Blank 4.docx

Parayno vs Jovellanos G.R. No. 148408 Subject: Public Corporation Doctrine: Police power Facts: Petitioner was the owner of a gasoline filling station in Calasiao, Pangasinan. In 1989, some residents of Calasiao petitioned the Sangguniang Bayan (SB) of said municipality for the closure or transfer of the station to another location. The matter was referred to the Municipal Engineer, Chief of Police, Municipal Health Officer and the Bureau of Fire Protection for investigation. Upon their advise, the Sangguniang Bayan recommended to the Mayor the closure or transfer of location of petitioner’s gasoline station. In Resolution No. 50, it declared that the existing gasoline station is a blatant violation and disregard of existing law. According to the Resolution, 1) the gasoline filling station is in violation of The Official Zoning Code of Calasiao, Art. 6, Section 44, the nearest school building which is San Miguel Elementary School and church, the distances are less than 100 meters. (No neighbors were called as witnesses when actual measurements were done by HLURB Staff, Baguio City dated 22 June 1989); 2) it remains in thickly populated area with commercial/residential buildings, houses closed (sic) to each other which still endangers the lives and safety of the people in case of fire; 3) residents of our barangay always complain of the irritating smell of gasoline most of the time especially during gas filling which tend to expose residents to illness, and 4) It hampers the flow of traffic. Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the resolution but was denied by the SB. Hence she filed a case before the RTC claiming that the gasoline filling station was not covered under Sec 44 of the mentioned law but is under Sec 21. Case was denied by the court and by the CA. Hence this appeal. ISSUE: Whether or not the closure/transfer of her gasoline filling station by respondent municipality was an invalid exercise of the latter’s police powers

HELD: The respondent is barred from denying their previous claim that the gasoline filling station is not under Sec 44. The Counsel in fact admitted that : “That the business of the petitioner [was] one of a gasoline filling station as defined in Article III, Section 21 of the zoning code and not as a service station as differently defined under Article 42 of the said official zoning code;” The foregoing were judicial admissions which were conclusive on the municipality, the party making them. hence, because of the distinct and definite meanings alluded to the two terms by the zoning ordinance, respondents could not insist that “gasoline service station” under Section 44 necessarily included “gasoline filling station” under Section 21. Indeed, the activities undertaken in a “gas service station” did not automatically embrace those in a “gas filling station.” As for the main issue, the court held that the respondent municipality invalidly used its police powers in ordering the closure/transfer of petitioner’s gasoline station. While it had, under RA 7160, the power to take actions and enact measures to promote the health and general welfare of its constituents, it should have given due deference to the law and the rights of petitioner. A local government is considered to have properly exercised its police powers only when the following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive. The first requirement refers to the equal protection clause and the second, to the due process clause of the Constitution. Respondent municipality failed to comply with the due process clause when it passed Resolution No. 50. While it maintained that the gasoline filling station of petitioner was less than 100 meters from the nearest public school and church, the records do not show that it even attempted to measure the distance,

notwithstanding that such distance was crucial in determining whether there was an actual violation of Section 44. The different local offices that respondent municipality tapped to conduct an investigation never conducted such measurement either. Moreover, petitioner’s business could not be considered a nuisance which respondent municipality could summarily abate in the guise of exercising its police powers. The abatement of a nuisance without judicial proceedings is possible only if it is a nuisance per se. A gas station is not a nuisance per se or one affecting the immediate safety of persons and property, hence, it cannot be closed down or transferred summarily to another location. On the alleged hazardous effects of the gasoline station to the lives and properties of the people of Calasiao, we again note: “Hence, the Board is inclined to believe that the project being hazardous to life and property is more perceived than factual. For, after all, even the Fire Station Commander.. recommended “to build such buildings after conform (sic) all the requirements of PP 1185.” It is further alleged by the complainants that the proposed location is “in the heart of the thickly populated residential area of Calasiao.” Again, findings of the [HLURB] staff negate the allegations as the same is within a designated Business/Commercial Zone per the Zoning Ordinance. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed resolution of the Court of the Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Municipality of Calasiao is hereby directed to cease and desist from enforcing Resolution No. 50 against petitioner insofar as it seeks to close down or transfer her gasoline station to another location.

