Case Digests On Civil Procedure (part Ii)

REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW I CASE DIGESTS

[G.R. No. 135805. April 29, 1999] CSC vs. DACOYCOY FACTS: Pedro Dacoycoy was charged with habitual drunkenness, misconduct and nepotism. After the fact-finding investigation, the CSC Regional Office Tacloban City, found a prima facie case against respondent and issued the corresponding formal charge against him. Accordingly, the CSC conducted a formal investigation and the CSC promulgated its resolution finding no substantial evidence to support the charge of habitual drunkenness and misconduct. However, CSC found respondent Dacoycoy guilty of nepotism on two counts as a result of the appointment of his two sons, Rito and Ped, as driver and utility worker, respectively, and their assignment under his immediate supervision and control as the Vocational School Administrator Balicuatro College of Arts and Trades, and imposed on him the penalty of dismissal from the service. Respondent Dacoycoy filed a motion for reconsideration. However CSC denied the motion. Respondent Dacoycoy filed with the Court of Appeals a special civil action for certiorari with preliminary injunction to set aside the Civil Service Commission’s resolutions. CA reversed and set aside the decision of the CSC, ruling that respondent did not appoint or recommend his two sons Rito and Ped, and, hence, was not guilty of nepotism. The Court further held that it is “the person who recommends or appoints who should be sanctioned, as it is he who performs the prohibited act.” Hence, this appeal. RULING: We agree with the CSC that respondent Pedro O. Dacoycoy was guilty of nepotism and correctly meted out the penalty of dismissal from the service. Danniel Ancheta

At this point, we have necessarily to resolve the question of the party adversely affected who may take an appeal from an adverse decision of the appellate court in an administrative civil service disciplinary case. There is no question that respondent Dacoycoy may appeal to the Court of Appeals from the decision of the Civil Service Commission adverse to him. He was the respondent official meted out the penalty of dismissal from the service. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the court required the petitioner therein, here respondent Dacoycoy, to implead the Civil Service Commission as public respondent as the government agency tasked with the duty to enforce the constitutional and statutory provisions on the civil service. Subsequently, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Civil Service Commission and held respondent not guilty of nepotism. Who now may appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court? Certainly not the respondent, who was declared not guilty of the charge. Nor the complainant George P. Suan, who was merely a witness for the government. Consequently, the Civil Service Commission has become the party adversely affected by such ruling, which seriously prejudices the civil service system. Hence, as an aggrieved party, it may appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court. By this ruling, we now expressly abandon and overrule extant jurisprudence that “the phrase ‘party adversely affected by the decision’ refers to the government employee against whom the administrative case is filed for the purpose of disciplinary action which may take the form of suspension, demotion in rank or salary, transfer, removal or dismissal from office” and not included are “cases where the penalty imposed is suspension for not more then thirty (30) days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty days

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REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW I CASE DIGESTS salary” or “when the respondent is exonerated of the charges, there is no occasion for appeal.” In other words, we overrule prior decisions holding that the Civil Service Law “does not contemplate a review of decisions exonerating officers or employees from administrative charges” enunciated in Paredes v. Civil Service Commission; Mendez v. Civil Service Commission; Magpale v. Civil Service Commission; Navarro v. Civil Service Commission and Export Processing Zone Authority and more recently Del Castillo v. Civil Service Commission [G.R. No. 128345. May 18, 1999] PNCC vs. NLRC FACTS: A complaint was formally aired to the Tollway General Manager (GM) about the “mulcting activities” of some security personnel at the North Luzon Tollway. The investigating team staged an entrapment. The jeepney was then carrying a cargo of dogs destined for Baguio City. Before reaching the Plaza Santa Entry, the jeepney was stopped by private respondent Angeles who was on duty at that time. He allegedly suspected them of illegally transporting dogs. Angeles approached the driver, asked for his driver’s license and told him to park at the shoulder of the road. After the jeepney had parked, the driver alighted and talked to the guards on duty. The members of the investigating team saw private respondents accept cash and a sack containing a dog, after which they allowed the jeepney to leave. As private respondents walked toward the toll plaza, they were accosted by the members of the investigating team. Upon verification, the team found that these were the same bills they had previously marked. After the formal investigation, the investigating officer Danniel Ancheta

submitted his findings to GM and recommended the dismissal of private respondents. Adopting the findings and recommendation of the investigating officer, GM issued a Notice of Termination to private respondents. Private respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioner. They alleged that they were dismissed without just or authorized cause and without due process. The complaint prayed for reinstatement plus payment of backwages and mid-year bonus. LA ruled in favor of private respondents. He held that petitioner failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that private respondents committed serious misconduct. However, instead of ordering their reinstatement, the Labor Arbiter ordered the payment of separation pay because of strained relations. He also ordered petitioner to pay private respondents their backwages and mid-year bonus. On appeal, NLRC modified the decision of the LA. It held that private respondents’ act of receiving a sum of money and a dog from motorists constituted bribery which was a sufficient ground for their dismissal. The NLRC nonetheless ordered petitioner to pay private respondents their separation pay on the ground of equity. It also retained the award of private respondents’ mid-year bonus for 1994. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the NLRC for lack of merit. Hence this petition for certiorari. RULING: The petition was filed on March 13, 1997. At that time, the prevailing rule was that petitions for certiorari may be filed within reasonable time from receipt of the resolution denying the motion for reconsideration. There was no fixed standard to determine the reasonableness of the period, but the Court generally considered the period of three (3) months to be reasonable.

