Baguio-lawyers-administrative-liability.docx

July 11, 2017 A.C. No. 5161 RE: IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR REINSTATEMENT OF ROLANDO S. TORRES AS A MEMBER OF THE PHILIPPINE BAR

Quick facts: Disbarred petitioner. Sought for reinstatement kawanmilyon but denied. Sought judicial clemency. WON karapatdapat ba sya. SC laid down guidelines for JUDICIAL CLEMENCY. See digest. Samok siya, walay remorse, tiguwang na pajud di na productive, etc. So no judicial clemency for him.

Facts: The Court meted the supreme penalty of disbarment on petitioner Torres for "presentation of false testimony; participation in, consent to, and failure to advise against, the forgery of complainant's signature in a purported Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement; and gross misrepresentation in court for the purpose of profiting from such forgery," thereby committing gross misconduct and violating Canons 1 and 10 the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Torres twice moved for reconsideration and filed numerous submissions for reinstatement, all of which were denied with finality by the Court.

More than ten (10) years from his disbarment, Torres filed a Petition seeking judicial clemency from the Court to reinstate him in the Roll of Attorneys. The Court denied the petition, holding that Torres had failed to provide substantial proof that he had reformed himself, especially considering the absence of showing that he had reconciled or attempted to reconcile with his sister-in-law, the original complainant in the disbarment case against him; nor was it demonstrated that he was remorseful over the fraudulent acts he had committed against her.

Despite the foregoing, Torres filed the instant petition, again seeking judicial clemency from the Court to reinstate him in the Roll of Attorneys.

Issue: Whether or not the petition seeking judicial clemency from the court to reinstate him in the RoA is meritorious.

Held: The petition is not meritorious. Torres failed to comply with the guidelines for the grant of judicial clemency; hence, the instant petition must necessarily be denied.

The principle which should hold true for lawyers, being officers of the court, is that judicial clemency, as an act of mercy removing any disqualification, should be balanced with the preservation of public

confidence in the courts. Thus, the Court will grant it only if there is a showing that it is merited. The Court laid down the following guidelines in resolving requests for judicial clemency, to wit:

1. There must be proof of remorse and reformation. These shall include but should not be limited to certifications or testimonials of the officer(s) or chapter(s) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, judges or judges associations and prominent members of the community with proven integrity and probity. A subsequent finding of guilt in an administrative case for the same or similar misconduct will give rise to a strong presumption of non-reformation.

2. Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of the penalty to ensure a period of reform.

3. The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he still has productive years ahead of him that can be put to good use by giving him a chance to redeem himself.

4. There must be a showing of promise (such as intellectual aptitude, learning or legal acumen or contribution to legal scholarship and the development of the legal system or administrative and other relevant skills), as well as potential for public service.

5. There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify clemency.

05 MAR 2018 A.C. No. 9257 EDGAR M. RICO v. ATTY. REYNALDO G. SALUTAN

Quick Facts: Atty. Salutan is the counsel of Abrille in “Abrille versus Rico” case. Loser si Rico. Way lain mabasul so he filed admin case against Atty. Salutan. From Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, IBP Board of Governors (twice kay ni MR), to SC, in favor tanan of course ni Salutan because he’s the good guy. So unsa man jud needed for an ADMINISTRATIVE CASE to prosper. See digest.

Facts: Milagros Villa Abrille, one of the defendants in the case filed by Rico for Forcible Entry, filed a separate case for Unlawful Detainer against Rico covering the same property. On November 6, 2001, the MTCC ordered Rico to vacate the premises. Subsequently, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) affirmed the MTCC ruling and issued a Writ of Execution.

Court’s sheriff executed a Return Service stating that the writ could not be served on Rico since the property subject of the case was different from the lot which Rico was occupying. Thereafter, Villa

Abrille, through her counsel, respondent Atty. Salutan, filed a motion for the issuance of an Alias Writ of Execution. The sheriff executed a Return of Service again since the alias writ could not be enforced for the same reason as the first time. Abrille once again filed a motion for the issuance of another Alias Writ of Execution, which, this time, the MTCC denied. Hence, Villa Abrille went to the Court for the issuance of a Writ of Mandamus to compel the MTCC to issue another Writ of Execution and for the sheriff to implement the same. The Court, however, dismissed the case.

