Admin.docx

JULIANITO M. SALVADOR vs. JUDGE MANUEL Q. LIMSIACO A.M. No. MTJ – 08 – 1695 | April 16, 2008 PONENTE: CORONA, J (Introduction) FACTS: Complainant filed an ejectment case in the MCTC of Valladolid San Enrique – Pulupandan, Negros Occidental where Respondent Judge presided over that court. The case was heard on February 13, 2002. As the parties failed to amicably settle the case, respondent judged required them to submit their respected position papers in which complainant submitted on March 15, 2002 while the defendants failed to do so. According to the complainant, respondent judge lost the original copy of his position paper. On November 4, 2002, he complied with respondent judge's directive. He filed two more motions for the early resolution of the case. Respondent judge did not resolve both motions. On May 21, 2003, respondent judge finally rendered a decision dismissing the ejectment case for lack of cause of action. The complainant filed a notice of appeal which the MCTC granted. On follow-up, however, he was informed that the records had not yet been transmitted to the Regional Trial Court (RTC). He also discovered that the MCTC's clerk of court, respondent John O. Negroprado, failed to attach his position paper to the case's records and to issue a certificate on the completeness of said records. In his comment, respondent judge contended that the complainant's accusations were baseless. According to him, he had already decided the case on May 21, 2003. It was not also true that he lost the original copy of complainant's position paper. He insisted he neither received nor saw the document. ISSUE: Whether Judge Limsiaco is guilty of obstruction of justice, undue delay in rendering a decision and gross inefficiency? RULING: Under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, the court shall render its judgment within 30 days after its receipt of the parties' position papers or the expiration of the period for filing the same, whichever comes first. The record shows that during the February 13, 2002 hearing, the parties were given 30 days (or until March 15, 2002) within which to submit their respective position papers. Only the complainant complied with the order. Despite the expiration of the period granted by the court, however, respondent judge failed to decide the case. It was only after more than one year from the lapse of the prescribed period that he rendered his decision. A judge's foremost consideration is the administration of justice. Thus, he should follow the time limit set for deciding cases. The Constitution mandates that all cases or matters filed before all lower courts shall be decided or resolved within 90 days from the time the case is submitted for decision. Judges are enjoined to dispose of the court's business promptly and expeditiously and decide cases within the period fixed by law. Failure to comply within the mandated period constitutes a serious violation of the constitutional right of the parties to a speedy disposition of

their cases. It also undermines the people's faith and confidence in the judiciary, lowers its standards and brings it to disrepute. Decision making, among other duties, is the most important duty of a member of the bench. Under Rule 140, Section 9 (1), as amended by Administrative Matter No. 01-8-10-SC, respondent judge's undue delay in rendering a decision is classified as a less serious offense. It carries the penalty of suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one nor more than three months, or a fine of more than P10,000 but not exceeding P20,000. WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Manuel Q. Limsiaco, Jr. is hereby found GUILTY of undue delay in rendering a decision. Accordingly, he is FINED P20,000 with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar infraction in the future shall be dealt with more severely. UNITED STATES vs. BULL GR NO. 5270 | JANUARY 15, 1910 PONENTE: ELLIOTT, J (Separation of Powers) FACTS: H. N. Bull was the master of a steam sailing vessel known as the steamship Standard, which vessel was then and there engaged in carrying and transporting cattle, carabaos, and other animals from a foreign port to the port and city of Manila. The said accused H.N. Bull, on or about the 2nd day of December, 1908 did carry, transport, and bring into the port and city of Manila, aboard said vessel, from the port of Ampieng, Formosa, six hundred and seventy-seven (677) head of cattle and carabaos, without providing suitable means for securing said animals while in transit, so as to avoid cruelty and unnecessary suffering to the said animals. That by reason of the aforesaid neglect and failure of the accused to provide suitable means for securing said animals while so in transit, the noses of some of said animals were cruelly torn, and many of said animals were tossed about upon the decks and hold of said vessel, and cruelly wounded, bruised, and killed. It is contended that the information is insufficient because it does not state that the court was sitting at a port where the cattle were disembarked, or that the offense was committed on board a vessel registered and licensed under the laws of the Philippine Islands. ISSUES: Whether the court had jurisdiction over an offense of this character, committed on board a foreign ship by the master thereof, when the neglect and omission which constitutes the offense continued during the time the ship was within the territorial waters of the United States RULING: No court of the Philippine Islands had jurisdiction over an offense or crime committed on the high seas or within the territorial waters of any other country, but when she came within 3 miles of a line drawn from the headlands which embrace the entrance to Manila Bay, she was within territorial waters, and a new set of principles became applicable. The ship and her crew were then subject to the jurisdiction of the territorial sovereign subject to such limitations as have

