All About Terrorists

International Standards and Recommended Practices

Annex 17 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation

Tusarkan ti Singham ahapatra

Security Safeguarding International Civil Aviation Against Acts of Unlawful Interference

This edition incorporates all amendments adopted by the Council prior to 1 December 2005 and supersedes, on 1 July 2006, all previous editions of Annex 17. For information regarding the applicability of the Standards and Recommended Practices, see Foreword.

Eighth Edition April 2006

International Civil Aviation Organization

Digitally signed by Tusarkanti Singhamahapatra DN: cn=Tusarkanti Singhamahapatra, o=AirIndia, ou, email=tksmp@yahoo. com, c=IN Date: 2009.06.14 18:21:22 +05'30'

THEMATIC BIBLIOGRAPHIES NO. 3/2005

AL QAEDA

Bibliographies Thématiques No. 3/2005

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PART I : BOOKS PREMIERE PARTIE : LIVRES* 2005

323

/00860 Terrorism and Violence in Southeast Asia : Transnational Challenges to States and Regional Stability - Armonk, NY : Sharpe. xx, 262 p.; 24 cm. ISBN: 0765614332 Subject(s): 1. TERRORISM--ASIA, SOUTHEASTERN 2. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION) Added entry(s): 1. Smith, Paul J., ed. Notes: Includes index. 'This work examines the scale and root causes of terrorism across Southeast Asia, including the role of al-Qaeda's ascendancy in the region.' ID number: 80019584 Year: 2005

2004

323

/00844 The 9/11 Commission Report : Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States - New York : Norton. xviii, 567 p. : ill.; 21 cm. ISBN: 0393326713 Subject(s): 1. SEPTEMBER 11 TERRORIST ATTACKS, 2001 2. TERRORISM--GOVERNMENT POLICY--USA 3. INTELLIGENCE SERVICE--USA 4. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION) 5. WAR ON TERRORISM, 2001Added entry(s): 1. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (US) Notes: 'Nearly three thousand people died in the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. In Lower Manhattan, on a field in Pennsylvania, and along the banks of the Potomak, the United States suffered the single largest loss of life from an enemy attack on its soil. In November 2002 the United States Congress and President George W. Bush established by law the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, also known as the 9/11 Commission. This independent, bipartisan panel was directed to examine the facts and circumstances surrounding the September 11 attacks, identify lessons learned, and provide recommendations to safeguard against future acts of terrorism. This volume is the authorized edition of the Commission's final report.' ID number: 80019441 Year: 2004 ?

* This list contains material received as of July 19th , 2005 – Cette liste est arrêtée au 19 juillet 2005.

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323

/00876 Al-Qaeda : The True Story of Radical Islam - London : Tauris. xxvii, 355 p. : ill.; 20 cm. ISBN: 1850436665 Author(s): 1. Burke, Jason Subject(s): 1. ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM 2. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION) 3. SEPTEMBER 11 TERRORIST ATTACKS, 2001 4. WAR ON TERRORISM, 20015. TERRORISM Notes: Bibliography: p. 339-343. Includes index. 'To most in the West 'al-Qaeda' is seen as a byword for terror : a deadly, highly organized fanatical group masterminded by Osama bin Laden. But does this tell the whole truth ? The author has spent a decade reporting from the heart of the Middle East and gaining unprecedented access to the world of radical Islam. Now, drawing on his frontline experience of recent events in Iraq and Afghanistan, on secret documents and astonishing interviews with intelligence officers, militants, mujahideen commanders and bin Laden's associates, he reveals the full story of al-Qaeda - and demolishes the myths that underpin the 'war on terror'. The author demonstrates that in fact 'al-Qaeda' is merely a convenient label applied by the West to a far broader - and thus more dangerous - phenomenon of Islamic militancy, and shows how eradicating a single figure or group will do nothing to combat terrorism. Only by understanding the true, complex nature of al-Qaeda, he argues, can we address the real issues surrounding our security today.' ID number: 80019816 Year: 2004

323

/00826 Against All Enemies : Inside America's War on Terror - London : Free Press. xiii, 304 p.; 24 cm. ISBN: 0743260244 Author(s): 1. Clarke, Richard A. Subject(s): 1. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION) 2. TERRORISM--USA 3. TERRORISM--GOVERNMENT POLICY--USA 4. SEPTEMBER 11 TERRORIST ATTACKS, 2001 5. WAR ON TERRORISM, 2001Notes: Includes index. 'Richard Clarke served seven presidents and worked inside the White House for George H. W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush until he resigned in March 2003. He knows, better than anyone, the hidden successes and failures of the Clinton years. He knows, better than anyone, why the Americans failed to prevent 9/11. He knows, better than anyone, how President Bush reacted to the attack and what happened behind the scenes in the days that followed. He knows whether or not Iraq presented a terrorist threat to the United States and whether there were hidden costs to the invasion of that country. Most disturbing of all are Clarke's revelations about the Bush administration's lack of interest in al Qaeda prior to September 11. From the moment the Bush team took office and decided to retain Clarke in his post as the counterterrorism czar, Clarke tried to persuade them to take al Qaeda as seriously as had Bill Clinton. For months, he was denied the opportunity even to make his case to Bush. He encountered key officials who gave the impression that they had never heard of al Qaeda; who focused incessantly on Iraq; who even advocated long-discredited

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conspiracy theories about Saddam's involvement in previous attacks on the United States. Clarke was the nation's crisis manager on 9/11, running the Situation Room - a scene described here for the first time - and then watched in dismay at what followed. After ignoring existing plans to attack al Qaeda when he first took office, George Bush made disastrous decisions when he finally did pay attention. Coming from a man known as one of the hard-liners against terrorists, this book is both a powerful history of America's two-decades-long confrontation with terrorism and a searing indictment of the current administration.' ID number: 80019240 Year: 2004 323

/00845 Al Qaeda's Great Escape : The Military and the Media on Terror's Trail Washington : Brassey's. xxv, 229 p. : ill. ; 24 cm. ISBN: 1574886282 Author(s): 1. Smucker, Philip Subject(s): 1. WAR ON TERRORISM, 2001---PRESS COVERAGE--AFGHANISTAN 2. BIN LADEN, OSAMA, 19573. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION) 4. WAR CORRESPONDENTS--AFGHANISTAN 5. MASS MEDIA AND WAR 6. WAR ON TERRORISM, 2001---PERSONAL NARRATIVES Notes: Bibliography: p. 223-224. Includes index. 'When President Bush announced in a televised speech the week after September 11 that he wanted Osama bin Laden 'dead or alive', a grieving nation seeking justice and revenge roared in approval. Two years later, as al Qaeda's associates mounted almost weekly attacks against US interests and bin Laden still roamed the earth as a free man, Americans wondered why. With both the military and the media declaring the war in Afghanistan over and a resounding success, the author examines what kind of victory we can rightfully claim. Primarily focusing on the major battles of Tora Bora and Operation Anaconda, the author details how bin Laden and scores of highly trained al Qaeda fighters managed to slip unnoticed out of eastern Afghanistan, despite the presence of the overwhelming US military power that had already decimated the Taliban. To balance his reproach, he turns a critical eye on post-9/11 developments in his own profession. He charges that the Western media outlets, eager to satisfy their audience's thirst for revenge, began losing their grasp on journalistic objectivity while covering the military's pursuit of bin Laden. Blinding patriotism and an unhealthy reliance on the Pentagon's press releases led the media to portray events that did not reflect the reality on the ground in Afghanistan. Further, the author contends that to satisfy the press and the public's need for vengeance, the Bush administration aggressively pushed to achieve some early, highly visible successes, leading to a shortchanging of long-term strategy. Impatience at the top forced a rush into a war aimed primarily at 'regime change', but it left the US military largely empty-handed when it came to capturing its al Qaeda prey. Likely the most grievous error of the ongoing campaign in Afghanistan, allowing members of al Qaeda to escape, has given them the option to regroup, thereby posing a dangerous resurgent threat to US national security.' ID number: 80019443 Year: 2004

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2002

323

/00859 Holy War, Inc. : Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden - London : Phoenix. xi, 303 p. : ill.; 20 cm. ISBN: 0753816687 Author(s): 1. Bergen, Peter L. Subject(s): 1. BIN LADEN, OSAMA, 19572. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION) 3. TERRORISM--AFGHANISTAN Notes: Includes index. 'The author, a journalist specialising in investigating terrorism, had been tracking Osama bin Laden for years, and was putting the finishing touches to the first edition of this book when the terrorist attacks of September 11th took place. In the course of researching 'Holy War, Inc.' he interviewed bin Laden in his lair, and spoke to scores of sources familiar with the man, from the Saudi exile's friends and associates, to the CIA officials tracking him, to cabinet members of Afghanistan's Taliban. The story is brought fully up to date for this new paperback edition.' ID number: 80019582 Year: 2002

323

/00769 Deterrence and Influence in Counterterrorism : A Component in the War on al Qaeda - Santa Monica, CA : Rand Corporation. xix, 86 p. : ill.; 30 cm. (Rand Publications ; MR-1619-DARPA) ISBN: 0833032860 Author(s): 1. Davis, Paul K., 19432. Jenkins, Brian Michael Subject(s): 1. TERRORISM--GOVERNMENT POLICY--USA 2. TERRORISM--GOVERNMENT POLICY 3. WAR ON TERRORISM, 20014. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION) Added entry(s): 1. Rand Corporation (US) Notes: accessed 09/01/03. 'It may not be possible to deter fanatical terrorists, but members of terrorist systems may be amenable to influence. The US counterterrorism strategy should therefore include political warfare, placing at risk things the terrorists hold dear, a credible threat of force against states or groups that support acquisition of weapons of mass destruction, and maintaining cooperation with other nations engaged in the war on terror, while also preserving core American values.' ID number: 80018418 Year: 2002

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323

/00740 Inside Al Qae'da - London : Hurst. xiii, 176 p. : ill.; 23 cm. ISBN: 185065672X Author(s): 1. Gunaratna, Rohan Subject(s): 1. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION) 2. TERRORISM--AFGHANISTAN 3. BIN LADEN, OSAMA, 1957Notes: Includes index. 'The definitive work on Al Qaeda, this book is based on five years of research, including extensive interviews with its members; field research in Al Qaeda-supported conflict zones around the globe; and monitoring Al Qaeda's infiltration of diaspora and migrant communities in North America and in Europe. This book sheds light on Al Qaeda's financial infrastructure and how the organisation trains combat soldiers and vanguard fighters for multiple guerrilla, terrorist and semiconventional campaigns in the Middle East, Asia, Africa, the Caucasus, and the Balkans. In addition, the author investigates the clandestine Al Qaeda operational network in the West. Finally, the author shows that for Al Qaeda to be destroyed or seriously weakened there needs to be a multipronged, multiagency, and multidimensional response by the international community.' ID number: 80018003 Year: 2002

323

/00747 Countering al Qaeda : An Appreciation of the Situation and Suggestions for Strategy - Santa Monica, CA : Rand Corporation. xi, 30 p.; 30 cm. (Rand Publications ; MR-1620-RC) ISBN: 083303264X Author(s): 1. Jenkins, Brian Michael Subject(s): 1. WAR ON TERRORISM, 20012. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION) 3. TERRORISM--AFGHANISTAN 4. TERRORISM--GOVERNMENT POLICY--USA Added entry(s): 1. Rand Corporation (US) Notes: accessed 17/09/02. 'This monograph reviews events since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and discusses the current state of al Qaeda and the kinds of actions that can be expected of it in the future. Al Qaeda constitutes the most serious immediate threat to the security of the United States, so the campaign against terrorism must remain focused. The monograph describes the central elements that must be emphasized in the next, more complex phase of that campaign.' ID number: 80018172 Year: 2002

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323

/00885 Les Afghans algeriens : de la Djamaa a la Qa'ida - [s.l.] : Editions ANEP. 226 p. : ill.; 23 cm. ISBN: 9961756215 Author(s): 1. Mokeddem, Mohamed Subject(s): 1. ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM--ALGERIA 2. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION) 3. ALGERIA--POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT Notes: 'Ce livre revient sur le phenomene des Afghans algeriens et retrace leur long chemin au sein des groupes islamistes armes, depuis la guerre d'Afghanistan contre l'occupation sovietique au debut des annees 80, jusqu'a la violence armee qui a ensanglante l'Algerie. L'auteur tente d'expliquer les liens existant entre les veterans de la guerre d'Afghanistan et Al Qai'da, l'organisation fondee par Oussama Ben Laden en 1989, et leur role de catalyseur au sein des groupes armes et leurs reseaux secrets dissemines a travers le monde, depuis que les GIA algeriens ont ouvert un nouveau front contre les Etats-Unis. Un chapitre est consacre a la tres controversee affaire Matoub Lounes.' ID number: 80019949 Year: 2002

2001

323

/00703 Usama bin Laden's al-Qaida : Profile of a Terrorist Network - Ardsley, NY : Transnational Publishers. var. pag. : ill.; 23 cm. ISBN: 1571052194 Author(s): 1. Alexander, Yonah 2. Swetnam, Michael S. Subject(s): 1. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION) 2. TERRORISM--AFGHANISTAN 3. BIN LADEN, OSAMA, 19574. TERRORISTS Notes: Bibliography : p. 53-59. 'The purpose of this publication is not to glorify bin Laden nor his group. Rather, it is designed to provide an easily accessible reference for academics, policy makers, the press, and other interested individuals. The study exposes much of al-Qaida's mystique and thereby places it in a perspective as one of the many challenges facing the international community in the twenty-first century.' ID number: 80017624 Year: 2001

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/00704 Au nom d'Oussama Ben Laden : dossier secret sur le terroriste le plus recherche du monde - Paris : Picollec. 399 p. : ill.; 21 cm. ISBN: 2864771837 Author(s): 1. Jacquard, Roland Subject(s): 1. BIN LADEN, OSAMA, 19572. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION) 3. TERRORISM--AFGHANISTAN 4. TERRORISTS Notes: Includes index. 'Le 11 septembre 2001, le monde entier est assomme : New York et Washington sont en feu. Ces actions d'eclat sont attribuees par les services secrets a Oussama Ben Laden, jusqu'alors bien peu connu du public. L'auteur ouvre ses dossiers et nous dit qui est ce milliardaire arabe. Quels sont ses objectifs ? Qui sont ses militants ? Ses kamikazes ? Ses terroristes qui constituent sa fraternite, veritable nebuleuse qui agit de l'Algerie aux Philippines ? Quel est son financement ? Qui sont ses taupes, ses relais en France, a Londres, en Allemagne ou en Amerique du Nord ? Quelles sont leurs operations du World Trade Center aux ambassades americaines en Afrique orientale, de l'assassinat de touristes a Louxor ou de marines en Arabie Seoudite a l'explosion d'un destroyer a Aden ? Quelles sont les menaces en France et en Europe occidentale ? Doit-on craindre les effets mortels des armes nouvelles (bacteriologiques, chimiques ou nucleaires) ? Avec des faits, des noms, des documents, des precisions, l'auteur y repond.' ID number: 80017629 Year: 2001

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PART II : JOURNAL ARTICLES DEUXIEME PARTIE : ARTICLES DE REVUES** 2005

The Origins of al Qaeda's Ideology : Implications for US Strategy. (PARAMETERS, vol. 35, no. 1, Spring 2005, p. 69-80.) Author(s): 1. Henzel, Christopher Subject(s): 1. SUNNITES 2. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION) Notes: This article details the origins of Sunnism and the personalities responsible for morphing it into the current militant form exemplified by the likes of al Qaeda. The author explores the influences of insiders and outsiders on Sunni Islam and the resulting rivalries and clashing philosophies that spawned the current Salafist reform movement (al Qaeda) and its ideology. The author implores America and the world at large to exploit ties with existing Sunni regimes in a mutual battle against revolutionary Salafists. He cautions that it is equally important during this battle that existing Muslim regimes fully understand there is no intent on the part of America to remake traditional Muslim culture; otherwise, the clash of civilizations sought by al Qaeda and some US pundits will be assured. ID Number: JA021258 Year: 2005 Language: English Al Qaeda as a Dune Organization : Toward a Typology of Islamic Terrorist Organizations. (STUDIES IN CONFLICT AND TERRORISM, vol. 28, no. 4, July - August 2005, p. 275-293.) Author(s): 1. Mishal, Shaul 2. Rosenthal, Maoz Subject(s): 1. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION) 2. TERRORISM--RELIGIOUS ASPECTS--ISLAM Notes: Al Qaeda and its affiliated groups offer the analyst a highly complex challenge. The current literature classifies Islamic terrorist organizations as either networked or hierarchical. Yet, this classification fails to account for the appearance on the international stage of a new type of global terrorism. Most notably, it does not capture the structure and mode of operation of Al Qaeda as it emerged after the 2001 US-led assault on Afghanistan. This article therefore introduces a new concept - the Dune organization - that is distinct from other organizational modes of thinking. This conceptualization leads to a new typology of Islamic terrorist organizations. This typology concentrates on organizational behavior patterns and provides a framework for a comparative analysis of terrorist movements, which is applied to a study of Al Qaeda, Hizballah, Hamas, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. ID Number: JA021641 Year: 2005 Language: English ** This list contains material received as of July 19th , 2005 – Cette liste est arrêtée au 19 juillet 2005.

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Al-Qa'ida : An Expanded Global Network of Terror. (RUSI JOURNAL, vol. 150, no. 3, June 2005, p. 40-43.) Author(s): 1. Ranstorp, Magnus Subject(s): 1. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION) 2. TERRORISM ID Number: JA021592 Year: 2005 Language: English Juridische slachtoffers van de oorlog tegen het terrorisme : de Conventies van Geneve. (VREDE EN VEILIGHEID, jg. 34, nr. 1, 2005, p. 38-57.) Author(s): 1. Verhoeven, Sten Subject(s): 1. PRISONERS OF WAR 2. WAR (INTERNATIONAL LAW) 3. TALIBAN 4. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION) Notes: De aanslagen van al Qaeda op 11 september 2001 leidden tot operatie Enduring Freedom waarbij honderden vermeende leden van de Taliban en al Qaeda gevangen werden genomen en overgebracht naar een militaire basis te Guantanamo Bay. Daar kwamen ze in een juridische schemerzone terecht door de beslissing van de Verenigde Staten om hen de bescherming van de Conventies van Geneve te ontzeggen. Deze bijdrage argumenteert dat die beslissing onterecht is : aangezien de aanslagen van 11 september 2001 kunnen worden toegerekend aan Afghanistan, is er vanaf die datum sprake van een internationaal gewapend conflict en zijn de Conventies van Geneve van toepassing. Verder kunnen de leden van de Taliban en al Qaeda wel degelijk worden beschouwd als kriegsgevangenen en hebben ze recht op de behandeling die voor deze status is voorzien. In uitzonderlijke gevallen zullen gedetineerden geen aanspraak kunnen maken op deze status, maar dan hebben ze de status van burgers in een gewapend conflict met de bijhorende bescherming. Zelfs als welbepaalde gedetineerden niet onder een van deze statussen vallen, dan voorziet het humanitair recht nog altijd in een minimale behandeling. De behandeling van de gedetineerden op Guantanamo Bay is zelfs niet in overeenstemming met deze minimale behandeling, en dus a fortiori niet met de bescherming van krijgsgevangenen en burgers. ID Number: JA021461 Year: 2005 Language: English 2004

Learning by Doing : Al Qaeda's Allies in Southeast Asia. (CURRENT HISTORY, vol. 103, no. 672, April 2004, p. 171-176.) Author(s): 1. Abuza, Zachary Subject(s): 1. TERRORISM--ASIA, SOUTHEASTERN 2. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION) Notes: Al Qaeda has suffered severe setbacks since the US-led war on terror began in 2001. Two-thirds of its known senior leadership have been arrested. The terrorist group, which before 9-11 was able to launch a major attack against US interests every year or two, has not succeeded in executing a major attack since. Nevertheless, Southeast Asia is still an attractive arena for

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Al Qaeda and various affiliated and supportive militants. The region is likely to remain a key theater of operations in the war on terror, and terrorist groups will remain the primary security concern for the region's governments. ID Number: JA020399 Year: 2004 Language: English Going to the Source : Why Al Qaeda's Financial Network is Likely to Withstand the Current War on Terrorist Financing. (STUDIES IN CONFLICT AND TERRORISM, vol. 27, no. 3, May - June 2004, p. 169-185.) Author(s): 1. Basile, Mark Subject(s): 1. TERRORISM--FINANCE 2. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION) Notes: On 24 September 2001, President Bush announced the first stage of the War on Terrorism with an attack against the terrorist financial infrastructure. Since then, the impact of this attack on Al Qaeda's ability to operate has been minimal, for three reasons. First, Al Qaeda has built a strong network of financiers and operatives who are both frugally minded and business savvy. As a result, terrorist finances are often hidden in legitimate and illegitimate businesses and disguised as commodities and cash. Second, Al Qaeda has learned to effectively leverage the global financial system of capital markets. Small financial transfers, underregulated Islamic banking networks and informal transfer systems throughout the world make it almost impossible to stop Al Qaeda from moving money. Third, Al Qaeda has built a significant base of Islamic charities in Saudi Arabia with international divisions that have not been scrutinized or controlled by the regime. As a result, Al Qaeda's sophisticated financial network may be able to sustain international efforts to disrupt it. Financial regulations imposed to reduce terrorist financing must be applied more broadly and be supported by significant resources. An improvement in the war on terrorist financing requires better international coordination, more effective use of financial regulations, and regulating the Saudi Arabian charity structure. ID Number: JA020522 Year: 2004 Language: English Fact, Fiction and Franchised Terror. (WORLD TODAY, vol. 60, no. 4, April 2004, p. 4-6.) Author(s): 1. Clarke, Michael Subject(s): 1. TERRORISM 2. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION) 3. TERRORISM--GOVERNMENT POLICY Notes: With the Madrid bomb of March 11 the global 'war' on terror has become a political fact - which means that it is surrounded by popular fiction. Just ahead of European Union enlargement in May, Madrid's '3/11' has taken on the guise of Europe's '9/11' and confirmed in the popular mind that the scourge of international terrorism now affects all western countries and their allies. ID Number: JA020402 Year: 2004 Language: English

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Al-Qaeda tussen mythen en werkelijkheid. (INTERNATIONALE SPECTATOR, jg. 58, nr. 11, november 2004, p. 523-530.) Author(s): 1. Coolsaet, Rik Subject(s): 1. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION) 2. TERRORISM Notes: The author compares fact and fiction in today's international terrorism. Underestimating terrorism is dangerous. But exaggerating the threat is just as dangerous - so is group-think, he argues. When dealing with al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden myth and reality tend to get mixed up. Contrary to widespread belief, international terrorism is far from humanity's biggest threat today. Indeed, since 1969 there has been a gradual decrease in the number of terrorist attacks and this despite dramatic terrorist mass murders such as 9/11. The author argues furthermore that al-Qaeda has become a kind of a myth. Just like in the 19th century, when a similar anarchist terrorist International only existed in the public's mind, today's al-Qaeda is like a broken thermometer : its mercury has burst into a multitude of small blobs, all highly toxic, but unrelated to one another. Al-Qaeda no longer exists as the global disciplined and centralized terrorist organization it once was. It has turned into a grassroots phenomenon. It is a unifying flag, carried by a loosely connected body of home-grown terror groups and even freelance jihadists, each going their own way without central command, unaffiliated with any group. This transformation of today's terrorism implies that counterterrorism efforts will have to be implemented through policy instruments with a more pronounced political character, domestically as well as internationally. ID Number: JA020985 Year: 2004 Language: Dutch Al-Qaeda : la holding et ses filiales. (POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE, no. 104, ete 2004, p. 297-312.) Author(s): 1. Denece, Eric Subject(s): 1. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION) 2. TERRORISM Notes: International security faces a particularly perilous situation. Global terrorist organizations are increasingly lacking in coordination as their contact networks are undermined, and yet at the same time, armed groups are more bent on achieving their aims than ever before. The Al Qaeda umbrella terrorist organization may be on the brink of vanishing, but its network of affiliated terrorist groups is thriving. They are determined, independent and enjoy grassroots support, making them more unpredictable and dangerous than before. As many feared, American intervention in Iraq has boosted terrorism and considerably exacerbated anti-Western sentiment across the Arab world. Since the start of US reprisals in October 2001, the terrorists' goals have not shifted : they seek to destabilize 'ungodly' Arab regimes and the Western nations that support them. While several major victories have undeniably been scored in the fight against terrorism over the last two years, the continuation of attacks is no longer hypothetical : it is now a certainty. ID Number: JA020740 Year: 2004 Language: French

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The Post-Madrid Face of Al Qaeda. (WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, vol. 27, no. 3, Summer 2004, p. 91-100.) Author(s): 1. Gunaratna, Rohan Subject(s): 1. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION) Notes: The terrorist threat has shifted beyond Al Qaeda as a group to an ideology. In many ways, Al Qaeda has completed its mission of being the vanguard of Islamic movements, having inspired a generation of two dozen existing groups as well as an emerging generation of them. ID Number: JA020547 Year: 2004 Language: English Al Qaeda and the War on Terrorism : An Update. (CURRENT HISTORY, vol. 103, no. 677, December 2004, p. 423-427.) Author(s): 1. Hoffman, Bruce Subject(s): 1. WAR ON TERRORISM, 20012. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION) Notes: Al Qaeda has transformed itself. Iraq is a recruiters' paradise. America lacks a clear strategy. In short, the war on terror is not going well. ID Number: JA021132 Year: 2004 Language: English

The Changing Face of Al Qaeda and the Global War on Terrorism. (STUDIES IN CONFLICT AND TERRORISM, vol. 27, no. 6, November December 2004, p. 549-560.) Author(s): 1. Hoffman, Bruce Subject(s): 1. TERRORISM 2. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION) 3. WAR ON TERRORISM, 2001Notes: This article assesses current trends and developments in terrorism within the context of the overall progress being achieved in the global war on terrorism (GWOT). It examines first the transformation that Al Qaeda has achieved in the time since the 11 September 2001 attacks and the variety of affiliated or associated groups (e.g., what are often referred to as Al Qaeda 'clones' or 'franchises') that have emerged to prosecute the jihadist struggle. It then focuses on recent developments in Saudi Arabia and especially Iraq in order to shed further light on Al Qaeda's current strategy and operations. In conclusion, this article offers some broad recommendations regarding the future conduct of the GWOT. ID Number: JA021077 Year: 2004 Language: English

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Al-Qaeda and Western Islam. (TERRORISM AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE, vol. 16, no. 1, Spring 2004, p. 1-17.) Author(s): 1. Jordan, Javier 2. Boix, Luisa Subject(s): 1. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION) 2. MUSLIMS Notes: This article studies the problems Al-Qaeda presents for Western societies that host large populations of native or immigrant Muslims. It analyzes first the peculiar characteristics of Al-Qaeda that make it particularly dangerous to multicultural communities. It looks at the repercussions that this terrorism can create for co-existence within societies with important Islamic populations. Finally, it suggests strategies to prevent a deterioration of conditions favorable to the co-existence of Muslims and non Muslims in Europe and the USA. ID Number: JA020711 Year: 2004 Language: English Counterterrorism after Al Qaeda. (WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, vol. 27, no. 3, Summer 2004, p. 101-113.) Author(s): 1. Pillar, Paul R. Subject(s): 1. TERRORISM--GOVERNMENT POLICY--USA 2. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION) Notes: The counterterrorism challenges that will follow Al Qaeda collecting and analyzing intelligence, enlisting foreign support, and sustaining the US commitment while avoiding further damage to relations with the Muslim world - may be even more complex. ID Number: JA020548 Year: 2004 Language: English Al Qaeda's New Recruits. (INTERNATIONALE POLITIK, vol. 5, no. 2, Summer 2004, p. 45-50.) Author(s): 1. Reuter, Christoph Subject(s): 1. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION) 2. TERRORISM--IRAQ 3. SUICIDE TERRORISM Notes: 'I don't just want paradise for myself', explained suicide bomber Qais Ibrahim Qadir to the author in a prison cell in northern Iraq. 'We have to cleanse the world !' Ironically, the US invaded Iraq in a preemptive strike to block the spread of al Qaeda terrorists - but it seems instead to have freed Iraq of all constraints and provided the kind of anarchy in which terrorists thrive and can recruit new terrorists. ID Number: JA020643 Year: 2004 Language: English

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Al-Qaeda and the Nature of Religious Terrorism. (TERRORISM AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE, vol. 16, no. 4, Winter 2004, p. 795-814.) Author(s): 1. Sedgwick, Mark Subject(s): 1. RELIGIOUS TERRORISM 2. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION) 3. SEPTEMBER 11 TERRORIST ATTACKS, 2001 Notes: This article examines the nature of religious terrorism, principally with reference to al-Qaeda. It argues that a distinction must be made between the ultimate aims and the immediate objectives of 'religious' terrorists, and that while the ultimate aims will be religiously formulated, the immediate objectives will often be found to be almost purely political. The distinction is illustrated with reference to such pre-modern religious terrorists as the Assassins and Zealots. Immediate objectives are for many purposes more important than ultimate aims. Although the immediate objectives of al-Qaeda on 9/11 cannot be established with certainty, it is highly probable that the intention was to provoke a response from the US that would have a radicalizing impact on al-Qaeda's constituency. Reference to public opinion in the Middle East, especially in Egypt, shows that this is indeed what has happened. Such an impact is a purely political objective, familiar to historians of terrorism form at least the time of Errico Malatesta and the 'propaganda of the deed' in the 1870s. While no direct link between Malatesta and al-Qaeda exists, al-Qaeda was certainly in contact with contemporary theories that Malatesta would have recognized, and seems to have applied them. Even though its immediate objectives are political rather than religious, al-Qaeda is a distinctively Islamic group. Not only is its chosen constituency a confessional one, but al-Qaeda also uses - and when necessary adapts - well-known Islamic religious concepts to motivate its operatives, ranging from conceptions of duty to conceptions of ascetic devotion. This is demonstrated with reference to the 'Last Night' document of 9/11. The conclusion is that terrorism which can be understood in political terms is susceptible to political remedies. ID Number: JA021241 Year: 2004 Language: English Naar een beter begrip van terrorisme. (INTERNATIONALE SPECTATOR, jg. 58, nr. 11, november 2004, p. 530-535.) Author(s): 1. Voorde, Teun van de Subject(s): 1. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION) 2. TERRORISM Notes: The author presents some interpretations of the current wave of Muslim terrorism that operates under the banner of Al Qaeda. She seeks to clarify two questions : how did Al Qaeda as a terrorist organisation originate, and why did its campaign of terrorism perpetuate itself ? To this end, the proposed framework is focused on finding patterns in the history of terrorism and its specific wider political and ideological context. Indeed, the history of terrorism reveals remarkable parallels with regard to the origin of terrorist campaigns and circumstances in which the strategy of international terrorism has persisted. As to Al Qaeda, the role of a discontented vanguard elite in a situation of waning revolutionary conditions has contributed to the strategic option for terrorism. To explain self-perpetuating dynamics of the terrorist threat a more structural level of analysis is

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required. When looking into the history of 'successful' campaigns of international terrorism the current position of the Muslim countries demonstrates striking similarities with the conditions of industrialising nation-states at the end of the 19th century. A period of transition provided anarchist terrorists with bombs or guns and made their message resonate amongst the masses being confronted with the social, political and economic injustices of an era of rapid changes. No single framework can account for all terrorism, but an integrated understanding of the political context and history of terrorism is the first step in gaining a relevant perspective on any campaign of terrorism. ID Number: JA020986 Year: 2004 Language: Dutch 2003

The Afghanisation of Chechnya. (INTERNATIONAL SPECTATOR, vol. 38, no. 3, July - September 2003, p. 137-145.) Author(s): 1. Brownfeld, Peter Subject(s): 1. TERRORISM--CHECHNYA (RUSSIA) 2. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION) 3. CHECHNYA (RUSSIA)--HISTORY--RUSSIAN INVASION, 1999Notes: This article examines the security risks connected with the spread of radical Islam and terrorist groups in Chechnya. The author notes that only recently has international terrorism become interested and involved in the Chechnya conflict and that this should be attributed to the continued deterioration of human rights conditions since 1996 caused by the bloody Russian repression. As a result there is now a serious risk that Chechnya is increasingly serving as a base and recruiting ground for al Qaeda and other terror networks, becoming a sort of new Afghanistan. According to the author, the West would be ill advised to support or close an eye to Russia's repressive policies. Even Moscow's recent attempts to promote a political solution have been, he argues, intrinsically flawed as they fail to address the root causes of the conflict. The author's suggestion is to work for an arrangement that would temporarily place Chechnya under UN administration and grant it independence only after a process of security stabilisation and democratisation has been completed. ID Number: JA019763 Year: 2003 Language: English Violence islamiste et reseaux du terrorisme international. (POLITIQUE ETRANGERE, 68e annee, no. 3 - 4, automne - hiver 2003, p. 643-661.) Author(s): 1. Chouet, Alain Subject(s): 1. TERRORISM--MIDDLE EAST 2. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION) Notes: La demesure des attentats du 11 septembre 2001 a focalise l'attention des politiques, des services de securite et des medias sur une forme particuliere de violence emanant du monde musulman. Au-dela de la problematique de la Qaida, qui a sombre avec la chute du regime taliban, cette focalisation occulte le fait que le terrorisme et la violence politique, plus actuels

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que jamais dans le monde arabo-musulman, s'inscrivent, la comme ailleurs, dans les logiques de pouvoir, des strategies d'Etats, des tentatives d'accaparement de la rente, petroliere ou autre, qui ne procedent nullement d'un quelconque phenomene d'affrontement des civilisations. Meconnaitre ce fait ne peut que faire le jeu des epigones d'Oussama Ben Laden en egarant la lutte antiterroriste et en alimentant les cycles de la violence. ID Number: JA020044 Year: 2003 Language: French Authoritarian Answers. (WORLD TODAY, vol. 59, no. 8 - 9, August - September 2003, p. 4-6.) Author(s): 1. Gearty, Conor Subject(s): 1. WAR ON TERRORISM, 20012. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION) Notes: As we move towards the second anniversary of September 11, it may seem eccentric to emphasize how weak the Al Qaeda organisation headed by Osama Bin Laden is - indeed, how weak it has always been. Clearly, the attacks on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon were unprecedently savage, both in terms of impact and the number of fatalities. It is also perfectly true that there has never been a terrorist act to match it, before or since. But consider the various things that have not happened since that terrible event. And consider too the nature of the response : it is threatening our fundamental freedoms ? ID Number: JA019485 Year: 2003 Language: English Still Threatening. (WORLD TODAY, vol. 59, no. 1, January 2003, p. 19-21.) Author(s): 1. Gunaratna, Rohan Subject(s): 1. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION) 2. TERRORISM--AFGHANISTAN Notes: Has the West got the measure of Al Qaeda ? The list of attacks attributed to it continues to grow, Mombasa and Bail having just been added. But what about the battle for Muslim hearts and minds, has that war even begun ? ID Number: JA018724 Year: 2003 Language: English Al Qaeda, Trends in Terrorism, and Future Potentialities : An Assessment. (STUDIES IN CONFLICT AND TERRORISM, vol. 26, no. 6, November December 2003, p. 413-442.) Author(s): 1. Hoffman, Bruce Subject(s): 1. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION) 2. TERRORISM Notes: This article assesses current trends in terrorism and future potentialities. It examines first the presumed state of Al Qaeda with particular reference to its likely agenda in a post-Iraq War world. It then more broadly focuses on some key current terrorism trends in order to understand better both how terrorism is changing and what the implications of these changes are in terms of possible future attacks and patterns.

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The discussion is organized along three key questions : (1) what is the state of Al Qaeda today and what effects have nearly two years of unremitting war had on it ? (2) what do broader current trends in terrorism today tell us about future potentialities ? (3) how should we be thinking about terrorism today and tomorrow ? ID Number: JA019952 Year: 2003 Language: English The Terrorist Calculus behind 9-11 : A Model for Future Terrorism ?. (STUDIES IN CONFLICT AND TERRORISM, vol. 26, no. 1, January - February 2003, p. 1-16.) Author(s): 1. Nacos, Brigitte L. Subject(s): 1. SEPTEMBER 11 TERRORIST ATTACKS, 2001 2. BIN LADEN, OSAMA, 19573. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION) Notes: Terrorists commit lethal acts of violence in order to realize their goals and advance their causes. They have a mixed record of success. This article explores the question whether the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon outside of Washington, D.C. were successful from the perspective of bin Laden and the Al Qaeda group. Although stunningly triumphant in exploiting the news media for their publicity goals and partially successful in advancing some of their short-term political objectives, the architects of the kamikaze attacks of 9-11 did not realize, and perhaps not even further, their ultimate desire to provoke a cataclysmic clash between Muslims and what bin Laden calls the 'Zionist-Crusader' alliance. The argument here is nevertheless that from the terrorist perspective the suicide terror of 9-11 was successful in many respects and could well become an attractive model for future terrorism. ID Number: JA018864 Year: 2003 Language: English Al Qaeda : A Different Diagnosis. (STUDIES IN CONFLICT AND TERRORISM, vol. 26, no. 6, November December 2003, p. 391-398.) Author(s): 1. Raufer, Xavier Subject(s): 1. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION) Notes: When doubt and confusion reign, when things are - or look complicated, one should revert to fundamental questions. What is Al Qaeda ? This is the question addressed by this article. But as a first step, and in a broader perspective, the real danger in the world today is defined. ID Number: JA019951 Year: 2003 Language: English

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It's War ! Fighting Post-11 September Global Terrorism through a Doctrine of Prevention. (TERRORISM AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE, vol. 15, no. 1, Spring 2003, p. 1-30.) Author(s): 1. Shultz, Richard H. 2. Vogt, Andreas Subject(s): 1. SEPTEMBER 11 TERRORIST ATTACKS, 2001 2. PREEMPTIVE ATTACK (MILITARY SCIENCE) 3. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION) 4. TERRORISM--GOVERNMENT POLICY--USA 5. INTELLIGENCE SERVICE--USA 6. WAR ON TERRORISM, 2001Notes: Following the 11 September terrorist attack a number of media revelations asserted that it could have been prevented if only the intelligence community (IC) had acted on information in its possession regarding the impending attack. This article explains why and how the intelligence agencies failed on 11 September, and assesses the need for and viability of preemptive military options for striking first to combat terrorism. First, it describes how the IC doggedly refused to regard terrorism as war through the 1990s. Second, the authors explain that an alternative perspective challenged this orthodoxy in the early 1990s, arguing that war was changing and entering its fourth generation. Third, based on new information about Al-Qaeda, the article addresses how Al-Qaeda organized for war and how it carried it out be delineating Al-Qaeda's organizational structure, ideology, linkages with other terrorist groups and supporting states, use of sanctuary, and financial base, and then detailing its targeting, weapons and war-fighting strategy. This assessment reveals how intimately the Al-Qaeda network bears an unmistakable resemblance to fourth-generation asymmetrical warfare and not to the 1990s profile of the IC. Finally, the authors demonstrate that President Bush has grasped fourth generation warfare by advocating preemptive first strikes against terrorists in his new national security strategy. ID Number: JA019274 Year: 2003 Language: English The Protean Enemy. (FOREIGN AFFAIRS, vol. 82, no. 4, July - August 2003, p. 27-40.) Author(s): 1. Stern, Jessica Subject(s): 1. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION) 2. TERRORISM Notes: Despite the setbacks al Qaeda has suffered over the last two years, it is far from finished, as its recent bomb attacks testify. How has the group managed to survive an unprecedented American onslaught ? By shifting shape and forging new, sometimes improbable, alliances. These tactics have made al Qaeda more dangerous than ever, and Western governments must show similar flexibility in fighting the group. ID Number: JA019360 Year: 2003 Language: English

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Transnational Terrorism after the Iraqi War. (MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, vol. 27, no. 10, 2003, p. 6-10.) Subject(s): 1. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION) 2. TERRORISM Notes: Among the most coherent arguments raised by opponents to the US-led military intervention in Iraq was that it would, by further inflaming anti-Western sentiment and distracting attention from counter-terrorism efforts, increase transnational Islamic terrorism. This may well be occurring. ID Number: JA019738 Year: 2003 Language: English Al Qaeda in Southeast Asia. (INTERNATIONALE POLITIK, vol. 4, no. 2, Summer 2003, p. 85-90.) Author(s): 1. Wagener, Martin Subject(s): 1. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION) 2. ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM--ASIA, SOUTHEASTERN Notes: The great majority of Muslims in Southeast Asia are moderates. But since adherents of Islam constitute 40 % of the region's 500 million, al Qaeda actively seeks to exploit grievances there to recruit terrorists in the name of Islam. It runs its own cells, and it also cultivates contacts with an archipelago of autonomous Islamic radicals in Southeast Asia. Abbu Sayaf and Omar al Faruq are only the beginning. ID Number: JA019520 Year: 2003 Language: English 2002

Balkan blowback ? Osama bin Laden and Southeastern Europe. (MEDITERRANEAN QUARTERLY, vol. 13, no. 1, Winter 2002, p. 44-53.) Author(s): 1. Bardos, Gordon N. Subject(s): 1. ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM--BALKAN PENINSULA 2. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION) 3. BALKAN PENINSULA--FOREIGN RELATIONS--USA 4. USA--FOREIGN RELATIONS--BALKAN PENINSULA Notes: The 11 September 2001 attacks on New York's World Trade Center and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., should force us to reexamine US policy in the Balkans, for two reasons. First, important elements of Osama bin Laden's organization, al Qaeda, as well as other Islamic extremist organizations have been operating in the region for the better part of a decade. Consequently, any comprehensive policy to combat international terrorism must involve southeastern Europe. Second, a thorough examination of bin Laden's alliances in the Balkans also reveal a disturbing pattern - ironically, for much of the past decade, bin Laden and the United States have often found themselves supporting the same factions in the Balkan conflicts. ID Number: JA017736 Year: 2002 Language: English

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Bin Laden, the Arab 'Street,' and the Middle East's Democracy Deficit. (CURRENT HISTORY, vol. 101, no. 651, January 2002, p. 36-39.) Author(s): 1. Eickelman, Dale F. Subject(s): 1. BIN LADEN, OSAMA, 19572. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION) Notes: Bin Laden speaks in the vivid language of popular Islamic preachers, and builds on a deep and widespread resentment against the West and local ruling elites identify with it. The lack of formal outlets to express opinion on public concerns has created a democracy deficit in much of the Arab world, and this makes it easier for terrorists such as bin Laden, asserting that they act in the name of religion, to hijack the Arab street. ID Number: JA017457 Year: 2002 Language: English Les enseignements de la guerre Etats-Unis-Al Quaida (2eme partie). (DEFENSE NATIONALE, 58e annee, no. 4, avril 2002, p. 102-113.) Author(s): 1. Encel, Frederic Subject(s): 1. SEPTEMBER 11 TERRORIST ATTACKS, 2001 2. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION) 3. WAR ON TERRORISM, 20014. AFGHANISTAN--FOREIGN RELATIONS--USA 5. USA--FOREIGN RELATIONS--AFGHANISTAN Notes: Les attentats du 11 septembre 2001 ont donne lieu a une vaste offensive americaine contre le terrorisme islamiste a travers le monde. La premiere phase de cette lutte fut victorieusement menee en Afghanistan, dont le regime barbare taliban abritait Al Quaida. Tandis que le reseau d'Oussama ben Laden entretient des objectifs de nature apocalyptique lies a la soumission de l'Occident judeo-chretien par l'islam, les Etats-Unis d'Amerique entendent conserver leur suprematie d'hyperpuissance. Au service de ces objectifs diametralement opposes, les deux camps menent ainsi, respectivement, une strategie de destabilisation des Etats musulmans allies de Washington, et le maintien au pouvoir de ces memes regimes (Pakistan, Arabie saoudite ...). Comme apres la guerre du Golfe de 1991, on assiste a une redistribution des donnees geostrategiques du Proche a l'Extreme-Orient. Au-dela de l'analyse objective de cette nouvelle guerre, les democraties occidentales - la France en particulier - doivent s'impliquer directement; a travers New York, c'est en effet l'ensemble du monde libre dont les fondements philosophiques ont ete frappes par une nouvelle forme de totalitarisme belliqueux. Le terrorisme islamique, comme tous les autres, doit etre impitoyablement combattu. ID Number: JA017795 Year: 2002 Language: French

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Les enseignements de la guerre Etats-Unis-Al Quaida (1ere partie). (DEFENSE NATIONALE, 58e annee, no. 3, mars 2002, p. 39-48.) Author(s): 1. Encel, Frederic Subject(s): 1. SEPTEMBER 11 TERRORIST ATTACKS, 2001 2. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION) 3. WAR ON TERRORISM, 20014. AFGHANISTAN--FOREIGN RELATIONS--USA 5. USA--FOREIGN RELATIONS--AFGHANISTAN Notes: Les attentats du 11 septembre 2001 ont donne lieu a une vaste offensive americaine contre le terrorisme islamiste a travers le monde. La premiere phase de cette lutte fut victorieusement menee en Afghanistan, dont le regime barbare taliban abritait Al Quaida. Tandis que le reseau d'Oussama ben Laden entretient des objectifs de nature apocalyptique lies a la soumission de l'Occident judeo-chretien par l'islam, les Etats-Unis d'Amerique entendent conserver leur suprematie d'hyperpuissance. Au service de ces objectifs diametralement opposes, les deux camps menent ainsi, respectivement, une strategie de destabilisation des Etats musulmans allies de Washington, et le maintien au pouvoir de ces memes regimes (Pakistan, Arabie saoudite ...). Comme apres la guerre du Golfe de 1991, on assiste a une redistribution des donnees geostrategiques du Proche a l'Extreme-Orient. Au-dela de l'analyse objective de cette nouvelle guerre, les democraties occidentales - la France en particulier - doivent s'impliquer directement; a travers New York, c'est en effet l'ensemble du monde libre dont les fondements philosophiques ont ete frappes par une nouvelle forme de totalitarisme belliqueux. Le terrorisme islamique, comme tous les autres, doit etre impitoyablement combattu. ID Number: JA017679 Year: 2002 Language: French Rethinking Terrorism and Counterterrorism since 9/11. (STUDIES IN CONFLICT AND TERRORISM, vol. 25, no. 5, 2002, p. 303-316.) Author(s): 1. Hoffman, Bruce Subject(s): 1. TERRORISM 2. SEPTEMBER 11 TERRORIST ATTACKS, 2001 3. BIN LADEN, OSAMA, 19574. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION) Notes: This article examines what has been learned since 11 September 2001 about the nature of twenty-first century terrorism, the challenges that it poses, and how it must be countered. It attempts to better understand Usama bin Laden and the terrorist entity that he created and to assess whether we are more or less secure as a result of the US-led actions in Afghanistan and the pursuit of the al Qaeda network. The article considers these issues, placing them in the context of the major trends in terrorism that have unfolded in recent months and will likely affect the future course of political violence. ID Number: JA018374 Year: 2002 Language: English

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Al-Qaeda- en Talibanstrijders : krijgsgevangenen of niet ?. (INTERNATIONALE SPECTATOR, jg. 56, nr. 5, mei 2002, p. 258-260.) Author(s): 1. Post, Harry Subject(s): 1. PRISONERS OF WAR 2. WAR (INTERNATIONAL LAW) 3. TALIBAN 4. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION) Notes: The author addresses the problem of the status of the Al Qaida and Taliban fighters who were captured by the Americans during the recent Afghan War and are now kept in prison at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba. The Americans argue that the 1949 Geneva Conventions are not applicable in respect to these prisoners, and that as 'unlawful combatants' they have no right to be accorded prisoner-of-war status. This position has been criticized, in particular by the United Nations and the International Committee of the Red Cross. The author shares this criticism and presents a legal argumentation on the basis of a thorough study of the relevant provisions of the Geneva Conventions and Protocols. ID Number: JA017851 Year: 2002 Language: Dutch Ayman Muhammad Rabi' Al-Zawahiri : The Making of an Arch-Terrorist. (TERRORISM AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE, vol. 14, no. 4, Winter 2002, p. 1-22.) Author(s): 1. Raphaeli, Nimrod Subject(s): 1. ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM 2. TERRORISM 3. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION) Notes: Few individuals have had a more central role in articulating and practicing terrorism than Ayman Al-Zawahiri. Tough born into the Egyptian aristocracy and trained as a surgeon, this gifted individual has always been attracted to the most extreme forms of Islam. In 1998 he brought his Egyptian Islamic Jihad organization into a union with the forces of Osama bin Laden, known as al-Qaeda (the base), in the effort to create a globalized network of terror whose capacities were demonstrated on 11 September 2001, as well as in the earlier destruction of the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania and in the damage inflicted on the USS Cole in the Gulf of Aden. Al-Zawahiri is driven by the belief that corrupt secular regimes in the Arab world ought to be replaced by regimes founded on the Islamic Shari'a - Islamic law. For him, the Shari'a is the ultimate law which must govern human and political behavior. Terror is just a means towards that end. Any attempt to legislate laws in violation of the Shari'a must be rejected. The ideal Islamic state must be governed by a supreme leader, a khalif. Democracy is contrary to the Shari'a and is a form of apostasy. This paragon of subterfuge and secrecy was forced to abandon his computer to escape American bombing. The computer was eventually sold in a Kabul market to a reporter from the Wall Street Journal - an emblem, in Zawahiri's eyes, of Western decadence. ID Number: JA018886 Year: 2002 Language: English

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Transnational Terrorism and the al Qaeda Model : Confronting New Realities. (PARAMETERS, vol. 32, no. 2, Summer 2002, p. 33-46.) Author(s): 1. Smith, Paul J. Subject(s): 1. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION) 2. TERRORISM Notes: The author tells us that the terrorist organization known as al Qaeda (The Base) was well known to members of the international intelligence and police communities long before the events of 9/11. Tracing al Qaeda back to its origins, Smith details the history and composition of the organization. He shows how the events of 11 September were not, as some suggest, the result of a massive 'failure of intelligence', but rather the acts of an organization well established in over 50 countries. The author says al Qaeda, 'the ultimate transnational terror organization', represents a new type of terrorist group, one not anchored to specific geographic locations or political constituencies, and possessing transglobal strategic reach. ID Number: JA017864 Year: 2002 Language: English Le cassure du 11 septembre 2001 : elements d'analyse. (DEFENSE NATIONALE, 58e annee, no. 1, janvier 2002, p. 24-40.) Author(s): 1. Touchard, Georges-Eric Subject(s): 1. SEPTEMBER 11 TERRORIST ATTACKS, 2001 2. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION) 3. ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM Notes: Les attentats du 11 septembre 2001 sur le territoire meme des Etats-Unis d'Amerique appellent deux questions : pourquoi et que faire? La presente synthese ne pretend evidemment pas repondre a ces deux vastes interrogations. Elle a pour simple ambition de rassembler, de maniere synthetique, certains elements d'analyse, susceptibles de clarifier la reflexion globale autour des interrogations majeures provoquees par les attentats du 11 septembre 2001. ID Number: JA017403 Year: 2002 Language: French 2001

The Bin Laden Trial : What Did We Learn ?. (STUDIES IN CONFLICT AND TERRORISM, vol. 24, no. 6, November December 2001, p. 429-434.) Author(s): 1. Bergen, Peter Subject(s): 1. BIN LADEN, OSAMA, 19572. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION) Notes: The Manhattan trial of four men linked to Osama bin Laden was the result of the largest overseas investigation ever mounted by the U.S. government. The trial generated thousands of pages of documents and the testimony of dozens of witnesses with some knowledge of bin Laden's group. What was learned from the trial is that bin Laden's organization experienced severe cash flow problems in the mid-1990s; that the U.S. government has had some real successes in finding informants within bin Laden's

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organization; that bin Laden has taken steps to acquire weapons of mass destruction; that the training of bin Laden's followers in his camps in Afghanistan is quite rigorous, featuring tuition on a wide range of weapons and explosives and terrorism techniques; and that bin Laden's group operates transnationally, its membership drawn from over four continents. Finally, the trial underlines the strengths and limits of the law enforcement approach to bin Laden. ID Number: JA017470 Year: 2001 Language: English The World According to Usama Bin Laden. (NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW, vol. 54, no. 4, Autumn 2001, p. 11-35.) Author(s): 1. Hashim, Ahmed S. Subject(s): 1. BIN LADEN, OSAMA, 19572. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION) 3. ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM--AFGHANISTAN Notes: Usama Bin Laden is a dangerous opponent, and so are those who might succeed him should he be killed. Bin Laden's ideas and goals, however, remain little explored or understood. To grasp them, it is necessary to examine the regional and historical context, his experiences, and the sources of fundamentalist thought upon which he draws. ID Number: JA017621 Year: 2001 Language: English The Struggle Against Terrorism : Grand Strategy, Strategy, and Tactics. (INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, vol. 26, no. 3, Winter 2001 - 2002, p. 39-55.) Author(s): 1. Posen, Barry R. Subject(s): 1. TERRORISM--GOVERNMENT POLICY--USA 2. WAR ON TERRORISM, 20013. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION) Notes: In this article, the author asks four questions related to the September 11th attacks : First, what is the nature of the threat posed by al-Qaeda? Second, what is an appropriate strategy for dealing with it? Third, how might the U.S. defense establishment have to change to fight this adversary ? And fourth, what does the struggle against al-Qaeda mean for overall U.S. foreign policy ? ID Number: JA017503 Year: 2001 Language: English Ben Laden et ses freres. (POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE, no. 93, automne 2001, p. 67-81.) Author(s): 1. Roy, Olivier Subject(s): 1. ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM--AFGHANISTAN 2. BIN LADEN, OSAMA, 19573. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION) 4. SEPTEMBER 11 TERRORIST ATTACKS, 2001 Notes: A hasty analysis of the terrorist attacks of September 11 might lead one to link them to the radical Islamic movement. And yet

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this is not really the case. Unlike the terrorists who since the 1980s have fought for the Palestinian or Islamic cause, Osama bin Laden has no political strategy. Nor is he pursuing any achievable goal. The destruction of the World Trade Center is simply the execution of his apocalyptic vision. The larger, traditional Islamic movements have all condemned the attacks. Those who support bin Laden come from outside the wider Islamic tradition. This distinction is key to understanding the bin Laden phenomenon. The bin Laden networks are a product of globalization and know no borders. They have no country, no social base and no program, except perhaps the application of the Sharia. Essentially, the bin Laden system is more of a sect than a political movement. ID Number: JA017217 Year: 2001 Language: French The Terror. (SURVIVAL, vol. 43, no. 4, Winter 2001, p. 5-15.) Author(s): 1. Simon, Steven 2. Benjamin, Daniel Subject(s): 1. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION) 2. TERRORISM--AFGHANISTAN Notes: The likelihood that al-Qaeda will lose its Afghan base raises the question of whether practical sovereignty within contiguous territory is necessary for the terror-group's success, or whether advances in communications and encryption - coupled with increasingly good tradecraft - will over time obviate the need for a territorial base. This is a crucial question for the US and others who are fighting the network, because even complete success in Afghanistan will not destroy this terrorist threat. Nor will the terrorists be appeased by any conceivable change in US policies toward the Muslim world. Moreover, preemptive or preventive strikes against terrorist operations will not be feasible. In this kind of world, a strategy dependent upon identification and elimination of specific threats will have to be combined with one focussed on remedying vulnerabilities to ill-defined, all-azimuth threats of potentially catastrophic scope. ID Number: JA017383 Year: 2001 Language: English Pragmatic Counter-terrorism. (SURVIVAL, vol. 43, no. 4, Winter 2001, p. 35-48.) Author(s): 1. Stevenson, Jonathan Subject(s): 1. TERRORISM--GOVERNMENT POLICY--USA 2. WAR ON TERRORISM, 20013. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION) Notes: Within ten days of the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, President George W. Bush proclaimed: 'our war on terror begins with al-Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated'. Despite the sweeping cast of the 'Bush doctrine', however, the qualification 'with global reach' gave him the leeway to circumscribe the operative definition of terrorism. Practical considerations require a policy that does so. The counter-terrorism effort against al-Qaeda alone will require diverse and sustained military, law-enforcement and intelligence resources that will stretch the capacities of the United States and its allies. The US and its allies enjoy

Page 27

greater leverage over some terrorist groups, and less over others. The upshot is that different policies will fit different terrorist groups and sponsors. ID Number: JA017385 Year: 2001 Language: English

Page 28

PREVIOUS ISSUES ALSO AVAILABLE FROM THE LIBRARY: (MORE TITLES ARE AVAILABLE ON THE LIBRARY INTRANET SITE : http://hqweb.hq.nato.int/oip/library (MINERVA) OR http://eapcweb/library/myweb/index.htm (EAPC)

No. 1/02 No. 2/02 No. 3/02 No. 5/02 No. 1/03 No. 6/03 No. 7/03 No. 8/03 No. 1/04 No. 2/04 No. 3/04 No. 4/04 No. 5/04 No. 6/04 No. 7/04 No. 8/04 No. 9/04 No. 1/05 No. 2/05

Russia's Foreign Policy under Vladimir Putin Central Asia Islam India and Pakistan The Use of Force US Foreign Policy under President Bush The Evolution of the United Nations since 1995 NATO's Strategic Choices : An Historical Overview The People's Republic of China since 1990 The Iraq War : One Year On The Debate on NATO's Enlargement since 2000 Partnership with NATO (PfP/EAPC) The Enlargement of the European Union South Africa Ten years After the End of Apartheid The Mediterranean Region : The Last Ten Years Ukraine since Independence The Arab-Israeli Conflict : Historical Perspective Intelligence NATO and the Russian Federation

ANCIENS NUMEROS EGALEMENT DISPONIBLES A LA BIBLIOTHEQUE: (D'AUTRES TITRES SONT EGALEMENT DISPONIBLES SUR LE SITE INTRANET DE LA BIBLIOTHEQUE : http://hqweb.hq.nato.int/oip/library (MINERVA) OU http://eapcweb/library/myweb/index.htm (CPEA)

No. 1/02 No. 2/02 No. 3/02 No. 5/02 No. 1/03 No. 6/03 No. 7/03 No. 8/03 No. 1/04 No. 2/04 No. 3/04 No. 4/04 No. 5/04 No. 6/04 No. 7/04 No. 8/04 No. 9/04 No. 1/05 No. 2/05

Russie : la politique étrangère de Vladimir Poutine L'Asie Centrale L'Islam L'Inde et le Pakistan L’usage de la force La politique étrangère des Etats-Unis sous le Président Bush L'évolution des Nations Unies depuis 1995 Les choix stratégiques de l'OTAN : aperçu historique La République populaire de Chine depuis 1990 La guerre en Irak : un an plus tard Le débat sur l'élargissement de l'OTAN depuis 2000 Le partenariat avec l'OTAN (PpP/CPEA) L'élargissement de l'Union européenne L'Afrique du Sud dix ans après la fin de l'apartheid La région méditerranéenne au cours de la dernière décennie L’Ukraine depuis l’indépendance Le conflit israélo-arabe : perspective historique Le renseignement L’OTAN et la Fédération de Russie Page 29

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This is a list of designated terrorist organizations by national governments and intergovernmental organizations, where the proscription has a significant impact on the group's activities. Many organizations that are accused of being a terrorist organization deny using terrorism as a military tactic to achieve their goals, and there is no international consensus on the legal definition of terrorism. This listing does not include states or governmental organizations, which are considered under state terrorism, or unaffiliated individuals accused of terrorism, which are considered under lone wolf terrorism. This list also excludes groups that might be widely considered terrorist, but who are not officially so designated according to the criteria specified above.

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Organization

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languages Česky

Abu Nidal Organization Abu Sayyaf Group

Deutsch Italiano ‫עברית‬ Magyar Nederlands 日本語 Português

Achik National Volunteer Council Akhil Bharat Nepali Ekta Samaj Al-Aqsa e.V. Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade Al-Badr

Română

Al Ghurabaa

Русский

al-Haramain Foundation

Slovenščina Suomi

Al Ittihad Al Islamia

Svenska

al-Qa'ida

中文

al-Qa'ida in Iraq al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb Al-Umar-Mujahideen All Tripura Tiger Force Ansar al-Islam Ansar us-Sunna Armed Islamic Group Asbat al-Ansar Aum Shinrikyo Babbar Khalsa Babbar Khalsa International Baluchistan Liberation Army Communist Party of India (Maoist) Communist Party of the Philippines/ New People's Army Continuity Irish Republican Army

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_designated_terrorist_organizations[14-Jun-09 5:34:13 PM]

UK

US India Russia

Terrorism Definitions History of terrorism International conventions Anti-terrorism legislation Counter-terrorism War on Terrorism By ideology Communist Eco-terrorism Narcoterrorism Nationalist Ethnic Religious (Christian • Islamic • Jewish)

Types and tactics Agro-terrorism Bioterrorism Car bombing Environmental Aircraft hijacking Nuclear Piracy Propaganda of the deed Proxy bomb Suicide attack State involvement State terrorism State sponsorship United States and state terrorism Pakistan and state terrorism Russia and state terrorism Iran and state terrorism Sri Lanka and state terrorism Configurations Terrorist front organization Lone-wolf fighter Clandestine cell system Historical Red Terror White Terror Lists Designated organizations Incidents v• d • e

List of designated terrorist organizations - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Cumann na mBan Deendar Anjuman Dukhtaran-E-Millat Egyptian Islamic Jihad Euskadi ta Askatasuna Fatah al-Islam Fianna na hEireann Gama'a al-Islamiyya GRAPO Great Eastern Islamic Raiders' Front Hamas

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

Harakat-ul-Jihad-ul-Islami Harakat-ul-Jihad-ul-Islami (Bangladesh) Harakat ul-Mujahidin Harakat-Ul-Mujahideen/Alami Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin Hezbollah Hizb ut-Tahrir Hizbul Mujahideen Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development Hynniewtrep National Liberation Council Informal Anarchist Federation [5] International Sikh Youth Federation Islamic Army of Aden Islamic Jihad — Jamaat of the Mujahideen Islamic Jihad Union Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan Irish National Liberation Army Irish People's Liberation Organisation Irish Republican Army Islamic Jihad Movement in Palestine Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan Jaish-e-Mohammed Jamaat ul-Furquan Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh Jamiat ul-Ansar Jamiat-e Islami Jammu and Kashmir Islamic Front Jemaah Islamiya Jund Ash Sham Kach/Kahane Chai Kanglei Yaol Kanba Lup Kangleipak Communist Party Khalistan Commando Force Khuddam ul-Islam Kurdistan Freedom Falcons Kurdistan Workers' Party Lashkar-e-Toiba

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_designated_terrorist_organizations[14-Jun-09 5:34:13 PM]

List of designated terrorist organizations - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Lashkar-e-Jhangvi Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam

[6] [7]

Libyan Islamic Fighting Group Loyalist Volunteer Force Manipur People's Liberation Front Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group Mujahedin-e Khalq

[8]

Muslim Brotherhood National Democratic Front of Bodoland National Liberation Army National Liberation Front of Tripura Nuclei Armati per il Comunismo Nuclei di Iniziativa Proletaria Nuclei Territoriali Antimperialisti Nucleo di Iniziativa Proletaria Rivoluzionaria Orange Volunteers Palestine Liberation Front Palestinian Islamic Jihad People's Congress of Ichkeria and Dagestan

[9]

People's Liberation Army People's Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine Popular Front for the Liberation of PalestineGeneral Command Real IRA Red Brigades for the construction of the Combative Communist Party Red Hand Commando Red Hand Defenders Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia Revolutionary Nuclei Revolutionary Organization 17 November Revolutionary People's Front Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front Revolutionary Struggle Saor Éire Saviour Sect Shining Path[10] Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan Social Reform Society Society of the Revival of Islamic Heritage Stichting Al Aqsa Students Islamic Movement of India Supreme Military Majlis ul-Shura of the United Mujahideen Forces of Caucasus Takfir wal-Hijra

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_designated_terrorist_organizations[14-Jun-09 5:34:13 PM]

[11]

List of designated terrorist organizations - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Taliban Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-eMohammadi Tamil Nadu Liberation Army Tamil National Retrieval Troops Ulster Defence Association Ulster Freedom Fighters Ulster Volunteer Force United Liberation Front of Asom United National Liberation Front United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia Vanguards of Conquest World Tamil Movement Sources: Australian Government. "Listing of Terrorist Organisations"

. Retrieved on 2006-07-03.

Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada. "Entities list" 07-03. European Union. "Common Position 2005/847/CFSP"

. Retrieved on 2006-

(PDF). Retrieved on 2006-07-03.

United Kingdom Home Office. "Proscribed terrorist groups"

. Retrieved on 2006-07-03.

United States Department of State. "Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs)" on 2006-07-03. Ministry of Home Affairs. "Banned Organisations"

. Retrieved

. Retrieved on 2008-09-27.

(Russian) "Единый федеральный список организаций, признанных

террористическими Верховным Судом Российской Федерации" Service. Retrieved on 2009-03-22.

. Federal Security

Footnotes

[edit]

1. ^ Australia has designated the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, the military wing of Hamas, as a terrorist organization. 2. ^ The United Kingdom has designated the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, the military wing of Hamas, as a terrorist organization. 3. ^ Australia has designated the Hizballah External Security Organisation as a terrorist organization. 4. ^ The UK has designated the military wing of Hizballah as a terrorist organization. 5. ^ The European Union has also designated 'Cellula Contro Capitale, Carcere i suoi Carcerieri e le sue Celle', 'Solidarietà Internazionale', 'Cooperativa Artigiana Fuoco ed Affini — Occasionalmente Spettacolare' and the 'July 20 Brigade' as terrorist organizations, all supposedly linked to the Informal Anarchist Federation. See http://www.interno.it/mininterno/export/sites/default/it/sezioni/sala_stampa/interview/Interventi/_sottosegretarioxprecedenti/intervista_233.html_2100293813.html 6. ^ http://www.dfat.gov.au/icat/persons_entities/2_proscribed_entities_10dec2001.html 7. ^ http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:023:0037:01:EN:HTML 8. ^ http://www.rfi.fr/actufr/articles/109/article_77771.asp 9. ^ http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/EG22Ag01.html 10. ^ 'Shining Path' (Spanish: Sendero Luminoso) is the name given by Peruvian mass media and government sources to the Maoist Communist Party of Peru. 11. ^ http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/EG22Ag01.html

External links

[edit] This article's external links may not follow Wikipedia's content policies or guidelines. Please improve this article by removing excessive or inappropriate external links. (May 2009)

START Global Terrorism Database (also contains data from the defunct MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base Public Safety Canada – Sécurité publique Canada (Currently listed entities) US Department of State's Foreign Terrorist Organizations, released April 8, 2008

Fact Sheet.

US Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control, 'What you need to know about U.S. Sanctions' European Union list of terrorist groups and individuals, 2007 European Union list of terrorist groups and individuals, 2009 Official text of the statute

as amended and in force today within the United Kingdom, from the UK Statute Law Database

Official text of the Terrorism Act 2000

as enacted

Home office independent reviews of the Act Lord Carlile's review of the Act in 2005 Review of definition of "Terrorism" in British Law published Categories: Irregular military | Lists of organizations | Organizations designated as terrorist

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_designated_terrorist_organizations[14-Jun-09 5:34:13 PM]

List of designated terrorist organizations - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

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Disclaimers

Order Code RL32223

CRS Report for Congress Received through the CRS Web

Foreign Terrorist Organizations

February 6, 2004

Audrey Kurth Cronin Specialist in Terrorism Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

Huda Aden, Adam Frost, and Benjamin Jones Research Associates Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

Foreign Terrorist Organizations Summary This report analyzes the status of many of the major foreign terrorist organizations that are a threat to the United States, placing special emphasis on issues of potential concern to Congress. The terrorist organizations included are those designated and listed by the Secretary of State as “Foreign Terrorist Organizations.” (For analysis of the operation and effectiveness of this list overall, see also The ‘FTO List’ and Congress: Sanctioning Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations, CRS Report RL32120.) The designated terrorist groups described in this report are: Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade Armed Islamic Group (GIA) ‘Asbat al-Ansar Aum Supreme Truth (Aum) Aum Shinrikyo, Aleph Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) Communist Party of Philippines/New People’s Army (CPP/NPA) Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group, IG) HAMAS (Islamic Resistance Movement) Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HUM) Hizballah (Party of God) Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM) Jemaah Islamiya (JI) Al-Jihad (Egyptian Islamic Jihad) Kahane Chai (Kach) Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK, KADEK) Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT) Lashkar I Jhangvi (LJ) Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK or MKO) National Liberation Army (ELN — Colombia) Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ) Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC) Al Qaeda Real IRA (RIRA) Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) Revolutionary Nuclei Revolutionary Organization 17 November (17 November) Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C) Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC)] Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path or SL) United Self-Defense Forces/Group of Colombia (AUC) Source: U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002. (Some spellings have been altered.)

