Conference Lse05 Reading4 Tsui
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Destabilizing websites By Lokman Tsui. Annenberg School for Communication, University of Pennsylvania Last updated March 16, 2005 Websites have been a prominent locale for mobilization. Mobilization efforts are, at times, considered destabilizing by a particular government. Here we are concerned primarily with two categories of such websites: a) “destabilizing websites” (i.e. sites considered to be such) the servers of which are located within the geographical of the government that perceives itself as threatened and b) such websites that are within the jurisdiction of another government. The latter category is particularly interesting because they lead to requests by the “threatened government” for the host government. Internet sites of the Falun Gong movements, for example, fall within both categories (located within and outside China). This paper will provide a comparative analysis of the different methods employed by governments to counter in specific these destabilizing websites. Case Studies We have identified a sample of websites that arguably fit the template. Some may not be appropriately viewed as imminently destabilizing. Obviously, there are a great many non-visible examples where Internet sites are closed down within authoritarian regimes. It is harder to enumerate sites where one state requests another state to take action. Summed up, they concern: Date: Government seeking stability: Party causing instability: Location of website: Content of website: Countermeasure by government:
May 13, 1999 UK American-based internet website US top-secret details of British intelligence agents requests to remove information, appeal to media not to publish the address of website, or its contents
Date: Government seeking stability: Party causing instability: Location of website: Content of website: Countermeasure by government:
August 30, 2000 Germany US internet service providers US Nazi propaganda request by Dusseldorf District Government President to prevent access to websites. Migration to US servers is mentioned as cause of fining German servers DM500,000 for hosting Nazi propaganda.
Date: Government seeking stability: Party causing instability: Location of website: Content of website: Countermeasure by government:
March 7, 2001 Japan Chinese hackers Saitama, Japan critical towards Japanese government, hacked website showing Chinese tank, Chinese messages about Diaoyu Islands website closed down
Date:
September 1, 2001
Government seeking stability: Party causing instability: Location of website: Content of website: Countermeasure by government:
Singapore Foreign Political Websites Outside Singapore Political websites Requirement to register, failure leads to blockade.
Date: Government seeking stability: Party causing instability: Location of website: Content of website: Countermeasure by government:
October 12, 2001 US IRAradio.com US terrorist website FBI closed it down
Date: Government seeking stability: Party causing instability: Location of website: Content of website: Countermeasure by government:
November 1, 2001 South Korea North Korean website China offers e-mail exchange and e-commerce approval of government required to subscribe to site
Date: Government seeking stability: Party causing instability: Location of website: Content of website: Countermeasure by government:
March 28, 2002 Bahrain opposition groups, Freedom Movement London, UK inciting sectarianism, offensive content blockades of London-based servers
Date: Government seeking stability: Party causing instability: Location of website: Content of website: Countermeasure by government:
April 24, 2002 China ABC (Australian Broadcasting Corp) Australia political sensitive to Chinese viewers Chinese foreign ministry spokeswoman denied government involvement
Date: Government seeking stability: Party causing instability:
February 4, 2003 Kyrgyzstan Opposition website (Kyrgyzstan Democratic Movement Party?) Kyrgyzstan critical of government, including shortcomings in the official draft version of the constitution website shutdown without explanation by ISP
Location of website: Content of website: Countermeasure by government: Date: Government seeking stability: Party causing instability: Location of website: Content of website: Countermeasure by government:
September 17, 2003 Uzbekistan Ozod Ovoz website Uzbekistan critical of Uzbek president, serves as public outlet for online protests about lack of freedom of expression blockade
Date: Government seeking stability: Party causing instability: Location of website: Content of website: Countermeasure by government:
September 23, 2003 India Meghalaya’s Khasi tribe, militant group India espousing the cause of the tribe blockade, to ensure “balanced flow of information”, not censorship
Date: Government seeking stability: Party causing instability: Location of website: Content of website:
December 21, 2003 Malaysia opposition parties UK inflammatory material, support for former DP Minister Anwar Ibrahim complaints lodged, unknown by who December 24, 2003 reopened?
