Armour V Board Of Ed Montgomery County Md

2 OpWn1J8 ()f MSBE 123

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - Equal Protection; DfSCRlMINATION - AIij,nage; LOCAL BOA1l.DSOF EDUCATION - L.ocal Control; STATE BOARD ·OF EDUCATWN - visitatorial Power; STUDENTS - Rig,ht to Attend Public School

DAVIP M. ARMOOR, et aI., App'ella1!t~ v. BOARD OF. EDUCATION OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MARYLA...'JD, et al., A{fpeUeea No. 79-10

Augtil>t 29, 1979 STATEl'IlENT OF DECISION The. State Boanlof Education, after colllli.d~g the briefs and oral arguments in this matter, has determined-by Ulli\IIim01l5 vote-that the Polky of tbe Boardo! Education of Montgomery CountyUoverning Enrollment and Thition for Students Not DomicIled in .Montgomery County is invalid both as a matter of law and as being CWItrary to the educational policiea of this State. Tlte Board concludes that the l!olllltitutionai and statutory lequiretnen:t.s oUffie public sebool education require the provision ofa free ~ucation to all bona fide residents of tbis State, whether or not J\€cessarily domiciled in this State,. and does. not permit the charge of tuition to iJ:u:Iividu~ who are in fact residents of the State. A written opinion setting forth in full the relU!ons for this decisinn will be issued shortly. 'V-llIiam G. Sykes, Premem L.•wrenc~ A. Mille!', V"", PrMid,ent Joanne T. Gdldamith, Alliemne 'Thomas Lancaster, IIfary Eu.abeUl Ellis,

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. 1.1AV"flJ M. UOO:()UH;irt.~a.:, A.pp'eua1!~~ v.

BOARD OF. EDUCATION OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MARYLAi'JD, et al., A{fpellees No. 79-10

Augtil>t 29, 1979 STATEl'IIENT OF DECISION The. State Boanlof Education, after colllli.d~g the briefs alid oral arguments in this matter, has determined-by unanimous

Z Opinions ofMSBE 123

2 OpfuioD!l of MSBE 123

adopted by the Montgomery County Board of Education (")lCBE') on August 20, 1979 entitled, "Enrollment and Tuition fur Students No.t Domiciled in ~lontgomery _County." Originally the appeal 11 ad

legislation im~lementing thiB requirement is teOected in § 1·201 of the Education Article of the MD. ANN. CODE' which states: There shall be throughout this Stat¢ a general system of fyee publi",.c"-ool. acoot·ding to the provis\ons of this Article, (empha· &is added)

cballenged the "Nonresident Tultion Policy" that had beenedopted by the MCBE .o n October 23, l.978 hut which has since been rescinded. However, on June 26, 19'19 ~ suit was filed in the Circuit GOUTt for ~lontgori1ery County by certain ofthe appellants clJalleng'ing this earlier policy. Armm'T v. Boam of Education of Mon!gomIn]! C(Y!!nty, et al., No. 67672. At the hearilig inthai ·case on J oly 27, 19'19, Judge H. Ralph 1\1illel" ordered that all further proceedings be stayed pending an appeal to this Board forits opinion .

FUrther, § 7·101(a) ("the free school law") pravides that: All indil>iduui. who areS year. old or older and under 21 shall be admittedjree 'If charge to the public sch\lQis of t"", Stat•. (emphasis .dded) -' ,

Thus, in the first instance it is apparent tbaUhe language ofthese constitutional iItId statutory provisions speak to "all individuals" and lack any elq)licit qualifications based on reSidency or domicile'. Generally, where the statutory Ianguage .i s plain and free !rom ambigu. ity, there is no 1&eW"Y to disregard the natural import of the W()rd~ with a view toward makihg the statute express an intention which is different from its ~1ain. meaning. E'I"-ifOlJ'II. Metcrmti.le-Sofq Dl![Jorit and TrI,st Co., 273 lI1el 58, 66 (1974). Indeed, it has bailn held that "the schools must be open·to all without e;<jJenae. The right is given to the whole body of the people." Stat6 ex 'reI. Clam'll. Mar-yland InstiJ.ute for Pm'rnotian. of MechIic Art8, 87 ~ld. 643, 661 (1898),