Contents Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Armed Islamic Group (GIA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 ‘Asbat al-Ansar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Aum Shinrikyo (Aum) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Communist Party of Philippines/New People’s Army . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group, IG) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 HAMAS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Harakat ul Mujahidin (HUM) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 Hizballah . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 Jemaah Islamiya (JI) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 Al-Jihad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 Kahane Chai (Kach) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 Lashkar I Jhangvi (LJ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK or MKO) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 National Liberation Army (ELN) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77 Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 Al Qaeda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 Real IRA (RIRA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90 Revolutionary Nuclei . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 Revolutionary Organization 17 November (17 November, N17) . . . . . . . . 96 Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front (RPLP/F) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98 Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100 Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path, SL) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103 United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106

Foreign Terrorist Organizations Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) Name(s). Fatah — Revolutionary Council, Arab Revolutionary Brigades, Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Muslims, Black June and Black September. Goals and Objectives. ANO’s goal is to destroy the state of Israel and establish a Palestinian state. Brief History. The ANO was founded in 1974 by Sabri al- Banna whose nom de guerre, Abu Nidal, means “father of the struggle.” Abu Nidal was a high-ranking official in the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), and served as PLO representative to several Arab states. Abu Nidal bitterly opposed the idea of a Palestinian state co-existing with an Israeli state and after the PLO began leaning towards reconciliation with the Jewish state, he split with the group to form the ANO. The ANO was once one of the most feared transnational terrorist organizations in the world.1 Its operations, which included kidnapping, murders, bombings and hijackings, have killed approximately 900 people and injured several hundred more across three continents and 20 countries.2 Over the years, Iraq, Syria, and Libya each reportedly harbored Abu Nidal and often hired the ANO to execute attacks that were in their interests.3 As a result, the ANO’s selection of targets has been diverse and inconsistent, depending largely on the demands of the state sponsor. The ANO has targeted Jews both inside and outside of Israel, but also targeted moderate Palestinians and Arabs who supported peace talks with Israel. ANO is responsible for the assassinations of senior Jordanian diplomat Naeb Imran Maaytah outside the embassy in Beirut in 1994,4 Abu Iyyad, the PLO’s second-in-command in 1991, and Abu el-Hol, commander of the Western Sector forces of Fatah in 1991.5 The group is also known for simultaneous attacks on Israeli airline counters in Rome and Vienna which killed 18 people and injured 111. In August 2002 Abu Nidal reportedly killed himself in his apartment in Baghdad where he was being treated for leukemia. However, the multiple gunshot wounds to his head leave unanswered

1

Noriyuki Katagiri, “In the Spotlight: Abu Nidal Organization (ANO),” Center for Defense Information, October 9, 2002, [http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/ano-pr.cfm].

2

“Abu Nidal was ‘bin Laden’ of his Time,” Reuters, Aug. 19, 2002

3

Alan Philips, “Mystery End for Abu Nidal,” The Daily Telegraph, August 20, 2002.

4

“Chronology of Abu Nidal’s Major Attacks,” The Jerusalem Post, August 20, 2002.

5

“Abu Nidal Shot Himself in the Mouth,” Agence France Presse, Aug. 21, 2002.

CRS-2 questions surrounding his apparent suicide.6 The extent to which the ANO is still active is under debate. Favored Tactics. Its operations include kidnapping, murders, bombings and hijackings. Anti-American Activities. While the ANO sometimes targeted Western interests, there is only one incident in which it directly targeted a U.S. interest. On July 22, 1985, ANO attempted to bomb the U.S. embassy in Cairo but failed. Primary Area(s) of Operation. From1974-1980, ANO headquarters were based in Baghdad, where the group reportedly took direction from the Iraqi administration to carry out attacks against primarily Syrian and PLO targets. The ANO later relocated to Syria, then Libya, and finally Lebanon.7 Today, ANO militants reportedly reside in Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon, but over the years, the group’s activities have reached far beyond the confines of its state sponsors.8 When the ANO was active in the 1970s and 1980s, it executed attacks in 20 countries, including Austria, Belgium, Egypt, France, Greece, India, Italy, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Pakistan, Philippines, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sudan, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, and the United Kingdom. Strength and Composition. According to the State Department, the ANO consists of a few hundred members.9 Connections with Other Groups. The ANO does not appear to be connected with any other group. State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. The ANO received funding and logistical assistance from several state supporters throughout the 1970s and 1980s, including Iraq, Syria and Libya.10 Originally Designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. October 8, 1997. Re-Designated. October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001. Issues of Interest to Congress. The mysterious circumstances of Abu Nidal’s death beg some questions. If it was a murder, published speculation spans from the killers being agents of Saddam Hussein seeking to eliminate any ties the regime may have had to terrorist groups, to the murderers being henchman of Yasir

6

“Death of a Terrorist,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, Sept. 6, 2002.

7

“Abu Nidal was ‘bin Laden’ of his Time,” Reuters, Aug. 19, 2002

8

“Terrorism Database,” Periscope, USNI Database, at [http://www.periscope1.com].

9

U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 120. Also accessible at [http//www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/].

10

“Terrorism Database,” Periscope, USNI Database, [http://www.periscope1.com].

CRS-3 Arafat carrying out revenge for the murders of PLO officials by Abu Nidal.11 In addition, the viability of ANO as a terrorist organization is up for debate; some might question whether it should continue on the designated foreign terrorist organization list. Third, it is unclear what impact the sanctions imposed on the ANO had or are having on state sponsorship for the group. Other CRS Products. CRS Report RL32058, Terrorists and Suicide Attacks, by Audrey Kurth Cronin, updated August 28, 2003. CRS Report RS21235, The PLO and its Factions, by Kenneth Katzman, updated June10, 2002. CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by Kenneth Katzman, updated February 13, 2003. CRS Issue Brief IB92052, Palestinians and the Middle-East: Issues for the United States, by Clyde Mark, updated November 13, 2003.

11

“Death of a Terrorist,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, Sept. 6, 2002.

CRS-4

Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) Names(s). Abu Sayyaf Group, Abu Sayyaf, ASG Goals and Objectives. Abu Sayyaf Group is a radical Islamic group in the Philippines. Its stated goal is to establish a separate Islamic state for the minority Muslim population of the Philippines, which is predominantly located in the southern islands of Mindanau and the Sulu Archipelago. Most claim, however, that since the late 1990s ASG has essentially become a violent gang of bandits seeking financial gain.12 Brief History. The original leader of ASG, Abubakar Janjalani, fought in the Afghan war against the Soviet Union in the 1980s. Returning to the Philippines in 1990, he founded Abu Sayyaf on the island Mindanao, the traditional home of Philippine Islamic radicalism, to continue the cause there.13 In 1998, Janjalani was killed in a shootout with police in Basilan. Since then, a single strong leader has not emerged, and the ASG has become more a confederation of loosely coordinated commands led by the personal power of individual leaders. Khaddafi Janjalani, Abubakar’s brother, is the head of one such command in the Basilan province and the closest thing the overall ASG is believed to have to a leader.14 In the early 1990s, the group conducted bombings, kidnappings, and executions of Filipino Christians. In 2000, the group apparently changed focus and began to kidnap foreigners, including tourists, journalists, and others to extract ransom payments.15 In April 2000, a $25 million ransom payment for three French journalists was reportedly funneled from European governments through Libya.16 In May 2000 Khaddafi Janjalani led a speedboat raid some 300 miles across the Sulu Sea to kidnap 20 tourists from a Palawan island resort, including three Americans (see below). In October 2001, the U.S. sent military observers to Mindanao to assess the ASG. In November, President Bush extended $93 million in military aid to President Arroyo and offered direct military assistance.17 In January 2002, the U.S. sent 650 12

Emily Clark,”In the Spotlight: Abu Sayyaf,” Center for Defense Information, updated March 5, 2002, [http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/sayyaf.cfm], accessed July 15, 2003. See also U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002, p. 102. 13

CRS Report RL31263, Abu Sayyaf: Target of Philippine-U.S. Anti-Terrorism Cooperation, by Larry Niksch, updated April 8, 2003, p.1.

14

Anthony Davis, “Resilient Abu Sayyaf Group Resists Military Pressure,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, Sept. 1, 2003. See also “Terrorism: Questions and Answers: Abu Sayyaf Group,” The Council on Foreign Relations, [http://www.terrorismanswers.org/ groups/abusayyaf2.html], accessed on July 15, 2003. 15

Larry Niksch, Abu Sayyaf: Target of Philippine-U.S. Anti-Terrorism Cooperation, CRS Report RL31263, updated April 8, 2003, p. 3.

16

Ibid.

17

“U.S.-Philippines Sign Military Logistics Support Pact,” Agence France Presse, Nov. 21, (continued...)

CRS-5 troops (150 special forces and 500 support forces) to the Philippines to operate under strict rules of engagement negotiated in June. Troop strength rose to around 1,300 at the height of operations. The results of Filipino-U.S. cooperation include: increased security cooperation with Philippine forces, the apparent erosion of ASG strength from an estimated 850 fighters to around 450, the expulsion of much of ASG from Mindanao to the Sulu island group, the death of ASG leader Abu Sabaya, the rescue of Gracia Burnham, and an apparent decrease in the local population’s support for ASG as a result of U.S. led civic action projects.18 The majority of U.S. forces withdrew by July 31, 2002. Favored Tactics. The group is renowned for its brutality. It has conducted bombings, kidnappings, and extortion, as well as massacres and beheadings. Anti-American Activities. In May 2000, Abu Sayyaf kidnapped a group of 20 foreigners that included three Americans, Guillermo Sobero of Corono, California and Martin and Gracia Burnham, Christian missionaries from Wichita, Kansas. In June 2001, Abu Sayyaf announced that Abu Sabaya, who was holding Sobero, had beheaded him. In June 2002, the Philippine military launched a rescue mission based on American intelligence. Martin Burnham and a Filipino nurse, Ebidorah Yap, were killed, but Gracia Burnham was rescued.19 The three Americans were apparently held for ransom rather than for ideological or political reasons. The Bush Administration reportedly facilitated a $300 million ransom payment to ASG from the Burnham family. The couple was not released after the payment was made.20 Areas of Operation. ASG is based in the southern Philippine islands of Mindanao and the Sulu island group and conducts most of its activities there. In 2000, the group abducted tourists and journalists in Malaysia, demonstrating an extended reach. However, since joint U.S.-Philippine operations, most of ASG has been forced off Mindanao and southward to Jolo and other Sulu islands.21 Strength and Composition. The group is comprised of Filipino Muslim radicals. The State Department estimates that ASG has between 200 and 500

17

(...continued) 2002. 18

CRS Report RL31263, Abu Sayyaf: Target of Philippine-U.S. Anti-Terrorism Cooperation, by Larry Niksch, updated April 8, 2003, p. 9-13. 19

Bradley Graham, “Hostage Dies, Wife Is Freed In Rescue; U.S. Missionaries Held 1 Year by Rebels,” The Washington Post, June 8, 2002. 20

Raymond Bonner and Eric Schmitt, “Philippine Officials Detail the Trap, Set with U.S. Help, that Snared a Rebel Leader,” The New York Times, September 22, 2002, p. NE16; and Mark Lerner, “Hostage’s Father Says Abu Sayyaf Broke Deal,” The Washington Times, April 26, 2002, p. A15; cited in CRS Report RL31672, Terrorism in Southeast Asia, by Mark Manyin, Richard Cronin, Larry Niksch, Bruce Vaughn, updated November 18, 2003, p. 11. 21

CRS Report RL31263, Abu Sayyaf: Target of Philippine-U.S. Anti-Terrorism Cooperation, by Larry Niksch, updated April 8, 2003, p. 12.

CRS-6 members.22 According to the Philippine government, the group’s strength reached 1,000 in 2001 as a result of successful kidnappings and the influx of ransom money.23 That number has dropped as a result of the post-9/11 government crackdown and military assistance from the United States to around 450.24 The group maintains its own fleet of speedboats to carry out their abductions and move quickly between island bases. Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations. Links between ASG and Al Qaeda are the subject of debate. It is generally believed that the group received funding from Al Qaeda in the early 1990s through Mohammad Jamal Khalifa, a brother-in-law of Osama bin Laden. Al Qaeda collaborator Ramzi Yousef operated in the Philippines in the mid-1990s and reportedly trained Abu Sayyaf fighters. However, there is little information about recent cooperation between Al Qaeda and ASG. Some have claimed that Abu Sayyaf is subordinate to Al Qaeda, but others contend that because of the group’s blatant use of ransom and extortion for profit, a close association between the two is unlikely.25 The 2002 edition of the U.S. State Department’s Patterns of Global Terrorism does not mention any ties to Al Qaeda.26 Though Janjalani’s first recruits were dissidents from the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), radical Islamic groups in the Philippines, such as the separatist Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the MNLF, deny having links with Abu Sayyaf. Both distance themselves from ASG because of its attacks on civilians and its profiteering. The Philippine military, however, has claimed that elements of both groups provide support to Abu Sayyaf.27 State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. The group obtains most of its financing through ransom and extortion. One report estimated its revenues from ransom payments in 2000 alone between $10 and $25 million.28 According to the State Department, it may also receive funding from radical Islamic benefactors in the Middle East and South Asia.29 “Libya was a conduit for ransoms paid to Abu Sayyaf and other Filipino Muslim groups...[Libya] also offered money

22

U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 102.

23

CRS Report RL31263, Abu Sayyaf: Target of Philippine-U.S. Anti-Terrorism Cooperation, by Larry Niksch, updated April 8, 2003, p. 3. 24

Anthony Davis, “Resilient Abu Sayyaf Group Resists Military Pressure,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, Sept. 1, 2003. 25

See “Terrorism: Questions and Answers: Abu Sayyaf Group,” The Council on Foreign Relations, [http://www.terrorismanswers.org/groups/abusayyaf2.html], accessed on July 15, 2003.

26

U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002,pp. 101-102.

27

CRS Report RL31263, Abu Sayyaf: Target of Philippine-U.S. Anti-Terrorism Cooperation, by Larry Niksch, updated April 8, 2003, p. 6. 28 29

Ibid., p. 3. U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002, p. 102.

CRS-7 for ‘livelihood projects’ in its role in the 2000 hostage negotiations...this raises the possibility that Libyan money gets channeled to Abu Sayyaf.”30 Originally Designated as an FTO. October 8, 1997. Re-designated. October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001. Issues of Concern for Congress. The presence of U.S. troops in the Philippines might raise questions for Congress over their cost, the scope of the war on terrorism, and the rules of engagement for American troops in assisting foreign counter-insurgency campaigns in the context of the war on terrorism. Congressional oversight of the role of the United States in fighting this group may be important. Some have questioned whether this group is appropriately classified as a terrorist group or whether it might be better considered a criminal gang of thugs. If the latter, then its place in the post-9/11 war on terrorism is open to question. The issue of the ASG’s ties to Al Qaeda is also relevant here. The role of Libya in providing ransom money to this group may be relevant to future debates about whether Libya should be removed from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism pursuant to section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (P.L. 96-72; 50 U.S.C. app. 2405(j)(as amended)). Finally, the relationship between Abu Sayyaf and both the MILF and MNLF is ambiguous and controversial. Given the importance of the Philippines as an ally to the United States, this group will bear watching. Other CRS Reports. CRS Report RL32120, The ‘FTO List’ and Congress: Sanctioning Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations, by Audrey Kurth Cronin, October 21, 2003. CRS Report RL31152, Foreign Support of the U.S. War on Terrorism, by Regina Dubey, Huda Allen, Amanda Douglas, updated August 8, 2003. CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by Kenneth Katzman, updated February 13, 2003. CRS Report RL31672, Terrorism in Southeast Asia, by Mark Manyin, Richard Cronin, Larry Niksch, Bruce Vaughn, updated November 18, 2003. CRS Report RL31263, Abu Sayyaf: Target of Philippine-U.S. Anti-Terrorism Cooperation, by Larry Niksch, updated April 8, 2003.

30

CRS Report RL31263, “Abu Sayyaf: Target of Philippine-U.S. Anti-Terrorism Cooperation,” by Larry Niksch, updated April 8, 2003, p. 5.

CRS-8

Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade Name(s). al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade; al-Aqsa Martyrs Battalion Goals and Objectives. Al-Aqsa aims to expel Israeli soldiers and settlers from the West Bank and Gaza, and to establish a Palestinian state. Brief History. Al-Aqsa is an offshoot of Yasser Arafat’s Fatah, and emerged just after the start of the second Intifada in September 2000. The organization’s goals are to create a Palestinian state and eliminate the presence of Israeli soldiers and settlers in the Palestinian- occupied territories. The group is secular in theory, but has been known to recruit young militants espousing Islamic fundamentalism.31 Unlike Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, al-Aqsa does not claim to be intent on destroying the state of Israel.32 Initially, al-Aqsa militants exclusively attacked Israeli Defense Force and Israeli settlers, but experts say that by early 2002 al- Aqsa began targeting civilians in Israel.33 This shift may have been due to the heightened intensity of the Intifada, including the increased death toll of Palestinians and what al- Aqsa militants believe to be Israel’s “targeted killing” of the group’s West Bank leader, Raed Karmi, on January 14, 2002.34 Since then, al-Aqsa’s attacks have become more severe, and in January 2002 the group introduced the use of female suicide bombers.35 In January 2003, al-Aqsa militants conducted two suicide bombings in downtown Tel Aviv that killed 23 people and wounded approximately 100. Since the start of the second Intifada, al-Aqsa militants have executed more attacks than even Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad36. While other Palestinian groups such as Hamas, Islamic Jihad and Fatah agreed to observe a cease-fire in June 2003, al-Aqsa refused to do so. Less than 24 hours after the other groups declared the cease-fire, al-Aqsa killed a Romanian worker on a settlement road near Jenin in the West Bank.37 Favored Tactics. Al-Aqsa uses many tactics, including suicide bombings (including by women), knifings, shootings, and kidnappings.

31 32 33

“Terrorism Database,” Periscope, USNI Database, www.periscope1.com. “Palestinian Militant Groups 101,” CNN, June 18, 2003. “Terrorism Database,” Periscope, USNI Database, www.periscope1.com.

34

“ a l -A q s a M a r t yr s B r i ga d e , ” C o u n c i l o n F o r e i gn R e l a t i o n s , [http://www.terrorismanswers.org /groups/alaqsa_print.html], accessed July 14, 2003.

35

Matthew Kalman, “Terrorist says orders come from Arafat; Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade leader says group is integral to Palestinian chief’s Fatah,” USA Today, March 14, 2002. 36

Dan Rothem, “In the Spotlight: al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades,” Center for Defense Information, June 10, 2002, [www.cdi.org/terrorism.aqsa-pr.cfm], accessed July 14, 2003. 37

“Foreign Worker Killed in West Bank,” Associate Press, June 30, 2003.

CRS-9 Anti-American Activities. Al-Aqsa does not directly target U.S. interests. However, the State Department has said that at least one U.S. citizen and four U.S.Israeli dual citizens have been killed in al-Aqsa attacks.38 Primary Area(s) of Operation. Al-Aqsa operates in Israel and the Palestinian Occupied Territories. The group’s bases are said to be in Nablus and Ramallah.39 Strength and Composition. According to the State Department, the number of members in al-Aqsa is unknown. Some experts estimate that the group consists of a few hundred young men and women.40 Connections with Other Groups. Al-Aqsa’s connection with Yasir Arafat’s Fatah — the largest faction of the Palestinian Liberation Organization — is murky. Some Israeli experts and the government itself assert that al- Aqsa is clearly linked with Yasser Arafat and Fatah.41 They cite as proof Israeli intelligence acquisition of an apparent al- Aqsa invoice, addressed to the Palestinian Authority (PA) chief financial officer. In their view, this intelligence suggests that al- Aqsa militants are “on the Palestinian Authority’s payroll, [al-Aqsa’s] activities are financed out of Palestinian Authority coffers, and its attacks are carried out with the knowledge and backing of Yasser Arafat’s inner circle.”42 Al-Aqsa has sometimes cooperated operationally with both Hamas and Palestinian Jihad.43 State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. The source of alAqsa’s funding is unclear. The sophistication of al- Aqsa attacks suggests that the group is well funded. Israeli forces claim to have recovered an invoice from a raid on PLO head Yasir Arafat’s compound in April 2002 that outlines the disbursing of funds from the PLO to the al-Aqsa Brigades. Israel claims that the invoice conclusively proves Yassir Arafat’s money supports for the group. However, Arafat

38

U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p.102.

39

“Martyrs of al-Aqsa,” International Policy Institute for Counter Terrorism, [http://www.ict.org.il], accessed July 14, 2003 .

40

“Israel 1991 to Present; al-Aqsa Martyrs [http://www.palestinefacts.org], accessed July 14, 2003.

Brigade,”

Palestine

Facts,

41

Yehuda Lancry, “Letter dated 16 January 2002 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General,” January 16, 2002, accessible at [http://domino.un.org]. 42

Yael Shahar, “The al- Aqsa Martyrs Brigade: A political tool with an edge,” International Policy Institute for Counter Terrorism, March 24, 2002. 43

“Israel 1991 to Present; al- Aqsa Martyrs [http://www.palestinefacts.org], accessed July 14, 2003.

Brigade,”

Palestine

Facts,

CRS-10 has dismissed the “invoice of terror” as a forgery.44 Yasser Arafat has neither “officially recognized nor openly backed” al- Aqsa.45 Originally Designated as an FTO. March 27, 2002. Issues of Concern for Congress. Since early 2002, this group has killed a significant number of civilians in Israel. Its use of suicide attacks has been particularly frequent and deadly. The question of whether or not Yasir Arafat and the Palestinian Authority provide money for this group (see above) will continue to be controversial. This group’s violent activities, and the Israeli response to them, may continue to affect the viability of an Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Other CRS Reports. CRS Report RL32058, Terrorists and Suicide Attacks, by Audrey Kurth Cronin, updated August 28, 2003. CRS Report RS21235, The PLO and its Factions, by Kenneth Katzman, updated June 10, 2002. CRS Issue Brief IB92052, Palestinians and the Middle-East: Issues for the United States, Clyde Mark, updated November 13, 2003. CRS Issue Brief IB91137, The Middle East Peace Talks, by Carol Migdalovitz, updated October 22, 2003.

44

Lee Hockstader, “Israel Says Document Links Arafat, Terror,” The Washington Post, April 3, 2002 45

“Profile: al- Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade,” BBC News.

CRS-11

Armed Islamic Group (GIA) Name(s). Armed Islamic Group, GIA Goals and Objectives. GIA is a loose-knit radical Islamic organization in Algeria. While it is unclear whether the group has a central authority or is a collection of smaller affiliated bands, it apparently seeks to overthrow the secular government of Algeria and replace it with a fundamentalist state based on Islamic law. Brief History. GIA formed in early 1993 after the secular Algerian government cancelled elections apparently because the Islamic party, Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), was poised to win. (GIA split from Islamic Salvation Army, the armed wing of FIS.) Returning Algerian veterans of the Afghan war against the Soviet Union united with disparate radical Islamic groups to form GIA. Since 1993, the group has attacked the government and the military, but also conducted brutal massacres of civilians and foreigners in Algeria, sometimes slaughtering entire villages. On December 31, 1997, the group reportedly killed 400 Algerian civilians in a small town in the space of a few hours.46 Several recent accounts allege, however, that some massacres may have been conducted by, or with the complicity of, the Algerian government.47 The group’s activity has diminished because of a military crackdown and widespread popular revulsion to the killing of civilians. Since 1998, GIA has apparently been eclipsed by the better organized though smaller offshoot called Salafist Group For Call and Combat (GSPC, see below). Favored Tactics. GIA is best know for slitting the throats of its victims, but it has employed a variety of other methods, including bombs, targeted assassinations, and airline hijackings. Anti-American Activities. Although GIA targeted French and other European interests in both Europe and Algeria, there is only one instance where the group has directly threatened U.S. interests. In 1999, Ahmed Ressam, a supposed member of the GIA, was arrested while on route from Canada to bomb the Los Angeles International Airport.48 Areas of Operation. GIA operates mainly within the borders of Algeria. It has reportedly raised funds and conducted attacks in Western Europe through Algerian expatriate communities. In 2002, a French court convicted two GIA members for a series of bombings that took place in France in 1995. Strength and Composition. GIA’s membership is predominantly Algerian Islamic militants. It is difficult to estimate the size of GIA because it is less cohesive

46

“New Bloodletting in Algeria,” Newsday, January 5, 1998.

47

See, for example: Habib Souaidia, The Dirty War and Nesroulah Youh, Who Killed in Bentalha: Chronicle of a Forecasted Massacre. 48

CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by Kenneth Katzman, updated February 13, 2003. See also Elaine Ganley, “Ahmed Ressam Followed Familiar Road Map to Terror,” Associated Press, Dec. 18, 2001.

CRS-12 than many other organizations. The group’s strength has apparently decreased substantially from its peak in the mid-1990s, but there is disagreement about the current number of members. The State Department estimates that the group’s strength is now “probably fewer than 100.”49 The International Institute for Strategic Studies puts its overall strength at “less than 1,500,” divided into cohorts of 50-100.50 Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations. There is evidence of connections between GIA and Al Qaeda. In mid-2002, the London-based Arabic newspaper Al Hayat cited Algerian sources alleging that an Al Qaeda operative visited Algeria to arrange cooperation between GIA and GSPC.51 In September 2002, a captured GIA leader stated that in the mid-1990s, Osama bin Laden provided financial assistance to GIA.52 It is possible that many Algerian members of Al Qaeda are or have been associated with GIA. State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. According to Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, GIA has no known sources of external support.53 As noted above, captured GIA members have asserted that bin Laden provided funding to GIA in the mid-1990s. The group reportedly receives aid from Algerian expatriates in Western Europe and Canada.54 Originally Designated as an FTO. October 8, 1997. Re-Designated. October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001. Issues of Concern for Congress. The apparent connections between GIA and Al Qaeda make this group of particular importance to the United States in the war on terrorism. The flow of funding to GIA from expatriates in Western Europe and Canada raises questions of whether or not efforts to counter terrorist financing are succeeding. Other CRS Reports. CRS Report RS21529, Al Qaeda after the Iraq Conflict, by Audrey Kurth Cronin, updated May 23, 2003. CRS Report RL31247, Africa and the War on Terrorism, by Ted Dagne, updated January 17, 2002.

49

U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 103.

50

Ibid.

51

“Al Qa’idah reportedly Trying to Unite Algeria’s Armed Islamic Groups,”BBC Monitoring Middle East, June 8, 2002. 52

“Former Islamist Chief Says bin Laden Offered to Help Topple Algerian Government,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, September 12, 2002. 53 54

U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 103.

CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by Kenneth Katzman, updated February 13, 2003.

CRS-13 CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by Kenneth Katzman, updated February 13, 2003. CRS Report RS21532, Algeria: Current Issues, by Carol Migdalovitz, updated May 30, 2003.

CRS-14

‘Asbat al-Ansar Name(s). ‘Asbat al-Ansar, also spelled ‘Osbat al-Ansar or ‘Usbat al-Ansar, meaning the “League of Partisans.” Goals and Objectives. ‘Asbat al-Ansar aims to establish an Islamic state in Lebanon and to eliminate anti-Islamic and U.S. influences in Lebanon and elsewhere. Brief History. Established in the 1990s, ‘Asbat al-Ansar is a small, relatively new, but highly active Sunni extremist group based primarily in the Ain al-Hilweh Palestinian refugee camp in the southern port of Sidon, Lebanon. Its leader is AbdelKarim al-Saade or Abou Mohjen and the group opposes Lebanon’s representative government, seeking to replace it with an Islamic state governed by Shari’a law.55 Its constituents, primarily Palestinian refugees, reject peace with Israel.56 ‘Asbat al- Ansar targets interests and people that it perceives as “un-Islamic,” including both soldiers and civilians, Arabs and Westerners. Churches, bars, nightclubs, theaters, liquor stores, and casinos have all been attacked by ‘Asbat alAnsar militants — as have members of rival militant groups and moderate government officials. In 1999, ‘Asbat al-Ansar assailants sprayed gunfire and hurled grenades at a courthouse in Sidon, killing four Lebanese judges. In an attack against an atypical target, in January 2000, militants launched a rocket-propelled grenade at the Russian embassy in Beirut, reportedly as a gesture of solidarity with the Chechen rebels.57 Favored Tactics. ‘Asbat al-Ansar militants primarily use small bombs and grenades to launch attacks against their targets. Anti-American Activities. In 2002, ‘Asbat al-Ansar stepped up its attacks and rhetoric against U.S. targets. The group is a suspect in the November 2002 killing of Bonnie Penner, an American missionary in Sidon.58 ‘Asbat al-Ansar is similarly suspected in a string of bombings against U.S. restaurants in Lebanon.59 Primary Area(s) of Operation. The group is based in Lebanon, primarily in the ‘Ain al- Helweh Palestinian refugee camp in Sidon. To a large extent, ‘Asbat alAnsar is able to reign freely in Lebanon’s refugee camps — without repercussions from the Lebanese government — because of an Arab League law that stripped

55 56

“Terrorism Database,” Periscope, USNI Database, www.periscope1.com. “Portraits of Groups U.S. Links to Terror,” Agence France Presse, September 25, 2001.

57

“Hundreds Attend Funeral of Palestinian Attacker of Russian Embassy in Beirut,” Associated Press, January 7, 2000. 58

Nicholas Blanford, “Lebanon Targets Islamic Radicals,” The Christian Science Monitor, May 20, 2003. 59

“Presumed Leader of Anti-U.S. Terror Group Arrested in Lebanon,” Agence France Presse, October 18, 2003.

CRS-15 Lebanon of governmental jurisdiction over the camps. Hence, the camps — where several militant and guerilla group such as Fatah and ‘Asbat al- Nour are also said to be operating — are “off-limits” to Lebanese law enforcement and security officials.60 ‘Asbat al-Ansar’s attacks have so far been limited to targets in Lebanon. Strength and Composition. The group consists of approximately 300 militants, mostly Palestinian refugees in Lebanon.61 Connections with Other Groups. Experts suspect that ‘Asbat al-Ansar is affiliated with Osama bin Laden and the al- Qaeda network.62 The allegation hinges on the connection of an Australian of Lebanese origin named Bilal Khazal who apparently forms a link between Asbat al-Ansar, the Tripoli Cell, and Al Qaeda. Khazal heads Australia’s Islamic Youth Movement that is accused of recruiting Islamic fundamentalists. The CIA claims that “the Al Qaeda leadership has allegedly delegated responsibility”63 to Khazal, and the Australian press claims “Bilal Khazal has been linked to an alleged Spanish Al Qaeda operative Abu Dahdah, who is accused of having strong links with one of the brains behind the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.”64 A group known as the Tripoli Cell attempted to assassinate U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon Vincent Battle in January 2003. Arrested members of the Tripoli Cell admitted to also being Asbat al-Ansar members and reportedly told a military court in Beirut that the group’s leader, Mohammed Ka’aki “received at least $1,800 from Khazal.”65 Some experts believe, then, that Khazal may have formed the linchpin between Asbat al-Ansar, through the Tripoli Cell, to Al Qaeda, although this is subject to dispute. State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. The State Department says that ‘Asbat al- Ansar likely receives aid from extremist Sunni groups as well as Osama bin Laden and the al- Qaeda network.66 Date added to the FTO list. March 27, 2002.

60

Nicholas Blanford, “Lebanon Targets Islamic Radicals,” The Christian Science Monitor, May 20, 2003. 61

“The Military Balance,” Institute for International and Strategic Studies, vol. 103. [http://www3.oup.co.uk/milbal/current/]. Table 41. 62

U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 103.

63

Jonathan Schanzer, “New Evidence of Wider Threats from Lebanon’s Asbat al-Ansar,” Analysis of Near East Policy from the Scholars and Associates of the Washington Institiute, Policywatch #79, October 3, 2003.

64

Sarah Smiles and Linda Morris, “Islamic Youth Leader Charged with Terrorist Links,” The Sydney Morning Herald, September 13, 2003. 65

Schanzer, “New Evidence of Wider Threats from Lebanon’s Asbat al-Ansar.”

66

U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 103.

CRS-16 Issues of Concern for Congress. This group threatens the Lebanese government, rejects peace with Israel and also reportedly tried to assassinate the U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon (see above). It may also have ties to Al Qaeda. Within the context of the war on terrorism, it bears watching in future months. Other CRS Reports. CRS Report RS21529, Al Qaeda after the Iraq Conflict, by Audrey Kurth Cronin, updated May 23, 2003. CRS Report IB89118, Lebanon, by Clyde Mark, updated November 19, 2003. CRS Report IB91137, Carol Migdalovitz, The Middle East Peace Talks, updated October 22, 2003. CRS Report RL31078, The Shi’ba Farms Dispute and Its Implications, by Alfred Prados, updated August 7, 2001.

CRS-17

Aum Shinrikyo (Aum) Name(s). Aum Supreme Truth (Aum), Aum Shinrikyo (means “teaching the supreme truth” on the “powers of destruction and creation in the universe”), Aleph Goals and Objectives. Aum aimed to control Japan and the world, and subsequently create a global utopian society. Brief History. Established in 1987 by Shoko Asahara, an eccentric, half-blind intellectual, Aum reflects an eclectic and twisted blend of Tibetan Buddhist, Hindu, Taoist and Christian thought. It focuses on spiritual existence in a world that its adherents view as increasingly hedonistic, superficial and materialistic. Asahara claimed that the state of the world indicated that apocalypse was nearing and would begin with a U.S. weapons of mass destruction (WMD) attack on Japan. His group sought to hasten that apocalypse, take over Japan and the globe, and herald a new order from chaos.67 To this end, Aum sought to develop nuclear, chemical and biological weapons capabilities.68 On June 27, 1994 Aum released the nerve agent, sarin, over a district in central Japan, killing seven people and injuring hundreds. In its deadliest and most infamous attack, on March 20, 1995, ten Aum followers punctured bags of diluted sarin in five subway stations located under government offices and the National Police Agency’s headquarters. Twelve people were killed and up to 6,000 were injured.69 In response, Japanese security forces arrested Aum followers, including Asahara, and closed laboratories and production facilities. Nine members of the group have since been sentenced to death and Asahara continues to stand trial. A verdict is expected in Asahara’s trial in February 2004. The group has renamed itself “Aleph,” meaning beginning, and is under the new leadership of Fumihiro Joyu.70 It has issued a public apology and promised at least $2.5 million in reparations for victims of the attack.71 It has also renounced violence in the political and spiritual processes. Although the group has not been associated with any terrorist act since 1995, Japanese officials are still concerned, saying that it is ‘no less dangerous than it was seven years ago.’72 Security forces closely monitor the group’s activities, and under new legislation, are permitted to conduct

67

Shawn Choy, “In the Spotlight: Aum Shinrikyo,” Center for Defense Information, July 23, 2003, [http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/AumShinrikyo-pr.cfm], accessed July 25, 2003. 68 69 70

Steven Strasser, “Tokyo Grabs Doomsday Guru,” Newsweek, v.125 No. 22, May 29, 1995. U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 104. “New Aum Title Riles Namesakes,” Mainichi Daily News, January 21, 2000.

71

Hiroshi Matsubara, “Aum grows again, guru still revered,” The Japan Times, Aug. 8, 2002.

72

Ibid

CRS-18 raids of Aum facilities. The group has reportedly renewed its recruiting activities, disseminating videos and posting web pages in Japanese, English and Russian.73 Favored Tactics. Aum has used chemical weapons against civilian and government targets. In 1993 the group attempted to spread anthrax from one of its facilities in Tokyo, and in 1995 Aum punctured bags of sarin with umbrellas in the Tokyo subway that killed 12 and injured up to 6,000.74 According to one source, “Members had tried on no fewer than eight different occasions between 1990 and 1995 to aerosolize anthrax bacteria and botulinum toxin at locations around Tokyo.”75 According to some experts, Aum produced or acquired enough sarin to kill an estimated 4.2 million people.76 Anti-American Activities. Aum has not targeted Americans or U.S. interests in the past. However, Asahara often preached anti-American rhetoric to his constituents, including the sentiment that the United States was at fault for Japan’s economic and social ills.77 Primary Area(s) of Operation. Aum has solely attacked targets in Japan, but its followers and its administrative offices extend beyond Japan. Analysts suspect that Aum once maintained offices in Australia, Germany, Russia, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Ukraine, and the United States.78 There are still reportedly a large number of members of Aleph in Russia. Strength and Composition. The State Department estimates that Aum currently consists of 1,500 to 2,000 followers.79 Some experts say that at its peak, the group had 60,000 followers, including 10,000 in Japan, as many as twenty to thirty thousand in Russia, and an additional ten to twenty thousand worldwide.80 As recently as August 2003, the Russian Orthodox Church has claimed there are more Aum members in Russia than in Japan.81 Aum’s spiritual message has appealed to

73

For this and other information about the cult’s activities, see David E. Kaplan, “Aum Shinrikyo,” Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons, edited by Jonathan B. Tucker (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2000), pp. 225-226 74

“Aum Released Anthrax Virus in Tokyo in 1993,” Japan Economic Newswire, July 25, 1995; and U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 104. 75

“Filthy Wars: Japan’s Aum Shinrikyo Sect,” Sunday Herald Sun, April 19, 1999.

76

Shawn Choy, “In the Spotlight: Aum Shinrikyo,” Center for Defense Information, July 23, 2003, [http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/AumShinrikyo-pr.cfm], accessed July 25, 2003. 77

Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, Columbia University Press: New York, p. 123.

78

Choy, “In the Spotlight: Aum Shinrikyo.”

79

U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 104.

80

Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), p. 122.

81

“Russia has more Aum Shinrikyo Members than Japan, Orthodox Bishop Says,” British Broadcasting Corporation, August 3, 2003.

CRS-19 young, well-educated individuals characterized as “alienated by society’s preoccupation with work, success, technology and making money.”82 Connections with Other Groups. Unknown. State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. Reportedly owning nearly $1.4 billion in assets, Aum has proven itself to be a wealthy and self-reliant group.83 It operates a computer store that reportedly generates annual sales of approximately 7 billion yen (about $63 million).84 It has been reported that Aum’s computer businesses have been highly lucrative because dedicated cult followers work for little or no wages, allowing Aum to undersell its competitors. The sophisticated technical capabilities of many members of Aum give this group the ability to generate robust sources of funds. In addition to high-tech goods, the cult generates revenue through sales of publications and spiritual goods.85 Originally Designated as an FTO. October 8, 1997. Re-designated. October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001. Issues of Concern for Congress. Aum was the first terrorist group to have used so-called weapons of mass destruction. The group’s willingness to use chemical and biological weapons makes it of special concern, especially considering that Japanese authorities are still very wary of the group’s intentions and that it continues to exist. With a reportedly large contingent of followers in Russia and the group’s past record of recruiting educated scientists, attention might be focused on whether Aum/Aleph is seeking to use its Russian members to acquire more weapons and resources from Russian facilities. Other CRS Products. CRS Report RS20412, Weapons of Mass Destruction-The Terrorist Threat, by Steven Bowman, updated December 8, 1999. CRS Report RL31831, Terrorist Motivations for Chemical and Biological Weapons Use: Placing the Threat in Context, by Audrey Kurth Cronin, March 28, 2003. CRS Issue Brief IB97004, Richard Cronin, Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress, updated November 14, 2003. CRS Report RL31609, Japan’s Economic and Security Challenges, by Richard Nanto, updated October 16, 2002.

82

Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, p. 122.

83

Choy, “In the Spotlight: Aum Shinrikyo.”

84

“Aum’s True Colors,” Mainichi Daily News, Oct. 2, 1999.

85

Kaplan, “Aum Shinrikyo,” in Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons, p. 226.

CRS-20

Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) Name(s). Basque Fatherland and Liberty; Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna, ETA Goals and Objectives. ETA aims to establish a Basque homeland based on Marxist principles in the ethnically Basque areas in northern Spain and southwestern France. Brief History. ETA was founded in 1959 by Basque Marxist rebels incensed by the efforts of Spanish dictator Francisco Franco to suppress the Basque language and culture. Since then the group has carried out numerous attacks in Spain and some in France. More than 800 people have been killed in ETA attacks since its founding.86 The group is best known for assassinating high level Spanish officials. In 1973, the group assassinated Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco, the heir apparent to Franco, and in 1995 Spanish politician and now president Jose Maria Aznar narrowly escaped an attack. Spanish King Juan Carlos was also the target of an unsuccessful plot. In addition, the group has targeted lower-level officials, journalists, and civilians.87 In the past two years, the Spanish government has made important breakthroughs against ETA, arresting over 120 suspected members and accomplices, seizing assets, and disrupting planned operations. France has also recently arrested a number of suspected members. ETA apparently does not enjoy broad support among Basques: often its attacks are followed by anti-violence demonstrations, and moderate political parties that reject violence do much better at polls than do parties supportive of ETA.88 In general, ETA seems to be declining: the number of attacks and killings has fallen (from 43 in 2001 to 20 in 2002), its financial assets appear to have been squeezed through international cooperation, and its reported IRA collaboration has been hurt by the Irish group’s cease fire.89 Favored Tactics. ETA has conducted bombings, shootings, kidnappings, and assassinations. Anti-American Activities. ETA has not been known to target Americans or U.S. interests. Areas of Operation. ETA operates mainly in the Basque regions of Spain and France which include Alava, Guipuzcoa, Navarra and Vizcaya. The group has also carried out attacks throughout Spain.

86

U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, pp. 105.

87

“Terrorism: Questions and Answers: Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA),” The Council on Foreign Relations and the Markle Foundation, [http://www.terrorismanswers.org/ groups/eta.html], accessed on July 25, 2003. 88 89

Support for the ETA does exist; however, it has been severely weakened. Ibid.

Keith B. Richburg, “Long Basque Rebellion Losing Strength: International Effort Squeezes Underground Separatist Group,” The Washington Post, December 11, 2003, p. A1.

CRS-21 Strength and Composition. The U.S. State Department’s Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002 estimates ETA’s strength at several hundred members, plus supporters.90 Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations. The group apparently has links to the Irish Republican Army, and some believe that it has often followed the IRA’s lead in terms of tactics and operations.91 Terrorism experts believe that ETA may also have helped Colombian terrorists to bomb a social club in Bogota in early 2003.92 State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. ETA members have reportedly received training in Lebanon, Libya, Yemen, and Nicaragua, as well as sanctuary in Cuba. The ETA finances itself through kidnappings, robberies, and extortion.93 The group has been known to rob banks, traffic in drugs, and extort money from businesses in the Basque regions.94 Originally Designated as an FTO. October 8, 1997. Re-designated. October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001. Issues of Concern for Congress. The measures taken by the United States and its allies to freeze ETA resources have apparently had an effect upon funding for the group. While some Basques in the United States have sympathy for Basque selfdetermination, it does not appear that expatriates in the U.S. are providing resources for the violent activities of the ETA. Some terrorism experts point to Spanish government measures in dealing with the ETA, especially in recent years, as a case study of effective state counterterrorism, although not all would agree. Others are concerned about the very hard political line that has been taken against further Basque autonomy, including against moderates who are not engaged in violence. Recent cooperation between France and Spain in dealing with the ETA, as well as measures instituted by the European Union, are arguably an example of effective transnational counterterrorism. Other CRS Reports. CRS Report RL31612, European Counterterrorist Efforts since September 11: Political Will and Diverse Responses, Paul Gallis, coordinator, October 17, 2002.

90

U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 105.

91

David Trimble, “In Northern Ireland, A Question of Trust,” The Washington Post, November 30, 2002. 92

Tim Johnson, “Hand of Irish or Basque Terrorists Seen in Deadly Colombian Bombing,” San Diego Union-Tribune, February 12, 2003.

93

U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, pp. 105.

94

“Terrorism Database,” Periscope, USNI Database, www.periscope1.com.

CRS-22

Communist Party of Philippines/New People’s Army Name(s). Communist Party of Philippines/New People’s Army (CPP/NPA). Goals and Objectives. To establish a Marxist state in the Philippines via a violent uprising against the Philippine government. Brief History. The New People’s Army (NPA) is the military wing of the Communist Party of the Philippines. It was established in 1969 by Jose Sison and is recognized as Southeast Asia’s longest-running Marxist insurgency.95 This Marxist group has remained active over the course of 34 years in spite of major shifts in global politics, including the fall of the Soviet Union and the emergence of new ideological players such as Al Qaeda. In June 2003, the NPA executed its deadliest attack in more than a decade when 200 of its militants raided a Philippine army camp, killing 17 people.96 In response, Philippine President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo condemned the attack and ordered an urgent crackdown on the group. Prior to this attack, the Philippine government had tried twice to engage the group in peace talks. Peace talks were in progress in 2001, but were halted after the NPA assassinated two Philippine congressman. Talks were resumed in 2003, but NPA rebels rejected a peace accord with the government, claiming that they are under extreme duress after being listed on European and U.S. terrorist lists.97 Favored Tactics. The NPA primarily targets Philippine citizens and interests. It has been known to use a variety of methods, including kidnapping, assassinations, and arson. It also has front groups in the labor and university sectors of Philippine society. Anti-American Activities. The NPA was responsible for attacks against U.S. military interests in the Philippines prior to the closure of the U.S. military bases there (Clark and Subic) in 1992. Since then, the NPA has continued to oppose the presence of U.S. forces in the Philippines and has demanded that the U.S. military stay out of domestic affairs. In 2002, the NPA objected to being designated a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) and threatened retaliatory attacks against Americans and U.S. interests. In 2003, the NPA threatened to target U.S. troops in the Philippines who have been participating in a joint military exercise to train Philippine soldiers with the skills to combat the Abu Sayyaf Group.98

95

“One Philippine soldier killed, eight injured in clash with communist rebels,” Associated Press, April 17, 2003. 96

Teresa Cerojano, “Arroyo orders action against communist rebels following deadly attack,” Associated Press, June 27, 2003. 97

“Philippine Exploratory Peace Talks Halted,” Xinhua News Agency, Feb. 20, 2003. See also Jim Gomez, “Philippine troops and communist rebels clash near Manila, 24 killed,” Associated Press, March 30, 2003. 98

Lee Peart, “Philippines — NPA Vows to Target US Troops in Philippines,” WMRC Daily Analysis, March 28, 2003.

CRS-23 Primary Area(s) of Operation. The NPA operates solely in the Philippines, particularly in rural Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao. It also reportedly has cells in Manila.99 Strength and Composition. The NPA consists of 10,000 to 13,500 members.100 According to the State Department, the group had reached an armed strength of over 25,000 in mid-1985. The NPA went into a steep decline due to Corazon Aquino’s restoration of democracy, more effective Philippine military operations, and, perhaps most decisive, internal divisions and purges within the Communist Party in the context of the international decline of their ideology. By 1993-94, NPA strength fell to an estimated 5,000. Since then, however, there has been slow growth up to an estimated 11,000 members. The reasons for the resurgence appear to be continued economic hardships in the rural areas and the restoration of a more monolithic leadership of the Communist Party (CPP) under the exiled Jose Sison.101 Sison and other CPP leaders are living in the Netherlands. Connections with Other Groups. Unknown. State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. NPA raises money through several mechanisms. It reportedly collects “revolutionary taxes” from rural communities by taxing food and other items.102 The group also raises money by engaging in criminal activities such as extortion. Philippine officials estimate that the group gathers about $1.8 million each year. Originally Designated as an FTO. August 9, 2002. Issues of Concern for Congress. This group is a threat to a major U.S. ally, the Philippines. It has threatened to renew attacks against U.S. citizens and it may be growing in numbers. Other CRS Reports. CRS Report RL31672, Terrorism in Southeast Asia, by Mark Manyin, Richard Cronin, Larry Niksch, and Bruce Vaughn, updated November 18, 2003. CRS Report RL31263, Abu Sayyaf: Target of Philippine-U.S. Anti-Terrorism Cooperation, by Larry Niksch, updated April 8, 2003.

99

U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p 106.

100

Ibid. See also Teresa Cerojano, “Arroyo orders action against communist rebels following deadly attack,” Associated Press, June 27, 2003. 101

CRS Report RL31672, Terrorism in Southeast Asia, by Mark Manyin, Richard Cronin, Larry Niksch, and Bruce Vaughn, updated November 18, 2003. See also Jim Gomez, “Philippine troops and communist rebels clash near Manila, 24 killed,” Associated Press, March 30, 2003. 102

Honesto C. General, “Is CPP/NPA a terrorist organization?,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, August 18, 2002.

CRS-24

al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group, IG) Name(s). al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya, also spelled al- Jama’a al-Islamiyya, (Islamic Group, IG). Goals and Objectives. The IG aims to overthrow the secular Egyptian government and replace it with an Islamic state, governed by Shari’a law and devoid of “un-Islamic” influences. Brief History. Established in the late-1970s, the IG, an Islamic militant group, was one of the largest and most active Islamic groups in Egypt. Several key events and phenomena served as catalysts for the group’s formation and the beginning of its violent attacks. The most notable event occurred in 1978 when Egypt, under President Anwar Sadat’s leadership, became the first Arab country to sign a peace accord with Israel (the Camp David Accords). At about the same time, Sadat introduced progressive social legislation, including measures to strengthen the rights of women. Sadat also began cracking down on and imprisoning members of militant Islamic groups — a shift in policy from years of practicing a more tolerant approach towards them. These policies prompted the IG’s spiritual leader, Sheikh Omar Abdel al- Rahman,103 to issue a fatwa calling for the assassination of Sadat, who was killed in 1981.104 Although another Egyptian group, al- Jihad, was primarily responsible for the assassination, several IG militants were involved and were convicted in connection with the crime.105 The IG is likewise suspected of a 1995 assassination attempt on Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak while traveling in Addis Ababa.106 In general, the organization has targeted people and interests that they believe obstruct its vision of an Islamic state, including government personnel, police officers, tourists, Coptic Christians, secular intellectuals, and employees in banks, video stores, and theaters. The Egyptian government blames the group for the deaths of over 1,300 people.107 In recent years, the IG is probably best known for the 1997 massacre of 58 foreign tourists at the Temple of Hatshepsut in Luxor, Egypt.108 Since the Luxor

103

Sheikh Rahman is also a conspirator in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, for which he has been serving life in prison since 1995.

104

William Farrell, “Egypt Reports Plot to Kill Aides at Sadat’s Funeral,” The New York Times, Oct. 31, 1981

105

Lamia Radi, “Egypt Frees Islamic Militant Leader Jailed for Sadat Murder,” Agence France Presse, Sept. 29, 2003.

106

“Ethiopia Announces Arrests in Mubarak Assassination Bid,” Agnence France Presse, Aug. 2, 1995. 107 108

Radi, “Egypt Frees Islamic Militant Leader Jailed for Sadat Murder.”

“Egypt Arrest 45 Militants after Identifying One of the Luxor Attackers,” Agence France Presse, Nov. 21, 1997.

CRS-25 attack, the IG has split unofficially into two different ideological camps.109 The goal of both groups remains the attainment of an Islamic state. However, one faction, led by Rifa’i Taha Musa, condones the use of violence to achieve these ends, and the other, led by Mustafa Hamza, condemns the use of violence.110 The IG has not apparently engaged in a terrorist attack inside Egypt since 1998.111 Favored Tactics. The IG employs several different tactics, using car bombs, suicide bombs, and gunfire. Anti-American Activities. The IG has not directly targeted U.S. citizens or interests, although the assassination of Sadat was considered a severe blow to U.S. foreign policy interests in the region. However, the group has previously threatened violence against American interests and reportedly considered kidnapping Americans to use as leverage to win the freedom of its leader Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman.”112 In 1998, the group’s current operational leader, Rifa’i Taha Musa, signed Osama bin Laden’s proclamation that calls for attacks against U.S. citizens.113 Primary Area(s) of Operation. The IG is based in southern (Upper) Egypt, primarily in the regions of al- Minya, Assiut, Qina, and Sohaj. The organization reportedly has some support in Cairo and Alexandria, and also boasts a presence in Afghanistan, Austria, Sudan, United Kingdom, and Yemen.114 Strength and Composition. The IG has an unknown number of followers, but at its peak it consisted of several thousand militants. Experts suspect that the group has lost members since the 1990s, a phenomenon that may be attributable to a 1999 cease-fire, as well as a government crackdown on militant groups since the 1997 attacks on tourists at Luxor and the September 11 attacks.115 The group has tended to attract disenfranchised university graduates who may be frustrated by widespread unemployment in the country. Connections with Other Groups. The IG allegedly maintains close contact with the Egyptian Islamic extremist group, al- Jihad. The two groups share members and reportedly jointly planned and carried out the assassination of Sadat and the attempted assassination of Mubarak.116 IG may also have a connection with Osama

109

U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p.106.

110

“Most Jamma Leaders Favor End to All Attacks,” Agence France Presse, Dec. 11, 1997.

111

Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002, p.106

112

“Urgent,” Agence France Presse, Apr. 21, 1996.

113

Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002, p 106.

114

“Terrorism Database,” Periscope, USNI Database, www.periscope1.com.

115

Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002, p 106.

116

“In the Spotlight: al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya - Islamic Group,” Center for Defense (continued...)

CRS-26 bin Laden and the Al Qaeda network. Dr. Ayman al- Zawahiri, a leader within the IG and al-Jihad movement, is a close associate of bin Laden (see al-Jihad below). Considering the close connections between al-Jihad and the IG, Zawahiri provides a key link between IG and Al Qaeda. State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. According to the Egyptian government, the IG receives aid from Iran, bin Laden and Afghan militant groups.117 The organization may also receive some funding from Islamic nongovernmental organizations.118 Originally Designated as an FTO. October 8, 1997. Re-designated. October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001. Issues of Concern for Congress. This group’s potential threat to the Egyptian government and murky funding sources (see above) make it a serious concern in the war on terrorism. Its link to Al Qaeda make it a potential threat to the United States. Other CRS Reports. CRS Report RL32058, Terrorists and Suicide Attacks, by Audrey Kurth Cronin, updated August 28, 2003. CRS Report RL31247, Africa and the War on Terrorism, by Ted Dagne, updated January 17, 2002. CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by Kenneth Katzman, updated February 13, 2003. CRS Issue Brief IB93087, Egypt-United States Relations, by Clyde Mark, updated Oct. 10, 2003.

116

(...continued) Information, December 2, 2002, [http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/algamaa-pr.cfm], accessed July 28, 2003.

117 118

Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p 106. “Terrorism Database,” Periscope, USNI Database, [http://www.periscope1.com].

CRS-27

HAMAS Name(s). Harakat Al-Muqawama Al-Islamia; Islamic Resistance Movement; HAMAS; Hamas. Goals and Objectives. Hamas is a radical Islamic Palestinian organization that initially sought to expel Jews and the state of Israel from Israel/Palestine, and to establish an Islamic Palestinian state based on Islamic law. These goals appear to have been moderated somewhat in recent years, however, with indications that the group would likely accept a favorable Israeli-Palestinian agreement. Brief History. Hamas split off from the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood organization in 1987, taking a much more militant line than its parent organization in terms of both Israel and the establishment of an Islamic state in Israel/Palestine. The group maintains both a social services wing that reportedly runs “clinics, kindergartens, orphanages, colleges, summer camps and even sports clubs,”119 and a terrorist wing that carries out attacks against Israeli military and civilian targets. Its social services wing has been very popular and important among Palestinians. Hamas has carried out scores of bombings and has been among the most vigorous participants in the first (1987-1990)and second (2000-present) Intifadas (or Palestinian uprisings against Israel). The group has opposed the Middle East peace process and has positioned itself as a challenger to the Palestinian Authority in the Gaza Strip, which it criticizes for making concessions to Israel and for corrupt and ineffective government.120 Recently, Ariel Sharon’s government has become much more aggressive in targeting Hamas leaders for assassination, including Hamas founder Sheikh Salah Shehada (killed July 2002), bomb-maker Muhammed Deif (killed Sept. 2002), Abdel Aziz Rantisi (June 2002) and most notably spiritual leader Sheik Ahmed Yassin (Sept. 2002).121 Yassin and Rantisi are still alive. Favored Tactics. Since 1994, the primary terrorist tactic of Hamas has been suicide bombings.122 Hamas bombers have not generally fit the expected profile, sometimes including older men and people with relatively well-paying jobs and families. The group has also employed car bombings, mortar attacks, and assassinations.123 Anti-American Activities. According to the State Department, the group has not targeted U.S. interests. Several U.S. citizens have died as a result of Hamas

119

Khaled Abou Toameh, “Cradle to Grave,” The Jerusalem Post, Sept. 4, 1997.

120

PR Kumaraswamy, “Hamas Emerges as Winner in Cairo Talks,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, March 1, 2003.

121

Ramit Plushnick-Masti, “Unsuccessful Israeli strike on top Hamas leaders highlights difficulty of targeted killings,” Associate Press Sept. 7, 2003.

122 123

Samuel Katz, “Policing Israel’s Front Line,” The Washington Times, Sept. 22, 2002. “Terrorism Database,” Periscope, USNI Database, [http://www.periscope1.com].

CRS-28 bombings in Israel, although Americans do not appear to have been intentional targets.124 Most notably, five American citizens were among 65 killed in a series of four joint Hamas-Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ, see entry below) bombings in 1996. Areas of Operation. Hamas operates in the West Bank and Gaza Strip but is strongest in the latter. The group also has presences in Syria, Lebanon, and the Gulf States.125 Strength and Composition. The members of Hamas are Palestinian Islamic radicals. The number of official members is unknown. According to some estimates, the group has “tens of thousands of supporters and sympathizers” for its uncompromising anti-Israel position and its attacks against Israel, its opposition to corruption in the Palestinian Authority, and its network of social services.126 Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations. Hamas’ closest ally is the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ-See below). Initially, PIJ and Hamas did not maintain ties; in fact, some analysts viewed them as rivals.127 Since 1994, the two groups have apparently collaborated on several fronts: they have conducted joint attacks and planned simultaneous bombings. In 2000, Time Magazine reported that Hamas and the PIJ were being courted by Iran to coordinate their efforts and derail the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Time also reported that Hizballah, a group deeply connected to Iran, was the intermediary that facilitated this process.128 There have also been numerous reports that Hamas members received training and logistical support from Hizballah facilities in southern Lebanon.129 In June 2003, PIJ and Hamas published a joint statement declaring a cease-fire to end attacks on Israelis and Israeli interests. State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. Hamas reportedly receives some aid from Iran (10% of its budget by some estimates) but apparently derives most of its financing from Palestinian expatriates around the world, private

124

U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 107.

125

Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 107.

126

“Terrorism Database,” Periscope, USNI Database, www.periscope1.com. See also Michael Donovan, “In the Spotlight: Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement),” Center for Defense Information, updated June 23, 2003. Accessed at [http://www.cdi.org], July 14, 2003. 127

“Palestinian Islamic Jihad,” International Policy Institute for Counter Terrorism, [http://www.ict.org.il], accessed July 11, 2003.

128

Massimo Calabresi, “A Hidden Hand in the Breakdown of Peace,” Time Magazine, Feb. 28, 2000.

129

Daniel Byman, “Should Hezbollah be Next?” Foreign Affairs, Nov.-Dec. 2003. See also “Hizballahland,” Commentary from the American Jewish Committee, No. 1, Vol. 116, July 1, 2003, pg 56.

CRS-29 sympathizers in Arab states, and legitimate businesses in Palestinian controlled areas.130 The Bush Administration accuses Syria and Iran of harboring and supporting Hamas.131 Both states are opposed to Israel and the peace process, and both claim that Hamas and other Palestinian groups opposed to Israel are legitimate freedom fighters.132 During the Second Intifada, which began in late 2000, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein reportedly gave money to the families of Palestinian suicide bombers, including Hamas members. Furthermore, Israel has accused Saudi Arabia of allowing money raised in state-run telethons to go to support Hamas.133 Secretary of State Colin Powell implied sympathy for that allegation by stating, “There are some troubling aspects as to how that telethon money would be distributed.”134 Hamas reportedly also runs money-generating businesses in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and abroad.135 Finally, Hamas is known to acquire money from charities operating in the West, reportedly including: The Palestinian Relief Development Fund (U.K.); the Holy Land Foundation (U.S.-assets currently frozen); Al Aqsa Foundation (Germany with branches in Holland and Belgium); and Comite de Bienfaisance et Solidarite avec la Palestine (France).136 Originally Designated as an FTO. October 8, 1997. Re-designated. October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001. Issues of Concern for Congress. This group apparently has significant financial resources and extensive international ties. The combination of strong social services and brutal terrorist attacks makes Hamas highly influential and dangerous. Hamas is crucial to the future prospects of any Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Recent U.S. efforts at curtailing terrorist financing have targeted charitable foundations that help support the activities of Hamas. The role of Saudi Arabian citizens in supporting Hamas, directly or indirectly, has been subject to much scrutiny and criticism in the United States.

130

CRS Report, RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by Kenneth Katzman, updated February 13, 2003.

131

T. Christian Miller, “Near Iraq, Syria Reportedly Still Quietly Backs Militants,”Los Angeles Times, August 12, 2003.

132

See for example, “Again, Bush Warns Iran, Syria on Terrorism,” Los Angeles Times, July 22, 2003.

133

Steve Weizman, “Israel Accuses Saudis of Helping Palestinian Terror Attacks,” Associate Press, May 6, 2002.

134

Barry Schweid, “Powell Says He Has No Evidence that Israel Massacred Palestinians in Refugee Camp,” Associate Press, Apr. 24, 2002.

135

CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by Kenneth Katzman, updated February 13, 2003.

136

“Terrorism Database,” Periscope, USNI Database, [http://www.periscope1.com].

CRS-30 Other CRS Reports. CRS Report RL32058, Terrorists and Suicide Attacks, by Audrey Kurth Cronin, updated August 28, 2003. CRS Report RL32048, Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses, by Kenneth Katzman, updated October 23, 2003. CRS Report RS21235, The PLO and its Factions, by Kenneth Katzman, updated June10, 2002. CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by Kenneth Katzman, updated February 13, 2003. CRS Issue Brief IB92052, Palestinians and the Middle-East: Issues for the United States, by Clyde Mark, updated November 13, 2003. CRS Issue Brief IB91137, The Middle East Peace Talks, by Carol Migdalovitz, updated October 22, 2003. CRS Issue Brief IB93113, Saudi Arabia: Current Issues and U.S. Relations, by Alfred Prados, updated November 14, 2003.

CRS-31

Harakat ul Mujahidin (HUM) Name(s). Jamiat ul-Ansar; Party of the Volunteers; Movement of Holy Warriors; formerly Harakat -ul-Ansar. Goals and Objectives. HUM is a Pakistan-based Islamic militant organization that seeks to wrest Jammu and Kashmir from Indian control and create an Islamic state encompassing Pakistan and these territories. Brief History. Founded by Fazlur Rehman Khalil, the HUM was initially founded to fight the Afghan insurgency against the Soviet Union in the 1980’s. After the Soviet pullout, HUM turned its focus on Kashmir, where it has carried out attacks against Indian interests in the Indian-controlled territory of Jammu and Kashmir. In 1998, Khalil signed Osama bin Laden’s fatwa calling for attacks on Americans and other Western targets. In December 1999, HUM hijacked an Indian airliner which resulted in the release of Maulana Masood Azhar, who had been imprisoned by India since 1994 for association with HUM attacks.137 After his release, Ahzar broke with the HUM and formed the new Jaish-eMuhammad, taking many HUM members with him (Jaish-e-Muhammad, see below). In recent years, HUM activities have decreased significantly, and crackdowns on Islamic militants in Pakistan have left the group under-funded and undersupported.138 In February 2000, longtime leader Khalil handed control of the group over to Farooq Kashmiri Khalil, and in 2001, after the HUM was banned by President Pervez Musharraf, Khalil renamed the group Jamiat ul-Ansar.139 Favored Tactics. HUM has attacked Indian military, government, and civilian targets in Kashmir with bombs and various other means. The group has also highjacked airliners. Anti-American Activities. Despite signing Osama bin Laden’s 1998 declaration against the United States, the group has not been known to target U.S. interests primarily. HUM remains focused on Kashmir and Jammu. However, in 2002, Pakistani authorities arrested three members of an HUM subgroup, the alAlmi faction, which admitted to the June 14, 2002 bombing of the U.S. Consulate in Karachi that killed 11 people.140 Areas of Operation. HUM is based in Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, and conducts insurgent and terrorist operations in Indian-controlled Jammu

137

U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 108.

138

Dan Rotham, “In the Spotlight: Harakat ul Mujaheddin (HUM),” Center for Defense Information, updated July 8, 2002. Accessed at [http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/harakat.cfm], July 15, 2003.

139

“Jaish-e-Mohammed and Harkat-ul-Ansar Change Names,” The Press Trust of India, March 12, 2003.

140

Kahn, Zarar. “Pakistan sentences men to death for bomb that killed French engineers.” Associated Press. June 30. 2003.

CRS-32 and Kashmir. In the past, the group has operated training camps in Afghanistan.141 Members of HUM have reportedly participated alongside other Islamic militants in operations in Central Asia, Bosnia, and Burma. Strength and Composition. HUM is comprised of Islamic radicals from Pakistan and Kashmir, as well as some Arab veterans of the Afghan war against the Soviet Union. The group is believed to have several thousand armed supporters. The group lost much of its strength in 2000 in defections to the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM, see below), and its activities have decreased since.142 Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations. The leader of HUM signed Osama bin Laden’s 1998 fatwa calling for attacks against American soldiers and civilians. The group is believed to have maintained ties with bin Laden and Al Qaeda, but the nature of these ties is unclear.143 HUM has also cooperated with other Islamic militant groups operating in Kashmir and Pakistan. State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. HUM receives financial support from sympathizers not only in Pakistan and Kashmir, but also in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states.144 The group allegedly also raises funds among Pakistani and Kashmiri expatriates in Europe, primarily Britain.145 Its fund-raising in Pakistan has been largely curtailed since the government crackdown on extremists following 9/11. The government of India has long accused Pakistan of supporting and encouraging militant Islamic groups operating in Kashmir, to include HUM. Originally Designated. as an FTO October 8, 1997. Re-designated. October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001. Issues of Concern for Congress. An important concern for the United States in its war on terrorism is the apparent cooperation between HUM and Al Qaeda. The convergence of a local, territorially-based agenda aimed at Jammu and Kashmir with a global, anti-American, “international jihad” focus is worrisome. Having its major locus of operations in Pakistan, a nuclear state that is allied with the United States but potentially unstable, is also a serious concern. Finally, attacks by the HUM exacerbate the tensions between India and Pakistan, two nuclear states apparently often on the brink of war.

141

Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 108.

142

CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by Kenneth Katzman, updated February 13, 2003, p. 18. See also Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002, p. 109.

143

CRS Report RL31119,, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by Kenneth Katzman, updated February 13, 2003, p. 18.

144 145

Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002, p. 108.

Dan Rotham, “In the Spotlight: Harakat ul Mujaheddin (HUM),” Center for Defense Information, updated July 8, 2002. Accessed at [http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/harakat.cfm], July 15, 2003.

CRS-33 Other CRS Reports. CRS Report RL32058, Terrorists and Suicide Attacks, by Audrey Kurth Cronin,, updated August 28, 2003. CRS Report RS21529, Al Qaeda after the Iraq Conflict, by Audrey Kurth Cronin, updated May 23, 2003. CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by Kenneth Katzman, updated February 13, 2003. CRS Report RL21658, International Terrorism in South Asia, by K. Alan Kronstadt, updated November 3, 2003. CRS Report RL31624, Pakistan-U.S. Anti-Terrorism Cooperation, by K. Alan Kronstadt, updated March 28, 2003. CRS Issue Brief IB94041, Pakistan-U.S. Relations, by K. Alan Kronstadt, , updated November 3, 2003. CRS Report RL31587, Kashmiri Separatists: Origins, Competing Ideologies, and Prospects for Resolution of the Conflict, by Kaia Leather, updated September 30, 2002.

