Annulment Of Judgment Of Court Of Appeals.docx

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 70443 September 15, 1986 BRAULIO CONDE, RUFINA CONDE, GERARDO CONDE, CONCHITA C. LUNDANG, and ALFREDO VENTURA, petitioners, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON. CESAR C. PERALEJO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch LXVI, Third Judicial Region, Capas, Tarlac, and MARCELO GUTIERREZ, respondents. Tomas P. Matic, Jr. for petitioners. Adelaido G. Rivera for private respondent.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

On January 16, 1984, the petitioners filed an action to annul the judgment of the Court of Appeals dated September 23, 1981, which reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court and ordered the petitioners and/or their successors-in-interest to deliver immediately the ownership and possession of the property in question to the then plaintiff-appellant Marcelo Gutierrez. In their complaint filed before the Regional Trial Court of Capas, Tarlac, the petitioners alleged that through fraud, Gutierrez was able to make it appear that he was the son of Esteban Gutierrez and Fermina Ramos and as a necessary consequence of such filiation, was the absolute owner by succession of the property in question. On February 27, 1984, the trial court dismissed the petitioners' complaint on the ground that it had no jurisdiction to annul the judgment of the Court of Appeals. Upon the denial of their motion for reconsideration, the petitioners filed a petition for certiorari, mandamus and a writ of injunction before the appellate court. The said court in turn, dismissed the petition and a subsequent motion for reconsideration on the grounds that a Regional Trial Court is without jurisdiction to annul the judgment of the Court of Appeals and that only the Supreme Court is empowered to review the judgment of said appellate court. Hence, the petitioners elevated the case before this Court. On August 31, 1984, we issued a resolution dated August 22, 1984, remanding the case to the appellate court for decision on the merits. The resolution reads as follows: The respondent intermediate Appellate Court erred when it declared that the complaint for annulment of judgment in this case should be filed with the Supreme Court. This Court has no

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original jurisdiction to look into allegations of fraud upon which the complaint for annulment is based. In January, 1984, the petitioners filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac seeking among other things the annulment of a decision which had already passed, on appeal, the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 60139-R. On February 17, 1984, the lower court dismissed the petitioners' complaint for annulment of judgment. The petitioners appealed the dismissal to the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court which denied due course to the petition stating that what is sought to be annulled is a decision of the Court of Appeals over which the regional trial court is obviously without jurisdiction. The decision sought to be annulled calls for the turning over of possession to the original respondent of the disputed properties. While the judgment being enforced may have been that of the Court of Appeals, it was actually an appellate judgment rendered on a review of the trial court's decision. Considering that Section 9 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980-B.P. No. 129 gives the Intermediate Appellate Court exclusive jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of regional trial courts, the COURT RESOLVED to REMAND this case to the Intermediate Appellate Court for it to hear and decide the action. On January 29, 1985, the appellate court rendered a decision dismissing the petition for lack of jurisdiction and for lack of merit. In its decision on the issue of jurisdiction, the respondent court ruled that since the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court can be annulled by the Regional Trial Court and a decision of the latter is annullable by the Court of Appeals, then logically the decision of the appellate court should be annullable only by the Supreme Court. Moreover, the appellate court ruled that it is but logical to conclude that it cannot annul its own decision unless there is an express grant under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. Finding none, it stated that it must perforce dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. On the merits of the petition, the appellate court ruled that the fraud relied upon by the petitioners is only intrinsic and thus, even on the assumption that it has jurisdiction to decide the case, still the same has no merit. It dismissed the petition. The petitioners elevated this decision to us. On June 5, 1985, we resolved to require the respondents to comment on the petition. Notwithstanding proof that a copy of the petition was served on the respondents' counsel on June 24, 1985, no comment has been filed. We decide the petition. We need not emphasize the rule that this Court decides appeals which only involve questions of law and that "it is not the function of the Supreme Court to analyze or weigh such evidence all over again, its jurisdiction being limited to receiving errors of law that might have been committed by

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the lower court." (Baniqued v. Court of Appeals, 127 SCRA 596, 601; citing Tiongco v. de la Merced, 58 SCRA 89). It was, thus, totally pointless for the Intermediate Appellate Court to delve into the question of whether or not it has jurisdiction to pass upon the merits of the petition which then alleged the perpetration of fraud by one of the parties in the original case, and which thereby called for a review of the factual findings of the court. Furthermore, the fact that this Court already remanded the case to the appellate court for decision on the merits should have prompted the latter to limit its decision only to the merits of the case. There are instances when this Court desires a further review of facts or a detailed analysis and systematic presentation of issues which the appellate court is in a more favored position to accomplish. Standing between the trial courts and the Supreme Court, the appellate court was precisely created to take over much of the work that used to be previously done by this Court. It has been of great help to the Supreme Court in synthesizing facts, issues, and rulings in an orderly and intelligible manner and in Identifying errors which ordinarily might have escaped detection. Statistics will show that the great majority of petitions to review the decisions of the appellate court have been denied due course for lack of merit in minute resolutions. The appellate court has, therefore, freed this Court to better discharge its constitutional duties and perform its most important work which, in the words of Dean Vicente G. Sinco, "is less concerned with the decision of cases that begin and end with the transient rights and obligations of particular individuals but is more intertwined with the direction of national policies, momentous economic and social problems, the delimitation of governmental authority and its impact upon fundamental rights." (Philippine Political Law, 10th Edition, p. 323). It is, therefore, difficult to understand why a Division of the Intermediate Appellate Court should hesitate to help the Supreme Court and to act on an action which it was specifically ordered to hear and decide. If its initial hesitation was due to doubts about the correctness of our action, then it should recall the admonition in Tugade v. Court of Appeals (85 SCRA 226, 230-231) that: xxx xxx xxx Respondent Court of Appeals really was devoid of any choice at all It could not have ruled in any other way on the legal question raised. This Tribunal having spoken, its duty was to obey. It is as simple as that. There is relevance to this excerpt from Barrera v. Barrera (34 SCRA 98): 'The delicate task of ascertaining the significance that attaches to a constitutional or statutory provision, an executive order, a procedural norm or a municipal ordinance is committed to the judiciary. It thus discharges a role no less crucial than that appertaining to the other two departments in the maintenance of the rule of law. To assure stability in legal relations and avoid confusion, it has to

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speak with one voice. It does so with finality, logically and rightly, through the highest judicial organ, this Court. What it says then should be definitive and authoritative, binding on those occupying the lower ranks in the judicial hierarchy. They have to defer and to submit.' (Ibid. 107. The opinion of Justice Laurel in People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1937] was cited.) The ensuing paragraphs of the opinion in Barrera further emphasizes the point: 'Such a thought was reiterated in an opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes and further emphasized in these words: 'Judge Gaudencio Cloribel need not be reminded that the Supreme Court, by tradition and in our system of judicial administration, has the last word on what the law is it is the final arbiter of any justifiable controversy. There is only one Supreme Court from whose decisions an other courts should take their bearings. (Justice J.B.L. Reyes spoke thus in Albert v. Court of First Instance of Manila [Br. VI], 23 SCRA 948, 961). The fault of the Intermediate Appellate Court is mitigated by the fact that it still decided the remanded case on the merits. It stated: On February of 1950 an original complaint for recovery of possession of a parcel of land was filed before the Court of First Instance of Tarlac, which was subsequently amended on March 19, 1951. On May 20, 1976, after a full blown trial the Regional Trial Court Branch 64 (formerly Court of First Instance) of Tarlac, rendered a decision dismissing the complaint and ordering plaintiff Marcelo Gutierrez to pay the defendants the costs of the suit. The dispositive portion of which reads as follows: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the complaint and ordering plaintiff Marcelo Gutierrez to pay the defendants the costs of this suit. He (sic) pronouncement as to damages for want of proof. From the above judgment an appeal was filed with the Court of Appeals. On September 23, 1981, the then Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 64, this time ordering the ten appellees (now petitioners) to deliver the ownership and possession of the litigated property to then appellant (now respondent Marcelo Gutierrez), which decision became final and executory on December 20, 1982, the dispositive portion of which reads, as follows: WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the decision appealed from, not being in accordance with the applicable law

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and evidence and finding validity in the errors assigned, is hereby reversed and set aside. In lieu thereof, another one is entered ordering defendants-appellees and/or their successorsin-interest to deliver immediately the ownership and possession of the property described under par. 3 of the complaint to herein plaintiff- appellant Marcelo Gutierrez. With costs. On January 16, 1984, an action to annul the judgment of the former Court of Appeals was filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 56, Third Judicial Region in Capas, Tarlac. On February 27, 1984, the respondent Court (Regional Trial Court), dismissed the case for annulment of judgment on the ground that it has no jurisdiction to annul the judgment of the Court of Appeals. On March 19, 1984, the motion for reconsideration filed by herein petitioner was denied by the respondent court. Accordingly, a petition for certiorari, mandamus and a writ of injunction was filed before the Intermediate Appellate Court and raffled to the Third Special Cases Division, The court dismissed the petition for lack of merit on the ground that a Regional Trial Court is without jurisdiction to annul a judgment of the Intermediate Appellate Court, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, this case should be, as it is hereby DISMISSED OUTRIGHT. With costs against the petitioners. On June 14, 1984, the motion for reconsideration filed by herein petitioner was denied by this Court. xxx xxx xxx Finally, a judgment based on alleged false testimony is not an extrinsic fraud by which an action for annulment of judgment could be grounded. The Supreme Court in Ilacad v. Court of Appeals (supra, p. 302), declared that: xxx xxx xxx ... and speaking of extrinsic fraud, it is that fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant which prevents a party from having his day in court from presenting his case. Fraud has been regarded as extrinsic or collateral, within the meaning of the rule 'where it is one of the effect of which prevents a party from having a trial, or real contests, or from presenting all of his case to the court, or where it operates upon matters pertaining not to the judgment itself, but to the manner by which it was procured so that there is not a fair submission of the controversy. In other words, extrinsic

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fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the prevailing party in the litigation which is committed outside of the trial of the case, where the defeated party has been prevented from presenting fully his side of the case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent. The resort to fraud in introducing fabricated evidence is definitely an intrinsic fraud, hence false testimony being a matter of evidence is definitely intrinsic and not extrinsic. Fraud consisting in acting fictitious cause of false testimony is intrinsic (sic) (Francisco v. David, 38 CG 714). Intrinsic fraud takes the form of acts of a party in a litigation during the trial such as the use of forged instruments or perjured testimony, which did not affect the presentation of the case, but did prevent a fair and just determination of the case (Libudan v. Palma, [S1, 45 SCRA 17]). Intrinsic fraud is not sufficient to attack a judgment (Yatco v. Sumagui, 44623-R, July 31, 1971). Petitioners stand that extrinsic fraud was employed by the respondents, is bereft of any factual basis, hence, even on the assumption that this court has jurisdiction to decide this issue, still the petitioners cause of action must fail. A careful review of the present petition and of the records of the appellate court on this case shows that even on the assumption that all the facts alleged in the petition are true, the petition should be dismissed for lack of merit because the fraud allegedly perpetrated by the private respondent in AC-G.R. SP No. 03301 is only intrinsic in nature and not extrinsic. Fraud is regarded as extrinsic or collateral where it has prevented a party from having a trial or from presenting an of his case to the court. (Asian Surety and Insurance Co. v. Island Steel, Inc., 118 SCRA 233, 239; citing Amuran v. Aquino, 38 Phil. 29). In the case at bar, the fraud was in the nature of documents allegedly manufactured by Marcelo Gutierrez to make it appear that he was the rightful heir of the disputed property, Hence, the Intermediate Appellate Court is correct in finding the fraud to be intrinsic in nature. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The respondents' counsel, Atty. Adelaido G. Rivera is fined Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00) for his failure to act on the order to file comment. SO ORDERED. Feria (Chairman), Fernan, Alampay and Paras, JJ., concur, The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

January 2014 Philippine Supreme Court Rulings on Remedial Law Here are select January 2014 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on remedial law: Civil Procedure Action to annul judgment or final order; jurisdiction. In 1981, the Legislature enacted Batas Pambansa Blg.129 (Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980). Among several innovations of this legislative enactment was the formal establishment of the annulment of a judgment or final order as an action independent from the generic classification of litigations in which the subject matter was not capable of pecuniary estimation, and expressly vested the exclusive original jurisdiction over such action in the CA. The action in which the subject of the litigation was incapable of pecuniary estimation continued to be under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC, which replaced the CFI as the court of general jurisdiction. Since then, the RTC no longer had jurisdiction over an action to annul the judgment of the RTC, eliminating all concerns about judicial stability. To implement this change, the Court introduced a new procedure to govern the action to annul the judgment of the RTC in the 1997 revision of the Rules of Court under Rule 47, directing in Section 2 thereof that “[t]he annulment may be based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.” Pinausukan Seafood House-Roxas Blvd., Inc. v. Far East Bank and Trust Cp., now Bank of the Philippine Islands, et al., G.R. No. 159926, January 20, 2014. Action to annul judgment or final order; lack of jurisdiction; types. Lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court in rendering the judgment or final order is either lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action, or lack of jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner. The former is a matter of substantive law because statutory law defines the jurisdiction of the courts over the subject matter or nature of the action. The latter is a matter of procedural law, for it involves the service of summons or other process on the petitioner. A judgment or final order issued by the trial court without jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action is always void, and, in the words of Justice Street in Banco Español-Filipino v. Palanca (37 Phil 949 [1918]), “in this sense it may be said to be a lawless thing, which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its head.” But the defect of lack of jurisdiction over the person, being a matter of procedural law, may be waived by the party concerned either expressly or impliedly. Pinausukan Seafood House-Roxas Blvd., Inc. v. Far East Bank and Trust Cp., now Bank of the Philippine Islands, et al., G.R. No. 159926, January 20, 2014. Action to annul judgment or final order; nature. The Court has expounded on the nature of the remedy of annulment of judgment or final order in Dare Adventure Farm Corporation v. Court of Appeals (681 SCRA 580, 586-587 [2012]), viz: “A petition for annulment of judgment is a remedy in equity so exceptional in nature that it may be availed of only when other remedies are wanting, and only if

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the judgment, final order or final resolution sought to be annulled was rendered by a court lacking jurisdiction or through extrinsic fraud. Yet, the remedy, being exceptional in character, is not allowed to be so easily and readily abused by parties aggrieved by the final judgments, orders or resolutions. The Court has thus instituted safeguards by limiting the grounds for the annulment to lack of jurisdiction and extrinsic fraud, and by prescribing in Section 1 of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court that the petitioner should show that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner. A petition for annulment that ignores or disregards any of the safeguards cannot prosper. x x x” The objective of the remedy of annulment of judgment or final order is to undo or set aside the judgment or final order, and thereby grant to the petitioner an opportunity to prosecute his cause or to ventilate his defense. If the ground relied upon is lack of jurisdiction, the entire proceedings are set aside without prejudice to the original action being refiled in the proper court. If the judgment or final order or resolution is set aside on the ground of extrinsic fraud, the CA may on motion order the trial court to try the case as if a timely motion for new trial had been granted therein. The remedy is by no means an appeal whereby the correctness of the assailed judgment or final order is in issue; hence, the CA is not called upon to address each error allegedly committed by the trial court. Pinausukan Seafood House-Roxas Blvd., Inc. v. Far East Bank and Trust Cp., now Bank of the Philippine Islands, et al., G.R. No. 159926, January 20, 2014. Action to annul judgment or final order; prescriptive period. The third requirement sets the time for the filing of the action. The action, if based on extrinsic fraud, must be filed within four years from the discovery of the extrinsic fraud; and if based on lack of jurisdiction, must be brought before it is barred by laches or estoppel. Pinausukan Seafood House-Roxas Blvd., Inc. v. Far East Bank and Trust Cp., now Bank of the Philippine Islands, et al., G.R. No. 159926, January 20, 2014. Action to annul judgment or final order; requisites. The first requirement prescribes that the remedy is available only when the petitioner can no longer resort to the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies through no fault of the petitioner. This means that the remedy, although seen as “a last remedy,” is not an alternative to the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal and petition for relief. The petition must aver, therefore, that the petitioner failed to move for a new trial, or to appeal, or to file a petition for relief without fault on his part. But this requirement to aver is not imposed when the ground for the petition is lack of jurisdiction (whether alleged singly or in combination with extrinsic fraud), simply because the judgment or final order, being void, may be assailed at any time either collaterally or by direct action or by resisting such judgment or final order in any action or proceeding whenever it is invoked, unless the ground of lack of jurisdiction is meanwhile barred by laches. The second requirement limits the ground for the action of annulment of judgment to either extrinsic fraud or lack of jurisdiction.

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Not every kind of fraud justifies the action of annulment of judgment. Only extrinsic fraud does. Fraud is extrinsic, according to Cosmic Lumber Corporation v. Court of Appeals (265 SCRA 168, 180 [1996]), “where the unsuccessful party has been prevented from exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent, as by keeping him away from court, a false promise of a compromise; or where the defendant never had knowledge of the suit, being kept in ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff; or where an attorney fraudulently or without authority connives at his defeat; these and similar cases which show that there has never been a real contest in the trial or hearing of the case are reasons for which a new suit may be sustained to set aside and annul the former judgment and open the case for a new and fair hearing.” The third requirement sets the time for the filing of the action. The action, if based on extrinsic fraud, must be filed within four years from the discovery of the extrinsic fraud; and if based on lack of jurisdiction, must be brought before it is barred by laches or estoppel. The fourth requirement demands that the petition should be verified, and should allege with particularity the facts and the law relied upon for annulment, as well as those supporting the petitioner’s good and substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may be. The need for particularity cannot be dispensed with because averring the circumstances constituting either fraud or mistake with particularity is a universal requirement in the rules of pleading. The petition is to be filed in seven clearly legible copies, together with sufficient copies corresponding to the number of respondents, and shall contain essential submissions, specifically: (a) the certified true copy of the judgment or final order or resolution, to be attached to the original copy of the petition intended for the court and indicated as such by the petitioner; (b) the affidavits of witnesses or documents supporting the cause of action or defense; and (c) the sworn certification that the petitioner has not theretofore commenced any other action involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the CA or the different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency; if there is such other action or proceeding, he must state the status of the same, and if he should thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the CA, or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency, he undertakes to promptly inform the said courts and other tribunal or agency thereof within five days therefrom. Pinausukan Seafood House-Roxas Blvd., Inc. v. Far East Bank and Trust Cp., now Bank of the Philippine Islands, et al., G.R. No. 159926, January 20, 2014. Appeal; trial court’s factual findings as affirmed by CA are binding on appeal. To start with, considering that the Court of Appeals (CA) thereby affirmed the factual findings of the RTC, the Court is bound to uphold such findings, for it is axiomatic that the trial court’s factual findings as affirmed by the CA are binding on appeal due to the Court not being a trier of facts. Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) v. Guariña Agricultural and Realty Development Corporation,G.R. No. 160758. January 15, 2014.

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Appeal by certiorari under Rule 45; covers questions of law only; exceptions. The Court has consistently held that as a general rule, a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court covers questions of law only. The rule, however, admits of exceptions, subject to the following exceptions, to wit: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on misappreciation of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings, the same are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; and (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record. Rodolfo Laborte, et al. v. Pagsanjan Tourism Consumers’ Cooperative, et al.,G.R. No. 183860, January 15, 2014 Appeal by certiorari under Rule 45; effect of failure to file motion for reconsideration within 15-day reglementary period. The Court emphasized that the 15-day period for filing a motion for new trial or reconsideration is non-extendible. Hence, the filing of a motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration did not toll the 15-day period before a judgment becomes final and executory. Rivelisa Realty, Inc., represented by Ricardo P. Venturina v. First Sta. Clara Builders Corporation, represented by Ramon A. Pangilinan, as President,G.R. No. 189618. January 15, 2014. Appeal by certiorari under Rule 45; factual questions may not be raised. Well entrenched in this jurisdiction is the rule that factual questions may not be raised before this Court in a petition for review on certiorari as this Court is not a trier of facts. Thus, it is settled that in petitions for review on certiorari, only questions of law may be put in issue. Questions of fact cannot be entertained. A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts, or when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted. A question of fact exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of the witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances as well as their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability of the situation.Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. BPI/MS Insurance Corp., and Mitsui Sumitomo Insurance Co., Ltd.,G.R. No. 193986, January 15, 2014. Appeal by certiorari under Rule 45; factual findings of trial court, when affirmed by CA, are binding on Supreme Court. Considering that the factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the CA, are binding on the Court, the Court affirms the judgment of the CA upholding Eduardo’s exercise of the right of repurchase.