Countermeasure by government: Update: Date: Government seeking stability: Party causing instability: Location of website: Content of website: Countermeasure by government: Date: Government seeking stability: Party causing instability: Location of website: Content of website: Countermeasure by government: Date: Government seeking stability: Party causing instability: Location of website: Content of website: Countermeasure by government:
May 14, 2004 Malaysia website of Acme Commerce Malaysia links to terrorist groups, showing beheading of US citizen in Iraq ordered ISP to close down website July 11, 2004 South Korea (alleged) Supreme Headquarters of Armed Islamic Warriors Iraq threat by militants to bomb South-Korean ships delivering US military supplies to Middle East security officials implemented “preventive measures” September 14, 2004 Russia kavkazcenter.com Lithuania support for radical field commander Shamil Basaev (his personal website is already blocked) Lithuanian ambassador summoned to Russian Foreign Ministry to explain failure of closing down website
Update: Date: Reaction to countermeasure: Countermeasure by government: Extra:
November 16, 2004 Relocation of server to Sweden Swedish ambassador called to discuss website Website previous on Finnish server (October 2004)
Date: Government seeking stability:
October 16, 2004 US (FBI)
Party causing instability: Location of website: Content of website: Countermeasure by government:
Indymedia London, UK independent media FBI seizure of servers
Date: Government seeking stability: Party causing instability: Location of website: Content of website: Countermeasure by government:
February 2, 2005 US Iran blogs Dallas, US Iran’s dissenting and liberal voices shutdown Discussion
When located inside the legal jurisdiction, it is generally easier to shutdown the website, as opposed to blocking or filtering. In contrast, when outside the legal jurisdiction, the government of the country hosting the server is sometimes requested to shutdown the website but more often the government seeking stability will block or filter the website. If “target” governments do not get the active participation of “server host”, then they resort to more covert means to disable a foreign website. For example, the Chinese government has been known to have launched Denial-of-Service (DOS) attacks against servers hosting Falun Gong websites located in the United States and Canada. These attacks were only by accident found to be initiated by the Chinese government. Because of the illegality of the technique, covertness is a likely characteristic. Some resources are available for further research. Some general websites on regulation, censorship and liability are at: : http://qlinks.net/quicklinks/, especially the sections concerning “content regulation”, “liability, jurisdiction and applicable law”, “racism and xenophobia”. There is an empty section on the website labelled “terrorism”. Terrorism, an ultimate description of a destabilizing activity, is a keyword to look out for when thinking about destabilizing websites. Since 9-11, government measures to act against opposite forces have gained more currency when posed under the label of ‘terrorism’. Other websites include: Caslon Analytics http://www.caslon.com.au/censorshipguide.htm This guide explores censorship, regulation of offensive material and free speech in the digital environment. It includes discussion of freedom of information, archives and whistleblowing legislation. Also see http://www.caslon.com.au/governanceguide5.htm ICE: Internet Censorship Explorer http://ice.citizenlab.org/ The Internet Censorship Explorer (ICE) is a blog maintained by the Citizen Lab's technical research director, Nart Villeneuve. ICE is an incubator where Nart explores the politics of technology (hacktivism, infowar/cyberterrorism and Internet filtering), develops ideas for future Citizen Lab projects, posts proof of concept code and any other snippets of raw data that don't really have a place anywhere else. ICE also contains bleeding edge Internet filtering and censorship research related to the work of the Citizen Lab and the OpenNet Initiative including the development of censorship circumvention technology. Also see the OpenNet Initiative: Documenting Internet Content Filtering Worldwide
http://www.opennetinitiative.net/index.php The ONI mission is to investigate and challenge state filtration and surveillance practices. “Our approach applies methodological rigor to the study of filtration and surveillance blending empirical case studies with sophisticated means for technical verification. Our aim is to generate a credible picture of these practices at a national, regional and corporate level, and to excavate their impact on state sovereignty, security, human rights, international law, and global governance.” http://www.citizenlab.org/index.php The Citizen Lab is an interdisciplinary laboratory based at the Munk Centre for International Studies at the University of Toronto, Canada focusing on advanced research and development at the intersection of digital media and world civic politics. Also http://www.infowar-monitor.net/index.php. The Information Warfare Monitor is a joint project of the Advanced Network Research Group, part of the Cambridge Programme for Security in International Society, University of Cambridge, and the Citizen Lab, an interdisciplinary laboratory based at the Munk Centre for International Studies, University of Toronto. “The Information Warfare Monitor is an advanced research project examining how states and non-state actors seek to exploit information and information systems to pursue political objectives through non-political means. The project seeks to examine this emerging dimension of global security on two levels:
•
•
Operational Case Studies -- by building a repertoire of grounded, multi-dimensional "case studies" of information warfare operations, and to do so by employing a crossdisciplinary fusion of advanced network monitoring/visualization tools and qualitative social science research methodologies. Consequences for Global Security -- by using the case study data to assess emerging threats and consequences of information operations on global security in its military, political, economic, legal and human rights dimensions.”