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REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW I CASE DIGESTS The records show that petitioner received the resolution of the NLRC denying its motion for reconsideration on December 16, 1996 and the petition at bar was filed two (2) months and twenty-seven (27) days later. We thus find that the instant petition was filed on time. We now go to the primary issue in this case – whether private respondents are entitled to separation pay and mid-year bonus. We rule in the negative. An employee who is dismissed for just cause is generally not entitled to separation pay. In some cases, however, the Court awards separation pay to a legally dismissed employee on the grounds of equity and social justice. This is not allowed, though, when the employee has been dismissed for serious misconduct or some other cause reflecting on his moral character. In the case at bar, private respondents were caught in the act of accepting bribe in the form of cash and a dog from a motorists who was suspected of illegality transporting dogs. As tollway guards, private respondents had the duty to maintain peace and order at the North Luzon Expressway and to ensure that tollway rules and regulations are followed. But private respondents did the contrary by yielding to bribery. They were the first to violate the rules they were tasked to enforce. Undoubtedly, private respondents’ act constituted serious misconduct which warranted their dismissal from service. It is for this reason that we find private respondents undeserving of the comparison accorded by the law to workers who are bound to join the ranks of the unemployed. Likewise, private respondents are not entitled to the mid-year bonus they are claiming. We do not agree with the Solicitor General’s contention that private respondents have already earned their mid-year bonus at the time of their dismissal. A bonus is a gift from Danniel Ancheta

the employer and the grant thereof is a management prerogative. Petitioner may not be compelled to award a bonus to private respondents whom it found guilty of serious misconduct. We further held in Metro Transit Organization, Inc. vs. NLRC that a bonus becomes a demandable or enforceable obligation only when it is made part of the wage or salary or compensation of the employee, thus: “The general rule is that a bonus is a gratuity or an act of liberality which the recipient has no right to demand as a matter of right. A bonus, however, is a demandable or enforceable obligation when it is made part of the wage or salary or compensation of the employee. Whether or not a bonus forms part of wages depends upon the circumstances and conditions for its payment. If it is additional compensation which the employer promised and agreed to give without any conditions imposed for its payment, such as success of business or greater production or output, then it is part of the wage. But if it is paid only if profits are realized or if a certain level of productivity is achieved, it cannot be considered part of the wage. Where it is not payable to all but only to some employees and only when their labor becomes more efficient or more productive, it is only an inducement for efficiency, a prize therefor, not a part of the wage.” Private respondents in this case neither alleged nor adduced evidence to show that the bonus they are claiming is a regular benefit which has become part of their compensation. Thus, the presumption is that it is not a demandable obligation from the employer and the latter may not be compelled to grant the same to undeserving employees.

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[G.R. No. 123910. April 5, 1999] UNILONGO, ET. AL., vs. CA, ET. AL. 11/9/2009

REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW I CASE DIGESTS FACTS: Sto. Niño de Cul de Sac Neighborhood Association, Inc. (SNSNAI), was incorporated and registered by petitioners (hereafter referred to as the Unilongo group) as a non-stock corporation with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Petitioners comprised SNSNAI's original Board of Trustees. An issue as to who is the rightful Board of Trustees of the said association ensued between the petitioners (the Unilongo group) and the private respondents(the Diño Group). Private respondents filed a complaint for Quo Warranto with Damages against petitioners before the RTC of Makati (Branch 63). RTC denied after hearing. Petitioners moved for reconsideration of the aforequoted order. The trial court denied. Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the CA raising practically the same issues set forth in their motion to dismiss. CA dismissed. Hence, the instant petition. Petitioners maintain the view that private respondents' complaint primarily concerns matters pertaining to their homeowners association, so that it is the Home Insurance and Guarantee Corporation (HIGC) which has jurisdiction over the dispute and not the regular courts pursuant to RA 580, conferring upon the said administrative agency, among others, the power to regulate and supervise the activities and operations of homeowners associations. Private respondents, on the other hand, claim that the regional trial court properly took cognizance of their quo warranto complaint in accordance with Rule 66 of the Rules of Court and Sec. 21(1) of B.P. No. 129 which vests the RTC with original jurisdiction to issue writs of quo warranto.