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Roberto could no longer assail the factual findings because his petition for review on certiorari was limited to the review and determination of questions of law only. A question of law exists when the doubt centers on what the law is on a certain set of undisputed facts, while a question of fact exists when the doubt centers on the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. Whether the conditions for the right to repurchase were complied with, or whether there was a tender of payment is a question of fact.Roberto R. David, represented by his Attorney-in-Fact Atty. Proceso M. Nacino v. Eduardo C. David, acting through his Attorney-in-Fact Edwin C. David,G.R. No. 162365. January 15, 2014. Appeal by certiorari under Rule 45; scope of review limited. Anent the correct amount of surety bond, it is well to emphasize that our task in an appeal by petition for review on certiorari is limited, as a jurisdictional matter, to reviewing errors of law that might have been committed by the CA. The allegations of incorrect computation of the surety bond involve factual matters within the competence of the trial court. LZK Holdings and Development Corporation v. Planters Development Bank,G.R. No. 187973, January 20, 2014. Appeal by certiorari under Rule 45; scope of review. At the outset, it must be pointed out that the petitioners’ assignment of errors calls for the Court to again evaluate the evidence to determine whether there was a partition of the property and whether the 1/3 portion of the southern half was sold to the respondent spouses. These clearly entail questions of fact which are beyond the Court’s ambit of review under Rule. Theresita, Juan, Asuncion, Patrocinia, Ricardo, and Gloria, all surnamed Dimaguila v. Jose and Sonia A. Monteiro,G.R. No. 201011, January 27, 2014. Ejectment; immediate execution of judgment; requisites for stay. The ruling in Chua v. Court of Appeals (286 SCRA 437, 444-445 [1998]) is instructive on the means of staying the immediate execution of a judgment in an ejectment case, to wit: As a general rule, a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in an ejectment suit is immediately executory, in order to prevent further damage to him arising from the loss of possession of the property in question. To stay the immediate execution of the said judgment while the appeal is pending the foregoing provision requires that the following requisites must concur: (1) the defendant perfects his appeal; (2) he files a supersedeas bond; and (3) he periodically deposits the rentals which become due during the pendency of the appeal. The failure of the defendant to comply with any of these conditions is a ground for the outright execution of the judgment, the duty of the court in this respect being “ministerial and imperative.” Hence, if the defendant-appellant perfected the appeal but failed to file a supersedeas bond, the immediate execution of the judgment would automatically follow. Conversely, the filing of a supersedeas bond will not stay the execution of the judgment if the appeal is not perfected. Necessarily then, the supersedeas bond should be filed within the period for the perfection of the appeal. In short, a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in an ejectment suit is immediately executory, but the defendant, to stay its immediate execution, must: (1) perfect an

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appeal; (2) file a supersedeas bond; and (3) periodically deposit the rentals becoming due during the pendency of the appeal. Herminia Acbang v. Hon. Jimmy Luczon, Jr., et al.,G.R. No. 164246, January 15, 2014. Execution; Terceria; when proper. The right of a third-party claimant to file a terceria is founded on his title or right of possession. Corollary thereto, before the court can exercise its supervisory power to direct the release of the property mistakenly levied and the restoration thereof to its rightful owner, the claimant must first unmistakably establish his ownership or right of possession thereon. In Spouses Sy v. Hon. Discaya (260 Phil. 401 [1990]) we declared that for a thirdparty claim or a terceria to prosper, the claimant must first sufficiently establish his right on the property: “[A] third person whose property was seized by a sheriff to answer for the obligation of the judgment debtor may invoke the supervisory power of he court which authorized such execution. Upon due application by the third person and after summary hearing, the court may command that the property be released from the mistaken levy and restored to the rightful owner or possessor. What said court can do in these instances, however, is limited to a determination of whether the sheriff has acted rightly or wrongly in the performance of his duties in the execution of judgment, more specifically, if he has indeed taken hold of property not belonging to the judgment debtor. The court does not and cannot pass upon the question of title to the property, with any character of finality. It can treat of the matter only insofar as may be necessary to decide if the sheriff has acted correctly or not. It can require the sheriff to restore the property to the claimant’s possession if warranted by the evidence. However, if the claimant’s proofs do not persuade the court of the validity of his title or right of possession thereto, the claim will be denied.” Magdalena T. Villasi v. Filomena Garcia, substituted by his heirs, namely, Ermelinda H. Garcia, et al.,G.R. No. 190106, January 15, 2014. Execution of judgments; Immediate execution in Small Claims cases. Section 23 of the Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases states that the decision shall immediately be entered by the Clerk of Court in the court docket for civil cases and a copy thereof forthwith served on the parties. A.L. Ang Network, Inc. v. Emma Mondejar, accompanied by her husband, Efren Mondejar,G.R. No. 200804. January 22, 2014. Execution of judgments; rationale. It is almost trite to say that execution is the fruit and end of the suit. Hailing it as the “life of the law,” ratio legis est anima, this Court has zealously guarded against any attempt to thwart the rigid rule and deny the prevailing litigant his right to savour the fruit of his victory. A judgment, if left unexecuted, would be nothing but an empty triumph for the prevailing party. Magdalena T. Villasi v. Filomena Garcia, substituted by his heirs, namely, Ermelinda H. Garcia, et al.,G.R. No. 190106, January 15, 2014. Grave abuse of discretion; concept. To be sure, grave abuse of discretion arises when a lower court or tribunal patently violates the Constitution, the law or

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existing jurisprudence. Here, while the RTC had initially issued a writ of possession in favor of Sps. Marquez, it defied existing jurisprudence when it effectively rescinded the said writ by subsequently granting Sps. Alindog’s prayer for injunctive relief. Spouses Nicasio C. Marquez and Anita J. Marquez v. Spouses Carlito Alindog and Carmen Alindog,G.R. No. 184045. January 22, 2014. Grave abuse of discretion; concept. It is settled doctrine that there is grave abuse of discretion when there is a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, such as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross so as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. Ralph P. Tua v. Hon. Cesar A. Mangrobang, Presiding Judge, Branch 22, RTC, Imus, Cavite; and Rossan Honrado-Tua,G.R. No. 170701. January 22, 2014. Judicial power; issuance of protection orders. Section 2 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides that “the Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 hereof.” Hence, the primary judge of the necessity, adequacy, wisdom, reasonableness and expediency of any law is primarily the function of the legislature. The act of Congress entrusting us with the issuance of protection orders is in pursuance of our authority to settle justiciable controversies or disputes involving rights that are enforceable and demandable before the courts of justice or the redress of wrongs for violations of such rights. Ralph P. Tua v. Hon. Cesar A. Mangrobang, Presiding Judge, Branch 22, RTC, Imus, Cavite; and Rossan Honrado-Tua, G.R. No. 170701. January 22, 2014. Judgments; enforceability of money judgments. It is a basic principle of law that money judgments are enforceable only against the property incontrovertibly belonging to the judgment debtor, and if the property belonging to any third person is mistakenly levied upon to answer for another man’s indebtedness, such person has all the right to challenge the levy through any of the remedies provided for under the Rules of Court. Magdalena T. Villasi v. Filomena Garcia, substituted by his heirs, namely, Ermelinda H. Garcia, et al.,G.R. No. 190106, January 15, 2014. Judgments; Law of the case; concept. Law of the case has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal, and means, more specifically, that whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule of decision between the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court. The doctrine of law of the case simply means, therefore, that when an appellate court has once declared the law in a case, its declaration continues to be the law of that case even on a subsequent appeal, notwithstanding that the rule thus laid down may have been reversed in other cases. For practical considerations, indeed, once the appellate court has issued a pronouncement on a point that was presented to it

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with full opportunity to be heard having been accorded to the parties, the pronouncement should be regarded as the law of the case and should not be reopened on remand of the case to determine other issues of the case, like damages. But the law of the case, as the name implies, concerns only legal questions or issues thereby adjudicated in the former appeal. Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) v. Guariña Agricultural and Realty Development Corporation,G.R. No. 160758. January 15, 2014. Judgments; remedies of third person claiming property taken by sheriff. Section 16, Rule 39 specifically provides that a third person may avail himself of the remedies of either terceria, to determine whether the sheriff has rightly or wrongly taken hold of the property not belonging to the judgment debtor or obligor, or an independent “separate action” to vindicate his claim of ownership and/or possession over the foreclosed property. However, the person other than the judgment debtor who claims ownership or right over levied properties is not precluded from taking other legal remedies to prosecute his claim. Magdalena T. Villasi v. Filomena Garcia, substituted by his heirs, namely, Ermelinda H. Garcia, et al.,G.R. No. 190106, January 15, 2014. Jurisdiction; concurrence of jurisdiction and hierarchy of courts. To be sure, the Court, the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari. Such concurrence of jurisdiction, however, does not give a party unbridled freedom to choose the venue of his action lest he run afoul of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Instead, a becoming regard for judicial hierarchy dictates that petitions for the issuance of writs of certiorari against first level courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals, before resort may be had before the Supreme Court. A.L. Ang Network, Inc. v. Emma Mondejar, accompanied by her husband, Efren Mondejar,G.R. No. 200804. January 22, 2014. Jurisdiction; Justiciable question; definition. The Court clarified, too, that the issue of whether a Deputy Ombudsman may be subjected to the administrative disciplinary jurisdiction of the President (concurrently with that of the Ombudsman) is a justiciable – not a political – question. A justiciable question is one which is inherently susceptible of being decided on grounds recognized by law, as where the court finds that there are constitutionally-imposed limits on the exercise of the powers conferred on a political branch of the government. Emilio A. Gonzales III v. Office of the President, etc., et al./Wendell Bareras-Sulit v. Atty. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al.,G.R. No. 196231/G.R. No. 196232, January 28, 2014. Jurisdiction; Small Claims cases. Hence, considering that small claims cases are exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, certiorari petitions assailing its dispositions should be filed before their corresponding Regional Trial Courts. This petitioner complied with when it instituted its petition for certiorari before the RTC which, as previously mentioned, has jurisdiction over the same. A.L. Ang Network, Inc. v. Emma Mondejar, accompanied by her husband, Efren Mondejar,G.R. No. 200804. January 22, 2014.

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Motions; motion to extend time to file motion for reconsideration prohibited in all courts except in the Supreme Court. While a motion for additional time is expressly permitted in the filing of a petition for review before the Court under Section 2, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, a similar motion seeking to extend the period for filing a motion for reconsideration is prohibited in all other courts. This rule was first laid down in the case of Habaluyas Enterprises v. Japzon (226 Phil. 144 [1986]) wherein it was held that: Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution, the rule shall be strictly enforced that no motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration may be filed with the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial Courts, and the Intermediate Appellate Court. Such a motion may be filed only in cases pending with the Supreme Court as the court of last resort, which may in its sound discretion either grant or deny the extension requested. Rivelisa Realty, Inc., represented by Ricardo P. Venturina v. First Sta. Clara Builders Corporation, represented by Ramon A. Pangilinan, as President,G.R. No. 189618. January 15, 2014. Motion for reconsideration; effect of non-filing. At the outset, the Court noted that Gonzales and Sulit did not file a motion for reconsideration of the Supreme Court’s September 4, 2012 Decision; only the Office of the President, through the OSG, moved for the reconsideration of our ruling reinstating Gonzales. This omission, however, poses no obstacle for the Court’s review of its ruling on the whole case since a serious constitutional question has been raised and is one of the underlying bases for the validity or invalidity of the presidential action. If the President does not have any constitutional authority to discipline a Deputy Ombudsman and/or a Special Prosecutor in the first place, then any ruling on the legal correctness of the OP’s decision on the merits will be an empty one. In other words, since the validity of the OP’s decision on the merits of the dismissal is inextricably anchored on the final and correct ruling on the constitutional issue, the whole case – including the constitutional issue – remains alive for the Court’s consideration on motion for reconsideration. Emilio A. Gonzales III v. Office of the President, etc., et al./Wendell Bareras-Sulit v. Atty. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al.,G.R. No. 196231/G.R. No. 196232, January 28, 2014. Pleadings; Defense and objections not pleaded either in motion to dismiss or in answer are deemed waived; exceptions. Significantly, the Rule requires that such a motion should be filed “within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim.” The time frame indicates that thereafter, the motion to dismiss based on the absence of the condition precedent is barred. It is so inferable from the opening sentence of Section 1 of Rule 9 stating that defense and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. There are, as just noted, only four exceptions to this Rule, namely, lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; litis pendentia; res judicata; and prescription of action. Failure to allege in the complaint that earnest efforts at a

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compromise has been made but had failed is not one of the exceptions.Heirs of Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr., represented by their co-heirs and attorneys-in-fact, Mercedes A. Favis and Nelly Favis-Villafuente v. Juana Gonzales, her son Mariano Favis, all minors represented herein by their parents, Sps. Mariano Favis and Larcelita D. Favis,G.R. No. 185922, January 15, 2014. Pleadings; Failure to allege compromise efforts in complaint not jurisdictional defect. Why the objection of failure to allege a failed attempt at a compromise in a suit among members of the same family is waivable was earlier explained in the case of Versoza v. Versoza (135 Phil. 84, 94 [1968]), a case for future support which was dismissed by the trial court upon the ground that there was no such allegation of infringement of Article 222 of the Civil Code, the origin of Article 151 of the Family Code. While the Court ruled that a complaint for future support cannot be the subject of a compromise and as such the absence of the required allegation in the complaint cannot be a ground for objection against the suit, the decision went on to state thus: The alleged defect is that the present complaint does not state a cause of action. The proposed amendment seeks to complete it. An amendment to the effect that the requirements of Article 222 have been complied with does not confer jurisdiction upon the lower court. With or without this amendment, the subjectmatter of the action remains as one for support, custody of children, and damages, cognizable by the court below. To illustrate, Tamayo v. San Miguel Brewery, Inc., allowed an amendment which “merely corrected a defect in the allegation of plaintiff-appellant’s cause of action, because as it then stood, the original complaint stated no cause of action.” We there ruled out as inapplicable the holding in Campos Rueda Corporation v. Bautista, that an amendment cannot be made so as to confer jurisdiction on the court x x x Therefore, the rule on deemed waiver of the non-jurisdictional defense or objection is wholly applicable to respondent. If the respondents as parties-defendants could not, and did not, after filing their answer to petitioner’s complaint, invoke the objection of absence of the required allegation on earnest efforts at a compromise, the appellate court unquestionably did not have any authority or basis to muto proprio order the dismissal of petitioner’s complaint. Heirs of Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr., represented by their co-heirs and attorneys-in-fact, Mercedes A. Favis and Nelly Favis-Villafuente v. Juana Gonzales, her son Mariano Favis, all minors represented herein by their parents, Sps. Mariano Favis and Larcelita D. Favis,G.R. No. 185922, January 15, 2014. Pleadings; motu proprio dismissal. Section 1, Rule 9 provides for only four instances when the court may motu proprio dismiss the claim, namely: (a) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b) litis pendentia; (c) res judicata; and (d) prescription of action. Specifically in Gumabon v. Larin (422 Phil. 222, 230 [2001]), cited in Katon v. Palanca, Jr. (481 Phil. 168, 180 [2004]), the Court held:

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“x x x [T]he muto proprio dismissal of a case was traditionally limited to instances when the court clearly had no jurisdiction over the subject matter and when the plaintiff did not appear during trial, failed to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time or neglected to comply with the rules or with any order of the court. Outside of these instances, any motu proprio [sic] dismissal would amount to a violation of the right of the plaintiff to be heard. Except for qualifying and expanding Section 2, Rule 9, and Section 3, Rule 17, of the Revised Rules of Court, the amendatory 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure brought about no radical change. Under the new rules, a court may muto proprio dismiss a claim when it appears from the pleadings or evidence on record that it has no jurisdiction over the subject matter; when there is another cause of action pending between the same parties for the same cause, or where the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations. x x x.” Heirs of Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr., represented by their co-heirs and attorneys-infact, Mercedes A. Favis and Nelly Favis-Villafuente v. Juana Gonzales, her son Mariano Favis, all minors represented herein by their parents, Sps. Mariano Favis and Larcelita D. Favis,G.R. No. 185922, January 15, 2014. Preliminary injunction; improper where act sought to be enjoined is already consummated. Case law instructs that injunction would not lie where the acts sought to be enjoined had already become fait accompli (meaning, an accomplished or consummated act). Hence, since the consummation of the act sought to be restrained had rendered Sps. Alindogs injunction petition moot, the issuance of the said injunctive writ was altogether improper. Spouses Nicasio C. Marquez and Anita J. Marquez v. Spouses Carlito Alindog and Carmen Alindog,G.R. No. 184045. January 22, 2014. Res judicata; conclusiveness of judgment. Under the principle of conclusiveness of judgment, the right of Planters Bank to a writ of possession as adjudged in G.R. No. 167998 is binding and conclusive on the parties. The doctrine of res judicata by conclusiveness of judgment postulates that when a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or when an opportunity for such trial has been given, the judgment of the court, as long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them. All the elements of the doctrine are present in this case. The final judgment in G.R. No. 167998 was rendered by the Court pursuant to its jurisdiction over the review of decisions and rulings of the CA. It was a judgment on the merits of Planters Bank’s right to apply for and be issued a writ of possession. Lastly, the parties in G.R. No. 167998 are the same parties involved in the present case. LZK Holdings and Development Corporation v. Planters Development Bank,G.R. No. 187973, January 20, 2014. Writ of possession; nature. No hearing is required prior to the issuance of a writ of possession. This is clear from the following disquisitions in Espinoza v United Overseas Bank Phils. (616 SCRA 353) which reiterates the settled rules on writs of

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possession, to wit: The proceeding in a petition for a writ of possession is ex parte and summary in nature. It is a judicial proceeding brought for the benefit of one party only and without notice by the court to any person adverse of interest. It is a proceeding wherein relief is granted without giving the person against whom the relief is sought an opportunity to be heard. By its very nature, an ex parte petition for issuance of a writ of possession is a non-litigious proceeding. It is a judicial proceeding for the enforcement of one’s right of possession as purchaser in a foreclosure sale. It is not an ordinary suit filed in court, by which one party sues another for the enforcement of a wrong or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong. LZK Holdings and Development Corporation v. Planters Development Bank,G.R. No. 187973, January 20, 2014 Other Proceedings Barangay Protection Order (BPO); Function of Punong Barangay purely executive in nature. The issuance of a BPO by the Punong Barangay or, in his unavailability, by any available Barangay Kagawad, merely orders the perpetrator to desist from (a) causing physical harm to the woman or her child; and (2) threatening to cause the woman or her child physical harm. Such function of the Punong Barangay is, thus, purely executive in nature, in pursuance of his duty under the Local Government Code to “enforce all laws and ordinances,” and to “maintain public order in the barangay.” Ralph P. Tua v. Hon. Cesar A. Mangrobang, Presiding Judge, Branch 22, RTC, Imus, Cavite; and Rossan Honrado-Tua, G.R. No. 170701. January 22, 2014. Extra-judicial foreclosure; ministerial duty to issue writ of possession to purchaser; exception. It is an established rule that the purchaser in an extra-judicial foreclosure sale is entitled to the possession of the property and can demand that he be placed in possession of the same either during (with bond) or after the expiration (without bond) of the redemption period therefor. To this end, the Court, in China Banking Corp. v. Sps. Lozada (579 Phil 454 [2008]), citing several cases on the matter, explained that a writ of possession duly applied for by said purchaser should issue as a matter of course, and thus, merely constitutes a ministerial duty on the part of the court. The ministerial issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the purchaser in an extra-judicial foreclosure sale, however, admits of an exception. Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court (Rules) pertinently provides that the possession of the mortgaged property may be awarded to a purchaser in an extra-judicial foreclosure unless a third party is actually holding the property by adverse title or right. In the recent case of Rural Bank of Sta. Barbara (Iloilo), Inc. v. Centeno (693 SCRA 110 [2013]), citing the case of China Banking Corp., the Court illumined that “the phrase ‘a third party who is actually holding the property adversely to the judgment obligor’ contemplates a situation in which a third party holds the property by adverse title or right, such as that of a co-owner, tenant or usufructuary. The coowner, agricultural tenant, and usufructuary possess the property in their own right, and they are not merely the successor or transferee of the right of possession of

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another co-owner or the owner of the property. Notably, the property should not only be possessed by a third party, but also held by the third party adversely to the judgment obligor.” In other words, as mentioned in Villanueva v. Cherdan Lending Investors Corporation (633 SCRA 173 [2010]), the third person must therefore claim a right superior to that of the original mortgagor. Spouses Nicasio C. Marquez and Anita J. Marquez v. Spouses Carlito Alindog and Carmen Alindog, G.R. No. 184045. January 22, 2014. Protection Order under Section 15 of RA 9262; concept. In Garcia v. Drilon (699 SCRA 352, 401 [2013]), wherein petitioner therein argued that Section 15 of RA 9262 is a violation of the due process clause of the Constitution, we struck down the challenge and held: A protection order is an order issued to prevent further acts of violence against women and their children, their family or household members, and to grant other necessary reliefs. Its purpose is to safeguard the offended parties from further harm, minimize any disruption in their daily life and facilitate the opportunity and ability to regain control of their life. The scope of reliefs in protection orders is broadened to ensure that the victim or offended party is afforded all the remedies necessary to curtail access by a perpetrator to the victim. This serves to safeguard the victim from greater risk of violence; to accord the victim and any designated family or household member safety in the family residence, and to prevent the perpetrator from committing acts that jeopardize the employment and support of the victim. It also enables the court to award temporary custody of minor children to protect the children from violence, to prevent their abduction by the perpetrator and to ensure their financial support. The rules require that petitions for protection order be in writing, signed and verified by the petitioner thereby undertaking full responsibility, criminal or civil, for every allegation therein. Since “time is of the essence in cases of VAWC if further violence is to be prevented,” the court is authorized to issue ex parte a TPO after raffle but before notice and hearing when the life, limb or property of the victim is in jeopardy and there is reasonable ground to believe that the order is necessary to protect the victim from the immediate and imminent danger of VAWC or to prevent such violence, which is about to recur. There need not be any fear that the judge may have no rational basis to issue an ex parte order. The victim is required not only to verify the allegations in the petition, but also to attach her witnesses’ affidavits to the petition. The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be challenged as violative of the right to due process. Just like a writ of preliminary attachment which is issued without notice and hearing because the time in which the hearing will take could be enough to enable the defendant to abscond or dispose of his property, in the same way, the victim of VAWC may already have suffered harrowing experiences in the hands of her tormentor, and possibly even death, if notice and hearing were required before such acts could be prevented. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due process must yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests, among which is protection of women and children from violence and threats to their personal safety and security. xxx Ralph P. Tua v. Hon. Cesar A. Mangrobang, Presiding Judge, Branch 22, RTC,

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Imus, Cavite; and Rossan Honrado-Tua,G.R. No. 170701. January 22, 2014. Temporary Protection Order (TPO) under Section 15 of RA 9262; court’s authority to issue ex parte. Clearly, the court, under Section 15 of RA 9262, is authorized to issue a TPO on the date of the filing of the application after ex parte determination that there is basis for the issuance thereof. Ex parte means that the respondent need not be notified or be present in the hearing for the issuance of the TPO. Thus, it is within the court’s discretion, based on the petition and the affidavit attached thereto, to determine that the violent acts against women and their children for the issuance of a TPO have been committed. Ralph P. Tua v. Hon. Cesar A. Mangrobang, Presiding Judge, Branch 22, RTC, Imus, Cavite; and Rossan Honrado-Tua,G.R. No. 170701. January 22, 2014. Evidence Admissions; contradiction. Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides that an admission made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case does not require proof, and may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake. The petitioners argue that such admission was the palpable mistake of their former counsel in his rush to file the answer, a copy of which was not provided to them. This contention is unacceptable. It is a purely self-serving claim unsupported by any iota of evidence. Bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof. Theresita, Juan, Asuncion, Patrocinia, Ricardo, and Gloria, all surnamed Dimaguila v. Jose and Sonia A. Monteiro,G.R. No. 201011, January 27, 2014. Admissions; rendered conclusive through estoppel. Article 1431 of the Civil Code provides that through estoppel, an admission is rendered conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon. The respondent spouses had clearly relied on the petitioners’ admission and so amended their original complaint for partition to one for recovery of possession of a portion of the subject property. Thus, the petitioners are now estopped from denying or attempting to prove that there was no partition of the property. Theresita, Juan, Asuncion, Patrocinia, Ricardo, and Gloria, all surnamed Dimaguila v. Jose and Sonia A. Monteiro,G.R. No. 201011, January 27, 2014. Best evidence rule; concept and exception. Section 3(d) of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except when the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office. Section 7 of the same Rule provides that when the original of a document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof. Section 24 of Rule 132 provides that the record of public documents may be evidenced by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody or the record. Certified true copies of the cadastral map of Liliw and the corresponding list of

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claimants of the area covered by the map were presented by two public officers. x x x The cadastral maps and the list of claimants, as certified true copies of original public records, fall under the exception to the best evidence rule. Theresita, Juan, Asuncion, Patrocinia, Ricardo, and Gloria, all surnamed Dimaguila v. Jose and Sonia A. Monteiro, G.R. No. 201011, January 27, 2014. Burden of proof in civil cases; quantum of evidence. Land Bank failed to prove that the amount allegedly “miscredited” to Oñate’s account came from the proceeds of the pre-terminated loans of its clients. It is worth emphasizing that in civil cases, the party making the allegations has the burden of proving them by preponderance of evidence. Mere allegation is not sufficient. Land Bank of the Philippines v. Emmanuel C. Oñate,G.R. No. 192371, January 15, 2014. Hearsay rule; entries in official records as exception. As to the hearsay rule, Section 44 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court similarly provides that entries in official records are an exception to the rule. The rule provides that entries in official records made in the performance of the duty of a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. The necessity of this rule consists in the inconvenience and difficulty of requiring the official’s attendance as a witness to testify to the innumerable transactions in the course of his duty. The document’s trustworthiness consists in the presumption of regularity of performance of official duty. Cadastral maps are the output of cadastral surveys. The DENR is the department tasked to execute, supervise and manage the conduct of cadastral surveys. It is, therefore, clear that the cadastral map and the corresponding list of claimants qualify as entries in official records as they were prepared by the DENR, as mandated by law. As such, they are exceptions to the hearsay rule and are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. Theresita, Juan, Asuncion, Patrocinia, Ricardo, and Gloria, all surnamed Dimaguila v. Jose and Sonia A. Monteiro,G.R. No. 201011, January 27, 2014. Judicial notice; discretionary notice of records of other cases. The taking of judicial notice is a matter of expediency and convenience for it fulfills the purpose that the evidence is intended to achieve, and in this sense, it is equivalent to proof. Generally, courts are not authorized to “take judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases even when said cases have been tried or are pending in the same court or before the same judge.” They may, however, take judicial notice of a decision or the facts prevailing in another case sitting in the same court if: (1) the parties present them in evidence, absent any opposition from the other party; or (2) the court, in its discretion, resolves to do so. In either case, the courts must observe the clear boundary provided by Section 3, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court. Land Bank of the Philippines v. Yatco Agricultural Enterprises,G.R. No. 172551, January 15, 2014. Offer of evidence; court considers evidence only when formally offered; exceptions. Section 34, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides the general rule, to wit:

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Section 34. The Court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified. From the above provision, it is clear that the court considers the evidence only when it is formally offered. The offer of evidence is necessary because it is the duty of the trial court to base its findings of fact and its judgment only and strictly on the evidence offered by the parties. A piece of document will remain a scrap of paper without probative value unless and until admitted by the court in evidence for the purpose or purposes for which it is offered. The formal offer of evidence allows the parties the chance to object to the presentation of an evidence which may not be admissible for the purpose it is being offered. However, there are instances when the Court relaxed the foregoing rule and allowed evidence not formally offered to be admitted. Citing People v. Napat-a and People. v. Mate the Court in Heirs of Romana Saves, et al., v. Heirs of Escolastico Saves, et al. (632 SCRA 236 [2010]), enumerated the requirements for the evidence to be considered despite failure to formally offer it, namely: “first, the same must have been duly identified by testimony duly recorded and, second, the same must have been incorporated in the records of the case.” In People v. Vivencio De Roxas et al. (116 Phil 977 [1962]), the Court also considered exhibits which were not formally offered by the prosecution but were repeatedly referred to in the course of the trial by the counsel of the accused. In the instant case, the Court finds that the above requisites are attendant to warrant the relaxation of the rule and admit the evidence of the petitioners not formally offered. As can be seen in the records of the case, the petitioners were able to present evidence that have been duly identified by testimony duly recorded. To identify is to prove the identity of a person or a thing. Identification means proof of identity; the proving that a person, subject or article before the court is the very same that he or it is alleged, charged or reputed to be. Rodolfo Laborte, et al. v. Pagsanjan Tourism Consumers’ Cooperative, et al.,G.R. No. 183860, January 15, 2014. Preponderance of evidence; definition. Spouses Monteiro, as plaintiffs in the original case, had the burden of proof to establish their case by a preponderance of evidence, which is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side, synonymous with the term “greater weight of the evidence.” Preponderance of evidence is evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto. Theresita, Juan, Asuncion, Patrocinia, Ricardo, and Gloria, all surnamed Dimaguila v. Jose and Sonia A. Monteiro,G.R. No. 201011, January 27, 2014. Question of law distinguished from question of fact. A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts, or when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted. A question of fact exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query invites calibration of the whole

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evidence considering mainly the credibility of the witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances as well as their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability of the situation.Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. BPI/MS Insurance Corp., and Mitsui Sumitomo Insurance Co., Ltd.,G.R. No. 193986, January 15, 2014. Question of law distinguished from question of fact. A question of law exists when the doubt centers on what the law is on a certain set of undisputed facts, while a question of fact exists when the doubt centers on the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. Whether the conditions for the right to repurchase were complied with, or whether there was a tender of payment is a question of fact.Roberto R. David, represented by his Attorney-in-Fact Atty. Proceso M. Nacino v. Eduardo C. David, acting through his Attorney-in-Fact Edwin C. David,G.R. No. 162365. January 15, 2014.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION G.R. No. 147406

July 14, 2008

VENANCIO FIGUEROA y CERVANTES,1 Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. DECISION NACHURA, J.: When is a litigant estopped by laches from assailing the jurisdiction of a tribunal? This is the paramount issue raised in this petition for review of the February 28, 2001 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 22697. Pertinent are the following antecedent facts and proceedings: On July 8, 1994, an information3 for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide was filed against the petitioner before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan, Branch 18.4 The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 2235-M-94.5 Trial on the merits ensued and on August 19, 1998, the trial court convicted the petitioner as charged.6 In his appeal before the CA, the petitioner questioned, among others, for the first time, the trial court’s jurisdiction.7 The appellate court, however, in the challenged decision, considered the petitioner to have actively participated in the trial and to have belatedly attacked the jurisdiction of the RTC; thus, he was already estopped by laches from asserting the trial court’s lack of jurisdiction. Finding no other ground to reverse the trial court’s decision, the CA affirmed the petitioner’s conviction but modified the penalty imposed and the damages awarded.8 Dissatisfied, the petitioner filed the instant petition for review on certiorari raising the following issues for our resolution: a. Does the fact that the petitioner failed to raise the issue of jurisdiction during the trial of this case, which was initiated and filed by the public prosecutor before the wrong court, constitute laches in relation to the doctrine laid down in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, notwithstanding the fact that said issue was immediately raised in petitioner’s appeal to the Honorable Court of Appeals? Conversely, does the active participation of the petitioner in the trial of his case, which is initiated and filed not by him but by the public prosecutor, amount to estoppel? b. Does the admission of the petitioner that it is difficult to immediately stop a bus while it is running at 40 kilometers per hour for the purpose of avoiding a person who unexpectedly crossed the road, constitute enough incriminating evidence to warrant his conviction for the crime charged?

c. Is the Honorable Court of Appeals justified in considering the place of accident as falling within Item 4 of Section 35 (b) of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, and subsequently ruling that the speed limit thereto is only 20 kilometers per hour, when no evidence whatsoever to that effect was ever presented by the prosecution during the trial of this case? d. Is the Honorable Court of Appeals justified in convicting the petitioner for homicide through reckless imprudence (the legally correct designation is "reckless imprudence resulting to homicide") with violation of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code when the prosecution did not prove this during the trial and, more importantly, the information filed against the petitioner does not contain an allegation to that effect? e. Does the uncontroverted testimony of the defense witness Leonardo Hernal that the victim unexpectedly crossed the road resulting in him getting hit by the bus driven by the petitioner not enough evidence to acquit him of the crime charged?9 Applied uniformly is the familiar rule that the jurisdiction of the court to hear and decide a case is conferred by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action, unless such statute provides for a retroactive application thereof. 10 In this case, at the time the criminal information for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide with violation of the Automobile Law (now Land Transportation and Traffic Code) was filed, Section 32(2) of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 12911 had already been amended by Republic Act No. 7691.12 The said provision thus reads: Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Criminal Cases.—Except in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise: xxxx (2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence, they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof. As the imposable penalty for the crime charged herein is prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods or imprisonment for 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years,13 jurisdiction to hear and try the same is conferred on the Municipal Trial Courts (MTCs). Clearly, therefore, the RTC of Bulacan does not have jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 2235-M-94. While both the appellate court and the Solicitor General acknowledge this fact, they nevertheless are of the position that the principle of estoppel by laches has already precluded the petitioner from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC—the

trial went on for 4 years with the petitioner actively participating therein and without him ever raising the jurisdictional infirmity. The petitioner, for his part, counters that the lack of jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter may be raised at any time even for the first time on appeal. As undue delay is further absent herein, the principle of laches will not be applicable. To settle once and for all this problem of jurisdiction vis-à-vis estoppel by laches, which continuously confounds the bench and the bar, we shall analyze the various Court decisions on the matter. As early as 1901, this Court has declared that unless jurisdiction has been conferred by some legislative act, no court or tribunal can act on a matter submitted to it.14 We went on to state in U.S. v. De La Santa15 that: It has been frequently held that a lack of jurisdiction over the subject-matter is fatal, and subject to objection at any stage of the proceedings, either in the court below or on appeal (Ency. of Pl. & Pr., vol. 12, p. 189, and large array of cases there cited), and indeed, where the subject-matter is not within the jurisdiction, the court may dismiss the proceeding ex mero motu. (4 Ill., 133; 190 Ind., 79; Chipman vs. Waterbury, 59 Conn., 496.) Jurisdiction over the subject-matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the court; it is given only by law and in the manner prescribed by law and an objection based on the lack of such jurisdiction can not be waived by the parties. x x x16 Later, in People v. Casiano,17 the Court explained: 4. The operation of the principle of estoppel on the question of jurisdiction seemingly depends upon whether the lower court actually had jurisdiction or not. If it had no jurisdiction, but the case was tried and decided upon the theory that it had jurisdiction, the parties are not barred, on appeal, from assailing such jurisdiction, for the same "must exist as a matter of law, and may not be conferred by consent of the parties or by estoppel" (5 C.J.S., 861-863). However, if the lower court had jurisdiction, and the case was heard and decided upon a given theory, such, for instance, as that the court had no jurisdiction, the party who induced it to adopt such theory will not be permitted, on appeal, to assume an inconsistent position— that the lower court had jurisdiction. Here, the principle of estoppel applies. The rule that jurisdiction is conferred by law, and does not depend upon the will of the parties, has no bearing thereon. Thus, Corpus Juris Secundum says: Where accused has secured a decision that the indictment is void, or has been granted an instruction based on its defective character directing the jury to acquit, he is estopped, when subsequently indicted, to assert that the former indictment was valid. In such case, there may be a new prosecution whether the indictment in the former prosecution was good or bad. Similarly, where, after the jury was impaneled and sworn, the court on accused's motion quashed the information on the erroneous assumption that the court had no jurisdiction, accused cannot successfully plead former jeopardy to a new information. x x x (22 C.J.S., sec. 252, pp. 388-389; italics ours.)

Where accused procured a prior conviction to be set aside on the ground that the court was without jurisdiction, he is estopped subsequently to assert, in support of a defense of previous jeopardy, that such court had jurisdiction." (22 C.J.S. p. 378.)18 But in Pindañgan Agricultural Co., Inc. v. Dans,19 the Court, in not sustaining the plea of lack of jurisdiction by the plaintiff-appellee therein, made the following observations: It is surprising why it is only now, after the decision has been rendered, that the plaintiff-appellee presents the question of this Court’s jurisdiction over the case. Republic Act No. 2613 was enacted on August 1, 1959. This case was argued on January 29, 1960. Notwithstanding this fact, the jurisdiction of this Court was never impugned until the adverse decision of this Court was handed down. The conduct of counsel leads us to believe that they must have always been of the belief that notwithstanding said enactment of Republic Act 2613 this Court has jurisdiction of the case, such conduct being born out of a conviction that the actual real value of the properties in question actually exceeds the jurisdictional amount of this Court (over P200,000). Our minute resolution in G.R. No. L-10096, Hyson Tan, et al. vs. Filipinas Compaña de Seguros, et al., of March 23, 1956, a parallel case, is applicable to the conduct of plaintiff-appellee in this case, thus: x x x that an appellant who files his brief and submits his case to the Court of Appeals for decision, without questioning the latter’s jurisdiction until decision is rendered therein, should be considered as having voluntarily waived so much of his claim as would exceed the jurisdiction of said Appellate Court; for the reason that a contrary rule would encourage the undesirable practice of appellants submitting their cases for decision to the Court of Appeals in expectation of favorable judgment, but with intent of attacking its jurisdiction should the decision be unfavorable: x x x20 Then came our ruling in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy21 that a party may be barred by laches from invoking lack of jurisdiction at a late hour for the purpose of annulling everything done in the case with the active participation of said party invoking the plea. We expounded, thus: A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different reasons. Thus, we speak of estoppel in pais, of estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches. Laches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds of public policy which requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute of limitations, is not a mere question of time but is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted.

It has been held that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction (Dean vs. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86 A.L.R. 79). In the case just cited, by way of explaining the rule, it was further said that the question whether the court had jurisdiction either of the subject matter of the action or of the parties was not important in such cases because the party is barred from such conduct not because the judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice cannot be tolerated—obviously for reasons of public policy. Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court (Pease vs. Rathbun-Jones etc., 243 U.S. 273, 61 L. Ed. 715, 37 S.Ct. 283; St. Louis etc. vs. McBride, 141 U.S. 127, 35 L. Ed. 659). And in Littleton vs. Burgess, 16 Wyo. 58, the Court said that it is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape a penalty. Upon this same principle is what We said in the three cases mentioned in the resolution of the Court of Appeals of May 20, 1963 (supra)—to the effect that we frown upon the "undesirable practice" of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse—as well as in Pindañgan etc. vs. Dans et al., G.R. L14591, September 26, 1962; Montelibano et al. vs. Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc., G.R. L-15092; Young Men Labor Union etc. vs. The Court of Industrial Relations et al., G.R. L-20307, Feb. 26, 1965, and Mejia vs. Lucas, 100 Phil. p. 277. The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety became a quasi-party on July 31, 1948, it could have raised the question of the lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Cebu to take cognizance of the present action by reason of the sum of money involved which, according to the law then in force, was within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts. It failed to do so. Instead, at several stages of the proceedings in the court a quo, as well as in the Court of Appeals, it invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case for a final adjudication on the merits. It was only after an adverse decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to raise the question of jurisdiction. Were we to sanction such conduct on its part, We would in effect be declaring as useless all the proceedings had in the present case since it was commenced on July 19, 1948 and compel the judgment creditors to go up their Calvary once more. The inequity and unfairness of this is not only patent but revolting.22 For quite a time since we made this pronouncement in Sibonghanoy, courts and tribunals, in resolving issues that involve the belated invocation of lack of jurisdiction, have applied the principle of estoppel by laches. Thus, in Calimlim v. Ramirez,23 we pointed out that Sibonghanoy was developing into a general rule rather than the exception:

A rule that had been settled by unquestioned acceptance and upheld in decisions so numerous to cite is that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject-matter of the action is a matter of law and may not be conferred by consent or agreement of the parties. The lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. This doctrine has been qualified by recent pronouncements which stemmed principally from the ruling in the cited case of Sibonghanoy. It is to be regretted, however, that the holding in said case had been applied to situations which were obviously not contemplated therein. The exceptional circumstance involved in Sibonghanoy which justified the departure from the accepted concept of non-waivability of objection to jurisdiction has been ignored and, instead a blanket doctrine had been repeatedly upheld that rendered the supposed ruling in Sibonghanoy not as the exception, but rather the general rule, virtually overthrowing altogether the time-honored principle that the issue of jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by estoppel. In Sibonghanoy, the defense of lack of jurisdiction of the court that rendered the questioned ruling was held to be barred by estoppel by laches. It was ruled that the lack of jurisdiction having been raised for the first time in a motion to dismiss filed almost fifteen (15) years after the questioned ruling had been rendered, such a plea may no longer be raised for being barred by laches. As defined in said case, laches is "failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert has abandoned it or declined to assert it.24 In Calimlim, despite the fact that the one who benefited from the plea of lack of jurisdiction was the one who invoked the court’s jurisdiction, and who later obtained an adverse judgment therein, we refused to apply the ruling in Sibonghanoy. The Court accorded supremacy to the time-honored principle that the issue of jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by estoppel. Yet, in subsequent cases decided after Calimlim, which by sheer volume are too plentiful to mention, the Sibonghanoy doctrine, as foretold in Calimlim, became the rule rather than the exception. As such, in Soliven v. Fastforms Philippines, Inc.,25 the Court ruled: While it is true that jurisdiction may be raised at any time, "this rule presupposes that estoppel has not supervened." In the instant case, respondent actively participated in all stages of the proceedings before the trial court and invoked its authority by asking for an affirmative relief. Clearly, respondent is estopped from challenging the trial court’s jurisdiction, especially when an adverse judgment has been rendered. In PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, we held: Moreover, we note that petitioner did not question at all the jurisdiction of the lower court x x x in its answers to both the amended complaint and the second amended complaint. It did so only in its motion for reconsideration of the decision of the lower court after it had received an adverse decision. As this Court held in Pantranco North Express, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 105180, July 5, 1993, 224 SCRA 477, 491), participation in all stages of the case before the trial

court, that included invoking its authority in asking for affirmative relief, effectively barred petitioner by estoppel from challenging the court’s jurisdiction. Notably, from the time it filed its answer to the second amended complaint on April 16, 1985, petitioner did not question the lower court’s jurisdiction. It was only on December 29, 1989 when it filed its motion for reconsideration of the lower court’s decision that petitioner raised the question of the lower court’s lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner thus foreclosed its right to raise the issue of jurisdiction by its own inaction. (italics ours) Similarly, in the subsequent case of Sta. Lucia Realty and Development, Inc. vs. Cabrigas, we ruled: In the case at bar, it was found by the trial court in its 30 September 1996 decision in LCR Case No. Q-60161(93) that private respondents (who filed the petition for reconstitution of titles) failed to comply with both sections 12 and 13 of RA 26 and therefore, it had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. However, private respondents never questioned the trial court’s jurisdiction over its petition for reconstitution throughout the duration of LCR Case No. Q-60161(93). On the contrary, private respondents actively participated in the reconstitution proceedings by filing pleadings and presenting its evidence. They invoked the trial court’s jurisdiction in order to obtain affirmative relief – the reconstitution of their titles. Private respondents have thus foreclosed their right to raise the issue of jurisdiction by their own actions. The Court has constantly upheld the doctrine that while jurisdiction may be assailed at any stage, a litigant’s participation in all stages of the case before the trial court, including the invocation of its authority in asking for affirmative relief, bars such party from challenging the court’s jurisdiction (PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 297 SCRA 402 [1998]). A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction (Asset Privatization Trust vs. Court of Appeals, 300 SCRA 579 [1998]; Province of Bulacan vs. Court of Appeals, 299 SCRA 442 [1998]). The Court frowns upon the undesirable practice of a party participating in the proceedings and submitting his case for decision and then accepting judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse (Producers Bank of the Philippines vs. NLRC, 298 SCRA 517 [1998], citing Ilocos Sur Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs. NLRC, 241 SCRA 36 [1995]). (italics ours)26 Noteworthy, however, is that, in the 2005 case of Metromedia Times Corporation v. Pastorin,27 where the issue of lack of jurisdiction was raised only in the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) on appeal, we stated, after examining the doctrines of jurisdiction vis-à-vis estoppel, that the ruling in Sibonghanoy stands as an exception, rather than the general rule. Metromedia, thus, was not estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter before the NLRC on appeal.281avvphi1 Later, in Francel Realty Corporation v. Sycip,29 the Court clarified that: Petitioner argues that the CA’s affirmation of the trial court’s dismissal of its case was erroneous, considering that a full-blown trial had already been conducted. In

effect, it contends that lack of jurisdiction could no longer be used as a ground for dismissal after trial had ensued and ended. The above argument is anchored on estoppel by laches, which has been used quite successfully in a number of cases to thwart dismissals based on lack of jurisdiction. Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, in which this doctrine was espoused, held that a party may be barred from questioning a court’s jurisdiction after being invoked to secure affirmative relief against its opponent. In fine, laches prevents the issue of lack of jurisdiction from being raised for the first time on appeal by a litigant whose purpose is to annul everything done in a trial in which it has actively participated. Laches is defined as the "failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it." The ruling in Sibonghanoy on the matter of jurisdiction is, however, the exception rather than the rule.1avvphi1 Estoppel by laches may be invoked to bar the issue of lack of jurisdiction only in cases in which the factual milieu is analogous to that in the cited case. In such controversies, laches should be clearly present; that is, lack of jurisdiction must have been raised so belatedly as to warrant the presumption that the party entitled to assert it had abandoned or declined to assert it. That Sibonghanoy applies only to exceptional circumstances is clarified in Calimlim v. Ramirez, which we quote: A rule that had been settled by unquestioned acceptance and upheld in decisions so numerous to cite is that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject-matter of the action is a matter of law and may not be conferred by consent or agreement of the parties. The lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. This doctrine has been qualified by recent pronouncements which stemmed principally from the ruling in the cited case of Sibonghanoy. It is to be regretted, however, that the holding in said case had been applied to situations which were obviously not contemplated therein. The exceptional circumstance involved in Sibonghanoy which justified the departure from the accepted concept of non-waivability of objection to jurisdiction has been ignored and, instead a blanket doctrine had been repeatedly upheld that rendered the supposed ruling in Sibonghanoy not as the exception, but rather the general rule, virtually overthrowing altogether the time-honored principle that the issue of jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by estoppel. Indeed, the general rule remains: a court’s lack of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. The reason is that jurisdiction is conferred by law, and lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of and to render judgment on the action. Moreover, jurisdiction is determined by the averments of the complaint, not by the defenses contained in the answer.30 Also, in Mangaliag v. Catubig-Pastoral,31 even if the pleader of lack of jurisdiction actively took part in the trial proceedings by presenting a witness to seek

exoneration, the Court, reiterating the doctrine in Calimlim, said: Private respondent argues that the defense of lack of jurisdiction may be waived by estoppel through active participation in the trial. Such, however, is not the general rule but an exception, best characterized by the peculiar circumstances in Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy. In Sibonghanoy, the party invoking lack of jurisdiction did so only after fifteen years and at a stage when the proceedings had already been elevated to the CA. Sibonghanoy is an exceptional case because of the presence of laches, which was defined therein as failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert has abandoned it or declined to assert it.32 And in the more recent Regalado v. Go,33 the Court again emphasized that laches should be clearly present for the Sibonghanoy doctrine to be applicable, thus: Laches is defined as the "failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable length of time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it." The ruling in People v. Regalario that was based on the landmark doctrine enunciated in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy on the matter of jurisdiction by estoppel is the exception rather than the rule. Estoppel by laches may be invoked to bar the issue of lack of jurisdiction only in cases in which the factual milieu is analogous to that in the cited case. In such controversies, laches should have been clearly present; that is, lack of jurisdiction must have been raised so belatedly as to warrant the presumption that the party entitled to assert it had abandoned or declined to assert it. In Sibonghanoy, the defense of lack of jurisdiction was raised for the first time in a motion to dismiss filed by the Surety almost 15 years after the questioned ruling had been rendered. At several stages of the proceedings, in the court a quo as well as in the Court of Appeals, the Surety invoked the jurisdiction of the said courts to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case for final adjudication on the merits. It was only when the adverse decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to raise the question of jurisdiction. Clearly, the factual settings attendant in Sibonghanoy are not present in the case at bar. Petitioner Atty. Regalado, after the receipt of the Court of Appeals resolution finding her guilty of contempt, promptly filed a Motion for Reconsideration assailing the said court’s jurisdiction based on procedural infirmity in initiating the action. Her compliance with the appellate court’s directive to show cause why she should not be cited for contempt and filing a single piece of pleading to that effect could not be considered as an active participation in the judicial proceedings so as to take the case within the milieu of Sibonghanoy. Rather, it is the natural fear to disobey the mandate of the court that could lead to dire consequences that impelled her to comply.34

The Court, thus, wavered on when to apply the exceptional circumstance in Sibonghanoy and on when to apply the general rule enunciated as early as in De La Santa and expounded at length in Calimlim. The general rule should, however, be, as it has always been, that the issue of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by waiver or by estoppel. Estoppel by laches, to bar a litigant from asserting the court’s absence or lack of jurisdiction, only supervenes in exceptional cases similar to the factual milieu of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy. Indeed, the fact that a person attempts to invoke unauthorized jurisdiction of a court does not estop him from thereafter challenging its jurisdiction over the subject matter, since such jurisdiction must arise by law and not by mere consent of the parties. This is especially true where the person seeking to invoke unauthorized jurisdiction of the court does not thereby secure any advantage or the adverse party does not suffer any harm.35 Applying the said doctrine to the instant case, the petitioner is in no way estopped by laches in assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC, considering that he raised the lack thereof in his appeal before the appellate court. At that time, no considerable period had yet elapsed for laches to attach. True, delay alone, though unreasonable, will not sustain the defense of "estoppel by laches" unless it further appears that the party, knowing his rights, has not sought to enforce them until the condition of the party pleading laches has in good faith become so changed that he cannot be restored to his former state, if the rights be then enforced, due to loss of evidence, change of title, intervention of equities, and other causes.36 In applying the principle of estoppel by laches in the exceptional case of Sibonghanoy, the Court therein considered the patent and revolting inequity and unfairness of having the judgment creditors go up their Calvary once more after more or less 15 years. 37 The same, however, does not obtain in the instant case. We note at this point that estoppel, being in the nature of a forfeiture, is not favored by law. It is to be applied rarely—only from necessity, and only in extraordinary circumstances. The doctrine must be applied with great care and the equity must be strong in its favor.38 When misapplied, the doctrine of estoppel may be a most effective weapon for the accomplishment of injustice. 39 Moreover, a judgment rendered without jurisdiction over the subject matter is void.40 Hence, the Revised Rules of Court provides for remedies in attacking judgments rendered by courts or tribunals that have no jurisdiction over the concerned cases. No laches will even attach when the judgment is null and void for want of jurisdiction. 41 As we have stated in Heirs of Julian Dela Cruz and Leonora Talaro v. Heirs of Alberto Cruz,42 It is axiomatic that the jurisdiction of a tribunal, including a quasi-judicial officer or government agency, over the nature and subject matter of a petition or complaint is determined by the material allegations therein and the character of the relief prayed for, irrespective of whether the petitioner or complainant is entitled to any or all such reliefs. Jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of an action is conferred by the Constitution and the law, and not by the consent or waiver of the parties where the court otherwise would have no jurisdiction over the nature or subject matter of the action. Nor can it be acquired through, or waived by, any act or omission of the parties. Moreover, estoppel does not apply to confer jurisdiction to a tribunal that has none over the cause of action. x x x

Indeed, the jurisdiction of the court or tribunal is not affected by the defenses or theories set up by the defendant or respondent in his answer or motion to dismiss. Jurisdiction should be determined by considering not only the status or the relationship of the parties but also the nature of the issues or questions that is the subject of the controversy. x x x x The proceedings before a court or tribunal without jurisdiction, including its decision, are null and void, hence, susceptible to direct and collateral attacks.43 With the above considerations, we find it unnecessary to resolve the other issues raised in the petition. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. Criminal Case No. 2235-M-94 is hereby DISMISSED without prejudice. SO ORDERED. ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice WE CONCUR: LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING* Associate Justice CONSUELO YNARESSANTIAGO Associate Justice

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIAMARTINEZ Associate Justice

RUBEN T. REYES Associate Justice ATTESTATION I attest that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division. CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice Chairperson, Third Division CERTIFICATION Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court. REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice

Footnotes 1

In the records, "Venancio" is also spelled as "Vinancio."