May 13, 1999 UK American-based internet website US top-secret details of British intelligence agents requests to remove information, appeal to media not to publish the address of website, or its contents
Date: Government seeking stability: Party causing instability: Location of website: Content of website: Countermeasure by government:
August 30, 2000 Germany US internet service providers US Nazi propaganda request by Dusseldorf District Government President to prevent access to websites. Migration to US servers is mentioned as cause of fining German servers DM500,000 for hosting Nazi propaganda.
Date: Government seeking stability: Party causing instability: Location of website: Content of website: Countermeasure by government:
March 7, 2001 Japan Chinese hackers Saitama, Japan critical towards Japanese government, hacked website showing Chinese tank, Chinese messages about Diaoyu Islands website closed down
Date:
September 1, 2001
Government seeking stability: Party causing instability: Location of website: Content of website: Countermeasure by government:
Singapore Foreign Political Websites Outside Singapore Political websites Requirement to register, failure leads to blockade.
Date: Government seeking stability: Party causing instability: Location of website: Content of website: Countermeasure by government:
October 12, 2001 US IRAradio.com US terrorist website FBI closed it down
Date: Government seeking stability: Party causing instability: Location of website: Content of website: Countermeasure by government:
November 1, 2001 South Korea North Korean website China offers e-mail exchange and e-commerce approval of government required to subscribe to site
Date: Government seeking stability: Party causing instability: Location of website: Content of website: Countermeasure by government:
March 28, 2002 Bahrain opposition groups, Freedom Movement London, UK inciting sectarianism, offensive content blockades of London-based servers
Date: Government seeking stability: Party causing instability: Location of website: Content of website: Countermeasure by government:
April 24, 2002 China ABC (Australian Broadcasting Corp) Australia political sensitive to Chinese viewers Chinese foreign ministry spokeswoman denied government involvement
Date: Government seeking stability: Party causing instability:
February 4, 2003 Kyrgyzstan Opposition website (Kyrgyzstan Democratic Movement Party?) Kyrgyzstan critical of government, including shortcomings in the official draft version of the constitution website shutdown without explanation by ISP
Location of website: Content of website: Countermeasure by government: Date: Government seeking stability: Party causing instability: Location of website: Content of website: Countermeasure by government:
September 17, 2003 Uzbekistan Ozod Ovoz website Uzbekistan critical of Uzbek president, serves as public outlet for online protests about lack of freedom of expression blockade
Date: Government seeking stability: Party causing instability: Location of website: Content of website: Countermeasure by government:
September 23, 2003 India Meghalaya’s Khasi tribe, militant group India espousing the cause of the tribe blockade, to ensure “balanced flow of information”, not censorship
Date: Government seeking stability: Party causing instability: Location of website: Content of website:
December 21, 2003 Malaysia opposition parties UK inflammatory material, support for former DP Minister Anwar Ibrahim complaints lodged, unknown by who December 24, 2003 reopened?