For the fourth (4th) time, Villa Abrille filed another motion for the issuance of a Writ of Execution. This time, the MTCC granted it. Sheriff led the demolition of the house and other improvements on the property. Thus, Rico filed the administrative complaint against Atty. Salutan.

For his part, Atty. Salutan denied the charges and argued that he merely advocated for his client’s cause and did the same within the bounds of the law and of the rules. He merely did what a zealous lawyer would naturally do in representation of his client.

The Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines recommended the dismissal of the administrative complaint against Atty. Salutan. The IBP Board of Governors passed a Resolution which adopted the CBD’s recommendation. Rico moved for reconsideration of said Resolution. The IBP Board of Governors passed another resolution denying said motion for reconsideration

Issue: Whether or not the administrative case filed by Rico is meritorious.

Held: The Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the findings and recommendation of the IBP that the instant administrative complaint against Atty. Salutan must be dismissed.

Here, despite the charges hurled against Atty. Salutan, Rico failed to show any badge of deception on the lawyer’s part. There was no court decision declaring that Villa Abrille’s title was fake or that it had encroached on Rico’s property. All that Atty. Salutan did was to zealously advocate for the cause of his client. He was not shown to have misled or unduly influenced the court through misinformation. He merely persistently pursued said cause and he did so within the bounds of the law and the existing rules.

In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt is substantial evidence, which is that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Further, the complainant has the burden of proving by substantial evidence the allegations in his complaint. The basic rule is that mere allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent to proof. Likewise, charges based on mere suspicion and speculation cannot be given credence. Besides, the evidentiary threshold of substantial evidence-as opposed to preponderance of evidence-is more in keeping with the primordial purpose of and essential considerations attending this type of cases.

5 October 2011 A.C. No. 9000 TOMAS P. TAN, JR. vs. ATTY. HAIDE V. GUMBA

Facts: Atty. Gumba obtained a loan of P350,000.00 from Mr. Tan and offered the parcel of land registered in her father’s name as security. She even showed Special Power of Attorney that she was authorized to sell or encumber the property. However, Atty. Gumba defaulted on her loan obligation and failed to pay the same despite repeated demands. So, Mr. Tan went to the Register of Deeds to register the sale, only to find out that the SPA did not give respondent the power to sell the property but only empowered respondent to mortgage the property solely to banks.

Issue: Whether or not a lawyer should be subject to disciplinary actions considering that the deception was made in her private capacity.

Held: Yes, a lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct committed either in his professional or private capacity. Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates all lawyers to uphold at all times the dignity and integrity of the legal profession. Lawyers are similarly required, under Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the same Code, not to engage in any unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct.

In the case at bar, Atty. Gumba’s actions clearly show that she deceived complainant into lending money to her through the use of documents and false representations and taking advantage of her education and complainants ignorance in legal matters.

However, suspension from the practice of law is sufficient to discipline respondent. Disbarment will be imposed as a penalty only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and the character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of the bar.

June 11, 2018 A.C. No. 3921 DELFINA HERNANDEZ SANTIAGO v. ATTY. ZOSIMO SANTIAGO AND ATTY. NICOMEDES TOLENTINO

Quick facts:

Absenot nga govt employee. Gitarong siya pagterminate. Iya giquestion and napildi siya. Gikiha ang legal officers (and mayor pud separate case) kay di siya nahan nga loser siya. In this case, gireiterate that disbarment is a severe disciplinary sanction. Dili pataka file disbarment.

Facts: Complainant was the City Personnel Officer of Caloocan City while respondents Santiago and Tolentino respectively held the positions of City Legal Officer and Legal Officer II in the City Government of Caloocan.