In view or the met the October 23, 1978 policy has now been super;;eded hy tbe one adopted by :lilCBE on AUgUst 20, l.979, the Board wiU restrict its attention to the newer poliey which has been challenged on t.he grounds that: 1. As itis predicated on domicile and not residence, it violates the Maryland c01l8titutional and statutory prpvisiOfls for free pobllceducl\tion; . 2. It unlawfully discriminates against aliens in violation of tbe Equal Protection Clause Ilf the Thurteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution;

3. It violates Art. 6, Clause 2 (the Supremacy Clause) of the United States C01l8Utution;

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4. It unlawfully interferes with the foreign affairs and rWrt.ions of the United States; and

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5. AJ; a matter of educational poli~y. it is lIDwllle andunfaii: For the reasons discl\Ssed below, we have concluded tbat the edu~ational poliCy of this State,cotlSistent with the Legislature's intent as·expressed in the constitutional and statutory requiIelnents for fl-ee public schools, does not permit the charge. of tuition to _ .......... _ _ r.-.... ......l:. ............ ;n f" ........ =i.r1o.r\to;::!

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ing this earlier policy. Armm'TlI. Boam of Educa/ion of Mon!gom· In]! C(YItnty, etal., No. 67672. At the hearilig inthafcase on July 27, 19'19, Judge H. Ralph l\1iller ordered that all further proceedings be stayed pending snappeal t
In view oIthe met the October 23, 1978 policy has now been super;;eded by the one adopted by :lilCBE on AUgUst 20, 19'79, the Board wiU restrict its attention to the newer p"liey whiCh has been challenged on t.he gronrrds that: 1. AJ; it is predicated on domicile and not residence, it violates the Maryland c01l8titutional and statutory prpvisions for free pobliceducl\tion; .

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Nevertheless, this hroad mandate bas never been in.terpl"eted by either this Board or· the various county boarM of education as affording free public education to any individual without regard to actual residence. Obviously, the State is not required to provide a free education to individuals who djl not have even a'minimal nexUll to the State. In tbis regard, § 7-3()1 (''the compulsory !chooUaw") is of primary importance as evidence of the General Assembly\! intent that the requirement of bona fide residency is a key f2.ctor in determining not only whether a stUdent is compelled to attend publie school but whether or not that person is entitled to attend free of ..,.

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public.sch\lQ~

Thus, in the first instance it is apparent thaUhe language ofthese constitutional iItId statutory provisions speak to "all individuals" and lack any elq)licit qualifications based on residency or domicile'.· Gen· erally,where the statutm-y language .i s plain and free !rain ambiguity, there is no 1&eW"Y to disregard the natural import of the W()rd~ with a view toward making the statute express an intention which iB different from its ~1ain. meaning. E'lu-ifOlJ '!I. Metcamtile-Sofq Dl![Jorit and TrI,st Co., 273 Mel 58,66 (1974). Indeed, it has been held tiult ''the schools be open to all .without e;<jJense. The right is given , must ,

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charge. Section 7·301 requires that "[e)ach child 'UItO T!1Bidesin litis

Slate and is6 years old or olderaild lmder 16 shall attend a public school regularly." (emphasis added) .We believe the compulsory sehoollaw mw;t he read in co'liunction with the free school law provision tn § 7·101(a) as both statute3 relate t6the s.arne general sU.bj:ct matter and are aimed at obtaining the same hWllc result-prIlVldUlg the chi!crren of Maryland with lin adequlite public education. In this sense they are in pa.ri materia. ~d should: be construed t~gether even though they' were passed at dIfferent times and contalD no' reference to each other. State of M~i'Y,land v, Ba'mes, 273 Md. 195, 208 (1974),; Boordo! F-iro Com. 'm7ssume-rs if the- City of Baltimore v.Potter, 268 Md . 285, 290c91 , ~I973)' As the Supreme Court observed, compulsary education is .neceS8~ to prepare citizens to participate effectivelY and intelligenUy m our open PolitiC$! system" and "preparllS individuals to be self~reli,llJlt and self-sufficient participants in society." Wiscomm v. Yods:,. 406 ,U.8. ' 205, '222 (1972). CoUectively, these two statutory proVISIOns represent an important indication of the Legisllll.ure'B intenttha~ residency in the State of Maryland is an implied, condition to the entitlement of free education.