CRS-34

Hizballah Name(s). Hezbollah, Party of God, Islamic Jihad, The Revolutionary Justice Organization, The Islamic Resistance, Organization for the Oppressed on Earth. Goals and Objectives. According to its manifestos, Hizballah is dedicated to the liberation of Jerusalem, the destruction of Israel, and the ultimate establishment of an Islamic state in Lebanon.146 Brief History. Established in 1982 by Lebanese Shiite clerics and ideologically inspired by the Iranian revolution, Hizballah was formed in response to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. The group was the principal supporter of antiWestern and anti-American terrorism in the 1980’s and is directed by its Majlis alShura, or Consultative Council. Since 1992, Hizballah has participated in Lebanon’s political system and currently holds 12 seats, with its allies, in parliament.147 Other terrorist activities include the highjacking of TWA Flight 847 (1985), the detention of 18 American hostages in Lebanon throughout the 1980’s and 1990’s, the bombing of Israel’s Embassy in Argentina (March 1992), and the bombing of the ArgentineJewish Mutual Association in Bueno Aires (July 1994).148 During its 15-year military insurgency campaign against Israeli and Israeli-aligned forces in Southern Lebanon, Hizballah carried out rocket attacks that killed Israeli civilians.149 Favored Tactics. Hizballah has engaged in kidnappings, bombings, and highjackings, as well as rocket strikes against Israeli settlements and the firing of surface-to-air missiles at Israeli jets.150 Anti-American Activities. Hizballah’s most active period of anti-American targeting occurred during the 1980’s and resulted in a very large number of U.S. casualties. Under the alias Islamic Jihad,151 Hizballah has been implicated in or is known to have carried out the truck bombings of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut (April 1983), the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut (October 1983, killing 220 Marine, 18 Navy, and 3 Army personnel), and the U.S. Embassy Annex in Beirut (September 1984).152 Hizballah also claimed responsibility for an April 1984 bombing that killed 18 U.S. service members in Torrejon, Spain. Of their strictly terrorist acts between

146

“Hezbollah’s Manifesto,” available at [http://www.ict.org.il/Articles/Hiz_letter.htm]. See also U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 108

147 148

Hezbollah holds ten seats and its allies hold two. “Terrorism Database,” Periscope, USNI Database, [http://www.periscope1.com].

149

CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near East Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by Kenneth Katzman, updated February 13, 2002. 150

“Terrorism Database.” Periscope, USNI Database. [http://www.periscope1.com].

151

CIA report on Islamic Jihad. Central Intelligence Agency. Issue Date: Oct 4, 1984. Date Declassified: Mar 01, 1987. 6 page(s). Reproduced in Declassified Documents Reference System. Farmington Hills, Mich.: Gale Group, 2003.

152

CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near East Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by Kenneth Katzman, updated February 13, 2002.

CRS-35 1994 and 2002, however, none has been directly targeted at U.S. citizens or assets. However, some experts believe there may be a resurgence in anti-American activity. For example, Singapore’s Internal Security Department claims to have foiled a Hizballah plot to attack U.S. shipping interests in the 1990’s.153 Moreover, Hizballah has pledged retaliation for the death of Ali Hussein Saleh, a Hizballah security official, for which the group blames both the United States and Israel.154 Finally, some experts have warned of Hizballah’s potential for “wreaking havoc” in post-war Iraq, although there is no direct evidence of a Hizballah role there so far.155 Primary Areas of Operation. Hizballah operates in the southern suburbs of Beirut, the Bekaa valley, and southern Lebanon. It has established cells in Europe, Africa, South America, North American, and Asia.156 Strength and Composition. The group is believed to have two to five thousand supporters and a few hundred terrorist operatives.157 Connections with Other Groups. Saudi and Bahraini investigations claim that Hizballah maintains connections with other Shiite groups bent on anti-regime activity throughout the Gulf region. Furthermore, portions of the U.S. government’s indictment against bin Laden for the bombings of two U.S. embassies in Africa in 1998 state that “Al Qaeda also forged alliances with... Hezbollah (variant spelling), for the purpose of working together against their perceived common enemies in the West, particularly the United States.”158 State Sponsors and Other Sources of Funding. Iran supports Hizballah with financial, political, and organizational aid, while Syria provides diplomatic, political, and logistic support.159 In May 1996, Secretary of State Warren Christopher testified that Iran provides “up to $100 million a year in the case of Hezbollah [sic].”160

153

“Singapore Says Hizballah Tried to From Terror Cell,” Reuters, Jun. 8, 2002. See also “Hezbollah had plans to attack US, Israeli ships in Singapore,” Agence France Presse, Jun 9, 2002.

154

“Hizbullah Vows to Retaliate,” The Daily Star, Aug. 4, 2003. Available at [http://www.hizbollah.org/english/frames/index_eg.htm]

155

Daniel Byman, “Should Hezbollah be Next?” Foreign Affairs, November-December 2003, Vol. 82, No. 6, pp. 54-67.

156

U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 108

157

“The Military Balance,” Institute for International and Strategic Studies, Vol. 103. [http://www3.oup.co.uk/milbal/current/]. Table 41.

158

“Iran, Syria, and bin Laden,” The Washington Times, November 29, 2001.

159

U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p.108.

160

Martin Sieff, “U.S. to Keep Pressure on Iran,” Washington Times May 26, 1996. See also Kenneth Katzman, “Terrorism: Near East Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, CRS Report, RL 31119, updated February 13, 2002.

CRS-36 The group also seeks financial aid from overseas, as evidenced by the U.S. arrest in 2002 of Chawki and Muhamod Hammoud, who are accused of using a cigarette smuggling operation to generate funds for Hizballah.161 Originally Designated as an FTO. October 8, 1997. Re-designated. October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001. Issues of Concern for Congress. The U.S. approach to Hizballah is complex. Hizballah has adopted a political role within Lebanon and is represented in the Lebanese Parliament, with 12 seats (with its allies) out of 128. Apparently mainly because it forced Israel to withdraw from Lebanon, Hizballah is popular in the Arab world. Hizballah is a designated foreign terrorist organization and has global assets. The Lebanese government has refused to freeze the financial assets of Hizballah. Hizballah has killed a large number of Americans, especially during the 1980s, and has apparently cooperated with Al Qaeda on training and logistics;162 however, it has apparently not carried out attacks directly against Americans in recent years. Some experts claim that the group is a growing threat to the United States, potentially comparable to Al Qaeda; others dispute this assessment and argue that failing to distinguish between the groups will increase their incentives to cooperate, ultimately increasing the threat to the United States.163 Other CRS Reports. CRS Report RL32058, Terrorists and Suicide Attacks, by Audrey Kurth Cronin, updated August 28, 2003. CRS Report RL32048, Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses, by Kenneth Katzman, updated October 23, 2003. CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by Kenneth Katzman, updated February 13, 2003. CRS Issue Brief IB89118, Lebanon, by Clyde Mark,,updated October 21, 2003. CRS Issue Brief IB92052, Palestinians and the Middle-East: Issues for the United States, by Clyde Mark, updated November 13, 2003. CRS Issue Brief IB91137, The Middle East Peace Talks, by Carol Migdalovitz, updated October 22, 2003. CRS Report RL31078, “The Shi’ba Farms Dispute and its Implications,” by Alfred Prados, updated August 7, 2001.

161

Gary Wright and Eric Frazer, “Trial Starts for Two Accused of Hizballah Tie,” The Charlotte Observer, May 20, 2002.

162

“Iran, Syria, and bin Laden,” The Washington Times, November 29, 2001.

163

Byman, “Should Hezbollah be Next?”

CRS-37

Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) Name(s). Islamic Party of Turkestan. Goals and Objectives. The IMU is a radical Islamic organization seeking to overthrow secular rule in Uzbekistan. The group reportedly also seeks Islamic rule in other Central Asian countries and to fight against those it deems enemies of Islam.164 Brief History. The IMU was formed in Afghanistan by radical Islamic opponents of Uzbek President Islam Karimov, who is accused of brutally repressing opposition to his rule and suppressing Islam. However the roots of the IMU go back as far as December 1991, when the mayor of the eastern city of Namangan refused to grant a group of young Muslims land on which to build a Mosque, and the men seized the Communist Party headquarters. The men were led by Tohir Abdouhalilovitch Yuldeshev, and Jumaboi Ahmadzhanovitch Khojaev (alias Juma Namangani). Yuldeshev was a 24-year-old college drop-out and mullah in the Islamic underground movement. Khojaev was a former Soviet paratrooper who apparently had his Muslim faith revitalized while fighting against the mujahidin while he served in Afghanistan.165 Under intense government pressure, Yuldashev fled Uzbekistan, was given refuge in Afghanistan by the Taliban, and began networking with Islamic groups. Namangani made a name for himself as a bold fighter in the Tajik civil war.166 In 1996, the two men announced the formation of the IMU, and reportedly helped the Taliban against the Northern Alliance, even leading troops in battle. From bases in Tajikistan, the group launched a terror campaign against the Uzbek government. Because of tight security, the group has generally been unable to operate in Uzbekistan and has been more active in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Many of the group’s leaders, including Namangani, were killed or captured during the U.S.-led war against the Taliban in 2001.167 Favored Tactics. The IMU has primarily used bombings and armed guerilla warfare. Anti-American Activities. In August 2000, the IMU kidnapped four American mountain climbers, who escaped after pushing their IMU guard off a

164

U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 109.

165

“In the Spotlight: Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.” Center for Defense Information. [http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/imu.cfm]. Updated Mar. 25, 2002. Accessed Oct. 27, 2003. 166 167

“Terrorism Database.” Periscope, USNI Database. [http://www.periscope1.com]. Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 109.

CRS-38 cliff.168 The IMU also fought alongside the Taliban and Al Qaeda in the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan in late 2001. Areas of Operation. The IMU operates throughout Central and South Asia, especially in the Ferghana Valley, where the Uzbek, Kyrgyz, and Tajik borders converge.169 The group is known to have operated in Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Iran, Pakistan, and Uzbekistan.170 Strength and Composition. The U.S. State Department’s Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, estimates that the IMU probably now has fewer than 1,000 militants.171 Before the U.S.-led war against the Taliban, which badly hurt the group, the IMU was believed to have had closer to 2,000 members.172 Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations. IMU leaders are believed to have formed ties to Al Qaeda while both were based in Afghanistan in the late 1990s.173 IMU members are believed to have trained at Al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan before the fall of the Taliban. State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. The IMU received support from other Islamic extremist groups as well as from sympathizers in the Middle East and South Asia. Before the post-9/11 crackdown, Al Qaeda is believed to have been a major supporter of the IMU.174 The group is reportedly heavily involved in the Central Asian opium trade; by one account, the group handles 70 percent of opium trafficking in the region.175 Originally Designated as an FTO. September 25, 2000. Re-designated. September 25, 2002.

168

Audrey Cooper, “American Hostages Push Guard Off Cliff to Escape Militants,” Chicago Tribune, Aug. 25, 2000.

169

Mark Burgess, “In the Spotlight: Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.” Center for Defense Information. [http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/imu.cfm]. Updated Mar. 25, 2002. Accessed Oct. 27, 2003.

170

Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 109.

171

Ibid

172

“The Military Balance,” Institute for International and Strategic Studies, Vol. 103. [http://www3.oup.co.uk/milbal/current/]. Table 41.

173

Raffi Khatchadourian, “Militants on the Steppes,” The Nation, May 20, 2002.

174

Ibid

175

Prepared Testimony of Ralf Mutschke, Assistant Director, Criminal Intelligence Directorate, InterPol General Secretariat Before for the House Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, “The Threat Posed by the Convergence of the Organized Crime, Drug Trafficking, and Terrorism,” December 13, 2000.

CRS-39 Issues of Concern for Congress. This group could play a role in impeding the success of the reconstruction of Afghanistan and the future stability of a postTaliban state. Although the IMU was seriously damaged during military hostilities against the Taliban regime, its role in the drug trade is of growing concern, as are its very close ties to Al Qaeda. Other CRS Reports. CRS Report RS21529, Al Qaeda after the Iraq Conflict, by Audrey Kurth Cronin, May 23, 2003. CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by Kenneth Katzman, updated February 13, 2003. CRS Report RL 31213, China’s Relations with Central Asian States and Problems with Terrorism, by Dewardric L. McNeal and Kerry Dumbaugh, updated October 7, 2002. CRS Issue Brief IB 93108, Central Asia: Regional Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests, by Jim Nichol, updated November 6, 2003. CRS Report RL30294, Central Asia’s Security: Issues and Implications for U.S. Interests, by Jim Nichol, updated Apr. 3, 2003. CRS Report RS21238, Uzbekistan: Current Developments and U.S. Interests, by Jim Nichol and Carl Ek, updated January 9, 2003. CRS Report RS21041, Taliban and the Drug Trade, by Raphael Perl, updated October 5, 2001.

CRS-40

Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM) Name(s). Army of Mohammed; Khaddam ul-Islam.176 Goals and Objectives. The JEM aims to end Indian rule in disputed Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), expel Indian security forces from the region, and unite J&K with Pakistan. Brief History. The JEM is a Pakistan-based, militant Islamic group founded by Maulana Masood Azhar in March 2000. Indian authorities arrested Azhar in February 1994 in connection with terrorist activities perpetrated by Harakat-ulMujahideen (HUM).177 Azhar was released from prison in December 1999 in exchange for 155 hostages aboard an Indian plane that had been hijacked by HUM militants.178 Azhar established JEM shortly after his release from prison in India with the express purpose of attacking Indian targets and liberating J&K from Indian rule. The JEM has targeted Indian officials, government buildings, and soldiers as well as non-Muslim civilians in Pakistan and in J&K.179 The JEM is suspected of executing a suicide bomb attack outside the J&K state assembly building on October 1, 2001, killing up to 38 people.180 The group initially claimed credit for the attack, but later denied involvement. The Indian government has also accused the JEM, in conjunction with Lashkar-e-Tayyeba, of carrying out a deadly attack on the Indian Parliament on December 13, 2001.181 Armed with explosive materials and firearms, five assailants stormed the Parliament and “fired indiscriminately,” killing nine security guards and one civilian bystander.182 In January 2002, the government of Pakistan banned JEM and several other groups (see also Lashkar-e-Tayyiba entry, below). The JEM is viewed by some as the “deadliest” and “principal terrorist organization in Jammu and Kashmir.”183 As of September 2003, crackdowns on the JEM have resulted in the deaths of 555 militants so far this year, including Gazi Baba, operations chief of the group (Aug 30, 2001), and Nasir Mehmood Ahwan, 176

“Jaish-e-Mohammed and Harkat-ul-Ansar Change Names,” The Press Trust of India, March 12, 2003. 177

Azhar was previously the leader of Harakat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM), which was renamed Harakat-ul-Ansar (HUA) and then again renamed HUM in October 1997 when the HUA was designated a FTO. See B. Raman, “Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM) — A Backgrounder,” South Asia Analysis Group, October [http://www.saag.org/papers4/paper 332.html], accessed July 31, 2003.

178 179

Zahid Hussein, “Freed Militant Arrives in Paksitan,” Associated Press, Jan. 6, 2000. “Terrorism Database,” Periscope, USNI Database, [http://www.periscope1.com].

180

“Jaish: Taliban’s Twin, Harakat’s New Avatar,” Indian Express, Oct. 2, 2001.

181

Neelesh Misra, “India Police Finger Attack Sponsors,” Associated Press, Dec. 16, 2001.

182

“Masood Azhar masterminded Parliament attack,” Hindustan Times, May 15, 2002.

183

B. Raman, “Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM) — A Backgrounder,” South Asia Analysis Group, October [http://www.saag.org/papers4/paper332.html], accessed July 31, 2003.

CRS-41 second in command (Sept. 17, 2003).184 After President Musharraf outlawed the group in January 2002, JEM changed its name to Khaddam-ul Islam. At the same time, JEM’s leader and founder, Azhar, was placed under house arrest, but then he was released in December 2002.185 Favored Tactics. Experts describe JEM strategies and attacks as fidayeen (suicide terrorist) in nature.186 In this type of operation, a terrorist launches an attack with the intention to kill as many people as possible and the expectation of being killed at the scene of the attack in retaliation.187 In this fashion, JEM militants allegedly stormed the Indian Parliament building, proceeded to engage the security personnel in a firefight, and killed 10 people. All five terrorists in this attack were killed. The JEM use a variety of firearms, including light and heavy machine guns, and assault rifles. JEM assailants have also used mortars, improvised explosive devices, and rocket grenades.188 Anti-American Activities. The JEM was implicated in the February 2002 kidnapping and execution of journalist Daniel Pearl in Karachi. Pearl, 38, worked as the South Asia Bureau Chief for the Wall Street Journal. He was on assignment in Karachi to interview members of militant groups and trace their possible links with alleged shoe-bomber Richard Reid.189 (See also Lashkar I Jhangvi entry, below.) Primary Area(s) of Operation. The JEM is based in Pakistan and Pakistancontrolled Kashmir. Most of its supporters are in Azad, Kashmir, Pakistan and India’s southern Kashmir and Doda regions. The JEM primarily launches attacks in Indian-controlled J&K. The attack on the Indian Parliament in December 2001 is the only recorded instance in which the JEM attacked a target outside of the J&K. Strength and Composition. The JEM consists of several hundred armed supporters.190 Most of its members are Kashmiris and Pakistanis. By some accounts, up to 75% of JEM are former HUM members.191 The JEM is said to have supporters and sympathizers in Afghanistan, including former Taliban associates and Arab

184

Mujtaba Ali Ahmad, “2 Top Rebel Commanders Killed in Kashmir,” Associated Press, Sept. 17, 2003.

185

Husain Haggani, “Pakistan Frees Terrorist Leaders,” Asian Wall Street Journal, January 7, 2003.

186

“Jaish-e-Mohammed Mujahideen-e-Tanzeem,” South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), [www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/terrorist_outfits/jaish_e_mohamme d_mujahideen_e_tanzeem.htm#], accessed August 8, 2003.

187

See CRS Report RL32058, Terrorists and Suicide Attacks, by Audrey Kurth Cronin,, August 28, 2003. 188

“Jaish-e-Mohammed,” Global Security, [http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ world/para/jem.htm], accessed July 31, 2003.

189

Paul Haven, “A Year After Pearl’s Abduction, Questions Remain,” Associated Press, Jan. 22, 2003.

190 191

U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 110. “Terrorism Database,” Periscope, USNI Database, www.periscope1.com.

CRS-42 veterans of the Afghan war. Until the fall of 2001, the JEM reportedly “maintained training camps in Afghanistan.”192 Connections with Other Groups. The JEM is reportedly linked with the former Taliban regime and is believed to receive funding from Osama bin Laden and the Al Qaeda network.193 The connection with the Taliban was apparently established and maintained through madrassahs (religious schools) in Karachi and Afghanistan. JEM leader Azhar has reportedly met with leaders and key figures in both the former Taliban and Al Qaeda. Analysts believe that JEM maintains ties with other Sunni Muslim groups in Pakistan, including Harakat ul-Mujahideen (HUM), Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT), Lashkar I Jhangvi (LIJ), and Sipahi-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP).194 State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. Experts believe that JEM has received some monetary support from bin Laden and Al Qaeda as well as HUM and Harakat ul-Jihad al- Islami (HUJI).195 Indian officials claim that the JEM has also received support from Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence in an attempt to undermine Indian security forces and bolster Pakistan’s position in the dispute over Kashmir. Those claims remain in dispute.196 Originally Designated as an FTO. December 24, 2001. Issues of Concern for Congress. This group is potentially a serious threat to stability in South Asia. Its ties to Al Qaeda and the former Taliban regime make it a significant concern for the United States. Its murder of Daniel Pearl and targeting of U.S. facilities may indicate that JEM will continue to target other American citizens and interests in the future. Attacks by JEM exacerbate the tensions between India and Pakistan, two nuclear states apparently often on the brink of war. Other CRS Reports. CRS Report RL21654, Islamic Religious Schools, Madrasahs: Background, by Febe Armanios, updated Oct. 29, 2003. CRS Report RL32058, Terrorists and Suicide Attacks, by Audrey Kurth Cronin, updated August 28, 2003.

192

“Jaish-e-Mohammed,” Global Security, [http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/ para/jem.htm], accessed July 31, 2003.

193

Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 110.

194

U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 110; “Jaish-eMohammed Mujahideen-e-Tanzeem,” South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), [http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/terrorist_ outfits/jaish_e_mohammed_mujahideen_e_tanzeem.htm#], accessed August 8, 2003.

195 196

“Terrorism Database,” Periscope, USNI Database, [http://www.periscope1.com].

Rajiv Chandrasekaran and Rama Lakshmi, “New Delhi Lays Blame,” The Washington Post, December 29, 2001.

CRS-43 CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by Kenneth Katzman, updated February 13, 2003. CRS Issue Brief IB94041, Pakistan-U.S. Relations, by K. Alan Kronstadt, updated November 3, 2003. CRS Report RL21658, International Terrorism in South Asia, by K. Alan Kronstadt, updated November 3, 2003. CRS Report RL31624, Pakistan-U.S. Anti-Terrorism Cooperation, by K. Alan Kronstadt, updated March 28, 2003. CRS Report RL31587, Kashmiri Separatists: Origins, Competing Ideologies, and Prospects for Resolution of the Conflict, by Kaia Leather, updated September 30, 2002.

CRS-44

Jemaah Islamiya (JI) Goals and Objectives. Jemaah Islamiya is a radical Islamic group that aims to create a strict Islamic state in place of Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, the southern Philippine islands, and southern Thailand. Brief History. The group’s roots trace back to Darul Islam, a violent Islamic group that opposed Dutch rule in Indonesia in the 1940s. After the Dutch left, the movement opposed the new independent government of Sukarno for being too secular. The name Jemaah Islamiya (JI) emerged in the 1970s, during the Suharto era, but it is unclear whether the name referred to an organized group or an informal gathering of anti-government Islamic militants.197 The co-founders of JI, clerics Abu Bakar Baasyir and Abdullah Sungkar, established a boarding school in Solo, on the main island of Java. Many suspected JI activists have been alumni of that school.198 In 1985, the two co-founders fled to Malaysia, where they began to send Indonesians and Malaysians to Afghanistan, initially to fight the Soviet occupation and then to train in Al Qaeda camps.199 Apparently some time in the mid-1990s, Baasyir and Sungkar merged their evolving network into Al Qaeda and began preparing for attacks in Southeast Asia. Bombings in Jakarta, Manila, and Thailand started in 2000.200 JI is linked to a wave of attacks in December 2000 against Christian churches in Indonesia, for example, and aborted plots to bomb Western embassies in Singapore. The group is most infamous for the October 12, 2002 suicide bombing of a night club on the Indonesian island of Bali that killed 200 people, many of them young Australian tourists. Abu Bakar Bashir, arrested one week after the Bali bombing, is believed to be the group’s spiritual leader, though he denies it. An Indonesian court convicted Bashir of plotting to overthrow the government, but dropped more serious charges. His four-year jail sentence was later reduced to three years by an appellate court. Riduan bin Isamuddin, also known as Hambali, is reportedly JI’s chief of operations and was arrested in mid-August 2003 in connection with the Bali bombing. The CIA has dubbed Hambali “Asia’s bin Laden.”201 Other specific evidence of JI’s shared origins with Al Qaeda has come out in the aftermath of the Bali tragedy. During the trial of Bali bomber Ali Gufron (also known as Mukhlas), the defendant claimed that he had fought alongside Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan in the Battle of the Lion’s Den (Battle of Jaji), which occurred in 1987 during the war against the Soviet Union. It is known that Osama bin Laden’s recruitment center (Maktab al-Khidmat - see below) provided logistical support for 197

“Terrorism: Questions and Answers,” The Council on Foreign Relations and the Markle Foundation, [http://www.terrorismanswers.org/groups/jemaah.html], accessed on July 10, 2003. 198

CRS Report RL31772, Terrorism in Southeast Asia,Mark Manyin, by Richard Cronin, Larry Niksch, and Bruce Vaughn, updated November 18, 2003, p. 5.

199

Ibid.

200

Ibid.

201

“Terrorism Database,” Periscope, USNI Database, [http://www.periscope1.com].

CRS-45 non-Afghan mujahedin, including Indonesians, during that period; and Mukhlas has testified that he met bin Laden while the Saudi was leading troops at Jaji.202 Building on Mukhlas’ testimony, further specific research has shown that the senior leadership of JI, including Hambali, camped, trained, and got their education in the Afghan war against the Soviets.203 Authorities in the region state that JI has continued to plot attacks against Western targets in Southeast Asia.204 On August 5, 2003, JI militants are suspected of having bombed a J.W. Marriott Hotel in Jakarta killing 14 and wounding 148.205 Favored Tactics. Most of Jemaah Islamiya’s attacks have involved bombings of varying degrees of sophistication. Anti-American Activities. In December 2001, JI was linked to plans to bomb the U.S. embassy and other locations frequented by American businesspeople and military personnel in Singapore. In mid-2002, a captured Al Qaeda operative revealed a joint Al Qaeda/Jemaah Islamiya plot to attack U.S. interests in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Taiwan, Vietnam, and Cambodia with car bombs on the anniversary of 9/11.206 On Aug. 5, 2003, Jemaah Islamiya was linked to a car bombing at a J.W. Marriott hotel in Jakarta that killed 14 and injured 148.207 Areas of Operation. JI operates throughout Southeast Asia, although Indonesia has traditionally been its primary area of operation. The group has also operated in Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and possibly the Philippines. It may also have a presence in neighboring Southeast Asian countries and in Australia. Strength and Composition. The numerical strength of JI is unknown. Some believe that the majority of JI leaders were either part of a close group which traces their relationship back to fighting the Soviets together in Afghanistan,208 or former trainees of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front who got to know each other in the

202

Shawn Donnan, “Terror Group May Have Been Born out of Afghan Jihad,” Financial Times, Aug. 27, 2003. 203

“Jemaah Islamiyah in East Asia: Damaged but Still Dangerous,” International Crisis Group, Asia Report No. 63, Aug. 26, 2003. Additional information about the Bali bombing and other recent attacks is available in CRS Report RL31672, Terrorism in Southeast Asia, by Mark Manyin, Richard Cronin, Larry Niksch, and Bruce Vaughn,, updated November 18, 2003, pp.6-8.

204

Manyin, Cronin, Niksch, and Vaughn, Terrorism in Southeast Asia, pp.7-8.

205

“Indonesia Points to Jemaah over Marriott Attack,” Reuters, Aug. 8, 2003.

206

Romesh Ratnesar, “Confessions of an Al-Qaeda Terrorist,” Time, September 23, 2002; cited in Manyin, Cronin, Niksch, and Vaughn, Terrorism in Southeast Asia, p. 6. 207 208

“Indonesia Points to Jemaah over Marriott Attack,” Reuters, Aug. 8, 2003.

Shawn Donnan, “Terror Group May Have Been Born out of Afghan Jihad,” Financial Times, Aug. 27, 2003.

CRS-46 terrorist camps in southern Philippines.209 Some intelligence reports say that up to 700 Indonesians trained in the camps from 1997 to 98.210 The State Department’s Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002 estimates that the group probably has several hundred operatives, but also cites Singaporean officials who put the group’s strength around 5,000.211 It is unclear how crackdowns on the group in various countries since 9/11, and especially since the Bali nightclub bombing, have affected the group. Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations. JI is alleged to have extensive ties to Al Qaeda, but the precise nature of those ties is in dispute. Some contend that the group is essentially subordinate to Al Qaeda, while others argue that Al Qaeda acts more like a funding agency that approves grants for independent JI proposals.212 Captured Al Qaeda operatives have reportedly asserted that JI leaders have been involved in various Al Qaeda plots.213 Two of the 9/11 hijackers and imprisoned accused operative Zacarias Moussaui allegedly visited Malaysia and met with JI members in 2000, and JI members reportedly sent money to them.214 Furthermore, in January of 2003, Singapore’s Internal Security Department released a report based on interviews with detained JI militants that outlines the close operational links between JI and Al Qaeda.215 Furthermore, the 13 suspects arrested in Singapore for the foiled plot against U.S. shipping interests in December 2001 are also believed to be connected to Al Qaeda.216 JI is also believed to have operational links to the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in the Philippines and the Malaysian Kampulan Mujihhedin Malaysia (KMM).217

209

Alan Sipress and Ellen Nakashima, “Al-Qaeda Affiliate Training Indonesians on Philippine Island,” The Washington Post, Nov. 17, 2003.

210

John McBeth, “Indonesia-Easy Does It,” The Far Eastern Economic Review, July 17, 2003.

211

U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 110.

212

“Jemaah Islamiyyah: Damaged but Still Dangerous,” International Crisis Group Asia Report No. 63, Jakarta/Brussels, Aug. 26, 2003. 213

“Terrorism: Questions and Answers: Jemaah Islamiyah,” The Council on Foreign Relations and the Markle Foundation, [http://www.terrorismanswers.org/ groups/jemaah.html], accessed on July 10, 2003.

214

Manyin, Cronin, Niksch, and Vaughn, Terrorism in Southeast Asia, p. 6.

215

“Singapore Government Reveals Extent of Islamic Terrorist Threat to South East Asia,” Jane’s Terrorism Intelligence Center, January 1, 2003. See also “Jemaah Islamiah Report Released,” Radio Australia, available at [http://abc.net.au/ra/asiapac/programs/s760988.htm].

216

“Worldwide arrests to root out alQaeda since September 11, 2001” Agence France Presse, Sept. 14, 2002.

217

“Moro Rebels Topple Down Electric Posts,” Financial Times Information Global News Wire, May 16, 2003. See also Anthony Davis, “Blast Suggests MILF-JI Links,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, May, 1, 2003.

CRS-47 State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. According to the U.S. State Department’s Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, JI receives funding and logistical help from Middle Eastern and South Asian contacts, including nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and Al Qaeda. The group also raises funds from sympathizers in the Southeast Asian region. Originally Designated as an FTO. October 23, 2002. Issues of Concern for Congress. Although there have been important arrests of JI members, some terrorism experts worry that Jemaah Islamiya is still a serious threat to stability in Southeast Asia, particularly Indonesia. Members of the group continue to plot against Americans and American interests, as well as the citizens and assets of U.S. allies. Jemaah Islamiya’s apparently extensive ties to Al Qaeda make it a particular concern for the United States. Indonesia’s reluctance to crack down on JI for domestic political reasons could complicate U.S. policy if another anti-Western attack occurs. Additionally, the growing evidence of ties between JI and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF, a radical Islamic separatist group in the Philippines),218 may soon force the United States and the Philippines to decide whether they must confront the MILF militarily. Other CRS Reports. CRS Report RL31152, Foreign Support of the U.S. War on Terrorism, by Regina Dubey, Huda Allen, Amanda Douglas, updated August 8, 2003. CRS Report RL32058, Terrorists and Suicide Attacks, by Audrey Kurth Cronin, updated August 28, 2003. CRS Report RL31672, Terrorism in Southeast Asia, by Mark Manyin, Richard Cronin, Larry Niksch, and Bruce Vaughn, updated November 18, 2003. CRS Report RL31265, Abu Sayyaf: Target of Philippine-U.S. Anti-Terrorism Cooperation,” by Larry Niksch, updated April 8, 2003. CRS Report RS20572, Indonesian Separatist Movement in Aceh, by Larry Niksch, updated September 25, 2002.

218

For additional information about the MILF see the Abu Sayyaf entry, above.

CRS-48

Al-Jihad Name(s). Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Jihad Group, Islamic Jihad, Vanguards of Conquest. Goals and Objectives. Al-Jihad is committed to the violent overthrow of the Egyptian government, to the establishment of an Islamic regime in Egypt, and to attacking American and Israeli interests in Egypt. Brief History. Founded in the late 1970s, al-Jihad is a violent offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, a religious and political organization founded in 1928 by Hasan al Banna seeking a return to the original precepts of the Qu’ran and opposed to the secular rule and Western influence. Known for high profile assassinations and bombings, al-Jihad is responsible for the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat (Oct. 1981), the death of the People’s Assembly Speaker Rifaat el-Mahgoub (Oct. 1990), and attempts on the lives of Interior Minister Al-Alfi (Aug. 1993), Prime Minister Atef Sedky (Nov. 1993), and President Hosni Mubarak (1995).219 In the early 1980s, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak ruthlessly cracked down on al-Jihad, forcing a split in the group.220 One faction, led by the imprisoned Abbud al-Zumar, has called for peaceful negotiation; but his faction has apparently withered. The other faction, led by Ayman al-Zawahiri, became even more violent, and around 1987 moved al-Jihad’s base of operations to Afghanistan.221 Al-Zawahiri has moved further away from the Egyptian cause and has embraced Osama bin Laden’s Al Qaeda quest to target American interests directly. In 1998 al-Jihad joined, and alZawahiri reportedly leads, Al Qaeda’s so-called International Front for Jihad against Jews and Crusaders. Then, in 2001, al-Jihad apparently merged with Al Qaeda. There have been no attacks inside Egypt attributed to al-Jihad since 1998.222 Favorite Tactics. Al-Jihad has engaged in assassinations, bombings, and suicide attacks.223 Anti-American Activity. Since the mid-1990s, al-Jihad has been shifting its focus from Egyptian to American targets. Commandos for al-Jihad were linked to

219

“Terrorism Database,” Periscope, USNI Database, www.periscope1.com. See also “Arrests in Connection with Assassination of Speaker of Parliament,” The IndependentLondon, Oct. 29, 1990. 220

“Egypt’s Brutal Response to Militants: Tactics Used to Counter Opponents at Home Contrast with Appeals for U.S. Restraint,” The Washington Post, October 7, 2001, p.A25.

221

“Al-Jihad,” International Policy Institute for Counter Terrorism, [http://www.ict.org.il] accessed October 27, 2003.

222

Anthony Keats, “In the Spotlight: Al-Jihad.” [http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/aljihad.cfm]. Accessed October 15, 2003. 223

“Terrorism Database.” Periscope, USNI Database. www.periscope1.com. See also Anthony Keats, “In the Spotlight: Al-Jihad,” Center for Defense Information, [http://www.cdi.org/terrorism], accessed October 15, 2003.

CRS-49 a foiled attack on the U.S. Embassy in Albania in August 1998.224 As part of Al Qaeda, al-Jihad members are believed to have been involved in the bombings of the American Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania on Aug. 7, 1998.225 They are also implicated in the 2000 bombing of the U.S.S. Cole in port at Aden, Yemen,226 and the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon.227 Primary Area(s) of Operation. Historically, al-Jihad operated in the Cairo area; but most of its network is now outside Egypt, in places such as Yemen, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Lebanon, and the United Kingdom.228 After the external component of al-Jihad merged with Al Qaeda, the group’s areas of operation may have expanded. Strength and Composition. Unknown. It is likely that al-Jihad has several hundred hard-core militants and possible several thousand supporters. After merging with Al Qaeda, distinguishing between members of the groups became more difficult. Connections with Other Groups. In June 2001 al-Jihad allegedly merged with Al Qaeda after a decade of increasing cooperation. State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. Uncertain. Egypt has claimed that al-Jihad is supported by Iran and Sudan, accusations that those states’ governments have denied.229 In 2002 U.S. intelligence claimed that Iran was harboring Saif al-Adl, Osama bin Laden’s security chief and an Egyptian national with links to al-Jihad.230 However, Iran claims to have prosecuted or deported all Al Qaeda related persons within its borders as of October 2003.231 In view of al-Jihad’s apparent merger with Al Qaeda, the groups are likely cooperating on sources of

224

Philip Shenon, “U.S. Embassy Halts Business in Albania,” The New York Times, Aug. 15, 1998.

225

David Cloud and Brian Duffy, “Egyptian Group Draws Scrutiny in Bomb Probe,” The Wall Street Journal, Aug. 14, 1998. See also “Embassy Bombings; Egyptian Group now Top Suspect,” Knight Ridder, Aug. 15, 1998. 226

Lenny Savino and Jonathan Landay, “Al-Jihad Suspects in ‘Cole’ Bombing, “KnightRidder, Oct. 20, 2000. See also “Authorities Reportedly Arrest Jihad Suspects Linked to Cole Blast,” BBC, Oct. 28, 2000.

227

Marcus Gee, “The Hydra’s Ten Biggest Heads,” The Globe and Mail, Sept. 29, 2001. See also Michael Elliott, “The Hate Club,” Time Magazine Vol. 158, Issue 21, Nov. 12, 2001.

228

U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p 111.

229

Anthony Keats, “In the Spotlight: Al-Jihad.” Center for Defense Information. [http://www.cdi.org/terrorism]. Accessed October 15, 2003.

230

Thomas Lumpkin, “Two Leaders of Terrorist Organization al-Qaeda Operating in Iran,” Associated Press, August 28, 2002.

231

“Iran List has 225 Names,” Associated Pres, October 27, 2003.

CRS-50 revenue. Other sources of revenue may include non-governmental Islamic agencies and criminal acts.232 Originally Designated as an FTO. October 8, 1997. Re-designated. October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001. Issues of Concern for Congress. This group has engaged in violent attacks against the United States and its interests. It is closely associated with Al Qaeda and, with that organization, has apparently evolved from a territorially-based threat to a truly global network. Other CRS Products. CRS Report RS 21529, Al Qaeda after the Iraq Conflict, by Audrey Kurth Cronin, May 23, 2003. CRS Report RL32058, Terrorists and Suicide Attacks, by Audrey Kurth Cronin, August 28, 2003. CRS Report RL31247, Africa and the War on Terrorism, by Ted Dagne, updated January 17, 2002. CRS Report RL32048, Iran: U.S. Policy Concerns and Responses, by Kenneth Katzman, updated October 24, 2003. CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by Kenneth Katzman, updated February 13, 2003.

232

Periscope, USNI Database. “Terrorism Database.” [http://www.periscope1.com].

CRS-51

Kahane Chai (Kach) Goals and Objectives. Kach and Kahane Chai are radical Jewish groups that aim to restore the Biblical state of Israel by annexing the West Bank and Gaza as well as parts of Jordan, and expelling all Arabs from this territory. These groups also seek the strict implementation of Jewish law.233 Brief History. Kach was founded in 1971 by Meir Kahane, an IsraeliAmerican Rabbi who was assassinated in New York in 1990 by El Sayyid Nosair, an Islamic radical also connected to the 1993 World Trade Center bombing.234 Kahane’s son, Binyamin, then founded Kahane Chai (Kahane Lives), although Kach appears to have continued to operate as an independent organization. Binyamin and his wife were killed in a 2000 drive-by shooting by a Palestinian group in a West Bank settlement.235 Beginning with the 2002 edition of Patterns of Global Terrorism, the State Department has listed the two groups as one entry, suggesting that the two have essentially merged. In 1994, Baruch Goldstein, a radical Jewish settler and U.S. immigrant to Israel, attacked a mosque in Hebron with a machine gun, killing 29 worshippers and wounding about 150. Goldstein was reportedly associated with Kach and other Jewish militant groups. Both Kach and Kahane Chai publicly supported the attack, leading Israel to declare them both terrorist organizations.236 The groups have conducted numerous attacks against Palestinians in the West Bank and Jerusalem with rocks, grenades, and firearms, including a failed attempt to assassinate several Palestinian mayors.237 Since the beginning of the second Intifada in September, 2000, at least seven Palestinians have been shot in the West Bank by Jewish settlers believed by Israeli police to be associated with Kahane Chai.238 In 2002, they were suspected of involvement in several attacks against Palestinians, but neither group claimed responsibility. Favored Tactics. Kach and Kahane Chai have attacked Palestinian targets with guns, grenades, bombs, and other weapons. Anti-American Activities. Neither Kach or Kahane Chai is known to have attacked U.S. interests. However, in December 2001 several members of the Jewish

233

CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by Kenneth Katzman, updated February 13, 2003, p. 21.

234

David Kocieniewski and Kevin McCoy, “Old Evidence Hints at Trade Center Blast,” The Seattle Times, May 29, 1993. See also Jeanne King, “Accused Killer of Kahane also Focus in Trade Center Bombing,” Reuters, March 5, 1993.

235

Dina Kraft, “Slain Settler Leader Followed Father’s Path,” Assoc. Press, Dec. 31, 2000.

236

Katzman, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, p. 21.

237

“Terrorism: Questions and Answers: Kach, Kahane Chai,” The Council on Foreign Relations, [http://www.terrorismanswers.org/groups/kkc.html], accessed on August 6, 2003.

238

Vivienne Walt, “Israeli Turnabout Alleged,” USA Today, May 17, 2002.

CRS-52 Defense League, a group associated with Kahane, were arrested by the FBI in California and charged with plotting to bomb the offices of Representative Darrell Issa, as well as a mosque and a Muslim advocacy group in Los Angeles.239 Areas of Operation. Both groups operate primarily in Israel and the West Bank, but recent arrests have led to concern that they could be planning attacks in the United States. Strength and Composition. The groups’ strength is unknown, according to the State Department.240 Estimates by other organizations place the groups’ strength at around several dozen.241 Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations. Neither Kach nor Kahane Chai is known to have ties to other designated foreign terrorist organizations. Both are believed to be linked to various militant Jewish groups in Israel and the West Bank. State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. Kach and Kahane Chai receive support from sympathizers in Europe and the United States. Within Israel, the groups receive funding and other support from various sympathizers, particularly members of settler communities in the West Bank. Originally Designated as an FTO. October 8, 1997. Re-designated. October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001. Issues of Concern for Congress. This group has allegedly plotted a violent attack against a Member of Congress, as well as a mosque and a Muslim advocacy group in Los Angeles. Its alleged activities lead to concern about the potential for future violence against civilians and property within the United States Other CRS Reports. CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by Kenneth Katzman, updated February 13, 2003. CRS Issue Brief IB92052, Palestinians and the Middle-East: Issues for the United States, by Clyde Mark, updated November 13, 2003. CRS Issue Brief IB91137, The Middle East Peace Talks, by Carol Migdalovitz, updated October 22, 2003.

239

“U.S. Representative Darrell Issa Holds News Conference on Bomb Threat,” Federal Documents Clearinghouse, Dec. 12, 2001. See also Aldrin Brown, “2 Leaders of Jewish Group Accused of Anti-Arab Bomb Plot,” The Orange County Register, Dec. 13, 2001.

240

U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, U.S. State Department, April 2003, pp. 112.

241

Periscope, USNI Database. “Terrorism Database.” [http://www.periscope1.com].

CRS-53

Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) Name(s). Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress; Freedom and Democracy Congress of Kurdistan, KADEK, KONGRA-GEL. Goals and Objectives. The PKK is a secular, leftist insurgent group that originally aimed to establish an independent Kurdish homeland in the ethnically Kurdish regions of the Middle East, which overlap the borders of Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria. More recently, the group has claimed to be seeking greater political and cultural rights for Kurds within Turkey rather than a separate homeland.242 Brief History. The PKK was founded in 1974 as a Marxist-Leninist group seeking to establish a Marxist Kurdish state in Southeast Turkey. The group launched a guerilla war against the Turkish government beginning in 1984 that claimed as many as 35,000 lives. After a brutal crackdown by the Turkish military in the early 1990s, the group shifted from a rural insurgency strategy to urban terrorism. In 1999, Turkish authorities, acting on a tip from U.S. intelligence, captured the PKK’s charismatic leader, Abdullah Ocalan, striking a major blow against the group.243 Ocalan’s arrest sparked riots among Kurdish populations in parts of Europe. Under threat of a death sentence, Ocalan advised his followers to refrain from violence and to pursue Kurdish rights peacefully. The PKK has essentially ceased its attacks as a result, and in 2000, the group formally announced its intention to use only political means to achieve the goal of rights for Turkish Kurds. The armed wing of the PKK (called the People’s Defense Forces) did not, however, disarm. The PKK first renamed itself the KADEK and then the KONGRA-GEL. In November 2003, the KADEK announced plans to dissolve itself and, according to reports, establish a “new group that would likely be pan-Kurdish and would pursue Kurdish rights through negotiations.”244 On November 14, 2003, the U.S. State Department stated, “The PKK/KADEK, under any alias, is a terrorist organization, and no name change or press release can alter that fact.” Favored Tactics. Many PKK attacks targeted Turkish military and security forces. In addition, however, the PKK used suicide bombings, car bombings, kidnappings of foreign tourists, and attacks against Turkish diplomats in Europe.245 There were also attacks on symbolic representatives of the Turkish state in the Southeast, such as teachers. Anti-American Activities. The PKK has not directly attacked or targeted U.S. citizens or interests. 242

CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by Kenneth Katzman, updated February 13, 2003, p. 27.

243

“U.S. Welcomes Ocalan Capture,” Agence France Presse Feb. 16, 1999.

244

Louis Meixler, “Kurdish Rebel Group Dissolves Itself,” Associated Press, Nov. 11, 2003. See also, “Turkish Kurd Rebel Group Disbands,” Dow Jones, Nov. 11, 2003.

245

Periscope, USNI Database. “Terrorism Database.” [http://scope1.com]

CRS-54 Areas of Operation. The PKK has operated primarily in Turkey. The armed wing of the group apparently took refuge in the Kurdish areas of Iraq. In the past, the group maintained bases in Syria and Lebanon.246 Strength and Composition. The PKK is comprised mainly of Turkish Kurds and has approximately 4,000 to 5,000 fighters, according to the State Department and other sources.247 Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations. In the early 1980’s, when the PKK fled to Lebanon’s Syria-controlled Beka’a Valley, the group reportedly got its first real training alongside various Palestinian groups and with the help of Syrian intelligence.248 Later, the PKK reportedly provided a safe haven for the Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front (RPLP/F), another Turkish group, in Southeast Anatolia in the Black Sea region. The two groups signed a protocol in 1996 that would deepen cooperation between the two groups249 However, cooperation has apparently since broken down. (See RPLP/F entry below.) State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. During its history, PKK reportedly received support and safe haven from Syria, Iran, Iraq, and Greece.250 The group also raises funds in Europe among Kurdish expatriates, some of whom accuse the Turkish government of human rights violations in its campaign against the PKK.251 Originally Designated as an FTO. October 8, 1997. Re-designated. October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001. Issues of Concern for Congress. Turkey’s treatment of its Kurdish minority has been a significant issue in its efforts to join the European Union. The European Union only named the PKK a foreign terrorist organization in May 2002 and has not similarly identified KADEK. With its leader Ocalan in jail, it is unclear whether the PKK, in its evolving form, will continue to be a violent group. The 246

“Ankara Accuses Syria of Backing Rebel Kurd Group,” Reuters, Jan. 7, 1996. See also “Turkey Syria, Lebanon to Stop Activity of Terrorist Group,” BBC, Dec. 27, 2001.

247

U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002, p. 112. See also “The Military Balance,” Institute for International and Strategic Studies, Vol. 103. [http://www3.oup.co.uk/milbal/current/]. Table 41. 248

Henri Barkey and Graham Fuller, Turkey’s Kurdish Question, Oxford, England: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1998. See also Nadire Matar, “Syria and Iran with Iraq on Kurdish Issue,” Inter-Press Service, Aug. 22, 1994. Michael Radu, “The Rise and Fall of the PKK,” Orbis, Vol. 5, Issue. 1, Jan. 1, 2001. 249

“Terror Organizations in Turkey: Islamic Terror Organizations/ Leftist Terror Organizations - DHKP/C.” [http://www.teror.gen.tr/english/organisations/dhkpc.html]. Accessed October 16, 2003.

250

Ibid., p. 31. See also Periscope, USNI Database. “Terrorism Database.” [http://www.periscope1.com].

251

U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 113.

CRS-55 Kurdish population in northern Iraq may play a role: for example, actions by Iraqi Kurds against PKK guerrillas remaining in Iraq could affect the future of PKK/KADEK/KONDRA-GEL. Other CRS Reports. CRS Report RL32058, Terrorists and Suicide Attacks, by Audrey Kurth Cronin, August 28, 2003. CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by Kenneth Katzman, updated February 13, 2003. CRS Report RL39714, Iraq: Turkey, the Deployment of U.S. Forces, and Related Issues, by Carol Migdalovitz, updated May 2, 2003. CRS Report RL32071, Turkey: Update on Selected Issues, by Carol Migdalovitz, updated September 8, 2003.

CRS-56

Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT) Name(s). Army of the Righteous/Pure, Jamaat al-Dawat. Goals and Objectives. Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT) is a radical Islamic group in Pakistan that seeks to establish Islamic rule throughout South Asia. Although primarily focused on freeing Kashmir from Indian control and establishing an Islamic state there, the group has also suggested that it aims to establish Islamic rule over all of India as well. Brief History. Formed in 1990, LT is the military wing of the Pakistani radical Islamic organization Markaz-ud-Dawa-wal-Irshad (MDI, or Center for Islamic Call and Guidance), which itself formed in 1989. Since 1993, LT has become one of the largest and best organized groups fighting in Kashmir against India.252 The group has conducted a number of attacks against Indian troops and civilians in Kashmir. The Indian government accused the group of involvement in the December 2001 bombing of the Indian parliament and charged the Pakistani intelligence service (ISI) with supporting the group.253 President Musharraf banned the LT and several other groups (see Jaish-e-Mohammed entry, above) in January 2002, and the LT renamed itself Jamaat al-Dawat.254 The LT’s leader, Hafiz Muhammad Saeed, was arrested in Pakistan in January 2002 but then released in December 2002.255 In May and June 2003, the FBI arrested 11 men in Virginia on charges of training with and supporting Lashkar e Tayyiba. The 11 are to face trial in the U.S. District Court in Alexandria, Virginia.256 In July, a federal judge ordered four of the eleven suspects released from custody until their trial begins.257 Favored Tactics. In its attacks, LT has used various types of firearms, machine guns, mortars, explosives, and rocket-propelled grenades. Anti-American Activities. Lashkar e Tayyiba is not known to have conducted attacks against American citizens or American interests. The group remains focused on Kashmir.

252

U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 113.

253

Chris Kraul and Mubashir Zaidi, India, Pakistan will try again to reach peace,” San Jose Mercury News, May 3, 2003.

254

CRS Report RL21658, International Terrorism in South Asia, by K. Allen Kronstadt,, updated November 3, 2003.

255

Husain Haqqani, “Pakistan Frees Terrorist Leaders,” Asian Wall Street Journal, January 7, 2003.

256 257

“Alleged U.S. Militants Arrested,” Associate Press, June 28, 2003.

Eric Lichtblau, “4 Terror Suspects Ordered Released Pending Trials,” The New York Times, July 3, 2003.

CRS-57 There is, however, possible cooperation between LT and Al Qaeda (see below). Areas of Operation. LT is based near Lahore in Pakistan and, according to the State Department, operates mobile training camps in Pakistan-controlled Kashmir.258 The group also had training camps in Afghanistan until the fall of the Taliban in late 2001. LT is believed to have conducted operations not only in Indiancontrolled Kashmir, but also in other regions of India. Strength and Composition. Lashkar-e-Tayyiba is comprised mainly of Pakistani Islamic radicals, although some Afghan veterans of the Afghan wars are also members. The State Department estimates a total of several hundred members.259 Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations. In March 2002, senior Al Qaeda leader Abu Zubaydah was captured in an LT safe house in Faisalabad, Pakistan, indicating that the group may be helping Al Qaeda members to move through Pakistan.260 There are also reports that members of LT have participated in conflicts in Bosnia, Chechnya, and the Philippines, suggesting that the group may have links to various other radical Islamic organizations.261 State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. According to the State Department, LT collects donations from Pakistani expatriates in the Persian Gulf and the United Kingdom.262 The group also reportedly receives support from Arab sympathizers in the Persian Gulf states.263 Prior to a crackdown by the Pakistani government against anti-Indian groups operating in Kashmir, the group invested in various business enterprises in Pakistan. Originally Designated as an FTO. December 24, 2001. Issues of Concern for Congress. The LT’s activities directed against India pose a threat to the stability of South Asia. The group may also be helping members of Al Qaeda in their anti-American activities. Its apparent links to other radical Islamic organizations lead to concern about the degree to which the LT is part of an evolving globalized network of terrorist organizations. Within the United States, this group’s alleged training and fund-raising activities in Alexandria, Virginia, if proven true, are also cause for concern (see above).

258

U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 113.

259

Ibid.

260

Ibid.

261

Dan Rothem, “CDI Fact Sheet: Lashkar e Taiba,” Center for Defense Information, updated August 12, 2002. Accessed at [http://www.cdi.org], July 28, 2003.

262 263

Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 113.

“Terrorism: Questions and Answers: Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA),” The Council on Foreign Relations, [http://www.terrorismanswers.org/groups/harakat.html] , accessed on July 25, 2003.

CRS-58 Other CRS Reports. CRS Report RL32058, Terrorists and Suicide Attacks, by Audrey Kurth Cronin, August 28, 2003. CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by Kenneth Katzman, updated February 13, 2003. CRS Report RL21658, International Terrorism in South Asia, by K. Alan Kronstadt, November 3, 2003. CRS Report RL31624, Pakistan-U.S. Anti-Terrorism Cooperation, by K. Alan Kronstadt, updated March 28, 2003. CRS Report IB94041, Pakistan-U.S. Relations, by K. Alan Kronstadt, updated November 3, 2003. CRS Report RL31587, Kashmiri Separatists: Origins, Competing Ideologies, and Prospects for Resolution of the Conflict, by Kaia Leather, updated September 30, 2002.

CRS-59

Lashkar I Jhangvi (LJ) Name(s). Army of Jhangvi. Goals and Objectives. Lashkar I Jhangvi (LJ) is a radical Sunni group that has primarily targeted Shi’a Muslims in Pakistan. The group apparently aims to establish Pakistan as a Sunni Islamic state based on Islamic law. The group has close links to Al Qaeda and has adopted that organization’s anti-Western, anti-U.S. ideology. Brief History. LJ arose in 1996 out of sectarian conflicts in Pakistan between radical Sunni Muslim and Shi’a Muslim factions. LJ’s members belong to the radical Deobandi sect of Sunni Islam, and have carried out numerous attacks against the minority Shi’a population, which they consider apostate. LJ reportedly killed 25 Shi’a and wounded 50 others in Lahore in 1998 and attempted to assassinate thenPrime Minister Nawaz Sharif in 1999.264 The group has also been connected to attacks against Christian groups in Pakistan.265 In mid-2001, Pakistani President Musharraf outlawed the group, which took refuge in Taliban-ruled Afghanistan.266 Since the fall of the Taliban, the group has presumably returned to Pakistan, but several leaders have been captured or killed by the Pakistani government.267 Favored Tactics. The group has conducted a variety of armed attacks and bombings, including several suicide bombings. Anti-American Activities. Lashkar I Jhangvi has carried out several attacks against Americans in Pakistan, most notably the kidnapping and subsequent murder of journalist Daniel Pearl in 2002 in conjunction with Al Qaeda. (See also Jaish-eMohammed entry, above.) The group also reportedly killed four American oil workers in 1997268 and attacked the Protestant International Church in Islamabad with grenades in 2002, killing two Americans.269 Areas of Operation. The group operates mainly in Punjab and Karachi in Pakistan, and some members reportedly travel in Afghanistan. Its strength is most manifest in urban areas.

264

Stephen Collinson, “US designates Pakistani-based Sunni extremists as terror group.” Agence France Presse. January 30, 2002.

265

U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002, p. 114.

266

Ibid.

267

Anthony Keats, “CDI Fact Sheet:Lashkar I Jangvi,” Center for Defense Information, updated March 3, 2003. Accessed at [http://www.cdi.org], July 25, 2003.

268 269

Ibid. Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002, p. 114.

CRS-60 Strength and Composition. The members of Lashkar I Jhangvi are militant Sunni Muslims of the Deobandi sect. The State Department estimates their strength at fewer than 100.270 Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations. LJ’s leaders participated in the Afghan war against the Soviet Union in the 1980s and are believed to have connected with bin Laden during that time. LJ members reportedly trained at Al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan in the 1990s. Al Qaeda is also believed to have provided key support to the group in several of its attacks against Western targets since 2002. Pakistani authorities believe that LJ has formed a partnership with two other Islamic militant groups in Pakistan, Harkat-ul-Jihad-i-Islami (HuJI) and Jaishe-Mohammed (JeM, see entry above), to form Lashkar-e-Omar (LeO), also called alQanoon.271 State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. Beyond support from Al Qaeda, it is not known how the group funds its activities. Originally Designated as an FTO. January 30, 2003. Issues of Concern for Congress. This group has engaged in serious antiAmerican violence in Pakistan, including apparently participating in the kidnapping and murder of American journalist Daniel Pearl. (See also Jaish-e-Mohammed entry, above.) Its activities may threaten the stability of Pakistan and the South Asian region. Its connections with Al Qaeda make it a serious concern. Other CRS Reports. CRS Report RL32058, Terrorists and Suicide Attacks, by Audrey Kurth Cronin, August 28, 2003. CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by Kenneth Katzman, updated February 13, 2003. CRS Issue Brief IB94041, Pakistan-U.S. Relations, by K. Alan Kronstadt, updated November 3, 2003. CRS Report RL21658, International Terrorism in South Asia, by K. Alan Kronstadt, updated November 3, 2003. CRS Report RL31587, Kashmiri Separatists: Origins, Competing Ideologies, and Prospects for Resolution of the Conflict, by Kaia Leather, updated September 30, 2002.

270 271

Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002, p. 114. Keats, “CDI Fact Sheet:Lashkar I Jangvi.”

CRS-61

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) Name(s). Tamil Tigers. Goals and Objectives. The LTTE is a Tamil separatist group in Sri Lanka that initially aimed to establish an independent state including the ethnically Tamil regions of the island. Recently the group has softened its insistence on an independent Tamil state, declaring that it will accept a solution that respects the principle of self-determination, possibly an autonomous area for Tamil-speaking peoples within a federal structure (see below). Brief History. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam were founded by the charismatic Vellupillai Prabhakaran and arose in the 1970s as the strongest of a number of Tamil groups opposing discrimination against Tamils by the dominant Sinhalese ethnic group. In 1983, in retaliation for the deaths of thirteen Sinhalese soldiers, several thousand Tamils were killed in riots that marked the beginning of full scale separatist war. In the ensuing 20-year war, an estimated 64,000 people were killed and between 800,000 and 1.6 million persons were displaced. The Tamil Tigers have gained control of portions of the Northern and Eastern provinces of Sri Lanka and have a substantial arsenal including artillery, mortars, and anti-aircraft weapons. They also have a naval component with speedboats, demolition teams, and fishing boats.272 The LTTE’s most infamous element is the Black Tigers, the 500 plus member highly-trained unit that carries out the group’s suicide attacks. The LTTE has engaged in a large number of political terrorist attacks and killings, most notably including the assassinations of Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and Sri Lankan Prime Minister Ranasinghe Premadasa. It is the only terrorist group ever to have assassinated two heads of state. And in December 1999, three days before re-election, current President Chandrika Kumaratunga lost vision in one eye to a LTTE suicide attack that killed 26. Citing fundamental changes in international attitudes towards violence for political ends after the September 11 attacks, experts say support and funding for the LTTE from the Tamil diaspora fell off dramatically. This was apparently a factor bringing this group to the negotiating table.273 Since December 2001, the LTTE has largely respected a cease fire negotiated with the Sri Lankan government. In September 2002, the LTTE and the Columbo government held their first peace talks in seven years. In December 2002 both sides made what could be the most important breakthrough by issuing a statement saying, “The parties have agreed to explore a solution founded on the principle of internal self-determination in the areas of historical habituation of the Tamil-speaking peoples, based on a federal structure

272

CRS Report RL31707, Sri Lanka: Background and U.S. Relations, by Bruce Vaughn, November 5, 2003, p. 4.

273

Kim Barker, “In War Torn Sri Lanka, Truce Holds Day by Day,” Chicago Tribune, April 4, 2002. See also Catherine Philip, “Sri Lanka and Tamil Tigers Ready to End 19-Year War and Share Power,” The Times, December 6, 2002. See also Amal Jayasinge and Edward Luce, “Tamil Tigers Emerge from the Shadows,” Financial Times, April 5, 2002.

CRS-62 within a united Sri Lanka.”274 Such a statement marks significant concessions from the LTTE who have always sought independence rather than autonomy, and from the government in Colombo, which would be accepting the idea of federalism for the first time. On the 4th and 5th of November 2003, Sri Lankan President Chandrika Kumaratunga removed three top cabinet officials, suspended parliament, and deployed troops around the Sri Lankan Capital of Colombo. The political crisis apparently was a result of a power struggle between President Kumaratunga, who represents the more hardline faction within the government, and the more conciliatory elements led by Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe. After reviving the Norwegian brokered peace talks in late 2001 Wickremesinghe has made significant gains, including a permanent cease-fire established and more-or-less respected since February 2002 and several rounds of successful talks. However, fearing Kumaratunga could veto any agreement, Wickremesinghe proposed a constitutional amendment (the 19th) that would eliminate the President’s power to dissolve the parliament. Kumaratunga and her supporters are opposed to any settlement that would establish a federal system and infringe on Sri Lankan sovereignty. They believe the Norwegian mediators are biased in favor of the rebels.275 This crisis is as yet unresolved. Favored Tactics. The LTTE’s tactics have ranged from full military operations to terrorist attacks against civilian centers and political assassinations. Inspired by the apparent success of suicide bombings by Hizballah in the latter’s campaign against foreign occupation of Lebanon in the 1980s, the LTTE launched its first suicide attack in 1987.276 The group subsequently conducted the bloodiest suicide campaign on record, involving more than 150 attacks.277 The LTTE is also noted for the first and most active use of female suicide bombers, who have carried out 30-40% of the suicide attacks of the LTTE.278 Anti-American Activities. interests.

The LTTE has not targeted or attacked U.S.

Areas of Operation. The LTTE operates mainly in the Northern and Eastern provinces of Sri Lanka, but has also operated throughout the island and in India.279

274

Amy Waldman, “Sri Lanka to Explore a New Government,” The New York Times, December 6, 2002.

275

Frances Harrison, “Sri Lanka Peace Moves Attacked,” BBC News, April 8, 2003.

276

CRS Report RL32058, Terrorists and Suicide Attacks, by Audrey Kurth Cronin, August 28, 2003.

277

Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga, “We Know Terrorism,” The Washington Post, Nov. 7, 2001. 278 279

Amy Waldman, “Masters of Suicide Bombing,” The New York Times, January 14, 2003.

CRS Report RL 31707, Sri Lanka: Background and U.S. Relations, by K. Alan Kronstadt, updated May 30, 2003, p. 4.

CRS-63 Most notably, there was the assassination of Rajiv Ghandi on May 22, 1991 while he was attending an election rally in Sriperambudur, India. Strength and Composition. The State Department estimates that LTTE has between 8,000 and 10,000 armed combatants plus substantial numbers of supporters within Sri Lanka and overseas.280 The Black Tigers, which are the elite unit believed responsible for most of the suicide bombings and other terrorist attacks, reportedly have some 500 members.281 Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations. The Tamil Tigers are not believed to have connections to Al Qaeda or other terrorist groups. LTTE suicide bombing tactics have been copied by various groups, however. For instance, Soosai, the head of the Sea Tigers, who carry out the LTTE’s naval attacks, claimed in a November 2002 interview that Al Qaeda’s attack on the U.S.S. Cole in 2000 had been inspired by LTTE naval operations.282 State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. LTTE has raised funds among the Tamil diaspora in North America, Europe, and Asia, and from smuggling and businesses in Sri Lanka.283 The most common estimates state that before 2001, the Tigers collected up to $1 million a month from expatriates in Canada, Britain, Switzerland and Australia, making it among the most well-funded terrorist groups in the world.284 This flow of funds was apparently significantly reduced after the September 11th, 2001 attacks. Originally Designated as an FTO. October 8, 1997. Re-designated. October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001. Issues of Concern for Congress. Although it is still early to be certain, this extremely violent, territorially-based group may be an example of a group that has been moved by the war on terrorism (among other things) toward negotiation and peaceful resolution. The apparently dramatic fall-off in funding after September 11th was an important development. The evolution of the LTTE and its relationship to the Sri Lankan government bears close scrutiny in future months. For example, the extremely authoritarian nature of Prabhakaran’s rule over the LTTE realm may pose difficulties for trying to reach a settlement on northern Sri Lanka that would be at all democratic.

280

U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 115.

281

“Terrorism: Questions and Answers: Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam,” The Council on Foreign Relations, [http://www.terrorismanswers.org/groups/tamiltigers.html] , accessed on August 11, 2003.

282

Waldman, “Masters of Suicide Bombing.” See also Amal Jayasinghe, “Tamil Tigers Mark Suicide Anniversary,” Agence France Presse, July 5, 2003.

283 284

Kronstadt, Sri Lanka: Background and U.S. Relations, p. 4.

Raymond Bonner, “Sri Lanka’s Ruthless Tigers Easily Armed by Unchecked Market,” Chicago Tribune Mar. 8, 1998. See also Peter Goodspeed, “Tamil Tigers’ Leader Poised for Dramatic Comeback,” National Post, May 17, 2000.

CRS-64 Other CRS Reports. CRS Report RL32058, “Terrorists and Suicide Attacks,” by Audrey Kurth Cronin, August 28, 2003. CRS Report RL21658, International Terrorism in South Asia, by K. Alan Kronstadt, updated November 3, 2003. CRS Issue Brief IB93097, India-U.S. Relations, by K. Alan Kronstadt, updated November 7, 2003. CRS Report RL31707, Sri Lanka: Background and U.S. Relations, by Bruce Vaughn, November 5, 2003.

CRS-65

Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK or MKO) Name(s). People’s Mujahedeen of Iran; PMOI; The National Liberation Army of Iran (NLA, the militant wing of the MEK), National Council of Resistance (NCR); the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI); Muslim Iranian Student’s Society.285 Goals and Objectives. The MEK is an Iranian dissident group whose ideology originally blended Marxism with a moderate interpretation of Islam. In the 1970s, the group opposed the regime of the Shah for its corruption and perceived susceptibility to U.S. and Western influence. Since the Islamic Revolution of 1979, MEK has opposed the religious Iranian regime, favoring a secular government in Iran. The group apparently supports the Arab-Israeli peace process and the rights of Iran’s minorities, although some believe the group takes these positions only to improve its image in Western countries.286 Brief History. The MEK was founded in the 1960s by leftist college students in Iran opposed to the Shah, who they believed was corrupt and too open to Western influences. During the 1970s, the group conducted several attacks against U.S. military personnel and civilians working with the Shah, as well as attacks against the Iranian government. The MEK participated in the 1979 revolution against the Shah, but quickly fell out of favor with Ayatollah Khomeini. Some of its original leadership was executed by the Khomeini regime. In 1981, the MEK bombed several important government buildings, killing as many as 70 high-ranking Iranian officials. Under pressure from the government in Tehran, the group fled to France from 1981 to 1986, after which it took refuge in Iraq. While in Iraq, Saddam Hussein armed the group and sent it into battle against Iran during the Iran-Iraq War. The group also provided various security services for the Saddam Hussein regime, including helping with the suppression of Kurdish and Shi’a revolts after the first Gulf War in 1991. It continued to attack the Iranian regime, conducting a 1992 bombing campaigning of Iranian embassies in 13 different countries. In early 2000, the group used mortars to attack the leadership complex in Tehran that houses the offices of the Supreme Leader and the President. Since the end of the Iran-Iraq War, the group has represented an important security threat to the Iranian regime.287 U.S. and international policy toward the MEK has been ambivalent and controversial. Some see the group as a legitimate, pro-democracy resistance to the illiberal Iranian government, while others condemn the group’s earlier anti-Western attacks and regard the group as an anti-Western cult with a pro-democracy facade. French authorities arrested more than 160 members, including the group’s leader

285

U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 115.

286

CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, Kenneth Katzman, updated February 13, 2003, p. 28. 287

CRS Report RL32048, Iran: U.S. Policy Concerns and Responses, by Kenneth Katzman, updated October 24, 2003.