*

In lieu of Associate Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario per Special Order No. 508, dated June 25, 2008. 2

Penned by Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales (now an Associate Justice of this Court), with Associate Justices Candido V. Rivera and Rebecca de Guia-Salvador concurring; rollo, pp. 23-31. 3

The indictment reads: That on or about the 16th day of January 1994, in the Municipality of Bocaue, Province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the driver and person-in-charge of German Espiritu Bus bearing plate no. PHZ-542, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously drive and operate the same along the highway in the said municipality, in a negligent, careless and imprudent manner, without due regard to the traffic laws, rules and regulations and without taking the necessary precautions to prevent death or injuries to persons and damage to property, causing by such negligence, carelessness and imprudence, said German Espiritu Bus driven by him to hit and bump one Rodolfo Lopez y Amparado, thereby causing physical injuries to the latter which caused his death. (Id. at 23-24.)

4

Id. at 26.

5

Id. at 55.

6

The dispositive portion of the trial court’s decision reads: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds the accused Vinancio Figueroa y Cervantes GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to (sic) homicide, as defined and penalized under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, sentencing him to suffer imprisonment of two (2) years, ten (10) months and twenty-one (21) days to four (4) years and two (2) months and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of: 1. P50,000.00 indemnity; 2. P3,034,560.00 for loss of earning capacity; 3. P24,000 for cemetery lot; 4. P45,000 for funeral expenses; 5. P54,221.00 for wake expenses. SO ORDERED. (Id. at 24-25 and 56.)

7

Id. at 25.

8

The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads: WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. As modified, the judgment reads: Appellant Vinancio Figueroa is found guilty

beyond reasonable doubt of Homicide Through Reckless Imprudence with violation of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code (formerly the Automobile Law) and is accordingly hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of One (1) Year, Four (4) Months and One (1) Day of prision correccional as minimum to Three (3) Years, Six (6) Months and Twenty (20) Days of prision correccional as maximum, and to pay the heirs of the victim the following: 1. P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; 2. P339,840.00 as damages for loss of earning capacity; 3. P45,000 for funeral expenses; and 4. P24,000 for burial expenses SO ORDERED. (Id. at 30.) 9

Id. at 156-158.

10

Alarilla v. Sandiganbayan, 393 Phil. 143, 155 (2000); Escobal v. Justice Garchitorena, 466 Phil. 625, 635 (2004). 11

Entitled "The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980," approved on August 14, 1981.

12

Entitled "An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Muncipal Circuit Trial Courts, Amending for the Purpose Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, Otherwise Known as the ‘Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980,’" approved on March 25, 1994, and took effect on April 15, 1994, fifteen days after publication in the Malaya and in the Times Journal on March 30, 1994, pursuant to Section 8 thereof. 13

Revised Penal Code, Art. 365.

14

In Re: Calloway, 1 Phil. 11, 12 (1901).

15

9 Phil. 22 (1907).

16

Id. at 26. (Emphasis ours.)

17

111 Phil. 73 (1961).

18

Id. at 93-94. (Emphasis ours).

19

No. L-14591, September 26, 1962, 6 SCRA 14.

20

Id. at 16-17.

21

131 Phil. 556 (1968).

22

Id. at 563-565.

23

204 Phil. 25 (1982).

24

Id. at 34-35.

25

G.R. No. 139031, October 18, 2004, 440 SCRA 389.

26

Id. at 395-396.

27

G.R. No. 154295, July 29, 2005, 465 SCRA 320.

28

Id.at 337.

29

G.R. No. 154684, September 8, 2005, 469 SCRA 424.

30

Id. at 429-431.

31

G.R. No. 143951, October 25, 2005, 474 SCRA 153.

32

Id. at 162.

33

G.R. No. 167988, February 6, 2007, 514 SCRA 616.

34

Id. at 635-636. (Citations omitted.)

35

Jolley v. Martin Bros. Box Co., 109 N.E. 2d, 652, 661 (1952).

36

Wisdom’s Adm’r v. Sims, 144 S.W. 2d 232, 235, 236, 284 Ky. 258.

37

Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, supra, at 37.

38

C & S Fishfarm Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 442 Phil. 279, 290-291 (2002).

39

Smith v. Smith, 265 N.C. 18, 27; 143 S.E. 2d 300, 306 (1965).

40

Veneracion v. Mancilla, G.R. No. 158238, July 20, 2006.

41

Arcelona v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 102900, October 2, 1997, 280 SCRA 20, 53.

42

G.R. No. 162890, November 22, 2005, 475 SCRA 743.

43

Id. at 755-757. (Italics supplied.)

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court Manila

FIRST DIVISION ANGELINA PAHILAGARRIDO, Petitioner,

G.R. No. 156358

Present: - versus – ELIZA M. TORTOGO, LEONILA FLORES, ANANIAS SEDONIO, ADELINO MONET, ANGIE MONET, JUANITO GARCIA, ELEONOR GARCIA, BENITA MOYA, JULIO ALTARES, LEA ALTARES, CLARITA SABIDO, JULIE ANN VILLAMOR, JUANITA TUALA, VICTOR FLORES III, JOHNNY MOYA, HAZEL AVANCEA, SONIA EVANGELIO, and GENNY MONTAO, Respondents.

CORONA, C.J., Chairperson, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BERSAMIN, DEL CASTILLO, and VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

Promulgated: August 17, 2011

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x DECISION BERSAMIN, J.: Nothing is more settled in law than that once a judgment attains finality it thereby becomes immutable and unalterable.1[1] The enforcement of such judgment should not be hampered or evaded, for the immediate enforcement of the parties rights, confirmed by final judgment, is a major component of the ideal administration of justice. This is the reason why we abhor any delay in the full execution of final and executory decisions.2[2] Thus, a remedy intended to 1[1]

Gallardo-Corro v. Gallardo, G.R. No. 136228, January 30, 2001, 350 SCRA 568.

2[2] Session Delights Ice Cream and Fast Foods v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division), G.R. No. 172149, February 8, 2010, 612 SCRA 10.

frustrate, suspend, or enjoin the enforcement of a final judgment must be granted with caution and upon a strict observance of the requirements under existing laws and jurisprudence. Any such remedy allowed in violation of established rules and guidelines connotes but a capricious exercise of discretion that must be struck down in order that the prevailing party is not deprived of the fruits of victory. Via her pleading denominated as a petition for review on certiorari, the petitioner has come directly to the Court from the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 48, in Bacolod City for the nullification of the order dated November 12, 2002 (granting the respondents application for a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction [enjoining the execution of the final and executory decision rendered in an ejectment suit by the Municipal Trial Court in Cities [MTCC], Branch 6, in Bacolod City]) issued in SCA Case No. 01-115223[3] for being in violation of law and jurisprudence. The petitioner also prays that the Court should enjoin the RTC from taking further proceedings in SCA Case No. 01-11522, except to dismiss it. Antecedents On June 23, 1997, Domingo Pahila commenced in the MTCC in Bacolod City an action for ejectment with prayer for preliminary and restraining order to evict several defendants, including the respondents herein, from his properties, docketed as Civil Case No. 23671 and raffled to Branch 6 of the MTCC. He amended the complaint to implead the spouses of some of the defendants. However, he died during the pendency of the action, and his surviving spouse, herein petitioner Angelina Pahila-Garrido, was substituted for him on September 24, 1998. The defendants in Civil Case No. 23671 were divided into two discrete groups. The first group, represented by Atty. Romeo Subaldo, included those defendants occupying Lot 641-B-1, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) T-167924; Lot 641-B-2, covered by TCT No. T-167925; and Lot No. 641-B-3, covered by TCT No. T-167926, all owned by the plaintiff. The defendants in this

3[3] Entitled Elisa M. Tortogo, et al. v. Hon. Eliseo C. Geolingo, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of Branch 6, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Bacolod City, Nicolas G. Albayda, in his capacity as Deputy Sheriff of Branch 6, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Bacolod City, and Domingo Pahila, as represented by Angelina Pahila-Garrido.

group relied on the common defense of being agricultural tenants on the land. The second group, on the other hand, was represented by Atty. Ranela de la Fuente of the Public Attorneys Office (PAO) and counted the defendants occupying Lot No. F-V-3-3749-D, covered by TCT No. T-55630, also owned by the plaintiff. The second groups common defense was that the plaintiffs title was not valid because their respective portions were situated on foreshore land along the Guimaras Strait, and thus their respective areas were subject to their own acquisition from the State as the actual occupants. After the parties submitted their respective position papers, the MTCC rendered a decision dated March 17, 1999 in favor of the petitioner,4[4] to wit: WHEREFORE, JUDGMENT IS RENDERED IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFF AND AGAINST THE DEFENDANTS except the defendant Damiana Daguno, as follows: 1.

Ordering the affected defendants or any person or persons in acting in

their behalf, assignees or successors-in-interests including members of their family to vacate portions of Lot No. 641-B-1 covered by TCT No. 16742, Lot No.641-B-2 covered by TCT No. T-167926 and Lot Plan-F-V-337490-D covered by TCT No. T-55630 which they occupy and turn over the possession of the said property to the plaintiff, and to pay the cost of the suit. The prayer for preliminary injunction/restraining order is denied for lack of basis.

All the defendants appealed. On September 22, 1999, the RTC in Bacolod City affirmed the decision of the MTCC.5[5] Only the second group, which includes respondents herein, appealed the RTCs decision to the Court of Appeals (CA), insisting that the land was foreshore land and that the petitioners title (TCT No. 55630) was not valid. Considering that the first group did not appeal, the RTCs decision became final and executory as to them. On December 6, 1999, the CA dismissed the second groups appeal, and later denied their motion for reconsideration on April 17, 2000.6[6]

4[4]

Rollo, pp. 32-51.

5[5]

Id., p. 58.

6[6]

Id., pp. 55-56.

The respondents herein appealed the dismissal to the Court via a petition for certiorari (G.R. No. 143458), but the Court rejected their recourse on July 19, 2000, and issued an entry of judgment on October 20, 2000.7[7] In the meantime, on February 16, 2000, the MTCC amended its decision to correct typographical errors in the description of the properties involved.8[8] None of the parties objected to or challenged the corrections. On April 5, 2000, the MTCC issued the writ of execution upon the petitioners motion.9[9] The writ of execution was duly served on August 24, 2000 upon all the defendants, including the respondents, as the sheriffs return of service indicated.10[10] On April 20, 2001, the respondents filed a motion to quash against the April 5, 2000 writ of execution and its aliases, and a motion to stay the execution of the March 17, 1999 decision and the February 16, 2000 amended decision.11[11] They anchored their motions on the supposedly supervening finding that the lot covered by the writ of execution was foreshore land belonging to the State. To support their contention, they presented the following administrative issuances from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), namely: (a) Memorandum dated August 30, 2000 issued by the Community Environment and National Resources Office (CENRO) of the DENR recommending the cancellation of Free Patent F.P. No. 309502 from which was derived Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-1, and petitioners TCT No. T55630; and (b) Memorandum dated November 13, 2000 of the DENR Regional Executive Director for Region VI in Iloilo City.

7[7]

Id., p. 57.

8[8]

Id., pp. 52-54.

9[9]

Id., pp. 58-60.

10[10] Id., pp. 61-64. 11[11] Id., pp. 67-69.

They argued that such supervening event directly affected the execution of the March 17, 1999 decision and its amendment, whose continued execution affecting foreshore land would be unjust to the occupants or possessors of the property, including themselves.12[12] On May 4, 2001, the MTCC denied the respondents motion to quash, observing that the cancellation of the petitioners TCT No. T-55630 was an event that might or might not happen, and was not the supervening event that could stay the execution.13[13] A month later, on June 8, 2001, the MTCC denied the respondents motion for reconsideration,14[14] viz:

As of this point in time the movant has not shown that she has a better right to possess the land she is presently occupying as a squatter, than the plaintiff who is in possession of a clean Torrens Title. It is not true that the execution of the decision of this court would be unjust to her. To put it bluntly, it would be more unjust to the plaintiff who was deprived of possession of his land for a very long time, because of the movants insistence in occupying said land even after the decision ejecting her from the plaintiffs land had become final and executory. In fine, the movant has not shown additional evidences or arguments which would warrant the reversal of the order dated May 4, 2001. WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration dated June 1, 2001 is denied. SO ORDERED.

The story would have ended then but for the fact that on October 1, 2001, or more than a year after the writ of execution was served upon the defendants in Civil Case No. 23671, the respondents, led by respondent Elisa M. Tortogo, and now assisted by Atty. Leon Moya, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition (with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and restraining order) in the RTC in Negros Occidental, docketed as SCA Case No. 0111522,15[15] praying: WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed of this HONORABLE COURT that the assailed ORDERS dated 4 May 2001 and 8 July 2001 be REVERSED, ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.

12[12] Id., p. 68. 13[13] Id., pp. 71-72. 14[14] Id., pp. 73-75. 15[15] Id., pp. 76-91.

PETITIONERS are further praying that after due notice and hearing, a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction be issued to enjoin the execution/implementation of the Decision dated 17 March 1999 and the 16 February 2000 Amended Decision.

Such other and further reliefs just and equitable under the premises.

On October 11, 2001, Judge Gorgonio J. Ybaez, to whose branch SCA Case No. 01-11522 was raffled, granted the respondents prayer for a temporary restraining order (TRO) in the following terms,16[16] to wit: xxxx WHEREAS, the matter of issuance or not of a TRO was summarily heard on October 5, 2001 in the presence of the parties and counsels who were both heard in support/amplification of their respective stand(s);

WHEREAS, it appears that the issuance of a TRO prayed for would be in order at this stage in this case because there appears an imminent danger of demolition of the structures of herein petitioners at the premises in question, pending the trial and final determination of the merits in this case in this case (sic) wherein the private respondent Pahila does not appear to have prior possession of the premises in question, and, wherein although it appears that the title of the premises in question is in the name of respondent Pahila, there also is a showing that the same title may have been illegally issued; WHEREAS, the very imminent danger of demolition may result to irreparable damage to herein petitioners, thus, the impending demolition appears to be a compelling reason for the issuance of a TRO at this stage in this case. NOW THEREFORE, YOU, the herein respondents, YOUR AGENTS, REPRESENTATIVES, or ANY PERSON acting for and in your behalf, are hereby ENJOINED to CEASE and DESIST from further implementing the 5 April 2000 Writ of Execution and/or any of its Aliases or any demolition order, if one might have already been issued, in civil case No. 23671, MTCC, Branch 6, Bacolod City, until further orders from this Court.

On October 25, 2002, the petitioner sought a clarificatory order,17[17] moving that the TRO be vacated due to its being effective for only twenty days and 16[16] Id., pp. 92-93. 17[17] Id., pp. 94-95.

because such effectivity could neither be extended nor be made indefinite. She complained that her hands had already been tied for a year from executing the decision and from availing herself of the writ of demolition; and pleaded that it was time to give her justice in order that she could already enjoy the possession of the property. On October 30, 2002, the respondents moved for the early resolution of the case and for the issuance of the writ of prohibitory injunction.18[18] On November 12, 2002, the RTC issued the assailed writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction,19[19] as follows: NOW,

THEREFORE,

YOU,

the

herein

respondents,

YOUR

AGENTS,

REPRESENTATIVES, or any person acting for and in behalf, are hereby ENJOINED to CEASE and DESIST from further implementing the April 25, 2000 Writ of Execution and/or any of its aliases, or any demolition order, if one might have been issued already, in Civil Case No. 23671 before MTCC, Branch 6, Bacolod City, pending the hearing and final determination of the merits in this instant case, or until further orders from this Court. xxxx SO ORDERED.

The petitioner then directly came to the Court through her so-called petition for review on certiorari, seeking to annul and set aside the writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction issued by the RTC pursuant to its order dated November 12, 2002. She contended that: (a) the RTC issued the writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction in a way not in accord with law or the applicable jurisprudence, because the injunction was directed at the execution of a final and executory judgment of a court of law; (b) the respondents (as the petitioners in SCA Case No. 01-11522) had no existing right to be protected by injunction, because their right and cause of action were premised on the future and contingent event that the petitioners TCT No. T-55630 would be cancelled through a separate proceeding for the purpose; and (c) the writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction to enjoin the execution was issued long after the March 17, 1999 judgment of the MTCC had become final and executory. 18[18] Id., pp. 96-97. 19[19] Id., pp. 99-100.

Issues The petition presents the following issues, to wit: a. Whether the present petition is a proper remedy to assail the November 12, 2002 order of the RTC; and b. Whether the RTC lawfully issued the TRO and the writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction to enjoin the execution of the already final and executory March 17, 1999 decision of the MTCC. Ruling We give due course to the petition as a petition for certiorari. The RTC was guilty of manifestly grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in taking cognizance of SCA Case No. 01-11522 and in issuing the TRO and the writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction to restrain the execution of the final and executory decision of the MTCC. I November 12, 2002 order of the RTC is an interlocutory order that was not subject of appeal

With the petition being self-styled as a petition for review on certiorari, a mode of appeal, we have first to determine whether the assailed order of November 12, 2002 was an interlocutory or a final order. The distinction is relevant in deciding whether the order is the proper subject of an appeal, or of a special civil action for certiorari. The distinction between a final order and an interlocutory order is well known. The first disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing more to be done except to enforce by execution what the court has determined, but the latter does not completely dispose of the case but leaves something else to be decided upon. 20[20] An interlocutory order deals with preliminary matters and the trial on the merits is yet 20[20] Tan v. Republic, G.R. No. 170740, May 25, 2007, 523 SCRA 203, 210-211.

to be held and the judgment rendered.21[21] The test to ascertain whether or not an order or a judgment is interlocutory or final is: does the order or judgment leave something to be done in the trial court with respect to the merits of the case? If it does, the order or judgment is interlocutory; otherwise, it is final. The order dated November 12, 2002, which granted the application for the writ of preliminary injunction, was an interlocutory, not a final, order, and should not be the subject of an appeal. The reason for disallowing an appeal from an interlocutory order is to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single action, which necessarily suspends the hearing and decision on the merits of the action during the pendency of the appeals. Permitting multiple appeals will necessarily delay the trial on the merits of the case for a considerable length of time, and will compel the adverse party to incur unnecessary expenses, for one of the parties may interpose as many appeals as there are incidental questions raised by him and as there are interlocutory orders rendered or issued by the lower court.22[22] An interlocutory order may be the subject of an appeal, but only after a judgment has been rendered, with the ground for appealing the order being included in the appeal of the judgment itself. The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65,23[23] provided that the interlocutory

21[21] See Miranda v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-33007, June 18, 1976, 71 SCRA 295. 22[22] United Overseas Bank (formerly Westmont Bank) v. Judge Ros, G.R. No. 171532, August 7, 2007, 529 SCRA 334; citing Rudecon Management Corporation v. Singson, G.R. No. 150798, 31 March 2005, 454 SCRA 612, 629; also, Sitchon v. Sheriff of Occidental Negros, 80 Phil. 397, 399 (1948). 23[23] Section 1, Rule 41, Rules of Court, pertinently states: Section 1. Subject of appeal.An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable. No appeal may be taken from: xxx (c) An interlocutory order; xxx In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65. (emphasis supplied)

order is rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Then is certiorari under Rule 65 allowed to be resorted to.24[24] II The petition, by alleging acts constituting manifestly grave abuse of discretion, was a petition for certiorari Without disregarding the rule that an interlocutory order cannot be the subject of appeal, the Court is constrained to treat the present recourse as a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65. Certiorari is a writ issued by a superior court to an inferior court of record, or other tribunal or officer, exercising a judicial function, requiring the certification and return to the former of some proceeding then pending, or the record and proceedings in some cause already terminated, in cases where the procedure is not according to the course of the common law.25[25] The remedy is brought against a lower court, board, or officer rendering a judgment or order and seeks the annulment or modification of the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and the granting of such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.26[26] It is available when the following indispensable elements concur, to wit: 1. That it is directed against a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; 2. That such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion; and 3. That there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.27[27] Certiorari being an extraordinary remedy, the party who seeks to avail of the same must strictly observe the rules laid down by law. 28[28] The extraordinary writ 24[24] 1 F. Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium 540 (8th revised ed.). 25[25] I Bouviers Law Dictionary, Third Rev., p. 442. 26[26] Sec. 1, Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. 27[27] Gelindon v. Judge Dela Rama, G.R. No. 105072, December 9, 1993, 228 SCRA 322; Tan vs. Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302, 322; Cochingyan, Jr. v. Cloribel, G.R. No. L-27070-71, April 22, 1977, 76 SCRA 361. 28[28] Manila Midtown Hotels & Land Corp. v. NLRC, G. R. No. 118397, March 27, 1998, 288 SCRA 259, 265.

of certiorari may be availed of only upon a showing, in the minimum, that the respondent tribunal or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion.29[29] For a petition for certiorari and prohibition to prosper and be given due course, it must be shown that: (a) the respondent judge or tribunal issued the order without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion; or (b) the assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous, and the remedy of appeal cannot afford adequate and expeditious relief.30[30] Yet, the allegation that the tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion will not alone suffice. Equally imperative is that the petition must satisfactorily specify the acts committed or omitted by the tribunal, board or officer that constitute grave abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion means such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.31[31] To justify the issuance of the writ of certiorari, the abuse of discretion must be grave, as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and the abuse must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all, in contemplation of law, as to be equivalent

to having acted without

jurisdiction.32[32] A reading of the petition shows that the petitioner has satisfied the requirements to justify giving due course to her petition as a petition under Rule 65. She has identified therein some acts as constituting the RTC Judges manifestly grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, namely: (a) despite the final and executory nature of the judgment sought to be enjoined, the 29[29] Camacho v. Coresis, Jr., G.R. No. 134372, August 22, 2002, 387 SCRA 628. 30[30] Investments, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 60036, January 27, 1987, 147 SCRA 334. 31[31] Feliciano v. Villasin, G.R. No. 174929, June 27, 2008, 556 SCRA 348; Uy v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 156399-400, June 27, 2008, 556 SCRA 73. 32[32] Vergara v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 174567, March 12, 2009, 580 SCRA 693; Nationwide Security and Allied Services, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 155844, 14 July 2008, 558 SCRA 148.