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ISSUE: Whether it is the ordinary courts or the Home Insurance and Guarantee Corporation which has jurisdiction over the corporate controversy between the contending groups both of which claim to be the rightful officers of a homeowners association. RULING: It is a settled rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations in the complaint. Jurisdiction cannot be made to depend upon the pleas and defenses set up by the defendant in a motion to dismiss or answer otherwise jurisdiction would become dependent almost entirely upon the defendant. On the basis of the foregoing undisputed facts, the controversy between the parties is intracorporate and, therefore, not cognizable by the ordinary courts of justice. The dispute between the contending parties for control of the corporation manifestly falls within the primary and exclusive jurisdiction of the SEC in whom the law has reserved such jurisdiction as an administrative agency of special competence to deal promptly and expeditiously therewith. Furthermore, the intent to remove from the regular courts jurisdiction over actions against persons who usurp corporate offices and quo warranto actions against corporations is crystallized in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. Section 2, Rule 66 of the old rules is deleted in its entirety, Section 1 (a), Rules 66 of the amended rules no longer contains the phrase “or an office in a corporation created by authority of law” found in the old section. Section 1, Rule 66 of the new rules now reads: SECTION 1. Action by Government against individuals.-- An action for the usurpation of a public office, position or franchise may be commenced by a verified petition brought in the name of the Republic of the Philippines against: (a) A person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office, position or franchise;

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REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW I CASE DIGESTS (b) A public officer who does or suffers an act which, by the provision of law, constitutes a ground for the forfeiture of his office; or (c) An association which acts as a corporation within the Philippines without being legally incorporated or without lawful authority so to act. Explaining the changes in the aforequoted provision, Justice Jose Y. Feria states: This rule is now limited to actions of quo warranto against persons who usurp a public office, position or franchise; public officers who forfeit their office; and associations which act as corporations without being legally incorporated. Actions of quo warranto against corporations, or against persons who usurp an office in a corporation, fall under the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission and are governed by its rules. However, the jurisdiction of the SEC over homeowners associations has been transferred to the HIGC by EO 90 and exercise all the powers, authorities and responsibilities that are vested on the Securities and Exchange Commission with respect to home owners association. In this case, the entities involved are homeowners associations. Although the SNSNAI is registered with the SEC as a nonstock, non-profit corporation, the purposes for which this neighborhood association was established correspond to the requirements laid down in the HIGC rules. Finally, private respondents have also raised the issue that petitioners are now estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the courts over the intra-corporate controversy because the trial of the case before the regional trial Danniel Ancheta

court was already half-way through when the latter raised the issue of jurisdiction. This is not true. Records bear out that the individual petitioners through their counsel had in fact filed a motion to dismiss in the Regional Trial Court on the ground, among others, that the regular courts lack jurisdiction over intracorporate matters. The trial court, however, did not act on the motion. Instead, it proceeded to trial. In fact, the allegations in the petition for certiorari and prohibitions filed by petitioners in the Court of Appeals were substantially a reiteration of those contained in the said motion to dismiss. [G.R. No. 125931. September 16, 1999] UNION MOTORS CORP., vs. NLRC FACTS: Ms. Go was appointed as Assistant to the President and Administrative and Personnel Manager by the Board. She claimed she had gone on leave to avoid further clashes between her and Ms. Cua, the Vice-President/Treasurer. However, Mr. Cua wrote private respondent a letter advising her that he was accepting her resignation. Insisting that she did not resign and hence, an acceptance of her resignation could not be possible, Ms. Go then filed a complaint for constructive/illegal dismissal with the Labor Arbiter. LA rendered his decision dismissing the private respondent’s complaint. Dissatisfied, Ms. Go appealed the LA’s decision to the NLRC. In their Reply/Opposition, petitioners initially argued that she was not dismissed, but had voluntarily resigned and abandoned her employment. However, in their Supplemental Reply, petitioners switched tracks. They now contended that she was a corporate officer who had been elected/appointed to the position of Assistant to the President/Administrative and Personnel Manager by the UMC Board of Directors. Any issue relating to her removal from the said posts was therefore an intra-corporate dispute. As such, jurisdiction over the action did

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REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW I CASE DIGESTS not lie with the NLRC but rather with the SEC. NLRC reversed LA’s decision. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. Said motion was denied by the NLRC. Petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari and/or prohibition. RULING: In the present case, we once again face the tug-of-war between the jurisdiction of the NLRC and the SEC. It is the private respondent’s stand that she is but mere employee of the petitioner corporation. A high-ranking employee, but an employee nonetheless, who was illegally dismissed. Hence, no grave abuse of discretion was committed by the NLRC when it assumed jurisdiction over her case. Petitioners, however, vehemently insist that she was a corporate officer who had been ousted from office. Thus, private respondent’s dismissal squarely falls within the jurisdiction of the SEC as an intra-corporate dispute. A proper resolution of this case thus entails determining whether the private respondent is a mere employee (albeit high in rank) or a corporate officer. To determine which body has jurisdiction over this case requires considering not only the relationship of the parties, but also the nature of the question that is the subject of their controversy. The records clearly show that private respondent’s position as Assistant to the President and Personnel & Administrative Manager is a corporate office under the bylaws of UMC. We have held that one who is included in the by-laws of an association in its roster of corporate officers is an officer of said corporation and not a mere employee. Hence, the inescapable conclusion is that private respondent was an officer of petitioner UMC. Danniel Ancheta