CRS-66 Maryam Rajavi, in Paris in 2003, reversing the longstanding French policy of giving asylum to the group.288 Several high-profile figures have opposed the arrests.289 During the 2003 Iraq war, U.S. forces bombed MEK bases in Iraq but later signed a cease-fire with the group. Finally in May 2003, the U.S. military disarmed the group.290 Favored Tactics. The MEK’s tactics range from bombings to organized guerilla warfare. Anti-American Activities. The MEK has not attacked or targeted U.S. interests since the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran. During the 1970s, it conducted several attacks against American military and civilian targets and participated in the capture of the U.S. embassy during the revolution.291 Areas of Operation. The MEK is primarily based in Iraq, near the border with Iran, but it has a global presence. The group conducted attacks in Iran and has also attacked Iranian interests in Europe and elsewhere. The group has affiliated lobbying organizations in the United States and Europe, and prior to a French crackdown in 2003, its members took refuge in France. Strength and Composition. The MEK is comprised of Iranian dissidents opposed to the Islamic regime in Iran. According to the State Department, the group possesses several thousand fighters in Iraq and additional members operating overseas. Within Iraq, the group has until recently controlled aging military equipment given to it by Saddam Hussein, including tanks, artillery, and armored vehicles.292 The U.S. military in Iraq recently disarmed the group. Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations. MEK has no known connections with other terrorist groups. State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. Until the recent war to topple Saddam Hussein in Iraq, the MEK received all of its military assistance and much of its financial support from the Iraqi regime. The group apparently uses front

288

Geoff Hutchinson, “France Targets Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization,” Australian Broadcasting Corporation, Jun. 18, 2003.

289

Elaine Sciolino, “Iranian Opposition Movement’s Many Faces,” The New York Times, June 29, 2003.

290

“Terrorism: Questions and Answers: Is Mujahedeen e-Khalq a Terrorist Group?” The Council on Foreign Relations and the Markle Foundation, [http://www.terrorismanswers.org/home/], accessed on August 5, 2003.

291

“Terrorism: Questions and Answers: Mujahedeen e-Khalq,” The Council on Foreign Relations and the Markle Foundation, [http://www.terrorismanswers.org/ groups/mujahedeen.html], accessed on August 5, 2003.

292

Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 116.

CRS-67 organizations to solicit contributions from Iranian expatriates and others, and may also raise funds among sympathizers within Iran .293 Originally Designated as an FTO. October 8, 1997. Re-designated. October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001. Legal Challenges to Designation. In 1998, a majority in the U.S. House of Representatives signed a letter challenging the State Department’s designation of MEK as an FTO. Some Members have suggested that the United States should support the group as an alternative to the Islamic regime in Iran.294 The debate over designation of the group has resurfaced in the aftermath of the 2003 Iraq war. Some believe that the group represents legitimate opposition to the regime in Iran, while others contend that the group is essentially a fanatical cult with a sophisticated public relations wing and that its pro-Western, pro-democracy overtures should not be trusted.295 The State Department continues to resist pressure to remove the MEK from the FTO list. On August 15, 2003, the State Department added the group’s political wing, the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCR)296 to the group’s designation.297 Previously, the NCR had operated in the United States as a legitimate, registered lobbying organization. Issues of Concern for Congress. In the recent past, this group has actively lobbied on Capitol Hill. Its political/lobbying arm is now also specifically cited by name as an alias for the MEK (and thus a foreign terrorist organization), and its assets have been frozen as a specially designated entity by the Treasury Department under Executive Order 13224.298 (See also Legal Challenges to Designation, above.) American treatment of this group in the aftermath of active hostilities in Iraq was at first ambivalent, but the group is currently disarmed. The status of this group is an important issue in the relationship between the United States and Iran.

293

Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 116.

294

CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by Kenneth Katzman, updated February 13, 2003, p. 29.

295

Elaine Sciolino, “Iranian Opposition Movement’s Many Faces,” The New York Times, June 29, 2003.

296

Their website is located at [http://www.iran-e-azad.org/english/ncri.html].

297

U.S. Department of State, “Designation of National Council of Resistance and National Council of Resistance of Iran Under Executive Order 13224,”Press Statement, August 15, 2003.

298

U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Public Affairs, “Designation of National Council of Resistance in Iran, National Council of Resistance and Peoples Mujahedin of Iran under Executive Order 13224,” August 15, 2003, #JS-664, available at [http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/js664.htm]. For an explanation of the meaning of this designation and the terrorist lists, see CRS Report RL32120, The “FTO List” and Congress: Sanctioning Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations, by Audrey Kurth Cronin, October 21, 2003, pp. 3-5.

CRS-68 Other CRS Reports. CRS Report RL32120, The ‘FTO List’ and Congress: Sanctioning Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations, by Audrey Kurth Cronin, October 21, 2003. CRS Report RL32048, Iran: U.S. Policy Concerns and Responses, by Kenneth Katzman, updated October 24, 2003. CRS Report RLRL31533, The Persian Gulf States: Post-War Issues for U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman, updated July 14, 2003. CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by Kenneth Katzman, updated February 13, 2003.

CRS-69

National Liberation Army (ELN) Name(s). National Liberation Army; ELN. Goals and Objectives. The founders of ELN hoped to emulate Cuba’s Marxist revolution in Colombia. The group’s objectives are to overthrow the government of Colombia and replace the capitalist economy with a socialist system. The group claims to represent the oppressed poor in Colombia against the wealthy classes, and it opposes privatization and U.S. influence in Colombia.299 Brief History. ELN was formed in 1964 by a group of students, Catholic radicals, and leftist intellectuals inspired by Che Guevara and trained in Cuba. For many years, the group was led by priests who opposed drugs and drug trafficking on moral grounds. Experts contend that this influence accounts for a relatively low level of drug-related activity within ELN, in comparison, for example, to FARC (see entry below).300 ELN and FARC, despite similar Marxist ideologies, have become rivals. Favored Tactics. ELN relies on kidnapping and extortion for funding, reportedly taking more than 800 hostages for ransom in 2001.301 ELN has also conducted bombing campaigns against multinational and domestic oil companies, including attacking oil pipelines.302 Anti-American Activities. The group opposes U.S. influence in Colombia and has attacked U.S. interests, particularly energy companies. In 1998, ELN activists bombed and ransacked a Dole-owned subsidiary and attacked the Ocensa pipeline, which is jointly owned by a consortium of American, British, French, Canadian, and Colombian companies.303 The group has also kidnapped Americans for ransom. Areas of Operation. ELN is based in rural and mountainous areas of north, northeast, and southwest Colombia and in border areas of Venezuela. The group has also reportedly used Bolivian territory.304

299

“Terrorism: Questions and Answers: FARC, ELN, AUC,” The Council on Foreign Relations and the Markle Foundation, [http://www.terrorismanswers.org/groups/farc.html], accessed on July 14, 2003.

300

Shawn Choey, “In the Spotlight: The National Liberation Army,” Center for Defense Information, updated June 23, 2003, available at [http://www.cdi.org], accessed on July 14, 2003.

301

Ibid.

302

“Terrorism: Questions and Answers: FARC, ELN, AUC,” The Council on Foreign Relations, [http://www.terrorismanswers.org/groups/farc.html], accessed on July 14, 2003.

303

“National Liberation Army,” International Policy Institute for Counter Terrorism, [http://www.ict.org.il], accessed October 27, 2003. 304

“Colombia’s ELN Rebels Move Into Bolivia,” EFE News Service June 16, 2003.

CRS-70 Strength and Composition. The State Department estimates ELN strength between 3,000 and 5,000 armed militants, plus an unknown number of active supporters.305 It thus appears to be roughly one third the size of Colombia’s other leftist militant group FARC (see entry below). Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations. There are no known connections between ELN and other terrorist organizations. State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. Most of ELN’s funding comes from kidnapping and extortion against wealthy Colombians, government officials, and employees of multinational corporations, particularly oil companies. In addition, the group has now reportedly entered the illegal drug trade.306 Until the early 1990s, ELN received support from Cuba. However, in recent years Castro has attempted to broker peace agreements between the ELN and the Colombian government. It is unclear whether the group continues to receive support from Castro.307 Originally Designated as an FTO. October 8, 1997. Re-designated. October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001. Issues of Concern for Congress. This group poses a serious threat to U.S. citizens and interests in Colombia and is apparently now involved in drug trafficking. It is a threat to the stability of the Colombian government. Other CRS Reports. CRS Issue Brief IB88093, Drug Control: International Policy and Approaches, by Raphael Perl, October 16, 2003. CRS Report RS21242, Colombia: The Uribe Administration and Congressional Concerns, by Nina Serafino, updated June 14, 2002. CRS Report RL32021, The Andean Regional Initiative (ARI): FY2003 Supplemental and FY2004 Assistance for Colombia and Neighbors, by K. Larry Storrs, updated November 14, 2003. CRS Report RS 21049, Latin America: Terrorism Issues, by Mark P. Sullivan, updated June 11, 2003. CRS Report RL32052, Colombia and Aerial Eradication of Drug Crops: U.S. Policy and Issues, by Connie Veillette, updated August 28, 2003.

305

U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 116.

306

“Terrorism: Questions and Answers: FARC, ELN, AUC,” The Council on Foreign Relations and the Markle Foundation, [http://www.terrorismanswers.org/groups/farc.html] accessed on July 14, 2003.

307

Ibid.

CRS-71

Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) Name(s). Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) Goals and Objectives. PIJ’s goal is to establish an Islamic Palestinian state and topple the state of Israel. Brief History. PIJ is a highly active Palestinian organization founded in 1979 by Palestinian students in Egypt. PIJ’s founding members — Fathi Shiqaqi, Abd alAziz Odah, and Bashir Musa — were once members of the Muslim Brotherhood (see also al-Jihad entry), but split from the group because of what they perceived as a moderate stance within the group and a diluted focus on the Palestinian issue.308 The founding members were inspired by the Iranian revolution and espoused several of its tenets. PIJ’s sole focus is to defeat the state of Israel (using “violence as a legitimate means”) and establish an Islamic Palestinian state. To this end, PIJ militants have perpetrated suicide bomb attacks against Israeli civilian and military targets throughout Israel and the Palestinian territories. Since the start of the second Intifada (September 2000), PIJ has conducted attacks that have killed more than 100 people.309 On June 29, 2003, after 33 consecutive months of violence, the radical group ceded to Palestinian Prime Minister Abbas’ appeal for a cease-fire.310 However, only about a week later, the group called off the cease-fire, complaining that Israel failed to fulfill aspects of the agreement, including the release of several jailed Islamic militants. The cease-fire is “effectively over” and ‘attacks will resume,’ said the Jenin leader of the PIJ Bessam Sa’adi.311 And the attacks did resume: on July 8, 2003, PIJ claimed a suicide bomb attack in central Israel that killed a 65-year old woman as well as the perpetrator. Favored Tactics. The PIJ engages in suicide attacks against Israeli targets. Occasionally, the PIJ also uses gunfire in its operations. Anti-American Activities. The PIJ does not directly target U.S. interests; however, Americans have died in PIJ attacks. For example, in November 2001, Shoshani Ben-Yishai, a 16-year old New York-born American student in Jerusalem died after a militant sprayed gunfire on the city bus she and her classmates were riding. Alisa Flatow, 20, was similarly killed in a bus attack in Apr. 1995.312 In February 2003, PIJ asserted that it would not target Americans in spite of a U.S.

308

Michael Donovan, “In the Spotlight: Palestinian Islamic Jihad,” Center for Defense Information, [http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/pij.cfm], accessed on April 29, 2003.

309

Liza Porteus, “Profile: Palestinian Islamic Jihad,” Fox News, February 20, 2003.

310

“Cease-fire give hope for Mideast peace plan,” Chicago Tribune, June 30, 2003.

311

Matthew Gutman, “Cease-fire is dead, Jihad tells ‘Post’,” Jerusalem Post, July 9, 2003.

312

Jeff Jacoby, “Palestinian Terrorism, American Blood,” Boston Globe, October 19, 2003.

CRS-72 indictment of eight PIJ activists (four of whom were living in the United States).313 PIJ claimed that it would stay focused on its fight against Israel and that it wished not to ‘open any new fronts’ by targeting U.S. interests.314 Primary Area(s) of Operation. PIJ conducts its attacks in Israel, the West Bank and Gaza Strip. However, PIJ leader Ramadan Abdallah Shallah reportedly lives in and operates from Damascus, Syria.315 (Shallah took over the leadership when Israeli forces killed Shiqaqi in 1994.) The PIJ also has a presence in Beirut, Tehran, and possibly Khartoum, where it raises money.316 Strength and Composition. The exact number of PIJ members is unknown. At the beginning of the first Intifada (1987-1990), PIJ reportedly consisted of as few as 250 militants.317 The group has, however, increased its recruiting base over the course of the 1990s and may now have more members, including students. Connections with Other Groups. The PIJ’s closest ally is Hamas (see entry above). Initially, PIJ and Hamas did not maintain ties, and in fact, some analysts viewed them as rivals.318 Since 1994, the two groups have apparently collaborated on several fronts: they have conducted joint attacks and planned simultaneous bombings. In 2000, Time Magazine reported that Hamas and the PIJ were being courted by Iran to coordinated their efforts and derail the IsraeliPalestinian peace process. Time also reported that Hizballah, a group deeply connected to Iran, was the intermediary that facilitated this process.319 There have also been numerous reports that Hamas provided training and logistical support from Hizballah facilities in southern Lebanon.320 In June 2003, PIJ and Hamas published a joint statement declaring a cease-fire to end attacks on Israelis and Israeli interests. Some analysts still see a rivalry between the groups, as both groups compete to launch suicide attacks against Israeli targets.

313

Ibrahim Barzak, “Islamic Jihad: Won’t Target Americans,” Associated Press, February 21, 2003. 314

Ibid.

315

“Islamic Jihad leader in Damascus says Palestinian Authority ‘has retreated,’” BBC, Aug. 2, 2001. 316

Michael Donovan, “In the Spotlight: Palestinian Islamic Jihad,” Center for Defense Information, [http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/pij.cfm], accessed on April 29, 2003.

317

Ibid.

318

“Palestinian Islamic Jihad,” International Policy Institute for Counter Terrorism, [www.ict.org.il], accessed July 11, 2003.

319

Massimo Calabresi, “A Hidden Hand in the Breakdown of Peace,” Time Magazine, February 28, 2000.

320

Daniel Byman, “Should Hezbollah be Next?” Foreign Affairs, November-December 2003, Vol. 82, No. 6, pp. 54-67. See also [http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/pij.cfm]”Hizbollahland,” Commentary from the American Jewish Committee, No. 1, Vol. 116, July 1, 2003, pg 56.

CRS-73 State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. The State Department has said that PIJ receives financial support from Iran and logistical support from Syria.321 PIJ leader Shallah has reportedly taken refuge in Syria.322 Originally Designated as an FTO. October 8, 1997. Re-designated. October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001. Syria’s role in aiding this group may be an issue of relevance to the Syrian Accountability Act, P.L. 108-175. This group has killed American civilians, and eight of its members are under U.S. indictment; however, it has claimed that it does not want to attack U.S. citizens and interests directly. The PIJ is an extremely violent group that uses suicide attacks and has killed a large number of Israeli civilians. Other CRS Reports. CRS Report RL32058, Terrorists and Suicide Attacks, by Audrey Kurth Cronin, August 28, 2003. CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by Kenneth Katzman, updated February 13, 2003. CRS Report RS21235, The PLO and its Factions, by Kenneth Katzman, updated June10, 2002. CRS Issue Brief IB92052, Palestinians and the Middle-East: Issues for the United States, by Clyde Mark, updated November 13, 2003. CRS Issue Brief IB91137, The Middle East Peace Talks, by Carol Migdalovitz, updated October 22, 2003. CRS Issue Brief IB92075, Syria: U.S. Relations and Bilateral Issues, by Alfred Prados, updated November 13, 2003.

321

U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 117.

322

Ibid.

CRS-74

Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) Goals and Objectives.The PLF is committed to the destruction of Israel and the establishment of a Palestinian state on its territory. Brief History. Originally formed in 1959 by Ahmed Jibril (PLFP-GC, see entry below), the PLF has gone through several periods of splits and mergers. In 1977, Jibril split off from the PFLP-GC and re-established the PLF as an independent organization. The group’s most recent fissure occurred in the 1980’s when the PLF split along pro-Syrian, pro-Libyan, and pro-PLO lines. While all three groups claim to represent the PLF, the pro-PLO faction of Muhammed Zaidan, known as Abu Abbas, is responsible for the PLF’s most prominent terrorist acts. On Oct. 7, 1985 four PLF terrorists hijacked the Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro on its way from Egypt to Israel and became infamous for the murder of wheelchairbound US citizen Leon Klinghoffer. In response to PLF demands, Italian authorities released Abu Abbas from prison, later sentencing him to life in prison in absentia. After the Achille Lauro incident, Tunisian authorities expelled the group which then moved its headquarters to Iraq. The group has not been blamed for a terrorist attack since 1990, when it attempted a seaborne-commando raid of Israeli beaches at Nizanim in an attempt to kill tourists and Israelis. Israeli forces foiled the attack, meant to avenge the deaths of seven Palestinian workers on May 20, killing four of the twelve militants with no Israeli casualties. At the time, Abu Abbas was a Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) executive committee member, and Israeli officials used the raid to put pressure on the U.S. dialogue with the PLO, claiming the raid was proof the PLO still engaged in terrorism.323 The PLF became active again in the al-Aqsa Intifada. In November 2001, 15 Iraqi trained PLF militants were arrested by Israeli authorities for plotting attacks inside Israel. Israeli authorities claimed the group was linked to Iraqi intelligence, and trained and supported by Baghdad324 On April 16, 2003, U.S. Special Forces captured Abu Abbas in southern Baghdad.325 The Italian government has requested his extradition so he may serve his sentence for the Achille Lauro incident.326 Favored Tactic. The PLF has engaged in bombings, kidnappings, and murders. The group has also used hang gliders and hot-air balloons to attack

323

“Israel Says U.S. Should End Dialogue with PLO,” Reuters, May 30, 1990. See also “4 PLO Guerrillas Killed,” Associated Press, May 30, 1990. 324

“Israel Says Uncovered Iraqi-Backed Militant Cell,” Reuters, Nov. 25, 2001. See also Israel arrests Iraq-supported Palestinian Cell,” Agence France Presse, Nov. 25, 2001.

325

“U.S. Forces Capture Terrorist Abu Abbas in Baghdad,” U.S. Department of State, Press Releases and Documents, Apr. 16, 2003.

326

“A Terrorist Nabbed, Abu Abbas Should be Brought to Justice,” Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Apr. 17, 2003.

CRS-75 Israel.327 The PLF has also attempted at least one seaborne assault on Israel, the 1990 attack on the beach at Nizanim.328 Anti-American Activity. The PLF does not focus its energies on attacking the United States or U.S. interests. The exception was the murder of American citizen Leon Klinghoffer on the Achille Lauro. Primary Areas of Operation. Abu Abbas has been based in Iraq since 1990 and the PLF has a presence in both Lebanon and the West Bank.329 While the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq did result in the capture of Abu Abbas, it remains unclear what effect the occupation will have on PLF operations. Strength and Composition. The State Department lists the PLF’s strength as unknown. However other estimates place the Abu Abbas faction at around 300 to 500 members.330 Connections with Other Groups. Abu Abbas has close relations to Yasir Arafat and, consequently, close links with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).331 There are no known links between the PLF and Al Qaeda. Abu Abbas condemned the September 11 attacks and stated Al Qaeda’s cause is separate from the Palestinian cause.332 State Supporters, Other Sources of Funding, and Constituencies. Before the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003, the PLF received most of its financial and logistical support from Iraq. Also, the $25,000 rewards Saddam Hussein was paying out to the families of suicide bombers in Palestinian territories were allegedly disbursed by the PLF.333 Originally Designated as an FTO. October 8, 1997. Re-designated. October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001.

327

“Israelis Shoot 2 Guerillas in Balloon,” The Globe and Mail, Apr. 17, 1981. See also Periscope, USNI Database. “Terrorism Database.” www.periscope1.com.

328 329

“4 PLO Guerrillas Killed,” Associated Press, May 30, 1990. U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 117.

330

“The Military Balance,” Institute for International and Strategic Studies, Vol. 103. [http://www3.oup.co.uk/milbal/current/]. Table 41.

331

Grace Chu, “In the Spotlight: PLF,” Center for Defense Information, November 14, 2002, [http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/plf.cfm].

332

Raymond Bonner, “Once Wanted, Mastermind Of Ship Attack Is Unwanted,” The New York Times, November 3, 2003. See also “A Terrorist Nabbed, Abu Abbas Should be Brought to Justice,” Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Apr. 17, 2003. 333

Niles Lathem, “Achilles Terror-Heel Captured,” New York Post, Apr. 16, 2003. See also Melissa Radler, “Powell Presents ‘Irrefutable’ Evidence on Iraq,” Jerusalem Post, February 3, 2003.

CRS-76 Issues of Concern for Congress. It is unclear what the status of the PLF is. Its leader Abu Abbas was captured during the U.S. invasion of Iraq. It may be in a period of disarray or transition. Other CRS Reports. CRS Report RL32058, Terrorists and Suicide Attacks, by Audrey Kurth Cronin, August 28, 2003. CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by Kenneth Katzman, updated February 13, 2003. CRS Report RS21235, The PLO and its Factions, by Kenneth Katzman, updated June10, 2002. CRS Issue Brief IB92052, Palestinians and the Middle-East: Issues for the United States, by Clyde Mark, updated November 13, 2003. CRS Issue Brief IB91137, The Middle East Peace Talks, by Carol Migdalovitz, updated October 22, 2003. CRS Issue Brief IB92075, Syria: U.S. Relations and Bi-Lateral Issues, by Alfred Prados, November 13, 2003.

CRS-77

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) Goals and Objectives. The PFLP seeks the destruction of the State of Israel, the establishment of a socialist Palestinian state and the end to American influence in the region. Brief History. After the 1967 Israeli victory over its Arab neighbors, George Habash, a medical doctor and a Christian, founded the PFLP as a more leftist leaning organization bent on the destruction of Israel. In the 1970’s the PFLP became one of the first Palestinian movements to use terrorism to further its agenda and was the second largest organization under the PLO.334 Unlike the PLO, the PFLP sought support from the People’s Republic of China, the Soviet Union, and the USSR’s client state Syria. Funding for the PFLP diminished with the collapse of the Soviet Union, but the group’s headquarters remain in Damascus.335 The PFLP conducted numerous terrorist attacks in the 1970’s. In its most infamous attack, PFLP members highjacked a TWA Boeing 747, a Swissair DC-8, and a BOAC VC-10, flew them all to Dawson Airfield outside Amman, Jordan, and blew them up on the ground after unloading the hostages.336 In June of 1972, three members of the Japanese United Red Army opened fire with machine guns and killed 26 people at Lod airport at the behest of the PFLP.337 In May of 2000, the ailing founder of the PFLP, George Habash, handed his authority over to Abu Ali Mustafa, originally named Mustafa al-Zibri. Since the Palestinian-Israeli peace process floundered in September 2000 and the Al-Aqsa Intifada erupted, the PFLP has carried out ten car bombings and numerous other attacks. In August 2001, Israeli helicopters launched a rocket attack against PFLP headquarters and killed Mustafa.338 The PFLP retaliated by killing Rehavam Zeevi, Israel’s Tourism Minister. Mustafa was succeeded by Ahmed Saadat who was arrested by the Palestinian Authority (PA) in 2002. Followers of the PFLP have threatened to kill PA figures if Saadat is not released.339 Favored Tactics. The PFLP is most famous for its plane highjackings. More recently, the group has turned to car bombings, assassinations, and guerilla tactics.340

334

“Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine” International Policy Institute for Counter Terrorism, [http://www.ict.org.il], accessed on October 27, 2003.

335

“Outflanking Arafat,” The Guardian, October 18, 2001.

336

Periscope, USNI Database. “Terrorism Database.” [http://www.periscope1.com].

337

“Radical Group’s Record of Terror-Japanese Red Army,” South China Morning Post, Sept. 18, 1994. See also Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1998), pp.187-189. 338

“Abu Ali Mustafa, Pragmatist Killed by Israel after Leading PFLP,” Agence France Presse, August 21, 2001.

339

Miral Fahmy, “Palestinians Attack Arafat for PFLP Arrest,”Reuters, January 17, 2002.

340

“Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine,” International Policy Institute for Counter (continued...)

CRS-78 Anti-American Activities. The PFLP has not engaged in any direct attacks on U.S. citizens or interests. Primary Areas of Operation. Headquarters for the PFLP are in Damascus, Syria, and the group is believed to keep support bases in Lebanon. They carry out operations in Israel and the Palestinian territories.341 Strength and Composition. The PFLP reportedly has around 800 to1,000 members.342 Connections with Other Groups. The PFLP rejected the 1993 Oslo Accords between Israel and the PLO and joined the Damascus-based Alliance of Palestinian Forces (APF). Within the APF, the PFLP enjoyed good relations with other groups such as Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the PFLP-General Command (see entries). However, the PFLP showed a willingness to negotiate with Arafat by attending the 1996 Palestinian National Council, and thereby effectively sealed a split between the PFLP and the APF. Bilateral relations with individual APF members continue, especially with the more violent elements of the Fatah movement.343 State Sponsors, Other Sources of Funding, and Constituencies. The PFLP receives safe haven and logistical support from Syria, and some financial support from Iran.344 Originally Designated as an FTO. October 8, 1997. Re-designated. October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001. Issues of Concern for Congress. Syria’s role in aiding this group may be an issue of relevance to the Syrian Accountability Act, P.L. 108-175. This group has violently attacked Israeli civilians and will play a role in the viability of any IsraeliPalestinian peace process. Other CRS Reports. CRS Report RL32058, Terrorists and Suicide Attacks, by Audrey Kurth Cronin, August 28, 2003.

340

(...continued) Terrorism, [http://www.ict.org.il], accessed October 27, 2003.

341

U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 117-118.

342

Ibid.

343

Strindberg, Anders. “The Damascus Based Alliance of Palestinian Forces.” The Journal of Palestinian Studies, Vol. 29, No. 3 (Spring 2000), p. 60.

344

Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 117-118.

CRS-79 CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by Kenneth Katzman, updated February 13, 2003. CRS Report RS21235, The PLO and its Factions, by Kenneth Katzman, updated June10, 2002. CRS Issue Brief IB92052, Palestinians and the Middle-East: Issues for the United States, by Clyde Mark, updated November 13, 2003. CRS Issue Brief IB91137, The Middle East Peace Talks, by Carol Migdalovitz, updated October 22, 2003. CRS Issue Brief IB92075, Syria: U.S. Relations and Bi-Lateral Issues, by Alfred Prados, November 13, 2003.

CRS-80

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC) Goals and Objectives. The PFLP-GC is a Marxist-Leninist group with Islamic beliefs committed to the establishment of a Palestinian state and the destruction of Israel. The group has been opposed to any negotiation with Israel and believes only in a military solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.345 Brief History. The history of the PFLP-GC is convoluted. In 1959, Ahmed Jibril, a former engineering captain in the Syrian army, founded the Palestine Liberation Front, only to merge his group with George Habash’s Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine in 1967. In 1968, finding himself at odds with both Habash’s willingness to negotiate with Israel and his leanings away from Syria, Jibril broke away from the PFLP to form the PFLP-GC with headquarters in Damascus. During the 1970’s, the PFLP-GC became more a proxy for Syria than an organization of freedom fighters for the Palestinians, even going so far as to support Syria against rival Palestinian factions in the Lebanese civil war in 1976.346 (During that fighting, Abu Abbas broke away from the PFLP-GC to form the Palestine Liberation Front in 1977 - see entry above). Furthermore, in 1983 the PFLP-GC sided again with Syria and aligned with a renegade Fatah element to drive Arafat from Tunisia .347 In the 1990s, with the decline of the Soviet Union and a tightening of Syria’s budget, the PFLP-GC limited its activities to training and equipping other Palestinian groups such as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. In May 2001, the PFLP-GC claimed responsibility for the attempted smuggling of 40-tons of weapons to the Palestinian territories that were intercepted by Israel’s navy.348 Most recently, the PFLP-GC claimed responsibility for the killing of two Israeli soldiers in the West Bank on November 18, 2003.349 Favored Tactics. Known for its unusual tactics, the PFLP-GC has used hot air balloons and hang-gliders to attack inside Israel. Recently it has reverted to bombings and guerilla tactics.350

345

Sophia Aldape, “In the Spotlight: Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine- General Command,” Center for Defense Information, [http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/pflp.cfm], accessed October 15, 2003.

346

“Rival Palestinian Guerrilla Groups Battle,” The New York Times, Dec. 22, 1976.

347

“Besieged Arafat seeks ceasefire in fighting to salvage PLO unity,” The New York Times, November 24, 1983. See also “PLO factions to leave Tripoli within 2 weeks,” Associated Press, November 26, 1983.

348

CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by Kenneth Katzman, updated February 13, 2003

349

“Radical Palestinian Group Claims Deadly West Bank Attack,” Agence France Presse, November 18, 2003.

350

U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 118.

CRS-81 Anti-American Activity. The PFLP-GC has not specifically targeted American interests or citizens. However, the group considers the United States an enemy for its support of Israel. Primary Areas of Operation. The PFLP-GC operates in Israel, Lebanon, Syria, and the Palestinian territories.351 Strength and Composition. The Department of State estimates the group’s strength at between 500-1,000, while other sources place the number of members closer to 500.352 Connections with Other Groups. The PFLP-GC is committed to the Alliance of Palestinian Forces (APF) and has aligned itself more closely with the fundamentalist Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas than other secular-leaning groups. This factor allows the PFLP-GC to act as a go-between for Islamist and secular elements seeking to collaborate.353 The PFLP-GC prefers ties with states over other groups. However, some experts have reported varying connections with other Leftist and nationalist groups in the 1980s including the Japanese Red Army, The Red Army Faction, and the Provisional Irish Republican Army.354 State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. Western intelligence sources are convinced the PFLP-GC is principally supported and directed by Syria.355 However, while Syria is by far the group’s closest state sponsor, in the mid-1980s, pilots from the PFLP-GC reportedly flew in the Libyan air force in Chad,356 and the Libyan government supplied hang gliders the PFLP-GC used in aerial raids on northern Israel.357 It is also reported that because of the PFLP-GC’s connections, the group serves as a liaison between secular governments and fundamentalist movements.

351

Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 118.

352

Ibid. See also “The Military Balance,” Institute for International and Strategic Studies, Vol. 103. [http://www3.oup.co.uk/milbal/current/]. Table 41.

353

Anders Strindberg, “The Damascus Based Alliance of Palestinian Forces.” The Journal of Palestinian Studies. Spring 2000 v29 i3 p60.

354

David Tal, “The International Dimension of PFLP-GC Activity,” The Jaffe Center for Strategic Studies Project on Low Intensity Warfare, International Terrorism, 1989, pp 6177.

355

CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by Kenneth Katzman, updated February 13, 2003

356

David Tal, “The International Dimension of PFLP-GC Activity,” The Jaffe Center for Strategic Studies Project on Low Intensity Warfare, International Terrorism, 1989. P61-77.

357

Anders Strindberg, “The Damascus Based Alliance of Palestinian Forces,” The Journal of Palestinian Studies, Vol. 29, No.3 (Spring 2000), p. 60.

CRS-82 Originally Designated as an FTO. October 8, 1997. Re-designated. October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001. Issues of Concern for Congress. Syria’s role in aiding this group may be an issue of relevance to the Syrian Accountability Act, P.L. 108-175. Its apparent ties with Libya and possible role in the bombing of Pan Am 103 may also have implications for U.S. interests. This group has violently attacked Israeli civilians and may play a role in the viability of any Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Other CRS Reports. CRS Report RL32058, Terrorists and Suicide Attacks, by Audrey Kurth Cronin, August 28, 2003. CRS Report RL31247, Africa and the War on Terrorism, by Ted Dagne, updated January 17, 2002. CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by Kenneth Katzman, updated February 13, 2003. CRS Report RS21235, The PLO and its Factions, by Kenneth Katzman, updated June10, 2002. CRS Issue Brief IB92052, Palestinians and the Middle-East: Issues for the United States, by Clyde Mark, updated November 13, 2003. CRS Report RS21601, Libya: Pan Am 103 Settlement, by Clyde Mark, updated August 27, 2003. CRS Issue Brief IB93109, Libya,,by Clyde Mark, updated October 21, 2003. CRS Issue Brief IB91137, The Middle East Peace Talks, by Carol Migdalovitz, updated October 22, 2003. CRS Issue Brief IB92075, Syria: U.S. Relations and Bi-Lateral Issues, by Alfred Prados, November 13, 2003.

CRS-83

Al Qaeda Names. The Base, Qa’idat al-Jihad, Maktab al-Khidamat, International Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders, Al-Jabhah al-Islamiyyah al-`Alamiyyah li-Qital al-Yahud wal-Salibiyyin, Group for the Preservation of Holy Sites, Islamic Army of the Liberation of Holy Places, Islamic Army for the Liberation of Holy Shrines, Islamic Sal.358 Goals and Objectives. Al Qaeda is an umbrella organization that carries out its own terrorist acts as well as providing logistical and training support to other extremist groups. Al Qaeda seeks to destroy the regimes of Muslim countries it deems as “non-Islamic” in order to establish a worldwide Islamic religious government based on the ancient model of the Caliphates. The groups believe the United States and its allies are the single greatest roadblock to that goal and therefore issued a proclamation calling for all Muslims to kill Americans - military or civilian in order to secure the expulsion of Western influence from the Muslim world.359 Following is a selection from the second fatwa (1998): The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies — civilians and military — is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it, in order to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque and the holy mosque [Mecca] from their grip, and in order for their armies to move out of all the lands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim. This is in accordance with the words of Almighty God...We — with God’s help — call on every Muslim who believes in God and wishes to be rewarded to comply with God’s order to kill the Americans and plunder their money wherever and whenever they find it.360

Brief History. The origins of Al Qaeda are rooted in the Afghan resistance to the Soviet invasion from 1979-1989. Believing that the war with the atheistic Soviets was a holy battle between Islam and the infidel, Osama bin Laden, the son of a wealthy Saudi contractor, traveled to Afghanistan to aid the fight. At the time, Afghanistan lacked both the infrastructure and manpower for a protracted war. Bin Laden joined forces with Sheikh Dr. Abdullah Azzam, leader of the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood, to establish the Maktab al-Khidamat (MAK- Afghan Services Bureau) whose goal was to recruit Muslim fighters from around the world to fight in Afghanistan. Bin Laden paid for their transportation and training (he imported specialists in guerilla warfare and other professionals), while Afghan local leaders contributed land and resources.

358

Periscope, USNI Database. “Terrorism Database.” www.periscope1.com; and U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, pp. 118-119.

359 360

Ibid.

From the Second Fatwa, issued February 23, 1998, available at [http://www.pbs.org/newshour/terrorism/international/fatwa_1998.html], accessed February 5, 2004.

CRS-84 Anywhere from 20,000 to 60,000 people, most of whom were not native Afghans, received training and combat experience in Afghanistan.361 During the Afghan war, the Central Intelligence Agency provided roughly $500 million a year in material support to the Mujahedin, though there is no evidence that U.S. aid was given to bin Laden himself. In 1988, bin Laden, believing Azzam’s perspective to be too narrow and limited, broke with his ally to form Al Qaeda (The Base) and carry on his jihad on a worldwide scale. Azzam died in a car bombing in 1989, ostensibly carried out by his Afghan rivals.362 With the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan, bin Laden returned to Saudi Arabia to combat what he saw as an infidel Saudi government. Further angered by the U.S. presence in Saudi Arabia accompanying the Gulf War, bin Laden became even more outspoken in his anti-regime rhetoric. With his immediate family and a band of followers, he moved to Sudan. His Saudi citizenship was revoked in 1994 for his opposition to the Saudi government. In Sudan, bin Laden established businesses, paved roads, built an airport, and created training camps to supply out-ofwork mujahedin with jobs.363 In 1996, as Sudanese relations with the United States improved, the government of Sudan asked bin Laden to depart. He then returned to Afghanistan where he established his ties with the Taliban movement, followed by training camps and a terrorist infrastructure. This infrastructure supported a number of plots against the United States and its citizens, including the bombings of the African Embassies in 1998 and the September 11th, 2001 attacks. Also in 2001, Al Qaeda officially merged with Egyptian Islamic Jihad (see entry above). In 2001, American-led forces toppled the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Approximately half of the senior Al Qaeda leadership have been captured, the group’s previous communications network has apparently been crippled, and its Afghanistan base has been largely eliminated. But Al Qaeda appears to have gone through a transition, from a territorially-based, centrally-directed structure to a more decentralized, mission-driven organization. Attacks in Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, and elsewhere have reportedly demonstrated the involvement of indigenous groups linked to Al Qaeda and supported by its resources and/or technical advice. Osama bin Laden remains at large, and Al Qaeda is still considered a major threat to the United States.

361

Estimates of the total number of fighters trained in Afghanistan vary greatly. On this issue, see CRS Report RS21529, Al Qaeda after the Iraq Conflict, by Audrey Kurth Cronin, p. 3-4. According to one source, nearly half of the fighting force came from bin Laden’s native Saudi Arabia. Others came from Algeria and from Egypt, with thousands more coming from other Muslim countries such as Yemen, Pakistan and the Sudan. “Al-Qaeda,” International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism, [http://www.ict.org.il/]

362

Colin McCullough, Anthony Keats, and Mark Burgess, “In the Spotlight: al’Qaeda,” Center for Defense Information, Dec. 30, 2002 [http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/alqaeda.cfm]. Accessed October 15, 2003. See also “Al-Qaeda,” International Policy Institute for CounterTerrorism, [http://www.ict.org.il/] 363

CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by Kenneth Katzman, updated February 13, 2003.

CRS-85 Favored Tactics. Al Qaeda is most famous for its elaborate large-scale bombings, although the group has also engaged in assassinations, guerilla warfare, and suicide attacks. The group also provides support to other terrorist organizations and violent individuals throughout the world in the form of training, logistics, and financial grants.364 Al Qaeda has also shown interest and some capability in chemical and biological weapons, and interest in nuclear and radiological weapons.365 Anti-American Activity. In February 1998, bin Laden issued a proclamation announcing the creation of his new organization The World Islamic Front for Jihad Against the Jews and Crusaders, which called on all Muslims to kill U.S. citizens and their allies (see above).366 Al Qaeda has been held directly responsible for or variously linked with numerous terrorist attacks against United States citizens and interests. These include but are not limited to: the August 1998 bombings of U.S. Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania (at least 301 killed, 5,000 injured); the October 2000 attack on the USS Cole in the port of Aden, Yemen (17 killed, 39 injured); and the September 11, 2001 attacks in New York, Virginia and Pennsylvania (approximately 3,000 people dead or injured).367 Primary Areas of Operation. Al Qaeda is a network with global reach. Until the U.S.-led attack on Afghanistan, that country was Al Qaeda’s base of operation and held its logistical and training facilities. Many of Al Qaeda’s leaders have either been captured or have apparently fled to areas along the western border of Pakistan. Al Qaeda cells or collaborators have also been found in south Asia, southeast Asia, the Middle East, Europe, and the United States.368 Strength and Composition. The exact size of Al Qaeda is unknown, though the group likely has several thousand fighters. The estimated number of people who trained in camps or fought in Afghanistan ranges from 20,000369 to 60,000,370 but these are not all Al Qaeda “members.” Many of Al Qaeda’s top leadership have been killed, and some estimates put the number of killed or captured Al Qaeda operatives since Sept. 11, 2001 at around 3,000.371 Some experts further believe Al Qaeda can best be described as an organization in transition. The losses 364

“Terrorism Database,” Periscope, USNI Database, www.periscope1.com.

365

See Audrey Kurth Cronin, Terrorist Motivations for Chemical and Biological Weapons Use: Placing the Threat in Context, CRS Report RL31831, March 28, 2003, p. 3.

366

Colin McCullough, Anthony Keats, and Mark Burgess, “In the Spotlight: al’Qaeda,” Center for Defense Information, Dec. 30, 2002 [http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/alqaeda.cfm].

367

This is a very incomplete list of Al Qaeda-associated attacks. For more information, see U.S. Department of State’s Patterns of Global Terrorism annual report for various years.

368

Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, pp. 118-119.

369

International Institute for Strategic Studies, Strategic Survey 2002-2003 (Oxford University Press, May 2003), p.9.

370

German Intelligence cited in The Atlantic Online, “Atlantic Unbound: Terrorism’s CEO,” interview with Peter Bergen, accessed at [http://www.theatlantic.com/unbound/interviews/int2002-01-09] on May 16, 2003.

371

“Terrorism Database,” Periscope, USNI Database, [http://www.periscope1.com].

CRS-86 of many of the group’s leaders and their base in Afghanistan have disrupted the organization, but experts fear that Al Qaeda’s structure, which fostered an entrepreneurial spirit in its lower-level fighters, can sustain the loss of senior leaders.372 Connections with Other Groups. Groups known to have connections with Al Qaeda include: Islamic Group (Egypt), al-Jihad (Egypt), Armed Islamic Group (Algeria), Salafist Group for Call and Combat (Algeria), Abu Sayyaf Organziation (Philippines), Harakat al-Mujahedin (Pakistan), Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Islamic Army of Aden (Yemen), Asbat al-Ansar (Lebanon), al Ittihad Islamiya (Somalia), Jemaah Islamiya, and the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, among others.373 State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. Afghanistan under the Taliban was the primary state supporter of Al Qaeda that provided a safe-haven and allowed training camps to be established on its territory. Pakistan’s Interservice Intelligence Agency (ISI), through the support it gave to the Taliban, can be said to have provided indirect support for Al Qaeda activities; however, there is no evidence of direct support from the ISI to Al Qaeda.374 The Bush administration has also claimed that Iraq under Saddam Hussein had direct links to Al Qaeda, though their leverage and significance is subject to dispute. During its early stage, Al Qaeda was funded by bin Laden’s personal fortune, estimated by Swiss sources at between $50-300 million.375 Today, Al Qaeda maintains legitimate businesses, solicits donations from supporters, and receives funds from donations to Muslim charitable organizations.376 Some front businesses date back to bin Laden’s time in the Sudan and include: a construction company, elHijrah for Construction and Development Ltd., that built a highway linking Khartoum to Port Sudan,377 and the el-Shamal Islamic Bank in Khartoum.378 Also, Al Qaeda is believed to have used ostrich farms and shrimp boats in Kenya, tracts

372

Audrey Kurth Cronin, Al-Qaeda After the Iraq Conflict, CRS Report RL21529, updated May 23, 2003.

373

Ibid.

374

“Al-Qaeda,” International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism, [http://www.ict.org.il/].

375

CRS Rerport RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by Kenneth Katzman, updated February 13, 2003.

376

Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, pp. 118-119.

377

“Bin Laden’s Roots as an Engineer,” Engineering News-Record, Vol. 247, No. 14, Oct. 1, 2001.

378

Peter Shinkle, “U.S. Officials Hunt for the Location of Terrorists’ Assets,” KnightRidder, September 15, 2001. See also Borzou Daragahi, “Financing Terror,” Wall Street Journal, November 1, 2001.

CRS-87 of forest in Turkey, diamond trading in Africa and farms in Tajikistan to finance its operations.379 Originally Designated as an FTO. Oct. 8, 1999. Re-designated. Oct. 5, 2001. Issues of Concern for Congress. This group continues to be an extremely serious threat to the United States and its allies. Given the global reach of Al Qaeda and its network, Congressional oversight of U.S. counterterrorism policy will continue to be important, not only in the military and intelligence fields, but also in foreign policy, law enforcement, international cooperation, public diplomacy, foreign homeland security, and other areas. Other CRS Reports. CRS Report RL21529, Al Qaeda After the Iraq Conflict, by Audrey Kurth Cronin, May 23, 2003. CRS Report RL31831, Terrorist Motivations for Chemical and Biological Weapons Use: Placing the Threat in Context, by Audrey Kurth Cronin, March 28, 2003. CRS Report RL32058, Terrorists and Suicide Attacks, by Audrey Kurth Cronin, August 28, 2003. CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Current Issues, and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman, updated November 4, 2003. CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by Kenneth Katzman, updated February 13, 2003. . CRS Report RL21658, International Terrorism in South Asia, by K. Alan Kronstadt, updated November 3, 2003. CRS Report RL31587, Kashmiri Separatists: Origins, Competing Ideologies, and Prospects for Resolution of the Conflict, by Kaia Leather, updated September 30, 2002. CRS Report RL31658, Terrorist Financing: The U.S. and International Response, by Rensselaer Lee, December 6, 2002. CRS Report RL31672, Terrorism in Southeast Asia, by Mark Manyin, Richard Cronin, Larry Niksch, and Bruce Vaughn, updated November 18, 2003.

379

Donna Abu Nasr, “Bin Laden’s Riches Vast,” Associated Press, September 19, 2001. See also Borzou Daragahi, “Financing Terror,” Wall Street Journal, November 1, 2001.

CRS-88

Real IRA (RIRA) Goals and Objectives. The Real IRA is dedicated to expelling British troops from Northern Ireland, which is part of the United Kingdom, and unifying the island of Ireland. RIRA split off from the original Irish Republican Army in 1997 because the leadership of that group declared a cease fire and engaged in the peace process in Northern Ireland. RIRA opposes the peace process, and many believe its aim is to embarrass the original IRA and its political wing, Sinn Fein, by derailing negotiations and the peace process.380 Brief History. RIRA was formed in 1997-1998 by hardliners within the IRA who opposed the peace process in Northern Ireland that was being negotiated by more moderate members of the IRA and Sinn Fein. The group conducted a series of attacks in 1998. In August 1998, the group bombed the marketplace in Omagh, in Northern Ireland, killing 29, including 9 children, and injuring over 200.381 The bombing was so shocking and so widely condemned that the group declared a cease fire, and claimed that it had not deliberately set out to kill civilians. In 2000, however, the group resumed its attacks, focusing on government and military targets rather than civilians. In 2000 and 2001, the group conducted numerous attacks in Northern Ireland and London. In March 2001, the group’s leader, Michael (Mickey) McKevitt, was arrested. In October 2002, McKevitt and 40 other imprisoned members declared that further armed resistence was futile and that the RIRA was “at an end.” Other members vowed to continue the group’s efforts, however, and RIRA attacks continue sporadically.382 Favored Tactics. The Real IRA has conducted bombings, assassinations, and robberies. One tactic the group has employed is the bombing of town centers in an effort to disrupt business and maximize the shock value of its attacks. Since the public outrage caused by the Omagh bombing, however, the group has tended to focus its attacks on police and military targets in Northern Ireland as well as in England.383 Anti-American Activities. The Real IRA has not directly targeted or attacked U.S. interests.

380

Monica Anatalio, “In the Spotlight: Real IRA,” Center for Defense Information, updated August 19, 2002, [http://www.cdi.org], accessed on August 13, 2003.

381

From CAIN Web Services, [http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/omagh/dead.htm], accessed on December 1, 2003.

382

“Terrorism: Questions and Answers: IRA Splinter Groups,” The Council on Foreign Relations and the Markle Foundation, [http://www.terrorismanswers.org/ groups/realira.html], accessed on December 17, 2003; and U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 120.

383

Monica Anatalio, “In the Spotlight: Real IRA,” Center for Defense Information, updated August 19, 2002, [http://www.cdi.org], accessed on August 13, 2003.

CRS-89 Areas of Operation. RIRA operates in Northern Ireland, other parts of the United Kingdom, and the Republic of Ireland. Strength and Composition. The State Department estimates RIRA’s strength at 100 to 200 activists, plus possible support from members of the IRA who are dissatisfied with the cease fire.384 Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations. Irish and Middle Eastern terrorist groups have a long tradition of exchanging expertise in bomb and weapon-making, and the Real IRA is suspected to have continued this tradition.385 State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. RIRA is suspected of receiving support from sympathizers in the United States and of attempting to purchase weapons from U.S. dealers. RIRA is also believed to have bought sophisticated weapons in the Balkans386 and to have engaged in drug trafficking.387 Originally Designated as an FTO. May 16, 2001. Issues of Concern for Congress. Alleged support for the RIRA from sympathizers in the United States may be a concern for Congress. Also, according to the State Department, the RIRA has attempted to buy weapons from U.S. gun dealers.388 Other CRS Reports. CRS Report RS21333, Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, by Kristin Archick, updated December 3, 2003. CRS Report RL30368, Northern Ireland: Implementation of the Peace Agreement during the 106th Congress, by Karen Donfried, updated January 5, 2001.

384

Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 120.

385

Henry McDonald, “Manhunt for Real IRA’s Bomb Expert in West Bank,” The Observer, July 13, 2003.

386

Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 120.

387

“Terrorism: Questions and Answers: Narcoterrorism,” The Council on Foreign Relations and the Markle Foundation, [http://www.cfrterrorism.org/terrorism/narcoterrorism2.html], accessed on December 19, 2003. 388

Ibid.

CRS-90

Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) Name(s). Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) Goals and Objectives. FARC’s goal is to establish a Marxist state in Colombia. On its website, the groups says it aims “to overcome the great economic, social, cultural, ethnic and political inequalities” in Colombia.389 Brief History. FARC was established in 1964 after a particularly bloody period in Colombia’s history known as La Violencia (1948-1958).390 The violence ended in 1958 with a reconciliation between key parties in the government. Meanwhile, landless rebels banded together under FARC, which was formally established as the military wing of the Colombian Communist Party. FARC has emerged to be what the State Department describes as Colombia’s “oldest, largest, most-capable, and best-equipped Marxist insurgency.”391 It has targeted both Colombian and foreign interests (including U.S.), as well as military and civilian targets. FARC’s original leader, Manuel “Tirofijo” Marulando, still controls the group, and has in the past agreed to negotiate cease-fire terms with the Colombian government. In 1999, these negotiations led President Andres Pastrana to grant FARC autonomy over a Switzerland-size zone in southern Colombia. Experts say that FARC engaged in illicit behavior, including kidnapping, extortion, and drug operations, and that this behavior proliferated in the autonomous area. In 2001, the FARC killed 197 civilians.392 President Pastrana called off peace talks with FARC in February 2002, after the group failed to cease attacks. The president ordered Colombian armed forces to reclaim the FARC-controlled area. Peace talks between FARC and the government have not progressed since the last failed attempt in 2002. Favored Tactics. FARC practices a variety of tactics, including bombings, kidnappings, hijackings, and mortar attacks.393 Anti-American Activities. FARC has been known to target U.S. citizens. Experts say that since 1980, FARC (together with the National Liberation Army (ELN)) has kidnapped more than 100 Americans, 13 of whom have been killed. As recently as February 2003, FARC rebels claimed to have shot down a U.S. plane carrying four Pentagon contractors and a Colombian on an anti-drug operation. The rebels kidnapped three of the Americans and executed the fourth after their plane

389

From the official FARC website, [http://www.farcep.org], accessed July 16, 2003.

390

Victoria Garcia, “In the Spotlight: Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC),” Center for Defense Information, [http://www.cdi.org], accessed on May 7, 2002.

391

U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 120.

392

Victoria Garcia, “In the Spotlight: United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC),”Center for Defense Information, September 23, 2002, [http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/ terrorist.cfm], accessed October 15, 2003.

393

Ibid.

CRS-91 crash-landed near a site where FARC commanders were holding a meeting.394 FARC has said that it will release the remaining hostages under the condition that Colombia also release jailed FARC guerillas. On March 4, 1999, FARC assailants abducted and later killed three U.S. humanitarian workers. In a landmark decision, in May 2003, the Colombian government extradited to the United States one of six FARC rebels suspected of committing the murders.395 At this writing, Nelson Vargas Rueda is awaiting trial in the United States. Primary Area(s) of Operation. FARC operates mainly in Colombia. According to some analysts, FARC operates in about 40% of the country, and it has recently claimed responsibility for terrorist activity in the capital city of Bogota. There are also reports that FARC has encroached upon the borders of Venezuela, Panama, and Ecuador. It also reportedly maintains offices in Cuba, Mexico, and Europe.396 Strength and Composition. The State Department has said that the FARC consists of 9,000 to 12,000 armed combatants.397 Some observers put the number much higher at as many as 18,000 members.398 Connections with Other Groups. Some experts suspect that FARC may have a connection with the Irish Republican Army. This suspicion arose on August 11, 2001, when three of the IRA’s best explosives experts were caught traveling with false passports in Bogotá, Colombia. The three men claimed that they were visiting FARC’s autonomous region in Colombia to observe the peace process; but traces of explosives were found on their belongings and they were subsequently charged with training FARC operatives.399 FARC has subsequently displayed more agility with the use of bombs and its tactics and targeting have changed. For example, the FARC increased its use of car bombs and began attacking more economic and urban targets.400 The FARC also increased the number and lethality of its attacks in 2001 and 2002, killing more than 400 Colombian soldiers and police in an 18 month-span.

394

Andrew Selsky, “Worries growing for U.S. hostages — Colombian rebels vow to kill three Americans if rescuers get too close,” Associated Press, May 11, 2003. 395

Catherine Wilson, “First rebel extradited by Colombia appears in US court,” Associated Press, June 6, 2003.

396

U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p.120. See also the Council on Foreign Relations and the Markle Foundation, “Terrorism: Q & A,”, [http://www.terrorismanswers.org/ groups/farc], accessed on July 16, 2003.

397

Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p.120.

398

“The Military Balance,” Institute for International and Strategic Studies, vol. 103. [http://www3.oup.co.uk/milbal/current/]. Table 41. 399

“Links with Drug-Trafficking Colombian Guerillas Likely to have Been,” Irish Times, Aug. 15, 2001. 400

See Tim Johnson, “Hand of Irish or Basque Terrorists Seen in Deadly Colombian Bombing,” San Diego Union-Tribune, February 12, 2003.

CRS-92 State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. Some analysts claim that FARC may very well be “one of the richest, if not the richest, insurgent group in the world.”401 FARC uses a variety of mechanisms to raise funds, including kidnapping for ransom, extortion, and drug trafficking. Drug operations may have yielded from $100 million upwards to $1 billion.402 There is no public evidence to suggest that FARC receives funding, arms, or training from foreign governments.403 Originally Designated as an FTO. October 8, 1997. Re-designated. October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001. Issues of Concern for Congress. This group has kidnapped and killed numerous American citizens and poses a serious threat to U.S. interests in Colombia. It is also very actively involved in drug trafficking and extortion, earning large amounts of money. It is a threat to the stability of the Colombian government. Other CRS Reports. CRS Issue Brief IB88093, Drug Control: International Policy and Approaches, by Raphael Perl, October 16, 2003. CRS Report RS21242, Colombia: The Uribe Administration and Congressional Concerns, by Nina Serafino, updated June 14, 2002. CRS Report RS 21049, Latin America: Terrorism Issues, Mark P. Sullivan,, updated June 11, 2003. CRS Report RL32021, The Andean Regional Initiative (ARI): FY2003 Supplemental and FY2004 Assistance for Colombia and Neighbors, by K. Larry Storrs, updated November 14, 2003. CRS Report RL32052, Colombia and Aerial Eradication of Drug Crops: U.S. Policy and Issues, by Connie Veillette, updated August 28, 2003.

401

Victoria Garcia, “In the Spotlight: Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC),” Center for Defense Information, [http://www.cdi.org], accessed on May 7, 2002.

402 403

Ibid.

Council on Foreign Relations and the Markle Foundation, “Terrorism: Q & A,”, [http://www.terrorismanswers.org/ groups/farc], accessed on July 16, 2003.

CRS-93

Revolutionary Nuclei Name(s). Revolutionary Nuclei/Epanastatiki Pirines. Goals and Objectives. The Revolutionary Nuclei is a leftist terrorist group opposed to the current Greek government, the European Union, NATO and the United States.404 Brief History. Revolutionary Nuclei (RN) is a small, leftist, urban guerilla group based in Greece. The similarities in modus operandi between RN and another now apparently dormant Greece-based group, the Revolutionary People’s Struggle (ELA), have led analysts to believe that RN may have succeeded ELA. ELA emerged in the 1970s in opposition to the military junta governing Greece. The group espoused anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist ideologies, and often attacked government and foreign establishments.405 ELA has not claimed an attack since 1995. RN surfaced in 1996 when it began claiming bomb attacks on foreign banks and state buildings in language that seemed similar to that used by the ELA.406 For example, on May 11, 1997, RN attacked a Greek Coast Guard Office in Piraeus.407 In 1998, RN struck a series of Greek government targets, including Athens court buildings and the office of a former Public Order Minister.408 In the same year, RN bombed a Barclay’s Bank branch in Piraeus, without causing any casualties, but severely damaging office equipment.409 In its most infamous attack, RN bombed the Athens Intercontinental Hotel in March 1999 to protest NATO military action in Yugoslavia; a Greek woman was killed and a man was seriously wounded.410 In 2000, RN bombed the offices of several Greek companies and attempted to bomb the office of a former minister. The targets have generally been associated with the Greek government or the United States/European Union. RN has not claimed an attack since November 2000, so there is some question as to whether the group may have disbanded or become dormant.411

404

“Terrorism Database,” Periscope, USNI Database, [http://www.periscope1.com].

405

Theodora Ruhs, “In the Spotlight: The Revolutionary Nuclei,” Center for Defense Information, September 2, 2002, [http://www.cdi.org/terrorism], accessed on July 7, 2003.

406

Ibid.

407

“Obscure terrorist group claims twin bombings of Piraeus banks,” Athens News, December 30, 1998. 408

Ibid.

409

“Anarchist Groups Claims Responsibility for Explosions in Athens,” Xinhua New Agency, Dec. 29, 1998.

410

“Greek police defuse makeshift bomb,” Reuters News, October 14, 2000.

411

U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 121.

CRS-94 Favored Tactics. RN assailants primarily plant small, makeshift bombs and use timing devices to detonate the bombs or engage in arson attacks. RN tends to place warning calls to newspapers and police offices immediately prior to commencing an attack. The group generally strikes at obscure hours of the night. Anti-American Activities. In December 1996, RN claimed a bomb attack on a Citibank branch in Athens. No one was injured, but there was damage to the office building. RN similarly detonated a makeshift bomb at the entrance of a building that had recently housed American Express offices.412 In its most recent attacks against U.S. interests, RN again targeted Citigroup and also bombed the studio of a GreekAmerican sculptor in November 2000.413 Primary Area(s) of Operation. RN operates in Athens, Greece and the surrounding metropolitan area. Strength and Composition. RN is believed to be a small group, although the exact number of members is unknown. Some estimates put membership at under 100.414 Members tend to espouse leftist ideologies and are believed to have antiestablishment and anti-U.S./NATO/EU stances.415 Connections with Other Groups. As stated above, because the former ELA and RN apparently have shared a common political agenda, targeted similar interests, and executed similar attacks, analysts believe that RN is a successor to the group. Former members of ELA may now be members of RN.416 This assertion has not been publicly confirmed, however. In addition, RN reportedly jointly launched an attack on Athens court buildings on July 13, 1998 with Liberation Struggle, an unknown group.417 State Supporters, Other Sources of Funding and Constituencies. RN’s funding sources are unknown, but the State Department has said that the group is likely “self-sustaining.”418 Originally Designated as an FTO. October 8, 1997. Re-designated. October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001. 412

“Xinhua World News Summary at 1500 GMT,” Xinhua News Agency, December 29, 1998.

413

Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 121.

414

“The Military Balance,” Institute for International and Strategic Studies, Vol. 103. [http://www3.oup.co.uk/milbal/current/]. Table 41.

415

Ibid.

416

Theodora Ruhs, “In the Spotlight: The Revolutionary Nuclei,” Center for Defense Information, September 2, 2002.

417

“Obscure terrorist group claims twin bombings of Piraeus banks,” Athens News, December 30, 1998. 418

Patterns of Global Terrorism,2002, p. 121.

CRS-95 Issues of Concern for Congress. Recently the Greek government has aggressively pursued measures against Greek terrorist organizations, especially 17 November (see below). As the Summer 2004 Olympics in Athens approach, the question of whether RN/ELA will target Western interests and Western citizens may be of concern. Other CRS Reports. CRS Report RL31612, European Counter Terrorist Efforts since September 11: Political Will and Diverse Responses, by Paul Gallis, updated October 17, 2002.

CRS-96

Revolutionary Organization 17 November (17 November, N17) Goals and Objectives. 17 November is a tiny anti-Western, leftist terrorist organization that opposes the Greek establishment, Greek ties to the United States and the EU, and the Turkish presence in Cyprus. The group seeks the removal of U.S. military bases from Greece. It apparently derives its anti-American stance from U.S. backing of the Greek military junta that ruled the country from 1967 to 1974.419 Brief History. 17 November formed in 1975 and conducted more than 100 high profile attacks in Greece since then, killing a total of 23 people. The group attacked the Greek government as well as foreign government and private targets. In the summer of 2002, with the help of the FBI and Scotland Yard, Greek police arrested 14 members, including several key leaders. The arrests were very important, representing the first significant headway by the government against the group in over 26 years. As a result, Greek authorities have declared victory over 17 November; but the group has since issued a statement declaring that it is “still alive.” The Greek government is especially concerned about 17 November as the country prepares for the 2004 Summer Olympics in Athens. The group had contributed to an impression among foreigners that Greece is unsafe, and the Greek government hopes that the 2002 arrests and 2003 convictions demonstrate a dramatic reduction in the threat and a serious national commitment to security.420 Favored Tactics. 17 November tends to favor symbolic attacks rather than attacks designed to coerce or cripple the Greek government or foreign interests.421 Its attacks have involved assassinations and bombings. Anti-American Activities. Four of the 23 killed in 17 November attacks have been U.S. citizens. In 1975, the group assassinated Richard Welch, CIA station chief in Athens.422 The group’s statements attack the United States and ties between Greece and the United States. Areas of Operation. 17 November operates in Greece, primarily in Athens. Strength and Composition. The group’s strength is unknown, according to the State Department, but is presumed to be small.423 Other sources estimate its strength at 20 or fewer members, many related to one another, and no more than 100

419

Anthee Carassava, “Tight Security at N17 Terror Trial,” CNN.com/World, March 3, 2003

420

Alan Abrahamson, “Athens Makes Security ‘Priority No. 1,’” Los Angeles Times, August 13, 2003.

421

Shawn Choy, “In the Spotlight: Revolutionary Organization 17 November,” Center for Defense Information, updated August 5, 2002, [http://www.cdi.org], accessed on August 13, 2003. 422

“Assassination of CIA Agent Richard Welch Scores Agency’s ‘Carelessness’” The New York Times, Dec. 31, 1975.

423

U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 122.

CRS-97 supporters.424 A number of arrests in 2002 may have crippled the group and substantially reduced its numbers. Arrested members of the group have been strikingly ordinary, including school teachers, shop keepers, and a telephone operator, all of whom led ostensibly mundane lives in mainstream society.425 Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations. 17 November has no known ties to other terrorist group.426 State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. The group is believed to fund itself through bank robberies.427 Originally Designated as an FTO. October 8, 1997. Re-designated. October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001. Issues of Concern for Congress. While the Greek government has apparently made great strides in arresting members of this group and potentially crippling it, as the Summer 2004 Olympics in Athens approach, the question of its operating capability will loom large. Other CRS Reports. CRS Report RL31612, European Counter Terrorist Efforts since September 11: Political Will and Diverse, by Paul Gallis, updated October 17, 2002.

424

Shawn Choy, “In the Spotlight: Revolutionary Organization 17 November,” Center for Defense Information, updated August 5, 2002, [http://www.cdi.org], accessed on August 13, 2003.

425

Ibid.

426

U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 122.

427

Ibid.

CRS-98

Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front (RPLP/F) Names. DHKP/C, Devrimci Sol, Dev Sol, and Revolutionary Way. Goals and Objectives. The RPLP/F is an anti-Western Marxist group determined to rid Turkey of Western influence in order to turn it into a socialist state. The group regards the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq as imperialistic and is opposed to Turkey’s membership in NATO.428 Brief History. Founded in 1978 as an offshoot of the Turkish People’s Liberation Party, the RPLP/F (originally Devrimci Sol or Dev Sol) began as a national political movement and turned into a terrorist organization. The “Party” refers to the group’s political wing, while the “Front” refers to its military operations. The RPLP/F began its terrorist career by assassinating current and retired prominent Turkish officials, including the 1980 assassination of former premier Nihat Emir.429 From 1981-1983, years of a military junta, the Turkish government managed to curtail the group’s activities. However, by the late 1980’s, the RPLP/F had recovered enough to carry out three simultaneous bombings against American economic interests (see below) and assassinate a former chief of the Turkish National Intelligence Agency in Istanbul.430 Throughout the 1990’s, the RPLP/F intensified its anti-Western activity but also developed internal factions.431 Group members claimed the murder of a British businessman in Ankara in 1991, and in 2001 detonated a pipe bomb in a crowd of New Year’s Eve celebrants, injuring ten.432 Favored Tactics. The RPLP/F has engaged in targeted assassinations, rocket attacks, and bombings. Anti-American Activity. The RPLP/F has been anti-American since its founding and has attacked American officials and civilians. For example, in February 1990, RPLP/F assassinated two Defense Department Contractors to protest the Gulf War. A month later the group shot and injured a U.S. Air Force officer near Izmir. In 1992, RPLP/F members fired a rocket at the U.S. Consulate in Ankara which produced no casualties.433

428

“Terror Organizations in Turkey: Islamic Terror Organizations/ Leftist Terror Organizations - DHKP/C, “ [http://www.teror.gen.tr/english/organisations/dhkpc.html] accessed October 16, 2003.

429

“Police authorities say 8 leftists belonging to Marxist group Dev Sol have been Arrested,” The New York Times, Oct. 4, 1980.

430

“Police Boost Protection after Ex-Intelligence Agent Killed,” Reuters, Sept. 28, 1990.

431

Noriyuki Katagiri, “In the Spotlight: Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front,” Center for Defense Information, Nov. 4, 2002, [http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/terrorist.cfm] accessed on October 15, 2003.

432 433

“Terrorism Database,” Periscope, USNI Database, [http://www.periscope1.com]. Noriyuki Katagiri, “In the Spotlight: Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front,” (continued...)

CRS-99 Primary Areas of Operation. The RPLP/F is located in Turkey with headquarters in Germany. Within Turkey, the group is based around the Aegean region. Attempts to move the group toward the Mediterranean were limited by the government.434 Strength and Composition. Unknown. Connections with Other Groups. The Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK or KADEK) provided a safe haven for the RPLP/F in Southeast Anatolia in the Black Sea region. The two groups signed a protocol in 1996 that would deepen cooperation between the two groups435 However, cooperation has since broken down. (See PKK entry, above.) State Supporters, Other Sources of Funding, and Constituencies. The RPLP/F has no known state supporters. It reportedly maintains fund raising operations in Western Europe.436 Originally Designated as an FTO. October 8, 1997. Re-designated. October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001. Issues of Concern for Congress. This group has violently attacked Americans and American interests. It is opposed to the U.S. presence in Iraq and Afghanistan. It has assassinated Turkish, American, and British officials, though not since the early 1990s. Other CRS Reports. CRS Report RL32058, “Terrorists and Suicide Attacks,” by Audrey Kurth Cronin, updated August 28, 2003. CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by Kenneth Katzman, updated February 13, 2003. CRS Report RL39714, Iraq: Turkey, the Deployment of U.S. Forces, and Related Issues, by Carol Migdalovitz, updated May 2, 2003. CRS Report RL32071, Turkey: Update on Selected Issues, by Carol Migdalovitz, updated September 8, 2003. 433

(...continued) Center for Defense Information, Nov. 4, 2002, [http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/terrorist.cfm]. Accessed October 15, 2003.

434

“Terror Organizations in Turkey: Islamic Terror Organizations/ Leftist Terror Organizations - DHKP/C.” [http://www.teror.gen.tr/english/organisations/dhkpc.html] accessed on October 16, 2003.

435 436

Ibid. “Terrorism Database,” Periscope, USNI Database, [http://www.periscope1.com].

