Admin_first4.docx

SALVADOR LAUREL vs ANIANO DESIERTO

Issue: Whether or not Salvador Laurel is a public officer.

Facts: In 1991, then President Corazon Aquino issued Administrative Order No. 223 constituting a Committee or the preparation of the National Centennial Celebration in 1998. When President Fidel Ramos took over, he reconstituted the said Committee as the National Centennial Commission (NCC). Salvador Laurel was appointed as the chairperson. Subsequently, the Centennial Exposition Project was constructed at the Clark Special Economic Zone.

Ruling: Yes Agnes. The court ruled that Laurel’s office was delegated with sovereign functions. Based on the executive issuances which constituted and reconstituted the NCC, as well as various executive orders, it can be seen that the NCC was given executive functions, to wit: promote economic development particularly in Central Luzon to attract investors to mitigate the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo, among others. Promotion of industrialization and full employment is a fundamental state policy.

After the centennial celebration, then Senator Ana Dominique Coseteng, in a privilege speech, exposed certain anomalies in the said Centennial Exposition Project. This eventually led to the filing of graft and corrupt practices charges against Laurel. The graft charges were referred to then Ombudsman Aniano Desierto. Laurel questioned the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman as he averred that the NCC is not a public office; that Laurel is not a public officer hence he cannot be charged with graft cases and the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction. Laurel avers that a public office is defined as follows: A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a public officer. From the above definition, Laurel insists that he is not a public officer because: 1. He was not delegated any sovereign functions; 2. He did not receive any compensation as chairman of NCC; 3. His office has no security of tenure because the NCC is an ad hoc body which is coterminous upon the happening of the 1998 Centennial Celebration.

Even if Laurel did not receive any compensation it must be remembered that a salary is a usual but not a necessary criterion for determining the nature of the position. It is not conclusive. The salary is a mere incident and forms no part of the office. Where a salary or fees is annexed, the office is provided for it is a naked or honorary office, and is supposed to be accepted merely for the public good. Hence, the office of Laurel as NCC Chairman may be characterized as an honorary office, as opposed to a lucrative office or an office of profit, i.e., one to which salary, compensation or fees are attached. But it is a public office, nonetheless. NCC being defined as an ad hoc body is of no moment. The true test, regardless of the designation by the creating law, is that if a duty be a continuing one, which is defined by rules prescribed by the government and not by contract, which an individual is appointed by government to perform, who enters on the duties pertaining to his station without any contract defining them, if those duties continue though the person be changed, — it seems very difficult to distinguish such a charge or employment from an office of the person who performs the duties from an officer.

Facts: Petitioner Veterans Federation of the Philippines (VFP) is a corporate body organized under Republic Act No. 2640. Sometime in August 2002, petitioner received a letter from Undersecretary of the Department of National Defense (DND) to conduct Management Audit of VFP pursuant to RA 2640, where it stated that VFP is under the supervision and control of the Secretary of National Defense. Petitioner complained about the broadness of audit and requested suspension until issues are threshed out, which was subsequently denied by DND. As a result, petitioner sought relief under Rule 65 assailing that it is a private non-government corporation. Issue: Whether or not veterans federation created by law is a public office, considering that it does not possess a portion of the sovereign functions of the government and considering further that, it has no budgetary appropriation from DBM and that its funds come from membership dues. Ruling: Oui mademoiselle, petitioner is a public corporation. In Laurel v. Desierto, public office is defined as the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a given period, is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised for the benefit of the public. In the instant case, the functions of VFP – the protection of the interests of war veterans which promotes social justice and reward patriotism – certainly fall within the category of sovereign functions. The fact that VFP has no budgetary appropriation is only a product of erroneous application of the law by public officers in the DBM which will not bar subsequent correct application. Hence, placing it under the control and supervision of DND is proper. VETERANS FEDERATION OF THE PHILS vs REYES

