Burma: All Change Or No Change?

ELECTIONS IN BURMA Richard Horsey, OPEN SOCIETY INSTITUTE FELLOW, FORMER UNITED NATIONS ADVISER ON BURMA

All Change or No Change? Next year, Burmese will vote in their first national elections for twenty years. The process is deeply flawed, but it will represent the most important political shift for a generation. The international community must seize this rare opportunity to induce the government to move towards greater openness and reform.

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HE RECENT PROSECUTION OF BURMA’S

opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi on the absurd charge of violating the terms of her own house arrest, and the prospect of elections next year that are unlikely to be at all free or fair, may tend to suggest that nothing is changing in Burma. In fact, there will be major changes in 2010 – because the ageing leadership will be handing F L I C K R . C O M / P H OTO S / L E W I S H A M D R E A M E R/

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over the reins of power to a younger generation of military officers, and because the controversial new constitution will significantly reorganise the institutions of political power. This is a crucial opportunity for the west to break with its failed policies, which have been ineffective in promoting reform, and in many ways counterproductive.

R E ST R ICT IO N S C O N T I N U E The charges against Suu Kyi stem from a bizarre incident in which an American intruder swam across the lake in front of her house and stayed there for two days. This may have provided the legal excuse the regime was looking for to keep her locked up. But it also gives them an opportunity to exclude her from standing in the forthcoming elections. She was prevented from doing so in 1990 on the basis of her marriage to the late Michael Aris, a British academic; but since his death, this provision would no longer bar her. If she is serving a custodial sentence at the time of the elections, however, Burmese law would prevent her from standing for political office. Her house arrest was an executive order, and so would not, in theory at least, debar her. The result is that the political situation in some ways parallels that before the 1990 elections. Key political opponents of the regime are locked up, as they were then; there are calls for a boycott of the polls; and there is a general expectation that they will not be free or fair. Shortly before the 1990 elections, the New York Times cited diplomats as referring to them as ‘a particularly unconvincing variety of Burmese puppet show’; in the end, however, the vote appears to have been fairly counted, even if the electoral process as a whole was far from free, with Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy winning a huge mandate. Yet an overwhelming victory for the opposition seems unlikely this time. The desire of the people for change has not diminished, as the September 2007 demonstrations led by Buddhist monks clearly proved. But the subsequent crackdown indicated equally clearly the regime’s determination to keep control – by arresting opponents and restricting opposition activities. Years of repression have left the National League for Democracy weakened, and it no longer has the grassroots organising machinery it once did. Like the regime, its leadership is ageing – but has failed to promote younger members into positions of authority.

So while Suu Kyi remains a very potent symbol of people’s hopes and aspirations, it seems likely the regime will prevent these being translated into political reality next year.

T H E E T H N IC Q U E ST IO N The elections could also be a defining moment in the country's long-standing ethnic conflict. Various ethnic groups have entered cease-fire agreements with the regime over the last two decades, on the promise of development for their areas and discussions about their political concerns. But they now feel that they have nothing much to show for it – the promised development has not materialised, and the new constitution fails to

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putting considerable pressure on these groups to disarm, or transform into militias under the command of the government army. It is unlikely that any of these groups will resume armed conflict. But 2010 certainly risks setting the stage for renewed confrontation, if the regime fails to promote political rather than military solutions to ethnic concerns, and if the ethnic people of Burma conclude that the process has failed to deliver tangible gains.

G E N E RAT IO N A L C H A N G E

meet their expectations. Conflict and widespread abuses continue in those areas where no ceasefire is in place. Nevertheless, despite being highly critical of the process, most ethnic organisations realise that they cannot disengage from it, or they risk marginalisation. They hope the new constitution will offer some limited political opportunities, and that the best way to expand these is from within the process. The key point of tension is disarmament. The major ceasefire groups intend to retain their arms pending anticipated political discussions with the new government; they will therefore not participate directly in the elections, but will endorse separate political parties that will. But the regime is currently

Given the lack of credibility, and the climate of oppression, it is tempting to conclude that the elections will be a stitch-up and bring no benefit for anyone except the regime itself. They will undoubtedly be neither free nor fair. But the international community should not underestimate the scale of the task the regime has set itself, and the opportunities some political developments may offer. There will be two key changes. First, the elections will bring the new constitution into force. While the intention of this charter is clearly – and explicitly – to institutionalise the military’s political role, it also fundamentally alters the political landscape – establishing a new bicameral parliament and fourteen regional governments and legislatures. We should not expect that these new institutions will necessarily be vehicles for political change, but by completely reorganising existing power and patronage networks, unpredictable effects and new opportunities are likely, and these should be grasped. Second, and possibly most important, is the fact that the elections will bring about a generational transition in the military. The current leaders will retire, and while ‘Senior General’ Than Shwe is likely to move to a ceremonial position through which he can continue to exert some influence, the president and the commander-in-chief will be drawn from the ranks of younger officers. Again, we should not be under any illusion that they will necessarily be more open than the current leaders. But the new government will want to create its own legacy, rather than perpetuating Than Shwe’s policies, which are widely seen in the officer corps as flawed and unsustainable.

S E I Z I N G O P P O RT U N I TY The generational transition following the elections could therefore be a key inflection PA R E S H / T H E K H A L E E J T I M E S / D U B A I

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point. The west has a rare opportunity to convince the new leaders that a renormalisation of relations with the international community is not out of reach, and that positive steps will trigger a proportional response. It is fortuitous that this important moment comes when a new administration in the United States is searching for a more effective Burma policy. Burma’s military, and the people, have always looked up to the US, and the country has been acutely aware of its geostrategic location – squeezed uncomfortably between the giants of China and India. For this reason, Burmese have traditionally prioritised good relations with the US, as a geostrategic counterbalance. The US therefore has more leverage that it may imagine, provided the regime believes that better relations are attainable should it alter its behaviour. Europe too, must find ways to adjust its failed policies. With a raft of sanctions that, on balance, impact on the people more than the regime, and having essentially run out of options for additional measures, Burma policy has hit a dead-end. New, creative thinking is required, in Brussels as well as in key capitals: most importantly in London. On the day after the elections, a new Burmese government will face two choices: moving towards greater openness and reform, or continuing past policies of isolation and authoritarianism. If the first reaction of the west to flawed elections is to isolate further the government and impose yet more sanctions, the new leaders are likely to conclude that they have no option other than to continue their familiar policies. The deplorable trial of Suu Kyi, continuing in the face of a wave of international condemnation, graphically demonstrates that past policies have failed to have an impact on the situation and have left us with almost no leverage. It should act as a wake-up call. In addition to clearly stating our expectations for free and fair elections, including the full participation of Suu Kyi and other opposition figures, the west must also adopt more practical and effective policies. It must position itself now to seize the opportunities next year may bring to push the country in the more positive direction we all want to see; the long-suffering people of Burma deserve no less.

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