Under Section 23 of the Corporation Code, directors are thus charged with the control and management of their corporation. It is settled that they may appoint officers and agents and as incident to this power of appointment, they may discharge those appointed. From all the foregoing, it becomes clear that the charges filed by Ms. Go against petitioners partake of the nature of an intra-corporate dispute. Similarly, the determination of the rights of Ms. Go and the concomitant liability of the petitioners arising from her ouster as a corporate officer, is an intra-corporate controversy. For the SEC to take cognizance of a case, the controversy must pertain to any of the following relationships: (a) between the corporation, partnership or association and the public; (b) between the corporation, partnership or association and its stockholders, partners, members, or officers (italics for emphasis); (c) between the corporation, partnership, or association and the state so far as its franchise, permit, or license to operate is concerned; and (d) among the stockholders, partners, or associates themselves. The instant case, in our view, is a dispute between a corporation and one of its officers. As such, Ms. Go’s complaint is subject to the jurisdiction of the SEC, and not the NLRC. Interpreting Section 5 of PD 902-A, we have consistently ruled that it is the SEC that has exclusive and original jurisdiction over controversies involving removal from a corporate office. Private respondent now faults petitioners for failing to raise the issue of lack of jurisdiction by the NLRC at the earliest possible time. She contends that since the petitioners actively participated in the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, they are now estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the NLRC.

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REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW I CASE DIGESTS Private respondent’s reliance on the principle of estoppel to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the NLRC over her case is misplaced. The long-established rule is that jurisdiction over a subject matter is conferred by law. Estoppel does not apply to confer jurisdiction to a tribunal that has none over a cause of action. Where it appears that the court or tribunal has no jurisdiction, then the defense may be interposed at any time, even on appeal or even after final judgment. Moreover, the principle of estoppel cannot be invoked to prevent this court from taking up the question of jurisdiction. To conclude, we find that the NLRC erred in assuming jurisdiction over, and thereafter in failing to dismiss, the private respondent’s complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioners, because the NLRC is without jurisdiction on the subject matter of the controversy. [G.R. No. 122269. September 30, 1999] REPUBLIC vs. CA, ET. AL., FACTS: The parcel of land that is presently the subject of the dispute in the instant case Lot 3 Portion forms part of the abovementioned parcel of land declared by this Honorable Court as belonging to the public domain, classified/zonified land available for fishpond development. This lot has been leased to Mr. Porfirio Morado by the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Secretary of Agriculture, for a period of 25 years, or up to December 31, 2013, under Fishpond Lease Agreement. On July 6, 1988, however, the late Zenaida Bustria [daughter of Isidro Bustria] filed a complaint against Porfirio Morado in the Regional Trial Court of Alaminos, Pangasinan for ownership and possession over the lot in Danniel Ancheta

question. Herein petitioner, the Republic of the Philippines, was not made a party to that suit. In her complaint, Zenaida Bustria claimed absolute ownership and quiet and peaceful possession of several lots under PSU-155696 surveyed in the name of her father, Isidro Bustria. She further asserted that said Porfirio Morado maliciously applied for a fishpond permit with the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources over Lot 3 thereof (the subject lot), well-knowing that said lot had always been occupied, possessed and worked by her and her predecessors-in-interest. Porfirio Morado denied the allegations in the complaint, claiming that the lot in question is part of the public domain which he developed and converted into a fishpond. Due, however, to Porfirio Morado’s and his counsel’s failure to appear at the pre-trial and subsequent court hearings, the trial court subsequently declared Porfirio Morado ‘as in default.’ Respondent Judge rendered a decision declaring the plaintiff as the exclusive and absolute owner of the land in question. Petitioner (REPUBLIC), filed with the CA a petition for the annulment of the trial court’s decision. Petitioner alleged that the land in question is within the classified/zonified alienable and disposable land for fishpond development and that since the land formed part of the public domain, the BFAR has jurisdiction over its disposition in accordance with P.D. No. 704, §4. CA rendered a decision dismissing the petition. Hence, this petition for review. The judgment rendered in a case may be annulled on any of the following grounds: (a) the judgment is void for want of jurisdiction or for lack of due process of law; or (b) it was obtained through extrinsic fraud. The question in this case is whether the decision of the Regional Trial Court is void on any of these grounds. The preliminary question, however, is whether the government can bring such action even though it

