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G.R. No. 164527

August 15, 2007

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner, vs. NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, R-II BUILDERS, INC., R-II HOLDINGS, INC., HARBOUR CENTRE PORT TERMINAL, INC., and MR. REGHIS ROMERO II, Respondents. VELASCO, JR., J.: FACTS: In his capacity as taxpayer, the Solicitor General Francisco Chavez petitioned the Court directly for, among other things, access to all documents and information relating to the Smokey Mountain Development and Reclamation Project (the “Project”), including its underlying Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) between the National Housing Authority (NHA), a government body, and R-II Builders, Inc. (RBI). With Congress having approved the Project as a boost to infrastructure through its development of lowcost housing projects, a private sector joint venture scheme was pursued in accordance with the BuildOperate-and-Transfer Law whereby “the contractor undertakes the construction . . . [for] the government agency or local government unit concerned which shall pay the contractor its total investment expended on the project, plus reasonable rate of return”. After multiple design changes, cost overruns, and corresponding amendments to the JVA, the Project was ultimately suspended, and RBI made demands for payment. A few years later, the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council initiated a bidding process for the work remaining on the Project, and the NHA reached a settlement with RBI to terminate the original JVA. Raising constitutional issues and asserting his right to all information related to the Project, Mr. Chavez filed a petition directly with the Court. The reclamation project in this case was undertaken by the NHA, a national government agency in consultation with PEA and with the approval of two Philippine Presidents, Aquino, mère, and Ramos. The NHA and RBI executed a JVA after RBI was declared the winning bidder on August 31, 1992 as the JVA partner of the NHA in the SMDRP after compliance with the requisite public bidding.

MO 415 of former President Aquino and Proclamation No. 39 of then President Ramos, coupled with Special Patents Nos. 3591, 3592, and 3598, classified the reclaimed lands as alienable and disposable lands of public domain. In this NHA case, the JVA and subsequent amendments were already substantially implemented. Subsequently, the Project was terminated through a MOA signed on August 27, 2003. Almost one year later on August 5, 2004, the Chavez petition was filed. In the instant petition, RBI and other respondents are considered to have signed the agreements in good faith as the Project was terminated even before the Chavez petition was filed. The NHA-RBI JVA and subsequent amendments constitute a BOT contract governed by the BOT Law. The reclaimed lands were transferred to NHA, a government entity NOT tasked to dispose of public land and therefore said alienable lands were converted to patrimonial lands upon their transfer to NHA. ISSUE: Whether respondents NHA and RBI were given the power and authority by DENR to reclaim foreshore and submerged lands. NO, there is no more need. Petitioner Chavez puts forth the view that even if the NHA and RBI were granted the authority to reclaim, they were not authorized to do so by the DENR. HELD: Under existing laws, the NHA is still required to procure DENR’s authorization before a reclamation project in Manila Bay or in any part of the Philippines can be undertaken. The requirement applies to PEA, NHA, or any other government agency or office granted with such power under the law. Notwithstanding the need for DENR permission, we nevertheless find petitioner’s position bereft of merit. The DENR is deemed to have granted the authority to reclaim in the Smokey Mountain Project for, among others, the reason that: Sec. 17, Art. VII of the Constitution provides that "the President shall have control of all executive departments, bureaus and offices." The President is assigned the task of seeing to it that all laws are faithfully executed. "Control," in administrative law, means "the power of an officer to alter, modify, nullify

or set aside what a subordinate officer has done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter." As such, the President can exercise executive power motu proprio and can supplant the act or decision of a subordinate with the President’s own. The DENR is a department in the executive branch under the President, and it is only an alter ego of the latter. Ordinarily the proposed action and the staff work are initially done by a department like the DENR and then submitted to the President for approval. However, there is nothing infirm or unconstitutional if the President decides on the implementation of a certain project or activity and requires said department to implement it. Such is a presidential prerogative as long as it involves the department or office authorized by law to supervise or execute the Project. Thus, as in this case, when the President approved and ordered the development of a housing project with the corresponding reclamation work, making DENR a member of the committee tasked to implement the project, the required authorization from the DENR to reclaim land can be deemed satisfied. It cannot be disputed that the ultimate power over alienable and disposable public lands is reposed in the President of the Philippines and not the DENR Secretary. To still require a DENR authorization on the Smokey Mountain when the President has already authorized and ordered the implementation of the Project would be a derogation of the powers of the President as the head of the executive branch. Otherwise, any department head can defy or oppose the implementation of a project approved by the head of the executive branch, which is patently illegal and unconstitutional. President Aquino reserved the area of the Smokey Mountain dumpsite for settlement and issued MO 415 authorizing the implementation of the Smokey Mountain Development Project plus the reclamation of the area across R-10. Then President Ramos issued Proclamation No. 39 covering the 21-hectare dumpsite and the 40-hectare commercial/industrial area, and Proclamation No. 465 and MO 415 increasing the area of foreshore and submerged lands of Manila Bay to be reclaimed from 40 to 79 hectares. Having supervision and control over the DENR, both Presidents directly assumed and exercised the power granted by the

