a petition for a writ of habeas data, the petition shall be consolidated with the criminal action. After consolidation, the procedure under this Rule shall continue to govern the disposition of the reliefs in the petition. SEC. 22. Effect of Filing of a Criminal Action. - When a criminal action has been commenced, no separate petition for the writ shall be filed. The relief under the writ shall be available to an aggrieved party by motion in the criminal case. The procedure under this Rule shall govern the disposition of the reliefs available under the writ of habeas data. SEC. 23. Substantive Rights. - This Rule shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. SEC. 24. Suppletory Application of the Rules of Court. - The Rules of Court shall

apply suppletorily insofar as it is not inconsistent with this Rule. SEC. 25. Effectivity. - This Rule shall take effect on February 2, 2008, following its publication in three (3) newspapers of general circulation. [PUBLISHED IN THE MANILA BULLETIN, THE PHILIPPINE STAR AND THE PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER ON 25 JANUARY 2008] (3) DR. JOY MARGATE LEE v. P/SUPT. NERI A. ILAGAN G.R. No. 203254 October 08, 2014 FACTS: Neri, a police officer, filed a petition for the issuance of Writ of Habeas Data against Joy, her former common law partner. According to him, sometime in July 2011, he visited Joy’s condominium and rested for a while. When he arrived at his office, he noticed his digital camera missing. On August 23, 2011, Joy confronted him about a purported sex video she discovered from the digital camera showing him and another woman. He denied the video and demanded the return of the camera, but she refused. The had an altercation where Neri allegedly slammed Joy’s head against a wall and then walked away. Because of this, Joy filed several cases against him, including a case for violation of Republic Act 9262 and administrative cases before the Napolcom, utilising the said video. The use of the same violated his life to liberty, security and privacy and that of the other woman, thus he had no choice but to file the petition for issuance of the writ of habeas data. After finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the RTC issued the writ and directed Joy to appear before the RTC and produce Neri’s digital camera, as well as the original and copies of the video, and to make a return within five days from receipt. In her return,. Joy admitted keeping the memory card of the digital camera and reproducing the video but only for use as evidence in the cases she filed against Neri. Neri’s petitions should be dismissed because its filing was only aimed at suppressing the evidence in the cases she filed

against him; and she is not engaged in the gathering, collecting, or storing of data regarding the person of Neri. The RTC granted Neri’s petition and ordered the turn-over of the video to Neri and enjoined Joy from reproducing the same. It disregarded Joy’s defense that she is not engaged in the collection, gathering and storage of data, and that her acts of reproducing the same and showing it to other persons (Napolcom) violated Neri’s right to privacy and humiliated him. It clarified that it ruling only on the return of the video and not on its admissibility as evidence. Dissatisfied, Joy filed the instant petition before the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether the filing of the petition for issuance of the writ of habeas data was proper RULING: NO. A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC, or the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data (Habeas Data Rule), was conceived as a response, given the lack of effective and available remedies, to address the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances. It was conceptualized as a judicial remedy enforcing the right to privacy, most especially the right to informational privacy of individuals, which is defined as “the right to control the collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination of data about oneself.” As defined in Section 1 of the Habeas Data Rule, the writ of habeas data now stands as “a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home, and correspondence of the aggrieved party.” Thus, in order to support a petition for the issuance of such writ, Section 6 of the Habeas Data Rule essentially requires that the petition sufficiently alleges, among others, “[t]he manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it affects the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party.” In other words, the petition must adequately show that there exists a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other. Corollarily, the