DAVAO CITY COMMISSION

WATER

DISTRICT

vs

CIVIL

SERVICE

Facts: Petitioners are among the more than five hundred (500) water districts existing throughout the country formed pursuant to the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 198, as amended by Presidential Decrees Nos. 768 and 1479, otherwise known as the "Provincial Water Utilities Act of 1973." Presidential Decree No. 198 was issued by the then President Ferdinand E. Marcos by virtue of his legislative power under Proclamation No. 1081. It authorized the different local legislative bodies to form and create their respective water districts through a resolution they will pass subject to the guidelines, rules and regulations therein laid down. The decree further created and formed the "Local Water Utilities Administration" (LWUA), a

national agency attached to the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA), and granted with regulatory power necessary to optimize public service from water utilities operations. Issue: Whether or not the local water districts formed and created pursuant to the provisions of PD198 are government-owned or controlled corporations with original charter falling under the civil service law and/or covered by the visitorial power of the commission on audit? Ruling: Iyo Agnes. The court ruled against the petitioners. It further reiterated its ruling in Tanjay case declaring water districts government-owned or controlled corporations with original charter. Ascertained from a consideration of the whole statute, PD 198 is a special law applicable only to the different water districts created pursuant thereto. In all its essential terms, it is obvious that it pertains to a special purpose which is intended to meet a particular set of conditions and circumstances. The fact that said decree generally applies to all water districts throughout the country does not change the fact that PD 198 is a special law. Accordingly, this Court's resolution in Metro Iloilo case declaring PD 198 as a general legislation is hereby abandoned. By "government-owned or controlled corporation with original charter," We mean government owned or controlled corporation created by a special law and not under the Corporation Code of the Philippines. From the foregoing pronouncement, it is clear that what has been excluded from the coverage of the CSC are those corporations created pursuant to the Corporation Code. Significantly, petitioners are not created under the said code, but on the contrary, they were created pursuant to a special law and are governed primarily by its provision. The provisions of PD 198,

as amended, are similar to those which are actually contained in other corporate charters. The conclusion is inescapable that the said decree is in truth and in fact the charter of the different water districts for it clearly defines the latter's primary purpose and its basic organizational set-up. In other words, PD 198, as amended, is the very law which gives a water district juridical personality. While it is true that a resolution of a local Sanggunian is still necessary for the final creation of a district, this Court is of the opinion that said resolution cannot be considered as its charter, the same being intended only to implement the provisions of said decree.

openly and actively campaigned for her election. Wherefore, plaintiff Saura commenced this suit for the recovery of damages. The lower court dismissed the complaint on the basis that the agreement sued upon is null and void, in tat (1) the subject matter of the contract, being a public office, is not within the commerce of man; and (2) the "pledge" was in curtailment of the free exercise of elective franchise and therefore against public policy. Issue: Whether or not a public office may be a valid subject of a binding agreement

RAMON SAURA vs ESTELA SINDICO . . . . FIGHT!!! Facts: Ramon E. Saura and Estela P. Sindico were contesting for nomination as the official candidate of the Nacionalista Party in the fourth district of Pangasinan in the congressional elections of November 12, 1957. On August 23, 1957, the parties entered into a written agreement bearing the same date, containing among other matters stated therein, a pledge that each aspirant shall respect the result of the aforesaid convention. In the provincial convention held by the Nacionalista Party, Saura was elected and proclaimed the Party's official congressional candidate for the district of Pangasinan. Nonetheless, Sindico, in disregard of the covenant, filed her certificate of candidacy for the same office with the Commission on Elections, and she

Ruling: Dae Agnes, dae. Among those that may not be the subject matter (object) of contracts are certain rights of individuals, which the law and public policy have deemed wise to exclude from the commerce of man. Among them are the political rights conferred upon citizens, including, but not limited to, once's right to vote, the right to present one's candidacy to the people and to be voted to public office, provided, however, that all the qualifications prescribed by law obtain. Such rights may not, therefore, be bargained away curtailed with impunity, for they are conferred not for individual or private benefit or advantage but for the public good and interest. Constitutional and statutory provision fix the qualifications of persons who may be eligible for certain elective public offices. Said requirements may neither be enlarged nor reduced by mere agreements between private parties. A voter possessing all the qualifications required to fill an office may, by himself or through a political party or group, present his candidacy without further limitations than those provided by law. In the case at hand, plaintiff complains on account of defendant's alleged violation of the "pledge" in question by filing her own certificate o candidacy for a seat in the Congress of the Philippines and in openly and actively campaigning for her

election. In the face of the preceding considerations, we certainly cannot entertain plaintiff's action, which would result in limiting the choice of the electors to only those persons selected by a small group or by party boses.