RTC still issued the TRO and, later on, the assailed writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction to enjoin the implementation of the writ of execution; (b) the RTC issued the writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction to protect the respondents alleged right in the subject properties, but the right did not appear to be in esse; and (c) the issuance of the TRO and the writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction was in violation of the requirements imposed by Rule 58 of the Rules of Court and pertinent jurisprudence. Did the petitioners failure to first make a motion for reconsideration in the RTC preclude treating her petition as a petition for certiorari? The answer is in the negative. That the petitioner did not file a motion for reconsideration in the RTC before coming to this Court did not preclude treating her petition as one for certiorari. The requirement under Section 1 of Rule 65 that there must be no appeal, or any plain or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law admits exceptions. In Francisco Motors Corporation v. Court of Appeals,33[33] the Court has recognized exceptions to the requirement, such as: (a) when it is necessary to prevent irreparable damages and injury to a party; (b) where the trial judge capriciously and whimsically exercised his judgment; (c) where there may be danger of a failure of justice; (d) where an appeal would be slow, inadequate, and insufficient; (e) where the issue raised is one purely of law; (f) where public interest is involved; and (g) in case of urgency. The allegations of the petition definitely placed the petitioners recourse under most, if not all, of the exceptions. Was the petition timely filed? It was. The petitioner received a copy of the order dated November 12, 2002 on November 15, 2002. Pursuant to Section 4 of Rule 65,34[34] she had until January 14, 2003, or 60 days from November 15, 2002, within which to file a

33[33] G.R. Nos. 117622-23, October 23, 2006, 505 SCRA 8; see also Cervantes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 166755, November 18, 2005, 475 SCRA 562; Flores v. Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Pampanga, G.R. No. 159022, February 23, 2005, 452 SCRA 278, 282; Acance v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 159699, March 16, 2005, 453 SCRA 548, 558-559. 34[34] Section 4. When and where position filed. The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case of a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of said motion. x x x

petition for certiorari. She filed the petition on January 2, 2003,35[35] well within the period for her to do so. We also observe that the rule that a petition should have been brought under Rule 65 instead of under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (or vice versa) is not inflexible or rigid.36[36] The inflexibility or rigidity of application of the rules of procedure is eschewed in order to serve the higher ends of justice. Thus, substance is given primacy over form, for it is paramount that the rules of procedure are not applied in a very rigid technical sense, but used only to help secure, not override, substantial justice. If a technical and rigid enforcement of the rules is made, their aim is defeated.37[37] Verily, the strict application of procedural technicalities should not hinder the speedy disposition of the case on the merits.38[38] To institute a guideline, therefore, the Rules of Court expressly mandates that the rules of procedure shall be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.39[39] III

March 17, 1999 Decision of the MTCC, being already final and executory, could not be assailed; nor could its execution be restrained The respondents elevated to the Court the CA decision dated December 6, 1999 and resolution dated April 17, 2000 via a petition for certiorari (G.R. No. 143458 entitled Damiana Daguno, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al.) The Court dismissed the petition on July 19, 2000, and the dismissal became final and executory on October 20, 2000 because the respondents did not timely file a motion for reconsideration. Consequently, the MTCC rightly issued the writ of execution on April 5, 2000. Based on the sheriffs return of service, the writ of execution was duly served upon all the defendants. 35[35] Rollo, pp.19-20. 36[36] See, e.g., Salinas v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 114671, November 24, 1999, 319 SCRA 54. 37[37] Ramiscal, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, G. R. Nos. 140576-99, December 13, 2004, 446 SCRA 166; citing Salazar v. NLRC, G.R. No. 109210, April 17, 1997, 256 SCRA 273. 38[38] Caraan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124516, April 24, 1998, 289 SCRA 579. 39[39] Section 6, Rule 1, Rules of Court.

Under the circumstances, the principle of immutability of a final judgment must now be absolutely and unconditionally applied against the respondents. They could not anymore be permitted to interminably forestall the execution of the judgment through their interposition of new petitions or pleadings.40[40] Even as their right to initiate an action in court ought to be fully respected, their commencing SCA Case No. 01-11522 in the hope of securing a favorable ruling despite their case having been already fully and finally adjudicated should not be tolerated. Their move should not frustrate the enforcement of the judgment, the fruit and the end of the suit itself. Their right as the losing parties to appeal within the prescribed period could not defeat the correlative right of the winning party to enjoy at last the finality of the resolution of her case through execution and satisfaction of the judgment, which would be the life of the law.41[41] To frustrate the winning partys right through dilatory schemes is to frustrate all the efforts, time and expenditure of the courts, which thereby increases the costs of litigation. The interest of justice undeniably demanded that we should immediately write finis to the litigation, for all courts are by oath bound to guard against any scheme calculated to bring about the frustration of the winning partys right, and to stop any attempt to prolong controversies already resolved with finality.42[42]

It is true that notwithstanding the principle of immutability of final judgments, equity still accords some recourse to a party adversely affected by a final and executory judgment, specifically, the remedy of a petition to annul the judgment based on the ground of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction, or the remedy of a petition for relief from a final order or judgment under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court.43[43] He may also have a competent court stay the execution or prevent the enforcement of a final judgment when facts and circumstances that render

40[40] Bongcac v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 156687-88, May 21, 2009, 588 SCRA 64. 41[41] Yau v. Silverio, Sr., G.R. Nos. 158848 and 171994, February 4, 2008, 543 SCRA 520. 42[42] Lim v. Jabalde, G.R. No. 36786, April 17, 1989, 172 SCRA 211, 224; citing Banogon v. Serna, G.R. No. L-35469, October 9, 1987, 154 SCRA 573. 43[43] Salting v. Velez and Velez, G.R. No. 181930, January 10, 2011.

execution inequitable or unjust meanwhile transpire;44[44] or when a change in the situation of the parties can warrant an injunctive relief.45[45] Neither of such remaining equitable remedies is available anymore to the respondents, however, for the time for such remedies is now past. Indeed, it is now high time for the respondents to bow to the judgment, and to accept their fate under it. IV

Issuance of TRO and writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction is patently without basis and violated the requirements of the Rules of Court and jurisprudence At this juncture, we find and declare that the RTC Judges issuance of the assailed order dated November 12, 2002 granting the respondents application for the writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction constituted manifestly grave abuse of discretion. A. Respondents had no existing right violated by the implementation of the writ of execution Generally, injunction, being a preservative remedy for the protection of substantive rights or interests, is not a cause of action in itself but merely a provisional remedy, an adjunct to a main suit. It is resorted to only when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences that cannot be redressed under any standard of compensation. The controlling reason for the existence of the judicial power to issue the writ of injunction is that the court may thereby prevent a threatened or continuous irremediable injury to some of the parties before their claims can be thoroughly investigated and advisedly adjudicated. The application for the writ rests upon an alleged existence of an emergency or of a special reason for such an order to issue before the case can be regularly heard, and the essential conditions for granting such temporary injunctive relief are that the complaint alleges facts that appear to be sufficient to constitute a cause of action for

44[44] Bachrach Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128349, September 25, 1998, 296 SCRA 487, citing Lee v. De Guzman, Jr., G.R. No. 90926, July 6, 1990, 187 SCRA 276. 45[45] Bachrach Corporation v. Court of Appeals, id.; citing Luna v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. L68374, June 18, 1985, 137 SCRA 7; Heirs of Pedro Guminpin v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-34220, February 21, 19883, 120 SCRA 687.

injunction and that on the entire showing from both sides, it appears, in view of all the circumstances, that the injunction is reasonably necessary to protect the legal rights of plaintiff pending the litigation.46[46] A writ of preliminary injunction is an extraordinary event and is the strong arm of equity or a transcendent remedy. It is granted only to protect actual and existing substantial rights. Without actual and existing rights on the part of the applicant, and in the absence of facts bringing the matter within the conditions for its issuance, the ancillary writ must be struck down for being issued in grave abuse of discretion. Thus, injunction will not issue to protect a right not in esse, which is merely contingent, and which may never arise, or to restrain an act which does not give rise to a cause of action.47[47] Here, the respondents did not establish the existence of an actual right to be protected by injunction. They did not, to begin with, hold any enforceable claim in the property subject of the MTCC decision and of the writ of execution. The Memoranda and investigative report, whereby the DENR appeared to classify the property as foreshore land, conferred upon the respondents no interest or right in the land. Under all circumstances, the classification was not a supervening event that entitled them to the protection of the injunctive relief. Their claim to any right as of then was merely contingent, and was something that might not even arise in the future. Simply stated, they could not lay proper claim to the land before the State has taken a positive act of first properly classifying the land as foreshore land and the courts have first conclusively determined and adjudged the ownership in their favor in a suit brought for the purpose. Without the States positive act of classification and the courts adjudication, all that the respondents had was an inchoate expectation that might not at all materialize, especially if we consider that the petitioner was already the registered owner of the same property, as evidenced by her existing and valid transfer certificate of title covering the land (a fact that

46[46] Del Rosario v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115106, March 15, 1996, 255 SCRA 152, 158.

47[47] 43 CJS Injunctions 18.

they themselves admitted and acknowledged),48[48] for which she enjoyed the indefeasibility of a Torrens title.49[49] Presumably well aware that the respondents held absolutely no valid and existing right in the land, the RTC Judge had plainly no factual and legal bases for enjoining the enforcement of the writ of execution through the TRO and the writ of preliminary injunction. He obviously acted arbitrarily and whimsically, because injunction protected only an existing right or actual interest in property. Thus, he was guilty of committing manifestly grave abuse of discretion, and compounded his guilt by stopping the enforcement of a final and executory decision of the MTCC. B. TRO and writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction were wrongfully issued for an indefinite period We further note that the RTC Judge expressly made the TRO effective until further orders from him. He thereby contravened explicit rules of procedure. He knowingly did so, considering that he thereby disregarded the nature and purpose of the TRO as a temporary and limited remedy, instead of a permanent and unrestricted relief. He disregarded Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, which expressly stated that the life span of a TRO was only 20 days from service of the TRO on the party or person sought to be enjoined. Considering that the limited life span of a TRO was a long-standing and basic rule of procedure, he consciously arrogated unto himself a power that he did not have. Ignoring a rule as elementary as the 20-day life span of a TRO amounted to gross ignorance of law and procedure. His violation is seemingly made worse by the fact that he thereby usurped the authority of the Court as the only court with the power to issue a TRO effective until further orders.50[50]

48[48] Rollo, p. 382. 49[49] Ugale v. Gorospe, G.R. No. 149516, September 11, 2006, 501 SCRA 376; Seville v. National Development Company, G.R. No. 129401, February 2, 2000, 351 SCRA 112; De Pedro v. Romasan Development Corp., G.R. No. 158002, February 28, 2005, 452 SCRA 564, 575. 50[50] Section 5, Rule 58, 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure.

Due to its lifetime of only 20 days from service on the party or person to be enjoined, the TRO that the RTC Judge issued automatically expired on the twentieth day without need of any judicial declaration to that effect. Yet, by making the TRO effective until further orders, he made the effectivity of the TRO indefinite. He thus took for granted the caution that injunction, as the strong arm of equity,51[51] should not be routinely or lightly granted. Again, restraint was required of him, for the power to issue injunctions should be exercised sparingly, with utmost care, and with great caution and deliberation. The power is to be exercised only where the reason and necessity therefor are clearly established, and only in cases reasonably free from doubt.52[52] For, it has been said that there is no power the exercise of which is more delicate, requires greater caution and deliberation, or is more dangerous in a doubtful case, than the issuing of an injunction.53[53] WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for certiorari. We NULLIFY and SET ASIDE the writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction issued on November 12, 2002 for being devoid of legal and factual bases; and DIRECT the Regional Trial Court, Branch 48, in Bacolod City to dismiss SCA Case No. 01-11522. Presiding Judge Gorgonio J. Ybaez of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 48, in Bacolod City is ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE in writing within ten days from notice why he should not be administratively sanctioned for gross ignorance of the law and procedure for his manifest disregard of the prohibition under the Rules of Court against unwarranted restraining orders and writs of injunction, and for issuing a temporary restraining order effective until furthers of the court.

51[51] 43 CJS Injunctions 2; citing Anderson v. Smith, 8 Alaska 470; Miollis v. Schneider, 222 N. E. 2d 715, 77 Ill. App. 2d 420; Triangle Sign Co. v. Randolph & State Property, Inc., 147 N. E. 2d 451, 16 Ill. App. 2d 21; Arthur Murray Dance Studios of Cleveland v. Witter, Com. PI., 105 N. E. 2d 685. 52[52] 43 CJS Injunctions 15. 53[53] Detroit Newspaper Publishers Association v. Detroit Typgraphical Union No. 18, Intern. Typographical Union, C. A. Mich., 471 F. 2d 872; Ancora-Citronelle Corp. v. Green, 115 Cal. Rptr., 879, 41 C. A. 3d 16; Mallon v. City of Long Beach, 330 P. 2d 423, 164 C. a. 2d 178.

Costs of suit to be paid by the respondents. SO ORDERED.

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA Chief Justice Chairperson TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO Associate Justice Associate Justice MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. Associate Justice CERTIFICATION Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

RENATO C. CORONA Chief Justice

G.R. No. 194751, November 26, 2014 - AURORA N. DE PEDRO, Petitioner, v. ROMASAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent.

SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 194751, November 26, 2014 AURORA N. DE PEDRO, Petitioner, v. ROMASAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent. DECISION LEONEN, J.: Regardless of the type of action — whether it is in personam, in rem or quasi in rem — the preferred mode of service of summons is personal service. To avail themselves of substituted service, courts must rely on a detailed enumeration of the sheriff’s actions and a showing that the defendant cannot be served despite diligent and reasonable efforts. The sheriff’s return, which contains these details, is entitled to a presumption of regularity, and on this basis, the court may allow substituted service. Should the sheriff’s return be wanting of these details, substituted service will be irregular if no other evidence of the efforts to serve summons was presented. Failure to serve summons will mean that the court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. However, the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration is tantamount to voluntary appearance. This Rule 45 petition seeks the review of the Court of Appeals July 7, 2010 decision in CA G.R. SP. No. 96471. The Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s action for annulment of the Regional Trial Court decision, which, in turn, nullified her certificate of title. This case originated from separate complaints for nullification of free patent and original certificates of title, filed against several defendants.1 One of the defendants is petitioner Aurora De Pedro (De Pedro).2 The complaints were filed by respondent Romasan Development Corporation before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City on July 7, 1998.3

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Respondent Romasan Development Corporation alleged in its complaints that it was the owner and possessor of a parcel of land in Antipolo City.4 The land was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 236044.5

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Based on respondent’s narrative, its representative, Mr. Rodrigo Ko, discovered sometime in November 1996 that De Pedro put up fences on a portion of its Antipolo property.6 Mr. Ko confronted De Pedro regarding her acts, but she was able to show title and documents evidencing her ownership.7 chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Mr. Ko informed respondent about the documents.8 Upon checking with the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office-Department of Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO-DENR), it was discovered that the DENR issued free patents covering portions of respondent’s property to the following: chanroblesvir tuallawlibrary

a. Defendant Nora Jocson, married to Carlito Jocson - OCT No. P-723, Free Patent No. 045802-91-616; b. Defendants Heirs of Marcelino Santos[,] represented by Cristino Santos - OCT No. P727, Free Patent No. 045802-91-919; c. Defendant Aurora de Pedro married to Elpidio de Pedro - OCT No. 691, Free Patent No. 045802-91-914; d. Defendant Wilson Dadia - OCT No. P-722, Free Patent No. 045802-91-915; and

e. Defendant Prudencio Marana - OCT No. P-721, Free Patent N[o]. 045802-91-923.9 (Emphasis supplied) Based on these free patents, the Register of Deeds issued titles covering portions of respondent’s property.10 Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 691, Free Patent No. 045802-91-914 was signed by the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office in favor of De Pedro on December 9, 1991.11 chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Respondent further alleged in its separate complaints that the government could not legally issue the free patents because at the time of their issuance, the land was already released for disposition to private individuals.12 OCT No. 438, from which respondent’s TCT No. 236044 originated, was already issued as early as August 30, 1937.13

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Respondent also prayed for the payment of attorney’s fees and exemplary damages. 14

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Attempts to personally serve summons on De Pedro failed.15 The officer’s return, dated February 22, 1999 reads in part: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

OFFICER’S RETURN I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 15th and 18th day of February, 1999, I have served a copy of the summons with complaint and annexes dated January 29, 1999 issued by Regional Trial Court, Fourth Judicial Region, Branch 74, Antipolo City upon defendants in the above-entitled case on the following, to wit; 1. AURORA N. DE PEDRO – Unserved for the reason that according to the messenger of Post Office of Pasig their [sic] is no person in the said given address.16 Respondent filed a motion to serve summons and the complaint by publication.17

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On August 17, 1998, the Regional Trial Court granted the motion.18 The summons and the complaint were published in People’s Balita on its April 24, May 1, and May 8, 1998 issues. 19

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On July 15, 1999, respondent moved to declare all defendants in its complaints, including De Pedro, in default for failure to file their answers.20 Respondent also moved to be allowed to present evidence ex parte.21 The Regional Trial Court granted the motions on August 19, 1999.22 chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

On January 7, 2000, the Regional Trial Court issued an order declaring as nullity the titles and free patents issued to all defendants in respondent’s complaint, including the free patent issued to De Pedro.23 Thus: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Accordingly the Court declares as a nullity the following titles and Free Patents issued to the Defendants. a. Defendant Nora Jocson married to Carlito Jocson OCT No. P-723; Free Patent N[o]. 045802-91-616; b. Defendant Heirs of Marcelino Santos represented by Cristino Santos – OCT N[o]. P-727; Free Patent N[o]. 045802-91-919; c. Defendant Aurora N. de Pedro married to Elpidio de Pedro – OCT No. P-691; Free Patent No. 045802-91-914; d. Defendant Wilson Dadia – OCT No. P-722; Free Patent No. 045802-91-915; e. Defendant Prudencio Marana – OCT No. P-721; Free Patent N[o]. 045802-91-923. There being clear bad faith on the part of the Private defendants in obtaining said Free Patents and titles in their names covering the portions of the property of the plaintiff, said defendants are each ordered to pay to the plaintiff the amount of P20,000.00 as attorney’s fees, P3,000.00 as appearance fee and also P50,000.00 as moral damages with costs against said private defendants.

Once the Decision becomes final and in order to give full force and effect to the Decision of the Court nullifying the titles and patents issued to the defendants, the latter are directed to surrender the same within a period of ten (10) days from the finality of said Decision to the Registry of Deeds of Marikina City and failure on the part of the defendants to surrender the owner’s duplicate of the titles in their possession, defendant Register of Deeds of Marikina City is authorized to cancel the same without the presentation of said owner’s duplicate of titles in the possession of the defendants.24 (Emphasis supplied) In so ruling, the Regional Trial Court noted that none of the defendants, including De Pedro, filed an answer to respondent’s complaints.25 The Regional Trial Court also noted the committee report admitting CENRO’s irregularity in the issuance of the free patents to the defendants in the case.26 chanRoblesvirtualLaw library

The Regional Trial Court also found that the title and free patent issued to De Pedro were void.27 As early as August 30, 1937, or before the free patents were issued to the defendants in the case, OCT No. 438 was already issued to the property’s original owner.28 Hence, the property was already “segregated from the mass of public domain” that can be disposed by the government.29 chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

On March 30, 2000, De Pedro, through counsel, filed before the Regional Trial Court a motion for new trial, alleging that the counsel received notice of the January 7, 2000 decision on March 16, 2000.30

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De Pedro argued that the Regional Trial Court did not acquire jurisdiction over her person because of improper and defective service of summons. Citing the officer’s return dated February 22, 1999, De Pedro pointed out that summons was not personally served upon her “for the reason that according to the messenger of Post Office of Pasig their (sic) is no person in the said given address.”31

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De Pedro also argued that the case should have been dismissed on the ground of litis pendentia. She alleged that there was a pending civil case filed by her, involving the same property, when respondent filed the complaints against her and several others.32

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On September 30, 2002, the Regional Trial Court issued an order denying De Pedro’s motion for new trial.33

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The Regional Trial Court ruled that summons was validly served upon De Pedro through publication, in accordance with the Rules of Court.34 Moreover, counting from the date of the summons’ publication beginning on March 2, 2000, the motion for new trial was filed beyond the 15-day period within which the motion may be filed.35 Therefore, the Regional Trial Court decision had become final and executory.36

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The Regional Trial Court also ruled that the reckoning period for filing the motion for new trial cannot be De Pedro’s counsel’s receipt of the decision. This is because at the time of the issuance of the court’s decision, which had already become final and executory, De Pedro’s counsel was yet to enter his appearance for De Pedro.37

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De Pedro filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, alleging that the Regional Trial Court committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied her motion for new trial.38

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On March 30, 2006, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari for lack of merit, and affirmed the denial of De Pedro’s motion for new trial.39

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The Court of Appeals noted De Pedro’s belated filing of her motion for new trial. The Court of Appeals also noted De Pedro’s failure to allege any ground that would justify the grant of a motion for new trial under Rule 37, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. 40

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De Pedro’s motion for reconsideration was denied in the Court of Appeals resolution dated August 24, 2006.41

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De Pedro elevated the case to this court, but this was likewise denied in the resolution dated

October 4, 2006 for failure to pay the Special Allowance for the Judiciary and sheriff’s fees.42

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On October 11, 2006, De Pedro filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for annulment of the January 7, 2000 judgment of the Regional Trial Court43 on grounds of lack of jurisdiction, litis pendentia, and for having been dispossessed of her property without due process. Citing Pantaleon v. Asuncion,44 De Pedro pointed out that “[d]ue process of law requires personal service to support a personal judgment, and, when the proceeding is strictly in personam brought to determine the personal rights and obligations of the parties, personal service within the state or a voluntary appearance in the case is essential to the acquisition of jurisdiction [so] as to constitute compliance with the constitutional requirement of due process.”45 chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

De Pedro also claimed to be the real owner of the property by virtue of OCT No. P-691.46 She pointed out that the same Regional Trial Court branch ordered the reconstitution of her title to the property in 1997.47 The Regional Trial Court also issued a certificate of finality stating that “an Entry of Judgment had already been issued by the Court of Appeals dated January 16, 2006.”48 chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

On July 7, 2010, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision denying De Pedro’s petition for annulment of judgment.49 The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals decision reads: chanroblesv irtuallawlibrary

WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby DENIED.50 The Court of Appeals ruled that since petitioner already availed herself of the remedy of new trial, and raised the case before the Court of Appeals via petition for certiorari, she can no longer file a petition for annulment of judgment.51

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De Pedro’s motion for reconsideration was denied on December 3, 2010:52

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WHEREFORE, premises considered, the motion for reconsideration is DENIED for lack of merit.53 On January 13, 2011, De Pedro filed before this court a Rule 45 petition, seeking the reversal of the July 7, 2010 Court of Appeals decision and the December 3, 2010 Court of Appeals resolution.54 chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The issues in this case are: I.

Whether the trial court decision was void for failure of the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over the person of petitioner Aurora N. De Pedro; and

II.

Whether filing a motion for new trial and petition for certiorari is a bar from filing a petition for annulment of judgment.