Complainant applied for, and was granted, a sick leave of absence with commuted pay covering 240 days from January 25 to December 31, 1988. Complainant received a Memorandum from then Mayor, which cancelled all leaves of absence of city officials and employees and another one detailing her to the Office of the Secretary to the Mayor. Complainant apparently paid no heed to said memoranda. She was later directed to return to work in a letter. Complainant received a memorandum from Mayor Asistio terminating her employment. Enclosed therewith was a Resolution signed by respondents Santiago and Tolentino, which recommended her dismissal from service

Complainant then filed the present case, accusing the respondents of making deceitful statements in said Resolution, committing gross misconduct and violating their Attorney's Oath for recommending her dismissal without just cause or due process.

Issue: Whether or not the complaint is meritorious.

Held: The Court finds no merit in the complaint.

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides for the grounds for the imposition of the penalty of disbarment, to wit:

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. — A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. x x x

In this case, complainant accused the respondents of deceit, gross misconduct and of violating their Attorney's Oath in issuing the Resolution that allegedly contained false statements and which was arrived at without her being informed of the charges or given the opportunity to present evidence.

As Commissioner Andres correctly ruled, deceit covers intentional falsehoods or false statements and representations that are made with malice or with the intent to do wrong. Gross misconduct, on the other hand, is "any inexcusable, shameful or flagrant unlawful conduct on the part of a person concerned with the administration of justice; i.e., conduct prejudicial to the rights of the parties or to the right determination of the cause. The motive behind this conduct is generally a premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose." Similarly, on the charge of the alleged violation of the Attorney's Oath, the settled rule is that:

The Code of Professional Responsibility does not cease to apply to a lawyer simply because he has joined the government service. In fact, by the express provision of Canon 6 thereof, the rules governing the conduct of lawyers '"shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official tasks." Thus, where a lawyer's misconduct as a government official is of such nature as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or to show moral delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a member of the bar on such grounds. Although the general rule is that a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the bar for infractions he committed as a government official, he may, however, be disciplined as a lawyer if his misconduct constitutes a violation of his oath [as] a member of the legal profession.

Before the Court may impose against respondents the severe disciplinary sanction of disbarment, complainant must be able to establish by substantial evidence the malicious and intentional character of the misconduct complained of that evince the moral delinquency of respondents. Substantial evidence is the amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.

Complainant cannot simply rely on speculations and suspicions, no matter how deep-seated, without evidence to support the same. Charges meriting disciplinary action against a lawyer generally involve the motives that induced him to commit the act charged and that, to justify disbarment or suspension, the case against the lawyer must be clear and free from doubt, not only as to the act charged but as to his motive. Mere allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent to proof. Charges based on mere suspicion and speculation likewise cannot be given credence.

Complainant admitted in her complaint and consolidated reply that she had indeed filed administrative cases against respondents before the CSC, as well as a separate administrative case against Mayor Asistio, in order to impugn the validity of her dismissal from service. However, the specific details, stages and/or outcome of said cases were not properly manifested before this Court. Complainant merely stated that she was not satisfied with these other proceedings so she opted to file the instant case for disbarment.

June 18, 2018 A.C. No. 10267 HELEN GRADIOLA v. ATTY. ROMULO A. DELES

Facts: Complaint for disbarment filed by Helen Gradiola (Helen), charging respondent lawyer Atty. Romulo A. Deles (respondent lawyer) with violating the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically Rule 9.01 and Rule 9.02 of Canon 9; and Rule 10.1 and Rule 10.02 of Canon 10 thereof.

Helen claimed that respondent lawyer was her counsel in a civil case then pending before the Court of Appeals.

Moreover, Helen averred that she was assured the case was in "good hands" because respondent lawyer and "Atty. Araneta" have a "contact" in the CA in Cebu City. "Atty. Araneta" soon billed Helen for these expenses and issued her all the receipts6 for these payments. These receipts all bore the signatures "Atty. Ernie/Ernesto Araneta." Helen discovered that this "Atty. Araneta" had not only been disbarred from the practice of law.

hereupon, Helen immediately filed with the City Prosecutor of Bacolod City a criminal complaint8 for estafa through falsification of public document against respondent lawyer and "Atty. Ernesto S. Araneta." The City Prosecutor of Bacolod City found Helen's criminal complaint well grounded, and instituted a criminal information therefor, now pending before Branch 53 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City.

