Building A True Amazonian Movement

Building a True Amazonian Movement Final Report of the Coordinating Office of the Amazon Alliance May 29, 2009

Table of Contents Executive Summary

1

I.

Amazon Alliance: Evaluating Indigenous Voice and Power in the Amazon Why an Amazon Alliance”? The Amazon Alliance: Mission Accomplished? Cracks in the Foundation of the Amazon Alliance

2 2 3 3

II.

Overview of Amazonian Indigenous Representative Systems Why Strong Systems of Indigenous Representation Matter How Systems of Indigenous Representation are Designed Strains on Indigenous Representative Systems The Results of Dysfunctional Systems of Representation

5 6 6 7 8

III.

Structural Problems in the Amazon Alliance Obstacles to Achieving the Amazon Alliance’s Mission The Steering Council of the Alliance Governance System of the Amazon Alliance The Co-Director Model

9 9 9 10 10

IV.

Structural Problems in COICA The Role of COICA Conflicts within COICA COICA’s Coordinating Office: Representative of all Indigenous Peoples in the Amazon? COICA: Financial Intermediary for the Amazon? COICA: Marginalizing and Replacing National Indigenous Organizations

12 12 12 13 14 15

V.

Resolving the Problems in the Amazon Alliance and COICA Amazon Alliance and COICA: Confused Roles and Inefficiency The Decision to Write a Public Report Amazon Alliance: Dissolution and Redesign COICA: Halt Representation, Strengthen Governance and Coordination

17 17 18 19 20

VI.

The Cost of Inaction Agents Against Change Anticipated Consequences of the Current Dysfunction

22 22 23

VII.

Building a New Paradigm for Amazonia Strengthening Representative Indigenous Organizations The Vital Role of Allies Diverse Actors Becoming a True Amazonian Movement

24 24 25 26

Appendix: Joint Resignation Letter of the Amazon Alliance Staff

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Executive Summary The Amazon Alliance is an international network of indigenous organizations and NGOs that facilitates collaborative work to create a better future for the people and environment of the Amazon Basin. The Alliance has worked for nearly two decades to support indigenous peoples, yet for reasons explained in this report, the Amazon Alliance’s dedication to strengthening indigenous organizations has been manipulated by a few individuals who have used it for their own ends. The Amazon Alliance lacks the strong governance systems that would be needed to prevent further distortion of the Alliance’s work. Therefore the staff of the Amazon Alliance recommends that the organization be dissolved immediately. Legitimate indigenous representatives have been increasingly marginalized by a system that shifts power away from the grassroots. False representatives who are not bound by systems of transparency or accountability now claim to represent all Amazonian indigenous peoples. This situation undermines indigenous governance structures, violates indigenous rights, and is a major threat to Amazonian indigenous peoples. The work of the Amazon Alliance is deeply interconnected with the Coordinator of Indigenous Organizations of the Amazon Basin (COICA), an umbrella organization that was created to coordinate joint efforts of all indigenous peoples of the Amazon. However, COICA is under enormous pressure from international funders, NGOs, and governments who want COICA’s staff to act as representatives of all Amazonian peoples, a shift that is politically strategic for these external entities but disempowers indigenous peoples. In the absence of strong oversight from representative indigenous organizations, COICA’s staff have been diverted from their mission by offers of access to power and money. Acting as representatives of all of Amazonia, COICA staff have made controversial executive decisions, and have entered into negotiations and funding contracts that put them in direct competition with the representative indigenous organizations they are supposed to coordinate. Although COICA has rapidly gained influence and money, this rise to power has come at the expense of the indigenous movement. We therefore recommend that COICA be suspended from any representative functions, and that immediate measures be taken to strengthen COICA’s Council so that they can refocus the organization and govern it effectively. The authors of this report firmly believe that this information must be made available to the public so that necessary action can be taken by the many agencies involved. Although many people will try to prevent any changes from being made in the current system, and solutions may be difficult to implement, the consequences of inaction will be severe for all parties. We strongly recommend that NGOs, funders, and other allies refocus their efforts on strengthening the national and local indigenous organizations that form the foundation of the indigenous movement. All agencies should recognize the important difference between individuals and true representatives, and demand evidence from anyone who claims to be a representative. Allies must engage indigenous peoples in ways that bridge but do not ignore the vast cultural differences between non-indigenous and indigenous peoples. It is our sincere hope that the dissolution of the Alliance, the refocusing of COICA, and the strengthening of representative indigenous organizations will contribute to a new paradigm in which a powerful Amazonian movement can be mobilized.

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I. Amazon Alliance: Evaluating Indigenous Voice and Power in the Amazon The Amazon Alliance has worked to strengthen Amazonian indigenous organizations and empower representative indigenous leaders, with the goal of ensuring that the voices of indigenous communities are clearly heard internationally. Regrettably, the Amazon Alliance’s work over the last few years seems to have contributed to a concentration of wealth and power in the hands of very few individuals, while indigenous communities are increasingly disempowered and marginalized. This situation fundamentally violates the system of indigenous representation in the Amazon, in which local indigenous leaders are supposed to be informed of key issues and then convey decisions to be implemented by representative indigenous organizations. Instead, major decisions that will have profound impacts on indigenous peoples in the Amazon are being made by a small group of individuals who follow no clear system of consultation with grassroots indigenous communities and have no functioning mechanisms to ensure the transparency and accountability of their actions. By any measure, the current situation violates the rights of grassroots indigenous communities to Free Prior and Informed Consent regarding major decisions that will affect their territories and lives. This report will analyze the significant barriers to guaranteeing that indigenous peoples have voice and power in the decisions that affect them. In addition, it will provide recommendations for how indigenous organizations, NGOs and international funders can more effectively empower grassroots indigenous communities in the Amazon. It is written in an accessible style to ensure that it serves as a useful tool for the wide range of important actors in Amazonia. This report draws on consultations with diverse experts on this topic, comprehensive documentation and the extensive experience of the Amazon Alliance Coordinating Office staff. Why an “Amazon Alliance?” The Amazon Alliance was founded in 1990 by indigenous organizations and NGOs to act as a unique vehicle for confronting environmental and cultural degradation in Amazonia. As a network of more than one hundred member organizations, the Alliance has worked since its inception to facilitate long-term collaboration between diverse actors. The Amazon Alliance brings together the leaders of the Amazonian indigenous and environmental movements to work as equal partners in addressing the challenges facing the region. In addition to providing members with information and technical assistance, the Alliance also ensures that indigenous perspectives are heard by decision-making bodies around the world, including governments and multilateral institutions. The Alliance is governed by a Steering Council of prominent indigenous organizations and NGOs that determine the Alliance’s priorities and strategies and oversee the work of the two Co-Directors. Indigenous peoples manage and conserve vast areas of the Amazon, and play a crucial role in ensuring a healthy future for Amazonia. The founding philosophy of the Amazon Alliance is predicated on the principle that indigenous peoples must have voice and power in all processes affecting their lands and communities. This principle is in accordance with all internationally recognized rights, including their rights to “Free, Prior, Informed Consent” or “FPIC.” The recently passed United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) clarifies that indigenous peoples’ representative organizations must play a central role in ensuring that the right of indigenous people to FPIC is respected with regard to all major decisions. The Amazon Alliance has worked to promote the importance of this concept at the international level.

