Calvert 2004

JANE CALVERT

THE IDEA OF ‘BASIC RESEARCH’ IN LANGUAGE AND PRACTICE

ABSTRACT. Today, there is increasing concern about the health of ‘basic research’, yet considerable disagreement about its definition. This paper examines the way in which the term is used in everyday practice. Drawing upon interviews with British and American scientists and policy-makers, we identify six different definitions currently in use. Given the utility and flexibility of the concept, it is useful to ask what function it serves, and whether we should develop new terminology.

INTRODUCTION The term ‘basic research’ is well established in the literature of science policy. The language that it assumes has developed in a specific historical context. However, there is little systematic analysis of its definition; or of the ways in which the term is today used in everyday practice. To identify different definitions, we conducted forty-nine interviews with British and American scientists who do ‘basic research’, and with British and American policy-makers who use the expression in their daily work. This paper aims to unpack the complexity of the idea and its different usages, and to consider its larger importance to the study of science in society. Historically, the value of pursuing natural knowledge ‘for its own sake’ owes much to the legacy of ancient Greece,1 and to the privileging of the search for ‘fundamental’ knowledge of nature during and since the Renaissance. It was not, however, until the twentieth century that the concept of ‘basic research’ became firmly established in modern institutional arrangements and ideological commitments.2 During the Second World War, Allied

1

Frits H. Brookman, The Making of a Science Policy: A Historical Study of the Institutional and Conceptual Background to Dutch Science Policy in a West-European Perspective (Amsterdam: Academische Pers BV, 1979). 2 Donald E. Stokes, Pasteur’s Quadrant: Basic Science and Technological Innovation (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1997). Minerva 42: 251–268, 2004.
2004 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

252

jane calvert

support of what was called ‘basic research’ proved to be a stepping stone to victory.3 After the war, the practices of fundamental, largely university-based research were crystallized in the rhetoric of science as the highest expression of the Western scientific world view, involving the autonomous pursuit of knowledge, free from government or private interference, its value system closely identified with the values of Western democracy.4 This was the vision translated into policy by, among others, Vannevar Bush, who led wartime research at the NDRC and the OSRD, and who helped draft the blueprint of what was to become the US National Science Foundation (NSF).5 By stressing the benefits of basic research, Bush helped legitimate what has since become known as the ‘linear model’, by which basic research is understood to feed technological innovation.6 Thanks to the linear model, research could be linked to the promise of application. From the 1950s, basic research was therefore singled out as a key area for public investment throughout the industrialized world.7 Its support was justified as a ‘public good’, advancing public interests that would never be adequately served by private enterprise acting alone.8 During the 1960s, there were several attempts among the industrialized countries to standardize the measurement of national and

3

Aant Elzinga and Andrew Jamison, ‘Changing Policy Agendas’, in Sheila Jasanoff, Gerald E Markle, James Petersen, and Trevor Pinch (eds.), Handbook of Science and Technology Studies (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1995). 4 David A. Hollinger, ‘Science as a Weapon in Kulturhamfen in the United States during and after World War II’, Isis, 86 (3), (1965), 440–454; see also, John R. Baker, The Freedom of Science: An Original Anthology (New York: Arno Press, 1975). 5 Vannevar Bush, Science – The Endless Frontier. A Report to the President on a Program for Postwar Scientific Research (Washington, DC: National Science Foundation, 1945, reprinted 1960). 6 David Hart has demonstrated that the conventional wisdom, by which a consensus grew around Bush’s ideas, is a simplification of history, since there were several influential actors involved in science policy during the 1940s. See David M. Hart, Forged Consensus: Science, Technology and Economic Policy in the United States, 1921–1953 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998). 7 National Science Board, Science and Engineering Indicators, 1998 (Arlington: National Science Foundation, 1998). 8 Richard Nelson, ‘The Simple Economics of Basic Scientific Research’, Journal of Political Economy, 67 (3), (1959), 297–306; see also Kenneth Arrow, ‘Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention’, The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), 609–626.