Petitioner argues that respondent’s prayer for attorney’s fees, appearance fees, exemplary damages, and costs of suit sought to establish personal obligations upon petitioner in favor of respondent.55 Hence, the case filed by respondent before the Regional Trial Court was an action in personam, which required personal service upon her for the court’s acquisition of jurisdiction over her person.56 In this case, the Regional Trial Court allowed service of summons by publication instead of ordering that summons be served by substituted service.57 Improper service of summons rendered the trial court decision null and void.58 It means that the court could not acquire jurisdiction over the person of petitioner.59 chanRoblesvirtualLa wlibrary

Petitioner also argues that respondent’s complaints were dismissible on the ground of litis pendentia, pointing to the alleged pending case between the same parties and involving same subject matter at the time when respondent filed its complaint before the Regional Trial Court in 1998.60 The alleged pending case was filed in 1997 by petitioner and her spouse against respondent, seeking “enforce[ment] of their rights as owners, and claim[ing] damages for the unlawful and illegal acts of dispossession, terrorism and violence which they, their family and their close relatives were subjected to by [respondent].”61 chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

On her ownership of the property, petitioner argues that she was able to obtain OCT No. P-691 in 1991 in strict and faithful compliance with all the requirements.62 When the Register of Deeds lost the records pertaining to the property, the Regional Trial Court ordered the reconstitution of the title on September 23, 1997.63 The same trial court issued the certificate of finality of the order on March 16, 2006.64 chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Moreover, petitioner refers to a counter-affidavit issued by a certain Jesus Pampellona, Deputy Public Land Inspector of CENRO-Antipolo, in the preliminary investigation of a case before the Department of Justice, docketed as I.S. No. 99-503 and entitled: “Rodrigo Sy v. Maximo Pentino, et al.” Petitioner highlights Pampellona’s statements that the free patent applicants for the property were found to be in “actual, public, adverse and continuous possession on the specific lots applied for by them with several improvements like the house of Mrs. Aurora de Pedro and several fruit[-]bearing trees with an average age of 20-25 years scattered within the twelve (12) hectares area applied for by the above named applicants;”65 Based on the affidavit, Pampellona was “unaware, at the time, of any previous title issued in favor of any person or entity covering the subject lots above mentioned as there was at that time, no existing record, both in the CENRO, Antipolo, Rizal, or at the Land Management Bureau in Manila, attesting to the issuance of previous titles on the subject lots.”66 chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Lastly, petitioner argues that the trial court decision was null and void, considering that petitioner’s title was cancelled in contravention of Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, which prohibits collateral attack upon certificates of title.67

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In its comment, respondent argues that the process server tried other forms of substituted service, including service by registered mail.68

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Respondent also argues that petitioner was in evident malice and bad faith when she allegedly did not disclose in her petition other actions taken by her after the Regional Trial Court had denied her motion for new trial.69 Particularly, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, pertaining to the trial court’s denial of the motion for new trial.70 When the petition for certiorari was denied, petitioner also filed a petition for review before this court, which was also denied.71 For these reasons, petitioner’s petition for review before this court deserves outright dismissal.72 chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

I The sheriff’s return must show the details of the efforts exerted to personally serve summons upon defendants or respondents, before substituted service or service by publication is availed Courts may exercise their powers validly and with binding effect if they acquire jurisdiction over: (a) the cause of action or the subject matter of the case; (b) the thing or the res; (c) the parties; and (d) the remedy. Jurisdiction over the subject matter refers to the power or authority of courts to hear and decide cases of a general class.73 It is conferred by the Constitution or by law.74 It is not acquired through administrative issuances or court orders. It is not acquired by agreement, stipulation, waiver,75 or silence.76 Any decision by a court, without a law vesting jurisdiction upon such court, is void. Jurisdiction over the thing or res is the power of the court over an object or thing being litigated. The court may acquire jurisdiction over the thing by actually or constructively seizing or placing it under the court’s custody.77

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Jurisdiction over the parties refers to the power of the court to make decisions that are binding on persons. The courts acquire jurisdiction over complainants or petitioners as soon as they file their complaints or petitions. Over the persons of defendants or respondents, courts acquire jurisdiction by a valid service of summons or through their voluntary submission.78 Generally, a person voluntarily submits to the court’s jurisdiction when he or she participates in the trial despite improper service of summons.

Courts79 and litigants must be aware of the limits and the requirements for the acquisition of court jurisdiction. Decisions or orders issued by courts outside their jurisdiction are void. Complaints or petitions filed before the wrong court or without acquiring jurisdiction over the parties may be dismissed.80

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Petitioner argued that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over her person because she was not properly served with summons. After the summons had returned unserved to petitioner because “there [was] no person in the said given address,”81 the trial court allowed the publication of the summons to petitioner. Jurisdiction over the parties is required regardless of the type of action — whether the action is in personam, in rem, or quasi in rem. In actions in personam, the judgment is for or against a person directly.82 Jurisdiction over the parties is required in actions in personam because they seek to impose personal responsibility or liability upon a person.83

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Courts need not acquire jurisdiction over parties on this basis in in rem and quasi in rem actions. Actions in rem or quasi in rem are not directed against the person based on his or her personal liability.84 chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Actions in rem are actions against the thing itself. They are binding upon the whole world.85 Quasi in rem actions are actions involving the status of a property over which a party has interest.86 Quasi in rem actions are not binding upon the whole world. They affect only the interests of the particular parties.87

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However, to satisfy the requirements of due process, jurisdiction over the parties in in rem and quasi in rem actions is required. The phrase, “against the thing,” to describe in rem actions is a metaphor. It is not the “thing” that is the party to an in rem action; only legal or natural persons may be parties even in in rem actions. “Against the thing” means that resolution of the case affects interests of others whether direct or indirect. It also assumes that the interests — in the form of rights or duties — attach to the thing which is the subject matter of litigation. In actions in rem, our procedure assumes an active vinculum over those with interests to the thing subject of litigation. Due process requires that those with interest to the thing in litigation be notified and given an opportunity to defend those interests. Courts, as guardians of constitutional rights, cannot be expected to deny persons their due process rights while at the same time be considered as acting within their jurisdiction. Violation of due process rights is a jurisdictional defect. This court recognized this principle in Aducayen v. Flores.88 In the same case, this court further ruled that this jurisdictional defect is remedied by a petition for certiorari.89

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Similarly in Vda. de Cuaycong v. Vda. de Sengbengco,90 this court held that a decision that was issued in violation of a person’s due process rights suffers a fatal infirmity.91

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The relation of due process to jurisdiction is recognized even in administrative cases wherein the standard of evidence is relatively lower. Thus, in Montoya v. Varilla:92 chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are ousted from their jurisdiction. The violation of a party’s right to due process raises a serious jurisdictional issue which cannot be glossed over or disregarded at will. Where the denial of the fundamental right of due process is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right is void for lack of jurisdiction.93 An action for annulment of certificate of title is quasi in rem. It is not an action “against a person on the basis of his personal liability,”94 but an action that subjects a person’s interest over a property to a burden. The action for annulment of a certificate of title threatens petitioner’s interest in the property. Petitioner is entitled to due process with respect to that interest. The court does not have competence or authority to proceed with an action for annulment of

certificate of title without giving the person, in whose name the certificate was issued all the opportunities to be heard. Hence, regardless of the nature of the action, proper service of summons is imperative. A decision rendered without proper service of summons suffers a defect in jurisdiction. Respondent’s institution of a proceeding for annulment of petitioner’s certificate of title is sufficient to vest the court with jurisdiction over the res, but it is not sufficient for the court to proceed with the case with authority and competence. Personal service of summons is the preferred mode of service of summons.95 Thus, as a rule, summons must be served personally upon the defendant or respondent wherever he or she may be found. If the defendant or respondent refuses to receive the summons, it shall be tendered to him or her.96

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If the defendant or respondent is a domestic juridical person, personal service of summons shall be effected upon its president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel wherever he or she may be found.97

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Other modes of serving summons may be done when justified. Service of summons through other modes will not be effective without showing serious attempts to serve summons through personal service. Thus, the rules allow summons to be served by substituted service only for justifiable causes and if the defendant or respondent cannot be served within reasonable time. 98 Substituted service is effected “(a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant’s residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant’s office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.”99

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Service of summons by publication in a newspaper of general circulation is allowed when the defendant or respondent is designated as an unknown owner or if his or her whereabouts are “unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry.”100 It may only be effected after unsuccessful attempts to serve the summons personally, and after diligent inquiry as to the defendant’s or respondent’s whereabouts. Service of summons by extraterritorial service is allowed after leave of court when the defendant or respondent does not reside or is not found in the country or is temporarily out of the country.101 chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

If a defendant or respondent voluntarily appears in trial or participates in the proceedings, it is generally construed as sufficient service of summons.102

chanRoblesvirtualLaw library

In

this

case,

summons

was

served

by

publication.

A look into the content of the sheriff’s return will determine if the circumstances warranted the deviation from the rule preferring personal service of summons over other modes of service. The sheriff’s return must contain a narration of the circumstances showing efforts to personally serve summons to the defendants or respondents and the impossibility of personal service of summons. Citing Hamilton v. Levy,103 this court said of substituted service in Domagas v. Jensen:104 chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The pertinent facts and circumstances attendant to the service of summons must be stated in the proof of service or Officer’s Return; otherwise, any substituted service made in lieu of personal service cannot be upheld. This is necessary because substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of service. It is a method extraordinary in character and hence may be used only as prescribed and in the circumstances authorized by statute. Here, no such explanation was made. Failure to faithfully, strictly, and fully comply with the requirements of substituted service renders said service ineffective.105 This court also said in Manotoc v. Court of Appeals:

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The date and time of the attempts on personal service, the inquiries made to locate the defendant, the name/s of the occupants of the alleged residence or house of defendant and all other acts done, though futile, to serve the summons on defendant must be specified in the Return to justify

substituted service. The form on Sheriff’s Return of Summons on Substituted Service prescribed in the Handbook for Sheriffs published by the Philippine Judicial Academy requires a narration of the efforts made to find the defendant personally and the fact of failure. .

.

.

.

However, in view of the numerous claims of irregularities in substituted service which have spawned the filing of a great number of unnecessary special civil actions of certiorari and appeals to higher courts, resulting in prolonged litigation and wasteful legal expenses, the Court rules in the case at bar that the narration of the efforts made to find the defendant and the fact of failure written in broad and imprecise words will not suffice. The facts and circumstances should be stated with more particularity and detail on the number of attempts made at personal service, dates and times of the attempts, inquiries to locate defendant, names of occupants of the alleged residence, and the reasons for failure should be included in the Return to satisfactorily show the efforts undertaken. That such efforts were made to personally serve summons on defendant, and those resulted in failure, would prove impossibility of prompt personal service. Moreover, to allow sheriffs to describe the facts and circumstances in inexact terms would encourage routine performance of their precise duties relating to substituted service—for it would be quite easy to shroud or conceal carelessness or laxity in such broad terms.106 A sheriff’s return enjoys the presumption of regularity in its issuance if it contains (1) the details of the circumstances surrounding the sheriff’s attempt to serve the summons personally upon the defendants or respondents; and (2) the particulars showing the impossibility of serving the summons within reasonable time.107 It does not enjoy the presumption of regularity if the return was merely pro forma. Failure to state the facts and circumstances that rendered service of summons impossible renders service of summons and the return ineffective. In that case, no substituted service or service by publication can be valid. This court in Manotoc explained that the presumption of regularity in the issuance of the sheriff’s return does not apply to patently defective returns. Thus: chanroblesvir tuallawlibrary

The court a quo heavily relied on the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty. It reasons out that “[t]he certificate of service by the proper officer is prima facie evidence of the facts set out herein, and to overcome the presumption arising from said certificate, the evidence must be clear and convincing.” The Court acknowledges that this ruling is still a valid doctrine. However, for the presumption to apply, the Sheriff’s Return must show that serious efforts or attempts were exerted to personally serve the summons and that said efforts failed. These facts must be specifically narrated in the Return. To reiterate, it must clearly show that the substituted service must be made on a person of suitable age and discretion living in the dwelling or residence of defendant. Otherwise, the Return is flawed and the presumption cannot be availed of. As previously explained, the Return of Sheriff Cañelas did not comply with the stringent requirements of Rule 14, Section 8 on substituted service. (Emphasis supplied) In the case of Venturanza v. Court of Appeals, it was held that “x x x the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions by the sheriff is not applicable in this case where it is patent that the sheriff’s return is defective.” (Emphasis supplied) While the Sheriff’s Return in the Venturanza case had no statement on the effort or attempt to personally serve the summons, the Return of Sheriff Cañelas in the case at bar merely described the efforts or attempts in general terms lacking in details as required by the ruling in the case of Domagas v. Jensen and other cases. It is as if Cañelas’ Return did not mention any effort to accomplish personal service. Thus, the substituted service is void.108 In this case, the sheriff’s return states: OFFICER’S RETURN

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 15th and 18th day of February, 1999, I have served a copy of the summons with complaint and annexes dated January 29, 1999 issued by Regional Trial Court, Fourth Judicial Region, Branch 74, Antipolo City upon defendants in the above-entitled case on the following, to wit; 1. AURORA N. DE PEDRO – Unserved for the reason that according to the messenger of Post Office of Pasig their [sic] is no person in the said given address.109 This return shows no detail of the sheriff’s efforts to serve the summons personally upon petitioner. The summons was unserved only because the post office messenger stated that there was no “Aurora N. De Pedro” in the service address. The return did not show that the sheriff attempted to locate petitioner’s whereabouts. Moreover, it cannot be concluded based on the return that personal service was rendered impossible under the circumstances or that service could no longer be made within reasonable time. The lack of any demonstration of effort on the part of the sheriff to serve the summons personally upon petitioner is a deviation from this court’s previous rulings that personal service is the preferred mode of service, and that the sheriff must narrate in his or her return the efforts made to effect personal service. Thus, the sheriff’s return in this case was defective. No substituted service or service by publication will be allowed based on such defective return. The issuance of a judgment without proper service of summons is a violation of due process rights. The judgment, therefore, suffers a jurisdictional defect. The case would have been dismissible had petitioner learned about the case while trial was pending. At that time, a motion to dismiss would have been proper. After the trial, the case would have been the proper subject of an action for annulment of judgment. Petitioner learned about the action for annulment of title only after trial. Instead of filing an action for annulment of judgment, however, she filed a motion for new trial without alleging any proper ground. Rule 37 of the Rules of Court provides that a party may move and the court may grant a new trial based on the following causes: chanroblesvir tuallawlibrary

(a) Fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against and by reason of which such aggrieved party has probably been impaired in his rights; or (b) Newly discovered evidence, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial, and which if presented would probably alter the result.110 Petitioner insisted in her motion for new trial that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over her person. She did not allege that fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence impaired her rights. Neither did she allege that she found newly discovered evidence that could have altered the trial court decision. When her motion for new trial was denied, she filed a petition for certiorari, insisting that her motion for new trial should have been granted on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over her person. The Court of Appeals denied the petition for her failure to allege any ground for new trial. We cannot attribute error on the part of the Court of Appeals for this denial because, indeed, lack of jurisdiction is not a ground for granting a new trial. What cannot be denied is the fact that petitioner was already notified of respondent’s action for annulment of petitioner’s title when she filed a motion for new trial and, later, a petition for certiorari. At that time, petitioner was deemed, for purposes of due process, to have been properly notified of the action involving her title to the property. Lack of jurisdiction could have already been raised in an action for annulment of judgment. Thus, when petitioner erroneously filed her motion for new trial and petition for certiorari instead of an action for annulment of judgment, she was deemed to have voluntarily participated in the proceedings against her title. The actions and remedies she chose to avail bound her. Petitioner’s failure to file an action for annulment of judgment at this time was fatal to her cause. We cannot conclude now that she was denied due process. cralawred

II

Petitioner filing judgment

is a

already petition

for

barred annulment

from of

A petition for annulment of judgment is a recourse that is equitable in character.111 It is independent of the case112 and is “allowed only in exceptional cases as where there is no available or other adequate remedy.”113

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An action for annulment of judgment may be filed to assail Regional Trial Court judgments when resort to other remedies can no longer be had through no fault of petitioner. Section 1 of Rule 47 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides: chanroblesv irtuallawlibrary

Section 1. Coverage. – This Rule shall govern the annulment by the Court of Appeals of judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts for which the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner. An action for annulment of judgment may be based on only two grounds: 1) extrinsic fraud; and 2) lack of jurisdiction. Section 2 of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court states: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Section 2. Grounds for Annulment. – The annulment may be based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground if it was availed of, or could have been availed of, in a motion for new trial or petition for relief. Lack of jurisdiction being a valid ground for annulment of judgments, circumstances that negate the court’s acquisition of jurisdiction — including defective service of summons — are causes for an action for annulment of judgments.114

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However, this court had an occasion to say that an action for annulment of judgment “may not be invoked (1) where the party has availed himself of the remedy of new trial, appeal, petition for relief, or other appropriate remedy and lost; or (2) where he has failed to avail himself of those remedies through his own fault or negligence.”115 Thus, an action for annulment of judgment is not always readily available even if there are causes for annulling a judgment. In this case, petitioner’s main grounds for filing the action for annulment are lack of jurisdiction over her person, and litis pendentia. These are the same grounds that were raised in the motion for new trial filed before and denied by the Regional Trial Court. Applying the above rules, we rule that the Court of Appeals did not err in denying petitioner’s petition for annulment of the Regional Trial Court’s judgment. Petitioner had already filed a motion for new trial and petition for certiorari invoking lack of jurisdiction as ground. Petitioner’s filing of the petition for annulment of judgment after she had filed a motion for new trial and lost, with both actions raising the same grounds, reveals an intent to secure a judgment in her favor by abusing and making a mockery of the legal remedies provided by law. This kind of abuse is what this court tries to guard against when it limited its application, and stated in some of the cases that an action for annulment of judgment cannot be invoked when other remedies had already been availed. As this court explained in Macalalag v. Ombudsman:116

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Rule 47, entitled “Annulment of Judgments or Final Orders and Resolutions,” is a new provision under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure albeit the remedy has long been given imprimatur by the courts. The rule covers “annulment by the Court of Appeals of judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts for which the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies could no longer be availed of through no fault of the petitioner.” An action for annulment of judgment is a remedy in law independent of the case where the judgment sought to be annulled is rendered. The concern that the remedy could so easily be resorted to as an instrument to delay a final and executory judgment, has

prompted safeguards to be put in place in order to avoid an abuse of the rule. Thus, the annulment of judgment may be based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction, and the remedy may not be invoked (1) where the party has availed himself of the remedy of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedy and lost therefrom, or (2) where he has failed to avail himself of those remedies through his own fault or negligence.117 (Emphasis supplied) Similarly, this court ruled in Sigma Homebuilding Corporation v. Inter-Alia Management Corporation, et al.:118 chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

A petition for annulment of judgment is an extraordinary remedy and is not to be granted indiscriminately by the Court. It is allowed only in exceptional cases and cannot be used by a losing party to make a mockery of a duly promulgated decision long final and executory. The remedy may not be invoked where the party has availed himself of the remedy of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedy and lost, or where he has failed to avail himself of those remedies through his own fault or negligence. Litigation must end sometime. It is essential to an effective and efficient administration of justice that, once a judgment becomes final, the winning party should not be deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Courts must therefore guard against any scheme calculated to bring about that undesirable result. Thus, we deem it fit to finally put an end to the present controversy.119 (Emphasis supplied) Thus, an action for annulment of judgment “will not so easily and readily lend itself to abuse by parties aggrieved by final judgments.”120 Petitioner cannot abuse the court’s processes to revive a case that has already been rendered final against her favor, for the purpose of securing a favorable judgment. An action for annulment of judgment cannot be used by petitioner who has lost her case through fault of her own, to make “a complete farce of a duly promulgated decision that has long become final and executory.”121 chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

III Filing title 48

an is of

action not a Presidential

for violation Decree

annulment of No.

of Section 1529

Petitioner insists that the annulment of her title was a violation of Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, which provides: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Sec. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. – A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law. Petitioner is mistaken. In Sarmiento, et al. v. Court of Appeals,122 this court said:

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An action is deemed an attack on a title when the object of the action or proceeding is to nullify the title, and thus challenge the judgment pursuant to which the title was decreed. The attack is direct when the object of the action is to annul or set aside such judgment, or enjoin its enforcement. On the other hand, the attack is indirect or collateral when, in an action to obtain a different relief, an attack on the judgment is nevertheless made as an incident thereof.123 An action for annulment of certificate of title is a direct attack on the title because it challenges the judgment decree of title. In Goco v. Court of Appeals,124 this court said that “[a]n action for annulment of certificates of title to property [goes] into the issue of ownership of the land covered by a Torrens title and the relief generally prayed for by the plaintiff is to be declared as the land’s true owner.”125

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Hence, there was no violation of Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 when petitioner’s title was declared null and void by the Regional Trial Court. Petitioner, however, points to the following statement made by this court in another case involving these same parties:126 chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The resolution of the issue will not involve the alteration, correction or modification either of OCT No. P-691 under the name of petitioner Aurora de Pedro, or TCT No. 236044 under the name of respondent corporation. If the subject property is found to be a portion of the property covered by OCT No. P-691 but is included in the technical description of the property covered by TCT No. 236044, the latter would have to be corrected. On the other hand, if the subject property is found to be a portion of the property covered by TCT No. 236044, but is included in the property covered by OCT NO. P-691, then the latter title must be rectified. However, the rectification of either title may be made only via an action filed for the said purpose, comformably with Section 48 of Act No. 496 .... A. The action of the petitioners against respondents, based on the material allegations of the complaint, if one for recovery of possession of the subject property and damages. However, such action is not a direct but a collateral attack of TCT No. 236044. Neither did the respondents directly attack OCT No. P-691 in their answer to the complaint. Although the respondents averred in said answer, by way of special and affirmative defenses, that the subject property is covered by TCT No. 236044 issued in the name of the respondent corporation, and as such the said respondent is entitled to the possession thereof to the exclusion of the petitioners, such allegations does not constitute a direct attack on OCT No. P-691, but is likewise a collateral attack thereon...127 Petitioner misreads the import of what we said in that case. That case involves petitioner’s action for recovery of possession and damages against respondents. It also involved respondent’s allegations that the property was covered by a certificate of title in its name and, therefore, its entitlement to the possession of the property. It does not involve an action for annulment of title. When this court said that “such action is not a direct but a collateral attack of TCT No. 236044” or that “such allegations does [sic] not constitute a direct attack on OCT No. P-691, but is likewise a collateral attack thereon,” we were referring to both parties’ action for and allegations of possessory rights over the property. This court was not referring to an action for annulment of title, which is the case involved here. To reiterate, an action for annulment constitutes a direct attack on a certificate of title. IV The not its

requisites satisfied action

of

litis

when for

pendentia respondent annulment of

are filed title

Petitioner argued that the case for annulment of title was dismissible on the ground of litis pendentia because there was a pending civil case filed by her against respondent. The requisites of litis pendentia are: “(a) identity of parties, or interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the other action, will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration.128 chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Although both cases involve the same parcel of land, petitioner was not able to show that there was identity of the relief prayed for. A review of the complaint in the said civil case shows that it was a case for damages, for alleged improper conduct of respondent relating the property. The action filed by respondent was an action for annulment of petitioner’s title. Petitioner was also not able to show that the relief prayed for in both cases were founded on the same facts. Petitioner’s complaint for damages was founded on the alleged misconduct of respondent. Respondent’s action for annulment of title was founded on the alleged irregularity in the issuance of petitioner’s title.

Hence, the petitioner was not able to show that all the requisites for litis pendentia are present. Respondent’s action for annulment of title cannot be dismissed on this ground. V

A

certificate

of

title

does

not

vest

ownership

Petitioner argues that her certificate of title was erroneously declared null and void because based on OCT No. P-691, she is the real owner of the property. It is true that certificates of title are indefeasible and binding upon the whole world. However, certificates of title do not vest ownership.129 They merely evidence title or ownership of the property.130 Courts may, therefore, cancel or declare a certificate of title null and void when it finds that it was issued irregularly. In this case, the trial court ruled based on the committee report that the free patents and original certificate of title issued to petitioner were irregularly issued, and, therefore, invalid. The principle of “bar by prior judgment” is embodied in Rule 39, Section 47(b) of the Rules of Court: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Section 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. — The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows: .