Helen likewise filed an administrative complaint for disbarment against respondent lawyer before the Committee on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)

Issue: Whether or not the complaint is meritorious.

Held: This case is ordered REMANDED to the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for further investigation, report and recommendation.

Question of due process. There must be an opportunity to be heard.

There seems to be truth that "Atty. Ernesto S. Araneta" was not a lawyer at all as Helen was made to believe. His name does not appear in the Law List, and there seems to be truth to the information Helen gathered that this "Atty. Ernesto S. Araneta" was disbarred because in A.C. No. 1109 (which this Court promulgated on April 27, 2005), this Court ordered the disbarment of a certain "Atty. Ernesto S. Araneta" due to his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude.

While "Atty. Araneta" admitted of his involvement in a fraudulent scheme in defrauding litigants that included Helen, we cannot immediately conclude that respondent lawyer himself was likewise part of this racket that duped Helen. It must be stressed that, because of his medical condition, respondent

lawyer could not yet explain his side. While indeed, an Answer was filed, it was John who signed the same and not respondent lawyer. As such, we cannot consider respondent lawyer to have been adequately represented.

With respondent lawyer not yet in a position to factually dispute the accusations and defend himself, and considering that there was no established lawyer-client relationship at all between him and Atty. Mampang, albeit the latter acted for respondent lawyer's best interest, proceeding with the investigation of the administrative case against him would amount to a denial of a fair and reasonable opportunity to be heard.

This Court has consistently held that an attorney enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of charges against him until the contrary is proved, and that as an officer of the court, he is presumed to have performed his duties in accordance with his oath. "For the Court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent [lawyer] must be established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof. Indeed, considering the serious consequences of disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, the Court has consistently held that a clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of the administrative penalty." "The burden of proof in disbarment and suspension proceedings always rests on the shoulders of the complainant."

July 31, 2018 A.C. No. 10555 EVELYN T. GOOPIO v. ATTY. ARIEL D. MAGLALANG

Facts:

In her disbarment complaint, Goopio primarily alleged that sometime in 2005, in relation to her need to resolve property concerns with respect to 12 parcels of land located in Sagay City, Negros Occidental, she engaged the services of Atty. Maglalang to represent her either through a court action or through extra-judicial means. Having been employed in Switzerland at the time, she allegedly likewise executed a General Power of Attorney on June 18, 2006 in favor of Atty. Maglalang, authorizing him to settle the controversy covering the properties with the developer, including the filing of a petition for rescission of contract with damages.

Goopio further alleged that Atty. Maglalang supposedly informed her that the petition for rescission was filed and pending with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City, and that as payment of the same, the latter requested and received the total amount of P400,000.00 from her.[6] Goopio similarly alleged that Atty. Maglalang presented an official receipt covering the alleged deposit of the P400,000.00 with the court.

Goopio further contended that Atty. Maglalang rendered legal services in connection with the petition, including but not limited to, appearances at mediations and hearings, as well as the

preparation of a reply between the months of December 2006 and April 2007, in relation to which she was supposedly billed a total of P114,000.00, P84,000.00 of which she paid in full.

Goopio also claimed that she subsequently discovered that no such petition was filed nor was one pending before the RTC or any tribunal, and that the purported inaction of Atty. Maglalang likewise resulted in the continued accrual of interest payments as well as other charges on her properties.

She alleged that Atty. Maglalang admitted to all these when he was confronted by Goopio's representative and niece, Milogen Canoy (Canoy), which supposedly resulted in Goopio's revocation of the General Power of Attorney on May 17, 2007. Goopio finally alleged that through counsel, she made a formal demand upon Atty. Maglalang for restitution, which went unheeded; hence, the disbarment complaint.

Issue: Whether or not the disbarment case is meritorious.