basic research in language and practice

253

international research activity. In response to this, the phrase ‘basic research’ became a statistical category.9 Given impetus by the NSF, the OECD helped define the practice of science by a series of categories, set out in the so-called ‘Frascati Manual’, published in 1963.10 Drawing boundaries around an activity that could be called ‘basic research’ became an important task for the emerging field of science policy. Once there was something to measure, classification became internationally important, trends could be identified, and comparisons drawn. Following a period of increased funding during the 1950s and 1960s, many industrial countries reduced the rate of growth in government spending on science during the late 1960s and 1970s.11 In 1969, the NSF’s budget was cut by nearly twenty per cent.12 Moreover, the 1970s saw the emergence of influential market-oriented approaches to research, epitomized in the UK by the ‘customercontractor’ principle.13 With the 1980s, and the end of the Cold War, support for basic research became incorporated into free-market strategies for technological innovation and economic competitiveness. The changes that began in the 1980s are continuing today. We now find a situation where ‘basic research has become intimately intertwined with the production of goods and technological development of relevance for all realms of society’.14 This emphasis upon relevance some say is having a detrimental effect on basic research.15 9

Benoit Godin, ‘Measuring Science: Is there ‘‘Basic Research’’ Without Statistics?’, Project on the History and Sociology of S &T Indicators, Paper No. 3 (Montreal: Observatoire des Sciences et des Technologies INRS/CIRST, 2000). 10 OECD, ‘The Measurement of Scientific and Technical Activities: Proposed Standard Practice for Surveys of R&D’ (Paris: OECD, 1963). Here, the term ‘fundamental research’ was used. See Benoit Godin, ‘The Numbers Makers: Fifty Years of Science and Technology Official Statistics’, Minerva, 40 (4), (2002), 375–395. 11 See Aant Elzinga, ‘Research, Bureaucracy and the Drift of Epistemic Criteria’, in Bjorn Wittrock and Aant Elzinga (eds.), The University Research System: The Public Policies of the Home of Scientists (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1985), 192. 12 National Science Foundation, Annual Report 1985 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1985). 13 Lord Rothschild, A Framework for Government Research and Development [Cm 4814] (London: HMSO, 1971). 14 Aant Elzinga, ‘The Science-Society Contract in Historical Transformation’, Social Science Information, 36 (3), (1997), 420. 15 See John Ziman, Real Science: What it Is and What it Means (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

254

jane calvert

Harvey Brooks, for example, has spoken of ‘the declining prestige of the kind of curiosity-driven, freewheeling research that was emphasised in the Bush report as a basis for a thriving economy and a healthy and peaceful society’. The issue is now, ‘science policy for what?’, rather than ‘science policy for science’s sake’.16 For many years, advocates of science ‘for its own sake’ – such as Keith Pavitt – have argued that basic research provides important shared benefits, including research training and background knowledge.17 Although these benefits are valued, today’s funding environment prefers to focus upon accountability, relevance, and measurable outcomes. There have been calls for a re-negotiation of the post-war ‘social contract’ between science and society, and a movement away from the assumption that autonomous science eventually produces public benefits.18 It is no longer sufficient for scientists to say they are engaged in autonomous truth-seeking; instead, they are expected to interact with the wider communities that support them.19

WHAT

IS MEANT BY

‘BASIC

RESEARCH’?

At first glance, ‘basic research’ appears a contested concept. Many phrases can be substituted, which may or may not mean the same thing. For example, what is the relationship between ‘pure science’, ‘fundamental research’, ‘curiosity-driven research’, and ‘blue skies research’? To clarify the use of the term in practice, we conducted fortynine semi-structured interviews between March 1999 and March

16

John de la Mothe and Paul Dufour, ‘Is Science Policy in the Doldrums?’, Nature, 374 (16 March 1995), 209. 17 Keith Pavitt, ‘Backing Basics: Basic Research Should Not Just Depend on What Industry Needs Now’, New Economy, 2 (1995), 71–74. 18 Michael Gibbons, Camille Limoges, Helga Nowotny, Simon Schwartzman, Peter Scott, and Martin Trow, The New Production of Knowledge: The Dynamics of Science and Research in Contemporary Societies (London: Sage Publications, 1994); Helga Nowotny, Peter Scott, and Michael Gibbons, Re-thinking Science: Knowledge and the Public in an Age of Uncertainty (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001). 19 Helga Nowotny, Peter Scott, and Michael Gibbons, ‘Introduction: ‘‘Mode 2’’ Revisited: The New Production of Knowledge’ Minerva, 41 (3), (2003), 179–194.

