Ael- Cases Of Galang Vs Ca To Fortich Vs Corona.docx

GR No. L-15569, May 30, 1961] EMILIO GALANG v. CA Original motion for a writ of certiorari to set aside a decision, as well as a bail bond granted by, the Court of Appeals. The facts are set forth in said decision, from which we quote: "Petitioner Tee Hook Chun arrived at the port of the city of Manila on May 12, 1958 aboard a ship from the port of Hongkong with the intention of entering this country, claiming to be a Filipino citizen with a Philippine passport number 5189 issued in the city of Manila on November 12, 1954. After the preliminary investigation carried out by the immigration inspectors, the Immigration Commissioner dated May 21, 1958, ordered the exclusion of the aforementioned Eutemio Rayel for being a foreigner whose real name is Tee Hook Chun without the right to use a Philippine passport (Exhibit 'A', Petition).Immediate effect was not given to this order of exclusion and at the request of the Department of Foreign Affairs the prosecutor of the city of Manila filed a criminal action against the petitioner Tee Hook Chun for violation of the paragraph (e ) of section 45 of Commonwealth law number 613 as amended by the law of the Republic, number l44, which punishes any foreigner who falsely represents being a Filipino to evade immigration law. "On December 10, 1958, the First Instance Court of Manila found the petitioner guilty of the defendant's crime, imposing the penalty of one (1) year in prison, to pay a fine of P1,000.00, with the corresponding subsidiary prison in case of insolvency. and the payment of the costs of the trial.The sentence also orders the deportation of the appellant to the port of Hongkong after serving the sentence of imprisonment. Deportation according to the sentence, will be carried out by the Commissioner of Immigration. "On December 26, 1958, the petitioner filed his appeal before this Court and the file was still in the lower court, the appellant filed a bail for his provisional release that was approved by the Court a quo . Judge a quo issued an order instructing the Commissioner of Immigration to release the appellant Tee Hook Chun pending his appeal for having given a bail of P2,000.00 The Commissioner of Immigration refused to release the petitioner on the grounds that it has issued the exclusion order referred to above. " Upon the foregoing facts, respondent Court found that a petition, filed by respondent Tee Hook Chun, for a writ of habeas corpus was well taken and, accordingly, rendered the aforementioned decision, the dispositive part of which reads: "THEREFORE, through the provision of a bond in the amount of P10,000.00 in criminal case number 45205 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and once approved by this court, the Immigration Commissioner is ordered to put in Freedom to the appellant, Tee Hook Chun. No costs. " A reconsideration of such decision having been denied, petitioner herein instituted this special civil action for a writ of certiorari, upon the ground that respondent Court had acted without jurisdiction and with serious abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in promulgating its aforementioned decision, in allowing Tee Hook Chun to bail, and in denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration. The conclusion reached in said decision is predicated upon the theory that the warrant of exclusion and the judgment of conviction of Tee Hook Chun are based upon the same facts; That the administrative proceeding for his exclusion is incompatible with his criminal prosecution in our courts of justice; That the institution of the criminal action implied a waiver of the authority to exclude him by administrative proceeding; At the outset, it should be noted that, although both proceedings are from the same facts, each proceeding sought with a violation of the provision of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 which is entirely different and distinct from that step with in the other proceeding. Thus, the warrant of exclusion was based on section 29 (a) (17) of said Act, providing that: "(a) The following classes of aliens shall be excluded from entry into the Philippines: "(17) Persons not properly documented for admission as may be required under the provisions of this Act". The charge in the criminal case was for an offense punishable under section 45 (e) of said Act, reading: "any individual who "(e) being an alien, shall for any fraudulent purpose represent himself to be a Philippine citizen in order to evade any requirement of the immigration laws. shall be guilty of an offense, and upon conviction, shall be fined not more than one thousand pesos, and imprisoned for not more than two years, and deported if he is an alien. " The difference between this criminal offense and that of breach of said section 29 (a) (17) becomes apparent when we bear in mind that the latter may be violated by an alien who, without claiming to be a Filipino , seeks entry, either ( 1) in his real name, as an alien, but without the documents necessary therefor, or (2) by impersonating another alien, and with no more

documents than those authorizing the latter's entry. In neither case may be prosecuted criminally under the aforementioned section 45 (e). In other words, we are faced with a situation analogous to that when the same act is two (2) or more different offenses not covered by Article 48 of the Revised Criminal Code, except that, in the case at bar, one offense is punishable as a felony or crime, and the other is to be with administratively. The one is not legally inconsistent with the other, and the prosecution for the former does not entail a waiver of the action due for the latter. Secondly, the authority to order the release on one of the crimes before the court of justice springs from the jurisdiction of the latter (1) over the accused, acquired by virtue of his arrest, and (2) over the party detaining He, by authority of the warrant of arrest issued by said court, and, consequently, as agent of the latter. When the detaining officer holds the accused in pursuit of a warrant issued by another court, in connection with another case, whether the latter is criminal or civil, for instance, in proceedings for civil contempt of court or of said Congress detaining officer is not bound to release said accused by order of the court first mentioned, and defendant continued deprivation of liberty, despite such order, upon the authority of the warrant issued by the latter or by Congress, will not be illegal and would not justify the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus . More akin to the situation confronting would be that if there was a person with a contempt of a House of Congress and held under custody in compliance with a writ issued therefor by said House were prosecuted criminally before a court of justice, for the same contempt of Congress. If the court should grant him bail in said criminal case and order therein his release, would a writ of habeas corpus issue to compel his aforementioned custodian to release him, despite the warrant of arrest or order of commitment issued by said House? Would it be proper to hold that the institution of the criminal action amounted to a renunciation of the power of the legislative department to punish him for his act of contempt and rendered ineffective and unenforceable its warrant of arrest or order of commitment? The answer to both questions must, obviously, be in the negative. In its carefully prepared and well-considered decision, respondent Court appears to have been impressed by the fact that the proceedings for exclusion were meant or expected to be summary; that eleven accused before a court of justice, Tee Hook Chun may no longer be deported from the Philippines with the speed and dispatch contemplated by the laws governing exclusive proceedings, but, petitioner will have to wait for the rendition of a final judgment in the criminal case, as well as the completion of the service of the penalty imposed upon Tee Hook Chun, if convicted, in said case; and that only then may Tee Hook Chun be deported, although this will have to be done in compliance with the sentence rendered in said case, pursuant to section 45 (e) of our Immigration Act of 1940, not by virtue of an administrative order of exclusion, With the analysis, in the decision of the respondent Court, of the pertinent provisions of said Act and the observations made in connection therewith which readily reflect mature deliberation and judicious reflection worthy of the highest traditions of the bench we are mostly in agreement. However, we find ourselves unable to agree with the conclusions drawn therefrom, namely: that the two (2) proceedings are incompatible with each other; That the institution of the court action amounted to a renunciation of the administrative proceeding; and that, upon the filing of the criminal case, the warrant of exclusion became ineffective and unenforceable. The alleged conflict between said proceedings is, at best, purely physical, if we may use the expression, not legal, in the sense that the one does not nullify or set aside the other. It is not different, physically and legally, from the conflict that may exist when a person is party in several cases, before different courts. When it is tried in one case it may be impossible for him to appear at the hearing of another case, which may have to be scheduled on or postponed for another date. So too, if convicted in several cases, the sentences therein may have to be served, not simultaneously unless the nature of the penalties is allowed, but successively (Article 70, Revised Penal Code). In other words, the conflicts affect mainly the time and placeat which certain things will have to be done. For this reason some, it is true, will have to yield to the others, but only in point of priority or order of execution or performance. But, neither will nullify or set aside the other , or imply a renunciation of the latter. Thus, for instance, in the example of one charged before a court of law of the House of Congress, while being detained pursuant to a warrant of arrest or a writ of commitment issued by the latter, shall remain in custody under such warrant or writ, despite the bail given in the criminal case, and service of the penalty imposed in the latter may have to be deferred depending on the circumstances until after the conclusion of the legislative proceedings for contempt. So too, petitioner herein may have to postpone the current exclusion of Tee Hook Chun, until after he has served such a penalty as may have been imposed upon him in the criminal case above mentioned, and, if the sentence therein should not include as it should, pursuant to the aforementioned section 45 (e) an order for his deportation, petitioner shall then deport him.not because petitioner's authority to order the exclusion of said respondent has been extinguished , nullified or waived in consequence of the filing of said criminal action, but, because, it would be unnecessary to exercise it, in view of the deportation of said respondent. Indeed, if the judgment of conviction in the criminal case should erroneously fail to include an order of deportation, there can be no doubt that petitioner could legally order the exclusion of Tee Hook Chun. It is that clear that the power of exclusion under section 29 (a) (17) is not set aside, waived or lost upon institution of the criminal case.

Again, the violation of section 45 (e) of our Immigration Act of 1940, of which Tee Hook Chun is accused in the criminal case, is, also, a ground for his arrest and deportation under section 37 (a) (9) of said Act. What is more, this section 37 (a) (9) provides that the administrative proceeding for deportation shall be " independent of the criminal action" for violation of said section 45. Hence, an order of release in the criminal action, Upon the filing therein of the corresponding bail bond, it would not affect the legality of the detention under a warrant of arrest or deportation issued by the Commissioner of Immigration under said section 37. Similarly, the acquittal of the accused in said criminal act would not bar his deportation, under the same provision, by the Commissioner of Immigration. Respondent Court felt that the exclusion proceeding under section 29 of said Act would be nullified or affected by the criminal action brought under section 45, because there is no express legal provision stating that the former shall be independent of the latter. This premise does not necessarily lead, however, to the aforementioned conclusion, apart from the fact that the latter is untenable for the reasons heretofore stated. Lastly, let us consider the consequences flowing from said conclusion. Section 37 Refers to aliens not yet ADMITTED, who, in the cases therein provided, "shall be excluded from entry into the Philippines" Whereas the aliens alluded to in section 37 are Those Already ADMITTED into the Philippines, who, for the causes specified Therein, have become subject to deportation. Pursuant to the view taken by respondent Court, an alien accused criminally of a violation of section 45, would not be entitled to a writ of habeas corpus to secure his release from custody under a warrant of arrest or deportation issued pursuant to section 37, but said writ of habeas corpus It would be available to him if he were subject to exclusion proceedings under section 29. In other words, one already admitted into the Philippines would have less rights than one who has not as yet gained admission into this country. Obviously, the lawmakers could not have intended to discriminate against the former. There was no reason whatsoever therefor. Indeed, the imposition of a penalty for violations of section 45, in addition to deportation, in cases falling under section 37, or exclusion, in cases covered by section 29, has no other justification than the need to effectively discourage said violations of section 45 , which may not be determined by deportation or exclusion as the case may be. If the party accused in the criminal case was entitled to release, despite the warrant of exclusion, as held by Respondent Court, the effect of said criminal action would have been significantly impaired. In fact, under certain conditions, one bent on being in the Philippines at all cost, even if only for a couple of years, would welcome his prosecution in court, for it would afford him a sure means were we to accept the view of the respondent Court to beat the proceedings for his exclusion, gain entry into the Philippines and be free to roam therein on bail, until the judgment rendered in the criminal case shall have become executory. Wherefore, the aforementioned decision of respondent Court is hereby set aside, with costs against respondent Tee Hook Chun. It is so ordered. Bengzon, CJ, Padilla, Baptist Angelo, Reyes, JBL, Paredes, Dizon, De Leon, and Natividad, JJ., Concur.