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In order for indigenous organizations to be effective advocates of indigenous peoples’ rights, they need strong governance systems to ensure that their leaders are accountable to grassroots communities and are truly representing their best interests. Strong, representative indigenous organizations may be the most effective means for protecting indigenous peoples’ rights. However, indigenous organizations that do not have good governance systems may be one of the biggest threats facing indigenous communities in the Amazon. The Amazon Alliance: Mission Accomplished? Over the last three years, the Amazon Alliance has coordinated increased participation of Amazonian indigenous leaders in international decision-making spaces. These spaces include: the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, the World Bank, the Interamerican Development Bank, the International Union for the Conservation of Nature, the World Social Forum, UN Climate Change negotiating sessions, and meetings of diverse NGOs and governments. Due in large part to the concerted efforts of the Amazon Alliance, indigenous leaders have been more effectively involved in these spaces than they ever had been before. This participation has predominantly been from the central office of COICA (The Coordinator of Indigenous Organizations of the Amazon Basin), although the Alliance has made great efforts to include the leaders of national indigenous organizations as much as possible. This increased participation from Amazonian indigenous leaders in international meetings has contributed to a growing interest in indigenous issues within current international debates. As a result, the few indigenous leaders in attendance have gained greatly increased access to funders and decision-makers, as well as the power to negotiate with regard to key policies and plans that affect indigenous peoples. The importance of working with representative indigenous organizations is increasingly recognized at these meetings, although there has been little effort to verify which organizations are truly representative of the people they claim to represent. Despite this increasing awareness of the need to involve indigenous communities, mechanisms for ensuring effective indigenous participation remain insufficient. Though it seems that the Amazon Alliance has achieved its mission to a greater degree than ever before, there are deep structural problems within the current system that undermine the Alliance’s ability to support the empowerment of indigenous peoples. Cracks in the Foundation of the Amazon Alliance While a small group of Amazonian indigenous people are highly visible at the international level, most grassroots indigenous communities have little to no information about what is being said on their behalf. Many national indigenous organizations are struggling to find basic operational funds and only a few are able to adequately monitor international issues that will affect their country. Within indigenous communities, there is virtually no understanding of what is going on at national and international levels, and most local indigenous organizations have no funding for even the most basic of functions. Despite the many successes of the Amazon Alliance in recent years, there are increasingly severe violations of the very principles that the Alliance was created to uphold. The right of indigenous peoples to Free Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) is central to the guiding principles of the Alliance.

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Achieving FPIC requires strong systems of transparency and accountability. Agreements made by individuals or organizations regarding the future of indigenous peoples and their lands without respecting FPIC must be revealed and confronted by the Amazon Alliance. A number of powerful organizations and individuals are currently violating the Alliance’s principles by:

• • •

Deliberately withholding or distorting information that is essential to national and grassroots indigenous leaders Obstructing the participation of representative indigenous leaders in key events, and/or choosing “representatives” for personal or political reasons even if these individuals were not legitimately elected or selected by the peoples they claim to represent Speaking “on behalf of” or “in representation of” indigenous peoples without implementing adequate systems of consultation, transparency, and accountability

The Amazon Alliance has a unique responsibility to expose these violations of indigenous rights, particularly where these violations have been caused by misuse of the opportunities created by the work of the Alliance. This topic will be explained in depth in this report.

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II. Overview of Amazonian Indigenous Representative Systems Effective coordination with indigenous peoples requires a clear understanding of why indigenous representative systems are important, how they are designed to function and the severe impacts of dysfunction. Because representative indigenous organizations fulfill an essential role in the success of any initiatives within Amazonia, all governmental and non-governmental actors should invest in strengthening the governance capabilities of indigenous organizations. Why Strong Systems of Indigenous Representation Matter The role of representative indigenous organizations is to act as a vital communication bridge between traditional grassroots indigenous leaders and Western society. Indigenous organizations provide strategic direction and support for leaders who need to interact with outside powerbrokers, and intervene on behalf of their member communities to influence policies and projects that will affect the people they represent. In order for an indigenous organization to be truly representative, it must have strong systems that enable regular communication with member communities and hold the organization’s leaders accountable to their many community leaders. The designated representatives of indigenous peoples are able to negotiate agreements regarding the vast natural resource wealth contained in indigenous territories. Many powerful interests, including governments, corporations, multilateral development banks, and some NGOs, seek to control these natural resources. Therefore, there are powerful vested interests involved in determining who can act as “representatives” of indigenous peoples and their natural resources. Implementation of the right to Free Prior Informed Consent requires strong systems of indigenous representation to ensure that consent is real. Without strong representative systems, no one can correctly advocate for the best interests of communities that have not been adequately involved in decisions that will affect them. Indigenous communities are highly unlikely to benefit from plans regarding their natural and cultural resources unless their right to FPIC has been enforced. If an indigenous organization does not have a strong governance system that nurtures and respects effective connections with grassroots indigenous leaders, then it cannot be considered to be a representative organization. True indigenous organizations must be rooted in authentic indigenous leadership systems and traditions. Even in traditional systems of "chiefs" and councils, the chief is not free to determine direction without consultation with elders and others within the communities, although historically powerful outsiders have forced chiefs to make decisions when it was to their advantage. There are numerous organizations that claim to be representative, but fail to systematically engage all grassroots leaders on a regular basis, and are therefore false representatives. Such false representatives cannot provide FPIC because they are not effectively consulting with grassroots leaders. For example, many development projects that negatively impact indigenous peoples have “consulted” a token indigenous person or indigenous organization to get their support “in representation of” the people who are affected by these projects. At times, new indigenous organizations have been created for the purpose of having a leader that could be controlled by the outside entity. Indigenous organizations without strong systems of accountability are deeply problematic because they have legitimized many of the processes that harm indigenous peoples and undermine their 5

right to FPIC. Most policies and development projects cannot legally be implemented until they can demonstrate that they have abided by the right to FPIC. However these projects frequently use non-representative organizations to fulfill this requirement. Thus, non-representative indigenous organizations have risen to become the principle mechanism by which major threats to indigenous peoples are enabled. How Systems of Indigenous Representation are Designed Systems of indigenous representation are based on participatory democracy, which was originally an indigenous concept that was adopted and modified by Western colonies in the Americas; the Iroquois Confederation served as a basis for the US Constitution, in relation to creating a framework of states´ powers being similar to those of the seven peoples´ powers in the Iroquois Confederation framework. There are key structural differences, however, between Western democracies and indigenous systems of representation. In the majority of indigenous representative systems, indigenous organizations collect information about issues that affect the communities they represent, then analyze this information and provide it to their communities with recommendations so that community leaders can make informed decisions and give a clear mandate to the leaders of their organizations. No major decision should be made by any indigenous leaders without first consulting with the communities that will be affected, in accordance with these communities’ rights to FPIC. This is an inverse pyramid decision-making structure, with ultimate decision-making authority resting with the grassroots leaders, not with the leaders of the larger indigenous organizations. In contrast, Western democracies employ a pyramid model in which a few leaders make most major decisions and ensure they are implemented and enforced by local government leaders. This fundamental difference is extremely important to keep in mind, as it is the source of many misunderstandings because outsiders expect indigenous leaders to make major decisions without consulting the communities they represent. The indigenous representation system begins at the level of communities, where leaders are typically chosen according to cultural tradition, although now many communities may instead hold formal elections for community leaders. Each community is a member of local or regional indigenous organizations, which often include a great many communities from several distinct ethnic groups. Leaders of these local or regional indigenous organizations are elected in an Assembly of the member communities, are usually based in offices within Amazonian cities, and are subject to 3-5 year term limits. Local and regional indigenous organizations have bylaws (usually based on labor union structures) which require the organization to act in representation of its member communities, focusing primarily on addressing the threats that face their member communities. Most local and regional indigenous organizations are members of larger indigenous organizations, which we refer to throughout this report as “national indigenous organizations.” National indigenous organizations are intended to represent all Amazonian indigenous peoples in their country. These national indigenous organizations, usually based in major cities, focus much of their effort on influencing national policies and large-scale threats that exceed the scope and capabilities of their local and regional member organizations. National indigenous organizations provide a vital interface with policy-makers, the media, funders, and diverse allies, leveraging these relationships to advocate for policy changes and financial resources that will benefit their peoples.

