Arraignment Cases.docx

MOTION TO QUASH

2. Heirs of Jane Honrales v. Honrales; GR No. 182651 (2010) FACTS: Jane Honrales was fatally shot by her husband, respondent Jonathan Honrales. An information was filed against respondent before the RTC of Manila. The RTC issued an Order granting leave to conduct the reinvestigation and authorizing 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Biglang-Awa to reinvestigate the case. The heirs of the victim moved before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila for the inhibition from conducting the reinvestigation and praying that the case be remanded to the court for trial. Prosecutor Rebagay recommended the withdrawal of the information for parricide and the filing of an information for reckless imprudence resulting in parricide in its stead. She subsequently filed with the RTC a motion to withdraw the information for parricide. While the Motion to Withdraw Information was still pending, an Information for Reckless Imprudence resulting in Parricide was filed against respondent before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila. Determined to have respondent prosecuted for parricide, petitioner heirs filed a petition for review with the DOJ questioning the downgrading of the offense, but it was dismissed. Petitioner Heirs appealed the dismissal of their petitions to the Office of the President, which the latter still dismissed. Judge Barrios issued an Order granting the withdrawal of the Information for parricide and recalling the warrant of arrest issued against respondent. Petitioner Heirs filed a petition for certiorari with the CA assailing the orders issued by the RTC through Judge Barrios. The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari. Though it found that Judge Barrios failed to make an independent assessment of the merits of the case and thus abdicated his judicial power and acted as a mere surrogate of the Secretary of Justice, it ruled that the remand of the case to the RTC would serve no useful purpose since it may result in the reopening of the parricide case which would violate respondent’s constitutional right against double jeopardy.

ISSUE: Whether or not the remand of the parricide case to the trial court will violate respondent’s constitutional right against double jeopardy. RULING: No, it will not violate respondent’s right against double jeopardy. Under Section 7 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, double jeopardy exists when the following requisites are present: (1) a first jeopardy attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first. A first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered; and (e) when the accused has been acquitted or convicted, or the case dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. In this case, the MeTC took cognizance of the Information for reckless imprudence resulting in parricide while the criminal case for parricide was still pending before the RTC. In Dioquino v. Cruz, Jr., we held that once jurisdiction is acquired by the court in which the Information is filed, it is there retained. Therefore, as the offense of reckless imprudence resulting in parricide was included in the charge for intentional parricide pending before the RTC, the MeTC clearly had no jurisdiction over the criminal case filed before it, the RTC having retained jurisdiction over the offense to the exclusion of all other courts. The requisite that the judgment be rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is therefore absent.

3. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ANDRADE DOCTRINE: It is clearly provided by the Rules of Criminal Procedure that if the motion to quash is based on an alleged defect in the information which can be cured by amendment, the court shall order the amendment to be made. FACTS: Pursuant to the instructions of then Director of the Bureau of Corrections, on June 30, 2003, a random drug test was conducted in the National Bilibid Prison (NBP) wherein the urine samples of thirty-eight (38) inmates were collected and subjected to drug testing by the Chief Medical Technologist and Assistant Medical Technologist of the Alpha Polytechnic Laboratory in Quezon City, and out of that number, twenty-one (21) urine samples tested positive. Hence, they were charged with violation of Section 15, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (RA 9165). All respondents pleaded "Not Guilty" to the crime charged during their arraignment on June 29, 2006. Thereafter, the case was set for pre-trial and trial on August 11, 2006. On August 29, 2006, respondents filed a Consolidated Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the facts alleged in the Information do not constitute a violation of Section 15, RA 9165, further contending that they were never apprehended or arrested for using a dangerous drug or for violating the provisions of RA 9165, which would warrant drug testing and serve as basis for filing the proper information in court. In fact, they were merely called to the Maximum Security Conference Hall in the morning of June 30, 2003 and with seventeen (17) other inmates made to undergo drug testing, pursuant to the directive. It was only after they were found positive for dangerous drugs that the information for Violation of Section 15, RA 9165 was filed against each of them. They were also not informed of the results of the screening test, thus depriving them of the right to challenge the same through a confirmatory drug test within the required fifteen (15)-day period after receipt of the positive result. The RTC Muntinlupa, before the scheduled hearing date for pre-trial and trial, GRANTED the Motion to Dismiss finding no probable cause for the offense charged in the Information. Petitioner filed Petition for Certiorari in CA, but was DENIED. Hence this petition. ISSUE: WON CA erred in upholding the RTC's grant of respondents' motion and eventually dismissing the case based on lack of probable cause HELD: YES.