GR No. L-23169, May 31, 1972 ] CONCHITA G. VILLANOS v. ABELARDO SUBIDO Villanos v. Subido (Commissioner of Civil Service) G.R. No. L-23169; May 31, 1972; Barredo, J.

Facts 

Conchita Villanos is a public school teacher of the Vigan Central School, in Vigan, Ilocos Sur.



On April 1, 1957, Villanos wrote a letter jointly addressed to Mrs. Esperanza F. Sebastian and Miss Anacleta Faypon, her co-teachers in the same school, containing libelous remarks against the two.

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Upon receipt thereof, Mrs. Sebastian and Miss Faypon instituted a criminal action against Villanos in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur charging Villanos with the crime of libel.

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Villanos was convicted of the crime charged and sentenced to pay a fine of P200.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay costs. This libel conviction was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals.



A few days after the commencement of the criminal action, Mrs. Sebastian and Miss Faypon lodged before the Division Superintendent of Schools an administrative charge against Villanos for (1) gross discourtesy to them as her co-teachers,

and for (2) notoriously disgraceful and/or immoral language and/or conduct. They supported their charge with the same libelous letter, basis of the criminal action. 

Two hearings were conducted on the administrative charge (just heard testimony of Mrs. Sebastian). A 3 rd hearing was scheduled but no hearing actually took place.



Two years thereafter, on March 1, 1960, Villanos wrote a letter to the investigator asking for a special investigator from either the Bureau of Public Schools or Bureau of Civil Service. Villanos’s request was, however, denied by the Bureau of Public Schools "in view of dearth of personnel" in the Office. Continuation of the investigation was directed.



A hearing was again scheduled for August 8, 1960, but investigation could not also proceed on said date because of another plea for postponement by Villanos who claimed that she made a second request for another investigator, this time from the Civil Service Commission. For quite sometime, no action whatsoever was taken on the second request of Villanos.



Hence, on March 16, 1962, the investigator made an indorsement forwarding to the Division Superintendent of Public Schools the explanation of Villanos on the charges preferred against her and the papers covering the investigation so far conducted. The indorsement stated that continuation of the investigation could not proceed because of another request of the Villanos for another investigator from the Civil Service Commission, which so far has not been acted upon.



The Division Superintendent, in turn, indorsed the same papers to the Director of Public Schools with a statement to the effect that Villanos refused to submit to investigation. He also forwarded to the Director a copy of the Decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the libel conviction of Villanos.



Following the indorsement of the Superintendent of Schools, the Assistant Director of Public Schools coursed another indorsement to the Secretary of Education wherein he likewise stated that Villanos "refused to submit to a formal investigation." The Assistant Director also recommended that Villanos be transferred to another station, reprimanded and warned that the commission by her of the same or similar offense will be severely dealt with. This recommendation met the approval or concurrence of the Secretary of Education.



Disregarding the recommendation of the Department of Education, Subido, the Commissioner of Civil Service, rendered a decision finding Villanos guilty of the administrative charge and dismissing her from the service.



On March 7, 1963, Villanos filed a verified petition for certiorari and/or prohibition, with writ of preliminary injunction, before the CFI of Manila, for the nullification of the decision of Subido. The lower court ruled in favor of Villanos.

Issue/s 1.

WoN Villanos was denied due process (in the admin case)

2.

WoN the decision of the Court of Appeals (which found Villanos guilty of libel) is enough basis for the Commissioner of Civil Service’s decision the administrative case, which arose from the same allegedly slanderous remarks

3.

WoN the action (this case) is premature (Non-exhaustion of administrative remedies)

Held Decision of CFI Manila upheld.

Ratio 1.

Villanos was denied due process. The fact that the authorities concerned allowed years to pass without even acting on Villanos’s request for new investigator should not be counted against her (delay not attributable to her).Note that at the stage in which the investigation was at the time when the Superintendent indorsed the records to higher authorities, only one witness of the complainants had testified, so, even the complainants' side had not rested; more importantly, the respondent therein, Villanos, had not yet presented any evidence. In particular:



Villanos was not given a full hearing. The investigation was not even half-through when the Superintendent of Schools of Ilocos Sur made his indorsement which culminated in the challenged decision of the Commissioner of Civil Service. Only one witness (Mrs. Sebastian) was able to testify and her cross examination has not yet been concluded when the hearing was postponed.



Also, in asking for an investigator from the Bureau of Public Schools or from the Office of the Commissioner of Civil Service, Villanos cannot be charged with deliberately delaying the proceedings. Villanos had the right to ask for a new investigator from Bureau of Public Schools or from the Civil Service Commission (to avoid impartiality or bias). Note that there was a bribery/corruption charge filed by Villanos against the Superintendent and his chief clerk for allegedly receiving material favor from Mrs. Sebastian’s father in exchange for granting Mrs. Sebastian (one of the complainants in the Admin case) salary promotions.



Indeed, it may be noted that what occurred was precisely what Villanos feared would happen if the investigation were to be conducted by someone from the Office of the Superintendent, considering that she had charged the former Superintendent with bribery or corruption in office.



As can be seen, it was the Superintendent who made the initial erroneous indorsement that Villanos "refused to submit to an investigation" and even attached to the records which were sent with said indorsement certified copy of the decision of the Court of Appeals convicting her, thus providing, as it turned out later, the Commissioner of Civil Service with what he considered a sufficient legal basis for her dismissal.

2.

The decision of the Court of Appeals which found Villanos guilty of libel is NOT enough basis for Commissioner’s decision in the administrative case which arose from the same allegedly slanderous remarks.



To begin with, the said decision was never presented, even informally, as evidence during the investigation. It was just attached to the records by the Superintendent when he indorsed them to the Bureau of Public Schools without even advising Villanos about it. Thus, she had no chance to present evidence which could have blunted the effects of said decision. And she had a right to present such evidence.



A condemnatory decision in a criminal case, even if final, by itself alone, cannot serve as basis for a decision in an administrative case involving the same facts, for the simple reason that matters that are material in the administrative case are not necessarily relevant in the criminal case.



Notwithstanding the fact that findings in criminal cases must be beyond reasonable doubt, they cannot be conclusive for administrative purposes. There are defenses, excuses and attenuating circumstances of value in administrative proceedings which are not admissible in the trial of the criminal cases.



At any rate, it is settled in this jurisdiction that even where criminal conviction is specified by law as a ground for suspension or removal of an official or employee, such conviction does not ex proprio vigore justify automatic suspension without investigation and hearing as to such conviction. o

As held in the case of Lacson v. Roque, “not even final conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, as distinguished from conviction pending appeal, dispenses with the requisite notice and hearing. Final conviction is mentioned in section 2188 of the Revised Administrative Code as ground for proceeding administratively against the convicted officer but does not operate as automatic removal doing away with the formalities of an administrative hearing.”

3.

The rule of exhaustion invoked is not applicable in this case.



It was argued that Villanos had not exhausted administrative remedies since appeal from the order of the Commissioner of Civil Service to the President was yet available, and it was error on the part of the Court of First Instance of Manila to entertain the premature action instituted against them.



However, it has been repeatedly held that the principle requiring the previous exhaustion of administrative remedies is not applicable: o

where the question in dispute is purely a legal one



o

where the controverted act is patently illegal or was performed without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction

o

where the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bear the implied or assumed approval of the latter

o

or where there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention

When, as this case, in terminating the services of the Villanos, the Commissioner of Civil Service acted summarily without any semblance of compliance, or even an attempt to comply with the elementary rules of due process, when the order is immediately executed and Villanos was immediately removed from office, then appeal was not a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in ordinary course of law, and the employee adversely affected may forthwith seek the protection of the courts.

Tan vs. COMELEC, 237 SCRA 353, October 4, 1994 Facts: On May 10, 1992, the petitioner, as an incumbent City Prosecutor of Davao City, was designated by the COMELEC as ViceChairman of the City Board of Canvassers in the said area for the May 11, 1992, synchronized national and local elections conformably with the provisions of Section 20 (a) of Republic Act 6646 and Section 221 (b) of the Omnibus Election Code. Manuel Garcia was proclaimed the winning candidate for a Congressional seat to represent the 2nd District of Davao City. Alterado, the private respondent, filed a number of cases questioning the validity of the proclamation. The cases filed in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and the Office of the Ombudsman was dismissed. What is still pending is an administrative charge, against the Board of Canvassers and herein petitioner for “Misconduct, Neglect of Duty, Gross Incompetence, and Acts Inimical to the Service”, instituted in the COMELEC.

Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC has the jurisdiction to take action on the administrative case when in fact the petitioner as a City prosecutor is under the Administrative jurisdiction.

Held: The COMELEC’s authority under Section 2 (6-8), Article 9 of the Constitution is virtually all-encompassing when it comes to election matters, also Section 52, Article 7 of the Omnibus Election Code. It should be stressed that the administrative case against petitioner is in relation to the performance of his duties as an Election canvasser and not as a City Prosecutor. The COMELEC’s mandate includes its authority to exercise direct and immediate suspension and control over national and local officials or employees, including members of any national and local law enforcement agency and instrumentality of the government, required by law to perform duties relative to the conduct of elections. To say that the COMELEC is without jurisdiction to look into charges of election offenses committed by officials and employees of government outside the regular employ of the COMELEC would be to unduly deny to it the proper and sound exercise of such recommendatory power and, perhaps more than that, even a possible denial of the process to the official or employee concerned. G.R. No. 139943

January 18, 2001

MANUEL MIRALLES, petitioner, vs. HON. SERGIO F. GO, Chairman of the National Police Commission; and PABLO S. VILLANUEVA, respondents. PANGANIBAN, J.: Factual findings of administrative agencies, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals are conclusive upon this Court. In the present case, petitioner has not shown sufficient ground to warrant an exception to the foregoing rule. The Case Filed before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the May 25, 1999 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals2 (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 42477. The CA had affirmed the ruling of the Special Appellate Committee of the National Police Commission (SAC-Napolcom), finding petitioner administratively liable for grave misconduct and ordering his dismissal from the service. The CA ruled as follows: "Premises considered the petition is dismissed, without pronouncement as to costs." 3 The Facts The facts were adequately summarized by the CA as follows:

"1. On December 7, 1977, an administrative compliant was filed before the Office of the Hearing Officer of NAPOLCOM against petitioner Manuel Miralles for grave Misconduct committed as follows: 'That on or about the 19th day of October 1977, in Quezon City Metro Manila, the above named respondent did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, without any just motive, and with intent to kill Patrolman NILO RESURRECION, assault, attack and wound the said Pat. Resurrecion with the use of firearms, directing the shots against the vital parts of the body of the latter and one Ernesto Merculio, thereby inflicting upon them gunshot wounds which directly caused the death of Nilo Resurrecion and Ernesto Merculio, acts of the said respondent punishable by law and rules.' (p. 1, Complaint, Annex '4' of Petition) "2. An investigation was conducted by Rogelio A. Ringpis, Hearing Officer No. 3 of NAPOLCOM, Manila (p. 2, Petition). '3. After hearing, Hearing Officer Rogelio Ringpis submitted to the Chairman of NAPOLCOM an Investigation Report finding petitioner guilty of Grave Misconduct (Double Homicide) and recommending his dismissal from the service. "Pertinent portion of said Investigation Report is hereby quoted: 'V. RECOMMENDATION: 'WHEREFORE, respondent is hereby found guilty of grave misconduct (Double Homicide) and there being no mitigating circumstances to offset the aggravating circumstance, it is respectfully recommended that the penalty of dismissal from the service be imposed with prejudice to reinstatement to the Integrated National Police. 'SO RECOMMEND.' (p. 13, Report of Investigation, Annex 'E', Petition). "4. On September 10, 1980, the Adjudication Board No. 15 of the NAPOLCOM rendered its Decision finding petitioner guilty of Grave Misconduct and dismissing him from the service with prejudice to reinstatement, thus: 'WHEREFORE, this Board finds the herein Respondent in the above-entitled case guilty as charged and is hereby DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE WITH PREJUDICE to reinstatement. 'SO ORDERED.' (p. 10, Decision, annex 'F', Petition) "5. On April 20, 1981, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision but the same was denied by the Adjudication Board (p. 4, Petition). "6. On September 23, 1981, petitioner appealed the aforestated Decision to the Special Appellate Committee of the NAPOLCOM (p. 4, Ibid). "7. On June 6, 1983, [SAC-Napolcom] issued a Resolution which reads as follows: 'On September 23, 1981, xxx Pat. Manuel Miralles filed a Notice of Appeal from the Decision finding him guilty of Grave Misconduct and ordering his dismissal from the service with prejudice. By virtue thereof, the record of the case was elevated to this Committee. Since then, however, up to the present or a period of more than one (1) year and seven (7) months, no appeal brief, memorandum or any pleading has been filed. 'WHEREFORE, the Appeal is hereby DISMISSED for abandonment and lack of interest. 'SO ORDERED.' (Annex "J", Petition) "8. On August 30, 1983, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration with manifestation praying that the dismissal of the Notice of Appeal be set aside and asking for time within which to submit his Memorandum. "9. On September 27, 1983, petitioner submitted a Memorandum to [SAC-Napolcom]. "10. On April 26, 1984, [SAC-Napolcom] rendered its Decision affirming the Decision of the Adjudication Board. '11. On June 30, 1984, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision. "12. On October 30, 1989, [SAC-Napolcom] issued a Resolution denying his Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit." 4

Ruling of the Court of Appeals The Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner's recourse was premature, because the SAC-Napolcom's decision should have been appealed first before the Civil Service Commission, pursuant to RA 6975. Even if it would, as it did, rule on the merits, the CA held that petitioner's appeal must still fail. This ruling was made in view of the documents presented and the eyewitness account of Alejandro Lamsen, who testified that he had seen petitioner shoot Pat. Nilo Resurreccion. The CA further stated that petitioner had failed to substantiate his claim of self-defense. Hence, this Petition.5 Issues Petitioner presents the following issues for our consideration: "I. Whether or not the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the instant case which was elevated directly from the Napolcom in view of the fact that the Napolcom decision sought to be reviewed was rendered before the effectivity of R.A. No. 6975, otherwise known as the PNP law, which provides that such decisions should first be elevated to the Civil Service Commission before the Court of Appeals. "II. Whether or not the dismissal of the petitioner from the service can be sustained on the basis of the evidence on record notwithstanding that the same overwhelmingly supports the dismissal of the instant administrative charge against the petitioner. "III. Whether or not the petitioner acted in self-defense when he killed Nilo Resurrecion."6 In the main, two issues are before us: (1) the propriety of the recourse to the CA and (2) the sufficiency of the evidence against petitioner. The Court's Ruling The Petition is not meritorious. First Issue: Propriety of the Recourse to the CA Petitioner contends that the CA erred in ruling that the SAC-Napolcom ruling should have been appealed first to the DILG and then to the Civil Service Commission, pursuant to RA 6975. He maintains that the assailed resolution of SAC-Napolcom had been issued on October 20, 1989, but that the said law was promulgated only on January 2, 1991. That he received a copy of the Decision only on November 5, 1996 was due to the fault of the Napolcom. Hence, he posits that his appeal should be governed by the law in effect in 1989, not RA 6975 which became effective only in 1991.1âwphi1.nêt We are persuaded. It is clear that petitioner filed its appeal to the CA only on December 4, 1996. By then, the law in force, RA 6975, had already prescribed that appeals from the Decision of the Napolcom should be lodged first with the DILG and then with the Civil Service Commission. It did not matter that the assailed Napolcom ruling had been promulgated in 1989; petitioner did not receive it at the time and, thus, could not have filed the appeal then. In other words, his right to appeal had not yet vested on him. Verily, an appeal is statutory right, and one who seeks to avail oneself of it must comply with the statute or the rule in effect when that right arose.7 Since the rule on appeal had already been modified at the modified rule. We agree with the following disquisition of the CA: "Although the Special Appellate Committee of the NAPOLCOM, which was then still operating under the old PC/INP set-up, affirmed his dismissal from the police service on April 26, 1984 and denied his motion for reconsideration on October 20, 1989, the petitioner received notice of the denial only on November 5, 1996, and he filed the instant petition on December 4, 1996. By then, as aforesaid, R.A. 6975, an Act Establishing the Philippine National Police under a Reorganized Department of Interior and Local Government was already in full force and effect. Its Section 91 provides that. "The Civil Service Law and its implementing rules and regulations shall apply to all personnel of the department.' As expounded by the Supreme Court in Cabada vs. Alunan III, petitioner's remedy at the first instance is appeal to the Secretary of the DILG and, thereafter, to the Civil Service Commission. Thus: "x x x Complementary laws on discipline of government officials and employees must then be inquired into, considering that in conformity with the mandate of the Constitution that the PNP must be national in scope and civilian in character, it is now a part, as a bureau, of the reorganized DILG. As such, it falls within the definition of the civil service in Section 2(1), Article IX-B of the Constitution. For this reason, Section 91 of the DILG Act of 1990 provides: "SEC. 91. Application of Civil Service Laws. The Civil Service Law and its implementing rules and regulations shall apply to all personnel of the Department.

'The Civil Service Law referred to in Section 91 of the DILG Act of 1990 in Subtitle A. title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (E.O. No. 292). Section 47 of Chapter 6 thereof provides, inter alia, That in cases where the decision rendered by a bureau or office is appealable to the Commission, the same may initially be appealed to the department and finally to the Commission. "The rules and regulations implementing the Civil Service Law referred to in Section 91 of the DILG Act of 1990 is the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 known as the Administrative Code of 1987 promulgated by the CSC, Sections 31 and 32, Rule XIV of the said Rules provide as follows: "SEC. 31. Except as otherwise provided by the Constitution or by law, the Commission shall have the final authority to pass upon the removal, separation and suspension of all officers and employees in the civil service and upon all matters relating to the conduct, discipline and efficiency of such officers and employees. "SEC. 32. The secretaries and heads of agencies and instrumentality's, provinces, cities and municipalities shall have jurisdiction to Investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary action against officers and employees under their jurisdiction. Their decisions shall be final incase the penalty imposed is suspension for not more than thirty (30) days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty (30) days' salary. In case the decision rendered by a bureau or office head is appealable to the Commission, the same may be initially appealed to the department, then to the Merit Systems Protection Board, and finally to the Commission and pending appeal, the same shall be executors except when the penalty is removal, in which case the same shall be executory only after confirmation by the Secretary concerned."8 In any event, petitioner's argument on this issue is moot, considering that the CA has nonetheless resolved the merits of the case. Second Issue Sufficiency of Evidence As a rule, administrative agencies' factual findings that are affirmed by the Court of Appeals are conclusive on the parties and not reviewable by this Court.9 Petitioner, however, now asks this Court to review the ruling of the Napolcom hearing officer, the Napolcom Adjudication Board No. 15, the Napolcom Special Appellate Committee and the Court of Appeals, all finding him administratively liable for killing Pat. Nilo Resureccion and Ernesto Merculio. He further contends that these fact-finding administrative and judicial entities failed to appreciate his claim of self-defense. Documentary Exhibits Petitioner specifically maintains that the SAC-Napolcom "heavily relied on Exhibits 'B' to 'O', notwithstanding the incontrovertible fact that they had not been properly identified by the persons who executed them. Hence, being hearsay, they are inadmissible in evidence."10 The argument is not persuasive. The bulk of these documents, 11 except Exhibits "B" and "C", are public documents consisting of reports made by government officials in the performance of their functions. 12 Hence, they are prima facie evidence of the facts they stated.13 We agree with the CA's disquisition on this point which we quote: "We readily agree with the petitioner but only insofar as Exhibits 'B' and 'C' are concerned because, without the affiants taking the witness stand, the contends of their respective sworn statements relating to the sequence of events that led to the incident in question and the other details thereof are hearsay for lack of cross-examination. "On the other hand, Exhibits 'D' to 'O' are official reports of public officials of their official acts or proceedings and as such are public documents which are prima facie evidence of the truth of the facts stated therein. "We are not, of course, saying that Exhibits 'B' and 'C', the sworn statements of eye-witness, are not public documents for in fact they, too, are but there can be no escaping the primordial rule that the testimony of witnesses shall be given orally in open court and under oath or affirmation. Otherwise put, although a document may be subsumed under the category of a public document, if it is excluded by an exclusionary rule, it will be denied admission as evidence." Lamsen's Testimony But even without these documents, petitioner documents, petitioner would still be liable based on the testimony provided by Alejandro Lamsen, a taxi driver who testified that he had seen petitioner, who was his passenger at the time, pull out a gun and shoot Pat. Nilo Resureccion three times in the chest. In open court, Lamsen identified and readily pointed to petitioner as the shooter and killer. The CA affirmed the findings of the Napolcom hearing officer, Adjudication Board and Special Appeal Committee. Petitioner claims, however, that Lamsen was not credible because he subsequently recanted his testimony "during crossexamination." He argues: "however, during cross-examination before the Napolcom hearing officer, he recanted his previous