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National indigenous organizations are in turn members of the Council of COICA (the Coordinator of Indigenous Organizations of the Amazon Basin) and the Amazon Alliance. As their names demonstrate, neither COICA nor the Amazon Alliance were designed to be representatives of indigenous peoples, but instead were created to coordinate joint actions between the national indigenous organizations of the nine Amazonian countries and other allies, in order to address international issues that affect the entire Amazon Basin. Numerous alternative "indigenous institutions" have been created to interact with Western organizations, and are in direct opposition to the indigenous system of indigenous representation. Examples include the many caucuses and forums that are created to serve the needs of governmental and non-governmental bodies. These ad hoc groups are typically comprised of nonrepresentative indigenous individuals who often possess technical expertise but are asked to make decisions as if they were authentic representatives of indigenous peoples. Strains on Indigenous Representative Systems Perhaps more than in any other movement or any region of the world, the difficulties of communication in the Amazon is a major barrier to any attempts to adequately consult and represent indigenous communities. Some communities have access to AM radios or HAM radios, but very few have access to phones or internet. Therefore the most effective way to engage indigenous communities is usually by physically going to the community, or by bringing community leaders to a regional gathering to discuss issues and then provide resources to enable them to communicate information back to their communities. Both of these options are extremely expensive and time-consuming, and are beyond the staffing capabilities and budgets of most indigenous organizations to do more than once a year. National organizations, on the other hand, typically have full access to telephones, cell phones, and internet, and skills in utilizing these technologies. At the international level, COICA and the Amazon Alliance make use of internet and phones, but have had limited success in attempting to engage indigenous organizations in this way, especially given the many different languages that must be used to communicate across all of the Amazonian countries. Because indigenous communities typically do not use communications technologies, the national and international organizations find it much easier to communicate regularly with external actors who are based in cities than with their own grassroots leaders. In many cases, the work of the national and international organizations is thus guided much more by inputs from their contacts and allies who utilize communications technology (mostly staff members of non-indigenous organizations) than from any real mandate from informed community leaders. The only truly effective means of international coordination has been by holding meetings that include all of the leaders of the national indigenous organizations. These meetings are extremely time-consuming for the national organization leaders, expensive for the conveners, and have great difficulties overcoming the language barriers and cultural differences between the leaders of different countries. These multiple communications barriers, contribute to the problems of indigenous leaders not being effectively kept up to date on international issues. Therefore important issues are often not addressed until the situation becomes urgent.

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Urgent issues that require immediate response from national and international indigenous organizations severely strain the decision-making process. The representative indigenous system is not designed to facilitate rapid decision-making. This is exacerbated by the fact that indigenous organizations lack the communications systems that would be needed to quickly inform communities and receive a clear mandate. Many of the threats and opportunities that indigenous organizations encounter in their work require urgent action, leaving insufficient time for the full decision-making process. Faced with urgent demands, leaders face a difficult choice: (1) attempt to properly consult their member communities, which costs significant time and resources and may still result in a decision that is too late; or (2) take a path that violates their requirement to seek the consent of their members and make an executive a decision on behalf of their constituents. Another major strain on indigenous representative systems is the way in which funding requirements limit support for the core organizational strengthening that is necessary for indigenous organizations to be able to function appropriately. Most indigenous organizations do not have the administrative capacity or the contacts to able to apply for grants. The limited sources of funding that are available for indigenous organizations create fierce competition, and are usually restricted to providing support for specific projects. Organizations are rewarded for implementing projects, but discouraged from strengthening their governance systems. Indigenous leaders who are willing to compete with their allies and ignore their governance systems in favor of quick results are able to quickly monopolize access to funds, while sidelining the checks and balances that should hold them accountable for what they do with those funds. This increasingly puts the financial resources of the indigenous movement in the hands of a few individuals who are not held in check by systems of transparency and accountability. The Results of Dysfunctional Systems of Representation Due to the severe strains on the indigenous representation system outlined above, the last few years have seen a dramatic consolidation of wealth and power in the hands of a small group of people. Because this group is largely disconnected from grassroots leaders, they cannot effectively mobilize broad indigenous participation in confronting major international threats. Even a highly skilled group of people cannot have anywhere near the impact that a powerful, organized indigenous movement with legitimate grassroots connections would have. Therefore, even with great access to funds and power, no major changes have been accomplished by this group with regard to the principle threats facing Amazonia. The next sections of this report will outline in detail how the structural problems we have described within the Amazonian indigenous representative system have severely undermined the rights of indigenous peoples and weakened traditional indigenous governance systems. We will begin with an analysis of the broadest umbrella organization, the Amazon Alliance, and then focus on the interrelated problems with COICA.

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III. Structural Problems in the Amazon Alliance The actions, priorities, and positions of the Amazon Alliance should reflect the consensus reached by the many Amazon Alliance member organizations. The work of the Alliance should be outlined by the members, directed by the Steering Council, and implemented by the staff. The statements made by the Alliance are influential because they are assumed to be backed by a large network of powerful organizations. Yet, with no clear systems of governance and no real oversight being provided by the Steering Council, there is no means to ensure that the activities of the Alliance are in alignment with the desires and needs of its broad membership. Obstacles to Achieving the Amazon Alliance’s Mission In addition to the common difficulties facing any alliance, the Amazon Alliance has had unique obstacles due to its size, scope, and composition. Its nearly one hundred powerful member organizations are spread across three continents, and require interpretation into at least five languages in order to be able to communicate effectively. The NGOs in the Alliance have highly diverse missions and approaches, ranging from human rights to conservation to sustainable development. The indigenous organizations of the Alliance come from distinct cultures, and have a variety of organizational structures and different models for engagement. Furthermore, there has been a long history of conflict and mistrust between indigenous organizations and NGOs, rooted in their profoundly different cosmovisions. Given these challenges, most successful coordination of Alliance members has centered on assisting small sub-groups that share a concrete objective. Although the Alliance was created to fulfill an important role, for years it has served primarily as a provider of basic services to these sub-groups, including logistical support, travel arrangements, and translation. Such work is important, but does not achieve the main purpose of the Alliance: the effective coordination of its diverse membership to set and accomplish shared goals. The Steering Council of the Alliance The Amazon Alliance Steering Council is comprised of indigenous organizations and NGOs that do extraordinary work on diverse topics. The purpose of a Council, as opposed to a Board of Directors, is to draw on a wide variety of expert perspectives so as to reach the wisest and best informed course of action and work collaboratively to achieve the goals that have been identified. The organizations on the Amazon Alliance Council include many visionary leaders, but these leaders are typically extremely overworked and have to prioritize work with their own organizations above all else. They therefore have very little time to dedicate to considering the larger issues of the Amazon Alliance, and are not able to fulfill most of the governance functions that are normally handled by a Board of Directors, such as fiduciary oversight and formal evaluations of the organization and its leaders. Moreover, the inability of most Council members to invest the time necessary to govern the Alliance means that they do not necessarily make informed decisions, and do not complete the work they have agreed must be done. The Council members often do not have time to even read and respond to direct proposals that require a Council vote. The Council’s dysfunction is not the fault of the individuals or organizations involved, but is due to a poorly-designed governance system. Within the current model, the only entity with the authority to resolve the deep problems in the Alliance’s governance structure is the Council. However, the 9