Section 2, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure plainly states that in a motion to quash, the court shall not consider any ground other than those stated in the motion, except lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged. The RTC judge's determination of probable cause should have been only limited prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest and not after the arraignment. Once the information has been filed, the judge shall then "personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence" to determine whether there is probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest. At this stage, a judicial determination of probable cause exists. In People v. Castillo and Mejia, this Court has stated: There are two kinds of determination of probable cause: executive and judicial. The executive determination of probable cause is one made during preliminary investigation. It is a function that properly pertains to the PUBLIC PROSECUTOR who is given a broad discretion to determine whether probable cause exists and to charge those whom he believes to have committed the crime as defined by law and thus should be held for trial. Otherwise stated, such official has the quasi-judicial authority to determine whether or not a criminal case must be filed in court. Whether or not that function has been correctly discharged by the public prosecutor, i.e.,whether or not he has made a correct ascertainment of the existence of probable cause in a case, is a matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be compelled to pass upon. The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other hand, is one made by the judge to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused. The judge must satisfy himself that based on the evidence submitted, there is necessity for placing the accused under custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. If the judge finds no probable cause, the judge cannot be forced to issue the arrest warrant The difference is clear: The executive determination of probable cause concerns itself with whether there is enough evidence to support an Information being filed. The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other hand, determines whether a warrant of arrest should be issued. The judge does not act as an appellate court of the prosecutor and has no capacity to review the prosecutor’s determination of probable cause; rather, the judge makes a determination of probable cause independent of the prosecutor’s finding. The RTC should not have ruled on whether or not there is probable cause to hold respondents liable for the crime committed since its duty is limited only to the determination of whether the material averments in the complaint or information are sufficient to hold respondents for trial.

Considering that the RTC has already found probable cause, it should have denied the motion to quash and allowed the prosecution to present its evidence and wait for a demurrer to evidence to be filed by respondents, if they opt to, or allowed the prosecution to amend the Information and in the meantime suspend the proceedings until the amendment of the Information without dismissing the case. Section 4, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure clearly states that if the ground based upon is that "the facts charged do not constitute an offense," the prosecution shall be given by the court an opportunity to correct the defect by amendment If it is based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the prosecution shall be given by the court an opportunity to correct the defect by amendment. The motion shall be granted if the prosecution fails to make the amendment, or the complaint or information still suffers from the same defect despite the amendment. In the present case, the RTC judge outrightly dismissed the cases without giving the prosecution an opportunity to amend the defect in the Informations. The CA, however, still upheld the ruling of the RTC, stating that "whatever perceived error the trial court may have committed is inconsequential as any intended amendment to the informations filed surely cannot cure the defects,"32 and to justify such conclusion, the CA proceeded to decide the merits of the case based merely on the allegations in the Information. Such pronouncement, therefore, is speculative and premature without giving the prosecution the opportunity to present its evidence or, to at least, amend the Informations. Thus, the RTC and the CA, by not giving the State the opportunity to present its evidence in court or to amend the Informations, have effectively curtailed the State's right to due process.

5. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LTSG. DOMINADOR BAYABOS The failure by school authorities to take any action to prevent the offenses as provided by the law exposes them to criminal liability as accomplices in the criminal acts. Thus, the institution and its officers cannot stand idly by in the face of patently criminal acts committed within their sphere of responsibility. They bear the commensurate duty to ensure that the crimes covered by the Anti-Hazing Law are not committed. Facts: Fernando C. Balidoy, Jr. was admitted as a probationary midshipman at the Philippine Merchant Marine Academy (PMMA). In order to reach active status, all new entrants were required to successfully complete the mandatory “Indoctrination and Orientation Period,” which was set from 2 May to 1 June 2001. Balidoy died on 3 May 2001. PMMA were criminally charged before the Sandiganbayan as accomplices to hazing under the Anti-Hazing Law. Before they were arraigned, the Sandiganbayan quashed the Information against them on the basis of the dismissal of the criminal case against the principal accused and, the failure to include in the Information the material averments required by the Anti-Hazing Law. Consequently, this petition was filed before this Court questioning the Sandiganbayan’s quashal of the Information. A criminal case against Alvarez et al. was then filed with the Regional Trial Court. The Assistant Provincial Prosecutor also endorsed to the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military the finding of probable cause to charge the following school authorities as accomplices to hazing RTC Ruling: RTC Zambales issued an Order dismissing the Information against the principal accused, Alvarez et al. Six days before Bayabos et al. were set to be arraigned,15 the Sandiganbayan issued the assailed Resolution (SB Resolution I) quashing the Information and dismissing the criminal case against them In this case, as there were no principal perpetrators to speak of, necessarily, there was no one else with whom they could have cooperated in the execution of the crime of hazing. In view of the dismissal of the case against the

principals, the court ruled that the Information charging Bayabos et al. as accomplices could no longer stand on its own. Aggrieved, the Office of the Ombudsman, through the Special Prosecutor, filed with this Court review on Certiorari. ISSUE: 1. Whether the prosecution of respondents for the crime of accomplice to hazing can proceed in spite of the dismissal with finality of the case against the principal accused 2. Whether the Information filed against respondents contains all the material averments for the prosecution of the crime of accomplice to hazing under the Anti-Hazing Law RULING: 1. Yes. The Sandiganbayan erred when it dismissed outright the case against respondents, on the sole ground that the case against the purported principals had already been dismissed. It is a settled rule that the case against those charged as accomplices is not ipso facto dismissed in the absence of trial of the purported principals; the dismissal of the case against the latter; or even the latter’s acquittal, especially when the occurrence of the crime has in fact been established. In People v. Rafael, the Supreme Court En Banc re asoned thus: “The corresponding responsibilities of the principal, accomplice, and accessory are distinct from each other. As long as the commission of the offense can be duly established in evidence, the determination of the liability of the accomplice or accessory can proceed independently of that of the principal.” Accordingly, so long as the commission of the crime can be duly proven, the trial of those charged as accomplices to determine their

criminal liability can proceed independently of that of the alleged principal. 2. No. SC affirm the quashal of the Information against respondents. The crime of hazing is thus committed when the following essential elements are established: (1) a person is placed in some embarrassing or humiliating situation or subjected to physical or psychological suffering or injury; and (2) these acts were employed as a prerequisite for the person’s admission or entry into an organization. In the crime of hazing, the crucial ingredient distinguishing it from the crimes against persons defined under Title Eight of the Revised Penal Code is the infliction by a person of physical or psychological suffering on another in furtherance of the latter’s admission or entry into an organization. In the case of school authorities and faculty members who have had no direct participation in the act, they may nonetheless be charged as accomplices if it is shown that (1) hazing, as established by the above elements, occurred; (2) the accused are school authorities or faculty members; and (3) they consented to or failed to take preventive action against hazing in spite actual knowledge thereof. The indictment merely states that psychological pain and physical injuries were inflicted on the victim. There is no allegation that the purported acts were employed as a prerequisite for admission or entry into the organization. Failure to aver this crucial ingredient would prevent the successful prosecution of the criminal responsibility of the accused, either as principal or as

accomplice, for the crime of hazing. Plain reference to a technical term in this case, hazing is insufficient and incomplete, as it is but a characterization of the acts allegedly committed and thus a mere conclusion of law. Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court,

expressly states that the information must include, inter alia, both “the designation of the offense given by the statute” and “the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense.” The Special Prosecutor’s belated argument in his Petition before this Court that the successful completion of the indoctrination and orientation program was used as a prerequisite for continued admission to the academy i.e., attainment of active midshipman status does not cure this defect in the Information. Thus, the Information must be quashed, as the ultimate facts it presents do not constitute the crime of accomplice to hazing.

6. JASON IVLER vs. HON. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO-SAN PEDRO, Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 71, Pasig City, and EVANGELINE PONCE, Respondents. Ponente: Carpio, J.