statement and asseverated that upon hearing the firs gunshot, he immediately alighted from the taxi cab and ran away towards the other street in the opposite direction, not looking back.'14 If the assertion of petitioner were accurate, we would agree with his claim that the CA and the Napolcom misappreciated a crucial piece of evidence. He, however, failed to understand the plain import of the proceedings wherein the recantation had allegedly been made. Even a cursory perusal of the records indicates that it was not made on cross-examination. On the contrary, the recantation was done when Lamsen appeared as a witness for the defense, after he had testified for the complainants and been cross-examined as such. His subsequent testimony for the defense was however, rightly brushed aside, because he had failed to appear for cross-examination despite due notice. Indeed, the Napolcom Adjudication Board wrote: "However, he failed to appear for cross-examination despite due notice at the later stages of the formal investigation prompting the prosecution to move for the striking out of this portion of his testimony for the defense from the records and which motion was granted by the Hearing Officer."15 As the CA succinctly stated, "Lamsen's testimony was stricken off the records for he never appeared for cross-examination."16 We note that petitioner continues to insist that the recantation was made on cross-examination, notwithstanding the clear and explicit rulings to the contrary, issued by the CA and the Napolcom Special Appellate Committee, Adjudication Board and hearing officer. Worse, nowhere in his pleadings before us does he directly controvert or even recognize the existence of the aforementioned rulings. Rather, he blithely ignores so basic and so significant a point. Third Issue: Self-Defense Equally unmeritorious is the contention that petitioner was able to establish the elements of self-defense. In this light, he insists that the CA and the Napolcom agencies should have given more credence to his version rather than to that of the complainant, especially because Lamsen had subsequently recanted his eyewitness testimony. As stated at the outset, factual findings of administrative agencies, especially when affirmed by the CA, are conclusive on this Court. Petitioner has not given sufficient reason to overturn the rejection of his claim of self-defense. Apropos here are the following statements of the SAC-Napolcom quoted by the CA: "The testimony of the taxi driver, Alejandro Lamsen, which was taken immediately after the incident by police investigator Det, Enrique Madura of Quezon City Police Station, NPD, is deemed a more reliable version of the incident than that of respondent[,] as it was [a] true narration of what actually transpired at the scene of incident, [the] witness having had no ample time to concoct a different story to favor the assailant at the time.1âwphi1.nêt "The claim of respondent in this case that he shot the victim in utter self-defense of his own person is devoid of any credit. After having admitted the wounding or killing of his adversary, he is to be held liable for the offense unless he establishes satisfactorily the fact of legitimate self-defense. In this particular case, the claim of the respondent is not supported by strong and convincing evidence required in proving self-defense. It is a settle[d] jurisprudence that he who seeks justification for his act must prove it to be so by clear and convincing evidence. "[The f]oregoing considered, the evidence of the prosecution that Pat Resurreccion was shot by the respondent for no justifiable reason is entitled to much weight and credit, the victim at the time being in the act of performing a police duty." Dismissal of Criminal Case Petitioner further contends that the Quezon City RTC's dismissal of the criminal case for homicide instituted against him was "conclusive of his innocence."17 His argument is bereft of merit. An administrative proceeding is different from a criminal case and may proceed independently thereof. Indeed, the quantum of proof in the latter is different, such that the verdict in one need not necessarily be the same as in the other. In a recent case, the Court explained this difference as follows:18 "It should be emphasized that a finding of guilt in the criminal case will not necessarily result in a finding of liability in the administrative case. Conversely, respondent's acquittal does not necessarily exculpate him administratively. In the same vein, the trial court's finding of civil liability against the respondent will not inexorably lead to a similar finding in the administrative action before this Court. Neither will a favorable disposition in the civil action absolve the administrative liability of the lawyer. The basic premise is that criminal and civil cases are altogether different from administrative matters, such that the disposition in the first two will not inevitably govern the third and vice versa.' WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.

Acuzar vs Jorolan G.R. No. 177878, April 7, 2010 Facts: Respondent, Jorolan, filed an administrative case against petitioner before the People’s Law Enforcement Board (PLEB) charging the latter of Grave Misconduct for allegedly having an illicit relationship with respondent’s minor daughter. Respondent also instituted a criminal case against petitioner for violation of Child Abuse Act.

The PLEB issued a decision finding the respondent guilty of Grave Misconduct which is punishable by dismissal. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the RTC of Tagum City alleging that the Board acted without jurisdiction in proceeding with the case without petitioner having been first convicted in the criminal case before the regular court. Petitioner pointed out that under the PLEB rules of procedure, prior conviction was required before the Board may act on the administrative case.

ISSUES: Whether or not the PLEB should have awaited the resolution of the criminal case before conducting a hearing on the administrative case charge against the petitioner.

Decision: No. Reason for the Decision The contention however is untenable. A careful perusal of respondent’s affidavit-complaint against petitioner would show that petitioner was charged with grave misconduct for engaging in an illicit affair with respondent’s minor daughter, he being a married man, and not for violation of law, as petitioner would like to convince the Court. Misconduct generally means wrongful, improper or unlawful conduct, motivated by premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose. It usually refers to transgression of some established and definite rule of action, where no discretion is left except what necessity may demand; it does not necessarily imply corruption or criminal intention but implies wrongful intention and not to mere error of judgment. On the other hand, "violation of law" presupposes final conviction in court of any crime or offense penalized under the Revised Penal Code or any special law or ordinance. The settled rule is that criminal and administrative cases are separate and distinct from each other. In criminal cases, proof beyond reasonable doubt is needed whereas in administrative proceedings, only substantial evidence is required. Verily, administrative cases may proceed independently of criminal proceedings.14 The PLEB, being the administrative disciplinary body tasked to hear complaints against erring members of the PNP, has jurisdiction over the case.

CSC v Colangco 553 SCRA 640, April 30, 2008 Facts: Respondent Tristan Colangco took the Professional Board Examination for Teachers (PBET), obtained a passing rate of 75.98% and was subsequently appointed Teacher I and was assigned at a school in Surigao del Norte. A complaint questioning the eligibility of teachers in Surigao del Norte was filed and was investigated by the CSC. CSC discovered significant irregularities in respondents documents wherein it appeared that someone else took his PBET application on his behalf. A formal charge for dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service was filed against respondent. He pointed out that the pieces of evidence against him were inadmissible as they were unauthenticated photocopies of the PBET application form, picture seat plan and Personal Data Sheet. Issue: Whether or not the evidence against petitioner is admissible. Decision: YES. Reason for Decision: Administrative rules of procedure are construed liberally to promote their objective and to assist parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of their respective claims and defences. Section 39 of the Uniform Rules provides that the investigation shall be conducted for the purpose of ascertaining the truth without necessarily adhering to technical rules applicable in judicial proceedings. The CSC correctly appreciated the photocopies of PBET application form, picture seat plan and PDS (though not duly authenticated) in determining whether there was sufficient evidence to substantiate charges against the respondent.

As a general rule, a finding of guilt in administrative cases, if supported by substantial evidence (or that amount of evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion), will be sustained by the Court.

SWITCHMEN’S UNION OF NORTH AMERICA VS. NATIONAL MEDIATION BOARD 320 US 297 (1943) Topic: Factors Affecting Finality of Administrative Decisions Facts: The case was due to a dispute between two labor organizations as to representation of employees of a carrier for collective bargaining, the services of the National Mediation Board were invoked pursuant to the Railway Labor Act. One of the organizations sought to be the representative of all yardmen, the other to be representative of certain smaller groups. The Board directed an election, designating all yardmen as participants. The first organization was chosen representative and the Board certified the result to the carrier. The second organization and some of its members brought suit in the federal District Court challenging the Board’s determination as to participants in the election and seeking cancellation of the certificate. Issue: Whether or not the District Court had the power to review the action of the National Mediation Board Decision: No Reason for Decision: The Judicial Code gives the federal district courts “original jurisdiction” of all “suits and proceedings arising under any law regulating commerce.” From this, it may be assumed that if any judicial review of the certificate of the Board could be had, the District Court would have jurisdiction by reason of the above provision. However, the Court believed that the broad grant of general jurisdiction may be invoked in the special circumstances of this case. Hence, it is for Congress to determine how the rights which it creates shall be enforced. Where Congress has not expressly authorized judicial review, the type of problem involved and the history of the statute in question are relevant in determining whether judicial review may be supplied. That the Board’s certification of representatives of employees for collective bargaining is conclusive does not make such certification judicially reviewable

G.R. No. L-5621 March 25, 1953 PHILIPPINE MOVIE PICTURES WORKERS' ASSOCIATION, vs. PREMIERE PRODUCTIONS, INC., BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.: This is a petition for review of two orders of the Court of Industrial Relations, one dated November 8, 1951, and the other November 24, 1951, which give authority to respondent to lay-off forty-four (44) of its employees in accordance with its urgent petition on condition that, in the event work is available in the future where their ability may be required, the same workers should be reemployed and that, if after the termination of the case, the court would find that at the time of their lay off work was available, the respondent shall pay to them the back wages to which they are entitled. These two holders were upheld by the court en banc in a resolution dated March 10, 1952, which is also involved in the present petition for review On October 2, 1951, respondent filed with the Court of Industrial Relations an urgent petition seeking authority to lay-off 44 men working in three of its departments, the first batch to be laid off thirty (30) days after the filing of the petition and the rest 45 days thereafter, in order that in the intervening period it may finish the filming of its pending picture. The ground for the lay-off is the financial losses which respondent was allegedly suffering during the current year. Petitioner opposed the request alleging that the claim of financial losses has no basis in fact it being only an act of retaliation on the part of respondent for the strike staged by the workers days before in an attempt to harass and intimidate them and weaken and destroy the union to which they belong. On November 5, 1951, date when the urgent petition was set for hearing, at the request of counsel for respondent, Hon. Arsenio C. Roldan, presiding judge of the Court of Industrial Relations, held an ocular inspection of the studios and filming premises of respondent in the course of which he interrogated about fifteen laborers who were then present in the place. On the strength of the evidence adduced during the ocular inspection Judge Roldan issued an order on November 8, 1951, allowing respondent to lay-off the workers mentioned in its petition with respect to Unit No. 2 and those assigned to the Ground Maintenance Department subject to the condition that, in the event that work is available in the future, they should be re-employed. With respect to the workers assigned to Unit No. 1, the hearing was postponed.