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REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW I CASE DIGESTS was not a party to the action in which the decision sought to be annulled was rendered. We shall deal with these questions in inverse order. RULING: First, is the question whether petitioner has personality to bring the action below. To begin with, an action to recover a parcel of land is in personam. As such, it is binding only between the parties thereto, as this Court explained in Ching v. Court of Appeals, viz: An action to redeem, or to recover title to or possession of, real property is not an action in rem or an action against the whole world, like a land registration proceeding or the probate of a will; it is an action in personam, so much so that a judgment therein is binding only upon the parties properly impleaded and duly heard or given an opportunity to be heard. Actions in personam and actions in rem differ in that the former are directed against specific persons and seek personal judgments, while the latter are directed against the thing or property or status of a person and seek judgments with respect thereto as against the whole world. An action to recover a parcel of land is a real action but it is an action in personam, for it binds a particular individual only although it concerns the right to a tangible thing.

subject of foreclosure proceedings has a sufficient interest to bring an action for annulment of the judgment rendered in the foreclosure proceedings even though it was not a party in such proceedings. It was held: [A] person need not be a party to the judgment sought to be annulled. What is essential is that he can prove his allegation that the judgment was obtained by the use of fraud and collusion and he would be adversely affected thereby. Private respondents do not deny that Isidro Bustria, to whom they trace their ownership, previously filed a fishpond application with the BFAR over the disputed land. Neither do they deny that the disputed land formed part of the public domain. We agree with petitioner. The State clearly stands to be adversely affected by the trial court’s disposition of inalienable public land. The land involved in this case was classified as public land suitable for fishpond development. In controversies involving the disposition of public land, the burden of overcoming the presumption of state ownership of lands of the public domain lies upon the private claimant. Private respondents have not discharged this burden.

The appellate court, holding that the proceedings before the trial court were in personam, ruled that since petitioner was not a party to Civil Case No. A-1759, it is not a real party-in-interest and, therefore, has no personality to bring the action for annulment of the judgment rendered in that case.

The fact that the land in dispute was transformed into a “fully developed fishpond” does not mean that it has lost its character as one declared “suitable for fishpond purposes” under the decree. By applying for a fishpond permit with BFAR, Isidro Bautista admitted the character of the land as one suitable for fishpond development since the disposition of such lands is vested in the BFAR. Consequently, private respondents, as his successors-in-interests, are estopped from claiming otherwise.

The appellate court is in error. In Islamic Da’wah Council of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals, this Court held that a party claiming ownership of a parcel of land which is the

It is settled under the Public Land Law that alienable public land held by a possessor, personally or through his predecessor-in-interest, openly, continuously, and exclusively for 30

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REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW I CASE DIGESTS years is ipso jure converted to private property by the mere lapse of time. However, only public lands classified as agricultural are alienable. Lands declared for fishery purposes are not alienable and their possession, no matter how long continued, cannot ripen into ownership. Since the disposition of lands declared suitable for fishpond purposes fall within the jurisdiction of the BFAR, in accordance with P.D. No 704, §4, the trial court’s decision is null and void. The trial court has no jurisdiction to make a disposition of inalienable public land.

With the denial of its Motion for Reconsideration, NSC has come to this court via the present petition. RULING: Anent the issue of mistaken appreciation of facts and law of the case, the petitioner theorizes that the awards made by the Board were unsubstantiated and the same were a plain misapplication of the law and even contrary to jurisprudence. If Petitioner seeks to refute such evidence, it should have done so before the Board of Arbitrators, during the hearings. To raise the issue now is futile.

[G.R. No. 127004. March 11, 1999] NATIONAL STEEL CORPORATION vs. RTC OF LANAO DEL NORTE

[G.R. No. 131039. December 8, 1999] PEOPLE vs. FLORES

FACTS: Petitioner-defendant Edward Wilkom Enterprises Inc. (EWEI for brevity) together with one Ramiro Construction and respondent-petitioner National Steel Corporation (NSC for short) executed a contract whereby the former jointly undertook the Contract for Site Development for the latter's Integrated Iron and Steel Mills Complex to be established at Iligan City. Differences arose thus their case was placed in arbitration proceedings. After series of hearings, the Arbitrators rendered the decision which is the subject matter of these present causes of action, both initiated separately by the herein contending parties, substantial portion of which directs NSC to pay EWEI. RTC rendered judgment declaring: the award of the Board of Arbitrators to be duly AFFIRMED and CONFIRMED "en toto;" that an entry of judgment be entered therewith pursuant to (the Arbitration Law); and costs against respondent National Steel Corporation.