Facts: Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City (MTC), with two separate offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property for the death of respondent Ponce’s husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponce’s vehicle.

Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in both cases. On 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge on the first delict and was meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to quash the Information for the second delict for placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence.

The MTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases.

Without acting on petitioner’s motion, the MTC proceeded with the arraignment and, because of petitioner’s absence, cancelled his bail and ordered his arrest.

Seven days later, the MTC issued a resolution denying petitioner’s motion to suspend proceedings and postponing his arraignment until after his arrest. Petitioner sought reconsideration but as of the filing of this petition, the motion remained unresolved.

ISSUES:

1. Whether petitioner forfeited his standing to seek relief from his petition for certiorari when the MTC ordered his arrest following his non-appearance at the arraignment in Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries for injuries sustained by respondent; and

2. Whether petitioner’s constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further proceedings in Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property for the death of respondent Ponce’s husband.

HELD: The petitioner elevated the matter to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City (RTC), in a petition for certiorari while Ivler sought from the MTC the suspension of proceedings in criminal case, including the arraignment his arraignment as a prejudicial question.

(1) Petitioner’s non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366 did not divest him of personality to maintain the petition in S.C.A. 2803; and

(2) The protection afforded by the Constitution shielding petitioner from prosecutions placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense bars further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366

The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted under the same provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses

RATIO: 1. The mischief in the RTC’s treatment of petitioner’s nonappearance at his arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366 as proof of his loss of standing becomes evident when one considers the Rules of Court’s treatment of a defendant who absents himself from post-arraignment hearings. Under Section 21, Rule 11411 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the defendant’s absence merely renders his bondsman potentially liable on its bond (subject to cancellation should the bondsman fail to produce the accused within 30 days); the defendant retains his standing and, should he fail to surrender, will be tried in absentia and could be convicted or acquitted. 2. The accused’s negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense"13 protects him from, among others, post-conviction prosecution for the same offense, with the prior verdict rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid information.14 It is not disputed that petitioner’s conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367 was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid charge. Thus, the case turns on the question whether Criminal Case No. 82366 and Criminal Case No. 82367 involve the "same offense." - that Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries is an entirely separate offense from Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property ". The Court found: Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime, its Consequences on Persons and Property are Material Only to Determine the Penalty

Article 48 Does not Apply to Acts Penalized Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code

The confusion bedeviling the question posed in this petition, to which the MeTC succumbed, stems from persistent but awkward attempts to harmonize conceptually incompatible substantive and procedural rules in criminal law, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses and Article 48 on complexing of crimes, both under the Revised Penal Code. Article 48 is a procedural device allowing single prosecution of multiple felonies falling under either of two categories: (1) when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies (thus excluding from its operation light felonies46); and (2) when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other. The legislature crafted this procedural tool to benefit the accused who, in lieu of serving multiple penalties, will only serve the maximum of the penalty for the most serious crime.

In contrast, Article 365 is a substantive rule penalizing not an act defined as a felony but "the mental attitude x x x behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight x x x," a single mental attitude regardless of the resulting consequences. Thus, Article 365 was crafted as one quasi-crime resulting in one or more consequences.

How should such a quasi-crime be prosecuted? Should Article 48’s framework apply to "complex" the single quasi-offense with its multiple (non-criminal) consequences (excluding those amounting to light offenses which will be tried separately)? Or should the prosecution proceed under a single charge, collectively alleging all the consequences of the single quasicrime, to be penalized separately following the scheme of penalties under Article 365?

Jurisprudence adopts both approaches. Thus, one line of rulings (none of which involved the issue of double jeopardy) applied Article 48 by "complexing" one quasi-crime with its multiple consequences unless one consequence amounts to a light felony, in which case charges were split by grouping, on the one hand, resulting acts amounting to grave or less grave felonies and filing the charge with the second level courts and, on the other hand, resulting acts amounting to light felonies and filing the charge with the first level courts.49 Expectedly, this is the approach the MeTC impliedly sanctioned (and respondent Ponce invokes), even though under Republic Act No. 7691,50 the MeTC has now exclusive original jurisdiction to impose the most serious penalty under Article 365 which is prision correccional in its medium period.