Ochosa vs Alano and Republic, G.R. 167459 Jose Reynaldo B. Ochosa, petitioner vs

Bona J. Alano and Republic of the Philippines, respondents G.R. No. 167459, January 26, 2011 Facts: Bona’s illicit affairs with other men started at the onset of their marriage on October 27, 1973, when Jose was assigned in various parts of the country as an officer in the AFP. She continued her infidelity even when they lived together at Fort Bonifacio, Makati City sometime in 1985, whenever Jose was out of their living quarters. In 1987, Jose was incarcerated in Camp Crame for rebellion for the alleged participation of the failed coup d’etat. He heard circulation of rumors of Bona getting caught having sex with his driver, Corporal Gagarin. He got a military pass from his jail warden and confronted Bona about the rumors, which she and Gagarin admitted. Since then they were separated, and their foundling, Ramona Celeste, stayed with Bona in Basilan until 1994 to live with Jose. Jose Reynaldo B. Ochosa filed a Petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage between him and Bona J. Alano, based on the ground of the latter’s psychological incapacity to fulfill the essential marital obligations of marriage. Elizabeth E. Rondain, a psychiatrist, one of the witnesses, testified and submitted a psychological evaluation report on Bona’s mental state. The interviews she had with Jose and two of his witnesses brought her to the conclusion that respondent was suffering from histrionic personality disorder, and it was traceable to her family history.

On January 11, 1999, the dispositive portion of the trial court declared the marriage of Jose and Bona void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity of the respondent under Article 36 of the Family Code. The Court finds that Bona’s illness exhibited gravity, antecedence, and incurability. OSG appealed the said ruling to the CA, and the CA subsequently granted the appeal and reversed the ruling of the trial court decision. Issue: Whether or not Bona should be deemed psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. Ruling: No. There is inadequate credible evidence that her defects were already present at the inception of, or prior to, the marriage. Bona’s alleged psychological incapacity did not satisfy the jurisprudential requisite of “juridical antecedence”. Her persistent sexual infidelity and abandonment are not badges of psychological incapacity nor can’t it be traced to the inception of their marriage. The psychiatrist’s conclusion about Bona’s HPD which made her prone to promiscuity and sexual infidelity existed before her marriage to Jose, cannot be taken as credible proof of antecedence since the method by which such an inference was reached leaves much to be desired in terms of meeting the standard of evidence required in determining psychological incapacity.

Dr. Rondain’s conclusion was based solely on the assumed truthful knowledge of Jose. No other witness testified to Bona’s family history or her behavior prior to or at the beginning of their marriage. The two witnesses only started to live with them in 1980 and 1986, respectively. Verily, Dr. Rondain evaluated Bona’s psychological condition directly from the information gathered solely from Jose and his witnesses. These factual circumstances evoke the possibility that the information fed to the psychiatrists is tainted with bias for Jose’s cause, in the absence of sufficient corroboration. Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. These marital obligations are those provided under Article 68 to 71, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code.

G.R. No. L-19650 Caltex Philippines, Inc., petitioner-appellee Vs.

Enrico Palomar, in his capacity as The Postmaster General, respondent-appellant Click Here for the Full Text of the case FACTS: In the year 1960, Caltex Philippines conceived and laid the ground work for a promotional scheme calculated to drum up patronage for its oil products. The contest was entitled “Caltex Hooded Pump Contest”, which calls for participants to estimate the actual number of liters as hooded gas pump at each Caltex station will dispense during a specific period. Foreseeing the extensive use of the mails not only as amongst the media for publicizing the contest but also for the transmission of communications, representations were made by Caltex with the postal authorities for the contest to be cleared in advance for mailing. This was formalized in a letter sent by Caltex to the Post master General, dated October 31, 1960, in which Caltex, thru its counsel, enclosed a copy of the contest rules and endeavored to justify its position that the contest does not violate the “The Anti-Lottery Provisions of the Postal Law”. Unfortunately, the Palomar, the acting Postmaster General denied Caltex’s request stating that the contest scheme falls within the purview of the Anti-lottery Provision and ultimately, declined Clatex’s request for clearance. Caltex sought reconsideration, stressing that there being no consideration involved in part of the contestant, the contest was not commendable as a lottery. However, the Postmaster General maintained his view that the contest involves consideration, or even it does not involve any consideration it still falls as “Gift Enterprise”, which was equally banned by the Postal Law. ISSUE: 1 Whether the petition states a sufficient cause of action for declaratory relief? 2 Whether or not the scheme proposed by Caltex the appellee is within the coverage of the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law?