Countermeasure by government: Update: Date: Government seeking stability: Party causing instability: Location of website: Content of website: Countermeasure by government: Date: Government seeking stability: Party causing instability: Location of website: Content of website: Countermeasure by government: Date: Government seeking stability: Party causing instability: Location of website: Content of website: Countermeasure by government:
May 14, 2004 Malaysia website of Acme Commerce Malaysia links to terrorist groups, showing beheading of US citizen in Iraq ordered ISP to close down website July 11, 2004 South Korea (alleged) Supreme Headquarters of Armed Islamic Warriors Iraq threat by militants to bomb South-Korean ships delivering US military supplies to Middle East security officials implemented “preventive measures” September 14, 2004 Russia kavkazcenter.com Lithuania support for radical field commander Shamil Basaev (his personal website is already blocked) Lithuanian ambassador summoned to Russian Foreign Ministry to explain failure of closing down website
Update: Date: Reaction to countermeasure: Countermeasure by government: Extra:
November 16, 2004 Relocation of server to Sweden Swedish ambassador called to discuss website Website previous on Finnish server (October 2004)
Date: Government seeking stability:
October 16, 2004 US (FBI)
Party causing instability: Location of website: Content of website: Countermeasure by government:
Indymedia London, UK independent media FBI seizure of servers
Date: Government seeking stability: Party causing instability: Location of website: Content of website: Countermeasure by government:
February 2, 2005 US Iran blogs Dallas, US Iran’s dissenting and liberal voices shutdown Discussion
When located inside the legal jurisdiction, it is generally easier to shutdown the website, as opposed to blocking or filtering. In contrast, when outside the legal jurisdiction, the government of the country hosting the server is sometimes requested to shutdown the website but more often the government seeking stability will block or filter the website. If “target” governments do not get the active participation of “server host”, then they resort to more covert means to disable a foreign website. For example, the Chinese government has been known to have launched Denial-of-Service (DOS) attacks against servers hosting Falun Gong websites located in the United States and Canada. These attacks were only by accident found to be initiated by the Chinese government. Because of the illegality of the technique, covertness is a likely characteristic. Some resources are available for further research. Some general websites on regulation, censorship and liability are at: : http://qlinks.net/quicklinks/, especially the sections concerning “content regulation”, “liability, jurisdiction and applicable law”, “racism and xenophobia”. There is an empty section on the website labelled “terrorism”. Terrorism, an ultimate description of a destabilizing activity, is a keyword to look out for when thinking about destabilizing websites. Since 9-11, government measures to act against opposite forces have gained more currency when posed under the label of ‘terrorism’. Other websites include: Caslon Analytics http://www.caslon.com.au/censorshipguide.htm This guide explores censorship, regulation of offensive material and free speech in the digital environment. It includes discussion of freedom of information, archives and whistleblowing legislation. Also see http://www.caslon.com.au/governanceguide5.htm ICE: Internet Censorship Explorer http://ice.citizenlab.org/ The Internet Censorship Explorer (ICE) is a blog maintained by the Citizen Lab's technical research director, Nart Villeneuve. ICE is an incubator where Nart explores the politics of technology (hacktivism, infowar/cyberterrorism and Internet filtering), develops ideas for future Citizen Lab projects, posts proof of concept code and any other snippets of raw data that don't really have a place anywhere else. ICE also contains bleeding edge Internet filtering and censorship research related to the work of the Citizen Lab and the OpenNet Initiative including the development of censorship circumvention technology. Also see the OpenNet Initiative: Documenting Internet Content Filtering Worldwide
http://www.opennetinitiative.net/index.php The ONI mission is to investigate and challenge state filtration and surveillance practices. “Our approach applies methodological rigor to the study of filtration and surveillance blending empirical case studies with sophisticated means for technical verification. Our aim is to generate a credible picture of these practices at a national, regional and corporate level, and to excavate their impact on state sovereignty, security, human rights, international law, and global governance.” http://www.citizenlab.org/index.php The Citizen Lab is an interdisciplinary laboratory based at the Munk Centre for International Studies at the University of Toronto, Canada focusing on advanced research and development at the intersection of digital media and world civic politics. Also http://www.infowar-monitor.net/index.php. The Information Warfare Monitor is a joint project of the Advanced Network Research Group, part of the Cambridge Programme for Security in International Society, University of Cambridge, and the Citizen Lab, an interdisciplinary laboratory based at the Munk Centre for International Studies, University of Toronto. “The Information Warfare Monitor is an advanced research project examining how states and non-state actors seek to exploit information and information systems to pursue political objectives through non-political means. The project seeks to examine this emerging dimension of global security on two levels:
•
•
Operational Case Studies -- by building a repertoire of grounded, multi-dimensional "case studies" of information warfare operations, and to do so by employing a crossdisciplinary fusion of advanced network monitoring/visualization tools and qualitative social science research methodologies. Consequences for Global Security -- by using the case study data to assess emerging threats and consequences of information operations on global security in its military, political, economic, legal and human rights dimensions.”
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