basic research in language and practice

255

2000 – twenty-four with biologists and physicists and twenty-five with policy-makers working in the US and UK.20 We decided to study two different countries and more than one scientific discipline to see if generalizations can be made about a concept that is considered universal. We focused on scientists in universities because that is where most government-funded basic research in the US and the UK is carried out. We concluded that it was not essential to cover a broad range of institutions because most of the scientists we interviewed had worked at several institutions, and because many also had experience of applied and industrially-relevant research. Although we cannot say that our sample is representative of American and British scientists in general, we have no reason to think the scientists we chose are atypical.21 Furthermore, our objective was to gather a range of views, rather than to acquire an exhaustive list of scientists holding any particular view. A semi-structured interview approach was preferred to a quantitative survey because our aim was to investigate subtleties that a survey could easily miss. In all cases, we asked how interviewees defined ‘basic research’ (if they used the term), and whether they had seen recent changes in attitude towards basic research. The quotations that follow are drawn from these interviews, and our discussion of ‘scientists’ and ‘policy-makers’ refers to our sample. During our study, six definitional criteria emerged from the interview process. These are not criteria that were imposed ex cathedra. The six criteria, and the number of interviewees who used each, are given in Table I, which also shows a breakdown of responses by scientists and policy-makers.22 In our study, only seven interviewees used a single criterion to define ‘basic research’, which suggests that most scientists and administrators do not have one all-encompassing idea of ‘basic research’, but rather draw upon many different attributes when defining the term. Definitions vary as widely among policy-makers as among scientists. The criteria most commonly used to distinguish ‘basic’ from other types of research are epistemological and 20

All interviews were transcribed. To remain faithful to the transcribed data, quotations have not been modified to correct grammatical errors. Interview quotations have been used anonymously to preserve confidentiality. 21 See Michael Mulkay and Nigel Gilbert, ‘Putting Philosophy to Work’, in Michael Mulkay (ed.), Sociology of Science: A Sociological Pilgrimage (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1991), 109–130. 22 These figures are intended to give a general idea of the popularity of different definitions, and have no statistical significance.

256

jane calvert TABLE I

Definitions of ‘Basic Research’ Criteria

No. of interviewees Policy-makers Scientists

1. Epistemological (Nature of knowledge produced) 2. Intentional (Aims of the research) 3. Distance from application 4. Institutional (Where carried out) 5. Disclosure norms (How disseminated) 6. Scientific field

32

12

20

33

16

17

15 8

7 7

8 1

7

5

2

3

2

1

intentional. Twenty-seven interviewees (sixteen scientists and eleven policy-makers) defined ‘basic research’ in both these ways. Epistemological definitions Basic research is often said to produce a certain type of knowledge. So, a distinction is labelled epistemological when it refers to the properties and/or nature of the knowledge that basic research is said to produce. Four epistemological sub-categories emerged from the interviews, defining ‘basic research’ in terms of its unpredictability and generality, and in terms of its theory-driven and reductionist features. Scientists and policy-makers routinely distinguish ‘basic research’ in the language of unpredictability or novelty. According to a British physicist, in basic research ‘what you’re trying to do is [to] find a new concept or push the boundaries of existing knowledge’. Unpredictability of this kind can lead to novel outcomes. A British policy-maker observed that ‘the word processor didn’t come about through research on a quill pen’. Some interviewees, however, disagreed with this definition, and spoke of epistemological distinctions, according to which research is deemed to be ‘basic’ if it is ‘general’ rather than ‘specific’. ‘General’ research refers to research at such a ‘level’ that it applies to a wide range of instances or phenomena, whereas ‘applied’ research will help solve only a particular problem. As with unpredictability, there were critics of generality as the defining characteristic. An American molecular biologist said that basic research was actually ‘specific’ research because her field

basic research in language and practice

257

involved working out how a specific gene functioned, and it was difficult to generalize to the level of the organism. Theory is closely related to generality, since theories involve statements of general principles. As one American policy-maker put it, ‘the more basic the research, the more it’s driven by the internal theoretical dynamics of the field’. However, the words ‘theory’ and ‘theoretical’ drew a contrasting response from physicists; a British physicist argued that ‘theory and experiment’s nothing to do with basic and applied’. Generality seems closely related to reductionism, insofar as reductionists claim that basic research requires the generalized understanding of phenomena in terms of their most basic entities. A British biologist believed that basic research implied the act of ‘looking at things at a molecular level’. This view was shared by other biologists.