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FACTS: Alberto Flores @ Amang Mangot and Rodolfo Flores @ Rudy were accused to have killed one Michael Manlapig. Trial ensued after accused-appellants pled not guilty to the charge. The trial court convicted the accused-appellants. It relied heavily on the testimony of Marissa. It held that she has no reason to testify falsely against them. It observed that she testified sincerely, candidly and was straightforward in the witness stand. It accepted her explanation that she did not immediately identify the accused-appellants out of fear as they were then still at large. It ruled that the positive identification of the accused negated their defense. The trial court further found that treachery attended the commission of the crime. In support of these assignment of errors, accused-appellants cite the glaring inconsistencies made by Marissa in her sworn statement at the police station and her testimony in court. In her sworn statement, she claimed that she did not see how and who killed the victim. She alleged that the victim was stabbed twice –“isa sa kanang sentido (right temple) at isa sa kanang butas ng tainga (right ear).” However, in her testimony, she claimed that she

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REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW I CASE DIGESTS saw Rodolfo stab the victim. She declared that the victim was stabbed on his left temple nd left ear. Accused-appellants also insist lack of motive to kill the victim. RULING: We acquit. Jurisprudence forewarns that when serious and inexplicable discrepancies are present between a previously executed sworn statement of a witness and her testimonial declarations with respect to one's participation in a serious imputation such as murder, there is raised a grave doubt on the veracity of the witness’ account. In the case at bar, it is difficult to reconcile the inconsistencies made by Marissa in her sworn statement and testimony in court. It is even more difficult to accept her explanation in committing these inconsistencies. Equally perplexing is the absolute absence of any action on the part of Marissa when she saw the intruders before they killed the victim. By her testimony, she did not even wake up the victim to warn him that there were intruders in their house. She did not call for help. Neither did she attempt to help the victim while he was being attacked. Nor did she make any move to protect her children who were sleeping by her side. All these omissions do not enhance her credibility. The Court has no option but to acquit. This is in keeping with the worn-out principle that the prosecution must rely on the strength of its evidence and not on the weakness of the defense. So often has it been said that it is better for 100 criminals to go free than for one innocent man to be convicted. Conviction should be decreed only when the exacting standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt is met. [G.R. No. 110798. July 20, 1999] BUSCAINO vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

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FACTS: Petitioner Odelon T. Buscaino is the Director of Fiscal Management Services of PUP. His functions include signing disbursement vouchers and certifying the availability of funds and legality and propriety of supporting documents. As such, petitioner is one of the necessary PUP official signatories to every disbursement voucher of PUP before payment thereon can be made. Auditor of PUP, disallowed in audit an aggregate amount of P993,933.32, involving overpriced purchases of various office and school supplies in violation of pertinent laws, applicable rules and regulations. A motion for reconsideration of the aforestated disallowances was interposed by former PUP President and the herein petitioner. COA affirmed the subject disallowances ordered by the PUP Auditor on the ground that there was “no public bidding and/or canvass resulting in overpricing” in the purchase of the various office and school supplies in question and holding petitioner jointly and severally liable with Dr. Pablo Mateo, and Dr. Juan E. Manuel, Jr., former President and Vice-President of PUP, respectively, for the said disallowances. After a reevaluation, the motion for reconsideration was denied in COA Decision. Petitioner filed with this Court a petition for certiorari. Before delving into the merits of the case, the timeliness of the petition must first be looked into and passed upon. The thirty day period for filing a petition for certiorari should be reckoned from the date subject decision was received by the petitioner. Our pivot of inquiry therefore is the true date petitioner received COA Decision. RULING: As evinced by the allegations of the parties, the issue at bar is factual in nature. Normally, this Court does not rule on a question of fact. However, since the factual issue aforestated is relevant to the resolution of the

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REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW I CASE DIGESTS issue of timeliness of filing of the petition, the Court may rule on this question. Respondent contends that subject decision was received by petitioner, through his secretary, on May 30, 1993. On the other hand, it is petitioner’s submission that he received such decision on June 15, 1993, when a copy thereof was sent to his residence by PUP President Zenaida Olonan as he was then on official sick leave from PUP. Petitioner’s allegation that he received the decision only on June 15, 1993 finds support in the evidence that he was, in fact, on official sick leave from PUP, as shown by Annex “A” - a medical certificate from Lyceum Northwestern General Hospital in Dagupan City stating that petitioner was under the hospital’s medical care, Annex “A-1” petitioner’s approved application for leave from PUP for the period April 12 to May 31, 1993 and Annex “A-2” - petitioner’s approved application for leave for the period June 1-30, 1993. It is thus understandable that petitioner received subject decision by registered mail on June 15, 1993 and his motion for extension of time sent in on July 15, 1993 was filed on the thirtieth day, within the 30-day reglementary period. Assuming arguendo that the thirty days for filing a petition for certiorari had already lapsed, this Court may still allow and, in fact, has allowed some meritorious cases to proceed despite the procedural defect or lapse; in keeping with the principle that rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice and that strict and rigid application of rules which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice must always be avoided.