HELD: I. By express mandate of Section 1 of Rule 66 of the old Rules of Court which deals with the applicability to invoke declaratory relief which states: “Declaratory relief is available to person whose rights are affected by a statute, to determine any question of construction or validity arising under the statute and for a declaration of rights thereunder. In amplification, conformably established jurisprudence on the matter, laid down certain conditions: 1 There must be a justiciable controversy. 2 The controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse. 3 The party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy. 4 The issue involved must be ripe for judicial determination. With the appellee’s bent to hold the contest and the appellant’s threat to issue a fraud order if carried out, the contenders are confronted by an ominous shadow of imminent and inevitable litigation unless their differences are settled and stabilized by a declaration. And, contrary to the insinuation of the appellant, the time is long past when it can rightly be said that merely the appellee’s “desires are thwarted by its own doubts, or by the fears of others” — which admittedly does not confer a cause of action. Doubt, if any there was, has ripened into a justiciable controversy when, as in the case at bar, it was translated into a positive claim of right which is actually contested.

EN BANC [ GR No. 162372, Sep 11, 2012 ] GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM v. COA +

RESOLUTION G.R. No. 162372 LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.: Romeo C. Quilatan, in his capacity as one of the petitioners in GSIS, et al. v. Commission on Audit, et al., and in representation of his fellow Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) officers and employees who retired under the GSIS RFP (Retirement/Financial Plan), filed a Motion for Clarification and Reconsideration dated November 7, 2011, and a Manifestation to Supplement the Motion for Clarification and Reconsideration dated January 20, 2012, of this Court's October 11, 2011 Decision in the said case. On May 17, 2012, Quilatan filed a Final Memorandum and Summary of Arguments, which he followed-up on August 28, 2012, with another Manifestation to Supplement [the] Final Memorandum and Summary of Arguments. On November 11, 2011, Federico Pascual, Daniel N. Mijares, Elvira U. Geronimo, Aurora P. Mathay, Manuel P. Bausa, Rustico G. Delos Angeles, Lourdes Delos Angeles, Sonia S. Sindac, Marina Santamaria, the Estate of Lourdes G. Patag represented by Napolen Patag, and Vicente Villegas (Movants Federico Pascual, et al.), who are some of the payees named in the decision, filed an Entry of Appearance with Motion for Leave of Court to Admit the Motion for Clarification filed on the same day. The Movants Federico Pascual, et al.

later on furnished Quilatan a copy of this Motion, as per their Compliance/Manifestation dated July 20, 2012, which this Court notes. On February 22, 2012, Quilatan filed a Manifestation and Motion to Defer Execution of Judgment, alleging that GSIS, the main petitioner in the case, which no longer contested this Court's October 11, 2011 Decision, had started to send out demand letters from the payees, asking them to refund the amounts they had received as retirement benefits under the GSIS RFP. In his Manifestations, Memorandum, and Motion for Clarification and Reconsideration of this Court's October 11, 2011 Decision, Quilatan raises several grounds, all of which were already addressed in said Decision. Movants Federico Pascual, et al., however, raised in their Motion for Clarification, a new issue, which this Court will address, to wit: Whether or not the payees should be compelled to return the retirement benefits they had received under the GSIS RFP. In essence, the Movants Federico Pascual, et al. are asking this Court to reconsider our Decision in so far as their liability, as the payees, to return the benefits they had already received, by applying our rulings in Molen, Jr. v. Commission on Audit,[1] De Jesus v. Commission on Audit,[2] Magno v. Commission on Audit,[3] Baybay

Water District v. Commission on Audit,[4] Barbo v. Commission on Audit,[5] Bases Conversion and Development Authority v. Commission on Audit,[6] among others, wherein, despite this Court's disapproval of the allowances and/or benefits the payees therein received, for being contrary to the law applicable in those cases, this Court did not require such payees to refund the monies they had received in good faith. On April 11, 2012, the public respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, commented and agreed with the Movants Federico Pascual, et al. that it would be an injustice if they were ordered to refund the retirement benefits they had received more than a decade ago. The Court notes the Comment filed by the GSIS on July 13, 2012, in compliance with our March 13, 2012 Resolution, where GSIS states that since it did not move for the reconsideration of this Court's October 11, 2011 Decision, it was bound by such decision. As far as it was concerned, the said decision became final after the lapse of fifteen days from receipt of said Decision on October 21, 2011. GSIS adds that since it already conceded that it had no power to adopt the GSIS RFP, and decided to accept the notices of disallowance, it had no reason to continue disregarding such notices, the implementation of which was never enjoined. As for Quilatan, GSIS claims that he has no legal standing to represent the payees as he has no interest in the main controversy, i.e., the power of GSIS to adopt the