CRS-100

Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC) Goals and Objectives. GSPC is a well-organized radical Islamic group in Algeria that aims to establish an Islamic state based on Islamic law. Brief History. GSPC formed when an estimated 600 militants split off from the Armed Islamic Group (GIA, see entry above) in 1996 during the bloody Algerian civil war. The group renounced GIA’s massacres of civilians in the mid-1990s and promised a better organized campaign against the government and the military. By 1998, GSPC had apparently eclipsed GIA in power and popularity. By 2000, the group appeared to have taken over GIA’s networks in Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa.437 European officials have linked GSPC to numerous plots in Europe. Within Algeria, the group has reportedly been weakened by a government crackdown; however, it continues to attack soldiers and officials, with the frequency and violence of the attacks increasing noticeably in the summer of 2003. According to the U.S. State Department, GSPC is the most effective armed group remaining in Algeria. Favored Tactics. The tactics of the GSPC are quite varied. Within Algeria, GSPC stages well-planned and executed ambushes of soldiers and officials. Beginning February 22, 2003, the group kidnapped several groups of European tourists in the Sahara desert (31 people in all; 30 were later freed, one perished), apparently seeking weapons and money.438 It has set up roadblocks in remote regions, charging fees to passers-by. In Europe, the group is suspected of involvement in several major bombing plots. Anti-American Activities. Shortly after 9/11, a GSPC leader threatened to retaliate should the United States interfere in Algeria or disrupt its overseas networks.439 The group was suspected of plotting to blow up U.S. embassies in Paris and Rome in early 2002. In May 2003, African authorities foiled a plot to bomb the U.S. embassy in Mali. Documents found in Mali connected the plot to GSPC.440 Areas of Operation. The group’s primary focus and area of operation is Algeria. Its main bases in Algeria have been in the mountainous regions east of Algiers. GSPC is also believed to maintain a network throughout Western Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa. Individuals and cells connected to GSPC have been arrested across Western Europe.

437

Anthony Keats, “In the Spotlight: The Salafist Group for Call and Combat,” Center For Defense Information, January 14, 2003, [http://www.cdi.org] accessed on July 8, 2003.

438

“Commando Raid Frees Algeria Hostages,” The Guardian, May 14, 2003, [http://www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,3604,955738,00.html], accessed on December 23, 2003.

439

Jonathan Schanzer, “Algeria’s GSPC and America’s War on Terror,” The Washington Institute, October 15, 2002, [http://www.washingtoninstitute.org], accessed on July 8, 2003.

440

Elsie Theodore, “Truck Bomb Plot Against U.S. Embassy in Mali Averted,” Dow Jones International News, June 5, 2003.

CRS-101 Strength and Composition. GSPC is comprised mainly of Algerian Islamic fundamentalists. Algerian authorities estimate that it has between 100 and 300 militants.441 According to the Algerian government, military raids and a recent amnesty period have reduced the group’s numbers in Algeria.442 European authorities have arrested more than 100 people with suspected GSPC ties, but the effect of these arrests on the group’s ability to operate is unknown. Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations. GSPC is believed to have extensive operational ties to Al Qaeda. According to one account, half of those arrested in Europe suspected of ties to Al Qaeda have been Algerians also associated with GSPC. In late 2002, Algerian authorities announced the arrest of a Yemeni Al Qaeda official who had been meeting with GSPC members in Algeria.443 State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. GSPC’s funding appears to come mainly from Algerian expatriates in Western Europe, particularly in France, and elsewhere. In Algeria, the group has also used kidnapping and smuggling to raise funds. The Algerian Government has accused Iran and Sudan of supporting Algerian extremists in years past.444 The GSPC was said to have been paid millions of dollars in ransom before most of the kidnapped European tourists were freed. (One person reportedly died of exposure.) Some media reports suggest Germany paid the ransom; others say Libya.445 These reports have not been confirmed. Still other sources claim that the hostages were not ransomed but freed in a commando raid.446 Originally Designated as an FTO. March 27, 2002. Issues of Concern for Congress. The GSPC’s extensive operational ties to Al Qaeda make this group of particular concern to the United States. Its apparently extensive networks in networks in Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa may provide an avenue for further attacks carried out on behalf of, or with links to, Al Qaeda.

441

Jonathan Schanzer, “Algeria’s GSPC and America’s War on Terror,” The Washington Institute, October 15, 2002, [http://www.washingtoninstitute.org], accessed on July 8, 2003.

442

Hassane Meftani, “Group Linked to Al-Qaeda Kidnapping,”Associated Press Newswires, May 14, 2003.

at

Center of Algerian

443

BBC News, “Profile: Algeria’s Salafist Group,” updated May 14, 2003.

444

U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 123,

445

BBC News, “Sahara hostage tells of ordeal,” May 15, 2003; accessed at [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3030683.stm] on December 23, 2003; and Tony Patterson, “Libya claims lead role in negotiations that freed Sahara hostages,” The Independent, August 20, 2003, p. 9.

446

BBC News, “Algeria Denies Hostages Freed,” May 19, 2003; accessed at [http://news.bbs.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3040255.stm] on December 23, 2003. See CRS Report RS21532, Algeria: Current Issues, by Carol Migdalovitz, updated November 20, 2003, p. 3.

CRS-102 Other CRS Reports. CRS Report RS21529, Al Qaeda after the Iraq Conflict, by Audrey Kurth Cronin, updated May 23, 2003. CRS Report RL31247, Africa and the War on Terrorism, by Ted Dagne, updated January 17, 2002. CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by Kenneth Katzman, updated February 13, 2003. CRS Report RS21532, Algeria: Current Issues, by Carol Migdalovitz, updated May 30, 2003.

CRS-103

Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path, SL) Name(s). Sendero Luminoso, Shining Path, SL. Goals and Objectives. Shining Path is a leftist organization in Peru. Its original goal was to overthrow the government and social structure of Peru and neighboring countries and replace them with a Maoist socialist system controlled by the indigenous peoples of the region. The group also opposes any foreign influence in Peru. Brief History. SL was formed in the late 1960s by former university professor Abimael Guzman as a splinter group from the Communist Party of Peru. Although the group worked to bring about a Maoist revolution in Peru, its campaign did not turn into an armed conflict until 1980 when the group began to murder local officials in rural areas and assume their functions. During the 1980s and early 1990s, the group conducted numerous attacks in Peru, taking rural regions under its command. It was known for excessive brutality in bringing under its power the peasants in these regions. Indeed, SL has been responsible for one of the most violent terrorist insurgencies in the Western Hemisphere; at least 30,000 people have died since the group took up arms.447 Areas that came under SL control included prime cocagrowing regions, and the group acquired much of its funding by protecting the coca farmers from government eradication programs.448 The 1992 capture of the charismatic Guzman and a subsequent government crackdown sharply reduced the group’s capabilities. While in prison, Guzman urged followers to end their campaign against the government. One faction heeded the call for cease fire, while another did not. In March 2002, just before President Bush visited Peru, a car bomb exploded near the U.S. Embassy, killing nine people and wounding thirty. Some observers believe that the group has recently begun to reconstitute itself after years of decline.449 In August of 2003, Peru’s Truth and Reconciliation Committee released its report to the public stating that upwards of 69,000 people died in the struggle between the Shining Path and government security forces.450 The report highlights the extreme brutality of the war and places blame on all sides. Favored Tactics. Shining Path has favored car bombings and assassinations, as well as massacres using machetes.

447

U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 123.

448

See Alberto Bolivar, “Peru,” Combatting Terrorism: Strategies of Ten Countries,” edited by Yonah Alexander (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 2002), pp. 84115.

449

Council on Foreign Relations/Markle Foundation, Terrorism Questions and Answers, accessed at [http://www.cfrterrorism.org/groups/shiningpath.html] on December 17, 2003.

450

“Shining Path Revisited,” The Economist, Sept. 6, 2003.

CRS-104 Anti-American Activities. The group opposes any foreign influence in Peru, including that of the United States. In 1990, it attempted to bomb the U.S. Embassy in Lima using a car bomb. SL is also believed to be responsible for a 2002 car bomb attack near the U.S. Embassy three days before a visit to Lima by President George W. Bush.451 Areas of Operation. The group operates almost exclusively in Peru, and mainly in rural areas. Strength and Composition. The State Department estimates the group’s current strength at 400 to 500 members.452 Its strength has been reduced sharply by arrests and defections; at its highpoint in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the group fielded as many as 10,000 militants, according to some accounts. The U.S. State Department’s Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, states that membership has begun to grow recently, perhaps because SL has become more heavily involved in narcotrafficking.453 Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations. Shining Path is not known to have ties with other terrorist organizations. State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. SL is not funded or supported by any foreign state. It receives much of its financing from coca farmers, who pay the group to protect them from government eradication programs. The groups also finances itself through robberies and extortion.454 Originally Designated as an FTO. October 8, 1997. Re-designated. October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001. Issues of Concern for Congress. The question of whether the Shining Path could be reconstituting itself, even in a weaker form, has potential implications for the security of Western citizens and interests, as well as the future stability of the Peruvian government. Shining Path’s involvement in narco-trafficking is also a worrisome element. Other CRS Reports. CRS Report RL32021, The Andean Regional Initiative (ARI): FY2003 Supplemental and FY2004 Assistance for Colombia and Neighbors, by K. Larry Storrs, updated November 14, 2003.

451

“Peru Arrests Shining Path Car Bomb Suspects,” Reuters, Jun. 12, 2002.

452

U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 124.

453

Ibid.

454

Shawn Choy, “CDI Fact Sheet: Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path, or SL),” Center for Defense Information, updated July 1, 2002. Accessed at [http://www.cdi.org], July 28, 2003.

CRS-105 CRS Report RS21049, Latin America: Terrorism Issues, by Mark Sullivan, updated June 11, 2003. CRS Report RL30918, Peru: Recovery From Crisis, Maureen Taft-Morales, updated April 25, 2002.

CRS-106

United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) Name(s). Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, the “Paramilitaries.” Goals and Objectives. Founded in 1997, the AUC is an umbrella organization for right-wing paramilitary groups which first began forming in the 1980s in order to protect the economic interests of wealthy land owners and combat Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and National Liberation Army (ELN) insurgents locally.455 Brief History. The AUC was founded by brothers Fidel and Carlos Castano in 1997. Groups subsumed by the AUC are believed to include: the Peasant SelfDefense Group of Cordoba and Uraba (ACCU), the Eastern Plains Self-Defense Group, the Cesar Self-Defense Group, the Middle Magdalena Self-Defense Group, Santander and Southern Cesar Self-Defense Group, Casanare Self-Defense Group, the Cundinamarca Self-Defense Group, the Pacific Bloc (including the “Frente Calima” in and around Cali), the Southern Bloc, and the”Frente Capital” forming in Bogota.456 The AUC targets real and perceived supporters of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the National Liberation Army (ELN), as well as political activists, police officials and judges. The group is known for its brutality and has killed more civilians than the leftist insurgencies have killed: in 2001, the AUC killed at least 1,015 civilians, compared to the 197 civilians killed by the FARC. The AUC also committed over 100 massacres in 2001, a tactic it used to displace large portions of the peasant population in order maintain firmer control over the major coca-growing lands. The U.S. State Department noted that the AUC was responsible for about 43 percent of Colombia’s internally displaced people in 2001.457 Co-founder Carlos Castano claims that drug- related activity supplies 70 percent of AUC’s funding, while the rest is donated by sponsors.458 In 2001, Castano stepped down as head of military operations to devote more time to the political activities of the AUC. In 2002, the AUC signed a cease fire and is engaged in peace talks with the Colombian government. In July 2003, citing government progress in combating the ELN and FARC, the AUC agreed to

455

U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, p. 124

456

“United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia.” International Policy Institute for CounterTerrorism. [http://www.ict.org.il/].

457

Victoria Garcia, “In the Spotlight: United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC),”Center for Defense Information, September 23, 2002, [http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/ terrorist.cfm], accessed October 15, 2003.

458

“Colombian Warlord Admits Business Ties,” Reuters, Sept. 6, 2000.

CRS-107 demobilize.459 In November 2003, a paramilitary group of some 850 members based near Medellin formally demobilized.460 Favored Tactics. The AUC has carried out indiscriminate bombing campaigns, assassinations, massacres of entire villages, and guerilla warfare.461 Anti-American Activities. The AUC specifically avoids American personnel or interests. However, human rights abuses and known ties to narcotics trafficking may have earned the AUC a place on the FTO list. Primary Areas of Operation. AUC forces operate in the northwest Colombian departments of Antioquia, Cordoba, Sucre, and Bolivar.462 Their presence has also been noted in the north and southwest, and fighting with FARC in 2000 in Putuyamo show AUC’s willingness to battle FARC throughout the country. Strength and Composition. The AUC membership has tripled in the last three years, with a reported strength of anywhere from 6,000 to 15,000 fighters.463 Connections with Other Groups. The AUC has no known connections with other terrorist groups. However, the group is intricately tied with Colombia drug producers. State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. There is no known direct relationship between the AUC and a state sponsor. However, there have been accusations that paramilitary organizations receive support from Colombia’s armed forces. Concerned that close collaboration between paramilitary and military forces was putting U.S. military aid to Colombia in the hands of the AUC, the U.S. government ordered the Armed Forces of Colombia to sever all ties with the AUC in order to qualify for U.S. aid.464 Originally Designated as an FTO. September 10, 2001. Issues of Concern for Congress. The relationship between the Colombian government and paramilitary groups has been a serious concern of Congress in the past because of the possibility that U.S. dollars might end up supporting the AUC. The Colombian government’s severing of those ties would remove this risk; however, congressional oversight will continue to be important.

459

“Colombian Paramilitaries to Demobilize-Keep Arms.” Agence France Presse. July 16, 2003.

460

“Colombian Paramilitaries to Begin Disarming November 25,” Agence France Presse, November 14, 2003.

461 462

U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 124. “Terrorism Database,” Periscope, USNI Database, www.periscope1.com.

463

Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 124.

464

“U.S. Clears $42 million for Colombian Military,” Reuters, September. 9, 2002.

CRS-108 Other CRS Products. CRS Issue Brief IB88093, Drug Control: International Policy and Approaches, by Raphael Perl, October 16, 2003. CRS Report RS21242, Colombia: The Uribe Administration and Congressional Concerns, Nina Serafino, updated June 14, 2002. CRS Report RS21049, Latin America: Terrorism Issues, by Mark P. Sullivan, updated June 11, 2003.

Date

Incident

Type

??/??/68 08/28/68 08/29/69 12/12/69 Early 70 05/20/70 09/16/70

El Al American Amb., Guatamala TWA 840, Rome to Tel Aviv Piazza della Fontana,Milan Bus with El Al passengers Childrens School Bus Five Airliners El Al (Amsterdam-N.Y.) TWA (Frankfurt-N.Y.) Air India (London-India) Pan Am (Amsterdam-N.Y.) Belgian Sabena,Vienna-Isr. Lod Airport Massacre El Al, Rome, Baggage Com. Munich Massacre,Olympics London, Israeli Counsel Lufthansa 615 Victor Samuelson P.M. Carreo Blanco, Spain Aeroflot Am. Consul Terry Leonhardy Japan Airlines TWA Athens (on ground) Lufthansa (same grp above) Pan Am Customs and plane Air Vietnam Ma'alot, Israel, a home Ma'alot, Israel, School Locker Room, LAX French Embassy, Hague TWA Air Vietnam TWA (Israel-AThens) Scheveningen Prison, Neth. Paris Paris German Embassy, Stockholm Philippines Airlines Maley Hungarian Airlines Beirut Airport Dublin, Terminal Indonesian Consul, Amster. OPEC Murders, Vienna New York Terminal Locker Middle East Airlines Phillippines Airlines Tel Aviv Customs Area Middle East Airline Air France Airbus, Entebbe Eastern Airlines Istanbul Baghdad, Suitcase Cubana Airlines Hanns-Martin Schleyer Canary Islands, Wait. Rm. Washington, D.C., Lock.Rm Instanbul Air Djibouti Malaysian Airlines Aldo Moro Paris Philippines Airlines El Al crew bus London Air Rhodesia U.K., M.P. Airey Neave COM Europe Alexandar Haig Air Rhodesia Frankfurt, Cargo Area Brussels Indian Airlines Madrid, Baggage Area American Embassy, Iran American Airlines Paris, Locker United Airlines Munich Oktoberfest Bar in Zarauz,Spain Rome Banco Central, Barcelona New York, Terminal Pope John Paul Anwar Sadat, Pres Egypt

Hijack (PLO) Drive by Assassination Hijack Attack Grenade Attack Bazooka Attack Hijack/Bomb/Grenade Sky Marshalls killed 1 hijacker

05/08/72 05/30/72 08/??/72 09/05/72 09/09/72 10/29/72 ??/??/73 ??/??/73 04/24/73 05/04/73 07/20/73 08/05/73 12/12/73 12/17/73 02/20/74 05/14/74 05/??/74 08/06/74 09/??/74 09/08/74 09/15/74 10/08/74 10/31/74 01/13/75 01/19/75 04/25/75 06/03/75 09/30/75 10/04/75 11/29/75 12/??/75 12/??/75 12/29/75 01/01/76 05/21/76 05/25/76 06/27/76 06/27/76 07/02/76 08/11/76 12/14/76 10/06/76 ??/??/77 03/26/77 04/23/77 05/29/77 10/16/77 12/04/77 03/16/78 05/20/78 08/18/78 08/28/78 09/03/78 ??/??/79 ??/??/79 02/12/79 04/03/79 04/16/79 04/26/79 07/29/79 11/04/79 11/15/79 06/12/80 09/09/80 10/??/80 12/??/80 02/24/81 05/??/81 05/16/81 Summer 81 10/06/81

Dead Inj 0 1 0 14 1 12 ?

0 0 ? 80 11 19 ?

Hijack/Guns 1 4 Grenade/Machine Guns 26 76 Bomb 0 0 Kidnap/Grenades/Guns 11 3 Letter Bomb 1 0 Hijack 0 0 Kidnap/Ransom $14.2m 0 0 Assassination 1 0 Hijack/Explosion 2 Kidnap 0 0 Hijack/ Explosion 1 1 Guns 5 55 Hijack 0 0 Ground Attack 30 28 Hijack/Explosion 3 6 Takeover 3 0 Takeover 22 60 Explosion 3 35 Takeover 0 0 Explosion 88 Explosion 70 Explosion in air 80 Hostages 0 0 Bazooka Attack 0 3 Pistol/Grenade Attack 0 21 Takeover 2 ? Explosion 1 45 Explosion 64 Machine Gun Attack 3 14 Expolsions 1 5 Takeover 3 0 Takeover, pistols 3 ? Explosions 11 54 Explosion 82 Hijack/Explosion 13 14 Suitcase Explosion 2 10 Rocket (GRD) 1 2 Hijack 4 ? Explosion 1 Machine Gun/Grenade 4 17 Explosion 3 100 Explosion 73 Kidnap/Murder 1 Explosion 0 8 Explosion 1 Baggage Area Explosion 5 24 Ground Attack 2 2 Hijacking/Crash 93 Kidnap/Murder 2 0 Machine Gun Attack 2 5 Explosion 1 3 Guns 1 1 Ground/Missile Attack 48 Car bomb 1 Assassination Attempt 0 0 Ground/Missile Attack 59 Explosion 0 10 Machine Gun/Grenade 0 17 Explosion 0 8 Explosion 1 9 Takeover/Hostages 0 0 Explosion 0 0 Explosion 0 8 Explosion 0 2 Bomb Attacks ? ? Attack 4 0 Machine Gun Attack 0 5 Hostages (200) 0 1 Explosion 1 Assassination Attempt 0 1 Shooting 1+ ?

10/13/81 11/12/81 12/??/81 12/12/81 ??/??/82 01/16/82 02/08/82 07/17/82 07/31/82 08/07/82 08/11/82 09/14/82 04/18/83 ??/??/83 09/30/83 10/23/83 07/15/83 09/11/83 09/23/83 ??/??/84 01/18/84 03/10/84 04/08/84 04/24/84 05/??/84 08/02/84 08/31/84 12/??/84 12/??/84

??/??/85 01/??/85 02/??/85 03/??/85 04/??/85 05/28/85 06/14/85 08/08/85 09/04/85 10/07/85 11/85 12/27/85 12/27/85 11/23/85 02/03/86 02/03/86 02/04/86 02/05/86 02/06/86 02/06/86 03/20/86 04/02/86 04/05/86 1989? 02/28/93 04/19/95 07/27/95 11/13/95

Air Malta Explosion Christian Chapmen Assassination Attempt Brig. Gen. James Dozier,IT Kidnap and Release Aeronica Explosion Paris, 2 Am. Women, Rest. Machine Gun attack Lt. Col. Robert Fay Assassination Miraflores, Colombia Under Aircraft Expl. Brazzaville Term., Congo Explosion Munich Waiting Room Explosion Ankara Machine Gun Attack Pan Am Explosion Bashir Gemayel, Pres Elect Assassination, Bomb of Lebannon US Embassy in Beirut Explosion Athens, Am. Naval Officer Assassination Beirut, Am. Embassy Truck Bomb Beirut, Marine Barracks Truck Bomb Paris, Suitcase Explosion Korean Airlines Shot Down Gulf Air Explosion Rome, Leamon Hunt, UN D.G. Assassination Air France Explosion Union Des Transport (UTA) Explosion Las Vegas Shooting London, Baggage Area Explosion CIA Sta. Ch. Bill Buckley Kidnapped Madras, Suitcase Explosion Kabol, Departure Lounge Explosion NATO Trng School, W. Germ. Bomb Attempt Six attacks Am. in Germ. Bombings U.S. Army Motor Pool U.S. Military Church Lindsay A.S., Weisbaden USAF Com Stn.,Weisbaden USAF Int. Off.,Dusseldorf Lebanon, 4 Soviets Kidnap/murder US Consul, Frankfurt Attack Bobby's Bar,Greece,US sold Bomb Am. Off. Club, Stuttgart Bomb (dud) Brussels, NATO office Bomb David Jacobsen, Dir Hosp. Kidnapped, Hizbollah TWA 847, 17 day TV vigil Hijack/Shooting Wing HQ, Rein-Main AB, Ger Car bomb Pan Am Aircraft on Ground Shooting, 5 attackers Achille Lauro Ship Hijack PX, Frankfurt, Germany Car Bomb Rome Airport Bomb Vienna Airport Bomb EgyptAir Hijack Paris, Champs-Elysees Bomb Paris, Eiffel Tower Bomb (diffussed) Paris, bookstore Bomb Paris, Forum des Halles Bomb Paris, Bomb Scares (80) Adm. Christobal Colon, Spn Assassination/MG/Gren. Paris, Champs-Elysee Bomb TWA 840 in air Airline Bomb West Berlin Disco Bomb Pan Am, Lockerbie, Scot. Airline Bomb World Trade Center, N.Y. Car Bomb Oklahoma Fed Building Car Bomb Paris France Bomb OPM-SNG, Riyadh SauArabia Car Bomb

2 0 0 2 2 1 1 3 0 9 1 1+

8 0 0 8 0 0 4 16 7 71 20 ?

63 1 17 241 7 269 112 1 0 0 1 0

? 0 ? ? 56

40 27 0 ?

19 200 0 ?

0 0 24 2 25

1 ? 0 0 ? 0 1 2 31 1 ? ? ? ? 0 0 ? ?

0 ? 70 0 ? 0 2 25 *1 ? 3 ? *1 ? ? ? 8 0 ? ?

2 2 4 2 140 7 >100 7? 6

0 28 ? 200 0 15 >100 ? 60+ *1

MILNET: Chronology of Worldwide Terrorism

MILNET: Chronology of Worldwide Terrorism Terrorist Group Profiles Major Terrorism Against U.S. Targets since 1997

Below we list a history of acts of terrorism, in the period 1968 through 1986. . A few of the major events since 1986 are included as well, but data is not complete from 1986 onward, as the volume of events has outpaced the author's ability to report on them. To make this point clear we also have compiled brief snapshots of terrorism since 1986 in the Terrfile . For more complete detail, the U.S. has been gathering and publishing details of attacks against U.S. citizens and property since 1995 and this data is published annually in the report, Patterns of Global Terrorism. Mirrored copies are available on MILNET. Note that the majority of terrorism reported before 1980 occurred in or around Isarael and the Middle East. This is due to the fact that world terrorism spread from the Middle East as Arab and Jew continued their ancestorial struggles. The State of Israel considered Arab attacks on their kinsmen as an act of War, and not to be outdone, began their own retalitory acts of terror. Their own band of terrorist/assassins ran free until the crew accidentally killed some innocents, at which time the Israeli government reigned them in (see "The Hit Team #25 in the Milnet Bibliography. Since then, Israeli retaliation has been in a more miltary fashion, with excursions into neighboring countries, seizing land to create buffer zones around them. Today, the Gaza Strip and West Bank, a contentious holding of the Israelis has been the scenes of most of the Middle East violence over the last several decades. However you will also note from the data below that Central Europe has also had their share of terrorism from Middle Eastern concerns. The only country which has not faced an onslaught of Middle Eastern terrorism until rather recently has been the United States. The foirst World Trade Center explosions were attributed to a radical Jordanian Muslem group. And of course, the attacks on 9/11 marked the largest U.S. terrorist attack in our history and the most significant attack on the U.S. homeland since the War of 1812. You will note a few instances where an act of violence is on the very gray edge of the line separating political violence versus terrorism... the difference being nearly indistinguishable at times. For instance, what were the motives of the assassin who took a shot at the Pope? Was it anti-catholicism, anti-Rome/anti-Italy, or just a nut case trying to get his moment of dubious "fame"?

Date

Incident

Type

??/??/68 08/28/68 08/29/69 12/12/69

El Al American Amb., Guatamala TWA 840, Rome to Tel Aviv Piazza della Fontana,Milan

Hijack (PLO) Drive by Assassination Hijack Attack

http://www.milnet.com/terrchrn.htm[14-Jun-09 5:58:11 PM]

Dead Inj 0 1 0 14

0 0 ? 80

MILNET: Chronology of Worldwide Terrorism

Early 70 05/20/70 09/16/70

05/08/72 05/30/72 08/??/72 09/05/72 09/09/72 10/29/72 ??/??/73 ??/??/73 04/24/73 05/04/73 07/20/73 08/05/73 12/12/73 12/17/73 02/20/74 05/14/74 05/??/74 08/06/74 09/??/74 09/08/74 09/15/74 10/08/74 10/31/74 01/13/75 01/19/75 04/25/75 06/03/75 09/30/75 10/04/75 11/29/75 12/??/75 12/??/75 12/29/75 01/01/76 05/21/76 05/25/76 06/27/76 06/27/76 07/02/76 08/11/76 12/14/76 10/06/76 ??/??/77 03/26/77 04/23/77 05/29/77 10/16/77 12/04/77 03/16/78 05/20/78 08/18/78 08/28/78 09/03/78 ??/??/79 ??/??/79 02/12/79 04/03/79 04/16/79 04/26/79 07/29/79 11/04/79 11/15/79 06/12/80 09/09/80 10/??/80 12/??/80 02/24/81 05/??/81 05/16/81 Summer 81 10/06/81 10/13/81 11/12/81 12/??/81 12/12/81 ??/??/82 01/16/82 02/08/82 07/17/82

Bus with El Al passengers Childrens School Bus Five Airliners El Al (Amsterdam-N.Y.) TWA (Frankfurt-N.Y.) Air India (London-India) Pan Am (Amsterdam-N.Y.) Belgian Sabena,Vienna-Isr. Lod Airport Massacre El Al, Rome, Baggage Com. Munich Massacre,Olympics London, Israeli Counsel Lufthansa 615 Victor Samuelson P.M. Carreo Blanco, Spain Aeroflot Am. Consul Terry Leonhardy Japan Airlines TWA Athens (on ground) Lufthansa (same grp above) Pan Am Customs and plane Air Vietnam Ma'alot, Israel, a home Ma'alot, Israel, School Locker Room, LAX French Embassy, Hague TWA Air Vietnam TWA (Israel-AThens) Scheveningen Prison, Neth. Paris Paris German Embassy, Stockholm Philippines Airlines Maley Hungarian Airlines Beirut Airport Dublin, Terminal Indonesian Consul, Amster. OPEC Murders, Vienna New York Terminal Locker Middle East Airlines Phillippines Airlines Tel Aviv Customs Area Middle East Airline Air France Airbus, Entebbe Eastern Airlines Istanbul Baghdad, Suitcase Cubana Airlines Hanns-Martin Schleyer Canary Islands, Wait. Rm. Washington, D.C., Lock.Rm Instanbul Air Djibouti Malaysian Airlines Aldo Moro Paris Philippines Airlines El Al crew bus London Air Rhodesia U.K., M.P. Airey Neave COM Europe Alexandar Haig Air Rhodesia Frankfurt, Cargo Area Brussels Indian Airlines Madrid, Baggage Area American Embassy, Iran American Airlines Paris, Locker United Airlines Munich Oktoberfest Bar in Zarauz,Spain Rome Banco Central, Barcelona New York, Terminal Pope John Paul Anwar Sadat, Pres Egypt Air Malta Christian Chapmen Brig. Gen. James Dozier,IT Aeronica Paris, 2 Am. Women, Rest. Lt. Col. Robert Fay Miraflores, Colombia Brazzaville Term., Congo

http://www.milnet.com/terrchrn.htm[14-Jun-09 5:58:11 PM]

Grenade Attack 1 Bazooka Attack 12 Hijack/Bomb/Grenade ? Sky Marshalls killed 1 hijacker

11 19 ?

Hijack/Guns 1 4 Grenade/Machine Guns 26 76 Bomb 0 0 Kidnap/Grenades/Guns 11 3 Letter Bomb 1 0 Hijack 0 0 Kidnap/Ransom $14.2m 0 0 Assassination 1 0 Hijack/Explosion 2 Kidnap 0 0 Hijack/ Explosion 1 1 Guns 5 55 Hijack 0 0 Ground Attack 30 28 Hijack/Explosion 3 6 Takeover 3 0 Takeover 22 60 Explosion 3 35 Takeover 0 0 Explosion 88 Explosion 70 Explosion in air 80 Hostages 0 0 Bazooka Attack 0 3 Pistol/Grenade Attack 0 21 Takeover 2 ? Explosion 1 45 Explosion 64 Machine Gun Attack 3 14 Expolsions 1 5 Takeover 3 0 Takeover, pistols 3 ? Explosions 11 54 Explosion 82 Hijack/Explosion 13 14 Suitcase Explosion 2 10 Rocket (GRD) 1 2 Hijack 4 ? Explosion 1 Machine Gun/Grenade 4 17 Explosion 3 100 Explosion 73 Kidnap/Murder 1 Explosion 0 8 Explosion 1 Baggage Area Explosion 5 24 Ground Attack 2 2 Hijacking/Crash 93 Kidnap/Murder 2 0 Machine Gun Attack 2 5 Explosion 1 3 Guns 1 1 Ground/Missile Attack 48 Car bomb 1 Assassination Attempt 0 0 Ground/Missile Attack 59 Explosion 0 10 Machine Gun/Grenade 0 17 Explosion 0 8 Explosion 1 9 Takeover/Hostages 0 0 Explosion 0 0 Explosion 0 8 Explosion 0 2 Bomb Attacks ? ? Attack 4 0 Machine Gun Attack 0 5 Hostages (200) 0 1 Explosion 1 Assassination Attempt 0 1 Shooting 1+ ? Explosion 2 8 Assassination Attempt 0 0 Kidnap and Release 0 0 Explosion 2 8 Machine Gun attack 2 0 Assassination 1 0 Under Aircraft Expl. 1 4 Explosion 3 16

MILNET: Chronology of Worldwide Terrorism

07/31/82 08/07/82 08/11/82 09/14/82 04/18/83 ??/??/83 09/30/83 10/23/83 07/15/83 09/11/83 09/23/83 ??/??/84 01/18/84 03/10/84 04/08/84 04/24/84 05/??/84 08/02/84 08/31/84 12/??/84 12/??/84

??/??/85 01/??/85 02/??/85 03/??/85 04/??/85 05/28/85 06/14/85 08/08/85 09/04/85 10/07/85 11/85 12/27/85 12/27/85 11/23/85 02/03/86 02/03/86 02/04/86 02/05/86 02/06/86 02/06/86 03/20/86 04/02/86 04/05/86 1989? 02/28/93 04/19/95 07/27/95 11/13/95

Munich Waiting Room Explosion Ankara Machine Gun Attack Pan Am Explosion Bashir Gemayel, Pres Elect Assassination, Bomb of Lebannon US Embassy in Beirut Explosion Athens, Am. Naval Officer Assassination Beirut, Am. Embassy Truck Bomb Beirut, Marine Barracks Truck Bomb Paris, Suitcase Explosion Korean Airlines Shot Down Gulf Air Explosion Rome, Leamon Hunt, UN D.G. Assassination Air France Explosion Union Des Transport (UTA) Explosion Las Vegas Shooting London, Baggage Area Explosion CIA Sta. Ch. Bill Buckley Kidnapped Madras, Suitcase Explosion Kabol, Departure Lounge Explosion NATO Trng School, W. Germ. Bomb Attempt Six attacks Am. in Germ. Bombings U.S. Army Motor Pool U.S. Military Church Lindsay A.S., Weisbaden USAF Com Stn.,Weisbaden USAF Int. Off.,Dusseldorf Lebanon, 4 Soviets Kidnap/murder US Consul, Frankfurt Attack Bobby's Bar,Greece,US sold Bomb Am. Off. Club, Stuttgart Bomb (dud) Brussels, NATO office Bomb David Jacobsen, Dir Hosp. Kidnapped, Hizbollah TWA 847, 17 day TV vigil Hijack/Shooting Wing HQ, Rein-Main AB, Ger Car bomb Pan Am Aircraft on Ground Shooting, 5 attackers Achille Lauro Ship Hijack PX, Frankfurt, Germany Car Bomb Rome Airport Bomb Vienna Airport Bomb EgyptAir Hijack Paris, Champs-Elysees Bomb Paris, Eiffel Tower Bomb (diffussed) Paris, bookstore Bomb Paris, Forum des Halles Bomb Paris, Bomb Scares (80) Adm. Christobal Colon, Spn Assassination/MG/Gren. Paris, Champs-Elysee Bomb TWA 840 in air Airline Bomb West Berlin Disco Bomb Pan Am, Lockerbie, Scot. Airline Bomb World Trade Center, N.Y. Car Bomb Oklahoma Fed Building Car Bomb Paris France Bomb OPM-SNG, Riyadh SauArabia Car Bomb

0 9 1 1+

7 71 20 ?

63 1 17 241 7 269 112 1 0 0 1 0

? 0 ? ? 56

40 27 0 ?

19 200 0 ?

0 0 24 2 25

1 ? 0 0 ? 0 1 2 31 1 ? ? ? ? 0 0 ? ?

0 ? 70 0 ? 0 2 25 *1 ? 3 ? *1 ? ? ? 8 0 ? ?

2 2 4 2 140 7 >100 7? 6

0 28 ? 200 0 15 >100 ? 60+ *1

Notes: *1 From Kirk Rains, witness in official capacity during the incidents. Early terrorist activities gleaned from: "Winning Back The Sky: A Tactical Analysis of Terrorism", David G. Hubbard, M.D., Saybrook Publishing Company, 4223 Cole Avenue, Dallas, TX, 75205, Copyright 1986, pp. 41-42. ISBN 0-933071-04-3 and "The War Against Terrorists, How to Win It", Gayle Rivers, Stein and Day (1986), Charter Books, 1987, The Berkeley Publishing Group, 200 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y., 10016, Copyright 1986, Littopus S.A. Information verified by supplemental from research in periodicals, and other non-fiction sources including: "VEIL: The Secret Wars of the CIA", Bob Woodward, Copyright 1987, Simon and Schuster, Simon & Schuster Building, Rockefeller Center, 1230 Avenue of the Americas, New York, N.Y., 10020. ISBN 0-671-60117-2 Also used were many of the titles listed in the MILNET Bibilography and real time events as they happen around the world (the author's personal knowlege or interpretation of news coverage). http://www.milnet.com/terrchrn.htm[14-Jun-09 5:58:11 PM]

MILNET: Chronology of Worldwide Terrorism

[email protected] Originally Created: July 29, 1985 Minor Updates on July 20, 2005

http://www.milnet.com/terrchrn.htm[14-Jun-09 5:58:11 PM]

Annual Report 2004 General intelligence and security service

1

2

Foreword

In 2004 the Netherlands was hit by a terrorist attack: the murder of film-director Theo van Gogh. The possibility of an attack had been anticipated for some time, in view of the threat emanating from radical Islamist terrorism. The fact that an attack indeed took place has underlined the vulnerability of our society. In order to reduce this vulnerability it is necessary to prevent radicalisation among Muslim communities and to identify and frustrate violent activities at an early stage. This is a task for each body responsible for security in this country. The AIVD, as an intelligence and security service, plays a special role in this respect. Its focus on radicalisation and terrorism was given the highest priority in 2004. This annual report gives and overview of the service’s efforts in this sphere and in its other areas of work. Operational details have not been included in the report. This information is provided to the parliamentary Committee on the Intelligence and Security Services. In 2004 the performance of the AIVD was examined by the Administrative Evaluation Committee for the AIVD, which I set up for this purpose. The committee brought out its report in November, on the basis of which a number of improvements will be undertaken relating to, for example, control, information management and the service’s co-operation with other government services. All in all, this means that the AIVD is faced with an extremely important challenge in the coming period: it has to combine the continuation of its important work - especially in the area of terrorism - with the implementation of changes and the realisation of a substantial growth. I wish the service, which will celebrate its sixtieth anniversary this year, every success!

J.W. Remkes Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations

3

4

Contents

Foreword

3

1

Developments relating national security

9

1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4

Introduction Threat situation Measures against terrorism The performance of the AIVD

9 9 10 11

2

Terrorism

13

2.1 2.1.1 2.1.2 2.1.3 2.2 2.2.1 2.2.2 2.2.3 2.2.4 2.2.5 2.2.6 2.3 2.4 2.5

Islamist terrorism International developments The Netherlands and Islamist terrorism European focus on recruitment Other terrorist groups DHKP/C and MLKP-FESK KONGRA-GEL Lebanese Hezbollah ETA IRA Communist Party of the Philippines/New People’s Army NBCR terrorism Financial investigation Migration and terrorism

13 13 14 16 17 17 17 19 19 19 20 20 21 21

3

Radicalisation tendencies

23

3.1 3.1.1 3.1.2 3.1.3 3.1.4 3.2 3.2.1 3.2.2 3.3 3.3.1 3.4 3.5 3.6

Focus on radicalisation Radicalisation and terrorism Salafi mosques in the Netherlands Education Al-Haramain The Moroccan community Religious radicalisation Political radicalisation within the Moroccan community The Turkish and Kurdish communities Turkish radical Islamic networks and organisations The Pakistani and Indian community The Afghan community European co-operation

23 23 23 24 24 24 25 26 26 26 27 27 28

5

4

Politically motivated violent activism

29

4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4

Left-wing activism Animal rights activism The far right The Moluccan community

29 30 30 31

5

Unwelcome interference of foreign powers

33

6

Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

35

6.1 6.2

Countries of concern The Netherlands and proliferation

35 36

7

Foreign Intelligence

37

8

Protective Security

39

8.1 Special information security 8.1.1 Regulation Information Security for the Government Service Special Information (Vir-bi) 8.1.2 Working group on Special Information Security and Crypto Facility 8.1.3 Security scans and advice 8.1.4 National Security Authority (NSA) 8.1.4.1 NSA for NATO 8.1.4.2 NSA for the EU 8.1.4.3 The Galileo project 8.2 Vital sectors 8.3 Persons, property and services 8.3.1 Threat reports and threat assessments 8.3.2 Products in 2004 8.3.3 International organisations 8.3.3.1 International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia 8.3.3.2 International Criminal Court 8.4 Positions involving confidentiality and security screening 8.4.1 Reducing the duration of procedures 8.4.2 Implementation of the Security Investigations Act in practice 8.4.3 Confidential posts and integrity 8.4.4 Vetting by the Royal Military Constabulary 8.4.5 Vetting for and by the police 8.4.6 Vetting for the Royal Household 8.4.7 Number of positions and investigations 8.4.8 Results 8.4.9 Objection and appeal cases 8.5 Other efforts 8.5.1 Integrity Violations Reporting Centre 8.5.2 Integrity at the police 8.5.3 Electronic attacks 8.5.4 Restructuring the position of Security Officer 8.5.5 Protection of application for and issue of travel documents 8.5.6 Protection of production, storing and transport of driving licences 6

39 39 39 40 40 40 41 41 42 42 42 43 44 44 44 45 45 45 45 46 46 47 47 48 48 50 50 50 50 51 51 51

9

Oversight

53

9.1 9.1.1 9.1.2 9.1.3 9.1.4 9.2 9.2.1 9.2.2 9.2.3 9.3 9.4 9.5 9.6

Control The Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations Council for National Security Joint Counter-terrorism Committee Netherlands Joint Intelligence Committee Parliamentary matters and legislation The Second Chamber The Committee on the Intelligence and Security Services Legislation Communication Applications under the Freedom of Information Act Complaints Supervisory Committee

53 53 53 53 54 54 54 55 56 57 58 58 59

10

Co-operation

61

10.1 10.1.1 10.1.2 10.1.3 10.2 10.3 10.3.1 10.3.2 10.3.3 10.3.4 10.4 10.4.1 10.4.2 10.4.3 10.4.4

National co-operation CT Infobox Police and Royal Military Constabulary MIVD Co-operation with the overseas parts of the Kingdom of the Netherlands European co-operation Club of Bern Middle Europe Conference (MEC) Counter Terrorist Group (CTG) SitCen International co-operation NATO Liaison network and bilateral contacts Vetting enquiries International co-operation on security standards

61 61 62 63 63 64 64 64 64 64 65 65 65 65 66

11

Internal management

67

11.1 11.2 11.3 11.4 11.5 11.5.1 11.5.2

Personnel Computerised information Quality management Registration, documentation and archives Finance Management statement Departmental Auditing Service

67 67 67 68 68 69 70

Parliamentary reports relating to the AIVD in 2004

71

Annex 1

7

8

1

Developments relating to national security

This chapter describes a number of current developments relating to national security from the perspective of the duties of the General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD). More details about the service’s focus areas will be given in the next chapters.

1.1

Introduction The year 2004 was an eventful year, also from the perspective of the AIVD. The threat from international terrorism increased, and the service’s focus on radical Islamist networks in the Netherlands was given the highest priority. The murder of Theo van Gogh on 2 November 2004 shocked the Netherlands, including the AIVD. The suspect of the murder was in contact with a network that plotted attacks on Ms Hirsi Ali and Mr Wilders, Members of Parliament. The persons who hatched these plots were arrested on the basis of AIVD information. In the course of 2004 the government took new measures to improve its combat of terrorism. Several of these measures had a direct impact on the work of the AIVD; new co-operative structures were set up and new forms of information exchange were introduced. Politicians and the media continued to pay much attention to the efforts of the AIVD. Several AIVD reports, for example the one about radical Islam, fuelled the public debate. Attention was also paid to the way in which the AIVD performed its duties. In late 2003 in Parliament the question was raised whether the service was adequately equipped for its tasks. The Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations subsequently set up the Administrative Evaluation Committee for the AIVD, which brought out a report of its findings in November 2004.

1.2

Threat situation The attacks in Madrid on 11 March clearly demonstrated that the threat emanating from Islamist terrorism was also aimed against Europe. The murder of Van Gogh proved that this applied to the Netherlands as well. The arrest of members of the so-called Hofstad network in The Hague, Amsterdam and Amersfoort removed an immediate threat, but there are more radical Islamic networks active in the Netherlands. The AIVD will continue to monitor these networks. Lat year’s developments have shown that the ideology and attacks of the international AlQaeda network have become an important source of inspiration for regional and local networks of radical Muslims. Charismatic persons who gained respect by, for example, their jihad experience in Afghanistan or Bosnia, often form a link between Al-Qaeda’s international level and the operatives with their regional or local supporters. The targets for attacks may differ widely. The attacks in Madrid exposed the vulnerability of crowded places that are difficult to protect, the so-called soft targets. Such attacks require specific preparations, like attacks on government buildings etc., for which indications were found in the Netherlands in summer 2004. We now know that a terrorist attack may also be targeted at one individual. Such an attack can be prepared and committed relatively easily, which makes detection at a preparatory stage more difficult.

9

The AIVD drew again attention to the radicalisation of mainly young Muslims in 2004. Throughout Europe, including the Netherlands, we are confronted with the phenomenon that some young Muslims do not identify themselves with the Western society and feel attracted to radical forms of Islam. Radicalisation in some cases leads to receptiveness to recruitment for the jihad. Prevention of radicalisation requires a broad approach, in which social organisations, the central government, local authorities and also the Muslim community itself play an important role. In December the AIVD brought out the paper ‘From Dawa to Jihad’, in which both radicalisation itself and the options for preventing this phenomenon were described. In addition to focusing on terrorism, the AIVD also continued to concentrate attention on other possible threats to national security represented by, for example, various forms of political extremism, foreign interference and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. These efforts were limited, however, since priority had to be given to terrorism and radicalisation.

1.3

Measures against terrorism As a follow-up to the Action Plan for Counter-terrorism that was initiated in 2001, the government again took certain measures in order to improve the combat of terrorism. In some cases these measures triggered debate, because they involve a tension between the protection of constitutional freedoms and enhancement of security. The Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations gave a full explanation of the Cabinet’s considerations concerning this dilemma in the Second Chamber (Dutch Lower House of Parliament), referring to the memorandum form the Minister of Administrative Reform and Kingdom Relations on constitutional rights in a multiform society. The measures include the penalising of recruitment of persons for the jihad. In addition, a legislative proposal by the Minister of Justice to allow the use of AIVD information as evidence in criminal proceedings is now being examined in Parliament. The measures add significance to AIVD information in relation to the tracing and prosecution of persons involved in terrorism. There was a sharp rise in the number of official reports presented by the AIVD to the Public Prosecutions Department in 2004. However, the AIVD’s efforts are still primarily aimed at gaining insight into current threats for early warning purposes, even if no offence has been committed yet. After all, obtaining information about the preparation of terrorist activities is a crucial part of counter-terrorism, because it enables the timely frustration of these activities. It was this idea on which the government’s decision of April 2004 was based to intensify the monitoring of persons who can in any way be associated with terrorist activities or support to such activities. This has led to a new collaborative structure between the AIVD, the National Police Agency, the Immigration and Naturalisation Service, the Public Prosecutions Department and later also the Defence Intelligence and Security Service. Within this structure, which is referred to as CT (counter-terrorism) Infobox, the information about relevant persons gathered by the various participants is collated as a basis for discussing a possible follow-up. In September the government announced a new organisational structure for its anti-terrorism policy. A National Counter-terrorism Co-ordinator (Dutch abbreviation NCTb) was appointed, who was to play a co-ordinating role under the responsibility of the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations and the Minister of Justice. The NCTb started his activities on 1 January 2005. The AIVD provides the NCTb with information on both the general threat situation and specific security risks posed to persons, property and services.

10

Early in 2005 the Minister of Justice and the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations again announced some new, mainly administrative, measures to constrain the activities of persons associated with terrorism. During the Dutch presidency of the European Union in the second half of 2004, the Netherlands initiated a number of arrangements to improve the European co-operation between intelligence and security services. One of these initiatives was the reinforcement of the Situation Centre, the European co-operative structure within which representatives of European intelligence and security services assemble information and analyses from the services.

1.4

The performance of the AIVD In the past year the Administrative Evaluation Committee for the AIVD examined the way in which the AIVD performed its duties. The findings were made public by the end of 2004. The committee made five recommendations. On the basis of these recommendations, the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations took certain measures to strengthen the service’s position, to improve its control and to expand its staff substantially. The committee’s principal recommendations that were adopted by the Minister and the government are the following: 1 the AIVD should continue to perform its current statutory duties; 2 the AIVD does not need any new powers other than those arising from earlier announced amendments to the law, including a detailed provision for the power of interference; 3 the AIVD should improve its quality, intensify its co-operation, considerably review its information management and realise a growth in staff; 4 the AIVD should improve its general communication to citizens, as well as the timely and adequate provision of information to various government bodies in order to enable these bodies to take adequate measures; 5 the complex embedding of the AIVD in the Dutch administrative system prompts a simplified form of control by the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations; 6 supervision of the AIVD should be deepened. A development plan has been drawn up, on the basis of which certain changes will be implemented. Special attention will be paid to the enhancement of the AIVD’s quality, involving a special focus on reinforcing the service’s investigating, interpreting and mobilising capacity. Its investigating capacity will be strengthened by optimising the use of special intelligence instruments and the development of new, particularly technical, instruments. Its interpreting capacity is enhanced by making the available information more accessible to all areas of work. Reinforcement of its mobilising capacity means that the external provision of information by the AIVD should indeed lead to useful action perspectives for partners and interested parties. The growth of the AIVD’s staff will also require extra attention. The service’s vulnerability with respect to the selection, introduction and training of new employees was recently demonstrated by the fact that a newly employed officer leaked state secrets to persons monitored by the AIVD. Certain misunderstandings about the AIVD’s provision of information to mayors led to the setting up of a working group representing the various parties involved in spring 2005. This working group will give advice on improving the communication between the AIVD and the mayors.

11

12

2

Terrorism

This chapter gives information about the AIVD’s focus on terrorism. In addition to Islamist terrorism, a section is devoted to foreign terrorist groups with branches in the Netherlands. Also described are developments relevant to NBCR terrorism, financial investigation and the link between migration and terrorism.

2.1

Islamist terrorism In December 2002 the AIVD expressed its fears that the threat from Islamist terrorism would increasingly manifest itself in and from the West in the near future. In its paper ‘Recruitment for the jihad’ the service concluded that there were indications that radical Muslims raised in the West were beginning to see Europe as a front line for the jihad and that they might soon 1 proceed to the commission of local terrorist attacks. Two violent incidents in 2004 unfortunately confirmed this assessment: the attacks in Madrid on 11 March and the murder of Theo van Gogh on 2 November. Islamist terrorism is not a new phenomenon in Europe. In the 1990s Algerian terrorists already committed several attacks in France, and even the 11 September 2001 attacks were largely prepared on European territory. In other words, Islamist terrorism already posed a real threat to Western societies. What is new, however, is the fact that Islamist terrorism can no longer be regarded as an exclusively external threat, but rather as a threat rooted in and aimed against the Western society itself. The use of violence targeted at one individual also seems to have given the nature of this threat a new dimension. In the following sections you will find more details about a number of national and international aspects involved in these new developments relating to the Islamist terrorist threat.

2.1.1

International developments In Madrid on11 March 2004, on the eve of national elections, bombs exploded on three commuter trains. The bombs killed almost two hundred people and injured hundreds. The terrorist cell that committed the attack gave as an important motive the Spanish participation in the Iraq war. The conflict in Iraq has a strong symbolic value for Islamist terrorists. They see this war as part of the West’s global fight against Islam and hence perceive their global jihad against the ‘enemies of Islam’ as a religious duty which fully justifies an attack like the one in Madrid. Radical Muslims from several countries in Europe have travelled to Iraq in order to take up arms against the American troops and their allies there. We are not exactly certain about the scale on which this is taking place. So far we have seen only a handful of individuals leave from the Netherlands. However, the conflict in Iraq plays a major role in the minds of young radical Muslims. It may thus pose a threat to this country from two angles. Firstly, it fuels feelings of hatred towards the West among radical and radicalising Muslims in the Netherlands. Secondly, it is possible that, as the conflict continues and more radicalised Muslims join the jihad in Iraq, they will eventually return as trained and experienced fighters, as was the case in the 1990s when jihad veterans returned from Afghanistan. In view of their expertise and experience in guerrilla strategies and the commission of attacks, these veterans will represent an increased threat to the European society. It is also possible that they will become active recruiters of new jihadists in Europe.

13

The attacks in Madrid confirmed the emergence of more autonomous, mainly locally active jihadist networks and cells. The group that committed the attacks in Madrid is an example of such a local cell, inspired by the ideology of the violent jihad, but not directly linked to a global terrorist network affiliated to Al-Qaeda. The emergence of these local cells, some of which interact with members of international veterans networks, has complicated the anticipated threat for the near future, especially since such locally operating cells can easily blend in with the society in which they live, which makes it more difficult to identify them. An additional phenomenon is the fact that the financing of these cells is largely a local matter, while particularly criminal activities may be a source of income. This interaction between crime and terrorism also increases the complexity and the scale of the terrorist threat. The result of these developments is that, despite successful counter-measures taken by intelligence and security services and law enforcement agencies, the power and resistance of jihadist cells has remained substantial. It would be bad policy, however, if bodies involved in counter-terrorism exclusively focused their efforts on these local, more or less autonomous, cells. Trans-national networks of jihadists still constitute a real threat. In 2004 the AIVD investigated a number of internationally operating cells that were also active on Dutch territory. These investigations revealed a wide range of international contacts and frequent trans-national travel movements. Any direct control of these cells by a higher level has not been established so far, but there are certain indications that there really is such a hierarchical type of control. It is quite likely, however, that since the arrest and elimination of several Al-Qaeda leaders, the international networks and local cells are operating more autonomously than before. In the long term a new level of leaders and planners might emerge to fill the present vacuum. As yet, however, it seems that cells and networks are working more autonomously and that they are no longer dependent on a higher hierarchical level for the planning and approval of certain attacks. Trans-national contacts between Islamists terrorists are spreading over large parts of Europe. Internationally operating Islamist terrorist networks have also proved to be increasingly interested in countries in Central Europe. In addition, the developments in Bosnia Herzegovina and Kosovo are reason for concern. Because of the weak government structures, the high corruption level and the limited financial means to combat terrorism effectively, these countries are an ideal base of operation for Islamist terrorists. 2.1.2

The Netherlands and Islamist terrorism Local Islamist terrorist cells also pose a threat to the Netherlands. Mohammed B., the suspected assassin of Van Gogh, operated on the periphery of such a cell, the so-called Hofstad group. Several members of this group were arrested on the basis of official AIVD reports. From the documents found at the suspect’s home it appeared that he harboured extremely radical ideas and that, in addition to a deep hatred of the Western society, he had visions of extreme violence and martyrdom. The aforementioned group sees itself as the vanguard of the Islamic community and as such as the enemy of the West in general and the Netherlands in particular. Within the context of this perceived war, they see certain politicians and opinion-leaders as legitimate targets against whom the use of violence is fully justified. The local character of the Hofstad group is underlined by the lack of specific indications for international control. It is true that in October 2003 the AIVD saw contacts between the Hofstad group and a Moroccan jihad veteran who was allegedly involved in the Casablanca attacks, but since his arrest no such contacts have been established. Even the role of the group’s Syrian spiritual leader is no indication of external control. Although this Syrian played

14

an important role in the ideological and religious development of the Hofstad group, he was not the only driving force behind their radicalisation. The Internet also played a very important role in this process. Many of the ideas expressed in Mohammed B.’s letters have circulated in news groups and chat rooms for quite some time or can be found on international web sites with texts about ‘true’ Islam. The Internet did not only inspire the Hofstad group ideologically, but the group also used this medium to contact young Muslims who were receptive to their ideas. The use of individual violence against one person has added a new dimension to Islamist terrorist violence. In the past, this was a type of violence with which mainly countries like Algeria, Egypt and Iraq were confronted. The murder of Van Gogh also showed how far a young radical Muslim in the Netherlands might go in defence of his religious convictions, and how serious the danger is that is emanating from radical ideologists form the Middle East who try to win these young Muslims over to their sectarian and violent Islamist ideas, either personally or through the Internet. In addition, the vehement reaction in our society triggered by the murder has exposed certain tensions and a lack of understanding between Muslims and nonIslamic Dutch citizens. Arson attacks on churches, mosques and schools are expressions of hatred and intolerance which were almost unimaginable in the Dutch society until recently. We can draw a distinct line, however, between radical movements operating within both ethnic minorities and native Dutch groups, and the moderate forces in both communities that should counterbalance them. The Madrid attacks have led to a shift of emphasis in Dutch counter-terrorism policy. We were already aware of the fact that Islamist terrorists had shifted their focus mainly to so-called soft targets, i.e. sites and buildings which - in view of their nature, situation or function - are easily accessible and therefore difficult to protect, and which can hence easily be hit, causing a large number of casualties. So in the prevention of terrorist attacks we put much emphasis on the protection of certain prominent places and property. On 9 July it was decided to tighten the security of a number of buildings and sites, on the basis of information provided by the AIVD about alleged reconnaissance for terrorist attacks. The phenomenon of ‘terrorist reconnaissance’ attracted international attention by the arrest of the Pakistani computer expert Naeem Noor Khan. Big amounts of information resulting from detailed reconnaissance of several buildings in the United States and the United Kingdom were found in his computer. This information showed that Islamist terrorists take much time to map the potential targets for attacks and to familiarise themselves with the security procedures for these sites. At several places in the Netherlands persons were arrested this summer - whether or not on the basis of AIVD information - because they were suspected of reconnoitring certain buildings or sites. Several times the AIVD itself also proved to be a potential target of an attack. The arrest of the young radical Muslim Samir A. for involvement in a supermarket robbery in June led to the discovery of plans for several attacks, including one on the AIVD office. On the basis of AIVD information, Samir A. was already arrested by the police in connection with preparations for a terrorist action in October 2003, but he was released for lack of evidence. The AIVD considers this radical Muslim as one of the core members of the Hofstad group. As early as in 2001 the AIVD decided, as part of its investigations into terrorist networks, to focus specifically on the monitoring of a number of persons associated with terrorism. After the Madrid attacks it was decided to widen the co-operation on this subject and to create a structure for collating information about these persons held by all participating services (see chapter 10 Co-operation).

15

2.1.3

European focus on recruitment Within the context of the Dutch presidency of the European Union and as part of the activities of the Counter Terrorism Group (CTG), the counter-terrorism forum of European intelligence and security services, the AIVD initiated an investigative study of recruitment for the jihad. This study was focused on places where recruiters spot potential followers in order to prepare them for participation in the jihad, Islamist terrorism and martyrdom. Although spotting can take place at various places, we confined our focus to recruitment in and around mosques, prisons, educational institutions and on the Internet. The study was set up as a first Europewide exploratory analysis, which will be continued under the Luxembourg and British presidency in 2005. Practically all European security services contributed to these efforts. The analytical conclusions resulting from the study included the following: -

-

-

16

with respect to recruiters: ‘Traditional’ recruitment for the jihad by a recruiter is still frequently taking place. Recruiters are often jihad veterans with some knowledge of Islam. The phenomenon of ‘autonomous’ recruitment (through self-initiated radicalisation) seems also to be winning ground. In this case young Muslims evolve into very radical persons without the mediation of a ‘real’ recruiter and subsequently try to travel to jihad areas or commit attacks on their own initiative. Radical web sites and news coverage of fights and atrocities in, for example, Chechnya, the Palestinian territories and Iraq play a major role in this process. In many cases, however, ‘autonomous’ recruits nevertheless eventually get in contact with professional mentors. Peer pressure may also play a role in recruitment: young radicals win other youngsters over; with respect to recruits: In Europe the persons who seem to be most receptive to recruitment are young male Muslims who have not fully integrated into the western society. They are often second or third generation immigrants who feel discriminated in the western society where they were born and bred. At the same time, however, they no longer have a natural affinity with the traditional world of their parents. Jihadist ideas hardly seem to appeal to Islamic population groups that have lived in the west for decades or even centuries. Among the recruits are also small, but significant numbers of converts. Female recruits are still rare. However, very radical Islamic women are remarkably active on the Internet; with respect to recruitment locations: Recruiters operate everywhere where they expect to find potential recruits. In Europe mosques are still on top of the list of hot spots for recruitment. In countries where vigilance has been stepped up we see that recruiters very soon leave the mosque to go to more secluded places with new recruits. Radicalisation and recruitment in prisons is mainly a problem in some penitentiaries in southwest Europe at the moment. Usually the recruiter continues his recruitment activities after his release. Within the context of Islamist recruitment, the Internet is a third and increasingly important location. Islamist web sites have a stimulating effect on radicalising young Muslims. They can play an important role in self-initiated radicalisation processes. Chat rooms also seem to provide good opportunities for recruiters to spot new recruits and vice versa. After their initial virtual contact with recruiters, Internet recruits often meet a recruiter in person at a later point in time.

2.2

Other terrorist groups In addition to its focus on Islamist terrorist networks, the AIVD also pays attention to (possible) activities of other terrorist groups in the Netherlands. These include the Turkish parties DHKP/C and MLKP-FESK, the Kurdish Kongra-Gel, the Lebanese Hezbollah, the ETA, the IRA and the Communist Party of the Philippines.

2.2.1

DHKP/C and MLKP-FESK As was the case in 2003, also in 2004 some dozens of sympathisers of the violent left-wing group DHKP/C were active in the Netherlands. Their activities in the Netherlands have remained peaceful. They were mainly focused on the situation of hunger strikers and prisoners in Turkish penitentiaries. Cultural events attracting many DHKP/C sympathisers had a peaceful character, like a manifestation in ‘s-Hertogenbosch on 22 May. As part of a co-ordinated police operation in an number of European countries in April 2004, the Dutch police raided several premises that were associated with the DHKP/C. Five premises in the Netherlands were searched, and a substantial amount of material was seized. The DHKP/C attracted public attention by a bomb attack in Istanbul on 24 June 2004, prior to the NATO summit in Istanbul. Because the bomb exploded prematurely, the organisation apologised to the victims. The DHKP/C was not the only extreme left-wing organisation, however, that committed attacks prior to and during the NATO summit in Istanbul. The Armed Forces of the Poor and Oppressed, the armed wing of the Turkish Marxist-Leninist Communist Party (MLKP-FESK) claimed responsibility for an attack on the hotel in Ankara where President Bush of the USA was supposed to stay. A small number of sympathisers of this MLKP is active in the Netherlands, but they follow a peaceful course. On some occasions these sympathisers participate in broader left-wing manifestations. The name of MLKP occasionally surfaces in pamphlets.

2.2.2

KONGRA-GEL The European list of persons, groups and entities whose financial assets are frozen within the context of counter-terrorism was extended by the inclusion of, among other groups, KADEK and Kongra-Gel. These groups are regarded as continuations (aliases) of the PKK, which was included on the EU list earlier. Inclusion on the list does not mean that the organisations in question are proscribed, but it implies that their financial assets are frozen and that financial support to these organisations is punishable. Because of its inclusion on the EU list, KongraGel has here been described under the chapter Terrorism. In November 2003 the Kurdish Freedom and Democracy Congress (KADEK) dissolved to be replaced by the People’s Congress of Kurdistan (Kongra--Gel). In summer 2004 a rift emerged within this new organisation as a consequence of differences of opinion among the leaders of the organisation. Partly as a consequence of the reforms that were implemented after the dissolution of KADEK and because of the disagreement about the course to be followed, a struggle for power is still going on within the top of the organisation. This continuing lack of clarity is one of the reasons that the North Iraq-based headquarters of the organisation increasingly fail to mobilise supporters in Europe.

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Within the leadership a majority decided to follow a hard line. They wished to continue under the well-known name of PKK, and on 1 June they announced to end the unilateral cease-fire. The announcement came after a month that was described as ‘one of the bloodiest in years’ for southeast Turkey. This group of hardliners also threatened to commit attacks on tourist and economic targets in Turkey. In a statement spread by the pro-Kurdish press agency Mezopotamya, foreign tourists and businessmen were warned that Turkey would ‘again be a high-risk country’. The minority attracted public attention when on 9 August Osman Öcalan, brother of the imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan, announced the foundation of the Patriotic Democratic Party (Partiya Welatparez é Demokratik). This new party, the PWD, claims to believe in democracy and patriotism, to support the American intervention in the Middle East and to pursue autonomy for the Kurds within the present Turkish borders. This is in line with the policy of Kongra-Gel and KADEK, who also wanted to preserve the present borders in the Middle East and dropped the demand for an independent Kurdistan. After the rift in the leadership, both factions tried to win supporters among the Kurdish communities outside Turkey. The PWD initiative seems to have had little success in Europe so far. The emergence of these factions and their attempts to win over the rank and file of the party has made the chaos within Kongra-Gel complete. On 7 May 2004 the Supreme Council decided that the former prominent PKK/KADEK member Nuriye Kesbir could be extradited to Turkey. On 7 September the Minister of Justice announced to follow the Supreme Council’s advice, after the Turkish authorities had given guarantees about Kesbir’s treatment. Subsequently, Kesbir’s lawyer instituted summary proceedings against the extradition. In November the court decided that Kesbir could not yet be extradited, because the Turkish guarantees were not firm enough. In an appeal to that decision the Court of Appeal in The Hague decided on 20 January 2005 that Kesbir could not be extradited to Turkey. The demonstrations against Kesbir’s extradition illustrated Kongra-Gel’s declining capability to mobilise supporters. Practically half of the participants in the demonstration against her extradition, held in The Hague on 22 May, were sympathisers from Germany. The demonstration on 30 October, also against Kesbir’s extradtion, showed a similar picture. In April 2004 the AIVD submitted two official reports to the Public Prosecutions Department about political-ideological training camps organised by Kongra-Gel at two locations in the Netherlands. At Liempde the organisation had a camp for young people who intended to join the organisation. They were instructed in the backgrounds, history, ideology and culture of the Kurdish movement and the political writings by PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan. At Zevenaar a cadre course was organised for high-ranking leaders in western Europe. On the basis of the two official AIVD reports, the Aliens Police inspected the two farmyard campsites in question. The official reports were based on evidence to suggest that at these sites there were persons who had no valid residence documents or who were using false and/or forged identity documents. In November 2004 the national criminal investigation department raided several premises, including the training camp at Liempde. These raids were based on separate police investigations which were not in connection with the aforementioned official AIVD reports about the training camps. In Istanbul in August attacks were committed on two tourist hotels. The attacks were claimed by an unknown group calling itself the ‘Kurdish Freedom Falcons’. The name called up associations with a group of radical young Kurds who committed attacks against Turkish targets under a similar name in the 1990s. An involvement of Kongra-Gel could not be

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established, however. In a press release spread through the Mezopotamya press agency the Freedom Falcons recommended tourists and businessmen to stay away from Turkey now that they (the Freedom Falcons) had taken up the initiative for the Kurdish struggle. In their statement they not only claimed responsibility for the hotel attacks, but also for earlier attacks on Turkish targets. In August the Turkish media reported the emergence of a Kurdish group calling itself ’15 August Initiative’, referring to 15 August 1984, th e date on which the first Kurdish attack on a Turkish target was committed. It has not been established whether this group really exists, committed attacks or can be associated with Kongra-Gel. 2.2.3

Lebanese Hezbollah Investigations have shown that Hezbollah’s terrorist wing, the Hezbollah External Security Organisation, has been directly and indirectly involved in terrorist acts. It can also be concluded that Hezbollah’s political and terrorist wings are controlled by one co-ordinating council. This means that there is indeed a link between these parts of the organisation. The Netherlands has changed its policy and no longer makes a distinction between the political and terrorist Hezbollah branches. The Netherlands informed the relevant EU bodies of its findings.

2.2.4

ETA In Spain the separatist movement Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA) pursues autonomy for the Basque country. ETA mainly aims its acts of violence at Spanish dignitaries, but also at the tourist industry. In recent years ETA has confined its activities to Spain, although early in 2004 the organisation sent a number of letters to several organisations outside Spain, including travel agencies in the Netherlands, in which it threatened to commit attacks against the Spanish tourist industry. Several raids by the police in France and Spain in 2004 have led to the arrest of prominent ETA members, including ETA’s political leader Mikel Albizu Iriarte, also known as Anboto, and to the dismantling of substantial ETA arms caches. The discovered caches included explosives, missiles and launching systems. Despite these raids, ETA succeeded in committing several bomb attacks in Spain in 2004, thus demonstrating that it still has the capability to strike. Alexander Acarrequi Casas, an ETA suspect imprisoned in the Netherlands in 2003, was extradited to Spain early in 2004.

2.2.5

IRA The Northern Irish conflict between republicans who wish to join the Republic of Ireland and loyalists who wish to remain part of the United Kingdom is not over yet. Several negotiations have so far failed to lead to autonomy in Northern Ireland. Among the main obstacles in the peace process are still the conditions for the disarmament of the republican Provisional IRA (PIRA). However, a truce has been in force since 1997, to which the principal loyalist terrorist groups have committed themselves. The most serious potential threat of violence emanates from a PIRA splinter, the Real IRA (RIRA). The RIRA never endorsed the truce of 1998 (the Good Friday Agreement). So far the RIRA has been responsible for acts of violence across the United Kingdom, mainly plotted in Ireland. It is the task of the AIVD to identify any activities of this group on Dutch territory.