been conceded by that sovereignty through the proper political agency. This offense was committed within territorial waters. The offense, assuming that it originated at the port of departure in Formosa, was a continuing one, and every element necessary to constitute it existed during the voyage across the territorial waters. The completed forbidden act was done within American waters, and the court therefore had jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the offense and the person of the offender. The defendant was found guilty, and sentenced to pay a fine of two hundred and fifty pesos, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. ROMEO P. GEROCHI vs. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (DOE) G.R. No. 159796 | July 17, 2007 Ponente: NACHURA, J.: (Non - delegation of Powers) FACTS: Petitioners Romeo P. Gerochi, Katulong Ng Bayan (KB), and Environmentalist Consumers Network, Inc. (ECN) (petitioners), come before this Court in this original action praying that Section 34 of Republic Act (RA) 9136, otherwise known as the Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA), imposing the Universal Charge, and Rule 18 of the Rules and Regulations (IRR) which seeks to implement the said imposition, be declared unconstitutional. Petitioners also pray that the Universal Charge imposed upon the consumers be refunded and that a preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order (TRO) be issued directing the respondents to refrain from implementing, charging, and collecting the said charge. Congress enacted the EPIRA on June 8, 2001; on June 26, 2001, it took effect. On April 5, 2002, respondent National Power Corporation-Strategic Power Utilities Group (NPC-SPUG) filed with respondent Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC) a petition for the availment from the Universal Charge of its share for Missionary Electrification. On May 7, 2002, NPC filed another petition with ERC, praying that the proposed share from the Universal Charge for the Environmental charge be approved for withdrawal from the Special Trust Fund (STF) managed by respondent Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Group (PSALM) for the rehabilitation and management of watershed areas. On December 20, 2002, the ERC issued an Order provisionally approving the computed amount as the share of the NPC-SPUG from the Universal Charge for Missionary Electrification and authorizing the National Transmission Corporation (TRANSCO) and Distribution Utilities to collect the same from its end-users on a monthly basis. On August 13, 2003, NPC-SPUG filed a Motion for Reconsideration asking the ERC, among others, to set aside the Decision. On April 2, 2003, ERC authorized the NPC to draw up to P70,000,000.00 from PSALM for its 2003 Watershed Rehabilitation Budget subject to the availability of funds for the Environmental Fund component of the Universal Charge. On the basis of the said ERC decisions, respondent Panay Electric Company, Inc. (PECO) charged petitioner Romeo P. Gerochi and all other end-users with the Universal Charge as reflected in their respective electric bills starting from the month of July 2003.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation of legislative power to tax on the part of the ERC. RULING: There is no undue delegation of legislative power to the ERC. The principle of separation of powers ordains that each of the three branches of government has exclusive cognizance of and is supreme in matters falling within its own constitutionally allocated sphere. A logical corollary to the doctrine of separation of powers is the principle of nondelegation of powers, as expressed in the Latin maxim potestas delegata non delegari potest (what has been delegated cannot be delegated). This is based on the ethical principle that such delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate through the instrumentality of his own judgment and not through the intervening mind of another. In the face of the increasing complexity of modern life, delegation of legislative power to various specialized administrative agencies is allowed as an exception to this principle. Given the volume and variety of interactions in today's society, it is doubtful if the legislature can promulgate laws that will deal adequately with and respond promptly to the minutiae of everyday life. Hence, the need to delegate to administrative bodies - the principal agencies tasked to execute laws in their specialized fields - the authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given statute and effectuate its policies. All that is required for the valid exercise of this power of subordinate legislation is that the regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the law and that the regulation be not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by the law. These requirements are denominated as the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. The second test mandates adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to determine the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. The Court finds that the EPIRA, read and appreciated in its entirety, in relation to Sec. 34 thereof, is complete in all its essential terms and conditions, and that it contains sufficient standards. 1st test - Although Sec. 34 of the EPIRA merely provides that within one (1) year from the effectivity thereof, a Universal Charge to be determined, fixed and approved by the ERC, shall be imposed on all electricity end-users, and therefore, does not state the specific amount to be paid as Universal Charge, the amount nevertheless is made certain by the legislative parameters provided in the law itself. Moreover, contrary to the petitioner’s contention, the ERC does not enjoy a wide latitude of discretion in the determination of the Universal Charge. Thus, the law is complete and passes the first test for valid delegation of legislative power.