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~o1'\1ove'r, the county ,b oards at' education are empowered to re-

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The more difficult issue we have addro.'."ed is whether the readequlite public education. In this sense they are in 'pa.ri materia. ~d shoul~ be construed t~gether even though they' were passed at ,dIfferent times aildcontalD no' reference to each other. State of Mai'Y,laT!(l v. BQ;I'tI.6S, 273 Md. 195, 208 (1974); Boordo! Fire Com. 'm7SSW'J:!enJ if the City of Baltimore v. ,Potter, 268 Md. 285, 290c91 , ~I973). As the Supreme Court o'b served, compulsory education is .nece.."l!~ to prepare, citizens to participate effectively and intelligently m our open politiCll! system" and "preparllS indiViduals to be self~reli,il.nt and self-sufficient participants ,in society." Wiscomm v. Yods:,.406 U .8.' 205, 222 (1972). ColIeetively, these two statutory proVISIOns represent an important indication of the Legisllll.ure's lOtent that resid'e ncy in the State of Mary land is an implied condition

The BQard is aware tbat the Court of Appeals has stated, ''the words 'reside' or 'resident' tn a constit!ltiorrai pl-ovision of statute delineating rights, duties, obligations, privileges, etc. lwilll be constmed to mean 'dolliicile' unless a, comlra.'111 inl • .,.t be .lu:J1fro,.n (<)m· pbasis add~d) Blli71'Um v. Kaien, 2'l2 Md. 490, 496 (1974); Dmft', Skolnik, 280 Md. IOL 1.16 ("1977). As-tbe discussion below indicates, it is our opinion, tha~ sucll 'a "contrary intent" exJsts when the words ''reMe'' or "residency" appear in,the publicscil!loL laws pertaining to 'a ,free edlJ;Cation. '''',

'l'o begin with, the Board is in agreement with the position neld by

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R~idence, then, 'is. word, whicll may bear d~rent shades of meaning according to the context. n. may mean something 'more tban 'domicile. . .. On the other hand, it may mean Born.thing less th:m oomi~le: '. dwetrrng-place adopted Cor the t ime being, but without such an intentilln of perrnapent abode as ' to create a domicile th,ere. 219 l1d. at 202c

It is the latter, meaning of "somet!\ing I~ than domicile" which must be given to the woro "reside" in,§ 7-301(1)(a) in onler to ensure all children tecave the education to' IVhich they 'are €lltitfed.

qulre that students attending ,their achool. be residents of their particular county.' See § 3·102 (t,he geographic bowl(iary of each cou.nty
,(children may att.end a school in an atijoiniog county tree of cbarge. and the,county boards'may jointly determine the geographic,attend'ance area and funding formula); § 7-1Q2 (Prince George''s Co.unty Board of Ec!ucation is authoriz~ to use an affidavit of digc~ fo~ as a prerequ.ialte for admission to its schools ,and parents are obliged to attest to their ( 1) legal residence and (2) the duration of their residency inMaryland). See also, SIin'T1', Parks, 345 F. SIlPP. 795 {D. Md. 1972).