A subsequent hearing was held in connection with the workers assigned to Unit. 1 and on the strength of the evidence submitted by respondent, Judge Roldan again found the petition justifiable and authorized their lay-off in an order dated November 24, 1951, under the same condition as those contained in his previous order. Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of both orders dated November 8 and November 24, 1951, which motion the court en banc denied in a resolution issued on March 10, 1952. Hence this petition for review. The only issue submitted to this court for reconsideration is: May the Court of Industrial Relations authorize the lay off of workers on the basis of an ocular inspection without receiving full evidence to determine the cause or motive of such lay-off? It appears that when the case was called for hearing to look in the merits of the urgent petition of respondent seeking to lay-off 44 men who were working in three of its departments on the ground of lack of work and because its business was suffering financial losses during the current year the court, which was then represented by its presiding Judge, decided to make an ocular inspection of the studios and filming premises of respondent following a request made to that effect by its counsel, and in the course of said inspection Judge Roldan proceeded to interrogate the workers he found in the place in the presence of the counsel of both parties. The testimony of those interrogated was taken down and the counsel of both parties were allowed to cross-examine them. Judge Roldan also proceeded to examine some of the records of respondent company among them the time cards of some workers which showed that while the workers reported for work, when their presence was checked they were found to be no longer in the premises. And on the strength of the findings made by judge Roldan in this ocular inspection he reached the conclusion that the petition for lay-off was justified because there was no more work for the laborers to do in connection with the different jobs given to them. It is now contended that such a procedure is unfair to the labor union in that it deprived the workers affected of the opportunity to disprove what apparently was represented to the court during the ocular inspection which at best may only be the result of prearrangement devised by the company to justify its claim of lack of work and that what the court should have done was to make a full-dress investigation if not a formal hearing giving both parties all the time and opportunity to present their evidence before deciding such an important matter which affects the position and the only means of livelihood of the workers affected by the petition. In other words, the petitioning labor union workers were deprived of their employment without due process of law. The claim of petitioner that the laborers were not given an opportunity to present their evidence to disprove the claim of lack of work is disputed by counsel for respondent company who claims that the labor union had its day in court because its counsel was present in the investigation or ocular inspection and even presented some witnesses to protect its interest. The record before the court on this matter is not clear and for such reason it has no way of determining the truth of both claims. The stenographic notes taken during the ocular inspection have not been elevated for the reason undoubtedly that this is a petition for review and the only issue before the court is one of law. In the face of this confusing situations on an issue which is determinative of the controversy, the only guide that the court finds is the order of the court of origin which happily contains a reference to the evidence that it has considered and which has served as basis for its conclusion resulting in lay-off of the workers in whose behalf the present petition was brought before this court. We refer to the order of November 8, 1951, subject of the petition for review, wherein Judge Roldan makes express mention of the evidence can only refer to testimony given by the workers interrogated by him and to whatever documents he found or examined in the course of such inspection. It is true, as counsel for respondent avers, that hearing were conducted by the court a quo on October 8, and 15, 1951, and on November 5, 6, 15, and 21, 1951, but it is likewise true that those hearings do not necessarily refer to the petition under consideration but to other matters and incidents which were then before the court for determination such as the petition of the labor union containing fourteen (14) demands and the petition of the same union to declare respondent in contempt for having violated certain directives of the court. At any rate, this matter does not appear clear and we are inclined to resolve the doubt in favor of labor considering the spirit of our Constitution. The right to labor is a constitutional as well as statutory right. Every man has a natural right to the fruits of his own industry. A man who has been employed to undertake certain labor and has put into it his time and effort is entitled to be protected. The right of a person to his labor is deemed to be property within the meaning of constitutional guarantees. That is his means of livelihood. He cannot be deprived of his labor or work without due process of law (11 Am. Jur., 333, pp. 1151-1153; 11 Am. Jur., section 344. pp. 1168-1171). Although the Court of Industrial Relations, in the determination of any question or controversy, may adopt its own rules of procedure and may act according to justice and equity without regard to technicalities, and for that matter is not bound by any technical rules of evidence (section 20, Commonwealth Act No. 103), this broad grant of power should not be interpreted to mean that it can ignore or disregard the fundamental requirements of due process in the trials and investigation of cases brought before it for determination. As aptly pointed out by this court, there are certain cardinal primary rights which the Court of Industrial Relations must respect in the trial of every labor case. One of them is the right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof (Manila Trading and Supply Co. vs. Philippine Labor Union, 71 Phil., 124, 129). An ocular inspection of the establishment or premise involved is proper if the court finds it necessary,

but such is authorized only to help the court in clearing a doubt, reaching a conclusion, or finding the truth. But it is not the main trial nor should it exclude the presentation of other evidence which the parties may deem necessary to establish their case. It is merely an auxiliary remedy the law affords the parties or the court to reach an enlightened determination of the case. Considering the merits of the controversy before us, we are of the opinion that the required due process has not been followed. The court a quomerely acted on the strength of the ocular inspection it conducted in the premises of the respondent company. The petition for lay-off was predicated on the lack of work and of the further fact that the company was incurring financial losses. These allegations cannot be established by a mere inspection of the place of labor specially when such inspection was conducted at the request of the interested party. As counsel for petitioner says, such inspection could at best witness "the superficial fact of cessation of work but it could not be determinative of the larger and more fundamental issue of lack of work due to lack of funds". This fundamental issue cannot be determined without looking into the financial situation of the respondent company. In fact, this matter is now being looked into by the court a quo in connection with the fourteen demands of the labor union, but before finishing its inquiry it decided to grant the lay-off pending final determination of the main case. This action is in our opinion premature and has worked injustice to the laborers. WHEREFORE, the orders subject of the present petition for review are hereby set aside, and it is ordered that the cause be remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings giving to petitioner an opportunity to present its evidence in support of its opposition to the urgent petition for lay-off of respondent company. No pronouncement as to costs.

Fortich v Corona 289 SCRA 624 (1998) Topic: Factors Affecting Finality of Administrative Decisions

Facts: The Office of the President through then Executive Secretary Torres issued a Decision which approved the conversion of a 144 hectare land from agricultural to agro-industrial/industrial area. A well-publicized hunger strike was then staged by some alleged farmer-beneficiaries against such Decision. This lead then Deputy Executive Secretary Corona to issue the “Win-Win” Resolution that substantially modified the earlier Decision after it had already become final and executory. The Resolution modified the approval of the 44 hectares, and ordered the remaining 100 hectares to be distributed to qualified farmer-beneficiaries. Petitioners filed the present petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction to annul and set aside the “Win-Win” Resolution and to enjoin Respondent DAR Secretary Garilao from implementing said Resolution. Issue: Whether or not the “Win-Win” Resolution validly overturned the Office of the President’s earlier Decision. Decision: No. Reason: When the Office of the President issued the Order dated June 23,1997 declaring the Decision of March 29, 1996 final and executory, as no one has seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration thereto, the said Office had lost its jurisdiction to re-open the case, more so modify its Decision. Having lost its jurisdiction, the Office of the President has no more authority to entertain the second motion for reconsideration filed by respondent DAR Secretary, which second motion became the basis of the assailed “WinWin” Resolution. Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 18 and Section 4, Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court mandate that only 1 motion for reconsideration is allowed to be taken from the Decision of March 29, 1996. Even if a second motion for reconsideration was permitted to be filed in “exceptionally meritorious cases,” as provided in the second paragraph of Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 18, still the said motion should not have been entertained considering that the first motion for reconsideration was not seasonably filed, thereby allowing the Decision of March 29, 1996 to lapse into finality. Thus, the act of the Office of the President in re-opening the case and substantially modifying its earlier decision which had already become final and executory, was in gross disregard of the rules and basic legal precept that accord finality to administrative determinations. The orderly administration of justice requires that the judgments/resolutions of a court or quasi-judicial body must reach a point of finality set by the law, rules and regulations. A resolution which substantially modifies a decision after it has attained finality, is utterly void. When an administrative agency's decision becomes final and executory and no one has seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration thereto, the said agency has lost its jurisdiction to re-open the case, more so modify its decision G.R. No. L-20993 September 28, 1968 RIZAL LIGHT & ICE CO., INC., petitioner, vs. THE MUNICIPALITY OF MORONG, RIZAL and THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION, respondents. ----------------------------

G.R. No. L-21221 September 28, 1968 RIZAL LIGHT & ICE CO., INC., petitioner, vs. THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION and MORONG ELECTRIC CO., INC., respondents. Amado A. Amador, Jr. for petitioner. Atilano C. Bautista and Pompeyo F. Olivas for respondents.

ZALDIVAR, J.: These two cases, being interrelated, are decided together. Case G.R. No. L-20993 is a petition of the Rizal Light & Ice Co., Inc. to review and set aside the orders of respondent Public Service Commission, 1 dated August 20, 1962, and February 15, 1963, in PSC Case No. 39716, cancelling and revoking the certificate of public convenience and necessity and forfeiting the franchise of said petitioner. In the same petition, the petitioner prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction ex partesuspending the effectivity of said orders and/or enjoining respondents Commission and/or Municipality of Morong, Rizal, from enforcing in any way the cancellation and revocation of petitioner's franchise and certificate of public convenience during the pendency of this appeal. By resolution of March 12, 1963, this Court denied the petition for injunction, for lack of merit. Case G. R. L-21221 is likewise a petition of the Rizal Light & Ice Co., Inc. to review and set aside the decision of the Commission dated March 13, 1963 in PSC Case No. 62-5143 granting a certificate of public convenience and necessity to respondent Morong Electric Co., Inc. 2 to operate an electric light, heat and power service in the municipality of Morong, Rizal. In the petition Rizal Light & Ice Co., Inc. also prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction ex parte suspending the effectivity of said decision. Per resolution of this Court, dated May 6, 1963, said petition for injunction was denied. The facts, as they appear in the records of both cases, are as follows: Petitioner Rizal Light & Ice Co., Inc. is a domestic corporation with business address at Morong, Rizal. On August 15, 1949, it was granted by the Commission a certificate of public convenience and necessity for the installation, operation and maintenance of an electric light, heat and power service in the municipality of Morong, Rizal. In an order dated December 19, 1956, the Commission required the petitioner to appear before it on February 18, 1957 to show cause why it should not be penalized for violation of the conditions of its certificate of public convenience and the regulations of the Commission, and for failure to comply with the directives to raise its service voltage and maintain them within the limits prescribed in the Revised Order No. 1 of the Commission, and to acquire and install a kilowattmeter to indcate the load in kilowatts at any particular time of the generating unit. 3 For failure of the petitioner to appear at the hearing on February 18, 1957, the Commission ordered the cancellation and revocation of petitioner's certificate of public convenience and necessity and the forfeiture of its franchise. Petitioner moved for reconsideration of said order on the ground that its manager, Juan D. Francisco, was not aware of said hearing. Respondent municipality opposed the motion alleging that petitioner has not rendered efficient and satisfactory service and has not complied with the requirements of the Commission for the improvement of its service. The motion was set for hearing and Mr. Pedro S. Talavera, Chief, Industrial Division of the Commission, was authorized to conduct the hearing for the reception of the evidence of the parties. 4 Finding that the failure of the petitioner to appear at the hearing set for February 18, 1957 — the sole basis of the revocation of petitioner's certificate — was really due to the illness of its manager, Juan D. Francisco, the Commission set aside its order of revocation. Respondent municipality moved for reconsideration of this order of reinstatement of the certificate, but the motion was denied. In a petition dated June 25, 1958, filed in the same case, respondent municipality formally asked the Commission to revoke petitioner's certificate of public convenience and to forfeit its franchise on the ground, among other things, that it failed to comply with the conditions of said certificate and franchise. Said petition was set for hearing jointly with the order to show cause. The hearings had been postponed several times. Meanwhile, inspections had been made of petitioner's electric plant and installations by the engineers of the Commission, as follows: April 15, 1958 by Engineer Antonio M. Alli; September 18, 1959, July 12-13, 1960, and June 21-24, 1961, by Engineer Meliton S. Martinez. The inspection on June 21-24, 1961 was made upon the request of the petitioner who manifested during the hearing on December 15, 1960 that improvements have been made on its service since the inspection on July 12-13, 1960, and that, on the basis of the inspection report to be submitted, it would agree to the submission of the case for decision without further hearing.