Revised Administrative Code to the DENR Secretary to authorize the NHA to reclaim said lands. What can be done indirectly by the DENR can be done directly by the President. It would be absurd if the power of the President cannot be exercised simply because the head of a department in the executive branch has not acted favorably on a project already approved by the President. If such arrangement is allowed then the department head will become more powerful than the President.

G.R. No. 192935

December 7, 2010

LOUIS "BAROK" C. BIRAOGO, Petitioner, vs. THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010, Respondent. x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x G.R. No. 193036 REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, REP. RODOLFO B. ALBANO, JR., REP. SIMEON A. DATUMANONG, and REP. ORLANDO B. FUA, SR., Petitioners, vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR. and DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Respondents. MENDOZA, J.: FACTS: After a month in office, President Benigno Aquino III issued Executive Order No. 1 (E.O. 1) on July 30, 2010 creating the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC). The PTC was tasked to conduct a thorough fact-finding investigation of reported cases of graft and corruption involving third level public officers during the administration of Aquino's predecessor Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, and thereafter submit its findings and recommendations to the Office of the President, Congress, and the Ombudsman. Private citizen Louis Biraogo and a group of congressmen led by Lakas Kampi CMD chairman Rep. Edcel Lagman filed in the Supreme Court separate petitions for certiorari and prohibition assailing the constitutionality of E.O. 1 based on their belief that the creation of the PTC constitutes usurpation of the legislative power to create public office, threatens the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman, and violates the equal protection clause of the Philippine Constitution for specifically targeting certain officials of the Arroyo administration. Power of the President to Create the Truth Commission ISSUE 1: Does the creation of the PTC fall within the ambit of the power to reorganize as expressed in Section 31 of the Revised Administrative Code? NO HELD 1: Sec. 31 contemplates "reorganization" as limited by the following functional and structural lines: (1) restructuring the internal organization of the Office of the President Proper by abolishing, consolidating

or merging units thereof or transferring functions from one unit to another; (2) transferring any function under the Office of the President to any other Department/Agency or vice versa; or (3) transferring any agency under the Office of the President to any other Department/Agency or vice versa. Clearly, the provision refers to reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions. These point to situations where a body or an office is already existent but a modification or alteration thereof has to be effected. The creation of an office is nowhere mentioned, much less envisioned in said provision. Accordingly, the answer to the question is in the negative. To say that the PTC is borne out of a restructuring of the Office of the President under Section 31 is a misplaced supposition, even in the plainest meaning attributable to the term "restructure"– an "alteration of an existing structure." Evidently, the PTC was not part of the structure of the Office of the President prior to the enactment of Executive Order No. 1. As held in Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Hon. Executive Secretary, The very source of the power of the President to reorganize any department or agency in the executive branch is that which constitutes an express grant of power. Under Section 31, Book III of Executive Order No. 292 (otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987), "the President, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have the continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President." For this purpose, he may transfer the functions of other Departments or Agencies to the Office of the President. In Canonizado v. Aguirre [323 SCRA 312 (2000)], we ruled that reorganization "involves the reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions." It takes place when there is an alteration of the existing structure of government offices or units therein, including the lines of control, authority and

