Chapter 11 Notes Principles Of Microeconomics

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Chapter 11 Notes Strategic Choice in oligopoly, monopolistic competition, and everyday life -basic elements of a game – the players, the strategies available to each player, and the payoffs each player receives for each possible combination of strategies -payoff matrix – a table that describes the payoffs in a game for each possible combination of strategies -dominant strategy – one that yields a higher payoff no matter what the other players in a game choose -dominated strategy – any other strategy available to a player who has a dominant strategy -Nash equilibrium – any combination of strategies in which each player’s strategy is his or her best choice, given the other players’ choices -prisoner’s dilemma – a game in which each player has a dominant strategy, and when each plays it, the resulting payoffs are smaller than if each had played a dominated strategy -cartel – a coalition of firms that agree to restrict output for the purpose of earning an economic profit -repeated prisoner’s dilemma – a standard prisoner’s dilemma that confronts the same players repeatedly -tit-for-tat – a strategy for the repeated prisoner’s dilemma in which players cooperate on the first move, then mimic their partner’s last move on each successive move -decision tree/ game tree – a diagram that describes the possible moves in a game in sequence and lists the payoffs that correspond to each possible combination of moves -credible threat – a threat to take an action that is in the threatener’s interest to carry out -credible promise – a promise to take an action that is in the promiser’s interest to keep -commitment problem – a situation in which people cannot achieve their goals because of an inability to make credible threats or promises -commitment device – a way of changing incentives so as to make otherwise empty threats or promises credible -the strategic role of preferences

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