When the case was called for hearing on July 5, 1961, petitioner failed to appear. Respondent municipality was then allowed to present its documentary evidence, and thereafter the case was submitted for decision. On July 7, 1961, petitioner filed a motion to reopen the case upon the ground that it had not been furnished with a copy of the report of the June 21-24, 1961 inspection for it to reply as previously agreed. In an order dated August 25, 1961, petitioner was granted a period of ten (10) days within which to submit its written reply to said inspection report, on condition that should it fail to do so within the said period the case would be considered submitted for decision. Petitioner failed to file the reply. In consonance with the order of August 25, 1961, therefore, the Commission proceeded to decide the case. On July 29, 1962 petitioner's electric plant was burned. In its decision, dated August 20, 1962, the Commission, on the basis of the inspection reports of its aforenamed engineers, found that the petitioner had failed to comply with the directives contained in its letters dated May 21, 1954 and September 4, 1954, and had violated the conditions of its certificate of public convenience as well as the rules and regulations of the Commission. The Commission concluded that the petitioner "cannot render the efficient, adequate and satisfactory electric service required by its certificate and that it is against public interest to allow it to continue its operation." Accordingly, it ordered the cancellation and revocation of petitioner's certificate of public convenience and the forfeiture of its franchise. On September 18, 1962, petitioner moved for reconsideration of the decision, alleging that before its electric plant was burned on July 29, 1962, its service was greatly improved and that it had still existing investment which the Commission should protect. But eight days before said motion for reconsideration was filed, or on September 10, 1962, Morong Electric, having been granted a municipal franchise on May 6, 1962 by respondent municipality to install, operate and maintain an electric heat, light and power service in said municipality — approved by the Provincial Board of Rizal on August 31, 1962 — filed with the Commission an application for a certificate of public convenience and necessity for said service. Said application was entitled "Morong Electric Co., Inc., Applicant", and docketed as Case No. 62-5143. Petitioner opposed in writing the application of Morong Electric, alleging among other things, that it is a holder of a certificate of public convenience to operate an electric light, heat and power service in the same municipality of Morong, Rizal, and that the approval of said application would not promote public convenience, but would only cause ruinous and wasteful competition. Although the opposition is dated October 6, 1962, it was actually received by the Commission on November 8, 1962, or twenty four days after the order of general default was issued in open court when the application was first called for hearing on October 15, 1962. On November 12, 1962, however, the petitioner filed a motion to lift said order of default. But before said motion could be resolved, petitioner filed another motion, dated January 4, 1963, this time asking for the dismissal of the application upon the ground that applicant Morong Electric had no legal personality when it filed its application on September 10, 1962, because its certificate of incorporation was issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission only on October 17, 1962. This motion to dismiss was denied by the Commission in a formal order issued on January 17, 1963 on the premise that applicant Morong Electric was a de facto corporation. Consequently, the case was heard on the merits and both parties presented their respective evidence. On the basis of the evidence adduced, the Commission, in its decision dated March 13, 1963, found that there was an absence of electric service in the municipality of Morong and that applicant Morong Electric, a Filipino-owned corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines, has the financial capacity to maintain said service. These circumstances, considered together with the denial of the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner in Case No. 39715 on February, 15, 1963, such that as far as the Commission was concerned the certificate of the petitioner was already declared revoked and cancelled, the Commission approved the application of Morong Electric and ordered the issuance in its favor of the corresponding certificate of public convenience and necessity.1awphîl.nèt On March 8, 1963, petitioner filed with this Court a petition to review the decision in Case No. 39715 (now G. R. No. L-20993). Then on April 26, 1963, petitioner also filed a petition to review the decision in Case No. 62-5143 (now G. R. No. L-21221). In questioning the decision of the Commission in Case No. 39715, petitioner contends: (1) that the Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction when it delegated the hearing of the case and the reception of evidence to Mr. Pedro S. Talavera who is not allowed by law to hear the same; (2) that the cancellation of petitioner's certificate of public convenience was unwarranted because no sufficient evidence was adduced against the petitioner and that petitioner was not able to present evidence in its defense; (3) that the Commission failed to give protection to petitioner's investment; and (4) that the Commission erred in imposing the extreme penalty of revocation of the certificate. In questioning the decision in Case No. 62-5143, petitioner contends: (1) that the Commission erred in denying petitioner's motion to dismiss and proceeding with the hearing of the application of the Morong Electric; (2) that the Commission erred in granting Morong Electric a certificate of public convenience and necessity since it is not financially capable to render the service; (3) that the Commission erred when it made findings of facts that are not supported by the evidence adduced by the parties at the trial; and (4) that the Commission erred when it did not give to petitioner protection to its investment — a reiteration of the third assignment of error in the other case.1awphîl.nèt

We shall now discuss the appeals in these two cases separately. G.R. No. L-20993 1. Under the first assignment of error, petitioner contends that while Mr. Pedro S. Talavera, who conducted the hearings of the case below, is a division chief, he is not a lawyer. As such, under Section 32 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended, the Commission should not have delegated to him the authority to conduct the hearings for the reception of evidence of the parties. We find that, really, Mr. Talavera is not a lawyer. 5 Under the second paragraph of Section 32 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended, 6 the Commission can only authorize a division chief to hear and investigate a case filed before it if he is a lawyer. However, the petitioner is raising this question for the first time in this appeal. The record discloses that petitioner never made any objection to the authority of Mr. Talavera to hear the case and to receive the evidence of the parties. On the contrary, we find that petitioner had appeared and submitted evidence at the hearings conducted by Mr. Talavera, particularly the hearings relative to the motion for reconsideration of the order of February 18, 1957 cancelling and revoking its certificate. We also find that, through counsel, petitioner had entered into agreements with Mr. Talavera, as hearing officer, and the counsel for respondent municipality, regarding procedure in order to abbreviate the proceedings. 7 It is only after the decision in the case turned out to be adverse to it that petitioner questioned the proceedings held before Mr. Talavera. This Court in several cases has ruled that objection to the delegation of authority to hear a case filed before the Commission and to receive the evidence in connection therewith is a procedural, not a jurisdictional point, and is waived by failure to interpose timely the objection and the case had been decided by the Commission. 8 Since petitioner has never raised any objection to the authority of Mr. Talavera before the Commission, it should be deemed to have waived such procedural defect, and consonant with the precedents on the matter, petitioner's claim that the Commission acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in so authorizing Mr. Talavera should be dismissed. 9 2. Anent the second assigned error, the gist of petitioner's contention is that the evidence — consisting of inspection reports — upon which the Commission based its decision is insufficient and untrustworthy in that (1) the authors of said reports had not been put to test by way of cross-examination; (2) the reports constitute only one side of the picture as petitioner was not able to present evidence in its defense; (3) judicial notice was not taken of the testimony of Mr. Harry B. Bernardino, former mayor of respondent municipality, in PSC Case No. 625143 (the other case, G. R. No. L-21221) to the effect that the petitioner had improved its service before its electric power plant was burned on July 29, 1962 — which testimony contradicts the inspection reports; and (4) the Commission acted both as prosecutor and judge — passing judgment over the very same evidence presented by it as prosecutor — a situation "not conducive to the arrival at just and equitable decisions." Settled is the rule that in reviewing the decision of the Public Service Commission this Court is not required to examine the proof de novo and determine for itself whether or not the preponderance of evidence really justifies the decision. The only function of this Court is to determine whether or not there is evidence before the Commission upon which its decision might reasonably be based. This Court will not substitute its discretion for that of the Commission on questions of fact and will not interfere in the latter's decision unless it clearly appears that there is no evidence to support it. 10 Inasmuch as the only function of this Court in reviewing the decision of the Commission is to determine whether there is sufficient evidence before the Commission upon which its decision can reasonably be based, as it is not required to examine the proof de novo, the evidence that should be made the basis of this Court's determination should be only those presented in this case before the Commission. What then was the evidence presented before the Commission and made the basis of its decision subject of the present appeal? As stated earlier, the Commission based its decision on the inspection reports submitted by its engineers who conducted the inspection of petitioner's electric service upon orders of the Commission. 11 Said inspection reports specify in detail the deficiencies incurred, and violations committed, by the petitioner resulting in the inadequacy of its service. We consider that said reports are sufficient to serve reasonably as bases of the decision in question. It should be emphasized, in this connection that said reports, are not mere documentary proofs presented for the consideration of the Commission, but are the results of the Commission's own observations and investigations which it can rightfully take into consideration, 12 particularly in this case where the petitioner had not presented any evidence in its defense, and speaking of petitioner's failure to present evidence, as well as its failure to cross-examine the authors of the inspection reports, petitioner should not complain because it had waived not only its right to cross-examine but also its right to present evidence. Quoted hereunder are the pertinent portions of the transcripts of the proceedings where the petitioner, through counsel, manifested in clear language said waiver and its decision to abide by the last inspection report of Engineer Martinez: Proceedings of December 15, 1960 COMMISSION: It appears at the last hearing of this case on September 23, 1960, that an engineer of this Commission has been ordered to make an inspection of all electric services in the province of Rizal and on that date the engineer of this Commission is still undertaking

that inspection and it appears that the said engineer had actually made that inspection on July 12 and 13, 1960. The engineer has submitted his report on November 18, 1960 which is attached to the records of this case. ATTY. LUQUE (Councel for Petitioner): ... (W)e respectfully state that while the report is, as I see it attached to the records, clear and very thorough, it was made sometime July of this year and I understand from the respondent that there is some improvement since this report was made ... we respectfully request that an up-to-date inspection be made ... . An inspector of this Commission can be sent to the plant and considering that the engineer of this Commission, Engineer Meliton Martinez, is very acquainted to the points involved we pray that his report will be used by us for the reason that he is a technical man and he knows well as he has done a good job and I think our proposition would expedite the matter. We sincerely believe that the inspection report will be the best evidence to decide this matter. xxx