Aims and intentions The second most common way of defining ‘basic research’ concerns aim and intention. Thus, it is said that a basic researcher is ‘someone who is just following their curiosity’ (American policy-maker). If the same research were done with different intentions, it should therefore be classified differently. For example, one could in principle map the stars for navigational reasons, or to learn about the solar system. The research category could be defined differently in each case. Intentional and epistemological definitions are not necessarily compatible. If the intention is to produce something that will result in an application, no matter how ‘fundamental’ the research may be (i.e., unpredictable or general), some interviewees believed that it should not be classified as ‘basic’. With definitions based on intention, we have the problem of determining whose aims are involved. A researcher’s goals may differ from those of her sponsor’s; and one researcher may differ from another. As one American policymaker pointed out, ‘something could be basic to the person who’s doing it, and could be applied to the sponsor. So partly it’s a matter of perspective’. Nonetheless, despite these problems, definition by ‘intention’ is still widely used.

Distance from Application It may seem logical to classify types of research activity in relation to their outputs. Accordingly, we may have a definition in terms of

258

jane calvert

distance from application. Distance is different from intent because results can be distant from application without there being any intention that they be so. Thus, as a British physicist observed, ‘The certain work I do has no applied use, so therefore it is basic research’. The same physicist then went on to justify public support of his work in terms of its potential application. His inconsistency shows how the heterogeneous properties of ‘basic research’ can be drawn upon to make it seem simultaneously ‘practically useful but useless’.23 Another limitation of this definition was pointed out by a second British physicist, who noted that it was possible to do research that had no immediately obvious application (such as ‘bouncing neutrons off coke bottles’), but this would not necessarily qualify the research as ‘basic’. In any case, there are many instances of basic discoveries having unforeseen applications. (e. g., lasers leading to CD players), while applied research may fail to meet expected outcomes.

The institutional distinction A research activity can also be defined in terms of where the research is undertaken. An American policy-maker put the matter thus: If you walk into a laboratory, how do you know whether they are doing basic or applied research? And I would say that the first clue is probably the name on the building. But if you don’t know what building you’re in, it gets a lot harder to distinguish it from the mechanical activities that go on.

Another policy-maker drew an analogy with the recent history of private commercial initiatives to sequence the human genome. If the research was done in a university, it would be basic research; but since it was done by a private company, it was not. Clearly, complications can arise. How would this interviewee categorize research that is done for companies, on contract, by university researchers? A simple answer would prove difficult.

23 Tom F. Gieryn, Cultural Boundaries of Science (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 19.

basic research in language and practice

259

Disclosure norms Basic research is normally published in the open literature. Open publication is often predicated upon institutional arrangements. Therefore, location and disclosure are often related. Thus, an American policy-maker defined ‘basic research’ as ‘research by scientists that is directed at an audience of other scientists, meaning that it is intending to be published ’. Partha Dasgupta and Paul David have distinguished between different categories of research in terms of the norms of disclosure.24 However, this carries the implicit assumption – roundly criticized by Diana Hicks – that commercial firms do not publish in the open literature.25 Scientific field Three of our interviewees chose to define ‘basic research’ by scientific discipline. The problem here, is that usage varies among individuals, and is subject to hierarchies among disciplines. One British policy-maker maintained that ‘basic research’ consists only of ‘astronomy and particle physics and nuclear physics’. Clearly, others would disagree.