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2.2.6

Communist Party of the Philippines/New People’s Army The Netherlands-based leader of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its armed wing, the NPA, participated, jointly with several sympathisers, in negotiations with the Philippine authorities that were organised by Norway in 2004. Partly on the basis of an official report of our service (then BVD) he was refused a refugee status and a residence permit. In early 2004 the two negotiating parties signed a declaration of intent that should clear the way for formal peace negotiations. The main obstacle is the party leader’s demand to be removed from the EU list of terrorist persons and organisations, on the basis of which his financial assets have been frozen. In the opinion of the Dutch government, he can only be removed from the list if the NPA/CPP explicitly abandons the use violence as a means to reach its goals. Since the signing of the declaration of intent the NPA has again committed several attacks in the Philippines, in which military and police officers were killed. By a combination of military and political pressure the Philippine government tries to force the CPP leader and his associates to the negotiations table. According the Philippine Ministry of Justice, the judicial inquiry into the assassination of former congress member Rodolfo Aguinaldo and his bodyguard on 12 June 2001 produced conclusive evidence that the murders were committed by the NPA on the instructions of the CPP’s Central Committee. The party leader was summoned to appear in court several times in 2004, but he failed to answer these summons. As he cannot be extradited to the Philippines and in view of the fact that he lives outside the jurisdiction of the Philippine government, the case has now reached a deadlock. In January 2005 a high-ranking delegation headed by the Philippine Minister of Foreign Affairs visited the Netherlands in order to discuss the case.

2.3

NBCR terrorism In 2004 the AIVD drew specific attention to bio security (the adequate protection of pathogenic agents) and informing the public about NBCR terrorism, with the intention to prevent panic among the population. The barrier against potential procurement of pathogens is rather low as a consequence of limited legal regulations for the storage, transport and trading of these substances. The AIVD tries to make relevant companies and institutions more aware of the risks involved in procurement. The Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations has been tasked with the co-ordination of these awareness-raising protective measures. Jointly with the National Information Centre a plan will be developed for the provision of public information about NBCR terrorism. As a follow-up to the threat assessments on NBCR terrorism, the AIVD brought out a report about Protection of the Central Government against NBCR attacks. In the report a number of conceivable threat scenarios involving an NBCR attack against the Central Government were described, in addition to possible security measures to enhance the defences against such an attack. During the Dutch EU presidency the AIVD focused on improving the international co-operation and information exchange between intelligence and security services and other organisations involved, such as emergency services. Within this context the AIVD contributed to an international seminar on NBCR terrorism that was organised by the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations on 7 and 8 July 2004. This seminar on the subject of ‘Co-operation between services on the civil defence against possible attacks at the civil population with NBCR agents’ was specifically focused on co-operation.

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2.4

Financial investigation The AIVD recognises the importance of financial investigation both in financially incapacitating terrorist groups and networks and in exposing those who secretly support terrorism. The AIVD will continue and expand its financial investigations into several forms of financing terrorism and propagation of extremist ideas. The AIVD’s efforts relating to the UN and EU freeze lists are focused on the identification of asset holders mentioned in these freeze lists. Financial institutions to that end give the AIVD the names of asset holders registered in their records. In 2004 a large number of names of persons and organisations were reported to the AIVD by financial institutions. None of them proved to be identical to persons or organisations on the freeze list. On the basis of these reports, the AIVD submitted 31 official reports to the Ministry of Finance. Inclusion of persons and organisations on the freeze lists might give terrorist groups and networks reason to continue under a different name or to use alternative methods for moving money. The AIVD closely follows such developments.

2.5

Migration and terrorism In the past year it has become evident that also Europe can be a logistical base of operation and a target for Islamist terrorist attacks. For this reason it is essential to have a good insight into the inflow, transit and outflow of persons who constitute a risk to national security, such as members of terrorist networks. The AIVD therefore focuses on travel movements of persons who play a specific role within terrorist networks, such as veterans (persons who fought in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Iraq or Chechnya), facilitators (persons who provide documents, trips and accommodation) and recruits (persons leaving from the Netherlands or other European countries to jihad areas in other parts of the world). This provides insight into the way in which certain persons enter the Netherlands - as network members or otherwise - and move to other countries. This information is not only used for internal operations, but also for identifying risk indicators to help organisations in the asylum and aliens sector, such as the Immigration and Naturalisation Service, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Royal Military Constabulary and the Aliens Police. These indicators should help these organisations to identify persons who might pose a threat to national security and who are travelling to or via the Netherlands. In close co-operation with the aforementioned bodies, the risk indicators will be geared to their specific tasks. Each of these organisations (in the Netherlands collectively referred to as the ‘aliens chain’) has its own specific type of information, so the risk indicators developed by the AIVD should be tailored to that type of information. Intensive co-operation with these organisations is therefore of crucial importance. The report ‘Aliens Policy and Counter-terrorism’ presented to Parliament by the Advisory Committee on Aliens Affairs in May 2003 gave an impulse to the co-operation between the AIVD and the ‘aliens chain’. In its report the Committee recommended to considerably step up the AIVD’s involvement in the admission of aliens to the Netherlands. In 2004 this co-operation was indeed much improved. The AIVD concluded co-operation agreements with all relevant organisations in order to give them more specific information about signs that might indicate terrorism. All organisations are readily prepared to contribute to the combat of terrorism.

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The AIVD intends to further intensify and structure this co-operation in 2005. The information provided by the AIVD should enable the co-operation partners to enhance their role in counterterrorism (so-called intelligence-controlled action and supervision).

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3

Radicalisation tendencies

This chapter concerns itself with the radicalisation of Muslims in the Netherlands in general and with the developments within various ethnic minority groups.

3.1

Focus on radicalisation The AIVD drew public attention to radicalisation processes among parts of the Muslim communities in the Netherlands. This radicalisation is encouraged by the preaching (dawa) of a strictly puritan interpretation of Islam, usually with a strongly anti-Western slant. This creed, which in most cases is based on a radical interpretation of the Saudi version of Salafism or Wahhabism, is mainly preached by a number of often Saudi-based Islamic missionary organisations. They focus on the dissemination of relevant literature and audio-visual material, the organisation of training sessions and on financial support to imams and mosques spreading 2 the message of ‘pure Islam’ . The government of Saudi Arabia has dissociated itself from this radicalisation. In addition to these institutionalised missionary organisations, more informal networks of individual preachers also play a role in the radical Islamic dawa. Some of these itinerant preachers, who mainly focus their efforts on young people, have ties with mullahs in various Islamic countries. Another major factor is the ‘virtual’ dawa via the Internet. The web sites of radical mullahs mainly attract young people. These web sites increasingly add to the radicalisation of parts of the Muslim communities in the Netherlands. But virtual dawa not only takes place through web sites, but also increasingly via ‘chat rooms’. This is a new trend, implying that radical Islamic dawa is increasingly taking place via an intensive exchange of Islamic ideas on the electronic highway instead of personal indoctrination by preachers. The participants in chat sessions thus increasingly ‘infect’ themselves with the radical Islamic ideology. Radical Islam is a multiform phenomenon constituting a variety of threats. The AIVD paper ‘From Dawa to Jihad’ seeks to contribute to the development of differentiated counter-strategies 3 against the various threats. The paper was sent to various bodies, among whom all mayors in the Netherlands. The municipal authorities of Amsterdam and Rotterdam have now developed plans to prevent radicalisation.

3.1.1

Radicalisation and terrorism It is difficult to pinpoint and to quantify causal connections between Salafi missionary activities and terrorism. It is a fact, however, that the preachers often emphasise the moral decadence of the Western (including the Dutch) society, as well as the undesirability of the integration of Muslims into such a society. The preachers also continuously suggest that Islam is being oppressed, threatened and attacked in the West and that Muslims should defend themselves against this. The preaching thus contributes to the intensification of confrontational sentiments and violent (jihadist) tendencies among parts of the Muslim minorities in the Netherlands.

3.1.2

Salafi mosques in the Netherlands As has been described in the aforementioned paper ‘Saudi influences in the Netherlands’, in the Netherlands there is a small number of mosques and foundations with a Salafi character,

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where radical, strongly anti-integrative ideas have been preached for years. This takes place in sermons by imams, but also during (often private) training sessions and conferences, or by disseminating relevant literature and audio-visual material. This strongly anti-integrative and anti-Western ideas have proved to contribute substantially to the radicalisation of some young Muslims, who have eventually become receptive to recruitment practices. Recently imams and board members of Salafi mosques seem to have moderated their attitude. They now take care that the worshippers of the mosques are not openly incited to participation in the armed jihad. However, this change seems mainly to be caused by external pressure (from e.g. media, politicians, local authorities and moderate Muslim organisations). It does not yet have the character of an irreversible and completed process. If the external pressure is removed, a reversion to the radical attitude is very well possible. The more moderate attitude of imams has prompted radical Muslims and recruiters to move their working area to more secluded, private places, out of the Salafi mosque’s view and without their knowledge. The radicalisation process initiated at these places can still be regarded as very serious. 3.1.3

Education In recent years educational institutions were confronted with several incidents relating to confrontations between Western standards and values on the one hand and an ultra-orthodox or extremist interpretation of Islam on the other. The AIVD estimates that most of these incidents were isolated cases. So far we have not established any central control from radical Muslim circles aimed at spreading an ultra-orthodox form of Islam within or via the Dutch educational system. The above-mentioned incidents should therefore rather be seen as attempts by individuals (or groups of individuals) to claim disproportional scope for the practicing of their religion in a major part of their private lives (at school). Nevertheless, these incidents are part of a broader development in all aspects of society. It is therefore expected that if the Dutch society fails to find a satisfactory solution to the problems within particularly groups of young Muslims, we will continue to be confronted with such incidents.

3.1.4

Al-Haramain On the recommendation of the United States and Saudi Arabia, the United Nations Sanctions Committee included a number of branches of the Saudi missionary organisation al-Haramain on the sanctions list in June 2004. The organisations on this list are associated with (financial) support to Al-Qaeda. Because the chairman of al-Haramain, sheikh Aqeel al-Aqeel, sat on the board of the Dutch al-Haramain branch, al-Haramain Humanitarian Aid in Amsterdam, this foundation was also included on the sanctions list. Subsequently, the organisation’s assets were frozen. The AIVD has no specific evidence to suggest that the Dutch al-Haramain branch was involved in support to Al-Qaeda. The foundation merely existed on paper for quite some time. The AIVD provided the Public Prosecutions Department with an official report about the al-Haramain Humanitarian Aid foundation to support its civil proceedings for dissolving this foundation.

3.2

The Moroccan community The AIVD’s investigations into the Moroccan community are focused on both religious and political radicalisation.

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3.2.1

Religious radicalisation The AIVD observed a further religious radicalisation of young Muslims of Moroccan origin in 2004. Groups of young Muslims in the age group from fifteen to twenty five appeared to be increasingly receptive to an ultra-orthodox interpretation of Islam. This is partly based upon the perception of these young Muslims that the Muslim community is being oppressed (not only in conflict areas such as Iraq, the Palestinian territories and Chechnya, but also in a country like the Netherlands). A Salafi interpretation of life gives these young Muslims a clear and straightforward guidance, but also encourages them to turn their back on the Dutch society, as a consequence of which they may end up in social isolation and become vulnerable to radicalisation and ultimately to recruitment for the jihad. International conflicts again proved to add to growing feelings of indignation among the Dutch Muslim community in 2004. They were, for example, outraged about the liquidations of Palestinian Hamas leaders by Israeli armed forces and about the siege of Falloujah in Iraq. Also, their own social circumstances in the Netherlands gave young Muslims enough reason to believe that they found themselves in a deprived position. Opinion-makers and politicians who criticised or offended Islam invariably provoked vehement reactions. Within the Moroccan community such sentiments are usually not expressed through organised political/activist means such as demonstrations and other extra-parliamentary campaigns, but they usually keep smouldering. These emotions are only expressed via an anonymous medium like the Internet and within their own religious and ethnic circles. Another factor that adds to the feelings of discontent is the lack of organisations with a wide support among the Moroccan community that can further the interests of this community. The AIVD has observed that groups of young radical Muslims are often formed at places frequented by Muslim youth. We mainly see radical-Islamic expressions and behaviour in social areas like the Internet, schools and Islamic institutions like houses of worship and Islamic associations. The resistance against radicalisation seems to have slightly increased in these social areas. The AIVD established, for example, that mosques, schools and web sites made attempts to keep extremism at bay. The consequence of this increased resistance is that extremists move their radical activities to other places. A positive effect of this development is that Muslims are less confronted and associated with radical ideas. But it also means that radicalisation increasingly takes place at small-scale, less visible meetings on which society has less influence. In the past year Internet forums with a Moroccan and/or Islamic background, which - despite curbing efforts by the web site managers - published controversial, shocking and even threatening texts attracted much attention in the Netherlands. These texts were mainly aimed against ‘the West’ and ‘unbelievers’ in general, and against politicians and opinion-makers in particular. Especially the MPs Ms Ayaan Hirsi Ali and Mr Geert Wilders and film-director Theo van Gogh were the object of anonymous torrents of abuse and threats. But the anger was also frequently aimed at moderate Muslims, who were branded as ‘renegades’, ‘hypocrites’ or ‘collaborators with the West’. The Internet has now become one of the principals channels for spreading extremist ideas and for extremist influencing. At the moment a system called ‘Notice and take down’ is being developed, which is expected to play an important role in countering this phenomenon. The system was announced in a letter from the Minister of Justice and the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations to the Second Chamber of 24 January 2004.

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3.2.2

Political radicalisation within the Moroccan community The Arab European League (AEL) failed to consolidate its success of 2003. The initially substantial membership ceased to grow in 2004. Although the AEL voiced its views on national and international political issues through press releases, the group failed to express the general dissatisfaction among the Moroccan community effectively to a broad audience. Among the AEL’s potential supporters (Muslims of North African, mostly Moroccan origin) there seems to be little enthusiasm for expressing the dissatisfaction about perceived sociopolitical abuses through extra-parliamentary campaigns, such as demonstrations etc. In 2004 the AEL mainly focused its efforts on the foundation of the Muslim Democratic Party (MDP), which should participate in the municipal elections in 2006. Through this initiative the AEL intends to fill the perceived gap in the political representation of Muslims in the Netherlands.

3.3

The Turkish and Kurdish communities Examination of radicalisation tendencies in the Turkish and Kurdish communities in the Netherlands has shown that the Salafi ideology seems to appeal to certain groups in these communities. Initially the Turkish community seemed to remain relatively free from these radicalising influences, but since the suicide attacks in Istanbul in November 2003 this has no longer been the case. However, like the other Islamic communities in the Netherlands, the vast majority of the Turkish community is not radical. A case in point was their condemnation of the murder of Theo van Gogh. The incident led to some commotion within the Turkish community, the largest Islamic community in the Netherlands, because they believed that the Dutch society unjustly held them, as Muslims, collectively responsible for the murder. However, like in nonTurkish radical circles, among Turkish radicals there were certain elements who applauded the murder of Van Gogh.

3.3.1

Turkish radical Islamic networks and organisations Within the Turkish community in the Netherlands we also see networks of radical Muslims, whether or not loosely organised. Although only a small number of persons are involved in these networks, this development is nevertheless important. The AIVD has established that some dozens of Turks have embraced the Salafi creed, a philosophy that until recently hardly had any Turkish adherents. However, it seems to be mainly a matter between Turks only; only a small number of radicalising Turks seem to have joined trans-ethnic or non-Turkish radical networks. In view of the threat emanating from this range of ideas, as described in the paper ‘Saudi influences in the Netherlands’ which was brought out in 2004, and in view of the fact that a Turkish group of adherents has now been identified, our monitoring of these persons will be continued and intensified. We also see a radicalisation in Turkish radical Islamic organisations like IBDA-C and the Turkish Hezbollah, whose ideas are welcomed in certain circles of the Turkish community. A larger Turkish radical Islamic organisation is the Kaplan movement. This movement attracted public attention in the Netherlands on several occasions in 2004, mainly in relation to the movement’s leader Metin Kaplan and his extradition to Turkey by the German authorities. The Kaplan community, surprised by this development, reacted indignantly. It is not clear who will succeed Metin Kaplan as leader of the movement. Finally, within this context we should mention the international radical Islamic organisation Hizb ut-Tahrir (HUT). Although, strictly speaking, this organisation is not a Turkish

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organisation, in the Netherlands its supporters are mainly recruited among Turks. Some dozens of Turks in the Netherlands adhere to the HUT’s ideas. The Hizb ut-Tahrir is an international movement which adapts itself to the local circumstances of each country in which it is represented. Hence, HUT in the Netherlands is different from for, example the British, German, Danish or Uzbek HUT. In each country the HUT focuses on the largest group of Muslims, so the British followers are mainly Pakistani and Bangladeshi, while the Dutch followers are Turks. The HUT is strictly spoken not really an organisation, but rather a movement that seeks to raise a certain Islamic awareness among its followers. The HUT does not exist as a legal entity. In January 2004 the Danish Ministry of Justice revealed that 18 months of investigation had not produced any evidence that the HUT pursued an illegal objective, used illegal means or carried out illegal activities, so it could not be proscribed. In Germany the movement as such has not been banned, but the membership of the movement is prohibited.

3.4

The Pakistani and Indian community Despite the cautious détente between India and Pakistan, started in 2004, Kashmir, the disputed territory, is still frequently confronted with attacks. The conflict has so far not led to direct confrontations between Indians and Pakistani in the Netherlands. The same goes for Hindus and Muslims originating from Surinam, who traditionally have a cultural and religious affiliation with India and Pakistan. In 2004 several high-ranking Pakistani spiritual and political leaders visited or tried to visit the Netherlands. First of all, the radical Member of Parliament Qazi Hussain Ahmed, representing the Jama’at-i-Islami, tried to visit the Netherlands in May 2004 on the AEL’s invitation. On the basis of an official AIVD report he was refused a visa. We feared that Ahmad’s presence in this country would have a radicalising or even recruiting effect on Muslims in the Netherlands. In August, one of his sympathisers, the MP Maulana Fazlur Rehman, representing the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islami (JUI), visited the Netherlands on a French Schengen visa. He delivered a speech at a mosque in The Hague. In August 2004 also Hafiz, Zubair Ahmad Zaher, leader of the orthodox Markazi Jama’at Ahle Hadith movement, visited the Netherlands. The AIVD is examining to what extent the ideas of the above-mentioned persons have found response among radical Muslims in the Netherlands. At an international level we see an increasing participation of Pakistanis among supporters of Islamist terrorism, instead of the former North African predominance. The recent arrests in the United Kingdom in summer 2004 in which mainly Pakistani were involved are a case in point. The AIVD is trying to find out whether this trend also manifests itself in the Netherlands. It has been established that some radicalised individuals within the Pakistani community in the Netherlands are maintaining ties with sympathisers from other communities.

3.5

The Afghan community Within the Afghan community in the Netherlands there is still anxiety about the deportation policy of the Dutch government. However, in 2004 - as opposed to 2003 - this did not lead to demonstrations or other manifestations. With a view to the election process in Afghanistan and the possible return of refugees to Afghanistan, in several European countries supporters of various Afghan political movements are trying to set up new parties in order to participate in the coming elections. Afghans resident in the Netherlands play a leading role in these efforts. One of them even put himself up for the

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presidential elections that were held in Afghanistan on 9 October 2004, but he withdrew as a candidate prior to the elections. The AIVD has found no evidence to suggest that the Afghan community constitutes a terrorist threat or that radicalisation tendencies would be developing within this community.

3.6

European co-operation The AIVD has further intensified its already close co-operation with European counterpart services concerning the focus on radicalisation processes and the development of counterstrategies. Within the context of the Dutch EU presidency in 2004, the AIVD, jointly with the European co-operative group of police services ‘EU Chiefs of Police Task Force’, organised an expert meeting on ‘Countering Radicalisation and Recruitment’ in September 2004.

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4

Politically motivated violent activism

The AIVD investigates politically motivated activism insofar as it involves violent means and action. The investigations are focused on violence (and threats of violence) aimed against both persons and property. This chapter describes the various forms of politically motivated violent activism in the Netherlands, in particular left-wing activism and right-wing extremism. Also described are developments within the Moluccan community.

4.1

Left-wing activism 2004 should have been a year of action for left-wing activists. The Netherlands held the presidency of the European Union in the second half of the year, which was expected to trigger various activities from left-wing activist quarters. Outsiders particularly expected many campaigns from the anti-globalisation movement as part of its protest against the global economic restructuring. Nothing proved to be further from the truth: practically nothing happened. In 2004 it became increasingly clear that left-wing activism in the Netherlands was faced with a growing despondency and lethargy. Anti-militarism hardly attracted any attention. The Informal Meeting of Ministers of Defence, held at Noordwijk in September, was only confronted with a playful gathering and an ‘noise demonstration’ that should have disturbed the meeting, but did not. Support to so-called political prisoners has increasingly become a marginal phenomenon. In the past few years, activists only gave support to ETA suspects. In 2004 they only paid attention to an anti-globalist from Amsterdam who was extradited to the Swedish authorities because of his suspected involvement in the Göteborg riots in June 2001. When the activist was released soon afterwards, the campaign was immediately stopped. Initially Minister Verdonk’s integration policy seemed to become a spearhead of activism in 2004. There were some demonstrations and an attempted sit-in at the various deportation centres (Rotterdam Airport, Schiphol Airport, Ter Apel), but activism in the traditional sense only played a marginal role in these campaigns. Only one act of more radical individuals made it to the front pages: an incident in which Minister Verdonk was smeared with ketchup. The non-violent campaign against the EU Conference on Integration Policy in Groningen, planned for 9 to 11 November, was indeed peaceful, except for one or two minor incidents. Only one category of activists could again be labelled as ‘politically violent’: the anti-fascists. In 2004 again several demonstrations and activities of right-wing groups triggered a reaction from anti-fascists. This reaction, often in the form of a counterdemonstration, was mainly intended to force local authorities to withdraw their authorisation for right-wing demonstrations. If they did not, the anti-fascists usually tried to provoke a direct confrontation with their extreme right-wing adversaries. And if these attempts failed, which was often the case, the activists sought a confrontation with the police. However, the extreme-right wing demonstrations in the aftermath of the murder of Theo van Gogh only triggered a few verbal reactions from left-wing anti-fascists. They did not seek a confrontation. Summarising, we can conclude that left-wing activism has generally reached a low. Hardly any disturbances of public order were initiated in 2004, let alone violations of the personal integrity of authorities. In October a spokesman of the anarchist group EuroDusnie in Leiden concluded

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that the character of the big protest manifestations in 2004 could be ranged between that of a political meeting and an ‘EO family day’ (a family event organised by the Protestant broadcasting company). He made an appeal to reflect on future resistance and struggle for more solidarity in society: ‘Which does not only mean that we should deal with this right-wing government, but also with the left-wing nostalgia towards the welfare state and ‘polder-model’ negotiating’.

4.2

Animal rights activism 4

In July 2004 the AIVD brought out a paper on welfare and rights of animals. The paper was submitted to the Second Chamber in April, together with a police (KLDP) report about this subject. The paper described the history and development of activism focused on animal welfare and animal rights, as well as the composition of action groups, the backgrounds of the activists, their methods and targets and the international component of this type of activism. The question was raised what risks are involved in the violent expressions of this type of activism and what we might do against excrescences. Animal rights activism in 2004 was again mostly characterised by moderate campaigns such as demonstrations and distributions of pamphlets. On a few occasions there were peaceful blockades. More radical campaigns such as liberations of animals did practically not take place in 2004, partly as a result of the fact that the target companies stepped up their security. The most violent expressions of dissatisfaction were three arson attacks. The most serious one was an incident at the village of Houten, where activists set fire to a car and the fire spread to a fur trader’s house. However, even with respect to this most violent category we can observe a decline in activity. Only companies and institutions associated with experimenting on animals were frequently confronted with campaigns last year. The Biomedical Primate Research Centre (BPRC) at Rijswijk, as well as its business contacts such the ABN Amro bank, were again target of many campaigns, as well as the private homes of persons employed by the BPRC. A temporary stagnation in these activities was caused by the arrest of eight persons on charges of vandalism at the BPRC grounds. In November a number of animal rights activists were acquitted on appeal for vandalism and overt violence in the so-called Putten case (damage inflicted to a mink farm and liberation of some minks at Putten in September 2003). New legislation is expected to help prevent radical animal rights activists from achieving ‘new successes’. On 1 January 2005 a new Identification Act will come into effect, which might lead to a drop in activities. On the other hand, however, it is also possible that the hard core of the activists will decide to go underground, with all its consequences.

4.3

The far right At the moment the two principal neo-Nazi movements in the Netherlands, the Nederlandse Volks Unie (NVU) and the Racial Volunteer Force (RVF), are rather small groups. As a consequence of their extreme ideas they find themselves in a relatively isolated position. The RVF is a small, originally British Blood & Honour organisation, set up in 2002 out of dissatisfaction with the NVU’s moderate course. The RVF and NVU kept a rather low profile in the past year. The NVU organised a demonstration in The Hague on 5 June, which caused some disorder, mainly stirred by extreme left-wing counter-demonstrators. The representatives of the so-called ‘civil extreme right’ foster xenophobic and ultra-nationalist ideas, but they have adapted themselves to the democratic mores, partly under pressure of the

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law and public opinion. In 2004 the significance of the ‘Nieuwe Nationale Partij’ (NNP), which actively sought the limelight in 2003, was considerably reduced, partly as a consequence of the fact that a lot of members left the party to join ‘Nieuw Rechts’ and the ‘Nationale Alliantie’ (NA). The NA, which was set up in November 2003, succeeded in attracting the more radical segment of the NNP, as well as neo-Nazi sympathisers. The NA is politically very active and frequently steps into the limelight. The group also has international ambitions and joined the European National Front (ENF), which was set up in 2004. The other members of the European National Front are extreme right-wing parties from Spain, Germany, Italy, Romania, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, the United Kingdom, Greece, Serbia and Lithuania. The far right in the Netherlands is mainly dominated by unorganised individuals (or groups of individuals) and subcultures propagating extreme right-wing or racist ideas in various ways, inspired by political or other motives. More and more individuals among the Dutch native youth are using extreme right-wing symbols to emphasise their identity and to seek a confrontation with ethnic minorities, local authorities and public opinion. Incidents caused by these persons meet with great resistance in society, if only because of the display of extreme right-wing symbols. Especially the so-called Lonsdale youth (teenagers sporting Lonsdale clothes) has been subject of much public attention last year. Although the vast majority of these young people have no organisational structure or political ideology, the fact that a number of them wear the same type of clothes may add to the perceived threat emanating from them. These youngsters may also be an interesting breeding ground for recruitment by extreme rightwing movements with more political ambitions. So far, however, we have hardly seen any successful recruitment by extreme right-wing parties among these unorganised groups. The murder of Theo van Gogh was used by extreme right-wing organisations as an opportunity to draw public attention to their ideas about the government’s failing integration policy and the collapse of the multicultural society. The organisations hardly attracted any new members, however. Most of the arson attacks against Islamic institutions in the aftermath of the murder proved to be committed by mainly young persons (including Lonsdale youth) who were motivated by a certain solidarity with racist ideas. In one or two cases the perpetrators were members of extreme right-wing groups.

4.4

The Moluccan community The members of the Moluccan community in the Netherlands are seriously concerned about the violence between Christians and Muslims in the Moluccas, which flared up in 2004 and is still continuing, although on a small scale. They are not only worried about their relatives in the Moluccas, but many Moluccan activists are also furious about the perceived evil role of the Indonesian authorities, whom they hold responsible for the violence. They accuse the Indonesian authorities of siding with the Muslim population on the Moluccas. Many Moluccans also protested again against the perceived passive attitude of the Dutch government towards the Republic of Indonesia with respect to the situation in the Moluccas. Apart from some small demonstrations in, for example, The Hague, Geneva and Brussels, this has not led to any violent campaigns initiated by the Moluccan community, however. The supporters of the RMS ideal in the Netherlands are currently reconsidering their line of action, because many of them believe that the RMS has lost initiative. This has led to a more prominent role of the FKM (Front Kedaulatan Maluku), an activist organisation pursuing independence for the Moluccas. Indonesia sees the FKM as a separatist organisation and accuses it of having incited the riots in the Moluccas. The leader of the FKM, Alex Manuputty,

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fled Indonesia in 2004 and is now living in the United States. The FKM has supporters both in the Moluccas and in the United States and the Netherlands. The organisation has plans to open a Moluccan ‘embassy’ in Vanuatu, Melanesia.

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5

Unwelcome interference of foreign powers

Unwelcome interference of foreign powers is not a subject that can be described in detail in a public report, with a view to the protection of the AIVD’s current level of knowledge. For this reason this chapter just gives some general information on the subject. Over the past decade a number of developments have had great impact on the way in which the AIVD had to respond to unwelcome interference of foreign powers. These developments include the emergence of foreign ‘control and influencing networks’ among migrants groups in the West, the growing need for intelligence among foreign powers as a consequence of the increasing complexity of international relations (the disappearance of the traditional Cold War friend-enemy perception), the increasing privatisation of intelligence gathering and the more sophisticated and differentiated mode of operation of foreign powers in the area of intelligence. Although multinationals, private organisations, criminal rings and terrorist networks may also be involved in intelligence activities and can thus damage Dutch interests, the AIVD - in accordance with its statutory duties - mainly focuses on government-controlled intelligence activity. This activity is mainly carried out by foreign intelligence services that have the required instruments and professionally trained intelligence officers at their disposal. In principle, all clandestine activities carried out by foreign intelligence services and powers that might damage Dutch interests can be subject of AIVD investigation. Unlike the threat emanating from Islamist terrorism, which has been high on the political agenda worldwide since 11 September 2001, the threat constituted by intelligence-gathering is a practically invisible phenomenon. As a consequence of this invisibility, awareness of the threat represented by unwelcome foreign intelligence activities among public and politicians is relatively low. The AIVD, jointly with the MIVD, intends to make this intelligence threat more visible and to combat it. In March 2004 the brochure ‘Espionage and security risks; invisible, but still there’ was published. This AIVD/MIVD co-production was intended to make employees in both the private and the public sector more aware of the current risks from espionage. It has been distributed among a wide range of AIVD and MIVD contacts. A reprioritisation of the AIVD’s activities in spring 2004, as a result of which our counter-terrorism efforts were stepped up, left limited room for counter-interference efforts.

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6

Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

The AIVD tries to identify and prevent attempts to procure goods or technology for programmes for weapons of mass destruction in or via the Netherlands. The service thus supports the Dutch counter-proliferation and export control policy. The AIVD also provides relevant information to the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Economic Affairs, as well as to relevant sectors in trade and industry and to scientific research institutions.

6.1

Countries of concern With respect to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction there are various countries that are internationally referred to as high-risk countries or countries of concern. Under this category the international intelligence community mainly ranges Iran, Syria, Pakistan and North Korea. These countries are situated in unstable regions like the Middle East and Southeast Asia, where the possession of weapons of mass destruction is perceived as an opportunity to exert political or military pressure at a regional or global level. It has become more and more evident that countries of concern are increasingly co-operating in the area of the development, production and procurement of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. Sharing their expertise, technology and procurement techniques enable them to develop and produce weapons more effectively. The level and intensity of this co-operation is considerably higher than we estimated in the past, especially between countries with a more or less equally developed industrial infrastructure. On the basis of disclosures in the international press about proliferation-relevant goods of Pakistani origin found in Iran and Libya, the Pakistani nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan was placed under house arrest in Pakistan in December 2003. Khan was accused of having sold these goods and technology to Iran, Libya and North Korea. In the 1990s Khan allegedly supplied goods including ultra centrifuges to Iran through his business partner in Dubai. On 4 February 2004 Khan held a press conference during which he confessed his guilt. President Masharraf granted him amnesty the next day. Khan is still under house arrest, however. In 2002 the National Council for Resistance in Iran (NCRI) disclosed some indications for possible nuclear activities with a military component in Iran. The next year, Iran avoided to answer questions asked by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) about the nature and purpose of these activities, which led to growing concern within the international community about the possible proliferation risk of Iran’s nuclear programme. in October 2003, under pressure of being referred to the UN Security Council, Iran agreed to answer a number of questions asked by the IAEA and to sign an additional protocol to its safeguards agreement under the non-proliferation treaty. As a confidence-building measure, Iran voluntarily suspended all its activities relating to uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing. In June 2004, however, Iran changed its mind and announced to resume its enrichment activities. In the period following the announcement it became clear that exerting pressure on Iran would not have the desired effect. Iran said never to renounce its indefeasible right to uranium enrichment. In view of the seriousness of the matter, a new approach was initiated, which resulted in an agreement between Germany, France and the United Kingdom in November 2004. This agreement and the IAEA resolution following Iran’s renewed agreement to voluntarily

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suspend all enrichment and reprocessing-related activities cleared the way for negations, started in January 2005, about a long-term agreement. In 2004 Iran and North Korea made considerable progress in the area of missile technology. Iran developed an improved version of a ballistic missile. During a parade in Tehran, an improved Shahab-3 was shown, which allegedly has a range of more than 1500 km. This is some hundreds of kilometres more than the now operational Shahab-3. This improved version brings Israel and parts of the NATO territory under the range over Iranian missiles that are capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction. In autumn 2004 North Korea declared to have a ballistic missile with a range of more than 3500 km.

6.2

The Netherlands and proliferation In the course of 2004 it was discovered that high-tech proliferation-relevant material and goods had disappeared from Iraq. In its quarterly reports to the UN Security Council UNMOVIC reported that over the years, Iraq procured 380 SA-2 engines for the Al Samoud programme. After Saddam Hussein’s fall, about twenty of these engines ended up with a Dutch scrap dealer in Rotterdam. The missile engines found in Rotterdam were destroyed according to UNMOVIC’s guidelines for destruction on Wednesday 24 November 2004. Three were stored elsewhere, under the responsibility of the Dutch government. UNMOVIC supervised the destruction. In December 2002 the Fiscal Intelligence and Investigation Service and the Economic Surveillance Department (FIOD-ECD) searched the premises of a Dutch businessman who dealt in goods for the Pakistani Khan Research Laboratories (KRL) for years. They found sufficient evidence for prosecution. The businessman has been charged with unlicensed exporting dual-use goods to Pakistan and twice exporting goods for which it had recently become obligatory to have license. A new house search was conducted on the instructions of the Public Prosecutions Department in April. The first part of the case came up for trial in May 2004. The trial will be continued in 2005. In 2003 President Bush announced the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) as a new instrument in the fight against weapons of mass destruction and against the use of these weapons by terrorists. Meanwhile many countries have endorsed the PSI. PSI implies that ships and other vehicles suspected of transporting weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery can be forced to stop for inspection (interdiction). The PSI was implemented as an additional instrument to the existing non-proliferation treaties and other relevant agreements and instruments (such as the export control regime) in order to enable a more effective prevention of proliferation.

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7

Foreign intelligence

Within the context of its foreign intelligence function, the AIVD collects intelligence relating to other countries in order to provide the government with information that is difficult or impossible to obtain through other channels and that may help the government to define its position on foreign policy and in international negotiations. This information should also contribute to an early identification of latent threats to national security and to a better comprehension of current threats. So the efforts in the area of foreign intelligence, like those in the area of security, contribute to the protection of national security. The difference is that where foreign intelligence is concerned, the AIVD exclusively focuses on the possible influence of the international environment on national security. With a view to the protection of the AIVD’s sources and methods, it is not possible to give a detailed description of these efforts in this annual report. We have therefore confined ourselves to listing the focus areas for foreign intelligence. The law prescribes that the Prime Minister, in agreement with the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations and the Minister of Defence, designates focus areas for foreign intelligence. The Minister of Foreign Affairs is closely involved in the process leading to the annual (and, if necessary, ad-hoc) designation of these subjects. The designation for 2004 was not essentially different from that for 2003, although, as we mentioned in chapter 1, in spring the attacks in Madrid prompted a reconsideration of priorities. The new designation for 2005 confirmed these priorities, so the focus areas for 2005 are largely identical to the reset priorities for 2004. This enables the AIVD to expand both its analytical knowledge and its access to information on these areas in 2005. These focus areas are the following: - developments relating to international terrorism; - developments in countries relevant to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery; - political, ethnic or religious tensions or conflicts in specific countries or regions - both within and between countries - which might lead to a threat to international stability or the international legal order. As the Netherlands has internationally safeguarded its security by participating since World War II in the United Nations, NATO and the OSCE and more recently also the EU, the AIVD’s efforts in the area of foreign intelligence are also focused on supporting these vital international institutions. In the explanatory notes to the designation of focus areas it was stated that: ‘Assessing the value of intelligence-gathering in relation to other countries should not be confined to its immediate usefulness for the Netherlands. Joint European and allied efforts or efforts pertaining to international law are also taken into consideration in assessing whether and to what extent this intelligence-gathering is in the interest of national security’. In view of the still limited number of staff for foreign intelligence, it was again not possible to focus equally intensive attention on all designated countries or subjects in 2004. For that reason the AIVD uses the so-called ‘varifocal model’ for the time being. This means that longterm investment aimed at gaining good access to unique intelligence is only focused on the most important countries or subjects. In other cases intelligence-gathering will be less thorough and usually be restricted to, for example, open sources and reports from counterpart services. Consequently, these efforts will involve a relatively limited use of special instruments.

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This more superficial intelligence-gathering is based on the principle that a subject should be followed in such a way that it enables us at an early stage to identify serious developments that deserve special attention (early warning).

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8

Protective security

The AIVD’s efforts in the area of protective security are aimed at the following objective: making sure that organisations responsible for security perform this task adequately. Within this context the AIVD focuses on the following areas: special information, vital sectors, as well as persons, property and services within the government domain and other subjects relevant to the democratic legal order and national security. The AIVD can help these bodies by providing them with information about threats, by giving them advice about security measures (and making them aware of the vulnerability), by facilitating matters like production, distribution and registration of cryptographic key material, by giving advice on the designation of confidential posts and by contributing to the development of a security policy. This approach adds value to the organisation’s own efforts in the area of security and supports them in their responsibility for security.

8.1

Special information security Special information encompasses state secrets and other vulnerable information that require extra protection. The AIVD contributes to the protection of special information by helping to develop national and international legislation, by giving advice to government bodies and private companies and by developing and acquiring information security products.

8.1.1

Security of Information Regulation for the Government Service - Special Information (Vir-bi) On 1 March 2004 the Security of Information Regulation for the Government Service – Special Information (Vir-bi) came into effect. It was published in no. 47 of the Government Gazette, 9 March 2004. The regulation replaces the old regulation for the protection of state secrets dating from 1989. Under the new regulation the use of modern information and communication technology in handling special information within the government service has to meet certain security requirements relevant to, for example, the storing, processing and transmission of special information in computerised information systems. The regulation also obliges the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations to submit a biennial report on the quality of special information security in the government service to the Council of Ministers. An interdepartmental working group promoted the implementation of the new regulation and developed information and publicity about it as well as guidelines for the implementation. On the basis of the Vir-bi the AIVD developed a framework for assessing systems for the protection of special information. Regulations related to the Vir-bi were brought in line with the new regulation.

8.1.2

Working group on Special Information Security and Crypto facility The Working Group on Special Information Security gives advice and makes proposals concerning the government’s policy in the area of special information security. The participants in the Working Group on Special Information Security are the Ministries of Defence, Foreign Affairs, Justice, and the Interior and Kingdom Relations. The AIVD chairs the working group and is also responsible for its secretariat.

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In 2004 the Working Group submitted three products for the protection of special information to the head of the AIVD for his approval; two products for the encryption of files and one concerned the renewal of an interim approval of a radio system. The head of the AIVD approved these products on behalf of the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations. The Working Group also gave positive advice on a regulation in which the security procedures and responsibilities for handling cryptographic key material and information security systems have been laid down. In addition, the Working Group approved and set priorities for certain projects to be implemented by the crypto facility unit, which is located at the AIVD. In 2004 these projects included development projects for the protection of data (e.g. PCs, laptops and palmtops), oral communication and fax messages (both via the mobile and the regular network), Public Key Infrastructure and software for the secure deletion of data (for example from hard disks). Another project that was launched is focused on the development of a security core in future equipment. 8.1.3

Security scans and advice A security scan is an examination of the security system of an organisation. In 2004 the AIVD completed a cycle of security scans at several ministries. The scans showed that many ministries should considerably improve their system for special information security. The AIVD will develop a plan for this improvement in consultation with the ministries in question in 2005. The AIVD also examined the protection of special information at the Regional Intelligence Services, the National Police Agency’s intelligence service and the special intelligence service of the Royal Military Constabulary. Where necessary recommendations were made to improve the situation. In 2004 the AIVD ‘swept’ several meeting rooms and offices at various ministries (checked the presence of eavesdropping equipment), for example for meetings under the Dutch EU presidency. The AIVD also gave advice on the use and quality of information security products for data communication and took care of the safe production and distribution of security products, including cryptographic key material.

8.1.4

National Security Authority (NSA) The National Security Authority (NSA) is responsible for the protection of special information relating to NATO, EU and the Galileo project at a national level. In the Netherlands the NSA responsibility rests with the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations. The latter has delegated this task to the AIVD. The Ministry of Defence focuses on security in the military sector, the AIVD on the civilian sector. The Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations acts as co-ordinator. The NSA regularly inspects national bodies holding special information and screens staff who have access to this information. 8.1.4.1 NSA for NATO The policy for the protection of classified NATO information is developed by the NATO Security Committee and its working groups. The AIVD, in its capacity of NSA, participates in the meetings of the Committee and the working groups. In 2004 implementation guidelines were drawn up for the NATO security policy. Much attention was also paid to the enlargement of NATO by new Member States.

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Organisations that have access to classified NATO information are regularly subjected to inspections by the NATO Office of Security (NOS). In the Netherlands in 2004 such inspections were conducted at several organisations in the public and the private sector. The AIVD and the Ministry of Defence jointly prepared and supported these inspections. The findings did not give any reason for taking special measures. A country hosting a NATO institution on its territory is obliged to offer this institution a safe working environment. Within this context, the AIVD provided a number of security recommendations to civilian NATO bodies based in the Netherlands. NATO requires that companies executing orders for NATO have a valid Facility Security Clearance Certificate and that staff are screened before getting access to classified NATO information. The activities involved in this screening are carried out by the AIVD. Within a NATO context, the AIVD also functions as National Communications Security Agency. As part of this responsibility the AIVD contributes to the development of NATO regulations for technical information security and related procedures. In 2004 these efforts were focused on, for example, the procurement and development of equipment for NATO. 8.1.4.2 NSA for the EU The Council of the European Union also has a Security Committee. The Netherlands is represented in this committee by the Ministry of Defence and the AIVD. In 2004 the Security Committee focused attention on several subjects, including - the exchange of classified EU information with third countries and international organisations; - the protection of two classified Council networks, both with a view to the entry into the EU of new Member States and in order to upgrade the security level of the networks; - a network that should replace the two present networks in the future. In connection with the enlargement of the EU, the EU, jointly with the European Commission’s security office, inspected all new Member States in order to verify whether they complied with the EU regulations for special information security. The AIVD was also involved in these inspections. The AIVD satisfies the EU requirements for conducting evaluations of information security equipment for the EU as a ‘second country’, independent from the producing country. In 2004 the AIVD conducted two evaluations for the EU and started a third one. The AIVD participates in the Commission Security Policy Advisory Group (CSPAG), a committee for the security policy of the European Commission. This group also paid attention to the enlargement of the EU, but also to a regulation for industrial security to supplement the current security regulation. A draft regulation is expected to be submitted to the Member States in 2005. 8.1.4.3 The Galileo project The Galileo project is a joint initiative of the European Commission and the European Space Agency (ESA) for the development of a European satellite navigation system as a counterpart of the American GPS system. The Netherlands is one of the participants in the project. In its capacity of NSA the AIVD sits on the ESA Security Committee, which develops a policy for the protection of classified information to be handled by ESA. Within this context the AIVD conducted an inspection of the European Space Research and Technology Centre (ESTEC) at Noordwijk in 2004. As a result, a security clearance was issued to ESTEC for the period of one year. The AIVD also gave ESTEC security advice. The AIVD also participates in a working group of the European Commission which develops the policy for the protection of special information within the Galileo project. 41

8.2

Vital sectors It is the AIVD’s task to support and enhance the security of vital sectors in our society. Vital sectors are parts of the public and the private sector that the ministry responsible deems to be of vital importance to the preservation of social life. The AIVD helps the organisations in these sectors to make risk assessments, provides them with information about threats and gives them advice on security. The Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations co-ordinates the interdepartmental efforts within the context of the Vital Infrastructure Protection project. The purpose of this project is to gain insight into the vulnerability of the vital infrastructure in the Netherlands and to protect this where necessary by taking protective measures. A coherent set of measures to protect the vital infrastructure will be presented to Parliament by the middle of 2005. In order to realise the objective of the project, each ministry should make vulnerability analyses of its vital sectors. The following twelve sectors have been designated as vital: 1 energy; 2 telecommunication; 3 water supply; 4 food; 5 health; 6 finance; 7 surface water control; 8 public order and safety; 9 legal order; 10 public administration; 11 transport; 12 chemical and nuclear industry. The AIVD provides expertise on a methodology to assess the interrelation between interests, threats and defence capability, helps the sectors to make vulnerability analyses and gives advice on possible security measures. Although the AIVD offered its assistance to all vital sectors, in 2004 only the energy sector, the telecommunication sector, the financial sector, the water supply sector and the chemical and nuclear industry accepted the offer. The progress and depth of vulnerability analyses differ per sector. Given the aim to have a coherent set of measures by the middle of 2005, the AIVD expects more requests for assistance from the ministries in the first six months of 2005.

8.3

Persons, property and services The AIVD completed the project for embedding the new system for safety and security in the AIVD organisation on 1 June 2004. The essence of this new task, which will be laid down in amended legislation, is to focus attention not only on specific threats by investigating the persons or groups posing the threats, but also on potential threats considered from the perspective of the threatened target. For this task extra staff was assigned to the AIVD.

8.3.1

Threat reports and threat assessments Within the final context of the system for safety and security the AIVD should produce four types of products: threat reports, threat assessments, threat analyses and risk analyses. A threat report contains information which the AIVD cannot immediately assess, but which

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may be important to the National Co-ordinator for Safety and Security. A threat assessment is brought out in relation to nearing events when it is important to specify possible indications of specific threats against these events. A threat assessment is based on investigations into a person or group posing the threat. Threat analyses describe not only specific threats, but also potential threats, considered from the perspective of the threatened target. Risk analyses are based upon the aspects of the threat analyses in relation to an assessment of the capability of the threatened person, property or service to defend himself/itself against the threat. On the basis of this defence capability we can assess the neutralising effect of security measures. If the measures are insufficient to neutralise the threat, there is a risk. Until the Intelligence and Security Services Act 2002 has been amended, the AIVD is not allowed to start investigations into potential threats or to lay down information related to persons or organisations within this context. The present Act restricts our efforts to the examination of situations in which there is a serious suspicion of a danger to the democratic legal order, national security or other vital interests of the state. This does not include a potential threat. This means that at the moment the AIVD cannot yet make complete threat analyses or risk analyses. But on the basis of its current statutory duties, the AIVD can make threat reports and threat assessments. The bill to amend the present Act will be submitted to Parliament in spring 2005. Under the provisions of this bill the intelligence and security services will be responsible for making threat analyses (MIVD and AIVD) and risk analyses (AIVD) for persons, property or services in the public domain. They will do so at the request of the National Co-ordinator for Safety and Security, who will be mandated to make such requests by the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations and the Minister of Justice. The services will then be enabled to start investigations for making these threat analyses and risk analyses, even in cases in which such investigations would not fall within the regular duties of the services. It is not allowed to use special intelligence instruments for these investigations. 8.3.2

Products in 2004 In 2001 the AIVD contributed to the Safety and Security System by providing the National Coordinator for Safety and Security with 696 threat reports and threat assessments. The products concerned threats aimed at persons and at special or specific events like the European Football Championship in Portugal and the situation in the aftermath of the murder of Theo van Gogh. The Netherlands held the presidency of the European Union from 1 July to 31 December 2004. The AIVD was involved in a number of security-related aspects of the presidency, including drawing up a temporary list of positions involving confidentiality, security screening for these positions, consulting records for political background information and making threat assessments for EU meetings. The EU presidency passed off without any problems or disturbances worth mentioning, partly as a result of the AIVD’s efforts. During the presidency the AIVD - issued about 450 security clearances; - produced about one hundred threat assessments and threat overviews for EU meetings in the Netherlands and Brussels and for the presidency in general; - checked the records on 21,000 persons. This resulted in two official reports which were intended to bar the persons mentioned in these reports from EU meetings.

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The AIVD also brought out reports about ‘reconnaissance activities’ carried out by radical Muslims at several public buildings. Extremist Muslims observed these buildings and proved to be in possession of plans of the buildings, possibly with the aim to commit attacks. The AIVD’s efforts within the context of the Safety and Security System first of all concerned the protection of a number of specific buildings, about which the AIVD provided regular updates to the organisations concerned. The murder of Theo van Gogh has led to a climate in society in which the polarisation between various groups intensified. The assassination triggered a series of threats to politicians and other prominent figures in the Netherlands. Mosques, churches and other buildings with an obvious religious background were targets (or potential targets) of violent campaigns. In this period the AIVD informed interested parties about possible threats to persons and property. As a host country for a number of international organisations, the Netherlands should create and guarantee conditions for the undisturbed functioning of these organisations. In 2004 the AIVD provided several relevant threat assessments and security recommendations to these organisations and conducted vetting inquiries at the request of these organisations. The organisations in question are the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the International Criminal Court (ICC), Eurojust, Europol, the International Court of Justice, Eurocontrol, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and the European Patent Office (EPO). The AIVD provided the National Security Committee on Civil Aviation with two reports on specific threats to civil aviation in 2004. 8.3.3

International organisations The Netherlands hosts several international organisations, such as the International Court of Justice, Europol, Eurojust, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Court (ICC). The Netherlands should safeguard the undisturbed functioning of these organisations as much as possible. The buildings, staff and visitors of these organisations may be exposed to certain security risks. In order to enable these organisations to defend themselves adequately against these risks, the AIVD provided them with threat assessments and security advice. At the request of a number of organisations the service also conducted a number of vetting inquiries. 8.3.3.1 International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia In 2004 the AIVD examined possible threats to the ICTY and informed the parties involved about its findings. The AIVD is on alert for risks involved in the Milosevic trial, which started in 2002, and for risks involved in the trial of three former fighters of the Kosovo Liberation Army, which started in 2004. The AIVD still believes that the suspected Bosnian Serbs Mladic and Karadzic might be handed over to the ICTY in 2005. If such is the case, the AIVD will inform the bodies responsible about possible security risks. 8.3.3.2 International Criminal Court The International Criminal Court (ICC), which started its activities in July 2002, is gradually developing into a fully operative tribunal. In 2004 the ICC investigated two situations, one in the Democratic Republic of Congo and one in Uganda. We expect that the first ICC trial will be started in 2005. Within this context the AIVD focuses on the identification and prevention of

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possible threats against the ICC and against the Netherlands as a host country. In 2004 the AIVD provided the ICC with relevant security advice and discussed matters like information exchange. We expect that the relations with the ICC will be further intensified in 2005.

8.4

Positions involving confidentiality and security screening A position involving confidentiality can only be filled when a security clearance (‘certificate of no objection’) has been issued by or on behalf of the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations. Prior to the issuing of such a clearance, a security investigation or vetting inquiry is conducted by, or under the responsibility of the AIVD. Positions involving confidentiality can be divided into three categories: A, B, and C positions. These categories indicate the vulnerability of the positions, which corresponds with the seriousness of the possible damage to national security that may be caused by employees holding the positions. The depth of an investigation depends on the category of the position. Recently a new category was introduced for positions at the police and at the Royal Household. For the police these positions are called P-category positions, for the Royal Household we call them KH-category positions (KH is an abbreviation of ‘Koninklijk Huis’, Dutch for Royal Household). Vetting for KH positions and P positions is comparable to vetting for B-category positions, be it that they include some fieldwork. These investigations are conducted by mandate.

8.4.1

Reducing the duration of procedures Early in 2004 the AIVD reconsidered its procedure for A-category vetting in view of the long duration of these investigations. This has led to an adjustment to the procedure, meaning that now more emphasis is put on administrative investigations in order to narrow down the labourintensive field investigations and make them more efficient. The AIVD also made some agreements with police regions in order to reduce the duration of vetting procedures. The measures indeed reduced the duration of A-category investigations in 2004. While in 2003 the average duration of these investigations was 16 weeks, by the end of 2004 this had been reduced to eight weeks. By the end of 2004 the average duration of A-category investigations for the police was 11 weeks, whereas in 2003 the average duration was 20 weeks. The AIVD also started to examine the usefulness and employability of several new instruments to reduce the duration, but also to improve the quality of vetting inquiries. This examination has not yet been completed.

8.4.2

Implementation of the Security Investigations Act in practice The AIVD, in co-operation with the Defence Intelligence and Security Service, reconsidered the implementation of the Security Investigations Act in practice. This led to proposals to amend the Act and some organisational activities (parliamentary report 2004/05, 29 843, no. 1). The AIVD has meanwhile started the implementation of the organisational activities that are relevant to its functions, such as the harmonisation of positions involving confidentiality and an updating of policy regulations. We are also preparing an amendment to the Act.

8.4.3

Confidential posts and integrity The AIVD started the development of guidelines for designating certain types of (sensitive) public positions as positions involving confidentiality if such contributes to the protection of

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the democratic legal order. The guidelines are based on the principle that the government bodies themselves are responsible for taking measures to enhance integrity. If these are inadequate and if, as a consequence, dishonourable or dishonest behaviour may affect the democratic legal order or national security, a possible option is to designate confidential posts (i.e. positions involving confidentiality). The guidelines are expected to be completed in 2005. 8.4.4

Vetting by the Royal Military Constabulary The AIVD has mandated the Royal Military Constabulary (KMAR) to conduct vetting inquiries for civil aviation. In comparison to 2003, the total number of investigations for civil aviations went down by 1,744 to 34,894. In 2003 the KMAR started with so-called renewed investigations in civil aviation. In 2004 4,622 inquires of this type were started for positions at Schiphol Airport. Renewed investigations were also started for positions at the other airports. If there are reasons to believe that a security clearance should be refused, the KMAR passes the investigations to the AIVD. In 2003 this happened in 3,744 cases. In 2004 this number went up by 546 to 4,290 cases. These investigations were passed to the AIVD because the subject had a criminal record or because initial vetting produced insufficient information to assess whether a security clearance could be issued. The KMAR also transfers investigations to the AIVD with a view to certain information held by the AIVD - the so-called political consultation of AIVD records - and in case of an earlier refusal of a security clearance for civil aviation.

8.4.5

Vetting for and by the police In 2004 25 police forces conducted vetting inquiries under the Security Investigations Act. In 2005 the last police force also started this activity. Vetting for the police includes both Acategory investigations and so-called P-category investigations. The AIVD has mandated the police to conduct these P-investigations. P-category positions involving confidentiality are less vulnerable than A-category positions, hence P-investigations are less in-depth than Ainvestigations. If there are reasons to believe that a security clearance should be refused, the police pass such investigations to the AIVD. In 2004 this happened in 83 cases. In principle, vetting for A-category positions at the police forces is carried out by the AIVD. In 2004 there were 981 of such A investigations, which was 105 more than in the previous year. The AIVD is also responsible for the training and supervision of police officers who have been charged with vetting for P-positions. The AIVD organised five training courses in 2004. 36 officers followed a course for investigators and 37 followed training in the processing of vettingrelated data. The AIVD made some agreements with a number of police regions, including the big ones, to have the police carry out part of the A-category vetting inquiries, i.e. the consultation of records. In 2004 the AIVD also started to have a number of A-category vetting inquiries conducted in the regions. In these cases the AIVD controls the inquiries, but the fieldwork is carried out by police officers. Decision-making still rests with the AIVD. In 2003 for the first time some police officers who were experienced in P investigations started to work for the AIVD on a secondment basis. This initiative was continued in 2004. By the end of 2004, seven police officers worked

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for the AIVD on a secondment basis. They mainly conducted vetting inquiries for A-category positions at the police. This initiative, as well as the fact that some A-category investigations were conducted in the regions, gave the AIVD more room for the other A-category vetting. 8.4.6

Vetting for the Royal Household As from 2 April 2004 a number of positions at the Royal Household have been designated as A-category and KH-category positions involving confidentiality. These positions are held by persons who are employed by the Royal Family. The AIVD conducts the A investigations. Vetting for KH positions is conducted by the National Police Agency under the responsibility of the AIVD. In the past year the AIVD carried out 32 A investigations, while the National Police Agency conducted 104 KH investigations. When there is reason to believe that a security clearance should be refused, the police pass the investigations to the AIVD. Seven KH investigations were passed to the AIVD in 2004. The AIVD is responsible for the training and supervision of the officers who have been charged with vetting for KH positions. In 2004 one officer followed a course for investigators and two followed training in the processing of vetting-related data. The courses were equal to those mentioned under section 8.4.5.

8.4.7

Number of positions and investigations The table below gives an overview of the number of positions involving confidentiality and the number of vetting inquiries over the past three years.

* Excluding the Ministry of Defence and the armed forces, including the AIVD. For the Ministry of Foreign Affairs the figure represents the number of FTEs for confidential posts. ** The figure under ‘confidential posts’ represents the number of vetting inquiries, because no confidential posts have been designated in civil aviation. In civil aviation a pass is required for access to protected areas. One of the conditions to obtain such a pass is a security clearance issued on the basis of a vetting inquiry. *** The confidential posts at the Royal Household will be designated in phases over a period of three years. **** Under the category ‘miscellaneous’ we range investigations carried out at the request of other countries or international organisations in connection with security measures used by these countries or international organisations.

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The table below gives an overview of the number of vetting inquiries conducted by the AIVD in the past three years. The investigations conducted by the KMAR and the police forces are not included, except for those that were later transferred to the AIVD.

8.4.8

Results In 2004 in 40,399 cases a security clearance was issued. The number of refusals of a security clearance dropped by 583 compared to 2003 to 1,549. Most of these cases involved B investigations in civil aviation (1,513 in 2004 and 2,065 in 2003). For the Royal Household no security clearances were refused in 2004.

* Other reasons for refusal are personal conduct and circumstances and/or information from AIVD records. In section 8.4.1 we mentioned our efforts to reduce the duration of A-category vetting inquiries. These efforts will be continued in 2005. The majority of the B and C investigations were handled within the statutory period of eight weeks. Cases in which this statutory period were exceeded mainly concerned A investigations. These investigations include an administrative phase and a field investigation, including interviews with informants. Each phase usually takes four weeks. However, if there is not enough staff available for the number of A investigations to be dealt with, it takes a couple of weeks before the field investigation can be started. This causes backlogs. Part of the manpower allocated to A investigations for the police was spent on training and supervision of police officers who conduct P investigations. Due to these extra efforts and the relatively large number of A investigations to be carried out for the police, work tends to pile up. 8.4.9

Objection and appeal cases The overview below represents the numbers and results of objection and appeal procedures instituted against the outcome of vetting inquiries.

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Part of the objection and appeal procedures that were dealt with were instituted in 2003.

In twelve of the cases in which the notice of objection was upheld the security clearance was refused because insufficient information about the applicant was available. During the objection procedure the lacking information was provided, which enabled us to assess whether the applicant would faithfully fulfil the duties ensuing from the position involving confidentiality faithfully under all circumstances. Ten cases concerned judicial information. During the objection procedures in two of these cases the information proved to have been changed. In the other eight cases the Complaints Committee for Security Screening did not deem the information serious enough to refuse a clearance. In two cases a security clearance was refused on the basis of other personal circumstances and actions. In one of these cases the Complaints Committee for Security Screening assessed these circumstances differently, and in the other the personal circumstances proved to have been changed. One appeal case that was upheld was focused on the question when an offence should be regarded as a juvenile offence. According to the court, finding an answer to this question should be based on the information mentioned in the extract from the General Documentation Register and the Policy Rule for positions involving confidentiality and security screening at civil airports. The court also deemed that in relation to the contested decision it was insufficiently explained what role the severity of the sentence had played in reaching the decision. Concerning another appeal that was upheld, the court considered to reverse the contested decision on the notice of objection because it was based on insufficient grounds, meaning that the decision failed to make clear why the offence in question was not considered a juvenile offence. These two cases have led to the decision to provide more detailed grounds for the reason why an offence committed by a minor is not considered a juvenile offence in case of a decision to refuse a security clearance on the basis of this offence.

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8.5

Other efforts A number of activities carried out by the AIVD within the context of protective security cannot be ranged under the above-mentioned subjects. This paragraph gives an outline of these efforts.

8.5.1

Integrity Violations Reporting Centre The Directorate General for Management in the Public Sector of the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations is developing an Integrity Office for the Public Sector. The intention is to transfer the further development of instruments for and management of the Guidelines for Integrity Projects from the AIVD to this office, because the latter is a more appropriate body for this task. At present the Integrity Violations Reporting Centre still falls under the AIVD’s responsibility. In 2005 the above-mentioned Directorate General for Management in the Public Sector and the AIVD will investigate where the reporting centre could better be transferred to another government organisation. This is in line with the recommendation made by the Administrative Evaluation Committee for the AIVD to examine whether parts of tasks now carried out by the AIVD, including integrity projects, might be conducted by other organisations. In the past few years, the Reporting Centre received many reports that did not actually concern integrity violations. This led to a distorted image of the proportion between the big number of reports and the small number of investigations. This was again the case in 2004. The AIVD received 87 reports, 67 of which were immediately recognised as irrelevant to integrity violations. Closer examination of the remaining 20 reports did not give us cause for starting integrity investigations either. This was based on various reasons: - On closer examination, ten reports concerned cases that failed to meet the relevant criteria; - Five cases were being dealt with by other organisations; - In five cases the reporter either withdrew the report or refused to provide more details for an investigation. The fact that many reports do not concern integrity incidents is another reason to broaden the public information about the Reporting Centre, specifically when we know under whose responsibility it will fall in the future.

8.5.2

Integrity at the police Jointly with the Police Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, the Netherlands Police Institute (NPI) and the Netherlands Police College (NPA), the AIVD is examining how it can contribute to current efforts focused on integrity at the police.

8.5.3

Electronic attacks In 2004 the AIVD continued its research into the nature and number of attacks on computer networks, the so-called electronic attacks. This will also be the case in 2005. The means used to that end include so-called intrusion detection systems, which enable temporary or long-term monitoring of various networks, focused on attacks from outside. The AIVD has set up a facility for the collection and collation of reports relating to electronic attacks from, for example, counterpart services and government organisations.

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8.5.4

Restructuring the position of Security Officer The tasks currently performed by the AIVD’s Security Officer (who is responsible for the service’s overall security) are considered to be inadequate in the sense that they do not meet today’s requirements for adequate governmentwide security. In 2004 the AIVD reconsidered the Security Officer’s position within the organisation and contributed to a restructuring of the tasks involved in the job. The results were laid down in a report about the position of Security Officer and incorporated in the draft ‘Security Regulation 2004’. Both documents are relevant to the development of a reviewed job description. They were approved by the council of secretaries general.

8.5.5

Protection of application for and issue of travel documents At the request of the Basic Administration of Personal Data and Travel Documents Agency (BPR), the AIVD examined the security procedures for protecting the application for and issue of travel documents in two towns. Similar examinations will be started in two other towns in 2005, after which the findings of all four examinations will be provided to the BPR.

8.5.6

Protection of production, storing and transport of driving licences The Government Road Transport Agency put out the development and production of a new driving licence to tender in Europe in 2004. The AIVD gave the Government Road Transport Agency advice on the formulation of security requirements for the production, storing and transport of these documents and on judging the tenders in relation to these aspects. In 2005 the AIVD will support the further progress of the tendering.

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9

Oversight

This chapter describes political control, parliamentary matters, legislation and communication relating to the AIVD, as well as applications under the Freedom of Information Act and complaints. The final section concerns the Supervisory Committee.

9.1

Control The primary responsibility for controlling the AIVD rests with the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations. Some areas come under the joint responsibility of this minister and other ministers. Relevant political decision-making is prepared by two official preparatory bodies.

9.1.1

The Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations The Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations is responsible for the General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD). The Minister determines the focus areas and renders account of the work of the AIVD to parliament. The Administrative Evaluation Committee for the AIVD concluded that, partly as a consequence of the complicated oversight structure relating to the AIVD, there is a lack of clarity about the way in which priorities are set for AIVD activities. The Committee was of the opinion that only one person, the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, should be responsible for controlling the service and for setting its priorities. The Council of Ministers endorsed these conclusions. As from 2005, the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations will lay down the priorities and posteriorities for the AIVD in a year plan, which will be co-ordinated with the other ministers. The Minister of Justice was designated as co-ordinating minister for counter-terrorism. So in relation to counter-terrorism efforts to be performed by the AIVD the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations works in close conjunction with the Minister of Justice. In order to support this structure, after the attacks on 11 March 2004, a National Co-ordinator for CounterTerrorism (NCTb) was appointed, who has his own staff.

9.1.2

Council for National Security In the aftermath of the attacks in Madrid the Council for National Security (RNV) was set up. The Council for National Security is a sub-council of the Council of Ministers. It replaces the former Council for the Intelligence and Security Services. The RNV is chaired by the Prime Minister. Its members are the Vice Prime Ministers, the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, the Minister of Justice, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Defence and the Minister for Aliens affairs and Integration. The RNV met on eight occasions in 2004. Counter-terrorism is obviously one of the RNV’s key focus areas. The RNV discussed the structure of counter-terrorism in the Netherlands several times in 2004. At each meeting an updated threat assessment is discussed, as well as the ensuing measures.

9.1.3

Joint Counter-terrorism Committee The Joint Counter-terrorism Committee (GCT) is one of the preparatory bodies for the RNV. In principle, each RNV meeting is preceded by meeting of a preparatory body. The GCT prepares documents and decisions for the RNV concerning counter-terrorism. The other

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documents are prepared by the Netherlands Joint Intelligence Committee (CVIN, see below). The National Co-ordinator for Counter-terrorism chairs the GCT meetings. The GCT consists of representatives of all organisations involved in counter-terrorism on a central government level. 9.1.4

Netherlands Joint Intelligence Committee Like the GCT, the Netherlands Joint Intelligence Committee (CVIN) is a preparatory body for the RNV. But where the GCT focuses specifically on the preparation of decision-making, the CVIN rather discusses certain sensitive issues relating to the foreign intelligence function of the AIVD and the MIVD. The CVIN is chaired by the Co-ordinator for the intelligence and security services of the Ministry of General Affairs. Its members are the Director General Political Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Director General Law Enforcement of the Ministry of Justice, the Director General Public Order and Security of the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, the Director General of the AIVD and the Director General of the MIVD.

9.2

Parliamentary matters and legislation This section describes the parliamentary oversight of the work of the AIVD by the Second Chamber (Lower House of Parliament) and its Committee on the Intelligence and Security Services, as well as legislation relevant to the AIVD.