Under this approach, the issue of double jeopardy will not arise if the "complexing" of acts penalized under Article 365 involves only resulting acts penalized as grave or less grave felonies because there will be a single prosecution of all the resulting acts. The issue of double jeopardy arises if one of the resulting acts is penalized as a light offense and the other acts are penalized as grave or less grave offenses, in which case Article 48 is not deemed to apply and the act penalized as a light offense is tried

separately from the resulting acts penalized as grave or less grave offenses.

The second jurisprudential path nixes Article 48 and sanctions a single prosecution of all the effects of the quasi-crime collectively alleged in one charge, regardless of their number or severity, penalizing each consequence separately. By prohibiting the splitting of charges under Article 365, irrespective of the number and severity of the resulting acts, rampant occasions of constitutionally impermissible second prosecutions are avoided, not to mention that scarce state resources are conserved and diverted to proper use.

Hence, it is held that prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed from a single charge regardless of the number or severity of the consequences. In imposing penalties, the judge will do no more than apply the penalties under Article 365 for each consequence alleged and proven. In short, there shall be no splitting of charges under Article 365, and only one information shall be filed in the same first level court.

7. JACOB AND LEGARDA VS. SANDIGANBAYAN (635 SCRA 94, 2010) The Office of the Ombudsman issued a Resolution dated March 27, 2000 finding probable cause against several public officers and private individuals, including petitioners Monico V. Jacob (Jacob), President, and Celso L. Legarda (Legarda), VicePresident and General Manager for Marketing, both of Petron, for perpetrating the socalled "tax credit scam."

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT SANDIGANBAYAN COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN DENYING PETITIONERS’ RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL.

Petitioners provided an undisputed account of the events that subsequently took place before the Sandiganbayan:

HELD: NO. An accused’s right to "have a speedy, impartial, and public trial" is guaranteed in criminal cases by Section 14(2), Article III of the Constitution. This right to a speedy trial may be defined as one free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays, its "salutary objective" being to assure that an innocent person may be free from the anxiety and expense of a court litigation or, if otherwise, of having his guilt determined within the shortest possible time compatible with the presentation and consideration of whatsoever legitimate defense he may interpose. Intimating historical perspective on the evolution of the right to speedy trial, we reiterate the old legal maxim, "justice delayed is justice denied." This oft-repeated adage requires the expeditious resolution of disputes, much more so in criminal cases where an accused is constitutionally guaranteed the right to a speedy trial

On April 14, 2000, petitioners and the four other Petron officers who were similarly charged filed a Motion for Reinvestigation [with the Office of the Ombudsman]. On 17 April 2000, the [Sandiganbayan Fourth Division] issued an Order giving the prosecution a period of sixty (60) days within which – … to re-assess its evidence in these cases and to take appropriate action on the said motion for reconsideration of accused movants and to inform the Court within the same period as to its findings and recommendations including the action thereon of the Honorable Ombudsman. Sixty (60) days passed but the Office of the Ombudsman did not even bother to submit a report on the status of the motions for reconsideration. Months passed, and then, AN ENTIRE YEAR PASSED. There was still nothing from the respondent Office of the Ombudsman. In the meantime, petitioner Jacob was arraigned on 1 June 2000 while petitioner Legarda was arraigned on 18 May 2001. In all the hearings conducted in the cases the defense verbally and consistently invoked their right to speedy trial and moved for the dismissal of the cases. In the course of more than one year, however, the [Sandiganbayan 4th Division] kept affording the prosecution one chance after another. The sixty days granted to the prosecution became more than four hundred days – still, there was no resolution in sight.

Justice Nario, as the Chairman of the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division, ordered the dismissal of all criminal cases arising from the purported tax credit scam on the ground that the accused, including petitioners, had already been deprived of their right to a speedy trial and disposition of the cases against them. Petitioners assert that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in reversing Justice Nario’s order of dismissal of Criminal Case Nos. 25922-25939 because such reversal violated petitioners’ constitutional right against double jeopardy.