OECD

DEFINITIONS

It is useful to hold these practical responses, by practitioners, against the widely accepted international definitions used by the OECD. These definitions, set out in the ‘Frascati Manual’, are outlined in Box 1, and were familiar to some interviewees.26

24

Partha Dasgupta and Paul A. David, ‘Toward a New Economics of Science’, Research Policy, 23 (5), (1994), 487–521. 25 Diana Hicks, ‘Published Papers, Tacit Competencies and Corporate Management of the Public/Private Character of Knowledge’, Industrial and Corporate Change, 4 (2), (1995), 401–423. 26 OECD, The Measurement of Scientific and Technical Activities: Proposed Standard Practice for Surveys of Research and Experimental Development (Paris: OECD, 1994). Inserted comments in italics and square brackets indicate the type of definition being used.

260

jane calvert Box 1: ‘Frascati’ Definitions

Basic research ‘is experimental or theoretical work undertaken primarily to acquire new knowledge of the underlying foundations of phenomena and observable facts [epistemological–general/reductionist,] without any particular application or use in view [intentional]’.27 It ‘analyses properties, structures, and relationships with a view to formulating and testing hypotheses, theories or laws [epistemological–general/theoretical]. The results of basic research are not generally sold but are usually published in scientific journals or circulated to interested colleagues [disclosure norms]’.28 It ‘is usually undertaken by scientists who may set their own goals and to a large extent organize their own work [intentional]’.29 Pure basic research ‘is carried out for the advancement of knowledge without working for long-term economic or social benefits and with no positive efforts being made to apply the results to practical problems or to transfer the results to sectors responsible for its application [intentional]’.30 Oriented-basic research ‘is carried out with the expectation that it will produce a broad base of knowledge [epistemological–general] likely to form the background to the solution of recognized or expected current or future problems or possibilities [intentional]’.31 For some interviewees the ‘pure basic’ category presented special difficulties. A British policy-maker, responsible for collecting data on research, said she could not classify any of her funding agency’s work as ‘pure basic’ because her agency was ‘mission-driven’. Because definition by ‘intention’ is written into the ‘pure-basic’ category, it becomes problematic to justify funding in cases where researchers make ‘no positive efforts’ to make their research applied. ‘Oriented-basic’ research is also problematic, in that it is difficult to establish unambiguously whether there is a reasonable ‘expectation’ that a piece of research will be ‘useful’ or not. It may be for such 27 28 29 30 31

Ibid., 68. Ibid., 68. Ibid., 69. Ibid. Ibid.

basic research in language and practice

261

reasons that these two categories are not widely used; indeed, among the OECD countries, only the UK and Australia do so.32 The OECD is aware that that its definitions are not perfect, and admit that ‘They seem to imply a sequence and a separation that rarely exist in reality’.33 But what is especially interesting about the ‘Frascati definitions’ is that they involve several different criteria simultaneously. It is revealing that the final report of the second Frascati Conference, held in 1968, includes the following caveat: ‘Besides defining the categories in terms of the goals of the performing organizations [intentional], other criteria which may be helpful for the classification of specific projects are the degree of generality of the results [epistemological–general], the use of the results [distance from application], the work organisation [disclosure norms], [and] the institutional location [institutional]’.34 This sentence was removed from later versions of the manual, but it confirms that we are looking at a flexible concept that inevitably incorporates a diversity of features.

ALTERNATIVE CATEGORIZATIONS The respondents to our study did not produce a simple definition of ‘basic research’. However, they revealed some of the many definitions in circulation. The fact that the OECD divides ‘basic research’ into ‘pure-basic’ and ‘oriented-basic’ suggests that, for at least some governments, it is desirable to have some sort of intermediate category between ‘basic’ and ‘applied’. Several scholars have attempted to overcome these definitional ambiguities, by proposing alternative terms. Donald Stokes, for example, has adopted an ‘intentional’ definition, and questions the value of drawing a distinction between research pursued for a specific goal, and research pursued to deepen understanding.35 Stokes gives many examples of research that has been driven simultaneously by considerations of use and understanding. He 32

See OECD, ‘Issues paper: Workshop on Basic Research: Policy Relevant Definitions and Measurement’, Oslo, 29–30 October 2001 (Paris: OECD, 2001). 33 OECD op. cit. note 26, 70. 34 OECD, The Measurement of Scientific and Technical Activities: Proposed Standard Practice for Surveys of Research and Development, Proceedings of the Second Frascati Conference on OECD International Standards for the Measurement of R&D, 2–6 December 1968 (Paris: OECD, 1968), 23. 35 Stokes op. cit. note 2, 74.

