Civ Pro Notes Part I

Pages 255-328 State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell 528 U.S. 408 (2003) p. 274 Issue: Whether punitive damages in this case is excessive and in violation of the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment Facts: • Campbell was driving and made an ill-advised attempt to pass 6 vans ○ Oncoming driver swerved, struck another driver: killing one and permanently disabling the other • State Farm ignored own investigators and refused to settle ○ Judgment was returned against Campbell for $185,849, $135,849 in excess liability  State Farm refused to cover the excess liability ○ Utah Supreme Court (1989) denied Campbell’s appeal in the wrongful death and tort actions and State Farm paid the entire judgment • Campbell still pursued a bad faith action against State Farm for refusing to settle ○ Also sued for the intentional infliction of emotional distress ○ Jury returned a verdict of $1 million compensatory and $145 million punitive Reasoning: • Such a large punitive damage award sought to punish State Farm for its conduct outside of Campbell’s specific case ○ Campbell submitted evidence that State Farm was engaged in a nation-wide scheme to meet corporate fiscal goals • 3 Guideposts for reviewing punitive damages (from BMW of North America v. Gore) ○ The degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s misconduct ○ The disparity between the actual or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damages award ○ The difference between the punitive damages awarded by the jury and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases • Court found that the judgment in Campbell failed to meet any of the three guideposts Holding: • Judgment of the Utah Supreme Court is reversed and case remanded for further proceedings to re-evaluate the punitive award not inconsistent with the opinion Conclusion • The punitive award was neither reasonable nor proportionate

Sigma Chemical Co. v. Harris 605 F. Supp. 1253 (E.D. Mo. 1985) p. 285 Issue: Whether permanent injunctive relief is appropriate in this case. Facts: • Defendant had contract with Sigma that said he could not work for competitor of Sigma until 2 years after leaving Sigma ○ Contract also stipulated that he would never disclose any confidential information • Defendant left Sigma for ICN (competitor) and disclosed confidential information Reasoning: • Court found that restrictive covenant (contract) between Sigma and D. was valid and enforceable • Court next found that D.’s employment with ICN violated his contract ○ Both for time requirement of K and knowledge obtained at Sigma • The court decided that the threat of harm to Sigma in not enforcing the covenant was greater than the threat of harm to D if it were enforced Holding: • Injunction issued barring D. from employment with ICN for two years Conclusion • Legal remedies were insufficient: would be difficult to quantify lost profits and it would be near impossible for D. to pay those lost profits

Evans v. Jeff D. 475 U.S. 717 (1986) pg. 307 Issue: Does a District Court have the authority to approve the waiver of attorney’s fees in light of the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976? Procedural History: • District Court approved Settlement • Idaho Legal Aid (Jeff D.) appealed to Circuit Court who reversed • State of Idaho (Evans) appealed to Supreme Court Facts: • Idaho Legal Aid filed class action suit against Idaho on behalf of handicapped children ○ The state offered a settlement which included a waiver by the class of any claim to attorney’s fees ○ Attorney for the class felt that this was the best deal he could get • Idaho Legal Aid didn’t want to accept the settlement ○ Argued that the settlement was coercive • District court approved the settlement and denied attorney’s fees Reasoning: • Respondent (Idaho Legal Aid) argued that the statute (Fees Act) forbids the inclusion of a fee waiver that is a result of coercion • Court found that legislative history proved the opposite was true ○ In fact, the decrease of attorney’s fees could be effectively used by the party seeking civil rights to increase the injunctive relief ○ Purposes of the act were furthered by this settlement by waiving the attorney’s fees • Respondent had coercive right to seek a fee award that, in this case, motivated a generous settlement offer ○ Legislature has not commanded that fees always be paid Holding: • The district court did not abuse its discretion in upholding a fee waiver ○ The relief granted by the settlement was greater than that which the plaintiffs could have achieved

Buckhannon Board and Care Home, Inc. v West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources 532 U.S. 598 (2001) pg. 312 Issue: Whether a party that has failed to secure a judgment on the merits or a court-ordered consent decree but has nonetheless achieved the desired result of their case, can recover attorney’s fees under prevailing party statues. Procedural History and Facts: • Nursing Homes file suit alleging a statute violated federal statutes • State agreed to stay enforcement until settlement could be reached ○ Meanwhile, West Virginia legislature repealed the statute • Court dismissed the case as moot ○ P attempted to recover attorney’s fees claiming they were the prevailing party ○ Claimed their actions were the catalyst by which the statue was changed • Court of Appeals denied P’s claims Reasoning • Catalyst effect is not enough to recover attorney’s fees under the fee shifting statutes ○ Legislative history is not clear enough to broaden the interpretation of prevailing party • Petitioners argued that failure to find for them would discourage future expensive litigation ○ Court found that assertion was unsupported Holding • Appellants are not able to recover attorney’s fees because they did not fit the strict interpretation of prevailing parties ○ There was no court ordered settlement/result, thus the court cannot mandate fees Dissent • Intentions of the fee-shifting statutes was to allow the catalyst effect ○ A majority of the circuit courts had already recognized this

William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co. 526 F. 2d 86 (9th Cir. 1976) pg. 317 Issue: Did the district court apply the correct test in determining whether a preliminary injunction should be issued? Facts: • Inglis and four other baking wholesale companies filed antitrust allegations against ITT and other baking companies ○ Inglis requested a preliminary injunction • District court held exhaustive hearings and ultimately determined that, in order to grant a preliminary injunction, P’s claims had to satisfy 4 requirements ○ P would suffer irreparable injury if injunctive relief were not granted ○ P would probably prevail on the merits of their case ○ D would not be harmed more than P would be helped ○ Granting the injunction is in the popular interest • District court denied the preliminary injunction, believing that P would not be able to prevail on the merits of their case Reasoning • Circuit Court found that District Court applied wrong tes ○ Alternative test says that if the harm to P is extreme, a court can grant preliminary injunction if P is only somewhat certain to prevail on merits Holding • Rejection of injunction is reversed and remanded for further proceedings under the alternative test ○ The court would not take a position as to which way the District Court should decide

Fuentes v. Shevin 407 U.S. 67 (1972)

pg. 322

Issue: Whether Pennsylvania and Florida statues that allow for the seizure of goods under a writ of replevin violate the 14th Amendment guarantee that no State shall deprive any person of property without due process of law. Facts: • P purchased stove from D with an installment plan ○ A dispute arose over a servicing problem and D initiated action in small claims court ○ Simultaneously, D filed a writ of replevin in Florida court which was granted without a hearing Reasoning: • The writ provides no prior warning to P nor does it allow P a hearing before the goods are taken ○ Writ must be given when the deprivation can still be prevented th • 14 Amendment does provide protection of household goods ○ It even provides protection of goods that may not be completely owned by P ○ Any significant property interest is protected under 14 • Some extraordinary situation would allow such a seizure to take place ○ But it would have to be for the benefit of the public interest • The signing of a conditional sales contract does not waive constitutional rights Holding • Reversed and remanded for further proceedings • The prejudgment replevin provisions work a deprivation of property without due process of law ○ They do so because they deny the right to a prior opportunity for a hearing before the goods (chattels) are taken ○ The court will not ban all prejudgment seizures=> if it serves public interest, it’s ok