.

.

.

(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been missed in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest, by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity[.] (Emphasis supplied) In this case, the trial court, by annulling petitioner’s certificate of title and declaring its issuance irregular, directly adjudged petitioner’s certificate of title as void. Because petitioner failed to appeal and cause the annulment of the trial court’s judgment as to her title’s validity, this question is already barred. This judgment has already attained finality and can no longer be litigated. This court explained in FGU Insurance Corporation v. Regional Trial Court131 the doctrine of finality of judgment, thus: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Under the doctrine of finality of judgment or immutability of judgment, a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and whether it be made by the court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land. Any act which violates this principle must immediately be struck down.132 In any case, even if petitioner’s original certificate of title was not irregularly issued as she claims, her original certificate of title was issued later than the title from which respondent’s title originated. As a rule, original titles issued earlier prevail over another original title issued later.133 Therefore, petitioner’s later-issued title cannot prevail over respondent’s title, which was derived from an earlier issued original certificate of title. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals July 7, 2010 decision in CA G.R. SP. No. 96471 is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

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Carpio, (Chairperson), Del Castillo, Mendoza, and Reyes,* JJ., concur.

Endnotes: *

Designated Acting Member per Special Order No. 1881 dated November 25, 2014.

1

Rollo, pp. 14, 49, 73, 97. The following are the defendants in the complaints filed by Romasan Development Corporation before the trial court: Civil Case No. 98-4936, Nora Jocson, married to Carlito Jocson, et al.; Civil Case No. 98-4937, Heirs of Marcelino Santos, et al; Civil Case No. 98-4938, Aurora de Pedro married to Elpidio de Pedro, et al.; Civil Case No. 98-4939, Wilson Dadia, et al.; Civil Case No. 98-4040, Prudencio Marana, et al. 2

Id.

3

Id.

4

Id. at 50 and 73.

5

Id.

6

Id. at 50 and 74.

7

Id.

8

Id. at 74

9

Id. at 51 and 74.

10

Id. at 74.

11

Id. at 74 and 155.

12

Id. at 74.

13

Id. at 51 and 74.

14

Id. at 74.

15

Id. at 14, 50-52, 74, and 97.

16

Id. at 14.

17

Id. at 52, 74-75.

18

Id. at 75.

19

Id. at 52 and 75.

20

Id. at 52 and 75.

21

Id.

22

Id. at 14-15, 52, and 75.

23

Id. at 15, 52, 78, and 98.

24

Id. at 78.

25

Id. at 77.

26

Id.

27

Id.

28

Id.

29

Id.

Id. at 15 and 79–85. See also p. 98. Based on petitioner’s petition for annulment of judgment, “[m]embers of petitioner’s family received notice of this DECISION only on 16 March 2000.” Page 18 of the petition for review also mentioned that petitioner’s family received the Court of Appeals decision on March 16, 2000. On the same day, they allegedly contacted their counsel. 30

31

Id. at 79.

32

Id. at 15 and 83; 86-90.

33

Id. at 15, 54-55, and 91-92.

34

Id. at 91.

35

Id. at 54 and 91.

36

Id. at 54–55 and 91

37

Id. at 92.

38

Id. at 55.

39

Id.

40

Id. at 56.

41

Id. at 57.

42

Id.

43

Id. at 16 and 93-116.

44

105 Phil. 761, 766 [Per J. Concepcion, En Banc].

45

Rollo, p. 94.

46

Id. at 109.

47

Id.

48

Id. at 109 and 158.

Id. at 16 and 49–62. The Court of Appeals’ decision, docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 96471, was penned by Presiding Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr., with Associate Justices Ramon M. Bato, Jr., and Mario V. Lopez concurring. 49

50

Id. at 61.

51

Id. at 60.

52

Id. at 16 and 63–65.

53

Id. at 65.

54

Id. at 12.

55

Id. at 19.

56

Id.

57

Id. at 20.

58

Id.

59

Id. at 25.

60

Id. at 28-29.

61

Id. at 29-30.

62

Id. at 31.

63

Id. at 32.

64

Id. at 32.

65

Id.

66

Id. at 34.

67

Id. at 39.

Id. at 181. This statement is footnoted, thus: “According to the Officer’s Return dated 22 February 1999, the messenger (sic) of Pasig City Post Office reported that there is no person in the residential address of petitioner De Pedro which readily shows that personal service including other forms of substituted service by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant’s residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein as stated under the Rules even service by registered mail cannot be possibly done under the circumstances thus the resort to publication since it became apparent at that time that petitioner De Pedro’s whereabouts was unknown.” 68

69

Id. at 180.

70

Id. at 183.

71

Id. at 184.

72

Id. at 185.

73

Heirs of Concha v. Lumocso, 564 Phil. 580, 592–593 (2007) [Per C.J. Puno, First Division].

74

Id. at 593.

75

Id.

76

Peralta-Labrador v. Bugarin, 505 Phil. 409, 415 (2005) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division]. 77

Biaco v. Philippine Countryside Rural Bank, 544 Phil. 45, 55 (2007) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division]. See also Regner v. Logarta, 562 Phil. 862 (2007) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Third Division]. 78

Manotoc v. Court of Appeals, 530 Phil. 454, 467 (2006) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., Third Division].

79

See ACE Publication, Inc. v. Commissioner of Customs, et al., 120 Phil. 143 (1964) [Per J. Paredes, En Banc]. 80

81

Rules of Court, Rule 16, secs. 1(a) and 1(b) Rollo, p. 70.

82

Domagas v. Jensen, 489 Phil. 631, 641 (2005) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., Second Division].

83

See Domagas v. Jensen, 489 Phil. 631 (2005) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., Second Division].

84

Biaco v. Philippine Countryside Rural Bank, 544 Phil. 45, 55 (2007) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division]. See also Regner v. Logarta, 562 Phil. 862 (2007) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Third Division]. 85

See Muñoz v. Yabut, G.R. No. 142676, June 6, 2011, 650 SCRA 344 [Per J. Leonardo-De Castro, First Division]. 86

Domagas v. Jensen, 489 Phil. 631, 642 (2005) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., Second Division].

87

Id.

88

151-A Phil. 556 (1973) [Per J. Fernando, En Banc]. This case involves an action for sum of money. 89

Id. at 560.

90

110 Phil. 113 (1960) [Per J. Concepcion, En Banc].

91

Id. at 118.

92

595 Phil. 507 (2008) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, En Banc].

93

Id. at 520–521.

94

Biaco v. Philippine Countryside Rural Bank, 544 Phil. 45, 55 (2007) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division]. See also Regner v. Logarta, 562 Phil. 862 (2007) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Third Division]. 95

Manotoc v. Court of Appeals, 530 Phil. 454, 467–468 (2006) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., Third Division]. 96

Rules of Court, Rule 14, sec. 6.

97

Rules of Court, Rule 14, sec. 11.

98

Rules of Court, Rule 14, sec. 7.

99

Rules of Court, Rule 14, sec. 7.

100

Rules of Court, Rule 14, sec. 14.

101

Rules of Court, Rule 14, secs. 15–16.

102

Rules of Court, Rule 14, sec. 20.

103

398 Phil. 781 (2000) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division].

104

489 Phil. 631 (2005) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., Second Division].

105

Domagas v. Jensen, 489 Phil. 631, 646 (2005) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., Second Division], citing Hamilton v. Levy, 398 Phil. 781, 791–792 (2000) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division]. 106

Manotoc v. Court of Appeals, 530 Phil. 454, 473–474 (2006) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., Third Division]. 107

See Gomez v. Court of Appeals, 469 Phil. 38, 51–52 (2004) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, Second Division].

108

Manotoc v. Court of Appeals, 530 Phil. 454, 476 (2006) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., Third Division].

109

Rollo, pp. 14, 50–52, 74, and 97.

110

Rules of Court, Rule 37, sec. 1.

111

Heirs of Maura So v. Obliosca, et al., 566 Phil. 397, 406 (2008) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division; J. Ynares-Santiago (Chairperson), JJ. Austria-Martinez, Corona {in lieu of J. ChicoNazario per Special Order No. 484 dated January 11, 2008}, and Reyes concurring]; See also City Government of Tagaytay v. Hon. Guerrero, et al., 616 Phil. 28, 46 (2009) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division; J. Ynares-Santiago (Chairperson), JJ. Chico-Nazario, Velasco, Jr., and Peralta concurring]. 112

Macalalag v. Ombudsman, 468 Phil. 918, 923 (2004) [Per J. Vitug, Third Division; JJ. Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Carpio-Morales concurring], citing Canlas v. Court of Appeals, 247 Phil. 118 (1988) [Per J. Sarmiento, Second Division]. 113

Heirs of Maura So v. Obliosca, et al., 566 Phil. 397, 406 (2008) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division], citing Orbeta v. Sendiong, 501 Phil. 478, 489 (2005) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division]. 114

Manotoc v. Court of Appeals, 530 Phil. 454 (2006) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., Third Division].

115

Heirs of Maura So v. Obliosca, et al., 566 Phil. 397, 406 (2008) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division], citing Macalalag v. Ombudsman, 468 Phil. 918, 923 [Per J. Vitug, Third Division]. 116

Macalalag v. Ombudsman, 468 Phil. 918 (2004) [Per J. Vitug, Third Division].

Id. at 922–923, cited in Republic v. “G” Holdings, Inc., 512 Phil. 253, 262–263 (2005) [Per J. Corona, Third Division]. 117

118

584 Phil. 233 (2008) [Per J. Corona, First Division].

119

Id. at 239–240.

120

Fraginal v. Heirs of Toribia, 545 Phil. 425, 432 (2007) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, Third Division]. 121

Republic v. “G” Holdings, Inc., 512 Phil. 253, 262 (2005) [Per J. Corona, Third Division].

122

507 Phil. 101 (2005) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Second Division].

123

Id. at 113.

124

G.R. No. 157449, April 6, 2010, 617 SCRA 397 [Per J. Brion, Second Division].

125

Id. at 405, citing Heirs of Abadilla v. Galarosa, 527 Phil. 264 (2006) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, First Division]. 126

Spouses De Pedro v. Romasan Development Corporation and Manuel Ko, 492 Phil. 643 (2005) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., Second Division]. 127

Rollo, pp. 39-40.

128

Guevara v. BPI Securities Corporation, 530 Phil. 342, 358–359 (2006) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, First Division], citing Jaban v. City of Cebu, 467 Phil. 458, 471 (2004) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., En Banc]. 129

130

Carino v. Insular Government, 212 US 449, 457–460. Id.

131

G.R. No. 161282, February 23, 2011, 644 SCRA 50 [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division].

132

Id. at 56.

133

Carpo v. Ayala Land, Inc., G.R. No. 166577, February 3, 2010, 611 SCRA 436, 458 [Per J. Leonardo-De Castro, First Division; C.J. Puno (Chairperson), JJ. Carpio-Morales, Bersamin, and Villarama, Jr., concurring].

Present-day Supreme Court Pursuant to the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, the Supreme Court is composed of a chief Justice and 14 associate justices who serve until the age of 70. The court may sit en banc or in one of its three divisions composed of five members each. The chief justice and associate justices are appointed by the President of the Philippines, chosen from a shortlist submitted by the Judicial and Bar Council. The president must fill up a vacancy within 90 days of occurrence. Article VIII, Section 4 (2) of the constitution explicitly provides for the cases that must be heard en banc, and Section 4 (3) for cases that may be heard by divisions. The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 transferred the administrative supervision of all courts and their personnel from the Department of Justice to the Supreme Court. This was affirmed by Article VIII, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution. To effectively discharge this constitutional mandate, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) was created under Presidential Decree No. 828, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 842 (and its functions further strengthened by a resolution of the Supreme Court en banc dated October 24, 1996). Its principal function is the supervision and administration of the lower courts throughout the Philippines and all their personnel. It reports and recommends to the Supreme Court all actions that affect the lower court management. The OCA is headed by the court administrator, three deputy court administrators, and three assistant court administrators. According to the 1987 Constitution, Article VIII, Section 5, the Supreme Court exercises the following powers: 1. Exercise jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus. 2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm, on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of the lower courts in:  All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question;  All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed in relation thereto;  All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue;  All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher;  All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved; 3. Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as public interest may require. Such temporary assignments shall not exceed six months without the consent of the judge concerned. 4. Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice. 1. Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts; the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar; and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.

2. Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance with the Civil Service Law (Sec. 5 , id.).

The Supreme Court has adopted and promulgated the Rules of Court for the enforcement of constitutional rights, pleadings and practice and procedure in all admission in the practice of law. Amendments are promulgated through the Revision of Rules. The Court also issues administrative rules and regulations court issuances posted on the Supreme Court E-Library website. ↵

protection and courts, and the Committee on in the form of

The Chief Justice The incumbent

Ma. Lourdes P. A. Sereno Tenure as Chief Justice: August 24, 2012 – present Appointed by: Benigno S. Aquino III Age at Appointment: 52 Read her biography from on website of the Supreme Court Full roster of chief justices The position of chief justice was created in 1901 by virtue of the establishment of the Philippine Supreme Court. At the time, the chief justice was appointed by the President of the United States: the court was composed mainly of American citizens with a Filipino chief justice.

The incumbent Chief Justice, Ma. Lourdes P.A. Sereno, appointed by President Benigno S. Aquino III, took her oath of office on August 25, 2012. She is the first woman to hold the position.

There were six chief justices appointed by the President of the United States. In 1935, upon the

inauguration of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, the power to appoint the chief justice was transferred to the President of the Philippines. According to the 1935 Constitution, the President of the Philippines shall make appointments with concurrence of the National Assembly. There have been six Chief Justices who were appointed under the 1935 Constitution. The only chief justice that was not appointed by a president was Chief Justice Jose Yulo, who was in office during the Japanese occupation, from 1942 until the liberation of the Philippines in 1945. During this time, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court was appointed by the Philippine Executive Committee headed by Jorge B. Vargas. The 1943 Constitution provided for the members of the Supreme Court and the chief justice to be appointed by the president with the concurrence of his cabinet. Upon the declaration of martial law and the subsequent establishment of the 1973 Constitution, the process of selection of the Chief Justice of the Philippines was changed. The power of Congress to veto an appointment by the president to the office of the chief justice was removed. According to the 1973 Constitution, “The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of inferior courts shall be appointed by the President.” There were five chief justices that were appointed under this provision. After the revolution of 1986, a new constitution was enacted and a new process of selecting a chief magistrate was created. Former chief justice and 1986 Constitutional Commission delegate Roberto V. Concepcion introduced the concept of the Judicial and Bar Council. The aim of the Council is to de-politicize the judiciary by lessening the appointing power of the president. To read more about the appointment of chief justices, members of the judiciary, and the Office of the Ombudsman, please click here. To date, there have been nine chief justices appointed under the conditions of the 1986 Constitution. Chief justices listed according to appointing President of the Philippines

Of the 15 Presidents of the Philippines, only eight have been able to appoint an individual to the highest judicial post in the land. The following is the list of presidents who appointed chief Jjstices and their appointees. 1. Manuel L. Quezon o Jose Abad Santos 2. Sergio Osmeña o Manuel V. Moran 3. Elpidio Quirino o Ricardo M. Paras 4. Carlos P. Garcia o Cesar Bengzon 5. Ferdinand E. Marcos o Roberto V. Concepcion o Querube Makalintal o Fred Ruiz Castro o Enrique M. Fernando o Felix V. Makasiar o Ramon C. Aquino 6. Corazon C. Aquino o Claudio Teehankee o Pedro L. Yap o Marcelo B. Fernan o Andres R. Narvasa 7. Joseph Ejercito Estrada o Hilario G. Davide 8. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo o Artemio Panganiban o Reynato Puno o Renato C. Corona

9. Benigno S. Aquino III o Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno

Notable chief justices Of the list of chief justices, there are a few individuals that stand out for having gone above and beyond their duty and tenure as chief justice. 1. Cayetano Arellano: Cayetano Arellano was the first Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. He was appointed in 1901 when the Supreme Court was created through Act No. 136, along with three American justices and one Filipino justice. 2. Ramon Avanceña: Appointed in 1925 by U.S. President Calvin Coolidge, he is known for ushering in an all-Filipino Supreme Court in 1935. Upon the establishment of the Philippine Commonwealth in 1935, American justices were no longer allowed to sit in the Philippine Supreme Court—thus, new justices were appointed, all of whom were of Filipino citizenship. 3. Jose Abad Santos: As a wartime chief justice, Abad Santos took on two different roles; he was the chief justice and concurrently the Secretary of Justice. When President Quezon left the Philippines to evade capture by the Japanese, Abad Santos chose to stay in the country as a caretaker of the government. On May 2, 1942, the Japanese military caught Abad Santos in Cebu and invited him to become one of the members of their puppet government. Abad Santos refused to collaborate. He died at the hands of the Japanese on May 2, 1942. His last words to his son were, “Do not cry, Pepito, show to these people that you are brave. It is an honor to die for one’s country. Not everybody has that chance.” 4. Manuel V. Moran: Appointed in 1945 by President Sergio Osmeña, Manuel V. Moran would serve as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court for six years. Upon his retirement in 1951, Moran was appointed as Philippine Ambassador to Spain and concurrently to the Holy See. During President Quirino’s administration, Moran was once again offered a position in the Supreme Court in 1953, at the twilight of Quirino’s presidency. Moran, however, refused the midnight appointment. 5. Roberto V. Concepcion: He went into early retirement for refusing to grant absolute power to Ferdinand Marcos, the president who appointed him. In the resolution of Javellana v. Executive Secretary, Concepcion argued against the validity of the 1973 Constitution and its questionable aspects. Accordingly, he dissented, along with Justices Teehankee, Zaldivar, and Fernando, from implementing the 1973 Constitution. Due to the court’s decision, Concepcion would enter early retirement, 50 days before his originally scheduled retirement date. 6. Claudio Teehankee: Claudio Teehankee was known for his firm anti-martial law stance during his tenure in the Supreme Court. Teehankee resisted multiple attempts by the Marcos administration to garner absolute power by issuing questionable decrees. In 1973, he was part of the bloc that dissented from the implementation of the 1973 Constitution. In 1980, he dissented from the proposed judicial reorganization act of President Marcos. In 1986, after the EDSA Revolution, he administered the Oath of Office of President Corazon C. Aquino in Club Filipino. He was appointed Chief Justice of the Supreme Court in 1986 by President Corazon C. Aquino 7. Hilario G. Davide: Appointed by President Joseph Ejercito Estrada in 1998, Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide was known as the presiding judge of the first impeachment proceedings in Asia. During the impeachment of President Estrada, he conducted proceedings with impartiality. Following EDSA II uprising, which deposed President Estrada, Davide swore in Gloria MacapagalArroyo as the 14th President of the Philippines. 8. Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno: Appointed by President Benigno S. Aquino III in 2012, Chief Justice Sereno is the first woman appointed to the position.

Court of Appeals The Court of Appeals is the second highest tribunal in the country, which was established on February 1, 1936 by virtue of Commonwealth Act No. 3. The current form of the Court of Appeals was constituted through Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Executive Order No. 33, s. 1986, Republic Act No. 7902, and Republic Act No. 8246.

The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals are as follows: 1. Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, and quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction; 2. Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgements of Regional Trial Courts; and 3. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgements, resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commission.

The Court of Appeals shall also have the power to try cases and conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and conduct new trials or proceedings. The Court of Appeals is composed of one presiding justice and 68 associate justices, all of which are appointed by the President from a shortlist submitted by the Judicial and Bar Council. The associate justices shall have precedence according to the dates (or order, in case of similar appointment dates) of their respective appointments. The qualifications for the justices of the Supreme Court also apply to members of the Court of Appeals. The current presiding justice of the Court of Appeals is Andres Reyes Jr., who is set to retire on May 11, 2020. Court of Tax Appeals The Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), which is of the same level as the Court of Appeals, was created by virtue of Republic Act No. 1125, which was signed into law on June 16, 1954. Its present-day form was constituted through RA 1125, as amended by Republic Act No. 9282 and Republic Act No. 9503. The CTA exercises jurisdiction in the following: 1. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal, as herein provided: 1. Decisions of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in cases involving disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties in relation thereto, or other matters arising under the National Internal Revenue or other laws administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue; 2. Inaction by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in cases involving disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties in relations thereto, or other matters arising under the National Internal Revenue Code or other laws administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue, where the National Internal Revenue Code provides a specific period of action, in which case the inaction shall be deemed a denial; 3. Decisions, orders or resolutions of the Regional Trial Courts in local tax cases originally decided or resolved by them in the exercise of their original or appellate jurisdiction; 4. Decisions of the Commissioner of Customs in cases involving liability for customs duties, fees or other money charges, seizure, detention or release of property affected, fines, forfeitures or other penalties in relation thereto, or other matters arising under the Customs Law or other laws administered by the Bureau of Customs; 5. Decisions of the Central Board of Assessment Appeals in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction over cases involving the assessment and taxation of real property originally decided by the provincial or city board of assessment appeals; 6. Decisions of the Secretary of Finance on customs cases elevated to him automatically for review from decisions of the Commissioner of Customs which are adverse to the Government under Section 2315 of the Tariff and Customs Code; 7. Decisions of the Secretary of Trade and Industry, in the case of non-agricultural product, commodity or article, and the Secretary of Agriculture in the case of agricultural product, commodity or article, involving dumping and countervailing duties under Section 301 and 302, respectively, of the Tariff and Customs Code, and safeguard

measures under Republic Act No. 8800, where either party may appeal the decision to impose or not to impose said duties. 2. Jurisdiction over cases involving criminal offenses as herein provided: 1. Exclusive original jurisdiction over all criminal offenses arising from violations of the National Internal Revenue Code or Tariff and Customs Code and other laws administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue or the Bureau of Customs: Provided, however, that offenses or felonies mentioned in this paragraph where the principal amount of taxes and fees, exclusive of charges and penalties, claimed is less than P1 million or where there is no specified amount claimed shall be tried by the regular courts and the jurisdiction of the CTA shall be appellate. 2. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction in criminal offenses: 1. Over appeals from the judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in tax cases originally decided by them, in their respective territorial jurisdiction. 2. Over petitions for review of the judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in the exercise of their appellate jurisdiction over tax cases originally decided by the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in their respective jurisdiction. 3. Jurisdiction over tax collection cases as herein provided: 1. Exclusive original jurisdiction in tax collection cases involving final and executory assessments for taxes, fees, charges and penalties: Provided, however, that collection cases where the principal amount of taxes and fees, exclusive of charges and penalties, claimed is less than P1 million shall be tried by the proper Municipal Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court and Regional Trial Court. 2. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction in tax collection cases: 1. Over appeals from the judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in tax collection cases originally decided by them, in their respective territorial jurisdiction. 2. Over petitions for review of the judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in the Exercise of their appellate jurisdiction over tax collection cases originally decided by the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, in their respective jurisdiction.

The CTA is composed of one presiding justice and 8 associate justices, all of which are appointed by the President from a shortlist submitted by the Judicial and Bar Council. The associate justices shall have precedence according to the dates (or order, in case of similar appointment dates) of their respective appointments. The qualifications for the justices of the Court of Appeals also apply to members of the CTA. The current presiding justice of the CTA is Roman del Rosario, who is set to retire on October 6, 2025. Sandiganbayan To attain the highest norms of official conduct among officials and employees in the government, the creation of a special graft court to be known as the Sandiganbayan was provided for in Article XIII, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution. This court was formally established through Presidential Decree No. 1606, which was signed into law on December 10, 1978. Through Article XI (Accountability of Public Officers), Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution, the Sandiganbayan was carried over to the post-EDSA Revolution republic. The current form of the Sandiganbayan was constituted through PD 1606, s. 1978, as amended by Republic Act No. 7975 and Republic Act No. 8245. The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the following:

1. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense: 2. Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including: 1. Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers and other provincial department heads; 2. City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors engineers and other city department heads; 3. Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher; 4. Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank; 5. Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of provincial director and those holding the rank of senior superintendent or higher; 6. City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor; 7. Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations; 2. Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as grade 27 and up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989; 3. Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the constitution; 4. Chairmen and members of constitutional commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the constitution; and 5. All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989. 2. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their office. 3. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, s. 1986.