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ATTY. LUQUE: ... This is a very important matter and to show the good faith of respondent in this case we will not even cross-examine the engineer when he makes a new report. We will agree to the findings and, your honor please, considering as we have manifested before that Engineer Martinez is an experienced engineer of this Commission and the points reported by Engineer Martinez on the situation of the plant now will prevent the necessity of having a hearing, of us bringing new evidence and complainant bringing new evidence. ... . xxx

xxx

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COMMISSION (to Atty. Luque): Q Does the Commission understand from the counsel for applicant that if the motion is granted he will submit this order to show cause for decision without any further hearing and the decision will be based on the report of the engineer of this Commission? A We respectfully reply in this manner that we be allowed or be given an opportunity just to read the report and 99%, we will agree that the report will be the basis of that decision. We just want to find out the contents of the report, however, we request that we be furnished with a copy of the report before the hearing so that we will just make a manifestation that we will agree. COMMISSION (to Atty. Luque): Q In order to prevent the delay of the disposition of this case the Commission will allow counsel for the applicant to submit his written reply to the report that the engineer of this Commission. Will he submit this case without further hearing upon the receipt of that written reply? A

Yes, your honor. Proceedings of August 25, 1961

ATTY. LUQUE (Counsel for petitioner): In order to avoid any delay in the consideration of this case we are respectfully move (sic) that instead of our witnesses testifying under oath that we will submit a written reply under oath together with the memorandum within fifteen (15) days and we will furnish a copy and upon our submission of said written reply under oath and memorandum we consider this case submitted. This suggestion is to abbreviate the necessity of presenting witnesses here which may prolong the resolution of this case. ATTY. OLIVAS (Counsel for respondent municipality): I object on the ground that there is no resolution by this Commission on the action to reopen the case and second this case has been closed. ATTY. LUQUE: With regard to the testimony on the ground for opposition we respectfully submit to this Commission our motion to submit a written reply together with a memorandum. Also as stated to expedite the case and to avoid further hearing we will just submit our written reply. According to our records we are furnished with a copy of the report of July 17, 1961. We submit your honor. xxx

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COMMISSION:

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To give applicant a chance to have a day in court the Commission grants the request of applicant that it be given 10 days within which to submit a written reply on the report of the engineer of the Commission who inspected the electric service, in the municipality of Morong, Rizal, and after the submission of the said written reply within 10 days from today this case will be considered submitted for decision. The above-quoted manifestation of counsel for the petitioner, specifically the statement referring to the inspection report of Engineer Martinez as the "best evidence to decide this matter," can serve as an argument against petitioner's claim that the Commision should have taken into consideration the testimony of Mr. Bernardino. But the primary reasons why the Commission could not have taken judicial cognizance of said testimony are: first, it is not a proper subject of judicial notice, as it is not a "known" fact — that is, well established and authoritatively settled, without qualification and contention; 13 second, it was given in a subsequent and distinct case after the petitioner's motion for reconsideration was heard by the Commission en banc and submitted for decision, 14 and third, it was not brought to the attention of the Commission in this case through an appropriate pleading. 15 Regarding the contention of petitioner that the Commission had acted both as prosecutor and judge, it should be considered that there are two matters that had to be decided in this case, namely, the order to show cause dated December 19, 1956, and the petition or complaint by respondent municipality dated June 25, 1958. Both matters were heard jointly, and the record shows that respondent municipality had been allowed to present its evidence to substantiate its complaint. It can not be said, therefore, that in this case the Commission had acted as prosecutor and judge. But even assuming, for the sake of argument, that there was a commingling of the prosecuting and investigating functions, this exercise of dual function is authorized by Section 17(a) of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended, under which the Commission has power "to investigate, upon its own initiative or upon complaint in writing, any matter concerning any public service as regards matters under its jurisdiction; to, require any public service to furnish safe, adequate, and proper service as the public interest may require and warrant; to enforce compliance with any standard, rule, regulation, order or other requirement of this Act or of the Commission ... ." Thus, in the case of Collector of Internal Revenue vs. Estate of F. P. Buan, L-11438, July 31, 1958, this Court held that the power of the Commission to cancel and revoke a certificate of public convenience and necessity may be exercised by it even without a formal charge filed by any interested party, with the only limitation that the holder of the certificate should be given his day in court. It may not be amiss to add that when prosecuting and investigating duties are delegated by statute to an administrative body, as in the case of the Public Service Commission, said body may take steps it believes appropriate for the proper exercise of said duties, particularly in the manner of informing itself whether there is probable violation of the law and/or its rules and regulations. It may initiate an investigation, file a complaint, and then try the charge as preferred. So long as the respondent is given a day in court, there can be no denial of due process, and objections to said procedure cannot be sustained. 3. In its third assignment of error, petitioner invokes the "protection-of-investment rule" enunciated by this Court in Batangas Transportation Co. vs. Orlanes 16 in this wise: The Government having taken over the control and supervision of all public utilities, so long as an operator under a prior license complies with the terms and conditions of his license and reasonable rules and regulations for its operation and meets the reasonable demands of the public, it is the duty of the Commission to protect rather than to destroy his investment by the granting of the second license to another person for the same thing over the same route of travel. The granting of such a license does not serve its convenience or promote the interests of the public. The above-quoted rule, however, is not absolute, for nobody has exclusive right to secure a franchise or a certificate of public convenience. 17 Where, as in the present case, it has been shown by ample evidence that the petitioner, despite ample time and opportunity given to it by the Commission, had failed to render adequate, sufficient and satisfactory service and had violated the important conditions of its certificate as well as the directives and the rules and regulations of the Commission, the rule cannot apply. To apply that rule unqualifiedly is to encourage violation or disregard of the terms and conditions of the certificate and the Commission's directives and regulations, and would close the door to other applicants who could establish, operate and provide adequate, efficient and satisfactory service for the benefit and convenience of the inhabitants. It should be emphasized that the paramount consideration should always be the public interest and public convenience. The duty of the Commission to protect investment of a public utility operator refers only to operators of good standing — those who comply with the laws, rules and regulations — and not to operators who are unconcerned with the public interest and whose investments have failed or deteriorated because of their own fault. 18 4. The last assignment of error assails the propriety of the penalty imposed by the Commission on the petitioner — that is, the revocation of the certificate and the forfeiture of the franchise. Petitioner contends that the imposition of a fine would have been sufficient, as had been done by the Commission in cases of a similar nature. It should be observed that Section 16(n) of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended, confers upon the Commission ample power and discretion to order the cancellation and revocation of any certificate of public convenience issued to an operator who has violated, or has willfully and contumaciously refused to comply with, any order, rule or regulation of the Commission or any provision

of law. What matters is that there is evidence to support the action of the Commission. In the instant case, as shown by the evidence, the contumacious refusal of the petitioner since 1954 to comply with the directives, rules and regulations of the Commission, its violation of the conditions of its certificate and its incapability to comply with its commitment as shown by its inadequate service, were the circumstances that warranted the action of the Commission in not merely imposing a fine but in revoking altogether petitioner's certificate. To allow petitioner to continue its operation would be to sacrifice public interest and convenience in favor of private interest. A grant of a certificate of public convenience confers no property rights but is a mere license or privilege, and such privilege is forfeited when the grantee fails to comply with his commitments behind which lies the paramount interest of the public, for public necessity cannot be made to wait, nor sacrificed for private convenience. (Collector of Internal Revenue v. Estate of F. P. Buan, et al., L-11438 and Santiago Sambrano, et al. v. PSC, et al., L-11439 & L-11542-46, July 31, 1958) (T)he Public Service Commission, ... has the power to specify and define the terms and conditions upon which the public utility shall be operated, and to make reasonable rules and regulations for its operation and the compensation which the utility shall receive for its services to the public, and for any failure to comply with such rules and regulations or the violation of any of the terms and conditions for which the license was granted, the Commission has ample power to enforce the provisions of the license or even to revoke it, for any failure or neglect to comply with any of its terms and provisions. (Batangas Trans. Co. v. Orlanes, 52 Phil. 455, 460; emphasis supplied) Presumably, the petitioner has in mind Section 21 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended, which provides that a public utility operator violating or failing to comply with the terms and conditions of any certificate, or any orders, decisions or regulations of the Commission, shall be subject to a fine and that the Commission is authorized and empowered to impose such fine, after due notice and hearing. It should be noted, however, that the last sentence of said section states that the remedy provided therein "shall not be a bar to, or affect any other remedy provided in this Act but shall be cumulative and additional to such remedy or remedies." In other words, the imposition of a fine may only be one of the remedies which the Commission may resort to, in its discretion. But that remedy is not exclusive of, or has preference over, the other remedies. And this Court will not substitute its discretion for that of the Commission, as long as there is evidence to support the exercise of that discretion by the Commission. G. R. No. L-21221 Coming now to the other case, let it be stated at the outset that before any certificate may be granted, authorizing the operation of a public service, three requisites must be complied with, namely: (1) the applicant must be a citizen of the Philippines or of the United States, or a corporation or co-partnership, association or joint-stock company constituted and organized under the laws of the Philippines, sixty per centum at least of the stock or paid-up capital of which belongs entirely to citizens of the Philippines or of the United States; 19 (2) the applicant must be financially capable of undertaking the proposed service and meeting the responsibilities incident to its operation; 20 and (3) the applicant must prove that the operation of the public service proposed and the authorization to do business will promote the public interest in a proper and suitable manner. 21 As stated earlier, in the decision appealed from, the Commission found that Morong Electric is a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines, the stockholders of which are Filipino citizens, that it is financially capable of operating an electric light, heat and power service, and that at the time the decision was rendered there was absence of electric service in Morong, Rizal. While the petitioner does not dispute the need of an electric service in Morong, Rizal, 22 it claims, in effect, that Morong Electric should not have been granted the certificate of public convenience and necessity because (1) it did not have a corporate personality at the time it was granted a franchise and when it applied for said certificate; (2) it is not financially capable of undertaking an electric service, and (3) petitioner was rendering efficient service before its electric plant was burned, and therefore, being a prior operator its investment should be protected and no new party should be granted a franchise and certificate of public convenience and necessity to operate an electric service in the same locality. 1. The bulk of petitioner's arguments assailing the personality of Morong Electric dwells on the proposition that since a franchise is a contract, 23 at least two competent parties are necessary to the execution thereof, and parties are not competent except when they are in being. Hence, it is contended that until a corporation has come into being, in this jurisdiction, by the issuance of a certificate of incorporation by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) it cannot enter into any contract as a corporation. The certificate of incorporation of the Morong Electric was issued by the SEC on October 17, 1962, so only from that date, not before, did it acquire juridical personality and legal existence. Petitioner concludes that the franchise granted to Morong Electric on May 6, 1962 when it was not yet in esse is null and void and cannot be the subject of the Commission's consideration. On the other hand, Morong Electric argues, and to which argument the Commission agrees, that it was a de facto corporation at the time the franchise was granted and, as such, it was not incapacitated to enter into any contract or to apply for and accept a franchise. Not having been incapacitated, Morong Electric maintains that the franchise granted to it is valid and the approval or disapproval thereof can be properly determined by the Commission.