radical changes that are needed to correct the structural flaws in the Alliance would require the Council to relinquish most of its authority. It would need to designate a new governing body to fulfill the functions that the Council cannot adequately complete and provide more detailed oversight of the Alliance’s work. Governance System of the Amazon Alliance Remarkably, although the Alliance has been in existence for nearly two decades, the Amazon Alliance Council has never agreed upon any clear system for how the Alliance should be run. The organizational bylaws are vague, and to date no operational guidelines have been formally adopted. The lack of clear agreement regarding how the Alliance should operate has created severe misunderstandings and conflicts within the Alliance for many years. Discussions of the problems with the inadequacy of the structure were initiated by prior leaders of the Amazon Alliance, but did not result in comprehensive solutions. Beginning in 2006, the new leadership of the Amazon Alliance Coordinating Office did intensive research into the structural problems within the Alliance. The Office leadership immediately submitted suggested changes to the organizational structure for the review and approval of the Steering Council. Continuing work on this issue necessitated the 2007 Steering Council Meeting, where members engaged in an in depth discussion of the purpose of the Alliance and reviewed proposed changes to the organizational structure. Yet, no final operational guidelines were drafted. The Council again reviewed proposed operational guidelines in the 2008 Steering Council Meeting. Although there was a general consensus on many of the points, there were entrenched disagreements about others. The Alliance Steering Council believed it was important for COICA and the Alliance to work together closely in developing the operational guidelines. After agreeing to work with the Alliance staff to draft final guidelines, COICA then refused to meet with the Alliance to complete this work for more than one full year. Instead, COICA recently independently developed its own draft document of operational guidelines for the Alliance that bears no resemblance to the decisions previously made by the Council. This draft has not been reviewed by the Alliance staff or Council. As of May 2009, the Alliance still has no consensus for the implementation of any clear governance structure. The Co-Director Model The Co-Director model of the Alliance was born out of the mistrust and misunderstandings between NGOs and indigenous peoples. In principle, the concept of having one Amazon Alliance Co-Director selected by NGOs and another selected by indigenous organizations would ensure balanced perspectives and leadership. However, the Council has not established clear definition of the respective roles and responsibilities of each Co-Director. There is no means for supervision of the Co-Directors, no formal processes for evaluating their work, and no agreement on exactly how decision-making and financial management should be handled. These weaknesses create confusion and make the Alliance very vulnerable to divide and conquer strategies. The Co-Director model has created problems ever since it was first adopted. The Alliance has cycled through five Co-Directors in the last decade, with no Co-Director designated by the Indigenous Council of the Alliance from 2005 to 2008. The Indigenous Council eventually selected Mr. Juan Carlos Jintiach to work as the second Co-Director beginning in 2008.

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The Alliance delegated Mr. Jintiach to accompany the COICA staff and provide direct technical support in international meetings, while other Alliance staff members provided him with relevant information and strategic advice. Lack of clarity regarding the role of Mr. Jintiach led him to increasingly blur the line between the Amazon Alliance and COICA, and he frequently presented himself as a representative of all Amazonian indigenous organizations. Since there was no system of accountability, he never formally reported any of his work or activities to the Council. By mid2008, Mr. Jintiach ceased completing most of the functions required of his position other than attending international meetings, and stopped using the Amazon Alliance office. By late 2008 he began working within COICA’s office, and he was formally incorporated as a staff member of COICA in early 2009, while retaining his role as Co-Director of the Alliance. Since moving his office to COICA, his work has been indistinguishable from the work of the COICA staff, and they have jointly conducted all of COICA’s activities, while abandoning all work of the Alliance. This dual role has created tremendous confusion regarding the distinctive roles of COICA and the Amazon Alliance.

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IV. Structural Problems in COICA The Role of COICA The Coordinator of Indigenous Organizations of the Amazon Basin (COICA) was created to facilitate the coordination between all Amazonian indigenous organizations to increase their ability to jointly confront major international threats. Once the national indigenous organizations of the Amazon have reached consensus on an issue, COICA’s elected staff members are supposed to convey this position in all relevant international forums. COICA may also draft potential strategies for the Amazonian indigenous movement and submit them to its member organizations for consideration. Finally, COICA has the responsibility of strengthening its member organizations and ensuring that the national indigenous organizations are systematically representing the best interests of the indigenous peoples in their respective countries. As the name of COICA implies, it is a coordinating body, and was not designed to act as a representative of all Amazonian peoples or make major decisions on behalf of the Amazon. COICA’s mandate is limited to presenting any joint positions that are agreed upon by the indigenous organizations of each of the nine Amazonian countries. As the broadest indigenous umbrella organization in the Amazon, COICA deals almost exclusively with the leaders of national level indigenous organizations, and therefore is also the organization that is furthest removed from any direct contact with indigenous communities and traditional leaders, most of whom have never heard of COICA. This structural distance between COICA and the grassroots makes COICA extremely vulnerable to the systemic problems created by lack of communication systems and urgency, as detailed above. COICA is constantly under tremendous pressure to speak on behalf of all Amazonian indigenous peoples, and COICA staff members are frequently asked by external actors to make major decisions on behalf of the entire Amazon. Historically, this tension around COICA’s tendency to act as an executive decision-making body for the Amazon has created a series of major conflicts. Conflicts within COICA The most severe internal crisis COICA has faced occurred in 2005. The Coordinator of COICA was repeatedly criticized for acting unilaterally and dominating access to international spaces and international funding. This Coordinator eventually made an executive decision to change the location and date of the Congress of COICA, overruling the decision that had been made by many of COICA’s Council members. As a result, two separate COICA Congresses were held, one organized primarily by the Coordinator of COICA, and the other organized by several of the member organizations of COICA. Each Congress elected entirely different staff to serve in COICA’s coordinating office, which led to a very public battle over control of the COICA office and the COICA website. A detailed report on this crisis was published by the Indigenous Information Service, SERVINDI, and can be downloaded in Spanish by clicking here: www.amazonalliance.org/es/servindi In 2007, all Council members of COICA agreed to end the standoff regarding who should lead COICA, and only in 2008 did COICA really begin to function again. Unfortunately, the severe flaws in COICA’s governance system were not addressed by the COICA Council. Therefore, the newly

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approved COICA coordinating office leadership very quickly began to replicate many of the patterns that had nearly destroyed COICA in the past. Six people were elected to serve as the leaders of COICA’s coordinating office, but internal disagreements have since caused four of the six elected leaders to withdraw from any significant involvement in guiding COICA’s work. The remaining two individuals lead COICA’s activities with the assistance of a small staff, although in the last few months virtually all of COICA’s staff has left the organization and been replaced by new people. The Coordinating Council of COICA (CCC) is the governing body of COICA, and is comprised of one indigenous organization from each of the nine Amazonian countries. These organizations are also the Indigenous Council members of the Amazon Alliance. Since 2007, the leaders of these organizations have repeatedly stressed the need for an in-depth internal discussion to review the role that COICA is playing, and make decisions about how to resolve the deep structural problems that have plagued COICA for years. Council members have consistently expressed concern about the major decisions that COICA has made without their approval, and objected to the lack of transparency regarding COICA’s financial management and secretive contracts with other organizations. The leaders of COICA’s coordinating office have consistently blocked their Council’s efforts to hold closed meetings to discuss the deep governance problems within COICA. In the absence of this essential review of its structure and activities, COICA is perpetuating an organizational model that violates the very principles of the indigenous movement. COICA’s Coordinating Office: Representative of all Indigenous Peoples in the Amazon? With the help of the Amazon Alliance and other allies, the new leaders of COICA’s office gained access to international negotiations and wealthy funders. Initially, the Amazon Alliance staff provided logistical coordination, strategic guidance, and secured financial support for new COICA staff as they entered for the first time into powerful international spaces. The Alliance consistently made efforts to ensure that the indigenous organizations from the nine Amazonian countries selected representative delegates to join COICA in attending important events. However, after having received support from the Alliance to attend several international meetings with international funders, the United Nations, and the IUCN, COICA increasingly began to attend international events without including many of their Council members in the delegations. The staff of COICA, including Mr. Jintiach, began to assert themselves as the only legitimate representatives of all indigenous peoples in the Amazon. They developed a very convincing discourse around the need to respect the role of elected indigenous representatives, and presented themselves as the maximum indigenous representatives of the entire Amazon. This position was largely accepted by many international organizations, who found it expedient to coordinate with a single organization from the Amazon rather than try to include indigenous representatives from each country. Thus, numerous government agencies, multilateral institutions, donors, and NGOs have moved quickly to offer funding and negotiate agreements with COICA on behalf of all Amazonian indigenous peoples. Since the Council of COICA has been unable to hold a meeting to develop and implement a strong governance system, COICA remains with no real mechanism to connect to the grassroots leaders they claim to represent. COICA staff increasingly make major decisions which will dramatically affect Amazonia, and they claim that these decisions represent the position of all indigenous 13