In addition, the Sandiganbayan exercises exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or orders or regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided. The Sandiganbayan also has exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for the issuance of the writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction and over petitions of similar nature, including quo warranto, arising or that may arise in cases filed or which may be filed under Executive Order Nos. 1,2,14 and 14-A issued in 1986. In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public officers or employees, including those employed in govemment-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them. The Sandiganbayan comprises of one presiding justice and 14 associate justices, all of which are appointed by the President from a shortlist submitted by the Judicial and Bar Council. The associate justices shall have precedence according to the dates (or order, in case of similar appointment dates) of their respective appointments. The qualifications to become a member of the Sandiganbayan are as follows:

1. a natural-born citizen of the Philippines; 2. at least 40 years of age 3. has been a judge of a court for at least ten years, or been engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines or has held office requiring admission to the bar as a prerequisite for at least ten years.

The current presiding justice of the Sandiganbayan is Amparo Cabotaje-Tang, who is set to retire on November 8, 2024.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-48480

July 30, 1943

FABIAN B. S. ABELLERA, petitioner, - versus MEYNARDO M. FAROL, ET AL., respondents. Fabian B.S. Abellera in his own behalf. Pedro C. Quinto and Agaton R. Yaranon for respondents. BOCOBO, J.: Whether in a cadastral case, the judge may upon motion of adverse claimants order the cancellation of the claimant's answer and keep the latter from introducing evidence to prove his ownership because the case is barred by a prior judgment, is the legal question at issue in this case. An order to that effect issued by the Court of First Instance of La Union, is impugned by Fabian B.S. Abellera in a petition for a writ of certiorari. Abellera, in a previous case concerning the same real estate involved herein, sued Hermegildo Balanag and others who are either the same parties in this case or the latter's predecessors in interest, alleging ownership of the land. But his complaint was dismissed by the Court of First Instance on two grounds: (1) prescription in favor of defendants; and (2) the deed of donation of these lands to him had not been formally accepted according to Article 633 of the Civil Code. Upon appeal to this Court, the judgment of the trial court was affirmed on the second ground aforementioned (Abellera vs. Balanag G.R. No. 11970, promulgated March 22, 1918, and reported in 37 Phil. 865). It appears in that decision of this Court that after the perfection of the appeal, Abellera executed a public document formally accepting the donation of the land, and presented and deed of acceptance together with proofs of notification of acceptance to the donor, as ground for new trial. This Court held that this was not newly-discovered evidence, and that Abellera had not acquired title to the hacienda until the execution of the deed of acceptance and the notification thereof to donor. This Court added:

So that whether rights he may have to institute and maintain a new action of ejectment in reliance upon his claim that he has acquired title to the hacienda, since the date of the dismissal of this action, it is clear that the present action was properly dismissed on the ground of failure of proof of title in the plaintiff at the time when the action was instituted and later when judgment of dismissal was entered by the trial court. In July of 1918, or four months after the above-mentioned decision of this Court, petitioner herein brought another action for recovery of the land against the same defendants in the previous case. The second suit was later dismissed by the Court of First Instance and transferred to cadastral case No. 5 which included the hacienda in question that had in the meantime been subdivided into lots. When the cadastral case came up before the Hon. Meynardo M. Farol at Aringay, La Union, in July 1941, Fabian B.S. Abellera appeared as claimant while Narciso de Guzman and others appeared as adverse claimant. The latter through counsel moved that Abellera's claim over the lots concerned be dismissed on the grounds of res judicata and prescription. A careful examination of the decision of this Court in the previous case (37 Phil., 865) convinces us that there is no res judicata. We merely held that Abellera had not acquired title to the hacienda until the execution of the deed of acceptance and the notification thereof, and we clearly refused to prevent Abellera from instituting a new action based upon his assertion that he had acquired title to the estate since the dismissal of his original action. The other ground for the motion for dismissal, prescription, is not involved in the present proceedings. The next question is: Did the cadastral court, on the ground of res judicata, have any power to entertain the motion to dismiss Abellera's claim and bar him from presenting evidence to prove his ownership of these lots? Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides: These rules shall not apply to land registration, cadastral and election cases, naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and other cases not herein provided for, except by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient. The Rules of Court may be applied in cadastral cases when two conditions are present: (1) analogy or need to supplement the cadastral law, and (2) practicability and convenience. If the nature and objective of the cadastral scheme are kept in view, a motion to dismiss in a cadastral case on the ground of prior judgment would seem to be out of place. The Government initiates a cadastral case, compelling all claimants in a municipality to litigate against one another regarding their respective claims of ownership. By this plan, all the private lands in a town are registered in one single collective proceeding. Thus, the piece-meal and isolated registration of lands, so inadequate in more ways than one, is avoided. The principal aim is to settle as much as possible all disputes over land and to remove all clouds over land titles, as

far a practicable, in a community. To attain this purpose, the cadastral court should allow all claimants ample freedom to ventilate whatever right they may assert over real estate, permitting them, in keeping with the law of evidence, to offer proofs in support of their allegations. To countenance the contrary opinion, by suppressing the presentation of evidence in support of claims, would but serve to perpetuate conflicts over land, for such stifled affirmations of ownership will fester like wounds unskillfully treated. No sufficient leeway having been give all claimants to demonstrate the strength and consistently of their alleged rights, the stability of decrees of title is jeopardized. In Haw Pia vs. Roman A. Cruz (G.R. No. 48506), we declared that the Court of First Instance in a cadastral proceeding cannot appoint a receiver because its jurisdiction is special and limited. We declined in that case to apply the new Rules of Court by analogy. We are, therefore, of the opinion that while in a cadastral case res judicata is available to a claimant in order to defeat the alleged rights of another claimant, nevertheless prior judgment can not set up in a motion to dismiss. The order appealed from is hereby reversed. Petitioner herein shall in the cadastral proceedings be allowed to present evidence to prove his claim over the lots in question. With costs against the adverse claimants who are respondents herein. So ordered. Yulo, C.J., Moran and Ozaeta, JJ. concur.

Separate Opinions PARAS, J., dissenting: Years ago a judge of first instance said that res adjudicata cannot be set up as a defense in land registration proceedings. On appeal this Court held: A final judgment in an ordinary civil case determining the ownership of certain land is res adjudicata in a registration proceedings when the parties and the property are the same as in the former case. (Menor vs. Quintana, 56 Phil., 657.) This doctrine is a reiteration of that laid down in Verzosa vs. Nicolas, 29 Phil., 425, and Santiago vs. Santos, 54 Phil. 619, which stated: A decision in ejectment bars a loser from opposing registration under Act No. 496 by the prevailing party. When the same parties have heretofore litigated over the same land for the recovery of real property, the judgment in that case (48 Phil., 567) constitutes res adjudicata in proceedings for registration of the land. A party cannot by varying the form of action escape the operation of the principle that one and the same cause of action shall not be twice litigated.

In a revindicatory actions it was declared that the plaintiffs had no right to the land sued for. In a subsequent action some of the former or successful plaintiffs sought to recover various portions of the same land from certain individuals to whom such portions had been deeded by the principal defendant in the prior case. Held: Judgment in the first case was conclusive against the plaintiffs in the second case. (Baguinguito vs. Rivera, 56 Phil., 423.) The answers in a cadastral proceedings partake of an action to recover title, as real rights are claimed therein. (Dais vs. Court of First Instance of Capiz, 51 Phil., 896) The reason for the application of the rule must lie in the fact that actions and proceedings are analogous in so far as the Court is therein called upon to adjudicate land in favor of any of the conflicting parties or claimants. The parcels of land involved in the instant case had been litigated between the same parties since the year 1914. The petitioner here, who was plaintiff in the case of Abellera vs. Balanag (37 Phil., 865), alleged that the defendants had been possessing the land since 1907. They are in fact still in possession thereof. Notwithstanding the decision of this Court in 1918 which affirmed the judgment of the lower court in the aforesaid case absolving the defendants-respondents from the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff-petitioner had failed to show title in his favor, the majority are now allowing the same parties to continue their odyssey in court. I dissent because in my opinion Rule 132 in connection with Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, instead of prohibiting, expressly authorizes the lower court in land registration or cadastral proceedings to entertain a motion for dismissal on the ground of res adjudicata or prescription. Of course the dismissal of petitioner's claim will not necessarily or automatically mean adjudication of title to the individual respondents, but it will certainly facilitate the consideration of their claims which cease to be contested. Prompt disposal of cases or such claims is the main purpose of the said rules. Let there be no retrogression in the application of sound rules and doctrines. The decision in Abellera vs. Balanag (37 Phil. 865) is on the merits and not one without prejudice to the filing of a new action against the same defendants. The dispositive part reads as follows: Twenty days hereafter let judgment be entered affirming the judgment of dismissal in the court below, with the costs of this instance against the appellant, and ten days thereafter let the record be returned to the court wherein it originated. So ordered. It must be borne in mind that the documentary title on which the plaintiff relied covers a large area of land and the defendants are occupying only small portions thereof. The new action contemplated must therefore refer to the remaining unoccupied portion, should any question be raised in relation thereto. And if the lower court had erred is granting the motion for dismissal, the remedy would have been an appeal from the said order. The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

LAND TITLES AND DEEDS by Gregorio G. Bilog, Jr. Book 1 REGISTRATION OF LANDS INTRODUCTION Land Registration – is a judicial or administrative proceeding whereby a person's claim of ownership over a particular land is determined and confirmed or recognized so that such land and the ownership thereof may be recorded in a public registry. Purposes 1.To issue a certificate of title to the owner which shall be the best evidence of his ownership of the land described therein; 2.To give every registered owner complete peace of mind; 3 . T o r e l i ev e t he l a n d o f u n k no w n c l a i m s ; 4.To quiet title to land and to stop forever any question as to its legality; 5.To avoid conflicts of title in and to real estate, and to facilitate transactions; 6.To guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect their indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established and recognized. Torrens System – The Torrens System of land registration was introduced in the Philippines by Act. No. 496, which took effect on February 1, 1903. This law was amended and superseded by Presidential Decree No. 1529, which took effect on June 11, 1978, otherwise known as the “Property Registration Decree.” This is the principal law now governing land registration in the Philippines. The originator of the system was Sir Richard Torrens, reformer of Australian Land Laws. Judicial Land Registration – is a proceeding where the application for land registration is filed in the proper court. Two Kinds of Judicial Land Registration 1. Ordinary land registration proceeding – where the application for land registration is initiated and filed in court by the owner or person claiming ownership of the land; and,

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2. Cadastral land registration proceeding – where it is the government undertakes the survey of the land and files the petition in court for the registration of the whole or part of the lands in a municipality, city or province, and where all persons are given notice by publication and required to make known and prove their claims of ownership or interest over the same, otherwise, the lots will be declared public land. In this sense, a cadastral proceeding is in the nature of a large scale compulsory proceeding. The court, after hearing, shall render judgment confirming the title of the applicant and ordering: (a) the Land Registration Authority to issue the decree of registration; and,(b) for the Register of Deeds to issue the corresponding Original Certificate of Title to the applicant or adjudged owner. Administrative Land Registration – is a proceeding where the application for a Free Patent, Homestead Patent, Sales Patent, or other grant of public land is filed in, and determined by, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). If the application is granted, the DENR issues a patent for the land applied for. Such patent shall be registered in the office of Register of Deeds who shall then issue the corresponding certificate of title. Torrens Certificate of Title – is the evidence of ownership issued by the Register of Deeds to the owner of a particular land which is registered under the Torrens system of registration. A certificate of title may be an Original Certificate of Title or a Transfer of Certificate of Title .Original Certificate of Title – is the first title issued in the name of a registered owner by the Register of Deeds covering a parcel of land which had been registered under the Torrens System, by virtue of judicial or administrative proceeding. Transfer of Certificate of Title – is the title issued by the Register of Deeds in favor of a transferee to whom the ownership of the registered land has been transferred by virtue of a sale or other modes of conveyance. Laws Implementing Land Registration 1.Property Registration Decree (PD No. 1529, as amended)

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2 . C a d a s tr a l A c t (A ct 2 25 9, a s a m en d e d ) 3 . P u b l i c La n d A ct ( C o m. A ct. 1 4 1 , a s a m e n de d ) 4 . P r e s i d e n t i a l D e c r e e N o . 2 7 5.Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 (R.A. No. 6657, as amended) Agencies Implementing Land Registration and Land Reform 1 . D e p a r t m en t o f E nv i r o nm e nt a n d N a tu r a l R es o ur ce s 2.Department of Justice – Land Registration Authority (LRA) and it registries of deeds 3.Department of Land Reform 4.Department of Agriculture Regalian Doctrine (or jura regalia) – is a time-honored Constitutional precept that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, and that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership in land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony. Imperium – the government authority possessed by the State in the concept of sovereignty. Dominium – the government's capacity to own or acquire property. The 1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitution of the Philippines adopted the universal feudal theory that all lands belong to the crown, ownership, however, being vested in the State, as such, rather than the head thereof. Art. XII, Sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines states that all lands of the public domain and other natural resources are owned by the State; and that with the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The theory of jura regalia was nothing more than a natural fruit of conquest. The regalia theory does not negate native title to lands held in private ownership since time immemorial. (Cruz vs Secretary of Environment and Natural resources, 347 SCRA 128) SEVEN (7) STEPS IN JUDICIAL LAND REGISTRATION 1. Application for land registration shall be filed in court by the applicant; 2. Publication of the notice of the initial hearing of said publication; 3. Opposition to said application shall be filed by any person who claims the land or interest therein;

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4. Hearing of said application and presentation of evidence in court; 5. Judgment shall be rendered by the court; 6. Decree of Registration for the land shall be issued by the LRA Administrator;and 7. Original Certificate of Title for the land shall be issued by the LRA Administrator which shall then be entered by the Register of Deeds in his record book. The owner’s duplicate of said certificate of title shall be given to the registered owner thereof. STEP 1: APPLICATION FOR LAND REGISTRATION IN COURT A. Who May Apply for Land Registration? Applicant must be the owner Rights included in ownership: ◦ Jus possidendi (right to posses) ◦ jus utendi (right to use and enjoy) ◦ jus fruendi (right to the fruits) ◦ jus accessionis (right to accessories) ◦ jus abutenti (right to consume) ◦ jus disponendi (right to dispose or alienate), and ◦ jus vindicandi (right to vindicate or recover) How to Acquire Ownership of Land 1 . B y p o s s e s s i o n o f l a n d s i n c e t ime i mme mo r i a l ; 2. By possession of alienable public land; 3 . B y s a l e , d o n a t i o n a n d other modes of acquiring ownership: • by law (Civil Code, Art. 712) – e.g. public grants; title to accretion in river banks under Art. 457, Civil Code); title by escheat under the Rules of Court, Rule 91 • by donation • by testate and intestate succession • in consequence of certain contracts, by tradition - e.g. ownership is transferred by delivery

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• by prescription B. Where to File the Application? 1. In the RTC – it has the exclusive jurisdiction over all applications for original registration of title of lands, including improvements and interests therein, and over all petitions filed after original registration of title, with power to hear and determine all questions arising upon such applications and petitions. 2. In the MTC and MCTC (if authorized by the Supreme Court) – to hear and determine cadastral or land registration cases. C. Contents of the Application; Annexes: 1. Name of applicant, etc. 2. Description of the land 3. Verification – the application shall be signed by the applicant or the person duly authorized in his behalf, and sworn to before any officer authorized to administer oath. 4.Application covering two or more parcels of land may be included provided they are situated in the same province or city. 5.Annexis to the application: • Survey plan of the land • technical descriptions • Certificate of the Geodetic Engineer • Certificate regarding the last assessment for taxation of the property D. Dealings with the Land, Pending registration After the filing of the application and before the issuance of the decree of registration, the land therein described may still be the subject of dealings in whole or in part. STEP 2: PUBLICATION OF THE NOTICE OF THE INITIAL HEARING OFSAID APPLICATION A. Notice of the Initial Hearing 1. Publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing must be published in the Official Gazette;

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and in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines; 2. Mailing of Notice of Initial Hearing – to persons named in the application. The Administrator of the LRA shall also, within seven days after publication, cause a copy of the notice to be mailed to: • every person named in the notice whose address is known; • government officials concerned; • the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, the Solicitor General, the Director of Lands, etc. • other persons as directed by the court; 3. Posting of Notice of Initial Hearing – caused by the Administrator of LRA to be posted by the sheriff of the province or city in a conspicuous place on the bulletin board of the municipal building of the municipality or city in which the land or portion thereof is situated; STEP 3: OPPOSITION TO SAID APPLICATION A. Opposition: Who May File? Any person claiming the land or adverse interest therein, whether named in the notice or not, may appear and file an opposition to the application for land registration on or before the date of initial hearing, or within such further time as may be allowed by the court. The opposition shall state all the objections to the application, the interest claimed by the party filing the same, and apply for the remedy desired; it shall be signed and sworn to by the oppositor or by some other duly authorized person. Case Notes • Basis of Opposition – the opposition to the application for land registration should be based on a right of dominion or some other real right independent of, and not at all subordinate to the rights of, the government. • Motion for intervention not allowed • Failure of government to oppose – the government cannot be estopped from questioning the validity of the certificates of title which were granted without opposition from the government. The principle of estoppel does not operate against the government for the act of its agents.

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STEP 4: HEARING OF SAID APPLICATION AND PRESENTATIONOF EVIDENCE IN COURT A. Rules of Court The Rules of Court shall, insofar as not inconsistent with the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1529, be applicable to land registration and cadastral cases by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient. Judicial proceedings for the registration of lands throughout the Philippines shall be in rem, and shall be based on the generally accepted principles underlying the Torrens system. B. Evidence 1. To prove: that the Notice of Initial Hearing of the application has been published, mailed, and posted as required by Law; 2. To prove that the applicant is the owner: (a) by virtue of possession of private land (b) by virtue of possession of public land – the general rule is that public land cannot be acquired by prescription because there can be no prescription against the State. Case Notes: • Possession of lands of public domain must be from June 12, 1945 or earlier, for the same to be acquired through judicial confirmation of imperfect title. • Possession of the applicant for land application for land registration must be under bonafide claim of ownership, which presupposes colorable title or acquisition of land through some state grant. • Public land becomes private land – open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land by a citizen of the Republic of the Philippines for the period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite period ipso jure and without the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes private property. Petitioners are “deemed to have acquired , by operation of law, a right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued.” The land is “segregated from public land.” • Filipino Corporations: can acquire private lands – if the land was already private at the time the corporation bought it from the seller, then the prohibition in the Constitution against corporations holding alienable lands of the public domain, except by lease, does not apply. Title and ownership over lands within the meaning of the Constitutional prohibition dates back to the time of their purchase, not later.

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• A parcel of land acquired by a corporation from a private individual should be deemed applied for by such private person for registration purposes. • For accretion or alluvium to form part of registered land or riparian owner, the gradual alluvial deposits made by human intervention are excluded. • The Government may declare the accretion property of the adjoining owner only when it is no longer washed by the waters of the sea and when it is no longer necessary for public use. • The owners of estates adjoining ponds or lagoons do not acquire the land left dry by the natural decrease of the waters, nor lose those inundated by them in extraordinary floods 3.To Prove: the identity of the land (a) identity of land: survey plan and technical description (b) identity of land: by area (c) original tracing cloth plan: mandatory evidence • Spanish titles are no longer admissible as evidence of ownership 4.To prove: that the land is “Alienable” and “Disposable” • The prerogative of classifying lands of the public domain belongs to the Executive Branch of the government. Classification of lands of Public domain (1987 Constitution, Art. XII, Sec. 3): (1) forest or timber (2) mineral lands (3) national parks (4) agricultural • With the exception of agricultural land, lands of the public domain shall not be alienated. Case Notes • All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. • Title to inalienable lands: void

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STEP 5: JUDGMENT SHALL BE RENDERED BY THE COURT A. Judgment 1 . J u d g me n t c o n f i r mi n g t i t l e . Partial judgment allowed – in a land registration proceeding where only a portion of the land subject of registration is contested, the court may render partial judgment provided that the subdivision plan showing the contested and uncontested portions approved by the Director of Lands is previously submitted to said court. Conditional judgments – judgments which are subject to the performance of a condition precedent, are not final until the condition is performed. 2. When judgment becomes final – judgment rendered in a land registration proceeding becomes final upon the expiration of fifteen (15) days to be counted from the date of the judgment. • Judgment binds the whole world. • Judgment is under the principle of res judicata: ◦ former judgment must be final ◦ the court which rendered judgment must have jurisdiction ◦ it must be a judgment of the merits, and ◦ there must be between the first and second actions identity of parties, subject matter, and cause of action • Under the principle of res judicata, the Court and the parties, are bound by such final decision, otherwise there will be no end to litigation.

• Adjudication of land to non-claimant is prohibited. • Title issued pending appeal, void. • A judgment dismissing an application for land registration does not operate as conclusive adjudication (res judicata) between the applicant and the opponent who has successfully resisted the application. • A void judgment has no legal or binding effect for any purpose. It is a nullity,and leaves the parties litigants in the same position they were in before the trial. STEP 6: DECREE OF REGISTRATION FOR THE LAND SHALL BE ISSUED BY THE LRA ADMINISTRATOR

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After judgment of the land registration court has become final and executory, it shall devolve upon the court to forthwith issue an order to the Administrator of LRA for the issuance of the decree of registration and the corresponding certificate of title in the name of the person adjudged entitled to registration. The decree of registration shall bear the date, hour and minute of its entry, and shall be signed by the Administrator of LRA. It shall state whether the owner is married or unmarried, and if married, the name of husband or wife: provided however that if the land adjudicated by the court is conjugal property, the decree shall be issued in the name of both spouses. Upon finality of judgment in the land registration cases, the winning party does not file a motion for execution as in ordinary civil actions. Instead, he files a petition with the LRA to issue a decree of registration, a copy of which is then sent to the Register of Deeds for transcription in the registration book, and issuance of original certificate of title. STEP 7: ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE FOR THE LAND SHALL BE ISSUED BY THE LRA ADMINISTRATOR, WHICH SHALL BE THEN ENTERED BY THE REGISTER OF DEEDS IN HIS RECORD BOOK. THE OWNERS DUPLICATE OF SAID CERTIFICATE OF TITLE SHALL BE GIVEN TO THE REGISTERED OWNER THEREOF. A writ of possession may be issued in favor of the successful applicant or adjudged owner. It is not only against the person who has been defeated in the registration case but also against anyone adversely occupying the land or any portion thereof during the proceeding up to the issuance of the decree. A writ of demolition must, likewise, issue, especially considering that the latter writ is but a complement of the former. Book 2 REGISTRATION OF DOCUMENTS INVOLVING LANDS Part 1 DOCUMENTS DEALING WITH “TITLED LANDS” A. PRELIMINARY 1 . D e f i n i t i o n o f T e r m s : Titled land – refers to land which has been registered under the Torrens system and for which a Torrens title issued in the name of registered owner thereof. Untitled land – refers to land which has not been registered under the Torrens system, hence, not covered by a Torrens title. 2 .F u n c t i o n s o f Re g i s t e r o f De e d s The office of the Register of Deeds constitutes a public repository of records of instruments affecting registered or unregistered lands and chattel mortgages in

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the province or city wherein such office is situated. 3.Ministerial Duty The function of the Register of Deeds with reference to the registration of deeds,encumbrances, instruments and the like is ministerial in nature.