it tbe more limited concept of domicile as defined by the Court of Appeals. See Thl! v. Mm·en.o, ' 2B4 Md. 426, 438·39 (1979); Drnf v. Skot-ail<, 200 Md, 101, 116-17 (1977).' We believe it dtles not. As we have note
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''residence'' al'€susceptible of different meaniugs, and "must l!e construed in ac,corclaru:e with the context and the purpose of the co nstitution, charter, stat lite or insj;rument in which they are fOWld." Indeed, the Gallaghe)' opinion quoted "ith ap,pr,ol'al from th!l Restateml!fit of Conflict of Lam § 10.'3: R~idence, then, is a word, whicll may bear different shades of meaning according to th~ context. n. may mean something 'more than 'domicile. ... On the other hand, it may mean Borneth,ing less th:m oomi~le: '3 dlVetrrng-place ado~ted Cor the time being, but without such an ,intentilln of perrnapent abode as ' to create a domicile the.",. 219 Md. at 202c

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all parties to this appeal-eren counsel for MCBE-t/iat the term "resides" in the compulsory school law does not lI!ean domicile but rather "mere residency.» Th€refore, we must r.eject Montgllmery County's contention that the term "domicile" is subsumed within the free school law, because this position. leads to a ludiCrous result. Cbildren who are ''mere residents" of the county could lre cO,rlpelled to attend school (lillbject to the imposition of crimil131 8aI1cl.ions on their parents or guardians) although at the same time, the.'!e same children could be denied total access to the county\! "Schools unless a tuition charge was paid. The long-standing implicitconsf.ruction of the term "resides" in § 7-ilOl{a) is significant in another respect as it is well-settled that the construction of a law by the agen~y charged with its enforce-

mentis entitled to great weight and should not bedisJ."egarded except for ''thestronge8t and most u1'!ltmt reasons." (emphasis added) Public Seruiee Commissian of Marylc,nd v. HfYWfI,ro Re· seaTCk and DelJel&{Yl1Wnt-Corp" 271 Md. l41, 152 (1973). No judicial decision in Maryland has thus far construed tbemeaning of the word ''resides," either in the context of the compulsory attendance law or for that matier in tl;le gena-al context of elementary and Becorrdary education. However, further support for our position is found in the Restatement CSeeond) .of Conftiet of Laws, § 11, comment k (1971), which riOtes that the word ''residence" is generally interpreted as "meaning the' place where a person dwells without regard to domicile in statutes relating to ... school privileges .... " Case law in jurisdictions .other than MaryJand is consistent with the interpretation expressed in the RestaJ:ementjn factual situations pertaining to free school pri vileg€s fur elementary and sscondary schools. What emerges from these judicial decisions is the overrid· ing general principle that the llj,ws relating to public school privileges should be given a liberal interpretation in a=d with the overriding policy that "aU the children within (State1 borders shall well" parenu; or guat'mans) aHnougn at. me same tune, tne.'!e same children could be denied.total access to the county\! "Schools unless a tuition charge was paid. The long-standing implicit construction of the term "resides" in § 7-ilOl(a) is significant in another respect as it is well-seWed that the construction of a law by the .agenCy charged with its enforce-

mentis entitled to great weight and shOUld not bedilll-egarded except for ''the8tronge~t and most u1'gent reasons." (emphasis added) Public Seruice Commissian of Maryland v. HfYWfI,rci Re· seaTCk and DelJel&{Yl1WntCorp., 271 Md. 141, i52 (1973). No judicial decision in Mlll:yland has thus far construed tbemean-

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Thos, in Hosierll. Emns, 314 F. Supp. 316, 318-1.9 (D.V.I. 1970\ alien children who resided in the Vll"gin Islands as, "notiinunigrant"

visitors .·a rgue that as residents they were entitled to fl-e€ attend· ance in the public schools despite' the fact they were not clomiciliaries. rn agreeing with plaintiffs, the Court stated: De[endants rely somewhat hea.ny on tbe nice legal distine!ions re,'olving around residence, i.e., domicile. They would h!\V~ this case tlll"fl on the implication;" rights and limitations "bieb flow from the concepto( domicile. For the purpose. of q~cal.ion or ent.it1ement to p.ublic education, howe;,-er, I oLSregard such fur. .malieue distinctioru .s irrelevant and inapt, and I adhel"e to the concept of residence in thesen.e of physical pl-e~nce in a ·place of abode. [citations omitted1

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We are here dealing with an aspect of twentielh century life so fund.mental .. to be fittingly considered the eorn~toqe of • vibrant and viable republican Corm or demoaacy, such as we .., proudly espouse, Le., ~ and unre.t.-icted public education.