Held: Atty. Ariel D. Maglalang is hereby REPRIMANDED, but the disbarment complaint against him is nevertheless DISMISSED for lack of merit. Let a copy of this decision be attached to his records.

In our ruling in Concepcion v. Fandiño, Jr.,a disbarment case which involved as documentary evidence mere photocopies of the notarized documents upon which the main allegation stood, we aptly reiterated how even in disbarment proceedings which are sui generis in nature, the Best Evidence Rule still applies, and submission of mere photocopies of documentary evidence is unavailing for their dearth of probative weight.

In Concepcion, the basis for the complaint for disbarment was the allegation that the lawyer therein notarized documents without authority. Similarly involving a disbarment proceeding that centered on the authenticity of the purported documents as proof of the violative act alleged, what we said therein is most apt and acutely instructive for the case at bar, to wit:

A study of the document on which the complaint is anchored shows that the photocopy is not a certified true copy neither was it testified on by any witness who is in a position to establish the authenticity of the document. Neither was the source of the document shown for the participation of the complainant in its execution. x x x This fact gives rise to the query, where did these documents come from, considering also the fact that respondent vehemently denied having anything to do with it. It is worthy to note that the parties who allegedly executed said Deed of Sale are silent regarding the incident.

x x x x x x x We have scrutinized the records of this case, but we have failed to find a single evidence which is an original copy. All documents on record submitted by complainant are indeed mere photocopies. In fact, respondent has consistently objected to the admission in evidence of said documents on this ground. We cannot, thus, find any compelling reason to set aside the investigating

commissioner's findings on this point. It is well-settled that in disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon complainant. x x x x x x x

The general rule is that photocopies of documents are inadmissible. As held in Intestate Estate of the Late Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban v. Court of Appeals, such document has no probative value and is inadmissible in evidence.

In both Concepcion and the case at bar, the allegations at the core of the disbarment complaints both involve alleged violations, the truth or falsity of which relies on a determination of the authenticity of the documents that serve as the paper trail of said punishable acts.

In the case at bar, the fact that Atty. Maglalang offered to restitute to Goopio the money award in no way precludes the Court from weighing in on the very merits of the case, and gauging them against the quantum of evidence required. No less than the public interest in disbarment proceedings necessitates such independent, impartial, and inclusive contemplation of the totality of evidence presented by the parties. Regrettably for the complainant in this case, her failure to comply with the elementary Best Evidence Rule caused her probative submissions to be weighed and found severely wanting.

As has been avowed by the Court, while we will not hesitate to mete out the appropriate disciplinary punishment upon lawyers who fail to live up to their sworn duties, we will, on the other hand, protect them from accusations that have failed the crucible of proof.

Accordingly, all premises considered, we cannot find Atty. Maglalang guilty of violating Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court as the case levelled against him by Goopio does not have any evidentiary leg to stand on. The latter's allegations of misrepresentation and deceit have not been substantiated as required by the applicable probative quantum, and her failure to present the best evidence to prove the authenticity of the subject documents places said documents well within the ambit of doubt, on the basis of which no punitive finding may be found.

July 23, 2018 A.C. No. 12005 ATTY. ACHERNAR B. TABUZO v. ATTY. JOSE ALFONSO M. GOMOS Quick Facts: Naay nagfile admin complaint against Atty. Tabuzo before the CBD. Ang case naassigned ni Atty. Gomos (commisioner taga CBD). Pildi and reprimanded chuchu si Atty. Tabuzo. Loser iyang pamati, iya gifilan complaint ang commissioner.

Facts:

Before the Court is a Verified Complaint filed by Atty. Achernar B. Tabuzo (complainant) against Atty. Jose Alfonso M. Gomos (respondent) who was then a Commissioner of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), for allegedly committing the following acts:

2.1 Violation of the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, the Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Bar Discipline, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court and Republic Act 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public [O]fficials and Employees; 2.2 Violation of Canon[s] 1 and 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and the Guidelines for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions of the Commission on Bar Discipline; 2.3 Nonfeasance in deliberately refusing to institute disciplinary action for serious violations of duties owed to the Courts and the Legal Profession committed by a lawyer, despite repeated notice, and contrary to the mandate of his office and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; 2.4 Gross Ignorance of the Law; 2.5 All the foregoing were aggravated by: a) pattern of misconduct; b) multiple offenses; [c)] substantial experience in the practice of law; and [d)] betrayal of the trust of his office as Commissioner of the Honorable Commission on Bar Discipline.