In determining whether the accused has been deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the case and to a speedy trial, four factors must be considered: (a) length of delay; (b) the reason for the delay; (c) the defendant’s assertion of his right; and (d) prejudice to the defendant. Prejudice should be assessed in the light of the interest of the defendant that the speedy trial was designed to protect, namely: to prevent oppressive pre-trial incarceration; to minimize anxiety and concerns of the accused to trial; and to limit the possibility that his defense will be impaired. Of these, the most serious is the last.

Irrefragably, there had been an undue and inordinate delay in the reinvestigation of the cases by the Office of the Ombudsman, which failed to submit its reinvestigation report despite the lapse of the 60-day period set by the Sandiganbayan, and even more than a year thereafter. Nevertheless, while the re-investigation by the Office of the Ombudsman delayed the proceedings in Criminal Case Nos. 25922-25939, the said process could not have been dispensed with as it was undertaken for the protection of the rights of petitioners themselves (and their co-accused) and their rights should not be compromised at the expense of expediency.

In Corpuz, we warned against the overzealous or precipitate dismissal of a case that may enable the defendant, who may be guilty, to go free without having been tried, thereby infringing the societal interest in trying people accused of crimes rather than granting them immunization because of legal error. We agree with the Sandiganbayan Special Fourth Division that Justice Nario’s dismissal of the criminal cases was unwarranted under the circumstances, since the State should not be prejudiced and deprived of its right to prosecute the criminal cases simply because of the ineptitude or nonchalance of the Office of the Ombudsman.

There can be no denying the fact that the petitioners, as well as the other accused, was prejudiced by the delay in the reinvestigation of the cases and the submission by the Ombudsman/Special Prosecutor of his report thereon. So was the State. We have balanced the societal interest involved in the cases and the need to give substance to the petitioners’ constitutional rights and their quest for justice, and we are convinced that the dismissal of the cases is too drastic a remedy to be accorded to the petitioners. The People has yet to prove the guilt of the petitioners of the crimes charged beyond reasonable doubt. We agree with the ruling of the Sandiganbayan that before resorting to the extreme sanction of depriving the petitioner a chance to prove its case by dismissing the cases, the Ombudsman/Special Prosecutor should be ordered by the Sandiganbayan under pain of contempt, to explain the delay in the submission of his report on his reinvestigation.

8. ARIEL M. LOS BAÑ OS v. JOEL R. PEDRO G.R. No. 173588. April 22, 2009. Joel Pedro was charged in court for carrying a loaded firearm without authorization from the COMELEC a day before the elections. Pedro, then filed a Motion to Quash after his Motion for Preliminary Investigation did not materialize. The RTC granted the quashal. The RTC reopened the case for further proceedings in which Pedro objected to citing Rule 117, Sec. 8 on provisional dismissal, arguing that the dismissal had become permanent. The public prosecutor manifested his express conformity with the motion to reopen the case saying that the provision used applies where both the prosecution and the accused mutually consented to the dismissal of the case, or where the prosecution or the offended party failed to object to the dismissal of the case, and not to a situation where the information was quashed upon motion of the accused and over the objection of the prosecution. The RTC, thus, set Pedro’s arraignment date. Pedro filed with the CA a petition for certiorari and prohibition to nullify the RTC’s mandated reopening. The CA, at first granted the reopening of the case but through Pedro's Motion for Reconsideration, his argument that a year has passed by from the receipt of the quashal order, the CA's decision was reversed. Petitioner now argues using the same argument of the public prosecutor. ISSUE: Whether the rule on provision dismissal is applicable. RULING: The SC granted the petition and remanded the case to the RTC. The SC differentiated Motion to Quash and Provisional Dismissal. Primarily, they are two separate concepts. In Motion to Quash, the Information itself has deficiency while in Provisional Dismissal, the Information has no deficiencies. It does not follow that a motion to quash results in a provisional dismissal to which Section 8, Rule 117 applies. In the case, the SC finds that the granting of the quashal of the RTC had no merit on the ground that there is a legal excuse or justification in Pedro's offense. Pedro misappreciated the natures of a motion to quash and provisional dismissal. As a consequence, a valid Information still stands, on the basis of which Pedro should now be arraigned and stand trial.