responsibility between them. The EIIB is a bureau attached to the Department of Finance. It falls under the Office of the President. Hence, it is subject to the President’s continuing authority to reorganize. [Emphasis Supplied] In the same vein, the creation of the PTC is not justified by the President’s power of control. Control is essentially the power to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former with that of the latter. Clearly, the power of control is entirely different from the power to create public offices. The former is inherent in the Executive, while the latter finds basis from either a valid delegation from Congress, or his inherent duty to faithfully execute the laws. ISSUE 2: Is there a valid delegation of power from Congress, empowering the President to create a public office? NO HELD 2: But the creation of the PTC finds justification under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution, imposing upon the President the duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. Section 17 reads: Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. (Emphasis supplied). The allocation of power in the three principal branches of government is a grant of all powers inherent in them. The President’s power to conduct investigations to aid him in ensuring the faithful execution of laws – in this case, fundamental laws on public accountability and transparency – is inherent in the President’s powers as the Chief Executive. That the authority of the President to conduct investigations and to create bodies to execute this power is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution or in statutes does not mean that he is bereft of such authority. It would not be accurate, however, to state that "executive power" is the power to enforce the laws, for the President is head of state as well as head of government and whatever powers inhere in such positions pertain to the office unless the Constitution itself withholds it. Furthermore, the Constitution itself provides that the execution of the laws is only one of the

powers of the President. It also grants the President other powers that do not involve the execution of any provision of law, e.g., his power over the country's foreign relations. On these premises, we hold the view that although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of specific powers of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of "executive power." Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated.

G.R. Nos. 142801-802

July 10, 2001

BUKLOD NG KAWANING EIIB, CESAR POSADA, REMEDIOS G. PRINCESA, BENJAMIN KHO, BENIGNO MANGA, LULU MENDOZA, petitioners, vs. HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY RONALDO B. ZAMORA, HON. SECRETARY JOSE PARDO, DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, HON. SECRETARY BENJAMIN DIOKNO, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, HON. SECRETARY ARTEMIO TUQUERO, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, respondents. SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.: FACTS: On June 30, 1987, former President Corazon C. Aquino, issued an Executive Order establishing the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB). Eleven years after, President Joseph Estrada issued an Executive Order deactivating the EIIB and the transfer of its functions to the Bureau of Customs and the National Bureau of Investigation. Meanwhile, President Estrada issued an Executive Order creating the Presidential Anti-Smuggling Task Force "Aduana." Then, the day feared by the EIIB employees came. President Estrada issued an Executive Order providing that all EIIB personnel occupying positions specified therein shall be deemed separated from the service, pursuant to a bona fide reorganization resulting to abolition, redundancy, merger, division, or consolidation of positions. Agonizing over the loss of their employment, petitioners now come before this Court invoking our power of judicial review of the Executive Orders. ISSUE: Does the President have the authority to reorganize the executive department? YES HELD: The general rule has always been that the power to abolish a public office is lodged with the legislature. This proceeds from the legal precept that the power to create includes the power to destroy. A public office is either created by the Constitution, by statute, or by authority of law. Thus, except where the office was created by the Constitution itself, it may be abolished by the same legislature that brought it into existence. The exception, however, is that as far as bureaus, agencies or offices in the executive department are concerned, the President's power of control may justify

him to inactivate the functions of a particular office, or certain laws may grant him the broad authority to carry out reorganization measures. The very source of the power of the President to reorganize any department or agency in the executive branch is that which constitutes an express grant of power. Under Section 31, Book III of Executive Order No. 292 (otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987), "the President, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have the continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President." For this purpose, he may transfer the functions of other Departments or Agencies to the Office of the President. In Canonizado v. Aguirre [323 SCRA 312 (2000)], we ruled that reorganization "involves the reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions." It takes place when there is an alteration of the existing structure of government offices or units therein, including the lines of control, authority and responsibility between them. The EIIB is a bureau attached to the Department of Finance. It falls under the Office of the President. Hence, it is subject to the President's continuing authority to reorganize.