The controversy stemmed from an administrative complaint filed by Lucille G. Sillo (Sillo) against complainant before the IBP, docketed as CBD Case No. 12-3457. The case was assigned to respondent for investigation and report.

recommending that complainant be reprimanded for the impropriety of talking to Sillo, without her counsel, prior to the calling of their case for mediation conference, and for the abusive, offensive or improper language used in the pleadings she filed in the said case.

Complainant averred that respondent was very cruel and heartless to an inexperienced lawyer when he mutilated statements made in her pleadings in CBD

Issue: Whether or not the administrative complaint is meritorious.

Held: DISMISSES the administrative complaint filed against Atty. Jose Alfonso M. Gomos.

Furthermore, the Court STERNLY WARNS Atty. Achernar B. Tabuzo and her collaborating counsel Atty. Gaudencio A. Barboza, Jr. to REFRAIN from abusing the disciplinary proceedings thru filing and maintaining frivolous administrative complaints against fellow members of the Bar.

Obviously, the filing of baseless and unfounded administrative complaints against fellow lawyers is antithetical to conducting oneself with courtesy, fairness and candor. It reduces the Bar's disciplinary process into an avenue for childish bickering and trivial catfights. Realistically, filing harassment

administrative complaints definitely causes undue anxiety and considerable psychological stress on wrongly charged respondents. Thus, it should be understood that the aforementioned Canon proscribes the filing of frivolous administrative complaints against fellow members of the legal profession to prevent exploitative lawyers from abusing the disciplinary process. Besides, an important portion of the Lawyer's Oath which should be the guiding beacon of every member of the legal profession states: "I will not wittingly nor willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, or give aid nor consent to the same."

Lawyers are reminded to treat their fellow members of the legal profession and even their non-lawyer adversaries with utmost candor, respect and dignity. More importantly, the primary purpose of administrative disciplinary proceedings against delinquent lawyers is to uphold the law and to prevent the ranks of the legal profession from being corrupted by unscrupulous practices—not to shelter or nurse a wounded ego. Such is the reason why lawyers should always set a good example in not using the law and the rules as weapons or tools of malicious vindication during petty squabbles as it degrades the credibility of the legal profession and tarnishes its integrity.

The Court has, in some instances, even conceded that "a lawyer may think highly of his [or her] intellectual endowment." Such observation is but a moderate and fair commentary to remind members of the legal profession to espouse humility in all their dealings not only with their clients and with their fellow lawyers but also against their adversaries.

The filing of an administrative complaint against an adjudicator is not the proper remedy for assailing the legal propriety of an adverse decision, order, resolution or recommendation, in the case of administrative complaints against lawyers. More importantly, the reckless practice of filing baseless administrative complaints against fellow lawyers undeniably degrades rather than cleanses the ranks of the legal profession.

Tabon v Atty. Bathan AC 10202, 7/11/2018 - Google, CD Asia, and Batas App. I exercised due diligence in looking for this case. Wala jud.

June 27, 2018 A.C. No. 8502 CHRISTOPHER R. SANTOS v. ATTY. JOSEPH A. ARROJADO

Quick Facts: Gi filan admin case si Atty Arrojado because he acquired DAW an interest in the land involved in a litigation in which he had taken part by reason of the exercise of his profession. Di mana pwede under Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code. Pero actually ANAK ni achurney ang nibuy with no slightest proof showing that the son was used by respondent to acquire the property of his clients. Duh, wala siya niviolate, pwede ra anak.