Petitioner's contention that Morong Electric did not yet have a legal personality on May 6, 1962 when a municipal franchise was granted to it is correct. The juridical personality and legal existence of Morong Electric began only on October 17, 1962 when its certificate of incorporation was issued by the SEC. 24 Before that date, or pending the issuance of said certificate of incorporation, the incorporators cannot be considered as de facto corporation. 25 But the fact that Morong Electric had no corporate existence on the day the franchise was granted in its name does not render the franchise invalid, because later Morong Electric obtained its certificate of incorporation and then accepted the franchise in accordance with the terms and conditions thereof. This view is sustained by eminent American authorities. Thus, McQuiuin says: The fact that a company is not completely incorporated at the time the grant is made to it by a municipality to use the streets does not, in most jurisdictions, affect the validity of the grant. But such grant cannot take effect until the corporation is organized. And in Illinois it has been decided that the ordinance granting the franchise may be presented before the corporation grantee is fully organized, where the organization is completed before the passage and acceptance. (McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, 3rd Ed., Vol. 12, Chap. 34, Sec. 34.21) Fletcher says: While a franchise cannot take effect until the grantee corporation is organized, the franchise may, nevertheless, be applied for before the company is fully organized. A grant of a street franchise is valid although the corporation is not created until afterwards. (Fletcher, Cyclopedia Corp. Permanent Edition, Rev. Vol. 6-A, Sec. 2881) And Thompson gives the reason for the rule: (I)n the matter of the secondary franchise the authorities are numerous in support of the proposition that an ordinance granting a privilege to a corporation is not void because the beneficiary of the ordinance is not fully organized at the time of the introduction of the ordinance. It is enough that organization is complete prior to the passage and acceptance of the ordinance. The reason is that a privilege of this character is a mere license to the corporation until it accepts the grant and complies with its terms and conditions. (Thompson on Corporations, Vol. 4, 3rd Ed., Sec. 2929) 26 The incorporation of Morong Electric on October 17, 1962 and its acceptance of the franchise as shown by its action in prosecuting the application filed with the Commission for the approval of said franchise, not only perfected a contract between the respondent municipality and Morong Electric but also cured the deficiency pointed out by the petitioner in the application of Morong EIectric. Thus, the Commission did not err in denying petitioner's motion to dismiss said application and in proceeding to hear the same. The efficacy of the franchise, however, arose only upon its approval by the Commission on March 13, 1963. The reason is that — Under Act No. 667, as amended by Act No. 1022, a municipal council has the power to grant electric franchises, subject to the approval of the provincial board and the President. However, under Section 16(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended, the Public Service Commission is empowered "to approve, subject to constitutional limitations any franchise or privilege granted under the provisions of Act No. 667, as amended by Act No. 1022, by any political subdivision of the Philippines when, in the judgment of the Commission, such franchise or privilege will properly conserve the public interests and the Commission shall in so approving impose such conditions as to construction, equipment, maintenance, service, or operation as the public interests and convenience may reasonably require, and to issue certificates of public convenience and necessity when such is required or provided by any law or franchise." Thus, the efficacy of a municipal electric franchise arises, therefore, only after the approval of the Public Service Commission. (Almendras vs. Ramos, 90 Phil. 231) . The conclusion herein reached regarding the validity of the franchise granted to Morong Electric is not incompatible with the holding of this Court in Cagayan Fishing Development Co., Inc. vs. Teodoro Sandiko 27 upon which the petitioner leans heavily in support of its position. In said case this Court held that a corporation should have a full and complete organization and existence as an entity before it can enter into any kind of a contract or transact any business. It should be pointed out, however, that this Court did not say in that case that the rule is absolute or that under no circumstances may the acts of promoters of a corporation be ratified or accepted by the corporation if and when subsequently organized. Of course, there are exceptions. It will be noted that American courts generally hold that a contract made by the promoters of a corporation on its behalf may be adopted, accepted or ratified by the corporation when organized. 28 2. The validity of the franchise and the corporate personality of Morong Electric to accept the same having been shown, the next question to be resolved is whether said company has the financial qualification to operate an electric light, heat and power service. Petitioner challenges the financial capability of Morong Electric, by pointing out the inconsistencies in the testimony of Mr. Jose P. Ingal, president of said company, regarding its assets and the amount of its initial investment for the electric plant. In this connection it should be stated that on the basis of the evidence presented on the matter, the Commission has found the Morong Electric to be "financially qualified to install, maintain and operate the proposed electric light, heat and power service." This is essentially a factual determination which, in a number of cases, this Court has said it will not disturb unless patently unsupported by evidence. An

examination of the record of this case readily shows that the testimony of Mr. Ingal and the documents he presented to establish the financial capability of Morong Electric provide reasonable grounds for the above finding of the Commission. It is now a very well-settled rule in this jurisdiction that the findings and conclusions of fact made by the Public Service Commission, after weighing the evidence adduced by the parties in a public service case, will not be disturbed by the Supreme Court unless those findings and conclusions appear not to be reasonably supported by evidence. (La Mallorca and Pampanga Bus Co. vs. Mercado, L19120, November 29, 1965) For purposes of appeal, what is decisive is that said testimonial evidence provides reasonable support for the Public Service Commission's findings of financial capacity on the part of applicants, rendering such findings beyond our power to disturb. (Del Pilar Transit vs. Silva, L-21547, July 15, 1966) It may be worthwhile to mention in this connection that per inspection report dated January 20, 1964 29 of Mr. Meliton Martinez of the Commission, who inspected the electric service of Morong on January 15-16, 1964, Morong Electric "is serving electric service to the entire area covered by its approved plan and has constructed its line in accordance with the plans and specifications approved by the Commission." By reason thereof, it was recommended that the requests of Morong Electric (1) for the withdrawal of its deposit in the amount of P1,000.00 with the Treasurer of the Philippines, and (2) for the approval of Resolution No. 160 of the Municipal Council of Morong, Rizal, exempting the operator from making the additional P9,000.00 deposit mentioned in its petition, dated September 16, 1963, be granted. This report removes any doubt as to the financial capability of Morong Electric to operate and maintain an electric light, heat and power service. 3. With the financial qualification of Morong Electric beyond doubt, the remaining question to be resolved is whether, or not, the findings of fact of the Commission regarding petitioner's service are supported by evidence. It is the contention of the petitioner that the Commission made some findings of fact prejudicial to its position but which do not find support from the evidence presented in this case. Specifically, petitioner refers to the statements or findings that its service had "turned from bad to worse," that it miserably failed to comply with the oft-repeated promises to bring about the needed improvement, that its equipment is unserviceable, and that it has no longer any plant site and, therefore, has discredited itself. Petitioner further states that such statements are not only devoid of evidentiary support but contrary to the testimony of its witness, Mr. Harry Bernardino, who testified that petitioner was rendering efficient and satisfactory service before its electric plant was burned on July 29, 1962. On the face of the decision appealed from, it is obvious that the Commission in describing the kind of service petitioner was rendering before its certificate was ordered revoked and cancelled, took judicial notice of the records of the previous case (PSC Case No. 39715) where the quality of petitioner's service had been squarely put in issue. It will be noted that the findings of the Commission were made notwithstanding the fact that the aforementioned testimony of Mr. Bernardino had been emphasized and pointed out in petitioner's Memorandum to the Commission. 30 The implication is simple: that as between the testimony of Mr. Bernardino and the inspection reports of the engineers of the Commission, which served as the basis of the revocation order, the Commission gave credence to the latter. Naturally, whatever conclusion or finding of fact that the Commission arrived at regarding the quality of petitioner's service are not borne out by the evidence presented in this case but by evidence in the previous case. 31In this connection, we repeat, the conclusion, arrived at by the Commission after weighing the conflicting evidence in the two related cases, is a conclusion of fact which this Court will not disturb. And it has been held time and again that where the Commission has reached a conclusion of fact after weighing the conflicting evidence, that conclusion must be respected, and the Supreme Court will not interfere unless it clearly appears that there is no evidence to support the decision of the Commission. (La Mallorca and Pampanga Bus Co., Inc. vs. Mercado, L-19120, November 29, 1965 citing Pangasinan Trans. Co., Inc. vs. Dela Cruz, 96 Phil. 278) For that matter, petitioner's pretension that it has a prior right to the operation of an electric service in Morong, Rizal, is not tenable; and its plea for protection of its investment, as in the previous case, cannot be entertained. WHEREFORE, the two decisions of the Public Service Commission, appealed from, should be, as they are hereby affirmed, with costs in the two cases against petitioner Rizal Light & Ice Co., Inc. It is so ordered. MACEDA v. ERB DOCTRINE: The ERB, as an administrative body is not bound by the strict or technical rules of evidence governing court proceedings FACTS: Because of the outbreak of the conflict on the Persian Gulf, private respondents oil companies filed with the ERB their applications on oil price increases. The ERB granted provisional increase (P1.42 per litter) Petitioner Maceda filed a petition for Prohibition

seeking to nullify this provisional increase he claims that the increase in prices has to undergo the requirements of notice and hearing, however in this case the requirements were not complied with, and therefore Maceda claims he was deprived of due process.In reaffirming the increase, the lower court ruled that Executive Order 172 does not preclude the board from ordering exparte, a provisional increase. These provisional increases, however, will be subject to final disposition of whether or not it should be made permanent, to reduce or increase it, or to deny the application. In fact, in the same order which authorized the provision increase, the ERB set the applications for hearing with due notice to all interested parties. Petitioners Maceda failed to appear at said hearing and at the second hearing. The notice of hearing was also published in newspapers of general circulation. Hearing for presentation of the evidence commences and the ERB outlined the procedure to be observed in the reception of evidence That the oppositors and the board must have all the evidence-in-chief to be places on record first then the examination will come later and the cross-examination will come later. Maceda claims that this order of relaxed procedure for presentation of proof resulted in a denial of due process because it deprived him of finishing his cross-examination of the witnesses. ISSUE: W/N Maceda, through this relaxed procedure of presentation of evidence was deprived of due process HELD:NO. The Solicitor General has pointed out that administrative bodies may relax the procedures in th eintroduction of evidence in trials. It is not improper. The ERB, as an administrative body is not bound by the strict or technical rules of evidence governing court proceedings. In fact, Section 2, Rule I of the Rules of Procedure Governing Hearings Before the ERB provides that These rules shall govern pleadings, practice and procedure before the ERB in all matters of inquiry, study, hearing, investigation and/or any other proceeding within the jurisdiction of the Board. However, in the broader interest of justice, the Board may, in any particular matter, except itself from these rules and apply such suitable procedure as shall promote the objectives of the Order