RFP, and because he was not prejudiced by the decision on the case. Moreover, the GSIS avers, Quilatan had already retired from the GSIS; thus, he cannot represent it and argue its case before this Court. Anent the payees, some of whom are the Movants now before us, the GSIS posits that they did not timely intervene in this case despite knowledge of its pendency before this Court, which lasted for almost eight years. According to the GSIS, giving due course to the motions would allow a form of intervention by persons who were not parties to the case after the opportunity for them to do so had lapsed. The Court finds merit in the aforesaid position of the GSIS. Quilatan's Motion for Clarification and Reconsideration and the Movants Federico Pascual, et al.'s Motion for Clarification, which in effect seeks a reconsideration of the Court's Decision dated October 11, 2011, should be denied for lack of the Movants' legal standing to question the said Decision. Furthermore, even if the substantive issues and arguments raised by the Movants Federico Pascual, et al. are considered, there is no justifiable ground to reverse the Court's Decision. While it is true, as claimed by the Movants Federico Pascual, et al., that based on prevailing jurisprudence, disallowed benefits received in good faith need not be refunded, the case before us may be distinguished from all the cases cited by Movants

Federico Pascual, et al. because the monies involved here are retirement benefits. Retirement benefits belong to a different class of benefits. All the cases cited by the Movants Federico Pascual, et al. involved benefits such as cash gifts, representation allowances, rice subsidies, uniform allowances, per diems, transportation allowances, and the like. The foregoing allowances or fringe benefits are given in addition to one's salary, either to reimburse him for expenses he might have incurred in relation to his work, or as a form of supplementary compensation. On the other hand, retirement benefits are given to one who is separated from employment either voluntarily or compulsorily. Such benefits, subject to certain requisites imposed by law and/or contract, are given to the employee on the assumption that he can no longer work. They are also given as a form of reward[7] for the services he had rendered. The purpose is not to enrich him but to help him during his non-productive years. Our Decision dated October 11, 2011 does not preclude Movants Federico Pascual, et al. from receiving retirement benefits provided by existing retirement laws. What they are prohibited from getting are the additional benefits under the GSIS RFP, which we found to have emanated from a void and illegal board resolution. To allow the payees to retain the disallowed benefits would amount to their unjust enrichment to the prejudice of the GSIS, whose avowed purpose is to maintain its actuarial

solvency to finance the retirement, disability, and life insurance benefits of its members.[8] This Court, elucidating on the concept of unjust enrichment in University of the Philippines v. PHILAB Industries, Inc.,[9] said: Unjust enrichment is a term used to depict result or effect of failure to make remuneration of or for property or benefits received under circumstances that give rise to legal or equitable obligation to account for them; to be entitled to remuneration, one must confer benefit by mistake, fraud, coercion, or request. Unjust enrichment is not itself a theory of reconvey. Rather, it is a prerequisite for the enforcement of the doctrine of restitution.[10] The statutory basis for unjust enrichment is found in Article 22 of the Civil Code, which provides: Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him. Under the foregoing provision, there is unjust enrichment when: 1 A person is unjustly benefited; and 2 Such benefit is derived at the expense of or with damages to another.[11]

In Car Cool Philippines, Inc. v. Ushio Realty and Development Corporation[12] we said: [T]here is unjust enrichment when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of another, or when a person retains money or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity and good conscience. x x x.[13] (Citation omitted.) In the same case, we added that "[t]here is no unjust enrichment when the person who will benefit has a valid claim to such benefit."[14] Because the GSIS RFP, which we repeat, is contrary to law, thus void and of no effect, the enrichment of the payees is without just or legal ground. Therefore, the payees have no valid claim to the benefits they received under the GSIS RFP. The payees received the disallowed benefits with the mistaken belief that they were entitled to the same under the GSIS RFP. Article 1456 of the Civil Code, which is applicable in this case, reads: If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes. Construing the above provision, this Court, in Aznar Brothers Realty Company v. Aying,[15] quoted established jurisprudence as follows:

A deeper analysis of Article 1456 reveals that it is not a trust in the technical sense for in a typical trust, confidence is reposed in one person who is named a trustee for the benefit of another who is called the cestui que trust, respecting property which is held by the trustee for the benefit of the cestui que trust. A constructive trust, unlike an express trust, does not emanate from, or generate a fiduciary relation. While in an express trust, a beneficiary and a trustee are linked by confidential or fiduciary relations, in a constructive trust, there is neither a promise nor any fiduciary relation to speak of and the so-called trustee neither accepts any trust nor intends holding the property for the beneficiary. xxxx x x x [I]mplied trusts are those which, without being expressed, are deducible from the nature of the transaction as matters of intent or which are superinduced on the transaction by operation of law as matters of equity, independently of the particular intention of the parties. x x x[16] Policarpio v. Court of Appeals[17] expounded on the doctrine of implied trust in relation to another provision of the Civil Code. We ruled in the said case that a constructive trust is substantially an appropriate remedy against unjust enrichment, as follows:

And specifically applicable to the case at bar is the doctrine that [a] constructive trust is substantially an appropriate remedy against unjust enrichment. It is raised by equity in respect of property, which has been acquired by fraud, or where although acquired originally without fraud, it is against equity that it should be retained by the person holding it.[18] Thus, the payees, who acquired the retirement benefits under the GSIS RFP, are considered as trustees of the disallowed amounts, as although they committed no fraud in obtaining these benefits, it is against equity and good conscience for them to continue holding on to them. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Clarification and Reconsideration and Manifestation to Supplement the Motion for Clarification and Reconsideration filed by Romeo C. Quilatan and the Motion for Clarification (which we treat as a Motion for Reconsideration) filed by Federico Pascual, Daniel N. Mijares, Elvira U. Geronimo, Aurora P. Mathay, Manuel P. Bausa, Rustico G. Delos Angeles, Lourdes Delos Angeles, Sonia S. Sindac, Marina Santamaria, the Estate of Lourdes G. Patag represented by Napolen Patag, and Vicente Villegas are DENIED. COCONUT OIL REFINERS ASSOCIATION, INC. vs TORRES [G.R. No. 132527. July 29, 2005] Facts: This is a Petition for Prohibition and Injunction seeking to enjoin and

prohibit the Executive Branch, through the public respondents Ruben Torres in his capacity as Executive Secretary, the Bases Conversion Development Authority (BCDA), the Clark Development Corporation (CDC) and the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), from allowing, and the private respondents from continuing with, the operation of tax and duty-free shops located at the Subic Special Economic Zone (SSEZ) and the Clark Special Economic Zone (CSEZ), and to declare the following issuances as unconstitutional, illegal, and void. The Subic Special Economic Zone shall be operated and managed as a separate customs territory ensuring free flow or movement of goods and capital within, into and exported out of the Subic Special Economic Zone, as well as provide incentives such as tax and duty-free importations of raw materials, capital and equipment. However, exportation or removal of goods from the territory of the Subic Special Economic Zone to the other parts of the Philippine territory shall be subject to customs duties and taxes under the Customs and Tariff Code and other relevant tax laws of thePhilippines [RA 7227, Sec 12 (b)]. Petitioners contend that the wording of Republic Act No. 7227 clearly limits the grant of tax incentives to the importation of raw materials, capital and equipment only thereby violating the equal protection clause of the Constitution. He also assailed the constitutionality of Executive

Order No. 97-A for being violative of their right to equal protection. They asserted that private respondents operating inside the SSEZ are not different from the retail establishments located outside. The respondent moves to dismiss the petition on the ground of lack of legal standing and unreasonable delay in filing of the petition. Issues: Whether or not there is a violation of equal protection clause. Held: The SC ruled in the negative. The phrases tax and dutyfree importations of raw materials, capital and equipment was merely cited as an example of incentives that may be given to entities operating within the zone. Public respondent SBMA correctly argued that the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, on which petitioners impliedly rely to support their restrictive interpretation, does not apply when words are mentioned by way of example. The petition with respect to declaration of unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 97-A cannot be, likewise, sustained. The guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based which was based on reasonable classification. A classification, to be valid, must (1) rest on substantial distinction, (2) be germane to the purpose of the law, (3) not be limited to existing conditions only, and (4) apply equally to all members of the same class. Applying the foregoing test to the present case, this Court finds no

violation of the right to equal protection of the laws. There is a substantial distinctions lying between the establishments inside and outside the zone. There are substantial differences in a sense that, investors will be lured to establish and operate their industries in the so-called ‘secured area and the present business operators outside the area. There is, then, hardly any reasonable basis to extend to them the benefits and incentives accorded in R.A. 7227. WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. Section 5 of Executive Order No. 80 and Section 4 of BCDA Board Resolution No. 93-05034 are hereby declared NULL and VOID and are accordingly declared of no legal force and effect. Respondents are hereby enjoined from implementing the aforesaid void provisions. All portions of Executive Order No. 97-A are valid and effective, except the second sentences in paragraphs 1.2 and 1.3 of said Executive Order, which are hereby declared INVALID.