peoples in the Amazon. Yet, no requirements have been put in place to ensure that COICA effectively consults all relevant representative indigenous organizations before taking a position. COICA’s positions, documents, and even speeches are increasingly developed by NGO staff members, and do not reflect the voice of Amazonia’s indigenous peoples. In the absence of any systems of accountability, there is a real danger that COICA’s staff could misuse their access to crucial decision-making spaces. Their disconnection from the many organizations they claim to represent provides them with free reign to violate basic principles of indigenous leadership. The core staff of COICA currently spend most of their time in attendance at international meetings, where they live in luxurious hotels and are given personal funds by the meeting sponsors. Their participation in these meetings is compromised by engaging in deeply problematic behavior. They have developed a widely-known reputation for their pattern of spending money on excessive use of alcohol and prostitutes while attending meetings. COICA’s staff also frequently fails to sufficiently prepare for meetings or arrive on time. Since they are seen as the representatives of all Amazonian indigenous peoples, this type of behavior not only diminishes their effectiveness in the meetings, but also discredits the integrity of the entire indigenous movement. COICA: Financial Intermediary for the Amazon? The discourse of COICA consistently focuses on the idea that COICA should have exclusive access to all of the funding that currently goes to other organizations in the Amazon. They argue that as the representatives of all indigenous peoples in the Amazon, funding intended for indigenous peoples should go to COICA, who will then disperse money to indigenous organizations throughout the Amazon. COICA’s leaders aggressively attack all NGOs as being unqualified to work with indigenous peoples, and demand that the funds currently going to NGOs should instead be given to the coordinating office of COICA. COICA is a convenient intermediary for many international funders and institutions, so COICA has quickly secured large sums of money from a number of highly controversial sources. Without ever submitting proposed projects or contracts to all of COICA’s Council members for their consideration, the staff of COICA has signed numerous contracts that grant them access to funding from government agencies, powerful international NGOs, and the World Bank. Recently, COICA has committed to attending exclusive meetings with multinational energy corporations, where they hope to get additional funding in exchange for promoting oil development in indigenous lands and the sale of the carbon in indigenous forests. Since all of these negotiations and contracts are held in secret, it is difficult to know to what degree they compromise the integrity and independence of COICA, but it is clear that many of these entities have strong vested interests in controlling COICA’s activities and weakening indigenous resistance to extractive industries. By claiming the role of indigenous representative, COICA is essentially able to sell the claim that they alone can acquire the Free Prior Informed Consent of all Amazonian Indigenous Peoples. Typically COICA offers to hold a meeting of indigenous leaders to discuss and form a position on the topic of interest to the donor, but they request a great deal more money than is actually necessary for the meeting. For example, COICA recently received $300,000 to conduct workshops on infrastructure developments (IIRSA), but did only minimal work to coordinate these workshops, and gave only $10,000 to the indigenous organization in each country to spend on the meetings, while keeping at least $200,000 for use by the coordinating office.

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During the last year, international attention on the role of indigenous peoples in confronting climate change has given COICA the opportunity to acquire large sums of money from entities that would benefit greatly if the indigenous people of Amazonia took a position that was in alignment with their interests. COICA has also initiated meetings with international investors in carbon trade schemes, who are interested in paying hundreds of millions of dollars in exchange for the rights to the carbon contained in the forests that are on indigenous lands. Such agreements would place strict limitations on the ways in which indigenous communities could use their lands, but it is not yet clear if these funds would actually benefit the indigenous organizations and grassroots communities of each Amazonian country. The Council of COICA has not been granted access to even the most basic information regarding COICA’s finances, and they have not been invited to play any role in determining how funds should be used, which projects should be prioritized, or which contracts should be approved. With a complete lack of financial oversight by the national indigenous organizations, it is no surprise that they have benefited very little from the funds COICA has acquired in the name of all indigenous organizations in the Amazon. COICA’s claim that it should act as an intermediary for all funding for indigenous peoples in the Amazon is not backed by any history of effective use or distribution of funds to indigenous organizations. Very limited funding is available to support indigenous representatives, and COICA has been very successful in getting funds that would otherwise have gone to national indigenous organizations. Most of these funds remain within COICA’s office, but the minimal funds that are given to national indigenous organizations are used as a political tool to reward individual allies, while funds are withheld from organizations whose leaders have criticized COICA’s staff. This system has enabled COICA to maintain some degree of control over its Council members. COICA has repeatedly told their Council that any public display of disagreement with COICA will result in the paralyzation of COICA’s million dollar trust fund and other sources of funding. Using this pretext, they have effectively silenced all debate about the management of COICA’s funds. COICA: Marginalizing and Replacing National Indigenous Organizations COICA is supposed to strengthen the national indigenous organizations that form the Council. Yet, by presenting themselves as the representative body of all Amazonian indigenous peoples, COICA has entered into direct competition with its Council members. COICA is currently monopolizing many of the important political spaces that are available to representatives of Amazonian indigenous organizations. Such political spaces offer critical opportunities for national indigenous organizations, both in terms of the decisions that are being made and for the chance to network with funders and allies who are interested in supporting the work being done by indigenous organizations. However, rather than facilitate the inclusion of national indigenous leaders, COICA typically sends its own staff to international meetings, or grants access only to those individuals who have given their political support to the staff of COICA. As an example, the Amazon Alliance recently secured sufficient funds for COICA to select five national indigenous leaders to attend an indigenous climate change summit in Alaska. COICA instead decided to send four members of their own staff and one representative from a national organization. In these political spaces, COICA staff sometimes directly contradict the positions taken by some members of their Council, but since they claim to be the maximum representatives of the Amazon their statements are seen as overruling any national positions.

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They do not provide any reports to their Council to explain which meetings they have attended, which positions and decisions they have taken, or what results were accomplished. Within the decision-making processes used by COICA, non-indigenous organizations actually exert more influence than the Council members of COICA do. COICA relies heavily on the staff members of NGOs in the development of COICA’s strategies, grant proposals, publications, and political positions. Individuals who are employed and supervised by foreign NGOs work within COICA’s office, and accompany COICA staff to important meetings to act as advisors and technical support. As an example, COICA currently has a staff member who is actually employed by a powerful USbased conservation organization, and who is financed by US government funds. In the meetings organized by COICA, they consistently invite friends from NGOs and government institutions, who sometimes are much more active in shaping the outcome of the meeting than the national indigenous leaders are. This has been the case even in such sensitive internal meetings as COICA’s recent Council meeting to evaluate the work COICA did in 2008. As a result, little open dialogue or evaluation occurs in COICA’s meetings because the Council is careful not to criticize COICA when external actors are present. COICA’s pattern of controlling access to information, money, and power has allowed it to rapidly rise to international prominence in only a little over a year. This rise has been largely at the expense of the indigenous organizations on their Council.