9.2.1

The Second Chamber The Second Chamber discussed the subject of terrorism and related subjects on many occasions in 2004. Plenary debates were held about the financing of imams by the Embassy of Saudi Arabia, the attacks in Madrid, the Al Tawheed mosque in Amsterdam and the assassination of Mr Van Gogh. On 11 March the standing committee for the Interior and Kingdom Relations and the standing committee for Justice discussed with the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations the government position on the report ‘Aliens Policy and Counter-Terrorism’ from the Advisory Committee for Aliens Affairs. Separately the two commissions also discussed with the minister the Takfir Wal Hijra and the Al Waqf Al Islami foundation. On 15 September the two aforementioned committees discussed the Al Tawheed mosque, Saudi financing of mosques and the Al-Haramain foundation. Finally, on 23 September the committees discussed some subjects including the exchange of law enforcement-related and terrorism-related information as well as the increased terrorist threat. Also discussed in plenary meetings were information from national security services about Iraq and threats against the Minister for Aliens Affairs and Integration. On 22 June the standing committees for the Interior and Kingdom Relations and for Justice discussed a letter from the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations and the Minister for Government Reform and Kingdom Relations about freedom of expression and the safety and security system, also referring to an AIVD paper about the background of jihad recruits in the Netherlands. The paper described how a growing number of Muslims in the Netherlands feel disrespectfully treated by opinion-makers and opinion-leaders. Finally, on 14 October 2004 the standing committee for the Interior and Kingdom Relations discussed the annual reports for 2003 of the AIVD, the Supervisory Committee for the Intelligence and Security Services and the parliamentary Committee on the Intelligence and Security Services. On the same occasion the government’s position with respect to the follow-up of a parliamentary motion about the attack on Mr Fortuyn were discussed, as well as the Supervisory Committee’s report about an AIVD study of

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radicalisation processes in the Islamic community, the legislative proposals to amend the Intelligence and Security Services Act 200 (Wiv 2002) and the Security Investigations Act (WVO) and an AIVD paper on animal rights activism. The standing committee for the Interior and Kingdom Relations paid a working visit to the AIVD on 13 February 2004. On that occasion the committee received a briefing on the threat level in the AIVD’s various focus areas and general information on the use of special intelligence tools, on financial investigation and on the AIVD’s contribution to the safety and security system. In the past year the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations provided the Second Chamber with detailed information about AIVD-related subjects on several occasions, by means of letters, reports, memorandums and notes. A complete list of these documents has been included in the overview of all parliamentary reports relating to the AIVD in 2004 (annex 1). The following documents were particularly relevant. - The AIVD paper ‘Backgrounds of jihad recruits in the Netherlands’, submitted on 9 March 2004 (Parliamentary reports II 2003/04, 27 925, no. 120); - The AIVD paper ‘Saudi influences in the Netherlands. Connections between Salafi mission, radicalisation processes and Islamic terrorism’, submitted on 3 June 2004 (Parliamentary reports II 2003/04, 27 925, no. 128); - The letter dated 10 June 2004 about the government’s knowledge of the involvement of Urenco Nederland BV in the development of nuclear weapons in a number of countries, including Pakistan (Parliamentary reports II 2003/04, 29 200 V, no. 87); - The AIVD paper ‘Animal rights activism in the Netherlands. Between peaceful and burning protest’, submitted on 12 July 2004 (Parliamentary reports II 2003/04, 29 200 VI, no. 175); - The letter dated 10 September 2004 from the Ministries of Justice and the Interior and Kingdom Relations about new steps and measures concerning counter-terrorism and about the threat situation in the past few months (Parliamentary reports II 2003/04, 29 754, no. 1); - The letter dated 10 November 2004 about the allegation that AIVD information might have ended up in the hands of Muslim terrorists and Mohammed B. (Parliamentary reports II 2004/05, 29 854, no. 3); - The letter dated 10 November 2004 about the backgrounds of the murder of Mr Van Gogh (Parliamentary reports II 2004/05, 29 854, no. 3); - The AIVD report ‘From Dawa to Jihad; the various threats from radical Islam to the democratic legal order’, submitted on 22 December 2004 (Parliamentary reports II 2004/05, 29 754, no. 4); - The report ‘Implementation of the Security Investigations Act in practice’, submitted on 11 October 2004 (Parliamentary reports II 2004/05, 29 843, no. 1); - The report ‘AIVD in transformation’ submitted by the Administrative Evaluation Committee for the AIVD on 16 November 2004 (Parliamentary reports II 2004/05, 29 876, no. 1) and the letter dated 24 January 2005 containing the government’s response to the committee’s report (Parliamentary reports II 2004/05, 29 976, no. 3). 9.2.2

The Committee on the Intelligence and Security Services The Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations renders account to the parliamentary Committee on the Intelligence and Security Services of all matters relating to the AIVD that cannot be discussed in public. The committee consists of the leaders of the parties represented in parliament, except for the leaders of recently split off parliamentary groups and the leader of the SP (Socialist Party) who has chosen not to sit on the committee. The committee brings out 55

a public annual report of its activities. The committee paid a working visit to the AIVD on 16 February 2004. In 2004 there were nine meetings of the committee with the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, who was accompanied by AIVD officers on these occasions. The subjects for discussion included the attacks in Madrid, setting new priorities for the AIVD, the secret version of the AIVD’s annual report, AIVD information about Iraq, the arrest of an AIVD officer and the assassination of Mr van Gogh. In relation to the murder of Mr van Gogh, the committee also discussed the system for safety and security. These discussions were also attended by the Minister of Justice and the national co-ordinator for safety and security. 9.2.3

Legislation In a letter dated 15 July 2004, written by the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, also on behalf of the Minister of Defence, an overview of the various proposals to amend Acts of Parliament pertaining to the intelligence and security services was sent to the chairman of the Second Chamber. The proposed amendments concerned the Intelligence and Security Services Act 2002 (Wiv 2002) and the Security Investigations Act (wvo). A number of proposals were based upon the experiences with the new regime since the coming into effect of the Wiv 2002. But also the attacks in Madrid gave cause to supplement the proposals and to reset priorities. In the letter these proposals were referred to as the so-called post-Madrid measures. The bill in which the post-Madrid proposals are incorporated is nearing its completion and is expected to be submitted to the Council of Ministers in spring 2005. The bill will also contain some other proposals, which were developed on the basis of the administrative evaluation of the AIVD, including an extension of the provisions for technical assistance and an adjustment to the appointment procedure for the Supervisory Committee. As concerns the other legislative proposals mentioned in the letter of 15 July, the Council of State gave its advice about the bill on safety and security based upon the amendments proposed in the memorandum on the new system for safety and security (Parliamentary reports II 2002/03, 28 974, no. 2), on 17 December 2004. The bill will be submitted to the Second Chamber in spring 2005. On 11 October 2004 the report on the implementation in practice of the Security Investigations Act was submitted to the Second Chamber (Parliamentary reports II 2004/05, 29 843, no. 1). In the report it was concluded that the Security Investigations Act needed to be amended with respect to a limited number of sections. The preparation of these amendments was recently started. On 18 March 2004 the Act to amend the Code of Criminal Procedure and other acts pertaining to the adjustment of authorisations to demand telecommunication data was laid down in the Bulletin of Acts, Orders and Decrees 2004, 105. Article IV of this Act provides for new Articles 28 and 29 in the Wiv 2002, pertaining to the authorisation to demand so-called traffic data (i.e. data relating to a user’s name, address, post code, place of residence, number and type of service) from the providers of public telecommunication services and telecommunication networks. The entering into force of this article was postponed awaiting the drawing up of an order in council containing a comprehensive enumeration of the types of traffic data that can be demanded from providers of public telecommunication networks and services on the basis of Article 28 of the Wiv 2002. The Council of State gave its advice on the proposal for this order in council on 10 December 2004. The proposal was also notified to the European Commission, on the basis of Directive no. 98/34/EC (notification directive). The stand-still period for the proposal ends on 21 February 2005. The Designation Order for Article 39 Wiv 2002 (Bulletin of Acts, Orders and Decrees 2004, 506) came into effect on 15 October 2004. This order designates a number of persons and organisations involved in public tasks to whom the services can provide information on the 56

basis of an urgent and serious reason, insofar as this information may also be relevant to the interests looked after by these persons and organisations within this context. Furthermore, the AIVD, in co-operation with the Ministry of Economic Affairs, worked on an exemption facility pursuant to Article 3.10, paragraph 3 of the Telecommunications Act. Under the provisions set forth in Article 3.10, paragraph 2 of this Act, the Minister of Economic Affairs, in agreement with Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations may give permission for a use of the frequency range that is different from the use set forth in chapter 3 of the Telecommunications Act when such is necessary for the performance of the AIVD’s statutory duties. This concerns, for example, the use of active scanning equipment for tracing numbers of pre-paid mobile phones to enable the effectuation of the authorisation to intercept telecommunication. Pursuant to Article 3.10, paragraph 3, of the Telecommunications Act, it is possible, by ministerial regulation of the Minister of Economic Affairs and the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations jointly, to grant exemption from the permission requirement under the provisions to be set forth in that regulation. After having consulted the Telecommunication and Post Consultation Platform, pursuant to Directive no. 98/34/EC (notification directive), the European Commission was notified of the draft regulation in December. The regulation is expected to be adopted in 2005. The Telecommunications Act provides that in case of interception of telecommunication, the providers are entitled to a reimbursement of the factual personnel and administrative costs. Pursuant to the provisions laid down in the Telecommunications Act, rules shall be laid down for determining and reimbursement of these costs by ministerial regulation. In 2004 the Ministers of Justice, the Interior and Kingdom Relations, Economic Affairs, Defence and Finance reached agreement about the fact that such a regulation would be drawn up and come into effect in 2005.

9.3

Communication The AIVD seeks to provide the Dutch society with as much information on current risks to national security as possible. To that end, in addition to the annual report, several publications were brought out last year, about subjects like foreign espionage in the Netherlands, radical Islam and animal rights activism. Given the response, these publications evidently proved to fill a need. So our policy to bring out papers on specific security issues will be continued. In addition to this, the AIVD also gives information about is work through the press and through public information, for example via its web site www.aivd.nl. Her Majesty Queen Beatrix paid a working visit to the AIVD. In addition, several Members of Parliament, ministers and business contacts visited the service in order to gain more insight into the performance and organisation of the AIVD. According to the conclusions in the Administrative Evaluation Committee’s report ‘The AIVD in transformation’, the public still have insufficient knowledge of the service’s duties and powers. The committee believes that this leads to false expectations of what the service can do. In his response to the report, the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations acknowledged that something should be done about this, both by the Minister himself and by the AIVD. The Minister will more often clarify the role of the service on the basis of specific incidents, and the AIVD itself will seek more publicity and explain its activities via its web site, publications or the press where possible. Obviously, this will take place insofar as it does not compromise current operations, the secrecy of sources, modes of operation and intelligence held by the service.

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9.4

Applications under the Freedom of Information Act In the year under review, many request were made to inspect files held by the AIVD. Only information that is no longer relevant to the AIVD’s current activities may in principle be released. However, if information is not relevant to current issues but might compromise sources or methods of the AIVD, this information is not released. Personal data are not disclosed to third parties, except for data concerning deceased relatives in the first degree. Despite the complexity of many applications under the Freedom of Information Act, the AIVD succeeded in dealing with all applications within the statutory period of three months. It has appeared that the more the AIVD is mentioned in the media, the more requests are made to inspect files. In 2004 the service received 225 applications under the Freedom of Information Act, which was 21.6% more than in 2003. 147 of these requests concerned data about the applicants themselves, 34 concerned data about deceased relatives, 37 concerned other information than personal data and seven requests concerned data relating to third parties. The number of requests is not indicative for the intensity and duration of handling them. While some cases do not ensue any processing of documents because the AIVD does not hold any information on the applicant, other cases lead to the examination and processing of hundreds of documents. In 2004 18 applicants filed a notice of objection against a refusal to inspect a file, 13 applicants instituted an appeal and eight took their case to a higher court. In 2004 16 objections, nine court cases and one appeal to the Council of State were dealt with. In all cases the AIVD’s policy stood the test of scrutiny by the court. Table 8 Pending cases in late 2004 Requests for inspection of files Notices of objection Court cases Appeals before the Council of State

9.5

40 2 4 7

Complaints If citizens believe to be improperly treated by the AIVD, they can lodge a complaint with the service itself, the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations or the parliamentary Committee on the Intelligence and Security Services. If the outcome does not satisfy a citizen, he or she may also turn to the National Ombudsman. In the year under review four complaints were lodged with the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations. The first complaint concerned an action that allegedly took place longer than one year before the complaint was lodged. By invoking Article 9:8, paragraph 1 sub of the General Administrative Law Act, this complaint was not handled. The second complaint concerned the fact that, according to the complainant, the AIVD failed to give the complainant protection. Pursuant to Article 83 of the Intelligence and Security Services Act 2002 (Wiv 2002), the minister submitted the case to the Supervisory Committee for the intelligence and security services for its advice. In conformity with this committee’s advice, the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations declared the complaint unfounded. In the third complaint the AIVD was accused of having unjustly started an investigation into

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the complainant. The Supervisory Committee gave its advice on this complaint. It will be dealt with in 2005. The fourth complaint also concerned an accusation of an unjust investigation into the complainant. This complaint was submitted to the Supervisory Committee early in 2005. Finally, the National Ombudsman dealt with a complaint about the use of a false identity by two AIVD officers in their contact with a citizen. The National Ombudsman regarded this action as proper. In 2003 the National Ombudsman investigated the handling of letters from citizens by government organisations. Within this context the National Ombudsman asked all ministers questions about their handling of applications, notices of objection, written complaints, other letters and e-mail messages in 2002. Some of these questions were also relevant to the AIVD. In his final report of 20 September 2003 (2003/325) the National Ombudsman recommended the AIVD to reduce the duration of handling notices of objection and to improve the provision of information to persons who file a notice of objection or a written complaint. On 15 March 2004, the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations informed the National Ombudsman that the AIVD was working on speeding up the progress of handling notices of objection and that the other recommendations for improvement were implemented in the relevant administrative procedures. Since then the internal procedure for handling notices of objection has been further streamlined. The Minister for Administrative Reform and Kingdom Relations submitted an action plan ‘Professional Handling of Letters and Electronic Messages’ to the Second Chamber on 28 May 2004. This action plan is also the Cabinet’s response to the National Ombudsman’s report (Parliamentary reports II, 2003/04, 29 362, no. 16).

9.6

Supervisory Committee The Intelligence and Security Services Act 2002 (Wiv 2002) provides for an independent supervisory committee pertaining to the intelligence and security services. The Committee’s primary task is to supervise the performance of duties in accordance with the Wiv 2002 and the Security Investigations Act. The Committee started its activities on 1 July 2003. The Committee brought out its first public annual report, covering the period from 1 July 2003 to 1 April 2004. The annual report gives an overview of the Committee’s activities. In addition to the annual report, the Committee also brings out so-called supervision reports. These reports are based upon examinations conducted by the Committee. The supervision reports are public, except for certain parts that provide insight into secret sources, the use of intelligence means in specific cases or a service’s current level of knowledge. On 29 April 2004 the Committee brought out its first supervision report concerning the AIVD. The report reflected the results of an in-depth examination of the AIVD’s activities in relation to its investigation of radicalisation processes within the Islamic community. The Committee concluded that the use of special powers in this investigation was justified and that the use of these powers met the requirements of proportionality and subsidiarity. The Committee also concluded that an initial inadequacy relating to the prolongation of the use of natural persons had been removed. Finally, the Committee made a number of recommendations of an administrative and procedural nature. The Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations submitted the public part of the report with his response to the chairmen of the two Chambers of the States General (Dutch Parliament) (Parliamentary reports II, 2003/04, 27 925, no. 129).

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The Committee sent the other part of the supervision report, which was classified Top Secret, to the parliamentary Committee on the Intelligence and Security Services for their information. In 2004 the Committee also examined the legitimacy of AIVD investigations into developments within the Moluccan community, into proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and into politically motivated violent activism, in particular animal rights activism. In addition, the Committee examined the exchange of information between the AIVD and the IND as well as the meaning and consequences of Article 13 of the Wiv 2002 concerning the processing of personal data. The Committee concluded that the interpretation of Article 13 of the Wiv 2002 did not ensue any problems for the AIVD. As for the other examinations, the supervision reports were not yet completed by the end of 2004. In 2004 the Committee also carried out a random survey at the AIVD to see how the AIVD’s methods were adapted to the provisions set forth in the new Wiv 2002. The Committee concluded that initially there was an inadequacy relating to the use of natural persons, but that this had been brought in line with the new Act. Nevertheless, the Committee decided to start a closer examination of the procedures relating to the use of special powers in 2004-2005. In addition, the Committee gave its opinion about the AIVD’s point of view that the obligation to examine whether a person against whom certain special powers were used can be notified of this fact five years afterwards lapses when there is no legal ground for this notification. The Committee deemed this point of view acceptable, but preferred the MIVD’s approach, meaning that after five years they examine whether there is still no legal ground for notification. The AIVD has decided to follow the MIVD’s method. Finally, pursuant to Article 83, paragraph 3 of the Wiv 2002, the Committee gave advice on two complaints about alleged actions of AIVD officers (see section 9.5).

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10

Co-operation

The AIVD co-operates with a large number of services at home and abroad. This chapter describes this co-operation in separate sections on national co-operation, co-operation with the overseas parts of the Kingdom, European co-operation and other co-operation at an international level.

10.1

National co-operation The AIVD’s co-operation with organisations at a national level encompasses a new cooperative structure, the Counter-terrorism Infobox (CT Infobox), as well as our standard relations with the police, judicial authorities, the Royal Military Constabulary and the MIVD.

10.1.1

CT Infobox Following the attacks in Madrid in March 2004, the Cabinet announced in a letter to the Second Chamber that the monitoring of persons who ‘can in any way be associated with terrorist activities or support to such activities’ should be intensified. This led to the setting up of an Analytical Cell in April 2004. This Analytical Cell, located at the National Police Agency’s (KLPD) headquarters at Zoetermeer, was a unit for co-operation between of the Public Prosecutions Department, the police and the AIVD. The Analytical Cell was supposed to compile and analyse the information held by the aforementioned services relating to persons associated with terrorism (the so-called ‘group of 150’) in order to find a proper way to deal with these persons. In practice, however, this structure proved to be inadequate, because the information held by the AIVD could not completely be made available to the Analytical Cell, in view of the statutory provisions governing secrecy and the provision of information. However, this problem was effectively solved by transferring the collection and collation facility to a new structure located at the AIVD, the CT Infobox . As from 1 July 2004 this has enabled the aforementioned parties to continue and intensify their co-operation. The co-operative group was enlarged with the Immigration and Naturalisation Service (IND) and on 1 January 2005 with the Defence Intelligence and Security Service (MIVD). The aim of the CT Infobox is to contribute to the combat of terrorism by compiling and comparing at a central point information about networks and persons who are in any way involved in terrorism - in particular Islamist terrorism - and in terrorism-related radicalisation. Consultation, comparison and analysis of the data provided to the CT Infobox by the participating services enables a quick, multi-disciplinary analysis and assessment of the information. On the basis of the results of the multi-disciplinary assessment it becomes clear which type of action – intelligence operations, measures pertaining to criminal or aliens law, or a frustration of activities - may be taken by the participating services. The required information is largely exchanged directly between the various partners, within the relevant legal regimes. The CT Infobox as such does not provide information to outsiders. The analysis and multi-disciplinary assessment in the CT Infobox may also lead to the conclusion that there is yet insufficient information to recommend, for example, a follow-up under criminal law or administrative law. In that case the CT Infobox may recommend to monitor certain individuals on various levels. If analysis and assessment of new information lead to the conclusion that there is sufficient reason for taking specific measures, for example pertaining to criminal law or administrative law, the CT Infobox partners will prepare relevant advice.

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The first results of the CT Infobox were promising and met the expectations of the participating services. By early December 2004 the CT Infobox gave the relevant bodies advice on 21 occasions. Six times advice was given to the UTBT (The KLPD’s Terrorism and Special Tasks Unit) on possible measures pertaining to criminal prosecution. The IND received advice on matters relating to aliens law on ten occasions, seven of which led to official reports and specific measures pertaining to aliens law. On one occasion advice was given to the Public Prosecutions Department. Finally, on four occasions advice was given to the AIVD in relation to intelligencerelated steps. The effectiveness of the CT Infobox’s efforts may considerably be enhanced by expanding the group with other services or by gaining direct access to records held by other services, for example the Fiscal Intelligence and Investigation Service/ Economic Surveillance Department (FIOD/ECD). After all, the more records and files about persons associated with terrorism and radicalism can be consulted, the completer the picture of these persons will be. The participation of other services will also widen the expertise on possible measures against such persons. An extension of the number of records to which the CT Infobox has access will prompt more efficient and more effective methods for consulting these records. One of the options is the use of various forms of data analysis, including files linking and automated files comparison. Furthermore, in the long term we should not rule out the possibility to expand the current cooperation to include other focus areas of the participating services where a joint approach may have an evident added value. The CT Infobox also intends to develop operational analysis, meaning that trends and developments relating to persons and networks involved in terrorism and radicalism will be examined at an operational level. 10.1.2

Police and Royal Military Constabulary In recent years information management within the police organisation underwent various changes. One of them was the development of one national infrastructure for the co-ordination of police information. These changes also have consequences for the Regional Intelligence Services (RID). After the project ‘National Information Co-ordination DNP (the Dutch police)’, in 2004 the project ‘AIVD-Police-RID Information Chain and Quality’ was set up to improve the quality and effectiveness of the information exchange with the Regional Intelligence and Security Services. This project will be completed by the end 2005. The recommendations made by the Administrative Evaluation Committee for the AIVD concerning the exchange of information between the AIVD and the police will be incorporated into the project, in coherence with the other points for improvement. Specific emphasis will be put on establishing a link to other intelligence functions within the regional forces than those carried out by the RID. The project ‘National Information Co-ordination DNP’ was concluded in April 2004. The method was adopted by the organisation. This project led to the development of a joint vision of the future of the RID, agreed by the Council of Police Commissioners and the Director General of the AIVD in 2004. This vision serves as a perspective for the future co-operation between the police/RID and the AIVD, and as a basis for a follow-up to the project. One of the steps taken as a follow-up was the description of working procedures for the RID’s public order function. The so-called Intelligence Need Plan plays a key role in the co-operation between the AIVD and the RID, in terms of making this co-operation concrete. It should help us to solve the problems

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in the co-operation between AIVD and RID that were identified by the Administrative Evaluation Committee for the AIVD. In the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 attacks, the AIVD - in close co-operation with the RIDs - organised lectures about the AIVD’s counter-terrorism task for community police officers and neighbourhood watchers throughout the country. The attacks in Madrid gave us reason to repeat this series of lectures. The lectures were attended by some 2500 police officers. The lectures were intended to enable the police to identify at an early stage signs of possible Islamist terrorist activities or support to such activities. The lectures were therefore not only focused on community police officers and neighbourhood watchers, but also on other police officers involved in relevant public tasks. In order to establish a proper link to the police’s information co-ordination system, the cooperation and co-ordination is not only a subject discussed within IBPs (police training units), but the AIVD also stationed a liaison officer to the National Criminal Information Service of the National Police Agency (KLPD). This liaison officer seeks to optimise the co-operation between the AIVD and in particular the National Information Centre (NIC), but he also plays a role in the implementation of the system for safety and security. The developments in this area mainly led to a further co-ordination between the parties involved in 2004. The co-operation between the AIVD and the Royal Military Constabulary (KMAR) was further intensified and confirmed by signing the co-operation protocol drawn up in 2003. The cooperation was particularly improved as a result of staff expansions in the area of aliens and border control. 10.1.3

MIVD In 2004 the AIVD and the Defence Intelligence and Security Service (MIVD) jointly considered where their current co-operation could be improved and where new co-operation could be initiated. Both services first of all pursue a better use of the information and resources at their disposal. The Intelligence and Security Services Act 2002 also provides for an exchange of information and mutual (technical) support between the two services. The principal focus points are operational co-operation and co-operation on protective security. One of the intentions is to combine specific in-company training courses. The co-operation structure will be laid down in an agreement to be approved in 2005. In 2004 the AIVD and the MIVD contributed to the development of the National Sigint Organisation (NSO). To that end a project was started by representatives of the two services. The project group drew up an Integrated Material Plan, on the basis of which the satellite interception capacity will be substantially expanded in 2005/2006. This fulfils the requirement of action point 18 of the Action Plan Counter-terrorism and Security. A small part of the expanded satellite interception capacity has already come into operation at the AIVD in 2004. The antennas required for the expanded satellite interception capacity should be located elsewhere. The Ministry of Defence is currently negotiating the purchase of premises to be used for this purpose.

10.2

Co-operation with the overseas parts of the Kingdom In 2004 several steps were taken for an upgrading of the co-operation between the security services in the various parts of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. The heads of the services

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signed an agreement which forms the basis for an intensification of the co-operation. This agreement concerns, for example, joint investigations or support to mutual investigations, vetting inquiries and the exchange of information. Agreements were also made about an intensive exchange of information and expertise on counter-terrorism. At least twice a year analysts of the services will meet in order to share information about subjects like radicalisation and financing of terrorism. In 2004 the AIVD again contributed to the further enhancement of the professionalism of the Security Service of Aruba by means of technical support at a middle management level.

10.3

European co-operation The European co-operation between intelligence and security services has been concentrated in several partnerships: the Club of Bern, the Middle Europe Conference, the Counter Terrorist Group and the Situation Centre.

10.3.1

Club of Bern The Club of Bern (or Club de Berne, CdB), the partnership of security services of the EU Member States, Switzerland and Norway convened an extraordinary meeting for the heads of service in Zurich in April 2004. At this meeting it was decided to reinforce the Counter Terrorist Group (CTG), which was set up as a sub-CdB group after the terrorist attacks in 2001 in order to intensify the co-operation on counter-terrorism between the services in Europe, to make it more independent and to enlarge it with the security services of the new EU Member States.

10.3.2

Middle Europe Conference (MEC) In 2004 the services of the Baltic states joined the Middle Europe Conference (MEC), a consultative partnership of services of central European countries and some western European services, including the AIVD.

10.3.3

Counter Terrorist Group (CTG) The CTG was set up on the instigation of the JHA Council immediately after the 11 September 2001 attacks. Although still an informal platform, it has now grown into a fully-fledged, independently functioning organisation, comprising counterterrorism-focused intelligence and security services from 27 countries. The AIVD chaired the CTG in de second half of 2005. The structure of the forum was reinforced, and its work has made good progress. For the first time a long-range work programme was adopted, which is focused on the well-known subjects involved in the broad approach to counter-terrorism (i.e. radicalisation tendencies, recruitment, financing of terrorism, migration and NBC terrorism). A link between the CTG and the EU’s Joint Situation Centre (SitCen) was realised by making agreements about the content and arrangement of the information exchange between both entities. As a result, the EU will be provided with more and with more specific terrorism-related information, as agreed by the European Council in June 2004.

10.3.4

SitCen The Joint Situation Centre (SitCen) is an intelligence unit within the EU Council Secretariat, at the moment consisting of representatives of seven European intelligence services. Currently its principal task is making analyses of countries and regions to support the European foreign

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policy and security policy. In 2004 it was decided to enlarge SitCen with representatives of European security services. The subject of counter-terrorism was added to the focus areas of SitCen.

10.4

International co-operation The AIVD’s network of liaison officers plays an important role in international co-operation outside Europe. This international co-operation also encompasses co-operation between intelligence and security services within the context of NATO, as well as international cooperation in the areas of security screening and security standards.

10.4.1

NATO In 2004 the subject of counter-terrorism was further embedded in the NATO structure by the setting up of the Terrorist Threat Intelligence Unit (TTIU), in which both civilian and military information are assembled. After the setting up of the TTIU, the Ad Hoc Analytical Cell, consisting of officers of security services of the Member States (including the AIVD) was dissolved. In 2004 the Secretary General of NATO initiated a wide-ranging reorganisation of the intelligence function within the Alliance. In the long term this will have consequences for the positions and functioning of the NATO Special Committee, the consultative body for security services of NATO member states.

10.4.2

Liaison network and bilateral contacts The AIVD closed its liaison station in Caracas in 2004. In 2005 the liaison network will be expanded and restructured as a consequence of the continuing globalisation of security-related phenomena. The liaison network enables the AIVD to gain direct access to information abroad while expanding and intensifying the relationship with foreign services. The liaison officers also contribute to collecting information relevant to the security of Dutch interests abroad. A number of new initiatives were taken in this respect in 2004. Decisions about expansion and preservation of the liaison network are made in close consultation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The AIVD stationed temporary liaison officers to Athens during the Olympic Games and the Paralympics, and to Istanbul during the NATO summit. They worked in close cooperation with representatives of the security services of the host countries and with liaison officers from other services. This enabled the best possible exchange of security-related information.

10.4.3

Vetting enquiries In 2004 a method was developed for expanding the co-operation with foreign counterpart services in the area of vetting. This co-operation should help the AIVD to collect the required data on persons who lived abroad prior to their application for a confidential post in the Netherlands. The new method implies that the intended co-operation is tested against a number of criteria with a view to identifying possible risks to national security and risks to the subject of the vetting and his family. The head of the AIVD eventually decides about entering into co-operation with a certain country, if necessary under certain conditions.

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10.4.4

International co-operation on security standards In order to gain insight into the security levels of IT security equipment a methodology for evaluation and certification of IT security equipment was developed at an international level: the ‘Common Criteria’. 21 countries have now committed themselves to a mutual recognition of certificates for IT security products on the basis of these criteria by signing the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement (CCRA). From September 2004 for the period of one year the Netherlands will chair the CCRA Management Committee, which co-ordinates the admission of countries. The AIVD represents the Netherlands in the CCRA Management Committee. The Dutch system for evaluation and certification of IT security products was presented for international CC recognition in 2004. This system was developed by TNO Certification with AIVD support. The system is expected to be officially recognised in 2005.

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11

Internal management

This chapter on internal management describes the following subjects: personnel policy, the provision of computerised information, quality management, registration, documentation, archives and finance. The final sections concern the obligatory ‘management statement’ by the head of the AIVD and an account of the activities of the Departmental Auditing Service.

11.1

Personnel The AIVD’s staff grew by more than 100 new employees in 2004. This growth will even increase in the next few years, partly as a result of the recommendations made by the Administrative Evaluation Committee for the AIVD. At the same time, however, we are confronted with a sharply rising outflow of personnel as a consequence of the large number of ageing staff. Consequently, recruitment and selection, as well as training of new staff will remain important spearheads of the AIVD’s personnel policy. The introduction of a so-called integrated jobs system in 2003 was a major improvement to both the flexibility of operational working procedures and personal career opportunities. This system was further worked out in 2004, in terms of implementing specific job changes and training programmes for the required coaching skills. These efforts gave a major impulse to the development of similar career development programmes for other job categories.

11.2

Computerised information In 2004 a technical innovation and expansion of the AIVD’s computer infrastructure (Work station->XP, Network, Vexnet) was implemented as a first step towards the functional innovation of the systems. A second step on this path was our participation in the interdepartmental acquisition of a document management system in ‘Interlab’. A third step towards functional innovation was the introduction of a new application development programme to be applied to the system for notification under the Intelligence and Security Services Act 2002. The rapid introduction of the CT Infobox was also supported by computerised facilities. The communication with external partners, which was specifically important within the context of several international events in 2004 (EU presidency, Olympic Games and EU enlargement), was further expanded and improved. Improvements were implemented in the provision of information for the registration of personal data. Finally, by the end of 2004 a large-scale survey was made of our operational information management with a view to improving the efficiency of information management processes. This was also one of the points mentioned in the recommendations made by the Administrative Evaluation Committee for the AIVD.

11.3

Quality management In 2004 the main subject for the quality management department was an extensive staff appraisal survey. The survey, presented in September, had a response rate of about 67%. The outcome of the survey, in addition to external measuring criteria, is an important input for the AIVD’s development path in the coming years.

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At an organisational level a protocol for policy evaluations was introduced. The most important evaluations were the following: - An internal survey of the quality of the interaction between the AIVD and Regional Intelligence Services (RID). The results were incorporated into improvement and innovation programmes; - An examination of the implementation of the personnel policy plan that was developed in 2002. Improvement and innovation efforts will be started in 2005. An exploratory study was made of a possible improvement and innovation of the methodology for describing working procedures and related instruments. This study led to the decision to start using a system that is also used by the police and that is in line with the police methodology for process arrangement.

11.4

Registration, documentation and archives In 2004 the first major steps were made towards a new document and workflow management system to replace our current applications. Also, the development of a so-called documentary structure plan was started, which should improve the management of support procedures in relation to documentary information. In 2004 a new Documentary Information Management Arrangement was introduced, in which management aspects and responsibilities with respect to the provision of documentary information have been laid down.

11.5

Finance The AIVD’s budget is part of the budget of the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations. Consequently, budgeting and accountability fall within the financial process of the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations. The AIVD’s financial resources are primarily used for salaries and business expenses. The service also has a ‘secret budget’, which covers the AIVD’s operational expenditure. The AIVD renders account on its secret budget - with an audit report to the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations and the president of the Netherlands Court of Audit. The results of the AIVD’s expenditure were described in the previous chapters of this annual report. In the course of 2004 a reallocation of resources took place on the basis of adjusted priorities. The Departmental Auditing Service concluded, on the basis of its examination, that in general the resources were spent on staff and equipment in the most effective and efficient way possible. This applied to both our regular activities and to our intensified focus on areas for which extra funds were made available. In 2004 extra funds were first of all intended for counter-terrorism, as part of a phased allocation to be provided from 2002 to 2006 in relation to the attacks in the United States. Another part was a new allocation in 2004 ensuing from the Madrid attacks. These funds were mainly used for extra manpower in the combat of Islamist terrorism. Extra funds from the budget of the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations were also allocated to the AIVD for our rising material costs involved in counter-terrorism. Furthermore, the second half of a phased allocation of funds for the Safety and Security system was provided to the AIVD. This enabled us to implement this task according to plan. Finally, the AIVD temporarily had the disposal of extra funds in 2004 in relation to the Dutch EU presidency. These funds enabled us to put extra efforts in investigations focused on security during the presidency and on the organisation of a number of meetings and conferences. 68

So all extra funds allocated to the AIVD were spent on extra personnel and material in order to improve the quantity and quality of the service’s efforts on some important subjects. Nevertheless, the budget for 2004 was still tight. Especially in the area of counter-terrorism the extra funds proved to be insufficient to employ enough extra staff to bring our efforts up to the required level, so it was decided to find additional funds by means of an internal resetting of priorities. Even the allocation of extra funds for materials was preceded by extensive internal cutbacks. As a result of a stringent budget policy the expenditure level remained within the budget limits. It led to a temporary stagnation of the planned growth in personnel, however, while planned investments had to be postponed. The Administrative Evaluation Committee for the AIVD explained in its report why the budget for the AIVD was insufficient. Subsequently, the government decided by the end of 2004 to make sufficient resources available to enable the AIVD to implement the recommendations of the Administrative Evaluation Committee and at the same time to realise the desired intensification of efforts focused on operational control, safety and security. The extra budget will amount from approximately € 15 million in 2005 to approximately € 46 million in 2009. Table 9 Budget 2004 (realisation figures) Staff € 52.2 million Materials € 32.2 million Secret budget € 3.1 million 11.5.1

Management statement The Director General of the AIVD has made the following statement concerning the service’s management in 2004: In the financial year 2004 the AIVD systematically focused attention on management control, weighing the use of steering and control instruments on the basis of a risk assessment. Explanation: Planning and rendering account of the AIVD’s activities have to meet requirements laid down in laws, regulations and circular letters. The most important ones relevant to management are the Government Accounts Act (and the ensuing regulation on Performance and Evaluation in the Central Government) and the government’s Policy Document ‘from policy budget to policy responsibility’. On the basis of these documents the AIVD further implemented its management control system. The internal policy, management and budget cycle was brought in line with the ministry’s by the introduction of working agreements. Both during the planning stage and in the implementation stage these working agreements enable ‘general control’ and ‘result-oriented management’. The working agreements replace ministerial year plans and management reports. However, at the AIVD year plans at a directorate level were also an important instrument for working out the consequences of priorities the outlines of which were established earlier. The year plans for the directorates for 2005 have meanwhile been completed. In 2004 on regular occasions account was rendered on the AIVD’s policy to the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations by means of three-monthly progress reports on political administrative relevant results and adjustments to the year plan. Management reports were based upon working agreements. In addition to reports about the working agreements, insight into the results and the means used to reach the results was also provided by periodical internal management reports from the directorates. 69

In 2004 a systematic evaluation survey was conducted as described in the above-mentioned regulation on Performance and Evaluation in the Central Government. This survey included both examinations from 2003 that were postponed to 2004 and examinations that were planned for 2004. Some examinations could not be completed in 2004. The results of some examinations were incorporated into projects that will be completed in 2005. A new planning for 2005 has been arranged now, to which the pending examinations from 2004 will be added, if possible. Attention was also paid to risk assessments for the service’s management. Because the new maintenance plan for the administrative organisation had not yet been completed, the risk assessments were particularly focused on the most urgent risks involved in supportive procedures, on the basis of current process plans. 11.5.2

Departmental Auditing Service For applying the auditing programme to the AIVD it is necessary to make specific agreements on the scope and depth of the audits and the involvement of the auditors. In 2004 the examinations were restricted to financial audits. In view of the findings, plans were drawn up to improve part of the administrative management of the AIVD. The Departmental Auditing Service of the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations evaluated the progress of these plans. The director of this service discussed the findings with the deputy director general of the AIVD.

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Annex 1 Parliamentary reports relating to the AIVD in 2004

Parliamentary reports 23 432

The situation in the Middle East

No. 166

Letter from the Minister of Defence about the military intervention in Iraq.

23 490

Draft decisions concerning Union Treaty

No. 321

Report of general consultations on 17 March 2004 about the preparation of the informal JHA Council on 19 March 2004

27 925

Combat of international terrorism

No. 110

List of questions and replies relating to the letter about the national Sigint (signal intelligence) organisation (27 925, no. 102).

No. 111

Report of written consultations about the alleged Saudi financing of imams

No. 112

Motion by Mr Wilders et al. about Saudi financing of Islamic institutions in the Netherlands.

No. 113

Motion by Ms Karimi et al. about Saudi financing of mosques, imams and Islamic centres in the Netherlands.

No. 114

Motion by Mr Eerdmans about admission of imams from countries with a fundamentalist Islamic culture.

No. 115

Letter from the Minister of Justice about the possibility to proscribe and dismantle religious communities and mosques.

No. 116

Letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs about his conversation with the Saudi Ambassador.

No. 118

List of questions and replies about the letter from the Minister of Aliens Affairs and Integration relating to the advice on ‘Aliens policy and counterterrorism’ (27 925, no. 103).

No. 120

Letter from the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations presenting the paper ‘Backgrounds of jihad recruits in the Netherlands’.

No. 121

Report of general consultations about the advice on ‘Aliens policy and counter-terrorism’ on 11 March 2004.

No. 122

Report of general consultations about terrorism on 11 March 2004.

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No. 123

Letter from the Minister of Justice and the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations about the attacks in Madrid, about the measures taken so far and about the need for additional measures.

No. 124

Motion by Mr Verhagen et al. about setting up a national security council.

No. 125

Motion by Mr Herben et al. about not yielding to international terrorism and about taking appropriate measures.

No. 126

Motion by Mr Van Aartsen et al. about the special powers and additional measures relevant to alertness levels, about amendment of emergency legislation and about reinforcing the co-ordination.

No. 128

Letter from the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations presenting the paper ‘Saudi influences in the Netherlands. Connections between Salafi mission, radicalisation processes and Islamist terrorism’.

No. 129

Letter from the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations presenting the public part of report of the Supervisory Committee for the Intelligence and Security Services about its examination of AIVD efforts focused on radicalisation processes in the Islamic community and the Minister’s comments to this report.

No. 131

Report of a hearing on 24 May 2004 about the combat of international terrorism.

No. 137

Letter from the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations and the Minister of Justice about safety and security measures that were taken in connection with a threat in relation to preparation of terrorist actions.

No. 138

Letter from the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations about the alleged letter from Al-Qaeda to the UN.

No. 147

Report of general consultations on 15 September 2004 about the Al Tawheed mosque, Saudi financing of mosques and the Al-Haramain foundation.

No. 149

Report of general consultations on 23 September 2004 about threats and terrorism.

No. 150

Letter from the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations about the alleged Al-Qaeda letter, among other things.

No. 151

Motion by Mr Van Heemst and Mr Dijsselbloem about a blacklist of radical Islamists who will be refused entry to the EU.

No. 152

Motion by Mr Van Heemst about supervision of non-profit organisations in order to prevent them from being used for siphoning money to terrorist activities.

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No. 153

Motion by Mr Van Heemst about setting up a unit at the national criminal investigation department for exposing discrimination and racism.

No. 154

Letter from the Minister for Aliens Affairs and Integration about barring persons from entering Schengen states for reasons of national security.

No. 157

Report of general consultations on 8 December 2004 about threats and terrorism.

28374

Assassination of Mr W.S.P. Fortuyn

No. 25

Letter from the Supervisory Committee on the Intelligence and Security Services presenting its report on the implementation of the CornieljeEerdmans motion.

No. 26

Letter from the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations about the report of the Supervisory Committee on the Intelligence and Security Services on the implementation of the Cornielje-Eerdmans motion.

No. 27

List of questions and replies about the report of the Supervisory Committee on the Intelligence and Security Services.

28463

Amendment and supplement to the Penal Code and some other Acts with respect to terrorist crimes (Terrorist Crimes Act)

No. C

Memorandum of reply from the Minister of Justice on counter-terrorism and the role of criminal law in counter-terrorism.

28 845

Exchange of information relating to law enforcement and terrorism

No. 5

Report of general consultations on 5 February 2004 about reports of the National Court of Audit concerning the exchange of information relating to law enforcement and terrorism.

No. 6

Letter from the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations about the role and tasks of the Public Order and Safety Inspection and about measures to improve the information exchange.

28 974

New system for safety and security

No. 3

Letter from the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations about the implementation of the system for safety and security with the replies (28 374, no. 27) to questions asked by the standing committee on the Interior and Kingdom Relations about the Supervisory Committee’s report of 19 January 2004 (28 374 no. 26)

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29 200 V

Adoption of the budget of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (V) for 2004

No. 72

Letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs about the involvement of Urenco Nederland BV in the development of nuclear weapons in a number of countries, including Pakistan.

No. 87

Letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs about the government’s knowledge about the involvement of Urenco Nederland BV in the development of nuclear weapons in a number of countries, including Pakistan.

29 200 VI

Adoption of the budget of the Ministry of Justice (VI) for 2004

No. 137

Motion by Mr Wilders et al. about the possible prosecution of mosques for their propagation of inadmissible ideas.

No. 138

Motion by Ms Sterk and Mr Wilders about penalising incitement to actions against the democratic legal order.

No. 139

Motion by Ms Sterk et al. about a condition to be set to imams working in the Netherlands for following a Dutch imam training.

No. 140

Motion by Mr Nawijn and Mr Wilders about a new overview of Islamic movements represented in the Netherlands.

No. 141

Motion by Mr Nawijn about depriving persons of the Dutch nationality after a conviction for inciting hatred or violence against the democratic legal order or against minority groups.

No. 142

Motion by Ms Azough and Mr Dijsselbloem about launching a national project to widen the activities of the Yousouf foundation to a national level.

No. 143

Amended motion by Ms Sterk et al. to replace the motion printed under no. 139

No. 155

Further amended motion by Ms Sterk et al. to replace the motion printed under no. 143.

No. 156

Letter from the Minister of Aliens Affairs and Integration about a Dutch imam training.

No. 175

Letter from the Minister of Justice and the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations presenting the National Police Agency analysis ‘Crime Analysis of Radical Animal Rights Activism 1999-2003) and the AIVD paper ‘Animal rights activism in the Netherlands: between peaceful and burning protest’.

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29 200 VII

Adoption of the budget of the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations (VII) for 2004

No. 46

Letter from the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations about setting up the independent Administrative Evaluation Committee for the AIVD.

No. 53

Letter from the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations and the Minister of Administrative Reform and Kingdom Relations about the freedom of speech.

No. 55

Report of general consultations on 15 April 2004 about the letter dated 5 December 2003 from the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations presenting a vulnerability analysis for interception rooms.

No. 58

Report of general consultations on 22 June 2004 about the letter dated 20 April 2004 concerning the freedom of speech and the system for safety and security (29 200 VII, no. 53).

No. 61

Letter from the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations about several proposed amendments to the Intelligence and Security Services Act 2002 and the Security Investigations Act.

29 432

Interpellation concerning the work of Dutch intelligence services in relation to the government’s decision to support the American-British war against Iraq.

No. 1

Motion by Ms Karimi et al. to set up an independent committee for examining the quality and reliability of the intelligence and for assessing the intelligence in the political decision-making process relating to the war in Iraq.

29 553

Amendment to the budget of the Ministry of General Affairs, adoption and amendment of the budget of the Queen’s Cabinet and adoption of the budget of the Supervisory Committee for the intelligence and security services (III) for 2004 (amendment relating to the Interim Budget Report)

No. 1

Legislative proposal.

No. 2

Explanatory memorandum.

29 622

Report from the Committee on the Intelligence and Security Services about its activities over the last five months of 2003

No. 1 reprint

Report.

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29 754

Counter-terrorism

No. 1

Letter from the Minister of Justice and the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations about new steps and measures relating to the counterterrorism policy and the current threat.

No. 2

Letter from the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations about the ‘leaking’ of AIVD information.

No. 4

Letter from the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations presenting the AIVD paper ‘From Dawa to Jihad; the various threats from radical Islam to the democratic legal order’.

29 800 VI

Adoption of the budget of the Ministry of Justice (VI) for the year 2005

No. 89

Motion by Ms Azough et al. about examining the national and international breeding grounds for radicalisation among Dutch Muslims.

29 800 VII

Adoption of the budget of the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations (VII) for the year 2005

No. 1

Legislative proposal.

No. 2

Explanatory memorandum.

No. 3

List of questions and answers about the annual report for 2003-2004 of the Supervisory Committee for the Intelligence and Security Services (CTIVD).

No. 4

List of questions and answers about the AIVD’s annual report for 2003.

No. 5

Amendment by Mr Wilders intended to spend half a billion euros extra on police and counter-terrorism.

No. 8

Report containing a list of questions and replies.

No. 10

Report of general consultations on 14 October 2004 about subjects including the AIVD’s annual report for 2003, the CTIVD’s annual report for 2003-2004 and the annual report of the Committee on the Intelligence and Security Services.

29 800 X

Adoption of the budget of the Ministry of Defence (X) for the year 2005

No. 55

Report of general consultations on 13 December 2004 about the MIVD’s annual report for 2003.

29 843

Implementation of the Security Investigations Act

No. 1

Letter from the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations presenting the report ‘Implementation of the Security Investigations Act in practice’.

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29 854

The murder of Mr T. Van Gogh

No. 1

Letter from the Minister of Justice and the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations about the murder of Mr Van Gogh.

No. 2

Letter from the Minister of Justice and the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations about the letter found on Mr Van Gogh’s body and the text found in the possession of the suspect.

No. 3

Letters from the Minister of Justice and the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations about the backgrounds of the attack.

No. 4

List of questions and replies about the letter of 2 November 2004 about the murder of Mr Van Gogh.

No. 5

Motion by Mr Wilders and Mr Van As to arrest potential terrorists immediately and deport them from the Netherlands.

No. 6

Motion by Mr Wilders concerning abandoning confidence in the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations in view of his responsibility for the AIVD.

No. 7

Motion by Mr Van As et al. concerning barring from the Netherlands foreign TV and radio channels which incite hatred and violence.

No. 8

Motion by Mr Van As concerning the creation of a Ministry of National Security.

No. 9

Motion by Ms Halsema et al. to include high-profile, threatened opinionleaders in the public domain for safety and security.

No. 10

Motion by Mr Bos et al. to actively support the setting up of Dutch imam training courses and to stop issuing residence permits to foreign imams.

29 876

AIVD evaluation

No. 1

Letter from the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations presenting the evaluation report of the Administrative Evaluation Committee for the AIVD ‘The AIVD in transformation’.

29 924

Supervision reports about AIVD and MIVD.

No. 1

Letter from the Minister of Defence presenting the public part of the CITVD’s supervision report concerning an MIVD counter-terrorism operation and the unclassified part of his reaction to the supervision report.

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78

Proceedings

Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 48, pp. 3262-3277 Debate about the financing of imams by the Embassy of Saudi Arabia. Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 54, pp. 3581-3596 Questions about information from national security services concerning Iraq. Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 54, p. 3632 Questions asked by Ms Karimi about an examination of the work of Dutch intelligence services in connection with the government’s decision to support the American-British war against Iraq. Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 66, pp. 4302-4360 Debate about the attacks in Madrid and counter-terrorism. Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 68, pp. 4441-4444 Replies to questions asked by Mr Koenders about the findings of the UN arms inspectors and the close relations with the Dutch AIVD and several Dutch ministries. Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 72, pp. 4714-4742 Debate about the Al Tawheed mosque in Amsterdam. Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 86, pp. 5506-5509 Questions asked by Mr Herben, with reference to radio reports, about threats to Minister Verdonk. Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 88, pp. 5621-5642 Debate about threats to the Minister of Aliens Affairs and Integration. Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 90, pp. 5804-5820 Examination of the letter about the preparation of the Cabinet’s decision on Iraq (23 432, no. 166). Proceedings II 2004/05, no. 22, pp. 1278-1332 Debate about the murder of Mr T. van Gogh. Proceedings II 2004/05, no. 24, pp. 1452-1475 Examination of the bill for adoption of the budget of the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations (VII) for the year 2005 (29 800 VII). Proceedings II 2004/05, no. 25, pp. 1577-1597 Continuation of the examination of the bill for adoption of the budget of the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations (VII) for the year 2005 (29 800 VII). Proceedings II 2004/05, no. 33, pp. 2216-2219 Debate resulting from general consultations about terrorism on 8 December 2004. Appendix to Proceedings.

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Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 630 Reply to written questions asked by Mr Wilders about the design of the ultracentrifuges in Iran. Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 678 Reply to written questions asked by Mr Wilders, Mr Eurlings and Mr Eerdmans about the financing of the es-Salaam mosque in Rotterdam. Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 680 Reply to written questions asked by Mr Wilders about alleged Saudi sponsoring of Islamic radicalism in the West. Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 698 Reply to written questions asked by Mr Wilders about the Turkish Islamic terror group IBDA-C. Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 699 Reply to written questions asked by Mr Wilders about intelligence services in relation to the fight against Al-Qaeda. Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 702 Reply to written questions asked by Mr Van der Ham about possibly criminal animal rights activists from the United Kingdom. Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 779 Reply to written questions asked by Mr Van Fessem about luggage handling at Schiphol Airport allegedly allowing the passage of suitcases containing cocaine. Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 784 Reply to written questions asked by Mr Wilders and Ms Örgü about the possible arrest of an Iraqi Muslim extremist at Schiphol Airport. Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 838 Reply to written questions asked by Mr Dittrich and Mr Lambrechts about the alleged collection of information from asylum seekers for the benefit of the AIVD. Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 834 Reply to written questions asked by Ms Karimi about alleged espionage for Israel by UN officials. Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 892 Reply to written questions asked by Mr Wilders and Mr Eurlings about UN evaluations concerning the development of Al-Qaeda. Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 908 Reply to written questions asked by Ms Karimi about amounts of chemical or biological weapons in Iraq. Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 909 Reply to written questions asked by Mr Wilders about the IAEA’s alleged concerns about the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

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Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 927 Reply to written questions asked by Ms Karimi about possible investigations into security services in the US. Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 962 Reply to written questions asked by Mr Wilders about the possibly serious terrorist threat in the EU. Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 967 Reply to written questions asked by Mr Wilders about the alleged escape of a Muslim extremist. Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 968 Reply to written questions asked by Mr Wilders about the alleged presence of terrorists with chemical weapons in Europe. Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 969 Reply to written questions asked by Mr Wilders about the alleged financing of the Al-Tawheed mosque in Amsterdam. Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 1007 Reply to written questions asked by Ms Karimi about the Pakistani government’s alleged suspicions concerning the supply of nuclear technology to Iran, Libya and North Korea. Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 1008 Reply to written questions asked by Ms Karimi about Mr Khan’s nuclear smuggling network and the Dutch connection. Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 1013 Reply to written questions asked by Ms Karimi about the Dutch and Israeli intelligence services. Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 1077 Reply to written questions asked by Mr Wilders about misuse of foundations and inadequate oversight of the non-profit sector. Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 1098 Reply to written questions asked by Mr Eerdmans, Mr Wilders and Mr Van Fessem about an allegedly radical Islamic meeting. Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 1149 Reply to written questions asked by Ms Kalsbeek about the AIVD’s statutory powers relevant to investigations into politicians. Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 1151 Reply to written questions asked by Mr Eerdmans about the visit of the Basque terrorist youth organisation SEGI to the University of Leiden.

81

Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 1211 Reply to written questions asked by Ms Karimi about an export licence granted to Mr Henk S. Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 1214 Reply to written questions asked by Mr Wilders about a possible ‘Dutch link’ to the attacks in Madrid. Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 1228 Reply to written questions asked by Mr Wilders about an alleged terrorist arrested in the province of Limburg. Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 1375 Reply to written questions asked by Mr Eerdmans about the right to free expression and the alleged decision of column writer and opinion-leader Paul Cliteur. Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 1551 Reply to written questions asked by Mr Wilders and Mr Balemans about alleged terrorist activities of the chairman of the Islamic Primary Schools Foundation in Amsterdam. Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 1601 Reply to written questions asked by Mr Wilders about a proscription of the Turkish terrorist organisation DHKP/C. Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 1644 Reply to written questions asked by Mr Van Fessem and Mr Haersma Buma about possible compensation to be paid to Mullah Krekar. Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 1650 Reply to written questions asked by Mr Lazrak about false travel documents. Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 1681 Reply to written questions asked by Mr Wilders and Mr Visser about applications for a residence permit in the town of Roermond. Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 1706 Reply to written questions asked by Mr Koenders about the fact that missile engine parts from Iraq were found at a Rotterdam scrap yard. Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 1708 Reply to written questions asked by Mr Van Bommel and Mr De Wit about an Internet site allegedly inciting to violence relating to the jihad. Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 1710 Reply to written questions asked by Ms Sterk about an alleged municipal subsidy for the Grey Wolves. Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 1794 Reply to written questions asked by Mr Wilders and Mr Nawijn about terrorism and the Dutch branch of the Al-Haramain foundation and the Al-Tawheed mosque.

82

Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 1795 Reply to written questions asked by Mr Van Fessem about an alleged Al-Qaeda terror cell that was active in the Netherlands. Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 1796 Reply to written questions asked by Mr Wilders and Ms Hirsi Ali about the Netherlands as a possible target for terrorist attacks by Al-Qaeda. Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 1827 Reply to written questions asked by Mr Eerdmans about fund-raising via the Internet by the Al-Aqsa foundation. Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 1838 Reply to written questions asked by Ms Sterk about the AEL demonstration. Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 1896 Reply to written questions asked by Mr Herben about alleged detailed aerial photographs of Dutch military property on the Internet. Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 1925 Reply to written questions asked by Mr Oplaat and Ms Griffith about an attack by animal rights terrorists. Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 1926 Reply to written questions asked by Mr Wilders about the IISS’s latest annual report and comments made by Interpol. Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 1988 Reply to written questions asked by Mr Van Bommel about a threat letter from terrorist organisation Al-Qaeda. Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 1989 Reply to written questions asked by Mr Van der Ham about a threat letter from Al-Qaeda to the UN. Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 2002 Reply to written questions asked by Mr Wilders and Mr Nawijn about terrorism and the Dutch branch of Al-Haramain and the Al-Tawheed mosque. Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 2003 Reply to written questions asked by Ms Sterk about the ‘charity’ Al-Haramain. Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 2004 Reply to written questions asked by Ms Sterk about the Al-Haramain foundation. Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 2100 Reply to written questions asked by Mr Wilders and Mr Weekers about the possible arrest of a second Al-Qaeda terrorist from Weert.

83

Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 2104 Reply to written questions asked by Mr Van Bommel about the report written by the American Senate Committee about the evaluation of the quality of the CIA’s efforts focused on weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 2120 Reply to written questions asked by Mr Koenders about the gathering and evaluation of information in the run up to the war in Iraq. Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 2123 Reply to written questions asked by Mr Koenders about the publication of the British ‘Butler report’. Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 2185 Reply to written questions asked by Mr Mosterd and Mr Atsma about animal rights activists. Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 2293 Reply to written questions asked by Mr Wilders about the arrest of a 17-year-old Muslim extremist from Rotterdam. Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 2313 Reply to written questions asked my Mr Dijsselbloem and Ms Kalsbeek about the arrival in the Netherlands of the fundamentalist Muslim leader Qazi Hussein Ahmed. Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 2314 Reply to written questions asked by Mr Wilders and Mr Luchtenveld about recent developments within the AEL. Appendix to Proceedings II 2003/04, no. 2315 Reply to written questions asked by Mr Van der Staaij about the arrival in the Netherlands of the fundamentalist Muslim leader Qazi Hussein Ahmed. Appendix to Proceedings II 2004/05, no. 9 Reply to written questions asked by Mr Wilders about the threat to the Netherlands made by the Islamic terror group al-Tawhid wa al-Jihad on the Internet. Appendix to Proceedings II 2004/05, no. 35 Reply to written questions asked by Mr Eerdmans about the terror alert pronounced in July 2004. Appendix to Proceedings II 2004/05, no. 78 Reply to written questions asked by Mr Eerdmans about the attendance of seminars in the Netherlands by the suicide pilots of the 11 September 2001 attacks and the organiser of these attacks. Appendix to Proceedings II 2004/05, no. 109 Reply to written questions asked by Mr Wilders about the arrest of two members of an alleged terrorist cell near Nijmegen.

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Appendix to Proceedings II 2004/05, no. 186 Reply to written questions asked by Ms Karimi about the alleged use of chemical weapons in Sudan. Appendix to Proceedings II 2004/05, no. 214 Reply to written questions asked by Mr Herben and Mr Eerdmans about inciting to offences by the ultra-left organisation XminY on its web site, www.xminy.nl. Appendix to Proceedings II 2004/05, no. 350 Reply to written questions asked by Mr Vos and Mr Azough about the role of mayors in identifying radicalisation among local Islamic communities for the benefit of the AIVD. Appendix to Proceedings II 2004/05, no. 405 Reply to written questions asked by Mr Wilders about alleged information concerning terrorism and North Europe. Appendix to Proceedings II 2004/05, no. 430 Reply to written questions asked by Mr Van Heemst and Mr Van Heteren about communication with emergency services concerning terror threat in the Netherlands. Appendix to Proceedings II 2004/05, no. 451 Reply to written questions asked by Ms Halsema and Mr Vos about ‘forwarding’ the letter from Mohammed B. containing death threats. Appendix to Proceedings II 2004/05, no. 455 Reply to written questions asked by Ms Van der Laan about public support for counterterrorism. Appendix to Proceedings II 2004/05, no. 456 Reply to written questions asked by Mr De Wit about the raid of the home of a Moroccan family in Utrecht. Appendix to Proceedings II 2004/05, no. 472 Reply to written questions asked by Ms Halsema, Mr Vos and Ms Griffith about ‘forwarding’ the letter with death threats from Mohammed B. Appendix to Proceedings II 2004/05, no. 481 Reply to written questions asked by Mr Dijsselbloem and Ms Dijksma about arson at a mosque in Enschede. Appendix to Proceedings II 2004/05, no. 553 Reply to written questions asked by Mr Gerkens about possibly inadequate protection against and combat of computer crime. Appendix to Proceedings II 2004/05, no. 554 Reply to written questions asked by Mr Algra and Mr Van Haersma Buma about computer crime.

85

Appendix to Proceedings II 2004/05, no. 555 Reply to written questions asked by Mr Van der Staaij about the FARC web sites. Appendix to Proceedings II 2004/05, no. 562 Reply to written questions asked by Mr Eerdmans about two possibly religiously inspired murders that allegedly took place in the Netherlands. Appendix to Proceedings II 2004/05, no. 563 Reply to written questions asked by Mr Van Heemst and Mr Wolfsen about comments made by Mr H.F. van den Haak about the information exchange in the Van Gogh case. Appendix to Proceedings II 2004/05, no. 566 Reply to written questions asked by Mr Wilders about security.

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Parliamentary questions asked in 2004, answered in 2005

Appendix to Proceedings II 2004/05, no. 715 Reply to written questions asked by Mr Bos about advice from the security services to candidates for political positions. Appendix to Proceedings II 2004/05, no. 724 Reply to written questions asked by Ms Griffith about the role of the probation and after-care service in counter-terrorism. Appendix to Proceedings II 2004/05, no. 749 Reply to written questions asked by Ms Van der Laan about intelligence obtained by torture. Appendix to Proceedings II 2004/05, no. 771 Reply to written questions asked by Mr Van Velzen about the alleged sale of poison gas to Iraq by Mr Van A. Appendix to Proceedings II 2004/05, no. 772 Reply to written questions asked by Mr Van Velzen about Mr Van A.’s alleged stay at a secret address. Appendix to Proceedings II 2004/05, no. 788 Reply to written questions asked by Ms Griffith about Mr Abdul-Jabbar van de Ven. Appendix to Proceedings II 2004/05, no. 877 Reply to written questions asked by Mr Eerdmans and Mr Nawijn about the growing threat against the safety of Mr Wilders and Ms Hirsi Ali. Appendix to Proceedings II 2004/05, no. 922 Reply to written questions asked by Mr Van Velzen about the Khan case. Appendix to Proceedings II 2004/05, no. 997 Reply to written questions asked by Ms Karimi about riots in Kosovo.

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Notes

1

See the paper ‘Recruitment in the Netherlands for the jihad; from incident to trend’, AIVD, 2002

2 See the paper ‘Saudi influences in the Netherlands. Links between Salafi mission, radicalisation processes and Islamist terrorism’, Parliamentary Reports II 2003/04, 27925, no. 120. 3

See the paper ‘From Dawa to Jihad. The various threats from radical Islam to the democratic legal order’, Parliamentary Reports II 2004/05, 29754, no. 4.

4 ‘Animal Rights Activism in the Netherlands – between peaceful and burning protest’, Parliamentary reports II 2003/04, 29200 VI, no. 175.

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Scott Atran

The Moral Logic and Growth of Suicide Terrorism

S

uicide attack is the most virulent and horrifying form of terrorism in the world today. The mere rumor of an impending suicide attack can throw thousands of people into panic. This occurred during a Shi‘a procession in Iraq in late August 2005, causing hundreds of deaths. Although suicide attacks account for a minority of all terrorist acts, they are responsible for a majority of all terrorism-related casualties, and the rate of attacks is rising rapidly across the globe (see figures 1 and 2). During 2000–2004, there were 472 suicide attacks in 22 countries, killing more than 7,000 and wounding tens of thousands. Most have been carried out by Islamist groups claiming religious motivation, also known as jihadis. Rand Corp. vice president and terrorism analyst Bruce Hoffman has found that 80 percent of suicide attacks since 1968 occurred after the September 11 attacks, with jihadis representing 31 of the 35 responsible groups.1 More suicide attacks occurred in 2004 than in any previous year,2 and 2005 has proven even more deadly, with attacks in Iraq alone averaging more than one per day, according to data gathered by the U.S. military.3 The July 2005 London and Sinai bombings, a second round of bombings at tourist destinations in Bali in October, coordinated hotel bombings in Jordan in November, the arrival of suicide bombings in Bangladesh in December, a record year of attacks in Afghanistan, and daily bombings in Iraq have spurred renewed interest in suicide terrorism, with recent analyses stressing the strategic logic, organizational structure, and rational calculation involved.4 Scott Atran is director of research in anthropology at France’s Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS) and a visiting professor of psychology and public policy at the University of Michigan. Background research was supported by the U.S. Air Force Office of Scientific Research, the National Science Foundation, and CNRS. The author would like to thank Khalil Shikaki, Rohan Gunaratna, and Noor Huda Ismail for help in the field and Marc Sageman, Reuven Paz, Jessica Stern, and Bruce Hoffman for relevant data and ideas. © 2006 by The Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology The Washington Quarterly • 29:2 pp. 127–147. T HE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY

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l Scott Atran Figure 1:

Suicide Attacks Worldwide, Annualized by Decade 180

180 160 140 120 100 80 60 40 16

20 4.7

0

1981-1990

1991-2000

2001-2005

Whereas they once primarily consisted of organized campaigns by militarily weak forces aiming to end the perceived occupation of their homeland, as argued by University of Chicago political scientist Robert Pape in Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism,5 suicide attacks today serve as banner actions for a thoroughly modern, global diaspora inspired by religion and claiming the role of vanguard for a massive, media-driven transnational political awakening. Living mostly in the diaspora and undeterred by the threat of retaliation against original home populations, jihadis, who are frequently middle-class, secularly well educated, but often “born-again” radical Islamists, including converts from Christianity, embrace apocalyptic visions for humanity’s violent salvation. In Muslim countries and across western Europe, bright and idealistic Muslim youth, even more than the marginalized and dispossessed, internalize the jihadi story, illustrated on satellite television and the Internet with the ubiquitous images of social injustice and political repression with which much of the Muslim world’s bulging immigrant and youth populations intimately identifies. From the suburbs of Paris to the jungles of Indonesia, I have interviewed culturally uprooted and politically restless youth who echo a stunningly simplified and decontextualized message of martyrdom for the sake of global jihad as life’s noblest cause. They are increasingly as willing and even eager to die as they are to kill. The policy implications of this change in the motivation, organization, and calculation of suicide terrorism may be as novel as hitherto neglected. 128

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The Moral Logic and Growth of Suicide Terrorism

Figure 2:

l

Suicide Attacks Worldwide, 2001–2005 460

450 400 350 300 250 200 163

150 100

81

91

99

2001

2002

2003

50 0

2004

2005

Many analysts continue to claim that jihadism caters to the destitute and depraved, the craven and criminal, or those who “hate freedom.” Politicians and pundits have asserted that jihadism is nihilistic and immoral, with no real program or humanity. Yet, jihadism is none of these things. Do we really understand the causes of today’s suicide terrorism? Do suicide attacks stem mainly from a political cause, such as military occupation? Do they need a strong organization, such as Al Qaeda? What else could be done to turn the rising tide of martyrdom?