Aecord, School District No.3 if Mmicl>{Jfl Co. 'II. Dailey, 106.Ariz; 124., .471 P.2d 736, 739 (1970) ("[IJt is dear that 'residence' ... refers to actual physical presence of the children."); School Dis/:nctNo. 16·R v. McCrnmmach, 238 Or. 51, 292P.2d 1019, 1020 (1964) ("Being within the school dis.ttictbburtdal"i.es depends not so much on the technical requirements of domicile or residence fOl" the purposes or snifrage or service of process or taxation but upon the physical presence of the clilld."J; 1kme:J" v. City Board of .Educ~tion of City of Mayfield, 231 S.w. 2d27, 2iJ (Ky. 1950) ("Every child of school age ha3 the privilege of attending the public school in the dislrictin which he lives, [citation omitt€d1. This does not mean legal domicile in the tedll)ical and narrow .ense.... It means the place wh€l-e the child fa a:n iribabitant or where he lives in fact."); Cline: v. Knight, 137 P.2d 680, 68S(Colo. 1943) ("[R!esidence"" erititling an infant to school privileges is. distinguished from domicile ... and it Lscoootrued in a liberalsen5e!ll! meaning to live in, or be ll!1_\I1h@jtaJ!t ~L l!~~h\l9L~!-t:i~,t:._~!!~lllJll)!Il! lJeing not to debar from the concepto( domicile. FOl' the pw-pose.of q~eal.ion or ent.it1ement to public education, howe;,~ I oLSregard such fur. mali.tic distillctioru as irrelevant and·. inapt, and I adhere to the concept o£ residence _in th.e·~~nse of pby:sic.al pl'e~ence in a place of .bode. [citations omitted I ..

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We are heTe dealing with an aspect of ~wentielh century life so fundamental .e -to be fittingly considered the eorner;tone of a vibrant ana viable republican Conn or demoaacy, such as we .•0 proudlyesp@se, Le., ~ and unrest.-ie!ed public education.

Accord, School District No.3-if Mmicl>{J(1. Co. 'II. Dailey, 106.Ariz; . . . "r 1 . h t 'resi.

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that the residence entitling a child to school privilegl!s is to be distinguished from domicile ... and tbe tendency is to give a more liberal interpretation o(the tenn. O ) If the word "reside" in the compulsory school law is not the equivalent 'of "domicile," theil it is illogkal-if not draconian-to contend that. the free School law embodies this morc Testrtctive concept. The free school law is at least as broad, if not brooder, .than the the statute dealing with compulsory education. The former has no expr.ess words of "residency" or "domic.ile" and is applicable
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Of Cow:se. a student must be a bona fide resident of the. school district in order to be eligible for free s.chool privileges. Obviously, a child who .reBides in Delaware, PeDnsylwnia, j)l' Washington, D.C. should not be eligible for free at tendance \vithin Maryland's public schoo! system. FUrther, a child who .b;ls estahlishen a superficial residence in a ·school disLrict for t~. sole purpose .o f attending its schools is ·t\llt a bona fide resident. See, DeLeon 11. Harling8n CO?~· Boliliated lndependeut School District, ,,52· S. W.2d 922, 924 (Tex. 1971); 7'lITnilr u. Board of Education, Nm1.h Chicago CMmbunity High School Distlid, 54 ill 2d 68, 294 N. E.2d 264, 266 (1973); SCMP/ Dim-ic:t No . :I of },!ariwpa Co. v. D(I;iiflY, 106 Ariz. 124,471 P.2d 7ll6, 737 (l970); Annat. 83 ALR2d 49'7, 5iJ5-09, 5i3..26 (1962). Nor does a temporary resident of a ~chool district qualify for free publie education. State v. School Dis/rict No. 12, Niolimm Co., 18 P'2d .at 1013. From tbe ~ases we have cited above, it appears that ·a child ig··a bona fide reBideat if at a minimum that child actually lives wit.hin the schoo! distri¢t wit.h a pal'ent, guardian, or other indivi<W.a l who has legal custody o[ that child. The det,ernrination of whether a child is·a bona fide resident il!a factual one and must be made on an individual tYm;tne'~tA'ro~'o'~-I.VI'th coliipiwl'o-ry' e'lrtic'iitto6> rllemrrltef'?ilI.'s no expr.ess words of "residency" or "domicile" and is applicable oil its face to "all individuals. » MoreoveI; whereas the compulso.ry attendance statute speaks only to t!mse cluldren who are "6 years old or older and onder l6, "·the free school law reaches alhhildren between the agss of li and 2l.