grave abuse of discretion in handing down its assailed decision. The various disbursements upon which petitioner’s liability is based have not been indubitably established as patently invalid or irregular and the disallowances ordered by COA were not substantiated by sufficient evidence on record. The requirements of due process of law mandate that every accused or respondent be apprised of the nature and cause of the charge against him, and the evidence in support thereof be shown or made available to him so that he can meet the charge with traversing or exculpatory evidence. COA’s failure to furnish or show to the petitioner the inculpatory documents or records of purchases and price levels constituted a denial of due process which is a valid defense against the accusation. Absent any evidence documentary or testimonial to prove the same, the charge of COA against the herein petitioner must fail for want of any leg to stand on. We agree with petitioners that COA’s disallowance was not sufficiently supported by evidence, as it was premised purely on undocumented claims, as in fact petitioners were denied access to the actual canvass sheets or price quotations from accredited suppliers. It was incumbent upon the COA to prove that its standards were met in its audit disallowance. The records do not show that such was done in this case. x x x absent due process and evidence to support COA’s disallowance, COA’s ruling on petitioner’s liability has no basis.” Indeed, without the evidence upon which the charge of overpricing is anchored, apart from being a denial of due process, it would not be possible to attach liability to petitioner. [G.R. No. 120236. July 20, 1999] E.G.V. REALTY vs. CA

Going into the merits of the case, the Court finds that the Commission on Audit acted with Danniel Ancheta

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11/9/2009

REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW I CASE DIGESTS FACTS: Respondent Unisphere International, Inc. (Unisphere) is the owner/occupant of Unit 301 of said condominium. Respondent Unisphere’s Unit 301 was allegedly robbed of valued at P6,165.00. The incident was reported to petitioner Cristina Condo. Corp (CCC). Another robbery allegedly occurred at Unit 301 where the items carted away were valued at P6,130.00, bringing the total value of items lost to P12,295.00. This incident was likewise reported to petitioner CCC.

SEC en banc issued the Order dismissing such for having been filed out of time. CA reversed the SEC en banc’s Order. Hence, the instant petition for review interposed by petitioners E.G.V. Realty and CCC challenging the decision of the CA.

Respondent Unisphere demanded compensation and reimbursement from petitioner CCC for the losses incurred as a result of the robbery. As a consequence of the denial, respondent Unisphere withheld payment of its monthly dues. Petitioner E.G.V. Realty executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over Unit 301 in favor of respondent Unisphere. Thereafter, Condominium Certificate of Title was issued in respondent Unisphere’s name bearing the annotation of a lien in favor of petitioner E.G.V. Realty for the unpaid condominium dues in the amount of P13,142.67.

With respect to the second contention, petitioners asseverate that the order of the SEC en banc has already become final and unappealable, therefore can no longer be reversed, amended or modified. They maintain that respondent Unisphere received a copy of said order on February 26, 1990 and that 10 days thereafter, it filed its motion for reconsideration. Said motion was denied by the SEC on May 14, 1990 which was received by respondent Unisphere on May 15, 1990.

Petitioners E.G.V. Realty and CCC jointly filed a petition with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for the collection of the unpaid monthly dues in the amount of P13,142.67 against respondent Unisphere. SEC Hearing Officer rendered a decision ordered to pay petitioner the sum of P13,142.67. Both parties filed their respective motions for reconsideration. Accordingly, the decision is partially reconsidered to the effect that petitioners are not made liable for the value of the items/articles burglarized from respondent’s condominium unit. Respondent Unisphere filed a notice of appeal with the SEC en banc questioning the abovementioned decision.

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RULING: Petitioners contend that assuming that the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction, the assailed SEC en banc Order of February 23, 1990 had already become final and executory.

Consequently, they assert that respondent Unisphere had only the remaining 5 days or on May 20, 1990 within which to file a notice of appeal. However, instead of appealing therefrom, respondent Unisphere filed a second motion for reconsideration on May 25, 1990 with the SEC en banc. Petitioners contend that no second motion for reconsideration is allowed by SEC Rules unless with express prior to leave of the hearing officer. Said second motion for reconsideration was likewise denied on August 21, 1990. Fifteen days later or on September 5, 1990, respondent Unisphere filed its notice of appeal. Section 8, Rule XII of the Revised Rules of Procedure of the SEC provides that: SEC. 8. Reconsideration.-- Within 30 days from receipt of the order or decision of the Hearing Officer, the aggrieved party may file a motion for reconsideration of such order or decision together with proof of service thereof upon the adverse party. No more than one motion for