262

jane calvert

terms this category, ‘use-inspired basic research’.36 However, his model can be criticized for focusing exclusively upon intention. He does not ask whether intention may not be the most important definition. His argument is that a statement about the epistemological status of a piece of research ‘is only a statement about an empirical correlate of the goal patterns envisaged by the Frascati definitions’37 – an argument that overlooks the importance of epistemological definitions of ‘basic research’ among scientists and policy makers. Some years ago, Harvey Brooks drew a distinction between ‘opportunity-oriented’ and ‘need-oriented’ research.38 ‘Opportunityoriented’ research, he said, is curiosity-driven – following an awareness of opportunities – while ‘need-oriented’ research is driven by social needs. We can see that, like Stokes, Brooks based his terminology on intention, and did not give due weight to other considerations. In effect, it would appear that both Stokes and Brooks have written from ‘on high’, without paying close attention to the ways in which the term ‘basic research’ is actually used in practice. Their efforts to find alternative language have had several counterparts. In the 1980s and 1990s, it became fashionable to use the phrase ‘strategic research’ as an intermediate concept, to describe long-term research that is more ‘directed’ than ‘basic’.39 The impetus for this came from applied scientists who wanted a category to describe background research, and from academic scientists, who knew that any discovery may have applications.40 This category, however, was not taken up by governments, nor was it included in the ‘Frascati Manual’, apparently because of a desire on the part of OECD to preserve the existing statistical series. In Stokes’ view, this suggests that ‘the conceptual issue of strategic research has been taken hostage by problems of measurement and has remained unsolved’.41 Meanwhile, other terms – such as ‘translational research’, and ‘basic technology’ 36

Ibid., 73. Ibid., 82. 38 Harvey Brooks, ‘Understanding the Bush Report’, Conference Proceedings, ‘Science - The Endless Frontier, 1945–1995: Learning from the Past, Designing for the Future’, Columbia University, New York, 9 December 1994 http:// www.cspo.org/products/conferences/bush/Brooks.pdf 39 John Irvine and Ben R Martin, Foresight in Science: Picking the Winners (London: Frances Pinter, 1984). 40 Jacqueline Senker, ‘Evaluating the Funding of Strategic Science – Some Lessons from the British Experience’, Research Policy, 20 (1), (1991), 29–43. 41 Stokes, op. cit. note 2, 67. 37

basic research in language and practice

263

– attempt to ‘bridge the gap’ between basic and applied research. Their use implies a general dissatisfaction with the language by which the research landscape is currently described.

CHANGES

IN THE

FUNDING ENVIRONMENT

FOR

BASIC RESEARCH

While the work of Stokes and others has not resolved the problem of definition, it has shown how resilient and necessary the term must be. In practice, ‘basic research’ is an intrinsically ambiguous category, with different features highlighted by different people at different times. In recent years, alternative classifications have emerged largely in response to a funding situation in which the old terminology, for one reason or another, no longer seems appropriate. Our interviewees discussed the role of basic research in this new environment. Most noted the growing stress on utility, complained about these trends, and expressed concern about delayed and suppressed publication, and fears that free inquiry may be jeopardized. One American biologist prophesized that today’s short-term perspective ‘will in the long run be detrimental to science’. A British physicist feared that ‘because of the pressures from the government to highlight relevance of the work to industry and to the end users, I think there has been a general under-funding of what I term truly basic research’. Increased pressures for commercial applicability filter through to the ways in which the interviewees describe their work. Research grant applications can be so pitched, as to appear either basic or applied, depending on the circumstances. As an American physicist said, ‘for me it’s very beautiful fundamental physics, but it’s so close to a lot of industrial processes that it’s very easy to write a grant that looks strictly applied’. However, other scientists maintained that the changes were merely cosmetic. In this way, perhaps, the ideal of ‘knowledge for its own sake’ could be retained in the face of pressures for relevance. The survival of this ideal was important to many of those whom we interviewed.