It’s Not Just for Politics Anymore In Dying to Win, Pape claims that foreign occupation is the root cause of suicide terrorism. The rise in attacks correlates with U.S. military occupation of countries whose governments tend to be authoritarian and unresponsive to popular demands. Analyzing data on 315 suicide attacks from 1980 to 2003, he asserts that the common thread linking 95 percent of all suicide attacks around the world is not religion or ideology, but rather a clear, strategic, political objective. They are organized campaigns to compel a modern democracy, principally the United States, to withdraw military forces from a group’s perceived homeland. Al Qaeda supposedly fits this model, being driven primarily by the efforts of Osama bin Laden and those sympathetic to his cause to expel the United States from the Arab heartland—Saudi THE W ASHINGTON Q UARTERLY

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l Scott Atran Arabia, Palestine, Egypt, and Iraq—and ultimately from all Muslim countries. On September 11, 2001, for example, 15 of the 19 suicide attackers came from Saudi Arabia, where nearly 5,000 U.S. combat troops were billeted at the time, with 7,000 more stationed elsewhere on the Arabian peninsula. According to Pape’s findings, suicide bombers come disproportionately from among the largely secular and educated middle classes that aspire to freedom and greater opportunities, yet see their hopes stymied by corrupt dictators and one-party elites acting in collusion with U.S. oil and other interests. On the surface, recent trends seem to bolster Pape’s thesis. In October 2003, bin Laden warned in a televised video that European nations fighting in Iraq or Afghanistan would be fair game for attack. The next month, suicide bombings targeted the British consulate and HSBC Bank in Istanbul. In December 2003, jihadi Web sites were broadcasting “Iraqi Jihad, Hopes and Risks,” 6 a 42-page blueprint for strategically timing bombings to European political events, the first target of which became the March 2004 Spanish elections. (The bombers in these attacks blew themselves up with suicide belts later when cornered by police, and two Madrid plotters who escaped the police dragnet died as suicide bombers in Iraq in April 2005.) In the last two years, suicide attackers have struck in 18 countries, mostly among U.S. allies linked to undemocratic regimes, such as Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Uzbekistan, and Egypt, or in places with perceived occupations, such as the Palestinian territories, Chechnya, Kashmir, Afghanistan, and Iraq. In Iraq in 2004, there were more suicide attacks than in the entire world in any previous year of contemporary history, involving “martyrs” from 14 other Arab countries, 7 as well as volunteers from all over Europe. Nevertheless, Pape’s basic data, correlations, and conclusions about the causes of terrorism are problematic, outdated in the wake of the September 11 attacks and sometimes deeply misleading. In broad terms, statistical regularity or predictability alone can only indicate correlations but never demonstrates cause. This study relies exclusively on the computation of statistical trends rather than complementing them with judgments gleaned from nonrandom interviews with the human subjects of study themselves. This dichotomy is unnecessary and even pernicious. 8 Although one should not make the reciprocal mistake of taking personal accounts at face value, structured psychological interviews and systematic observations by anthropologists and other social scientists who participate in the lives of their informants can provide new and surprising alternatives to frame the collection of statistical data.9 More specifically, at least four critical flaws are embedded in the conclusions drawn from the data. First, there is a concern with sampling. Pape continues to argue that “the leading instigator of suicide attacks is the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, a Marx-

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ist-Leninist group whose members are from Hindu families but who are adamantly opposed to religion.”10 Yet, in the last three years, the Tigers and the other main secular and nationalist groups in Pape’s sample, such as Turkey’s Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK), have carried out very few attacks or none at all. The Tigers have carried out only two confirmed suicide attacks since the beginning of 2002. Although they perhaps remain the leading single organizer of suicide attacks (77 in total), there have been more suicide attacks by various Iraqi groups in 2005 (where more than 400 attacks killed more than 2,000 people) than in the entire history of the Tigers.11 The Iraqi attacks have not been carried out through a particularly well-orgahere were more nized strategic operation, but rather via a loose, suicide attacks in ad hoc constellation of many small bands that the last two years act on their own or come together for a single 12 than between 1980 attack. There also appear to be clear and profound differences between secular nationalist and 2003. groups such as the Tamil Tigers, who fight to expel occupiers from their homeland, and global jihadis, who fight against perceived global domination. For example, Tamil suicide operatives are actively selected by recruiters and cannot withdraw from planned operations without fear of retaliation against their families,13 whereas the martyrs of the Al Qaeda network are mostly self-recruiting and deeply committed to global ideology through strong network ties of friendship and kinship so that events anywhere in jihad’s planetary theater may directly impact actions anywhere else. Second, Pape’s conclusions about suicide terrorism are both too narrow and too broad. On the narrow side, none of Pape’s data indicate that conventional tactics are less useful than suicide attacks in cases where terrorists appear to have scored successes in liberating their homeland.14 For example, Israel exited southern Lebanon 14 years after Hizballah ceased to use suicide tactics, and the United States withdrew from Somalia after casualties suffered under conventional attack. The category of suicide terrorism today also proves to be too broad and motley a category to draw reliable conclusions about motivations and goals. For example, although the Tigers deserve their due in any inquiry on contemporary suicide terrorism, their relevance to the global diffusion of martyrdom operations is questionable. Marc Sageman, a forensic psychiatrist and former intelligence case officer, has traced the links among more than 400 jihadis with ties to Al Qaeda. 15 No significant demographic differences emerge between Sageman’s global jihadi sample and Pape’s more restricted sample of 71 terrorists who killed themselves between 1995 and 2004 in attacks sponsored or inspired

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l Scott Atran by Al Qaeda. In other words, there seem to be no reliable differences between jihadi martyrs in particular and jihadis who fight in the name of global jihad more generally. Third, rather than judging as Pape does the success of suicide tactics primarily by whether the sponsoring organization has helped to expel foreigners from its homeland, the broader strategic goal that suicide attacks seek may be to increase the sponsoring organization’s political here is a lingering “market share” among its own potential supmisconception that porters, that is, to broaden its political base martyrs are being among the population and narrow popular directed by ‘Al support for rival organizations.16 For example, the Hamas campaign of suicide bombings acQaeda.’ tually caused Israel to reoccupy Palestinian lands during the second intifada and not to withdraw, but levels of popular support for Hamas increased to rival and at times even surpass support for the Fatahdominated Palestinian Liberation Organization.17 Inciting the withdrawal of foreign forces is only one means of accomplishing that goal. Thus, the net effect of the suicide attacks was not to expel foreign forces but to increase the appeal of Hamas. Similarly, the net result of the September 11 attacks was substantially greater U.S. and foreign intervention in Muslim territories, although Al Qaeda’s profile rose to the top of the global jihadi ranks. Fourth, Pape’s argument that suicide terrorism is unrelated or only marginally related to Salafi ideology employs an unfounded inference. Salafis believe that the hadith (oral traditions) and literal readings of the Qur‘an are sufficient guides for social law and personal life. The most militant among them, the jihadis, believe that all contemporary majority-Muslim countries with the exception of Afghanistan under the Taliban have strayed from the true path of Islam and that the only way back is through violent jihad. Pape relies on statistics to show that “the presence of [U.S.] military forces for combat operations on the homeland of suicide terrorists is stronger than Islamic fundamentalism in predicting” whether someone will become an Al Qaeda suicide terrorist. 18 According to Pape’s analysis, nearly one-third of Pakistan’s 150 million people are estimated to be Salafi, but the country has produced only two suicide terrorists, whereas Morocco has no Salafis, according to a single secondary source from 1993, but has produced 12 suicide terrorists. Some of these statistics can be contested, whereas others need to be updated. For example, although Salafism may still lack wide popular support in Morocco, its appeal has grown steadily among the discontented in that

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country since the 1970s and especially after the return of the Afghan alumni in the 1990s.19 By the end of 2004, Pakistan had at least 10 suicide bombers in the country, apart from the dozens of suicide terrorists from Pakistan’s Kashmiri groups that profess allegiance to global jihad. Similarly, the number of suicide terrorists in heavily Salafi Egypt has quadrupled over the figure presented in Pape’s 2003 tables and has more than doubled in Indonesia. Uzbekistan, which had six suicide bombers in 2004 and which Pape listed as having no Salafi population, in fact has large numbers of mostly urban youth who now sympathize with Hizb ut-Tahrir, a radical Islamist movement largely unknown in Central Asia before the mid-1990s, whose proclaimed goal is jihad against the United States and the overthrow ost jihadis follow of existing political regimes and their replacekin and colleagues ment with a caliphate run on Salafi principles. more than they do As a causal variable, however, “Salafi population in country of origin” is largely irrelorders from afar. evant to what is happening in the world today. Even if the sample’s statistical reliability were to hold up for the years that Pape surveyed, suicide terrorism is a rapidly moving phenomenon that still involves relatively small numbers, the significance of which can shift dramatically in a relatively short period of time. Indeed, there were more suicide attacks in the last two years, roughly 600, than in Pape’s entire sample between 1980 and 2003. The British-born bombers who attacked London in 2005 or the Malaysians who likely planned the latest Bali bombing belong to the fringe of a large and growing Muslim diaspora. This changing jihadi landscape is revealed in the formation of the cell responsible for the 2004 Madrid train bombings. As early as October 2002, the substitute imam of the Takoua Mosque in Madrid was informing Spanish police under the codename “Cartagena” that a band of friends, unhappy with the mosque’s seemingly moderate preachings, had begun calling themselves Al Haraka Salafiya (The Salafi Movement). According to Cartagena, they met “clandestinely, with no regularity or fixed place, by oral agreement and without any schedule, though usually on Fridays.” Soon, the informal group of mostly homesick Moroccan descendants and émigrés “reached the conclusion that they had to undertake jihad.” By November 2002, opinion within the group began to shift against “going to other countries to undertake jihad, when operations were possible in Morocco and Spain.”20 A detailed action plan only began to coalesce later the following year, however, around the time the Internet tract “Iraqi Jihad, Hopes and Risks” began to circulate a call for “two or three attacks … to exploit the coming general

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l Scott Atran elections in Spain in March 2004” on the Global Islamic Media Front Web site,21 to which the Madrid plotters had been systematically logging on since the spring of 2003. The police reports show that targeting trains to force Spain out of the coalition in Iraq was only a late goal emanating from an informal network dedicated to the simple but diffuse project of undertaking jihad to defend and advance a Salafist vision of Islam. When Egyptian Bedouin are dying to kill European tourists and the Egyptians who cater to them; when British citizens blow themselves up along with other British because of the country’s involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan; when jihadis exclusively target co-religionists linked to the secular government in Bangladesh, which is not a particularly close friend of the United States or its allies; when Malaysian bombers kill Australians and Balinese Hindus in Indonesia as “self-defense” in a “clash of civilizations” between Islam and the United States;22 and when Arabs from more than a dozen countries rush to embrace death in Iraq in order to kill Shi‘as, who are probably more supportive of Iran than they are of the United States, it is quite a stretch to identify the common thread as a secular struggle over foreign occupation of a homeland, unless “secular” covers transcendent ideologies, “foreign occupation” includes tourism, and “homeland” expands to at least three continents.

Al Qaeda as Bogeyman Attributing the motivations to narrowly expelling foreign forces is not the only common misconception about today’s suicide terrorists. There is a preferred interpretation and lingering misconception among leading pundits and politicians that contemporary martyrs around the world are being directed and organized by a specific “Al Qaeda” group. Al Qaeda leaders and operatives, they claim, are behind the coordinated bombings in London, Egypt, Iraq, and elsewhere. Yet, remnants of the mostly Egyptian hardcore around bin Laden have not managed a successful attack in three years, since the bombing in Djerba, Tunisia, in October 2002. In fact, they do not even know who many of the new terrorists are, much less be able to communicate with and direct them reliably. Whither Al Qaeda? Only after the embassy bombings in Africa in 1998 did U.S. officials or anyone else begin referring to Al Qaeda as a worldwide terrorist organization led by bin Laden. It came from the somewhat contradictory testimony in United States vs. Usama Bin Laden, et al. in U.S. federal court in New York that same year. One detainee, Khalfan Khamis Mohamed, claimed never to have heard of an “Al Qaeda” group but recognized the term as a way of carrying out militant actions. Another, Jamal Ahmed Al-Fadl, said “the Al Qaeda group” had existed since “around ’89.”23 134

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Especially after the September 11 attacks, nationalist Islamist movements from Morocco to Indonesia, which had jealously guarded their independence, spiritually united under the Al Qaeda logo. Intense public attention on Al Qaeda encouraged homegrown groups only tenuously connected with bin Laden, if at all, to claim responsibility for attacks in Al Qaeda’s name, to be taken more seriously both by friends and foes. Abu Mus’ab Al-Zarqawi’s Iraq-based jihadi group, whose violent, anti-Shi‘a policy was never bin Laden’s, is a good example. “Al Qaeda” terrorist actions are now chiefly executed by self-forming cells of t is nonsense to claim friends that swarm for attack, then disapthat terrorists simply pear or disperse to form new swarms. Inwant to annihilate dependent studies by Nixon Center scholar Western civilization. Robert Leiken 24 and Sageman show that more than 80 percent of known jihadis currently live in diaspora communities, which are often marginalized from the host society and physically disconnected from each other. Similar to the decentralized anarchist movement that terrorized the world a century ago, most jihadis follow kin and colleagues more than they do orders from afar. Their difficult-to-penetrate social networks consist of about 70 percent friends and 20 percent family.25 Yearning for a sense of community and a deeper meaning in life, small groups of friends and family from the same area “back home” bond as they surf Islamist Web sites and seek direction from Al Qaeda’s inspiration.26 In the last five years, Web sites carrying Islamist messages have increased from less than 20 to more than 3,000,27 with about 70 avowedly militant sites collectively forming a virtual jihadi university. In fact, an October 2005 posting by Ahmad Al-Wathiq bi-Llah, “deputy general emir” of the Al-Zarqawi–affiliated Global Islamic Media Front, reissued a 2003 announcement for the “Al Qaeda University of Jihad Studies … a tangible reality for the enemies of the Nation and the Faith; a decentralized university without geographical borders, present in every place.” 28 “Graduates,” he explains, pass through “faculties” that advance the cause of a global caliphate through morale boosting and bombings and specialize in “electronic jihad, media jihad, spiritual and financial jihad.” Although veteran jihadis may sometimes help trigger the newer groups into action, even information for the do-it-yourself explosives used in the Madrid and London bombings is available on the Internet.29 As in the case of the Madrid train bombers, even if all of the plotters are caught or kill themselves, it need not affect the ability of other groups to self-organize and

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l Scott Atran stay motivated so that the movement does not die with them. The December 2003 Internet tract that foreshadowed the Madrid bombings inspired attacks that would force Spain’s withdrawal from Iraq as a way to generate “huge pressure on the British presence, which [Prime Minister] Tony Blair could not overcome.”30 When Blair did not follow suit, however, it appears that a mix of homegrown talent—three cricket friends of Pakistani origin: one married, one in college, one “born again,” later joined by a convert— fused by foreign-born incitement bombed London to press matters. Web sites such as that of the Global Islamic Media Front 31 that host these tracts have become the new organizational agents in jihadi networks, replacing physical agents such as bin Laden. Even functioning central actors such as Zarqawi are effectively only co-leaders with the media sites that increasingly control the distribution of knowledge and resources. The edited snippets and sound bites favored by today’s mass media have been used with consummate skill by jihadi leaders and ideologues, beginning with bin Laden himself. As a result, deeply local and historically nuanced interpretations of religious canon have been flattened and homogenized across the Muslim world and beyond, in ways that have nothing in particular to do with actual Islamic tradition but everything to do with a polar reaction to perceived injustice in the prevailing unipolar world. At the same time, the historical narrative, however stilted or fictitious, translates personal and local ties within and across small groups into a profound connection with the wider Muslim community (ummah).

Jihadis Are Not Nihilistic (Even If Apocalyptic) A third misconception is that those who carry out attacks in the name of Al Qaeda or through its inspiration do so mostly because the terrorist is desperate or a nihilist who, in the words of President George W. Bush, “hates freedom, rejects tolerance, and despises dissent” and wants only to replace the current mildly corrupt and undemocratic regimes with the terrorist’s own far more authoritarian and arbitrary form of “evil.” 32 This is the thesis of the U.S. leadership. 33 It is hopelessly tendentious and willfully blind.34 It is nonsense to claim that Al Qaeda and its sympathizers have no morality and simply want to annihilate Western civilization. In general, charges of nihilism against an adversary usually reflect ignorance of the adversary’s moral framework or an attempt publicly to cast it as simply evil to mobilize domestic support for war. Even bin Laden has never preached destruction of Western culture or else, as he has taunted, “Why didn’t we attack Sweden?” 35 At every turn, bin Laden has earnestly sought moral justification for Al Qaeda’s actions and demands.36 This includes his invocation of a fatwah 136

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published in May 2003 by radical Saudi cleric Hamid bin Al-Fahd permitting the use of nuclear weapons to inflict millions of casualties on the United States, unless Washington changes its foreign policy toward the Middle East and elsewhere in the Muslim world.37 One important post–September 11 development in global network jihad is that Al Qaeda splinters no longer consider themselves to be territorially rooted in supporting populations. Unconstrained by concrete concerns for what will happen to any population that supports them, deracinated jihadis can conceive of any manner of attack, including one leadhe key is not to ing to fulfillment of Al-Fahd’s apocalyptic vichange deeply held sion. Al Qaeda deputy Ayman Al-Zawahiri religious beliefs, but continues to urge jihadis everywhere to into channel them. flict the greatest possible damage and maximum casualties on the West, regardless of the time and effort required or of the immediate consequences. To some extent, organizations that sponsor suicide terrorism are motivated to fight policies they abhor by hard-nosed calculations of the material costs and benefits associated with martyrdom actions. Al-Zawahiri argues in his “testament,” Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner, that “[t]he method of martyrdom operations [i]s the most successful way of inflicting damage against the opponent and the least costly to the mujahideen in casualties.”38 Increasing their organization’s political market share, jihadi leaders point to the sacrifice of their best and brightest as signals of their costly commitment to their community. In September 2004, Sheikh Hamed Al-Betawi, a spiritual leader of Hamas, told me that “[o]ur people do not own airplanes and tanks, only human bombs. Those who undertake martyrdom actions are not hopeless or poor, but are the best of our people, educated, successful. They are intelligent, advanced combat techniques for fighting enemy occupation.”39 Yet, according to Harvard political scientist Jessica Stern, who has interviewed terrorists and those who sponsor them, holy wars are dependent first and foremost on redressing a deep pool of perceived humiliation, not just on military occupation per se and certainly not on simply nihilistic grounds.40 Al-Zawahiri decries globalization, including tourism, as cultural domination that degrades Muslims. Groups claiming responsibility for the July 2004 suicide bombings of hotel and market areas in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, for example, did not simply wish to purge Egypt of foreign influence. Rather, the plotters or those sympathetic to them considered “that this operation was in response to the crimes committed by the forces of international evil, which are spilling the blood of Muslims in Iraq, Afghanistan and Chechnya.”41

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l Scott Atran Inspiration for targeting tourists can be found in the recent online musings of Abu Mus’ab Al-Suri, the new global jihadi Web “star” and principal theoretician of “leaderless resistance,”42 who sets a top priority of targeting Western tourists. 43 This tactic, initiated by Zawahiri, has become a mainstay of suicide attacks linked to Al Qaeda’s primary ally in Southeast Asia, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), most recently with the September 2005 Bali bombings. JI lieutenant Riduan Isamuddin, also known as Hambali, first decided to intervene in a local dispute between Muslims and Christians in the remote Indoe can no longer nesian Maluku islands to extend his brand of jihad to all of Indonesia and then, after the ignore the moral September 11 attacks, to globalize the jihad values and group by enlisting suicide bombers to hit Western dynamics that drive targets and interests, including the 2002 Bali bombings that killed more than 200, mostly suicide terrorism. tourists, and the 2003 attack on Jakarta’s J.W. Marriott hotel. In Iraq, the theme of humiliation, such as well-publicized U.S. military actions at Abu Ghraib prison, is important to understanding the Islamists’ rage. As an observation from interviewing terrorists and those who inspire and care for them, individuals who opt for suicide attacks often seem motivated by values and small-group dynamics that trump rational self-interest. Violation of such values leads to moral outrage and seemingly irrational vengeance (“get the offender, even if it kills us”). Adherence to sacred values, which provides the moral foundations and faith of every society or sect that has endured for generations,44 ultimately leads to perceived moral obligations that appear to be irrational, such as martyrdom. 45 One is obliged to act “independently of the likelihood of success,”46 as in acts of heroism or terrorism, because believers could not live with themselves if they did not. When our research team interviews would-be suicide bombers and their sponsors and when we survey their supporters, for example, Hamas students or students in Indonesian madrassas that have produced suicide bombers, we pose questions such as, “What if your family were to be killed in retaliation for your action?” or “What if your father were dying and your mother discovered your plans and asked you to delay until the family could recover?” Almost all answer along the lines that, although duty to family exists, duty to God cannot be postponed. The typical response to the question “What if your action resulted in no one’s death but your own?” is, “God will love you just the same.” When I posed these questions to the alleged emir of JI, Abu Bakr Ba’asyir, in Jakarta’s Cipinang prison in August 2005, he re-

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sponded that martyrdom for the sake of jihad is the ultimate fardh ‘ain, an inescapable individual obligation that trumps all others, including four of the five pillars of Islam (pilgrimage, almsgiving, fasting, prayer). This is a radically new interpretation of Islam, where only the profession of faith in Allah and his prophet counts as equal to jihad. What matters for Ba’asyir, as for most would-be martyrs and their sponsors whom I have interviewed, is the martyr’s intention and commitment to God.47 It is inspired by love of one’s group and by rage at those who would humiliate it, but certainly not blind rage. The power of faith is something many understand at home but few deem worthy of consideration for enemies abroad. Yet, responses from jihadis, as well as their actions, suggest that sacred values are not entirely sensitive to standard political or economic calculations regarding costs or payoffs that come with undertaking martyrdom actions, nor are they readily translatable from one culture to another. Especially in Arab societies, where the culture of honor applies even to the humblest family as it once applied to the noblest families of the southern United States,48 witnessing the abuse of elders in front of their children, whether verbal insults at roadblocks or stripdowns during house searches, indelibly stains the memory and increases popular support for martyrdom actions.49 This can be true even if the person is witness only to an injured party living thousands of miles away, for example, an Indonesian observing events in the Palestinian territories on television or though the Internet. What may be considered standard police practice in the United States may warrant undying calls for revenge in another society. Moreover, when sacred values are at stake, traditional calculations of how to defeat or deter an enemy, for example, by invoking a democratic vote, providing material incentives to defect, or threatening massive retaliation against supporting populations, might not succeed.

Policy Implications: Responding Transnationally Despite common popular misconceptions, suicide terrorists today are not motivated exclusively or primarily by foreign occupation, they are not directed by a central organization, and they are not nihilistic. Most suicide terrorists today are inspired by a global jihadism which, despite atavistic cultural elements, is a thoroughly modern movement filling the popular political void in Islamic communities left in the wake of discredited Western ideologies co-opted by corrupt local governments. Appeals to Muslim history and calls for a revival of the caliphate are widespread and heartfelt. To some extent, jihadism is also a countermovement to the ideological and corresponding military thrust ensconced, for example, in the National Security Strategy of the United States, which enshrines liberal democracy as the “single THE W ASHINGTON Q UARTERLY

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l Scott Atran sustainable model of national development right and true for every person, in every society—and the duty of protecting these values against their enemies.” 50 An alternative both to global jihadis and U.S. democracy promoters are those who support a more measured version of realism. This strategy would advocate returning to “offshore balancing,” which would shift the burden of and recognition for managing the security of turbulent regions to regional powers. 51 Pape favors this approach as the only coherent strategy to minimize suicide terrorism and what it represents: unwanted he policy domination. U.S. military superiority would implications of this permit a nod to others’ primary interests in a change may be as region and help to maintain the latter’s novel as hitherto spheres of influence, while also allowing surgical interventions in cases where regional neglected. affairs got out of hand, for example, if oil supplies were threatened. Would ending military adventures and support for corroded, undemocratic regimes, as Pape’s analysis suggests, end the menace from suicide attack? As a long-term strategy, ending belligerent intervention in other people’s affairs is likely a sound suggestion. In the short term, however, the link between ceasing military intervention and terminating suicide terrorism is less compelling. Simply exiting Iraq or Afghanistan today would not likely solve matters. Because the United States was not involved in Iraq or Afghanistan at the time, they could not have figured into the motivations for the September 11 attacks or earlier Al Qaeda suicide operations. After Spain’s exit from Iraq, the threats to that country from jihadi terrorists did not abate: a subsequent bomb plot against a highspeed train to Toledo, as well as a plot by an independent Algerian cell to blow up the Madrid office of an antiterrorism judge, were both foiled by authorities, but they existed. Even the fact that the United States has largely withdrawn its military forces from Saudi Arabia seems to have done absolutely nothing to appease bin Laden. Moreover, his sympathizers see this as a concession, perhaps even inciting further attacks. Both the realist and idealist approaches focus on the increasingly transected nation-state system, that is, on building nations or maintaining alliances among states. The problem, however, is transnational, and the solutions are not likely subject to any sovereign control, even that of the United States. What may be needed are new and varied forms of transnational associations that reach across cities and cyberspace, where decisions by and interactions among states represent only one of several possible dimensions. How, then,

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to deal with this deeply faith-inspired, decentralized, and self-adjusting global jihadi “market,” where any small group of friends can freely shop for ideas or even for personnel and materials and any can inflict such widespread damage? A successful counterstrategy would have to act on at least three different levels: changing the motivations of potential recruits, disrupting sponsors’ organizations, and undermining popular support.

RECRUITS: FORGET THE PROFILES, UNDERSTAND THE CELLS In targeting potential recruits for suicide terrorism, it must be understood that terrorist attacks will not be prevented by trying to profile terrorists. They are not sufficiently different from everyone else. Insights into homegrown jiahdi attacks will have to come from understanding group dynamics, not individual psychology. Small-group dynamics can trump individual personality to produce horrific behavior in otherwise ordinary people. Most jihadi cells are small in number, with eight members being most common.52 Although the members of each cell usually show remarkable homogeneity within the group (age, place of origin, residence, educational background, socioeconomic status, dietary preferences, etc.), there is little homogeneity across the jihadi diaspora. This renders attempts at profiling practically worthless. Cells are often spontaneously formed and self-mobilizing, with few direct physical contacts with other cells. Radicalization usually requires outside input from and interaction with the larger jihadi community. The Internet is taking over from the hands-on gurus of global jihad in radicalizing friends into pseudo-families for whom they will give their lives. Without the Internet, the extreme fragmentation and decentralization of the jihadi movement into a still functioning global network might not be possible. This requires the careful monitoring rather than simple removal of existing jihadi Web sites. What is needed is a subtle infiltration of opportunities to create chat rooms, as well as physical support groups, which advance causes that can play to jihadi sentiments but that are not destructive, such as providing faith-based social services. The key is not to try to undermine the sacred values that inspire people to radical action or attempt to substitute one’s own preferred values by forceful imposition or through propaganda. Our studies show that such tactics, as well as offers of instrumental incentives such as monetary compensation to forego martyrdom or make peace with an enemy, only incite further moral outrage and extreme behavior.53 Rather, the aim should be to show how deeply held sacred values can be channeled into less-belligerent paths. What has struck me in my interviews with mujahideen who have rejected suicide bombing is that they remain very committed to Salafi principles, with firm and deep religious beliefs. Those who seem to succeed best in convincing their brethren to forsake THE W ASHINGTON Q UARTERLY

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l Scott Atran wanton killing of civilians do so by promoting alternative interpretations of Islamic principles that need not directly oppose Salafi teachings. In his recent book, Unveiling Jemaah Islamiyah, one of JI’s former top leaders, Nasir Abas, refutes what he believes to be a tendentious use of the Qur‘an and hadith to justify suicide bombing and violence against fellow Muslims and civilians. (JI, similar to many of the militant Salafi groups that are sympathetic to Al Qaeda, is riddled with internal divisions over the wisdom of killing fellow Muslims and civilians.) “Not one verse in the [Qur‘an] contains an order for Muslims to make war on people of another religion,” Abas writes, “or that killing women, children and civilians can ever be proper, just or balanced. [The contrary belief] has only created discord in the Muslim community and has led non-Muslims to regard Islam as sadistic and cruel.”54 He reasons that the best way to turn altruistic suicide bombers who believe that what they are doing is sacred away from violence may be by religiously promoting competing sacred values, such as spreading the faith and promoting equal economic opportunity, as well as social and political advancement through educational achievement and personal piety. Sincere alternative appeals to sacred values could undermine consensus for violent jihad. The United States and its allies should quietly encourage this process without strangling it in open embrace.

ORGANIZATIONS: DISRUPTING DECENTRALIZED NETWORKS In targeting organizations that sponsor suicide terrorism, police action and intelligence are crucial, but the present mode of operations is not encouraging. Although traditionally hierarchical forms of military and intelligence command and control were suitable for large-scale operations against the Taliban and Al Qaeda’s global organization, they are patently less effective now, even though classical means are still needed to prevent sanctuaries from reemerging. Impressions, such as the one that Central Intelligence Agency director Porter Goss reaffirmed in his inaugural address before Congress, that some specific group called Al Qaeda is out there planning bigger and better attacks are misleading. 55 Ever more hierarchical and centralized management under a new national intelligence director to deal with increasingly decentralized terrorist networks may also be precisely the wrong way to go. According to former attorney general Edwin Meese, “It [will not] help matters to have a national intelligence director whose job is to prepare briefs to bring to the president every day or simply to coordinate intelligence products. What we could use is a facilitator to bring people and ideas together, not another operative.”56 It may take a broad and elastic web of the diverse talent, tolerance, and spare conformity of our democracies, unbound from any nation’s hegemony, 142

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calls to ruthlessness, or rigid rules of hierarchy, to snare the virtual hand of born-again jihad that guides suicide missions. Informal bonds may need to grow among diverse experts with idiosyncratic personal skills and the operational branches fighting terrorism, so that a phone call from an expert or operator in one country to another country can trigger specific responses without plodding through official channels—much the way globally networked jihadis now operate. This would help to convert fairly static responses into a dynamic system that would throw open the flow of information that would allow the intelligence and military communities’ technological advantages to keep ahead of jihadi innovations without being mired in existing or reformed bureaucracies.

SOCIETY: DIVERTING SYMPATHY FOR MARTYRS In targeting popular support for suicide terrorism, it must be understood that terrorists depend, often quite consciously, on prodding those attacked into committing atrocious retaliatory acts, either deliberately or by a willingness to tolerate indefinitely horrific degrees and amounts of collateral damage to innocent bystanders. Historically and today, it is desecration of sacred places and perceived humiliation, even more than death and destruction, that has moved people to embrace violence.57 One strategic alternative is for the United States to do more of what it did in Aceh in early 2005 for tsunami victims, providing constructive investments of soft power that can generate longer-term relief from the need to use destructive and usually snowballing forms of hard power.58 U.S. tsunami relief arguably has been the one significant victory since the September 11 attacks in the struggle to prevent the enlistment of future terrorists for jihad (unfortunately, Kashmiri jihadi groups are the primary providers of assistance to the victims of Pakistan’s recent earthquake). According to recent surveys conducted by the Pew Global Attitudes Project, Indonesian views of the United States, which were largely favorable before the U.S. invasion of Iraq, plummeted to 15 percent immediately afterward.59 Yet, the study shows that, since the rescue and relief role that the United States played in concert with other nations, international associations, and nongovernmental organizations after the tsunami, favorable attitudes toward the United States among Indonesians have risen to 38 percent.60 Concurrently, popular support for combating terrorism has doubled from 23 percent in 2003 to 50 percent in 2005. Indonesia is now one of the few nations where a majority (59 percent, up from 25 percent in 2003) believes that the United States can act in other nations’ interests. Although these polls indicate that popular sentiment remains volatile, the bright side is that such instability suggests that the anti-Americanism that helps sustain the jihadi cult of martyrdom could yet be reversed. THE W ASHINGTON Q UARTERLY

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l Scott Atran Embracing Complexity Those who believe suicide terrorism can be explained by a single political root cause, such as the presence of foreign military forces or the absence of democracy, ignore psychological motivations, including religious inspirations, which can trump rational self-interest to produce horrific or heroic behavior in ordinary people. Those who believe that some central organization such as the old Al Qaeda directs such suicide terrorists ignore the small-group dynamics involving friends and family that form the diaspora cell of brotherhood and camaraderie on which the rising tide of martyrdom actions is based. Finally, those who simply dismiss jihadis as nihilists risk developing policies based on faulty assumptions that seek to challenge deeply held religious beliefs, rather than more effectively channel them to less-violent expressions. Simple explanations and solutions, based mostly on familiar research and policy paradigms but no first-hand knowledge or field experience capable of challenging them, may be more appealing and easier to grasp. They are liable to fail, however, because they ignore the underlying moral values and group dynamics that drive jihadis to suicide terrorism. “Know thine enemy” is not a call for therapy but for a better understanding of who out there is dying to kill and why. Understanding that can help decisionmakers devise organizational and ideological solutions to defuse the threat of martyrdom.

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1.

Bruce Hoffman, “Security for a New Century,” Washington, D.C., September 23, 2005 (briefing for Senate Foreign Affairs Committee staff).

2.

Scott Atran, “Suicide Terrorism Database, 2004,” http://www.sitemaker.umich.edu/ satran/files/suicide_terrorism_database_2004.xls.

3.

Neil Macdonald, “Suicide Attack Every Day in the New Iraq,” Financial Times, July 14, 2005, http://news.ft.com/cms/s/7c74abf8-f495-11d9-9dd1-00000e2511c8.html; Chris Tomlinson, “Fewer Suicide Bombings in Iraq in November,” Associated Press, December 1, 2005.

4.

Jim Giles and Michael Hopkin, “Psychologists Warn of More Suicide Attacks in the Wake of London Bombs,” Nature, July 21, 2005, pp. 308–309.

5.

Robert Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (New York: Random House, 2005).

6.

Reuven Paz, “Qa’idat al-Jihad, Iraq and Madrid,” PRISM Special Dispatches on Global Jihad, March 13, 2004, http://www.e-prism.org/images/PRISM_Special_dispatch_no_12.pdf.

7.

Reuven Paz, “Arab Volunteers Killed in Iraq,” PRISM Special Dispatches on Global Jihad, March 3, 2005, http://www.e-prism.org/images/PRISM_no_1_vol_3__Arabs_killed_in_Iraq.pdf.

8.

For representations of these two poles in the field of terrorism studies, see Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania THE W ASHINGTON QUARTERLY

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Press, 2004); Jessica Stern, Terror in the Name of God (New York: HarperCollins, 2003). Both approaches yield important insights that may be enhanced by a coordination of efforts, which our common project with the National Science Foundation aims to accomplish. 9.

For detailed examples of how cultural reframing of hypotheses can thoroughly undermine the presumed validity of statistical trends, no matter how significant and reliable those trends appear to be, see Scott Atran, Douglas Medin, and Norbert Ross, “The Cultural Mind: Ecological Decision Making and Cultural Modeling Within and Across Populations,” Psychological Review 112 (2005): 744–776.

10. Robert Pape, “Blowing Up an Assumption,” New York Times, May 18, 2005, p. A29. 11. Pape does not consider coordinated attacks launched around the same time as separate attacks. Even so, according to S.W.A.B. Daulagala, Sri Lanka’s chief inspector of police, in total, 262 Tamil Tigers launched suicide attacks. Data presented to the Technical Experts Workshop on Suicide Terrorism, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, May 20, 2005. 12 Dexter Filkins, “Profusion of Rebel Groups Helps Them Survive in Iraq,” New York Times, December 2, 2005, p. A1. 13. Selliah Ignasius Yoganathan, “Rise and Decline of Suicide Terrorism in Sri Lanka,” paper presented to the NATO Advanced Workshop on “The Strategic Threat from Suicide Terrorism,” Lisbon, June 11, 2004. 14. Joshua Sinai, “The Unsettling Lure of Suicide Terrorism,” Washington Times, June 19, 2005, http://www.washingtontimes.com/books/20050618-115922-1289r.htm. 15. Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (updated with data presented to World Federation of Scientists Permanent Monitoring Panel on Terrorism, Erice, Italy, May 8, 2005). 16. Mia Bloom, Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005). 17. See Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/survey.html (political tracking polls of Palestinian popular opinion for the last seven years). 18. Pape, Dying to Win, p. 103. 19. Anouar Boukhars, “Origins of Militancy and Salafism in Morocco,” Jamestown Terrorism Monitor, June 17, 2005, http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php? articleid=2369722. 20. “Las notas del Confidente ‘Cartagena’ Preuban Que la Policia Controlaba la Cúpula del 11-M” [Notes from the police informant “Cartagena” prove that the police were controlling the ringleader of March 11], http://www.belt.es/noticias/2005/junio/01/ 11-M.asp. 21. See Paz, “Qa’idat al-Jihad, Iraq and Madrid.” 22. Scott Atran, “The Emir: An Interview With Abu Bakr Ba’asyir, Alleged Leader of the Southeast Asian Jemaah Islamiyah Organization,” Jamestown Foundation Spotlight on Terrorism, September 15, 2005, http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/ article.php?articleid=2369782. 23. United States of America v. Usama bin Laden, et al., February 6, 2001, http:// cryptome.org/usa-v-ubl-02.htm (defendant Jamal Ahmed Al-Fadl); United States of America v. Usama bin Laden, et al., March 19, 2001, http://cryptome.org/usa-v-ubl19.htm (discussion of Khalfan Khamis Muhamed). Members of Jemaah Islamiyah who studied in Afghanistan with Abdullah Azzam (Bin Laden’s mentor and originator of the term al-Qaeda al-sulbah [the strong base]) and who over the years met THE W ASHINGTON Q UARTERLY

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l Scott Atran with bin Laden and hosted September 11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Muhammad, also tell me they never heard the term “Al Qaeda” applied to an organization until after September 11. 24. Robert Leiken, “Bearers of Global Jihad? Immigration and National Security After 9/11,” March 25, 2004, http://www.nixoncenter.org/publications/monographs/ Leiken_Bearers_of_Global_Jihad.pdf. 25. Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks. Our research team has been updating Sageman’s database with several hundred entries, and we find the demographic and networking trends fairly constant. 26. For more information on youth and the Internet, see “European Youth Ditching TV and Radio for Web,” European Tech Wire, June 24, 2005, http://www.europeantechwire.com/ etw/2005/06/24/. For more information on interpersonal communications through the Internet, see Paul Resnick and Richard Zeckhauser, “Trust Among Strangers in Internet Interactions,” in Advances in Applied Microeconomics 11, ed. Michael Baye (Amsterdam: Elsevier Science, 2002). 27. Luis Miguel Ariza, “Virtual Jihad: The Internet as the Ideal Terrorism Recruiting Tool,” Scientific American, January 2006, http://www.sciam.com/article.cfm? articleID=000B5155-2077-13A8-9E4D83414B7F0101. 28. Al-Farouq jihadi forum, October 7, 2005, http://www.Al-farouq.com/vb/. 29. Raymond Bonner, Don Van Natta, and Stephen Grey, “Investigators So Far Find Little Foreign Involvement,” New York Times, July 31, 2005, p. A1. 30. Scott Atran, “The Jihadist Mutation,” Jamestown Terrorism Monitor, March 25, 2004, http://www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=400& issue_id=2929&article_id=23646. 31. See http://online2005.100free.com/. 32. Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, “President Addresses Nation, Discusses Iraq, War on Terror,” June 28, 2005, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/06/20050628-7.html. 33. Stephen Hadley and Frances Fragos Townsend, “What We Saw in London,” New York Times, July 23, 2005, p. A13. 34. For a discussion of the “hates freedom” thesis, see Scott Atran, “Mishandling Suicide Terrorism,” The Washington Quarterly 27, no. 3 (Summer 2004): 67–90. 35. Al Jazeera, October 29, 2003. See Al Jazeera, November 28, 2003 (Ayman AlZawahiri). 36. Michael Scheuer, Imperial Hubris (Dulles, Va.: Potomac Books, 2004). 37. Reuven Paz, “Yes to WMD: The First Islamist Fatwah on the Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction,” PRISM Special Dispatches on Global Jihad 1, no. 1 (May 2003), http://www.e-prism.org/images/PRISM%20Special%20dispatch%20no%201.doc. 38. Ayman Al-Zawahiri, Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner, serialized in Al-Sharq AlAwsat (London), December 2–10, 2001, trans. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, FBIS-NES-2001-1202. 39. Sheikh Hamed Al-Betawi, interview with author, Nablus, West Bank, September 2004. 40. Jessica Stern, “Beneath Bombast and Bombs, a Caldron of Humiliation,” Los Angeles Times, June 6, 2004, p. M1. 41. “[Al Qaeda]–Linked Militants Claim Responsibility for Resort Bomb,” Ireland OnLine, July 23, 2005 (quoting Abdullah Azzam Brigades, “Al Qaeda in Syria and Egypt”). 146

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42. Mustafa Setmariam Nasar (also known as Abu Mus’ab Al-Suri), Da’wah lilMuqawamah Al-Islamiyyah Al-’Alamiyyah [A call for the Islamic global resistance], http://www.fsboa.com/vw/index.php?subject=7&rec=27&tit=tit&pa=0. 43. Reuven Paz, “Al-Qaeda’s Search for New Fronts: Instructions for Jihadi Activity in Egypt and Sinai,” PRISM Special Dispatches on Global Jihad 3, no. 7, October 2005, http://www.e-prism.org/images/PRISM_no_7_vol_3_-_The_new_front_in_Egypt_ and_Sinai.pdf. See Abu Mus’ab Al- Suri, lecture, October 5, 2005, http:// z15.zupload.com:download.php?file=getfile&filepath=1233 (posted by the Global Islamic Media Front). 44. Scott Atran, In Gods We Trust (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002). 45. Alan Fiske and Phillip Tetlock, “Taboo Tradeoffs: Reactions to Transactions That Transgress the Spheres of Justice,” Political Psychology 18 (1997): 255–297. 46. Max Weber, Economy and Society (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1978). 47. Atran, “Emir.” 48. R. Nisbett and D. Cohen, The Culture of Honor: Psychology of Violence in the South (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1996); J. Peristiani, ed., Honor and Shame: The Values of Mediterranean Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966). 49. See Atran, “Mishandling Suicide Terrorism” (discussion of support for suicide attack rising as a function of roadblocks). 50. National Security Strategy of the United States, September 2003, introduction, http:// www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html. 51. Christopher Layne, “From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: U.S. Grand Strategy in the Twenty-first Century,” International Security 22, no. 1 (Summer 1997): 86–124; Christopher Layne, “Offshore Balancing Revisited,” The Washington Quarterly 25, no. 2 (Spring 2002): 233–248. 52. Sageman, data presented to World Federation of Scientists Permanent Monitoring Panel on Terrorism, Erice, Italy, May 8, 2005. 53. Scott Atran, “Risk in the Wild: Reassessing Terrorist Threats From the Field” (presentation, American Association for the Advancement of Science, St. Louis, Mo., February 19, 2006). 54. Nasir Abas, Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyah [Unveiling Jemmah Islamiyah] (Jakarta: Grafindo Khazanah Ilmu, 2005), pp. 221, 316. 55. Porter J. Goss, “Global Intelligence Challenges 2005: Meeting Long-Term Challenges With a Long-Term Strategy,” testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, February 16, 2005, http://www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/ 2004/Goss_testimony_02162005.html. 56. Edwin Meese, remarks to the Critical Incident Analysis Group, Charlottesville, Va., April 3, 2005; Edwin Meese, e-mail communication with author, April 6, 2005. 57. See Ron Hassner, “Fighting Insurgencies on Sacred Ground,” The Washington Quarterly 29, no. 2 (Spring 2006): 149–166. 58. Scott Atran, “In Indonesia, Democracy Isn’t Enough,” New York Times, October 5, 2005, p. A29. 59. Pew Research Center, “U.S. Image Up Slightly, but Still Negative,” Pew Global Attitudes Project, June 2, 2003, http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=185. 60. Pew Research Center, “Views of a Changing World,” Pew Global Attitudes Project, June 23, 2005, http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=247.

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Al Qaeda and the Internet: The Danger of “Cyberplanning” TIMOTHY L. THOMAS

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e can say with some certainty, al Qaeda loves the Internet. When the latter first appeared, it was hailed as an integrator of cultures and a medium for businesses, consumers, and governments to communicate with one another. It appeared to offer unparalleled opportunities for the creation of a “global village.” Today the Internet still offers that promise, but it also has proven in some respects to be a digital menace. Its use by al Qaeda is only one example. It also has provided a virtual battlefield for peacetime hostilities between Taiwan and China, Israel and Palestine, Pakistan and India, and China and the United States (during both the war over Kosovo and in the aftermath of the collision between the Navy EP-3 aircraft and Chinese MiG). In times of actual conflict, the Internet was used as a virtual battleground between NATO’s coalition forces and elements of the Serbian population. These real tensions from a virtual interface involved not only nation-states but also non-state individuals and groups either aligned with one side or the other, or acting independently. Evidence strongly suggests that terrorists used the Internet to plan their operations for 9/11. Computers seized in Afghanistan reportedly revealed that al Qaeda was collecting intelligence on targets and sending encrypted messages via the Internet. As recently as 16 September 2002, al Qaeda cells operating in America reportedly were using Internet-based phone services to communicate with cells overseas. These incidents indicate that the Internet is being used as a “cyberplanning” tool for terrorists. It provides terrorists with anonymity, command and control resources, and a host of other measures to coordinate and integrate attack options. Cyberplanning may be a more important terrorist Internet tool than the much touted and feared cyberterrorism option—attacks against information and systems resulting in violence against noncombatant targets. The Naval Postgrad112

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uate School (NPS) has defined cyberterrorism as the unlawful destruction or disruption of digital property to intimidate or coerce people.1 Cyberplanning, not defined by NPS or any other source, refers to the digital coordination of an integrated plan stretching across geographical boundaries that may or may not result in bloodshed. It can include cyberterrorism as part of the overall plan. Since 9/11, US sources have monitored several websites linked to al Qaeda that appear to contain elements of cyberplanning: l alneda.com, which US officials said contained encrypted information to direct al Qaeda members to more secure sites, featured international news on al Qaeda, and published articles, fatwas (decisions on applying Muslim law), and books. l assam.com, believed to be linked to al Qaeda (originally hosted by the Scranton company BurstNET Technologies, Inc.), served as a mouthpiece for jihad in Afghanistan, Chechnya, and Palestine. l almuhrajiroun.com, an al Qaeda site which urged sympathizers to assassinate Pakistani President Musharraf. l qassam.net, reportedly linked to Hamas. l jihadunspun.net, which offered a 36-minute video of Osama bin Laden.2 l 7hj.7hj.com, which aimed to teach visitors how to conduct computer attacks.3 l aloswa.org, which featured quotes from bin Laden tapes, religious legal rulings that “justified” the terrorist attacks, and support for the al Qaeda cause.4 l drasat.com, run by the Islamic Studies and Research Center (which some allege is a fake center), and reported to be the most credible of dozens of Islamist sites posting al Qaeda news. l jehad.net, alsaha.com, and islammemo.com, alleged to have posted al Qaeda statements on their websites. l mwhoob.net and aljehad.online, alleged to have flashed politicalreligious songs, with pictures of persecuted Muslims, to denounce US policy and Arab leaders, notably Saudi.5 While it is prudent to tally the Internet cyberplanning applications that support terrorists, it must be underscored that few if any of these measures are really anything new. Any hacker or legitimate web user can employ many of these

Lieutenant Colonel Timothy L. Thomas, USA Ret., is an analyst at the Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He has written extensively on information operations, combat in cities, and peacekeeping operations, among other issues, including four previous articles for Parameters. During his military career he served in the 82d Airborne Division and was the Department Head of Soviet Military-Political Affairs at the US Army’s Russian Institute in Garmisch, Germany.

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same measures for their own purposes, for business, or even for advertising endeavors. The difference, of course, is that most of the people on the net, even if they have the capabilities, do not harbor the intent to do harm as does a terrorist or al Qaeda member. Highlighting several of the more important applications may help attract attention to terrorist methodologies and enable law enforcement agencies to recognize where and what to look for on the net. Sixteen measures are listed below for consideration. More could be added. l The Internet can be used to put together profiles. Internet user demographics allow terrorists to target users with sympathy toward a cause or issue, and to solicit donations if the right “profile” is found. Usually a front group will perform the fundraising for the terrorist, often unwittingly. E-mail fundraising has the potential to significantly assist a terrorist’s publicity objectives and finances simultaneously.6 Word searches of online newspapers and journals allow a terrorist to construct a profile of the means designed to counter his actions, or a profile of admitted vulnerabilities in our systems. For example, recent articles reported on attempts to slip contraband items through security checkpoints. One report noted that at Cincinnati’s airport, contraband slipped through over 50 percent of the time. A simple Internet search by a terrorist would uncover this shortcoming, and offer the terrorist an embarkation point to consider for his or her next operation. A 16 September report noted that US law enforcement agencies were tracing calls made overseas to al Qaeda cells from phone cards, cell phones, phone booths, or Internet-based phone services. Exposing the targeting techniques of law enforcement agencies allows the terrorist to alter his or her operating procedures. The use of profiles by terrorists to uncover such material greatly assists their command and control of operations. The implication is that in a free society such as the United States, you can publish too much information, and while the information might not be sensitive to us, it might be very useful to a terrorist. l Internet access can be controlled or its use directed according to the server configuration, thus creating a true ideological weapon. In the past, if some report was offensive to a government, the content of the report could be censored or filtered. Governments cannot control the Internet to the same degree they could control newspapers and TV. In fact, the Internet can serve as a terrorist’s TV or radio station, or his international newspaper or journal. The web allows an uncensored and unfiltered version of events to be broadcast worldwide. Chat rooms, websites, and bulletin boards are largely uncontrolled, with few filters in place. This climate is perfect for an underfunded group to explain its actions or to offset both internal and international condemnation, especially when using specific servers. The Internet can target fence-sitters as well as true believers with different messages, oriented to the target audience. In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, al Qaeda operatives used the Internet to fight for the hearts and minds of the Islamic faithful worldwide. Sev114

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eral internationally recognized and respected Muslims who questioned the attacks were described as hypocrites by al Qaeda. Al Qaeda ran two websites, alneda.com and drasat.com, to discuss the legality of the attacks on 9/11. Al Qaeda stated that Islam shares no fundamental values with the West and that Muslims are committed to spread Islam by the sword. As a result of such commentary, several Muslim critics of al Qaeda’s policies withdrew their prior condemnation.7 Ideological warfare worked. l The Internet can be used anonymously, or as a shell game to hide identities. Terrorists have access to Internet tools to create anonymity or disguise their identities. Online encryption services offer encryption keys for some services that are very difficult to break. The website spammimic.com offers tools that hide text in “spam,” unsolicited bulk commercial e-mail. Speech compression technology allows users to convert a computer into a secure phone device. Network accounts can be deleted or changed as required. For example, Internet users can create Internet accounts with national firms such as America Online (AOL), or can even create an AOL Instant Messenger (AIM) account on a shortterm basis. In addition, anonymous logins are possible for many of the thousands of chat rooms on the net. If desired, the user can access cyber cafes, university and library computers, or additional external resources to further hide the source of the messages.8 An al Qaeda laptop found in Afghanistan had linked with the French Anonymous Society on several occasions. The site offers a two-volume Sabotage Handbook online. Not only are anonymous methods available for the people who use the Internet, but at times Internet service providers (ISPs) unwittingly participate in serving people or groups for purposes other than legitimate ones. The al Qaeda web site www.alneda.com was originally located in Malaysia until 13 May. It reappeared in Texas at http://66.34.191.223/ until 13 June, and then reappeared on 21 June at www.drasat.com in Michigan. It was shut down on 25 June 2002. The ISPs hosting it apparently knew nothing about the content of the site or even the fact that it was housed on their servers.9 This shell game with their website enabled the al Qaeda web to remain functional in spite of repeated efforts to shut it down. Cyber deception campaigns will remain a problem for law enforcement personnel for years to come. l The Internet produces an atmosphere of virtual fear or virtual life. People are afraid of things that are invisible and things they don’t understand. The virtual threat of computer attacks appears to be one of those things. Cyberfear is generated by the fact that what a computer attack could do (bring down airliners, ruin critical infrastructure, destroy the stock market, reveal Pentagon planning secrets, etc.) is too often associated with what will happen. News reports would lead one to believe that hundreds or thousands of people are still active in the al Qaeda network on a daily basis just because al Qaeda says so. It is clear that the Internet empowers small groups and makes them appear much more capable than they might actually be, even turning bluster into a type of Spring 2003

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“The Internet provides terrorists with anonymity, command and control resources, and a host of other measures to coordinate and integrate attack options.”

virtual fear. The net allows terrorists to amplify the consequences of their activities with follow-on messages and threats directly to the population at large, even though the terrorist group may be totally impotent. In effect, the Internet allows a person or group to appear to be larger or more important or threatening than they really are. The Internet can be used to spread disinformation, frightening personal messages, or horrific images of recent activities (one is reminded of the use of the net to replay the murder of reporter Daniel Pearl by his Pakistani captors). Virtually, it appears as though attacks are well planned and controlled, and capabilities are genuine. Messages are usually one-sided, however, and reflect a particular political slant. There is often little chance to check the story and find out if it is mere bravado or fact. The Internet can thus spread rumors and false reports that many people, until further examination, regard as facts. Recently, the Arab TV station al-Jazeera has played tape recordings of bin Laden’s speeches and displayed a note purportedly signed by him praising attacks on an oil tanker near Yemen, and on US soldiers participating in a war game in Kuwait. These messages were picked up and spread around the Internet, offering virtual proof that bin Laden was alive. Most likely bin Laden was seriously injured (which is why we haven’t seen him in over a year), but his image can be manipulated through radio or Internet broadcasts so that he appears confident, even healthy. l The Internet can help a poorly funded group to raise money. Al Qaeda has used Islamic humanitarian “charities” to raise money for jihad against the perceived enemies of Islam. Analysts found al Qaeda and humanitarian relief agencies using the same bank account numbers on numerous occasions. As a result, several US-based Islamic charities were shut down.10 The Sunni extremist group Hizb al-Tahrir uses an integrated web of Internet sites from Europe to Africa to call for the return of an Islamic caliphate. The website states that it desires to do so by peaceful means. Supporters are encouraged to assist the effort by monetary support, scholarly verdicts, and encouraging others to support jihad. Bank information, including account numbers, is provided on a German 116

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site, www.explizit-islam.de.11 Portals specializing in the anonymous transfer of money, or portals providing services popular with terrorists (such as the issue of new identities and official passports) are also available.12 The fighters in the Russian breakaway republic of Chechnya have used the Internet to publicize banks and bank account numbers to which sympathizers can contribute. One of these Chechen bank accounts is located in Sacramento, California, according to a Chechen website known as amina.com. Of course, there are other ways to obtain money for a cause via the Internet. One of the most common ways is credit card fraud. Jean-Francois Ricard, one of France’s top anti-terrorism investigators, noted that many Islamist terror plots in Europe and North America were financed through such criminal activity.13 l The Internet is an outstanding command and control mechanism. Command and control, from a US military point of view, involves the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures accomplish command and control by assisting in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of a mission. Command and control on the Internet is not hindered by geographical distance, or by lack of sophisticated communications equipment. Antigovernment groups present at the G8 conference in Cologne used the Internet to attack computers of financial centers and to coordinate protests from locations as distant as Indonesia and Canada. Terrorists can use their front organizations to coordinate such attacks, to flood a key institution’s e-mail service (sometimes as a diversionary tactic for another attack), or to send hidden messages that coordinate and plan future operations. The average citizen, the antigovernment protester, and the terrorist now have access to command and control means, limited though they may be, to coordinate and plan attacks. Further, there are “cracking” tools available to detect security flaws in systems and try to exploit them. Attaining access to a site allows the hacker or planner to command and control assets (forces or electrons) that are not his. The Internet’s potential for command and control can vastly improve an organization’s effectiveness if it does not have a dedicated command and control establishment, especially in the propaganda and internal coordination areas. Finally, command and control can be accomplished via the Internet’s chat rooms. One website, alneda.com, has supported al Qaeda’s effort to disperse its forces and enable them to operate independently, providing leadership via strategic guidance, theological arguments, and moral inspiration. The site also published a list of the names and home phone numbers of 84 al Qaeda fighters captured in Pakistan after escaping from Afghanistan. The aim presumably was to allow sympathizers to contact their families and let them know they were alive.14 l The Internet is a recruiting tool. The web allows the user complete control over content, and eliminates the need to rely on journalists for publicity. Spring 2003

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Individuals with sympathy for a cause can be converted by the images and messages of terrorist organizations, and the addition of digital video has reinforced this ability. Images and video clips are tools of empowerment for terrorists. More important, net access to such products provides contact points for men and women to enroll in the cause, whatever it may be.15 Additionally, Current versions of web browsers, including Netscape and Internet Explorer, support JavaScript functions allowing Internet servers to know which language is set as the default for a particular client’s computer. Hence, a browser set to use English as the default language can be redirected to a site optimized for publicity aimed at Western audiences, while one set to use Arabic as the default can be redirected to a different site tailored toward Arab or Muslim sensibilities.16

This allows recruiting to be audience- and language-specific, enabling the web to serve as a recruiter of talent for a terrorist cause. Recently, the Chechen website qoqaz.net, which used to be aimed strictly against Russian forces operating in Chechnya, changed its address to assam.com, and now includes links to Jihad in Afghanistan, Jihad in Palestine, and Jihad in Chechnya. Such sites give the impression that the entire Islamic world is uniting against the West, when in fact the site may be the work of just a few individuals. l The Internet is used to gather information on potential targets. The website operated by the Muslim Hackers Club reportedly featured links to US sites that purport to disclose sensitive information like code names and radio frequencies used by the US Secret Service. The same website offers tutorials in viruses, hacking stratagems, network “phreaking” and secret codes, as well as links to other militant Islamic and cyberprankster web addresses.17 Recent targets that terrorists have discussed include the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta; FedWire, the money-movement clearing system maintained by the Federal Reserve Board; and facilities controlling the flow of information over the Internet.18 Attacks on critical infrastructure control systems would be particularly harmful, especially on a system such as the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system. Thus any information on insecure network architectures or non-enforceable security protocols is potentially very damaging. Terrorists have access, like many Americans, to imaging data on potential targets, as well as maps, diagrams, and other crucial data on important facilities or networks. Imaging data can also allow terrorists to view counterterrorist activities at a target site. One captured al Qaeda computer contained engineering and structural architecture features of a dam, enabling al Qaeda engineers and planners to simulate catastrophic failures.19 With regard to gathering information through the Internet, on 15 January 2003 Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld observed that an al Qaeda training manual recovered in Afghanistan said, “Using public sources openly and without resorting to illegal means, it is possible to gather at least 80 percent of all information required about the enemy.”20 118

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l The Internet puts distance between those planning the attack and their targets. Terrorists planning attacks on the United States can do so abroad with limited risk, especially if their command and control sites are located in countries other than their own. Tracing the route of their activity is particularly difficult. The net provides terrorists a place to plan without the risks normally associated with cell or satellite phones. l The Internet can be used to steal information or manipulate data. Ronald Dick, Director of the FBI’s National Infrastructure Protection Center, considers the theft or manipulation of data by terrorist groups as his worst nightmare, especially if the attacks are integrated with a physical attack such as on a US power grid.21 Richard Clark, Chairman of the President’s Critical Infrastructure Protection Board, said the problem of cybersecurity and data protection had its own 9/11 on 18 September 2001 when the Nimda virus spread through Internet-connected computers around the world, causing billions of dollars of damage. Nimda’s creator has never been identified. This virus, hardly noticed in the wake of the airliner attacks and anthrax scares, set off a chain reaction among software companies (including Microsoft) to get very serious about plugging vulnerabilities.22 In the fall of 2001 a number of unexplained intrusions began occurring against Silicon Valley computers. An FBI investigation traced the intrusions to telecommunication switches in Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, and Pakistan. While none was directly linked to al Qaeda, there remain strong suspicions that the group was somehow involved.23 l The Internet can be used to send hidden messages. The practice of steganography, which involves hiding messages inside graphic files, is a widespread art among criminal and terrorist elements. Hidden pages or nonsensical phrases can be coded instructions for al Qaeda operatives and supporters. One recent report noted,

Al Qaeda uses prearranged phrases and symbols to direct its agents. An icon of an AK-47 can appear next to a photo of Osama bin Laden facing one direction one day, and another direction the next. The color of icons can change as well. Messages can be hidden on pages inside sites with no links to them, or placed openly in chat rooms.24

In addition, it is possible to buy encryption software for less than $15. Cyberplanners gain an advantage in hiding their messages via encryption. Sometimes the messages are not even hidden in a sophisticated manner. Al-Jazeera television reported that Mohammed Atta’s final message (another advantage of the Internet—the impossibility of checking sources) to direct the attacks on the Twin Towers was simple and open. The message purportedly said, “The semester begins in three more weeks. We’ve obtained 19 confirmations for studies in the faculty of law, the faculty of urban planning, the faculty of fine arts, and the faculty of engineering.”25 The reference to the various faculties was apparently the code for the buildings targeted in the attacks. Spring 2003

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l The Internet allows groups with few resources to offset even some huge propaganda machines in advanced countries. The web is an attractive device to those looking for a way to attack major powers via the mass media. The “always on” status of the web allows these individuals not only to access sites day and night but also to scold major powers and treat them with disdain in a public forum. The web can be used to counter facts and logic with the logic of the terrorist. There is no need for the terrorist organization to worry about “the truth,” because ignoring facts is a standard operating procedure. Al Qaeda uses polemics on the net not only to offset Western reporting, but also to counter Muslims who don’t toe the party line. It defends the conduct of its war against the West and encourages violence. The web is important to al Qaeda because it can be used to enrage people and neutralize moderate opinion. The website of the Center for Islamic Studies and Research (according to one source, a made-up name), for example, has 11 sections, including reports on fighting in Afghanistan, world media coverage of the conflict, books on jihad theology, videos of hijackers’testaments, information about prisoners held in Pakistan and Guantanamo Bay, and jihad poetry.26 It does not pay for any major power to lie, as facts can be easily used against them. Even in the war in Chechnya, there were times when the Chechens would report a successful ambush of a Russian convoy, and the Russians would deny the event ever happened. To prove their point, the Chechens would show video footage of the ambush on the Internet, thus offsetting the credibility of the Russian official media and undercutting the power of their massive propaganda machine. Al Qaeda officials are waiting to do the same to Western media reporting if the opportunity presents itself. l The Internet can be used to disrupt business. This tactic requires precise timing and intimate knowledge of the business climate in the target country. It attempts to harm businesses by accusing them of guilt by association. Hizbullah, for example, has outlined a strategy to cripple Israeli government, military, and business sites with the aim of disrupting normal economic and societal operations. Phase one might be to disable official Israeli government sites; phase two might focus on crashing financial sites such as those on the Israeli stock exchange; phase three might involve knocking out the main Israeli internet servers; and phase four might blitz Israeli e-commerce sites to ensure the loss of hundreds of transactions.27 A final phase could be to accuse companies that do business with a target government as guilty by association and call for a boycott of the firm’s products. Arab terrorists attacked Lucent Technologies in a round of Israeli-Arab cyber skirmishes, for example.28 All of these plans require insider knowledge in order to carry out the operation in a timely and accurate manner. l The Internet can mobilize a group or diaspora, or other hackers to action. Websites are not only used to disseminate information and propaganda. They also are used to create solidarity and brotherhood among groups. In the case

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“The Internet allows a person or group to appear to be larger or more important or threatening than they really are.”

of Islamist terrorist organizations, the Internet substitutes for the loss of bases and territory. In this respect the most important sites are alneda.com, jehad.net, drasat.com, and aloswa.org, which feature quotes from bin Laden tapes, religious legal rulings that justify the terrorist attacks, and support for the al Qaeda cause.29 In addition, website operators have established a site that is “a kind of database or encyclopedia for the dissemination of computer viruses.”30 The site is 7hj.7hj.com, and it aims to teach Internet users how to conduct computer attacks, purportedly in the service of Islam.31 l The Internet takes advantage of legal norms. Non-state actors or terrorists using the Internet can ignore Western notions of law and focus instead on cultural or religious norms. At a minimum, they ignore legal protocols on the Internet. In addition, they use the net to break the law (when they hack websites or send out viruses) while at the same time the law protects them (from unlawful surveillance, etc.). International investigations into such behavior are difficult to conclude due to the slow pace of other nations’ investigative mechanisms, and the limited time that data is stored.32 However, in the aftermath of the events of 9/11 in the United States, the terrorists’ actions actually initiated several changes in the US legal system that were not to the terrorists’ advantage. For example, in the past, the privacy concerns of Internet users were a paramount consideration by the US government. After 9/11, new legislation was enacted. The controversial USA Patriot Act of 2001 included new field guidance relating to computer crime and electronic evidence. The Patriot Act is designed to unite and strengthen the United States by providing the appropriate tools required to intercept and obstruct terrorism. It establishes a counterterrorism fund in the Treasury Department, amends federal criminal code that authorizes enhanced surveillance procedures, provides guidelines for investigating money-laundering concerns, removes obstacles to investigating terrorism (granting the FBI authority to investigate fraud and computer-related activity for specific cases), and strengthens criminal laws against terrorism.33 The “Field Guidance on New Authorities that Relate to Computer Crime and Electronic Evidence Enacted in the USA Patriot Act of 2001” provides the authority to do several things. Authorizations include: intercepting voice commuSpring 2003

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nications in computer hacking investigations; allowing law enforcement to trace communications on the Internet and other computer networks within the pen register and trap and trace statute (“pen/trap” statute); intercepting communications of computer trespassers; writing nationwide search warrants for e-mail; and deterring and preventing cyberterrorism. The latter provision raises the maximum penalty for hackers that damage protected computers (and eliminates minimums); states that hackers need only show intent to cause damage, not a particular consequence or degree of damage; provides for the aggregation of damage caused by a hacker’s entire course of conduct; creates a new offense for damaging computers used for national security and criminal justice; expands the definition of a “protected computer” to include computers in foreign countries; counts prior state convictions of computer crime as prior offenses; and defines computer “loss.” In addition, the guidance develops and supports cyber-security forensic capabilities.34 l The Internet can be used to divert attention from a real attack scenario. Al Qaeda can plant threats on the Internet or via cell phones to mislead law enforcement officials. Terrorists study how the United States collects and analyzes information, and thus how we respond to information. Terrorists know when their Internet “chatter” or use of telecommunications increases, US officials issue warnings. Terrorists can thus introduce false information into a net via routine means, measure the response it garners from the US intelligence community, and then try to figure out where the leaks are in their systems or what type of technology the United States is using to uncover their plans. For example, if terrorists use encrypted messages over cell phones to discuss a fake operation against, say, the Golden Gate Bridge, they can then sit back and watch to see if law enforcement agencies issue warnings regarding that particular landmark. If they do, then the terrorists know their communications are being listened to by US officials.35

I

n conclusion, it should be reiterated that cyberplanning is as important a concept as cyberterrorism, and perhaps even more so. Terrorists won’t have an easy time shutting down the Internet. Vulnerabilities are continuously reported and fixed while computers function without serious interference (at least in the United States). One hopes that law enforcement and government officials will focus more efforts on the cyberplanning capabilities of terrorists in order to thwart computer attacks and other terrorist activities. At a minimum, America can use such measures to make terrorist activities much harder to coordinate and control. Paul Eedle, writing in The Guardian, summed up the value of the Internet to al Qaeda: Whether bin Ladin or al Qaeda’s Egyptian theorist Ayman al-Zawahiri and their colleagues are on a mountain in the Hindu Kush or living with their beards shaved off in a suburb of Karachi no longer matters to the organization. They can inspire

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and guide a worldwide movement without physically meeting their followers— without knowing who they are.36

Such is the power and the danger of cyberplanning. NOTES 1. Patricia Daukantas, “Government Computer News via Infowar.com,” 14 December 2001, http:// www.infowar.com. 2. Jack Kelley, “Militants Wire Web with Links to Jihad,” USA Today, 10 July 2002, from CNO/IO Newsletter, 8-14 July 2002. 3. Ibid. 4. Yossi Melman, “Virtual Soldiers in a Holy War,” Ha’aretz, http://www.haaretz.com, 17 September 2002. 5. Habib Trabelsi, “Al-Qaeda Wages Cyber War against US,” Middle East Times, Dubai, 27 June 2002, rpt. in CNO/IO Newsletter, 1-7 July 2002. 6. Patrick S. Tibbetts, “Terrorist Use of the Internet and Related Information Technologies,” unpublished paper, School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, June 2002, p. 20. 7. Paul Eedle, “Al-Qaeda Takes Fight for ‘Hearts and Minds’ to the Web,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, August 2002, rpt. in CNO/IO Newsletter, 5-11 August 2002. 8. Tibbetts, pp 7, 9. 9. Eedle, “Al-Qaeda Takes Fight.” 10. Colin Soloway, Rod Nordland, and Barbie Nadeau, “Hiding (and Seeking) Messages on the Web,” Newsweek, 17 June 2002, p. 8. 11. “Sunni Extremist Group Hizb al-Tahrir Promotes Ideology on the Internet,” FBIS, http://199.221.15.211, 5 February 2002. 12. C. E. Manin, “Terrorism and Information Communication Technology,” La Tribune, College Interarmees de Defense, April 2002, p. 112. 13. Michael Elliot, “Reeling Them In,” Time, 23 September 2002, p. 33. 14. Paul Eedle, “Terrorism.com,” The Guardian, 17 July 2002, downloaded from the FBIS website on 17 July 2002. 15. Tibbetts, p. 37. 16. Ibid., p. 34. 17. Mark Hosenball, “Islamic Cyberterror,” Newsweek, 20 May 2002 18. Tom Squitieri, “Cyberspace Full of Terror Targets,” USA Today, 5 June 2002. 19. Barton Gellman, “FBI Fears Al-Qaeda Cyber Attacks,” San Francisco Chronicle, 28 June 2002, pp. 1, 10. 20. “Citing Al Qaeda Manual, Rumsfeld Re-Emphasizes Web Security,” InsideDefense.com, http:// www.insidedefense.com/, 15 January 2003. 21. Gellman, pp. 1, 10. 22. John Schwartz, “Despite 9/11 Warnings, Cyberspace Still at Risk,” The Post Standard (Syracuse, N.Y.), 11 September 2002, pp. D-10, 11. 23. Maria T. Welch, “Accumulating Digital Evidence is Difficult,” The Post Standard, 11 September 2002, pp. D-9, 11. 24. Ibid.; also Soloway, Nordland, and Nadeau. 25. Melman. 26. Eedle, “Terrorism.com.” 27. Giles Trendle, “Cyberwars: The Coming Arab E-Jihad,” The Middle East, No. 322 (April 2002), p. 6. 28. Tim McDonald, “Fanatics with Laptops: The Coming Cyber War,” NewsFactor.com via Yahoo! News, 16 May 2002. 29. Melman. 30. Ibid. 31. Ibid. 32. Manin, p. 112. 33. See “Bill Summary & Status for the 107th Congress,” http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/ z?d107:HR03162:@@@L&summ2=m&. 34. See “Field Guidance on New Authorities that Relate to Computer Crime and Electronic Evidence Enacted in the USA Patriot Act of 2001,” http://www.cybercrime.gov/PatriotAct.htm. 35. John Diamond, “Al-Qaeda Steers Clear of NSA’s Ears,” USA Today, 17 October 2002, CNO/IO Newsletter, 23-30 October 2002, pp. 17-18. 36. Eedle, “Terrorism.com.”

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