G.R. No. 142283

February 6, 2003

ROSA LIGAYA C. DOMINGO, ROMEO M. FERNANDEZ, VICTORIA S. ESTRADA, JULIETA C. FAJARDO, ADELAIDA B. GAWIRAN, MARCIANO M. SERVO, VICTORIA S. DAOANG, FELICIANO N. TOLEDO III, JAYNELYN D. FLORES, MA. LIZA B. LLOREN, ROMELIA A. CONTAPAY, MARIVIC B. TOLITOL, PAZ LEVITA G. VILLANUEVA, EDITHA C. HERNANDEZ, JOSE HERNANDEZ, JR., VERONICA C. BELLES, AMELITA S. BUCE, MERCELITA C. MARANAN, CRISTITUTO C. LLOREN, HERNANDO M. EVANGELISTA, and CARLOS BACAY, JR., petitioners, vs. HON. RONALDO D. ZAMORA, in his capacity as the Executive Secretary, HON. ANDREW B. GONZALES, in his capacity as the Secretary of Education, and HON. CARLOS D. TUASON, in his capacity as the Chairman of the Philippine Sports Commission, respondents. CARPIO, J.: FACTS: On March 5, 1999, former President Joseph E. Estrada issued Executive Order No. 81 ("EO 81" for brevity) which transferred the sports development programs and activities of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports ("DECS" for brevity) to the Philippine Sports Commission ("PSC" for brevity). Pursuant to EO 81, former DECS Secretary Andrew B. Gonzales ("Secretary Gonzales" for brevity) issued Memorandum No. 01592 and Memorandum No. 01594 ("DECS Memoranda" for brevity), which reassigned all Bureau of Physical Education and School Sports ("BPESS" for brevity) personnel named in the DECS Memoranda to various offices within the DECS. Dissatisfied with their reassignment, petitioners filed the instant petition. In their Petition, petitioners argue that EO 81 is void and unconstitutional for being an undue legislation by President Estrada. Petitioners maintain that the President’s issuance of EO 81 violated the principle of separation of powers. Petitioners also challenge the DECS Memoranda for violating their right to security of tenure. Petitioners seek to nullify EO 81 and the DECS Memoranda. Petitioners pray that this Court prohibit the PSC from performing functions related to school sports development. Petitioners further pray that, upon filing of the petition, this Court issue a temporary restraining order against respondents to desist from implementing EO 81.

During the pendency of the case, Republic Act No. 9155 ("RA 9155" for brevity), otherwise known as the "Governance of Basic Education Act of 2001", was enacted on August 11, 2001. RA 9155 expressly abolished the BPESS and transferred the functions, programs and activities of the DECS relating to sports competition to the PSC. ISSUE: WON EO 81 and DECS Memoranda are valid. YES HELD: Executive Order No. 292 ("EO 292" for brevity), otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, expressly grants the President continuing authority to reorganize the Office of the President. Section 31 of EO 292 provides: "SEC. 31. Continuing Authority of the President to Reorganize his Office. – The President, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President. For this purpose, he may take any of the following actions: (1) Restructure the internal organization of the Office of the President Proper, including the immediate Offices, the Presidential Special Assistants/ Advisers System and the Common Support System, by abolishing, consolidating or merging units thereof or transferring functions from one unit to another; (2) Transfer any function under the Office of the President to any other Department or Agency as well as transfer functions to the Office of the President from other Departments and Agencies; and (3) Transfer any agency under the Office of the President to any other department or agency as well as transfer agencies to the Office of the President from other Departments or Agencies." (Emphasis supplied.) Since EO 81 is based on the President’s continuing authority under Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292, EO 81 is a valid exercise of the President’s delegated power to reorganize the Office of the President. The law grants the President this power in recognition of the recurring need of every President to reorganize his office "to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency." The Office of the President is the nerve center of the Executive Branch. To remain effective and efficient, the

Office of the President must be capable of being shaped and reshaped by the President in the manner he deems fit to carry out his directives and policies. After all, the Office of the President is the command post of the President. This is the rationale behind the President’s continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President. Petitioners’ contention that the DECS is not part of the Office of the President is immaterial. Under EO 292, the DECS is indisputably a Department of the Executive Branch. Even if the DECS is not part of the Office of the President, Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292 clearly authorizes the President to transfer any function or agency of the DECS to the Office of the President. Under its charter, the PSC is attached to the Office of the President. Therefore, the President has the authority to transfer the "functions, programs and activities of DECS related to sports development" to the PSC, making EO 81 a valid presidential issuance. However, the President’s power to reorganize the Office of the President under Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292 should be distinguished from his power to reorganize the Office of the President Proper. Under Section 31 (1) of EO 292, the President can reorganize the Office of the President Proper by abolishing, consolidating or merging units, or by transferring functions from one unit to another. In contrast, under Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292, the President’s power to reorganize offices outside the Office of the President Proper but still within the Office of the President is limited to merely transferring functions or agencies from the Office of the President to Departments or Agencies, and vice versa. This distinction is crucial as it affects the security of tenure of employees. The abolition of an office in good faith necessarily results in the employee’s cessation in office, but in such event there is no dismissal or separation because the office itself ceases to exist. On the other hand, the transfer of functions or agencies does not result in the employee’s cessation in office because his office continues to exist although in another department, agency or office. In the instant case, the BPESS employees who were not transferred to PSC were at first temporarily, then later permanently reassigned to other offices of the DECS, ensuring their continued employment. At any rate, RA 9155 now mandates that these employees "shall be retained by the Department."