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V. Resolving the Problems in the Amazon Alliance and COICA The Amazon Alliance and COICA were created as very distinct organizations that were designed to fulfill complementary roles. In essence, COICA is supposed to coordinate consensus within the indigenous organizations, while the Alliance was created to coordinate joint actions between indigenous organizations and allied NGOs. Though the conceptualization of their different roles is clear, the details of how exactly these two organizations should relate to each other were never clear. The lack of comprehensive, interrelated governance systems has created confusion and conflict since the inception of the two organizations. This section of the report will explain the problematic interrelations between the Amazon Alliance and COICA, and then give concrete recommendations for how to resolve the problems they have created. Amazon Alliance and COICA: Confused Roles and Inefficiency Officially COICA’s coordinating office is a non-voting observer within the Amazon Alliance Steering Council. As a coordinating body, COICA should not vote on decisions, but rather must support whatever decision is made by their own Council members. However, during the last decade, COICA staff members have repeatedly asserted that they are the ultimate authority for determining what the Alliance can and should do. With the recent confusion about the dual role of Mr. Jintiach as staff of both the Amazon Alliance and COICA, the distinction between these two organizations was virtually eliminated. The staff of COICA began to claim that the Amazon Alliance was unnecessary competition, while asking Alliance staff to do most of the coordination work that was more appropriately in COICA’s domain. When there were imperfections in joint initiatives, COICA was quick to blame the Alliance, but offered no coherent explanation. Beginning in late 2008, a few of COICA’s staff members began to actively attack the Amazon Alliance and tried to either take over or incapacitate all major Amazon Alliance projects, without demonstrating any willingness to do the work that the Alliance staff were doing. The Alliance staff tried to resolve these conflicts while carrying on with the work that the Council had mandated, but COICA’s hostility made collaboration extremely inefficient. COICA’s staff insisted that they had the right to unilaterally approve or reject all Alliance activities, and demanded that all Alliance communications with any indigenous organization be translated into Spanish and sent to the COICA staff. Complying with these demands caused major delays in time-sensitive projects, and tremendous amounts of time and funding were spent on translations. Even with these amplified efforts at facilitating collaborative work, COICA’s staff created barriers to the Amazon Alliance’s work and provided no assistance or meaningful participation in the process. For example, the Amazon Alliance coordinated extensively with the Council members from Guyana, Suriname, and French Guiana to develop an important regional meeting of indigenous leaders and NGOs. COICA demanded that all communications about this meeting be translated to Spanish and sent to COICA staff, but they did not respond to the many urgent requests their Council members sent them. When COICA staff arrived, they threatened to denounce the Amazon Alliance because they did not like the agenda that the indigenous organizations had designed. This agenda had been translated and sent to COICA weeks earlier for comments and suggestions before being finalized by the Council member. When the meeting turned out to be a great success, COICA was quick to claim the credit for the event despite having played virtually no role in helping to coordinate it. 17

Such conflicts between the Alliance and COICA have persisted for many years, even though the leaders and entire staff of each organization has changed several times. Fundamentally, the problem is not with the many individual staff members who have been involved in both organizations, who in many cases have done exceptional work. Rather, the unresolved governance problems set the stage for conflict. The Decision to Write a Public Report During the previous administration of COICA, due to many of the same problems of weak governance, the COICA coordinating office was widely criticized for hostile interactions with potential allies, severe mismanagement of funds, and unauthorized decision-making. When the situation culminated in a public conflict within COICA in 2005, it nearly destroyed both COICA and the Amazon Alliance. Since these two organizations have high international profiles, the crisis also severely damaged the reputation of the entire indigenous movement, causing many funders and allies to withdraw support for all Amazonian indigenous organizations. In recent years, the Amazon Alliance has made continued efforts to support the resolution of conflicts within COICA. The Alliance staff has carefully avoided revealing any of the structural weaknesses facing both organizations in the hope of finding solutions without repeating the public clashes that damaged the indigenous movement in 2005. There were signs that the organizations might be able to fully redesign their organizational bylaws to address the governance problems. As recently as November 2008, the Alliance and COICA held a landmark strategic planning meeting in Manaus, Brazil. In that meeting, COICA and the Alliance agreed to a highly collaborative joint work plan for 2009 that would reengage and empower grassroots indigenous leaders, strengthen their connections to NGO members of the Alliance, and support leaders in analyzing the threats of infrastructure development and climate change. Unfortunately, as early as January 2009, COICA took measures to undermine the participation of grassroots indigenous representatives in the planned meetings it had agreed to co-convene with the Alliance in the strategic plan established in November 2008. COICA’s staff stated that they had already developed positions on infrastructure development and climate change, so there was no need for indigenous representatives to engage these issues other than to learn about and support the positions developed by COICA’s staff. After undermining the meeting of grassroots leaders and NGOs that took place in January in Brazil, COICA declared that all other planned meetings of grassroots leaders in each Amazonian country were to be cancelled. Eventually they were forced by their Council members to move forward with the planned meeting in the Guiana Shield countries, but they still made a number of attempts to sabotage the meeting. At this point it became clear to the authors of this report that there was no way to overcome the severe structural flaws in the governance of COICA and the Alliance without notifying and mobilizing the grassroots indigenous leaders who are the ultimate authority of the indigenous movement. Since the leadership of the Alliance was compromised by the structural flaws outlined above, the only recourse was to release a report that fully explains the situation so that immediate action can be taken by the diverse actors involved in Amazonia. Allowing the current situation to continue would produce severe negative consequences. The Alliance and COICA cannot be allowed to perpetuate a broken system that concentrates power in the hands of a few and undermines the authority of national and local indigenous organizations. 18

Amazon Alliance: Dissolution and Redesign The staff members of the Amazon Alliance, after having worked for years to strengthen the organization, have reached the conclusion that the deep structural problems of the Amazon Alliance cannot be resolved. The Alliance has a Council that cannot govern the organization effectively, a poorly designed CoDirector system, and profound communications problems due to distance, language, and culture. With one of the Alliance’s Co-Directors working as a staff member of COICA and acting on behalf of both, it is clear that the Alliance is rapidly becoming an extension of COICA. Since the current leaders of COICA are extremely antagonistic towards most NGOs, it makes no sense for COICA to control an alliance of NGOs and indigenous organizations. Until the national indigenous organizations are greatly strengthened in their ability to coordinate with their grassroots communities, there is no way for the Amazon Alliance to effectively link its NGO member organizations to the real needs of indigenous communities. Consequently, despite hard work and the best of intentions, the Alliance has demonstrated that it is an alliance in name only. The conditions for a true Amazonian alliance do not currently exist. Functional alliances are greater than the sum of their parts because all members contribute to the strength of the whole. Creating a true alliance would require that member organizations value cooperative work as being a means to achieving their own organization’s goals. It would also require that all member organizations invest whatever resources they could—be they human or financial resources—to support the success of the alliance itself. In the case of the Amazon Alliance, most members have not contributed any resources to the organization in years, instead focusing only on what services the Alliance Coordinating Office can provide. Given the deep problems within the Alliance and the many major barriers that prevent resolution of the problems, we do not believe that the Alliance can continue to exist without becoming a threat to the very principles it is supposed to exemplify. We therefore strongly recommend that the Amazon Alliance be dissolved immediately. In accordance with the current Amazon Alliance bylaws, we have submitted this recommendation to all Amazon Alliance member organizations, who will decide the matter by vote. To demonstrate our conviction in this decision, the staff members of the Alliance have submitted a joint letter of resignation to the Steering Council, which is also included in the appendix of this report. We hope that the members of the Alliance and diverse other actors will see the value of systematic collaboration, and that the dissolution of the Alliance will result in a healthy debate about how to create the conditions for a new alliance that is well-designed from its inception.