Facts:

Complainant Christopher R. Santos (Complainant Santos) sought the disbarment of respondent Atty. Joseph A. Arrojado (Atty. Arrojado) for violation of Article 1491 of the Civil Code, by acquiring an interest in the land involved in a litigation in which he had taken part by reason of the exercise of his profession

Complainant Santos alleged that he was the defendant in the unlawful detainer case filed by Lilia Rodriguez (Lilia) wherein the respondent lawyer, Atty. Arrojado, was the counsel for Lilia. The case eventually reached the Supreme Court which resolved2 the same in favor of Atty. Arrojado's client.

Complainant claimed while the case was pending before the Supreme Court, Lilia sold one of the properties in litis pendentia to Atty. Arrojado's son, Julius P. Arrojado (Julius) and that Atty. Arrojado even signed as a witness of that sale. Believing that Atty. Arrojado committed malpractice when he acquired, through his son Julius, an interest in the property subject of the unlawful detainer case in violation of Article 1491 of the Civil Code, complainant instituted the instant complaint.

In his Verified Comment, Atty. Arrojado admitted: (1) that Lilia was a client of the law firm wherein he was a senior partner; (2) that Julius was his son; and (3) that one of the subject properties in the ejectment suit was purchased by his son from Lilia. Atty. Arrojado maintained that he did not violate Article 1491 as he had absolutely no interest in the property purchased by his son; and that the proscription in the said article did not extend to the relatives of the judicial officers mentioned therein. He postulated that, when the sale took place, Julius was already of legal age and discretion, as well as a registered nurse and an established businessman; and that while it was through him (respondent lawyer) that Lilia and Julius met, he did not at all facilitate the transaction. Respondent lawyer also pointed out that complainant failed to cite a specific provision or canon in the Code of Professional Responsibility which he had allegedly transgressed or violated.

Issue: Whether or not the administrative complaint is meritorious.

Whether or not the prohibition in Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code against justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of court, and other officers and employees connected with the administration of justice, as well as lawyers, from purchasing property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their profession, extends to their respective immediate families or relatives.

Held: The present administrative case is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

As worded, Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code covers only (1) justices;

(2) judges; (3) prosecuting attorneys; (4) clerks of court; (5) other officers and employees connected with the administration of justice; and (6) lawyers. The enumeration cannot be stretched or extended to include relatives of the lawyer - in this case, Julius, son of respondent lawyer.

Article 1491 provides that "[t]he following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public or judicial auction, either in person or through the mediation of another xx x." However, perusal of the records would show that complainant failed to adduce any shred of evidence that Julius acted or mediated on behalf of respondent lawyer, or that respondent lawyer was the ultimate beneficiary of the sale transaction. The mere fact that it was Julius, son of respondent lawyer, who purchased the property, will not support the allegation that respondent lawyer violated Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code. As aptly noted by the Investigating Commissioner, "[t]here is no evidence to show that respondent had used his son as a conduit to gain the property in question xx x."

August 06, 2018 A.C. No. 9850 ATTY. MA. ROWENA AMELIA V. GUANZON v. ATTY. JOEL G. DOJILLO

Facts: Complaint for Disbarment1 dated September 25, 2007, filed by Atty. Ma. Rowena Amelia V. Guanzon (Atty. Guanzon) against Atty. Joel G. Dojillo (Atty. Dojillo), for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Rules of Court on confidentiality of documents and proceedings, gross misconduct, discourtesy, unfairness, malicious and unethical conduct towards a fellow lawyer.

Complainant Atty. Guanzon was the counsel of Rosalie Jaype-Garcia (Rosalie) and her minor children when they filed a Petition for Temporary Protection Order under R.A. No. 9262, otherwise known as the Anti-Violence against Women and their Children Act of 2004 against Jesus Chua Garcia (Garcia), Rosalie's husband. Later, the Regional Trial Court (RTC),Branch 41 of Bacolod City granted the temporary protection order (TPO) and financial support in favor of the clients of Atty. Guanzon.