HOW USEFUL

IS THE

TERM?

Our discussions revealed a wide range of views about the relative importance of the term. Several policy-makers thought the term unproblematic. For them, ‘basic research’ was simply what a particular agency funds, or as what is described by the ‘Frascati Manual’.

264

jane calvert

An American policy-maker hopefully concluded that ‘most people sort of agree what basic research is’. These particular policy-makers had no interest in resolving ambiguities. By contrast, some of our scientists said that they were obliged to use the term when they would rather not do so. They thought that forcing research into boxes marked ‘basic’ and ‘applied’ could be unhelpful. An American biologist, for example, worried that when the term entered the funding arena, ‘it can really lead to misuse’. For example, he observed, the World Health Organization had a remit to support applied research, but would not fund research if it were defined as ‘basic’. Others believed the use of the term was fundamentally unhelpful. A British policy-maker stressed that the whole activity of trying to classify research types was pointless (‘on a bad day it’s counting angels on the head of a pin’). He asked, rhetorically, ‘when you’re sitting in a library reading an article, are you doing basic research or applied research or what the hell?’ and concluded that ‘the question is irrelevant’ for most practising scientists. An American policy-maker agreed, saying, ‘It’s just a flashback to an earlier way of thinking – it doesn’t mean much’. When contrasting these views, the question arises, who owns the term? Our policy-makers used the terms ‘basic’ and ‘applied’ so that they could better communicate with scientists. Our scientists, however, said that the basic/applied terminology is used only when they have to present themselves for assessment, or when they are seeking funds. These comments suggest that the term may, in fact, be used most widely when the worlds of science and policy interact. This view was supported by an American biologist, who said that the term could be significant to him if there were an expectation that his work might produce economic outcomes: If I’m talking to someone who’s from a commercial concern, I will very quickly in the conversation use the term ‘basic’. Just because I just want to make it clear to them that I don’t foresee that I’m going to have something patentable or anything else during some reasonable time span of my grant.

It seems that the question of definition thus becomes important when there are specific pressures to describe research in a certain way. Our scientists were obliged to categorize their research as ‘basic’ only in situations such as these; and rather than sticking to a precise definition, they described their research in different ways, depending on the requirements of the case.

basic research in language and practice CATEGORIES

AND

265

CHANGE

Given these complications, should we attempt to develop a new language to describe research activities? When we put this question to our policy-makers, many said that they would be unhappy to change existing categories because the current vocabulary is so well established. One of the American policy-makers said that, even if current terminology was ‘rough around the edges’, it allowed trends to be analysed and international comparisons to be made. Indeed, the NSF uses the longevity of the basic/applied scheme to justify its continued use, on the grounds that terms ‘have been in place for several decades and are also generally consistent with international definitions’.42 Many of our American policy-makers were familiar with the work of Stokes, but thought it impossible to operationalize his scheme. Despite a certain level of dissatisfaction with the basic/ applied distinction, most of the policy-makers we interviewed wanted to retain the current categories. It would seem that these categories persist, despite their shortcomings, at least in part because of their statistical momentum.43 ‘Basic research’ has been recognized by the ‘Frascati Manual’ since 1963.44 It has been used as an accounting category for the NSF since the Foundation began. Benoit Godin argues that because the category is measurable, it became stabilized, and because it is stabilized, there is tremendous inertia against change.45 This suggests that there will be pressures to retain a category whose boundaries are blurred, simply because it can be used, however imperfectly. This point is well taken by Theodore Porter, who holds that statistics regulate economic and social life, rather than just describe it.46 It is clear that, in this case, ‘the collection and publication of statistics tends to … crystallize what it sets out to describe’.47

42

National Science Board, Science and Engineering Indicators – 1998 (Arlington: National Science Foundation, 1998). 43 Godin, op. cit. note 9, 21. 44 OECD, op. cit. note 10. 45 Godin, op. cit. note 9. 46 Theodore M. Porter, ‘The Management of Society by Numbers’, in John Krige and Dominique Pestre (eds.), Science in the Twentieth Century (Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1997), 97–110. 47 Ibid.,101.