Of Cow:se, a student must \:Ie a bonafide resident of the school district in order to be eligible for free s.chool privileges . Obvionsly, a child who ..resides in Delaware, .PeDnsylwnia,or Washington, D.C. should not be eligible for free attendance \vithin Maryland's public schoo! system. F\irther, a child who .has estahlishen a superficial residence in aachool disLrict for the sole ose of atfendin its

[n awnmary, the BC/aro · finds that the policy of Montgomery County which is predicated on domicile and not bona fide residente, is incopsiste!)t with thehee pu\:llic scl\oollaws of this .state as fuund ih. ~§: 1-201 and 7-101 Ca).' Therefore, having reac~d tbi5 ~o!)clusion on statutory grounds, it becomes unnecessary for us to address the constitutional q,uestions that have heen raised. Ash:uxmdrgv. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 elM6) (Br.mleis, J., concurring).

In addition to. these legal considerations, the Board is af the opinion that even if free school privileges could be premised on a child's domicile, the present policy that ha.s been adopted by MGBE is cont,·ary to wund educational policy AAd is. inconsistent with the efficient .administratioo.of public schools. There are several .tTiluJr ling features. First, the policy makes an 3l'bitrary and .unfai,r·clBS5i· lkation in its express presumption that a. noncitizen of the United States is presumed not domiciled.. Indeed, tonnsel for MCBE bas indicated that molit of t1.te appellants. in the present case, ·a good number of whom are not citizens of the United States, conld reaPlly meet .the reqairements of domicile. Second, the app€
.' We 4re aware that the lenn "d<JmjciJe' appean witbln 'riUe.3, S..b!itle (C'If1!l'.e educatio"al progr"'" available 10 each haiidk.~ped clriId; and § 8i4O'\(b) .tal.. in pertinent pilrt, "Each pliln .baII provide ·(or tfie· edaeatiiln of all handicapped clll· drOD, i""j·"di11g: (I) n.a..twhoare 8everelJ bandicapped, wh""" parents ot.gumI· .k... . . 'U'A JfiurU,..j·\M..in tJv. ~(!fiJ"'ty , __ '!.JAronh?!OU9.:!uJdPril ThpJ\"Mll ~ m ~ nd:.tp. in

In addition to these legal considerations, the Board is af the opinion that even if free school privileges could be premised on a clilld's domicile, the present policy that ha.s been adopted by MGBE is contrary to round educational policy and is inconsistent with the efficient .administration of public schools. There are several .ttiJuJr ling features. First, the policy makes an 3l'bitrary and .unfai,r·classi· lkation ·in its express presumption that a. noncitizen of the United States is presumed not domiciled.. Indeed, connsel for MCBE bas indicated that molit of the appellants in the present- case, a good number of whom are not citizens of the United S.tate&, conld reaPlly meet the reqairements of domicile.

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:::: barred from schools for significant peliods of time during appeals concerning theh- dotniciIe. . ..