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COICA: Halt Representation, Strengthen Governance and Coordination Given the deep structural problems within COICA, and the recent violations of the principles of the indigenous movement, it would seem logical to recommend that COICA’s Council dissolve the organization. However, we believe that COICA can and should play a central role in strengthening the Amazonian indigenous movement. The threats facing Amazonia are too severe and urgent to justify closing an organization that could develop the capacity to support the indigenous movement in coordinating an effective response. Since COICA is comprised of nine indigenous organizations, it faces fewer cultural barriers and has to coordinate between fewer entities than the larger and more diverse Amazon Alliance. An organization that is dedicated exclusively to facilitating effective coordination between Amazonian indigenous organizations could be vital in enabling diverse indigenous leaders to join together in presenting shared concerns, visions, and positions at the international level. COICA should facilitate access to information, funding, and international events for its member organizations. We believe that the barriers to COICA’s effectiveness can be overcome by strong leadership by its Council and principled support from allies and funders. Creating a fully functional COICA requires focusing attention on strengthening the ability of the Council members to truly govern COICA. Governing COICA will require a tremendous time investment from each indigenous organization on the Council. These national indigenous organizations will require direct financial and technical support to be able to consistently supervise and participate in the activities of COICA. Currently, Council members simply do not have sufficient staff for their basic operations, and cannot invest enough time in supervising COICA. In the long run, strengthening the governance systems of indigenous communities and their representative organizations is the only way to ensure that COICA upholds its founding vision. In the more immediate future, there are a number of concrete steps that can be taken to guide COICA back towards its mission: 1. Independent investigation of COICA’s current activities The staff members of COICA will go to great lengths to deny the validity of the information and analysis in this report. We therefore strongly recommend that the Council of COICA demand a full investigation of COICA by an independent body with demonstrated expertise in conducting organizational evaluations. The Amazon Alliance staff has collected extensive evidence to demonstrate the accuracy of this report. All relevant information will be available to the qualified independent evaluators that are chosen by COICA’s Council. It is very important that the true extent of the current crisis within COICA be clearly recognized, and that a report be circulated to all grassroots organizations, so that real solutions can be found. 2. Immediately suspend the ability of COICA staff to act as representatives COICA’s coordinating office should not act as a representative and should not make decisions on behalf of all of Amazonia. COICA has neither the mandate nor the governance systems to be considered legitimate representatives of all indigenous peoples of the Amazon. The role of representation should be given exclusively to local and national indigenous organizations that can demonstrate strong systems of transparency and accountability. No international body should recognize COICA staff as representatives, because they cannot provide clear evidence of a functioning governance system. 3. Paralyze the execution of all COICA projects until the Council reviews them All contracts, agreements, and proposals that have been made by COICA staff should be considered null until they have been thoroughly reviewed by COICA’s Council. 20

4. Council meeting to evaluate COICA’s purpose and structure A meeting of all nine COICA Council members should take place as soon as possible. This meeting should last for many days, and will require very strong facilitation and a complete interpretation team. Experts and allies may be called to attend portions of the meeting to give short informational presentations and recommendations, but no outside organizations should be allowed in the internal discussions. Council members must then report to their grassroots leaders to explain the situation and justify their conclusions. 5. Redesign and enforce COICA’s bylaws An expert commission should be selected by the Council to fundamentally redesign COICA’s bylaws. The new bylaws should ensure that COICA complies with the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, and should include clearly designed systems of accountability and transparency. Strong mechanisms should be developed to ensure strict enforcement of the bylaws. 6. Implement communication systems Communication difficulties currently make it impossible for COICA to truly fulfill its intended role of coordination. Communications technologies, especially for videoconferencing and satellite phones, should be provided to COICA and all nine Council organizations. Skilled interpreters are needed to facilitate conversations and translate documents. 7. Refocus on National Indigenous Organizations The funding and access to international events that has recently been granted to COICA should be refocused on the national indigenous organizations, which will need to be greatly strengthened before they will be able to govern COICA well. 8. Supporting COICA’s Congress COICA is scheduled to hold its Congress in November of 2009. This is where major decisions about the future of COICA will be made, and new leaders of COICA’s coordinating office will be elected. The Congress should include not only the leaders of all of the Council members, but also all of the grassroots indigenous organizations from each Amazonian country, which will be a total of several hundred participants. However, past COICA Congresses have been manipulated, with leaders inviting non-representative participants for political reasons. A commission should be created as soon as possible to arrange the logistics, design the agenda, plan for facilitation and interpretation and design parameters to ensure full and appropriate participation of all representative indigenous organizations. This Congress is the only real chance for COICA to overcome many of its problems, and the opportunity must not be wasted. Supporting the strengthening of COICA will require allies and funders to cease providing unsupervised funds to COICA’s office, and stop accepting COICA staff as representatives. Instead, allies should focus their efforts on providing support specifically for initiatives that will help COICA improve its governance systems and coordination capacity. It will likely take several years to fully design and implement a good governance system, and requires first strengthening the national indigenous organizations that are on COICA’s Council. Creating an effective coordinator of indigenous organizations in the Amazon will not be easy, and will demand great patience and dedication. However, we believe this is a unique opportunity to establish an organization that could eventually mobilize a true Amazonian movement.

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VI. The Cost of Inaction The problems within the Amazon Alliance and COICA have impacts that extend far beyond the actors that are directly involved with these two organizations. At stake are the fundamental rights of indigenous peoples to demand respect for their own systems of governance. These systems of governance are essential to the survival of indigenous communities, and the current marginalization of the true representatives of indigenous peoples must be stopped. Though consequences of inaction could be severe, the many individuals who benefit from the current situation will do everything in their power to prevent this system from being changed. Agents Against Change Over the last two decades, the Amazon Alliance has amassed deep institutional knowledge about the Amazonian indigenous system, enabling us to effectively analyze this situation. Our intention in writing this report is to provide a concise analysis and productive recommendations regarding the empowerment of grassroots indigenous communities in the Amazon. However, those who hold power in the current scenario have strong vested interests in discrediting this report and the people who contributed to it. We anticipate that attacks on the legitimacy of this report will come from the individuals in COICA who benefit greatly from the current system, from their friends and allies, and from many of the organizations for whom the Amazon Alliance and COICA have been useful tools. In the interest of maintaining the power they currently have, they will make every effort to prevent any formal investigation into the problems explained here. Based on our knowledge of the individuals who benefit most from the current dysfunctional system, we expect that they will focus primarily on personal attacks against the staff of the Amazon Alliance and the other contributors to this report. We expect personal attacks that will include the following accusations: •

“The authors lack understanding of indigenous peoples”

•

“The authors are covering up for financial mismanagement”

•

“This report is really just the result of personal conflicts between the people involved”

•

“The authors will benefit from this report”

The many indigenous and non-indigenous authors and contributors of this report have demonstrated a lifetime commitment to strengthening the indigenous movement, and a deep understanding of the Amazonian indigenous movement. We are making an independent audit of our finances available to the public, and we request a full investigation to verify our responsible financial management. New leadership in the Alliance and in COICA has not changed the fundamental pattern of problems. This report makes it clear that the structural problems are what enables and fuels conflict between individuals. Releasing this report may damage the reputations and careers of the authors, and will provide no personal gain of any kind. However, we stand firm in the conviction that it is our responsibility to make the severity of the current problems known.

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Anticipated Consequences of the Current Dysfunction If immediate action is not taken to correct the profound flaws in the governance systems of COICA and the weaknesses within the national indigenous organizations, we anticipate that there will be grave consequences for indigenous communities. Since indigenous communities are vital to the survival of the Amazon rainforest, strengthening them will contribute to a better future for the entire planet. The most immediate threats to Amazonia are the massive infrastructure development plans that are being implemented to facilitate the extraction of natural resources, which are accelerating the impacts of climate change. If development plans for the Amazon continue unchecked, scientists predict that the entire Amazon region may be at the brink of permanent ecological collapse within the next 10-20 years. The hundreds of development projects that will directly affect indigenous peoples are legally required to consult with indigenous representatives, and in most cases must demonstrate must show that they have consented to the project before construction can begin. However, developers have become very skilled at misleading legitimate indigenous leaders, and often resort to getting “consent” from corrupt leaders who claim to represent indigenous communities. If COICA continues to act as the representative of all indigenous peoples in the Amazon, development projects could simply get consent from COICA staff members, thus denying community representatives their right to FPIC. There is growing global concern about the importance of avoiding further deforestation of the Amazon rainforest because the carbon that is released from destroyed forests contribute greatly to climate change. The renewed interest in forests has led to international negotiations on a major new proposal known as “REDD,” (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation) which will likely greatly increase the economic value of forests because of the carbon they contain. While the basic concept of REDD seems beneficial, there are many aspects of this proposal that will be deeply problematic for indigenous peoples, as some governments advocate strict controls on the use of indigenous forests while providing minimal benefits for indigenous peoples. If implemented, REDD may force enormous changes in indigenous livelihoods. It is therefore vital that all grassroots leaders become fully informed on this topic and are given the resources to enable them to effectively influence the negotiations. However, COICA staff, led on this topic by Mr. Jintiach, have seized the strategic opportunity REDD has provided to begin negotiating multi-million dollar deals with interested funders, NGOs, energy corporations, and investors. If COICA’s position as the representatives of all of Amazonia stands unchallenged, they could negotiate to sell the rights to indigenous forests without the consent of the grassroots communities. This is an imminent and serious threat that is gaining momentum. If the indigenous peoples of Amazonia became highly organized, they could exert tremendous pressure internationally to prevent infrastructure projects from destroying their livelihoods and ensure that REDD provides real benefits for grassroots indigenous communities. However, the power dynamics within COICA currently obstruct any real empowerment of the grassroots and prevent millions of indigenous people in the Amazon from getting organized and mobilized. The concentration of power in the hands of a few individuals makes truly transformative social change impossible, because social movements must have broad grassroots participation that can be guided strategically by responsible, legitimate leaders. If Amazonian indigenous peoples are to overcome the tremendous threats facing them, they must strengthen their organizations from the grassroots up, and develop a united Amazonian movement.