266

jane calvert SCIENTISTS

AND

POLICY-MAKERS

The discussion of terminology revealed some interesting differences between our scientists and policy-makers. The policy-makers were more likely to accept current definitions, and in many cases had thought less about them. Policy-makers would point to statistics to answer questions, and were happy to use ‘basic research’ as a category for funding decisions. Their acceptance of the ‘given-ness’ of the concept helps explain why any new language is likely to meet resistance. Scientists are more aware of ambiguities, and gave many examples of how their work could be described as either ‘basic’ or ‘applied’. They did not find the term particularly helpful, except when they wished to raise a barrier between themselves and some external group. It could be that, by sticking to the old (vague and ambiguous) terminology, policy-makers can effectively conceal change (and perhaps even conceal movements towards ‘Mode 2’ type policies).48 Classifying money as spent on ‘basic’ research may cover attempts to pacify a scientific community clamouring for funds and autonomy.

CONCLUSION This paper has suggested that ‘basic research’ is a protean concept, and has illustrated the problematic dimensions of the term. It may be helpful to think of the concept not in terms of one definition, but as having flexible boundaries and multiple definitions.49 It is this degree of constructive ambiguity that makes it useful – but also political. The term is therefore more than just a label. It performs social functions – such as protecting autonomy and defining self-image. If the term ‘basic research’ persists, what of the research it describes? In focusing on definitions, this paper has left unexamined the changing content of basic research, or arguments for its governance. However, recognizing the existence of commonly conflated ways of distinguishing ‘basic research’ reveal the complexity of practitioners’ reactions in situations where science and values mix. Once we understand the different reasons for defining ‘basic research’ in different ways, we can have a more enlightened discussion of its future. Not all scientists resile from the idea that basic 48 49

Gibbons et al. op. cit. note 18. Gieryn, op. cit. note 23.

basic research in language and practice

267

research must be justified in terms of social benefits. There are also pressures for the greater democratization of science.50 Through democratization and commercialization, society has assumed a greater role in the scientific process, and the autonomy of the scientist will inevitably be brought into question. Some interpret this as a challenge to basic research, but closer examination reveals that it is actually a challenge to the custom of defining ‘basic research’ in terms of intention. Some may worry that if research is not ‘intentionally basic’ (i.e., driven by the curiosity of the researcher), the fact will have negative consequences for its epistemic content. Once we separate ways of defining ‘basic research’, however, we see that this conclusion does not necessarily follow. Helga Nowotny et al. argue that research that is socially embedded can be just as rigorous as research driven by the interests of the researcher because ‘its validity is no longer determined solely, or predominantly, by narrowly circumscribed scientific communities, but by much wider communities of engagement’.51 Arie Rip, among others, sees the interpenetration of science and society as necessary for the vitality of both, and argues that ‘the re-assertion of purity of science is more dangerous than its possible exploitation and fragmentation’.52 Whatever the truth of these arguments, once we understand that ‘basic research’ is an ambiguous term that is used for given purposes, and to further given interests, we see that questions about definition are, in fact, reflections of larger political and ethical questions about the organisation and direction of science. All this is not to overlook the resilience of the concept itself. We must develop a way to retain the aspects of what we call ‘basic research’ that we consider valuable, while recognizing that the research it comes to describe may change in tomorrow’s environment. In this way, we will better understand the challenges that face basic research in the future, both in language and in practice.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The author would like to thank Brian Balmer, Ben Martin, and Roy MacLeod for their valuable assistance with this paper. 50

Nowotny, et al. op. cit. note 18. Nowotny et al. op. cit. note 19, 191–2. 52 Arie Rip, ‘A Cognitive Approach to Relevance of Science’, Social Science Information, 36 (4), (1997), 634. 51

268

jane calvert ABOUT

THE

AUTHOR

Jane Calvert is a Research Fellow at the ESRC Centre for Genomics in Society (Egenis), University of Exeter. Previously she was a Research Fellow at SPRU, University of Sussex, where she carried out her doctoral research on the concept of ‘basic research’. She is interested in the interaction between science and technology studies and science policy, and is currently researching intellectual property rights in genomics.

ESRC Centre for Genomics in Society (Egenis) Amory Building University of Exeter EX4 4RJ, UK E-mail: [email protected]