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·Tltitd, the policy provides that nondomidled students ~y receive a proportionate creelit against tuition to the extent that their pargents.make payment.of one ot" more"of the major sources of taxation ~ trom which the ·Montgomery County public scho.ols.derive revenue. Consequently, it is co.nceivable that certain nondomio:;jle~students :;;, will be permitted to attend .. chools free or charge while others, .... either because .of personal wealth or international agreementB over whieh they have no control, would be unable to qualify I'or such credit. This p!!rtitula'r feature of tbe policy seems unfair when one considers that .ffiost individuals who are bona fide I'esidents of Montgomery County pay all Maryland and l.[ontgomery taxes··such ::: as income, real property, .sales and motor vehicle and fuel taxes. ::: What is not p~id bynom'esident aliens who are employee!!; of internati~ organizations is mcome tax on salaries paid to them by these -:: organiz:itions, the·imposition of this tax. being pl'eCluded by certain inte>rnationaLagreements. It should be notfrd, however, that most Of. these individuals Pl!y the real property tax, even if indirectly through rent, which is a major source of funding for educational expenditures within this state. ~

APPEALS TO STATE BOARD· Jurisdiction; CONSTlTUTfON'AL LAW -Due ProcEss; SCHOOL DlSTRICTfNG - Consolidation and Closing

LUCILLE SIMPSON, Appellant v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF BA.LTIi'J[ORE COUNTY; MARYLAND, Appel/ee No.7~11

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La.st, the policy presents the probability of lIUljor retaliatory repercussions for United State>s officials abroad who cuttently enjoy free plibJic frdl!catiQn for theirchlldren on the basis ofintemational comlty.

Septemlier 14, 1979

OPINION We adopt the Findings ofFa<;t of the Hearing Examiner as weU as the> ConcltlSion of Law tIlat App~nts have ",aived their right to any claim of relief by this Board and according\ydisTniss Appellants' appea(in· full with prejudice.

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FUr·thermore, we wish express our total coneWTllIfCe with the opinion issued on July 22, 1979 by the Honorable Frank A. Kauf.. man, Judge of the UDited States DiStrict. Court in Welch v. Board I¥ Edutativn of BaltimureCo., et' a.L , Ch-il Action No. K-79-1W2 ""hiell spoke to the merits {If the> issues Appellants bad raised in this appeal. WlI.liam G. Sykaki, Ma,y B. Bolt, Vema ~L fletcher

In concllisinn, we reiterate that it is the educational policy in ~ Maryland, consistent with the constitutional and statutory provi·

'"' siona for frlle pnbliceducation, that all children within the borders of 0-g, this State who are bonafide residents, are entitled to free public ~ school privileges. Only such a policy will assure in this age of great mobility tbat.all· children, regardless of the inCj)me of their families, 1:o will be provided an uninterrupted opportunity fpr public education. U>nsequelltly, i~ is· conceivable t hat certatn nond orriiqJ.e(l students :;;, will be permitted to · attend schools free> or charge while others, 0-- eitoor because.of personal wealth or international ·agreern-ents over whieh they have no control, would be ,mable to qualify I'or such credit. This )Y!!rticula'r feature of tbe policy seems unfair when one considers that .ffiost individuals who are bona fide l'esidents of Montgomery County pay all Maryhmd and Montgomery taxes such ::: ·as income, ri*U property, .sales and motor vehicle and fuel taxes . ::: What is not p~id bynom'esident aliens who are employee!!; of interna~ tiQ!lal organizations is incOlRe tax on salaries paid to them by these -:: organiz:itions, the imposition of this tax. beingpl'eCluded by certain internationaL3greements. It should be notfrd, however, that most Of. ... . . . " . ..

" FINDfNGS OF FACT ANOCONG.LUSIONB OF 'rHE HEARING EXAMINER

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The· ·issue in this caSe is whether the action of the Baltimore County Board ot'Educatian in closing several Ecbools all of June 30, 1979, was arbitrary, capricious, in viollllion of t~~ _?~~-" p"~~ ~

. No . .7~li

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Septemlier 14, 1979

OPINION We adopt the Findings afFact of the Hearing Examiner as weUas the Conclusion of Law tIlat Appellants have 'waived their right to any claim of relief by this Board and according\ydisTniss Appellants' appeal in full with prejudice.

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FUrthermore, we wish express our total eanew-rence \vith the opinion issued on July 22, 1979 ~y the H.?nor~le.!~;U< ~. Ka,uf..