allegations in the petition must be supported by substantial evidence showing an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim. In this relation, it bears pointing out that the writ of habeas data will not issue to protect purely property or commercial concerns nor when the grounds invoked in support of the petitions therefor are vague and doubtful. In this case, the Court finds that Ilagan was not able to sufficiently allege that his right to privacy in life, liberty or security was or would be violated through the supposed reproduction and threatened dissemination of the subject sex video. While Ilagan purports a privacy interest in the suppression of this video – which he fears would somehow find its way to Quiapo or be uploaded in the internet for public consumption – he failed to explain the connection between such interest and any violation of his right to life, liberty or security. Indeed, courts cannot speculate or contrive versions of possible transgressions. As the rules and existing jurisprudence on the matter evoke, alleging and eventually proving the nexus between one’s privacy right to the cogent rights to life, liberty or security are crucial in habeas data cases, so much so that a failure on either account certainly renders a habeas data petition dismissible, as in this case. In fact, even discounting the insufficiency of the allegations, the petition would equally be dismissible due to the inadequacy of the evidence presented. As the records show, all that Ilagan submitted in support of his petition was his self-serving testimony which hardly meets the substantial evidence requirement as prescribed by the Habeas Data Rule. This is because nothing therein would indicate that Lee actually proceeded to commit any overt act towards the end of violating Ilagan’s right to privacy in life, liberty or security. Nor would anything on record even lead a reasonable mind to conclude that Lee was going to use the subject video in order to achieve unlawful ends – say for instance, to spread it to the public so as to ruin Ilagan’s reputation. Contrastingly, Lee even made it clear in her testimony that the only reason why she reproduced the subject video was to legitimately utilize the same as

evidence in the criminal and administrative cases that she filed against Ilagan. Hence, due to the insufficiency of the allegations as well as the glaring absence of substantial evidence, the Court finds it proper to reverse the RTC Decision and dismiss the habeas data petition. 

Purpose of the guaranty

(4) Hurtado v. California 110 US 516, 1884 The purpose of the guaranty is to protect individual’s right to life, liberty, and property against the encroachment of powers delegated to the government. Hence, it shall also serve as a limitation to the government’s power. NOTE: The Constitution of California authorizes prosecutions for felonies by information, after examination and commitment by a magistrate, without indictment by a grand jury, in the discretion of the legislature. Facts: The district Atty. Of Sacramento County (A prosecutor in the case) filed an information against Joseph Hurtado charging him with the crime of murder in the killing of one Jose Antonio Stuardo. He was found guilty of murder in the first degree punishable by death. Petitioner strongly hold that California denied him an indictment by a grand jury when he was prosecuted based only on information. Thus, further asserting that he was denied due process, which is violative of the 14th Amendment’s due process clause. Issue: Whether the petitioner’s prosecution based on an information is violative of the due process clause? Held: No, The Constitution is a document written for an expanding and undefined future. The broad concept of “due process of law” should not be held static by requiring a certain legal process over another. Thus, even though his case wasn’t presented to a grand jury, nevertheless, petitioner was afforded due process since the legal proceeding on California afforded him security of his liberty

and justice. It was stated on California Law that; “…authorizes prosecutions for felonies by information, after examination and commitment by a magistrate, without indictment by a grand jury, in the discretion of the legislature.” The Penal Code of the State makes provision for an examination by a magistrate, in the presence of the accused, who is entitled to the aid of counsel and the right of crossexamination of witnesses, whose testimony Is to be reduced to writing, and upon a certificate thereon by the magistrate that a described offence has been committed, and that there is sufficient cause to believe the accused guilty thereof, and an order holding him to answer thereto, requires an information to be filed against the accused in the Superior Court of the county in which the offence is triable, in the form of an indictment for the same offence. Moreover, the words "due process of law" in the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States do not necessarily require an indictment by a grand jury in a prosecution by a State for murder. The 14th Amendment was designed not to confine the States to a particular mode of procedure in judicial proceedings, and prohibit them from prosecuting for felonies by information instead of by indictment, if they chose to abolish the grand jury system. And the words ' due process of law' in the amendment do not mean and have not the effect to limit the powers of State governments to prosecutions for crime by indictment; but these words do mean law in its regular course of administration, according to prescribed forms, and in accordance with the general rules for the protection of individual rights. It would further mean that it shall also serve as a limitation upon the powers of the government, brought into being by the Constitution, it has now been added as an additional security to the individual against oppression by the States themselves; that one of these institutions is that of the grand jury, an indictment or presentment by which against the accused in cases of alleged felonies is an essential part of due process of law, in order that he may not be harassed or destroyed by

prosecutions founded only upon private malice or popular.