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11/9/2009

REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW I CASE DIGESTS reconsideration shall be allowed unless with the express prior leave of the Hearing Officer. Respondent Unisphere’s non-observance of the foregoing rule rendered the February 23, 1990 and the May 14, 1990 orders of the SEC en banc final and unappealable. Its failure to perfect its appeal in the manner and within the period fixed by law rendered the decision sought to be appealed final, with the result that no court can exercise appellate jurisdiction to review the decision. Contrary to petitioners’ view, the appeal to the Court of Appeals in this case should have been perfected within 15 days from receipt of the order denying the motion for reconsideration on May 15, 1990. But instead of appealing, respondent Unisphere filed a prohibited second motion for reconsideration without express prior leave of the hearing officer. Consequently, when it subsequently filed its notice of appeal on September 6, 1990, it was already eightytwo (82) days late. Therefore, the appeal before the Court of Appeals could have been dismissed outright for being time-barred. Rules of procedure are intended to ensure the proper administration of justice and the protection of substantive rights in judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings. Blatant violation of such rules smacks of a dilatory tactic which we simply cannot countenance. [G.R. No. 134441. May 19, 1999] CONTI vs. CA, ET. AL. FACTS: In 1989, PUP appointed petitioner Indalicio P. Conti from Assistant Professor IV to Professor I. On 01 July 1993, Dr. Zenaida A. Olonan, President of PUP, issued an appointment paper to Conti, confirming his promotional appointment with Dionisia P. Pingol, Director II of CSFO-NCR, signing below the name of Dr. Olonan for the CSC.

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Ms. Pingol sent a letter to Dr. Zenaida Olonan asking for a copy of Conti’s MBA diploma or transcript of records in order to verify an “information” she had received to the effect that Mr. Conti was not a masteral degree holder. When furnished with a copy of the letter of Ms. Pingol, Conti sent a written reply contending that a masteral degree was not a requisite for the position of Professor I. Hence, the Director IV of CSC-NCR formally charged Conti with dishonesty. CSC held Conti guilty of dishonesty. Conti moved for a reconsideration of the CSC resolution. Still, the CSC had not acted. On 23 February 1998, Conti finally filed with SC a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. SC referred the petition to the Court of Appeals. In its now challenged resolution, the appellate court dismissed the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus for having been filed out of time. Conti sought reconsideration but it was to no avail; hence, the instant recourse. Conti explains that his petition before the appellate court for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is an original action under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure and not an appeal under Rule 43 thereof. RULING: The instant petition has merit, and it must be granted. Before the advent of Revised Administrative Circular (“RAC”) No. 1-95 and the eventual incorporation of its provisions in the 1997 Revised Civil Procedure under Rule 43 thereof, the established rule had been that a decision, order, or ruling of the CSC, the single arbiter of all contests relating to the civil service, was unappealable subject only to this Court’s certiorari jurisdiction. In other words, no appeal could then lie from judgments of the CSC and that a party aggrieved thereby should proceed to the SC alone on certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court within thirty (30) days from receipt of a copy thereof.

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REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW I CASE DIGESTS RAC No. 1-95, made effective as of 01 June 1995, now mandates, however, that an appeal from judgments, final orders or resolutions of quasi-judicial agencies, like the CSC, may be taken to the Court of Appeals by way of a petition for review within fifteen (15) days from notice of the assailed judgment, order or resolution. Regarding cases still pending with this Court via petitions for certiorari directed against CSC prior to the effectivity of RAC 1-95 and those that might have been filed soon thereafter. Truly, an essential requisite for the availability of the extraordinary remedies under the Rules is an absence of an appeal nor any “plain, speedy and adequate remedy” in the ordinary course of law, one which has been so defined as a "remedy which (would) equally (be) beneficial, speedy and sufficient, not merely a remedy which at some time in the future will bring about a revival of the judgment x x x complained of in the certiorari proceeding, but a remedy which will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of that judgment and the acts of the inferior court or tribunal" concerned.

the failure of justice without the writ, that should determine the propriety of certiorari. This Court has ruled that a recourse to certiorari is proper not only where there is a clear deprivation of petitioner’s fundamental right to due process; but so also from where other special circumstances warrant immediate and more direct action. Conti’s motion for reconsideration has been pending with the CSC for more than two years since 13 December 1995 up until his petition with this Court on 28 February 1998. Given the circumstances, it should behoove the appellate court to resolve the case on its merits.

Illustrative of such a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law is a motion for reconsideration that has thus often been considered a condition sine qua non for the grant of certiorari. As the Solicitor General so aptly points out, the continuous failure of respondent CSC to resolve Conti’s motion for reconsideration for so long a time has virtually amounted to a denial of his right to due process and right to the speedy disposition of his case. In fact, there is yet no indication on record that CSC has already resolved Conti’s motion for reconsideration. It cannot be gainsaid that it is the inadequacy, not the total absence, of all other legal remedies, and the danger of Danniel Ancheta

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11/9/2009