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VII. Building a New Paradigm for Amazonia Countless organizations are currently struggling to prevent further devastation of Amazonia. Yet the lack of coordination between these diverse actors undermines their ability to adequately respond to the complex array of overwhelming threats. Only a united, broad-based Amazonian social movement can successfully address the root causes of the systemic problems in the Amazon. If the nearly three million Amazonian indigenous people mobilized on a pan-Amazonian scale in coordination with their many allies, they could achieve profound shifts in the power relations shaping the future of their communities. This report will conclude by offering suggestions for how to organize a diverse and effective Amazonian movement. Strengthening Representative Indigenous Organizations Engaged grassroots communities, organized through a number of interconnected organizations that reach from the local level to the national level, form the core of all successful social movements. As detailed in this report, local and national indigenous organizations play extremely important roles, but struggle to overcome the many barriers that make it difficult for them to effectively represent their grassroots communities. Local indigenous organizations must be strengthened in their ability to govern their national indigenous organization. Similarly, national indigenous organizations need much greater assistance in developing communications systems and good governance policies in order to appropriately govern an international organization like COICA. Much work must be done before the inverse pyramid model of indigenous representation can properly function in the current context. We therefore strongly recommend that all allies of the indigenous and environmental movements focus their efforts primarily on strengthening local and national indigenous organizations. Although some of the representative indigenous organizations are already quite effective, almost all indigenous organizations need additional support in these areas: •

Communications The communications technology that is available today could revolutionize the indigenous movement if strategically implemented within indigenous organizations and grassroots communities.

•

Staff Indigenous organizations need more paid staff members to fully achieve their goals. Current staff members—especially leaders who must maintain a household in the capital city—need to be adequately compensated to be able to carry out their work. In most cases, staff with technical and administrative skills are especially important, as are staff who can be fully dedicated to outreach efforts to grassroots communities.

•

Technical Support Allied NGOs should provide relevant information and technical support to indigenous organizations, without trying to overly influence the activities of the organization. 24

•

Training Indigenous organizations frequently change leaders, so it is especially important to provide strong ongoing training for indigenous leaders and their staff members. Ideally this training would be provided by exceptionally skilled indigenous individuals with direct experience in representative organizations. Systems for maintaining institutional memory and transfer of knowledge during leadership transitions should be strengthened.

•

Flexible funding Representative indigenous organizations must be able to act quickly in the face of emergencies, and adapt their plans if their members shift priorities. While project-specific funding can be useful, indigenous organizations are most effective when given flexibility in the use of their funds. However, flexible funds must be accompanied with strong systems of transparency and accountability.

The Vital Role of Allies The systemic changes in governance and representation that are required to strengthen indigenous organizations depend in large part on the conditions established by external actors. Over the last few years the Amazon Alliance has worked to evaluate how diverse actors can best support the indigenous movement, and this section will draw on that experience to recommend priority action areas for different sectors involved in Amazonia: •

NGOs o It is vital for NGOs to involve representative indigenous organizations in any projects that will affect their territories, and to ensure that this collaboration not only achieves the goals of the NGO, but also strengthens the indigenous organization. o Allied NGOs should consistently make all relevant information available to national and local indigenous organizations. o NGOs should demand that indigenous leaders demonstrate a strong governance system before treating them as true representatives.

•

Funders o Funders should refocus their efforts on strengthening the governance systems of local and national indigenous organizations. o When reporting on any project, funders should require grant recipients to prove how they have been transparent to grassroots communities about the management and use of funds. o Funders should seek training in how to best interact with indigenous organizations without undermining their systems of governance o A comprehensive list of guidelines for funders can be found on the Amazon Alliance website: http://www.amazonalliance.org/en/guidelines-for-best-practice

•

Governments o Governments should focus on bringing their national laws into alignment with the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. o Governments should work in collaboration with representative indigenous organizations to achieve FPIC on any project that will affect indigenous peoples. o Governments should develop policies to formally verify which indigenous organizations are truly representative. 25

o

Governments should cease treating representative indigenous organizations as if they were just NGOs, and recognize that they are a vital part of indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination.

•

International Negotiations o International negotiations should formally distinguish between non-representative participants and true indigenous representatives. o Indigenous representatives who attend international negotiations must be provided with sufficient time and financial support to enable them to adequately consult with the communities they represent and prepare for the negotiations.

•

Multilateral Development Banks o Decision-making processes should be more inclusive of verifiable indigenous representatives. o As with negotiations, indigenous representatives must be given time and funds for consultation with their communities.

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Academic Institutions o Academics can contribute greatly by opening a broad debate on the issues presented in this report. o Academics can provide suggested methodologies for improving current practices. o Academics can provide expert guidance in thinking about how to build functional alliances and movements. o Academics can study the diverse actors involved in Amazonia to make their actions more transparent and accountable.

Diverse Actors Becoming a True Amazonian Movement In order for the Amazonian movement to have any real chance at overcoming the threats it must confront, the many agencies and individuals working to defend the Amazon must develop a unified, shared purpose. It is important to note that becoming unified does not require uniformity; rather, the greater the diversity in types of organization and strategies, the more dynamic and agile the movement becomes. However, such diversity poses significant challenges for collaboration. A new paradigm of coordination is necessary to create networks that reach from local to international levels and include diverse categories of actors, thus making it possible to generate fundamental change. The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) sets forth a framework centered on the rights to self-determination and self-representation of indigenous peoples. This framework, if taken seriously as a guiding document for all actors in the Amazon, provides the core ideas needed for a building a movement that is rooted in shared principles. Indigenous organizations, NGOs, funders, multilateral institutions and governments should all align their policies and practices with UNDRIP. Effective movement-building requires that organizational strengthening occur from the bottom-up. In the face of the current breakdown of the indigenous system of representation, there are no institutions that can legitimately claim to represent the best interests of all the peoples of the Amazon.

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As detailed above, representative local and national indigenous organizations have limited access to power and resources. COICA and countless other non-representative institutions are powerful and well-funded, but do not appropriately engage the grassroots. In the absence of a functional Amazon Alliance or COICA, there is the need for movement-building organizations that generate spaces for strategic analysis and networking between all the actors. Creating new institutions for movement coordination is key. These new institutions must be intentionally designed from their inception to incorporate UNDRIP and FPIC in their foundational structure. In contrast with the Western-style organizations that dominate the Amazonian movement now, these new institutions must also emerge from a profound commitment to embodying indigenous cosmovisions and respecting indigenous governance systems. The dissolution of the Amazon Alliance creates an opportunity for all actors involved in Amazonia to join together in designing a new alternative. The refocusing of COICA will remove this major threat to indigenous systems of representation. We sincerely hope that the readers of this report take immediate action to contribute to developing new systems for organizing and empowering a true Amazonian movement.

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