Subsequently, before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Garcia then filed a disbarment complaint against herein complainant Atty. Guanzon docketed as CBD Case No. 06-1710 and Administrative Case No. 7176 for immorality, grave misconduct and conduct unbecoming of a member of the Bar. In the said disbarment complaint, Garcia submitted the affidavits of Sheryl Jamola, former "yaya" of their child and a certain Bernadette Yap (subject documents), who both alleged that Atty. Guanzon has "romantic and pecuniary interest" on Rosalie and the financial support which was ordered by the court.

On June 13, 2006, Atty. Guanzon filed a case for Damages against Garcia and docketed as Civil Case No. 802-C before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 60, Cadiz City. On September 27, 2006, Atty. Guanzon filed anew a case for Unjust Vexation against Garcia and docketed as Criminal Case No. 06-10-12695 before the MTCC, Branch 6, Bacolod City. On October 12, 2006, Atty. Guanzon filed a

case for Grave Oral Defamation against Garcia and docketed as Criminal Case No. 06-10-12696 before the MTCC, Branch 5, Bacolod City.

In Garcia's Answer and Counter-Affidavits in the aforesaid three (3) complaints, respondent Atty. Dojillo as counsel of Garcia, attached the documents in the disbarment case, i.e., the affidavits of Sheryl Jamola and Bernadette Yap against Atty. Guanzon. Thus, the filing of disbarment complaint against Atty. Dojillo for violating the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section 18, Rule 139 on the confidentiality of disbarment proceedings and documents.

Atty. Guanzon lamented that Atty. Dojillo knew that there was a disbarment suit filed by his client against her, yet, with malice and bad faith, he submitted the subject documents as part of Garcia's Answer and Counter-Affidavits. By doing so, Atty. Dojillo caused the exposure of confidential records in the disbarment case which damaged her good reputation.

Issue: Whether or not the disbarment case is meritorious. Whether or not confidentiality was breached.

Held: WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit.

This Court will not hesitate to mete out proper disciplinary punishment upon lawyers who are shown to have failed to live up to their sworn duties, but neither will it hesitate to extend its protective arm to them when the accusation against them is not indubitably proven.

In the instant case, we find that Atty. Guanzon failed to provide clear and convincing evidentiary support to his allegations against Atty. Dojillo. As the IBP aptly concluded, Atty. Dojillo cannot be faulted in attaching the disbarment records in his client's Answer and Counter-Affidavit in the three cases which Atty. Guanzon filed against his client as he found it necessary to establish factual basis on the motive of Atty. Guanzon in filing said cases against his client. In effect, Atty. Dojillo's act of attaching said subject documents to his client's Answer was to defend his client's cause which is his duty as counsel. In the absence of proof that Atty. Dojillo was motivated by malice or bad faith, or intent to harass or damage Atty. Guanzon's reputation, the instant disbarment complaint deserves no merit.

It must also be pointed out that the confidentiality in disciplinary actions for lawyers is not absolute. It is not to be applied, under any circumstance, to all disclosures of any nature. The confidentiality rule requires only that proceedings against attorneys be kept private and confidential. The rule does not extend so far that it covers the mere existence or pendency of disciplinary actions. Thus, Atty. Dojillo, in attaching the subject documents to his client's Answer, did not per se violate the confidentiality rule as the purpose was to inform the court of its existence.

CANON II

CONFIDENTIALITY

SECTION 1. Court personnel shall not disclose to any unauthorized person any confidential information acquired by them while employed in the Judiciary, whether such information came from authorized or unauthorized sources.

Confidential information means information not yet made a matter of public record relating to pending cases, as well as information not yet made public concerning the work of any justice or judge relating to pending cases, including notes, drafts, research papers, internal discussions, internal memoranda, records of internal deliberations, and similar papers.

The notes, drafts, research papers, internal discussions, internal memoranda, records of internal deliberations and similar papers that a justice or judge uses in preparing a decision, resolution or order shall remain confidential even after the decision, resolution or order is made public.

Even if Atty. Dojillo attached said subject documents to Garcia's Answer and Counter-Affidavit filed before the courts, the same remains private and confidential. In fact, even after the decision, resolution, or order is made public, such information that a justice or judge uses in preparing a decision, resolution, or order shall remain confidential.