2nd test - Provisions of the EPIRA such as, among others, to ensure the total electrification of the country and the quality, reliability, security and affordability of the supply of electric power and watershed rehabilitation and management meet the requirements for valid delegation, as they provide the limitations on the ERCs power to formulate the IRR. These are sufficient standards. From the foregoing disquisitions, we therefore hold that there is no undue delegation of legislative power to the ERC. Petitioners failed to pursue in their Memorandum the contention in the Complaint that the imposition of the Universal Charge on all end-users is oppressive and confiscatory, and amounts to taxation without representation. Hence, such contention is deemed waived or abandoned. Moreover, the determination of whether or not a tax is excessive, oppressive or confiscatory is an issue which essentially involves questions of fact, and thus, this Court is precluded from reviewing the same. Finally, every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution and not one that is doubtful, speculative, or argumentative. Indubitably, petitioners failed to overcome this presumption in favor of the EPIRA. We find no clear violation of the Constitution which would warrant a pronouncement that Sec. 34 of the EPIRA and Rule 18 of its IRR are unconstitutional and void. WHEREFORE, the instant case is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. PEOPLE vs. VERA G.R. No. L-45685 | NOVEMBER 16, 1937 PONENTE: J. LAUREL (Test of Validity of Delegation of Powers) FACTS: Mariano Cu Unjieng was convicted by the trial court in Manila. He filed for reconsideration and four motions for new trial but all were denied. He then elevated to the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court remanded the appeal to the lower court for a new trial. While awaiting new trial, he appealed for probation alleging that the he is innocent of the crime he was convicted of. The Judge of the Manila CFI directed the appeal to the Insular Probation Office. The IPO denied the application. However, Judge Vera upon another request by petitioner allowed the petition to be set for hearing. The City Prosecutor countered alleging that Vera has no power to place Cu Unjieng under probation because it is in violation of Sec. 11 Act No. 4221 which provides that the act of Legislature granting provincial boards the power to provide a system of probation to convicted person. Nowhere in the law is stated that the law is applicable to a city like Manila because it is only indicated therein that only provinces are covered. And even if Manila is covered

by the law it is unconstitutional because Sec 1 Art 3 of the Constitution provides equal protection of laws. The said law provides absolute discretion to provincial boards and this also constitutes undue delegation of power. Further, the said probation law may be an encroachment of the power of the executive to provide pardon because providing probation, in effect, is granting freedom, as in pardon. ISSUE: Whether or not Act No. 4221 constituted an undue delegation of legislative power RULING: The Court concludes that section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitutes an improper and unlawful delegation of legislative authority to the provincial boards and is, for this reason, unconstitutional and void. There is no set standard provided by Congress on how provincial boards must act in carrying out a system of probation. The provincial boards are given absolute discretion which is violative of the constitution and the doctrine of the non-delegation of power. Further, it is a violation of equity so protected by the constitution. The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows: This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those now provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the Probation Office. An act of the legislature is incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay down any rule or definite standard by which the administrative officer or board may be guided in the exercise of the discretionary powers delegated to it. The Probation Act does not, by the force of any of its provisions, fix and impose upon the provincial boards any standard or guide in the exercise of their discretionary power. What is granted, as mentioned by Justice Cardozo in the recent case of Schecter, supra, is a “roving commission” which enables the provincial boards to exercise arbitrary discretion. By section 11 of the Act, the legislature does not seemingly on its own authority extend the benefits of the Probation Act to the provinces but in reality, leaves the entire matter for the various provincial boards to determine. ARANETA vs. DINGLASAN G.R. No. L-2044 | AUGUST 26, 1949 PONENTE: J. TUASON FACTS: The petitions challenged the validity of executive orders issued by virtue of CA No. 671 or the Emergency Powers Act. CA 671 declared a state of emergency as a result of war and authorized the President to promulgate rules and regulations to meet such emergency. However, the Act did not fix the duration of its effectivity. EO 62 regulates rentals for houses and lots for residential buildings. The petitioner, Araneta, is under prosecution in the CFI for violation of the

provisions of this EO 62 and prays for the issuance of the writ of prohibition. EO 192, aims to control exports from the Philippines. Leon Ma. Guerrero seeks a writ of mandamus to compel the Administrator of the Sugar Quota Office and the Commissioner of Customs to permit the exportation of shoes. Both officials refuse to issue the required export license on the ground that the exportation of shoes from the Philippines is forbidden by this EO. EO 225, which appropriates funds for the operation of the Government during the period from July 1, 1949 to June 30, 1950, and for other purposes was assailed by petitioner Eulogio Rodriguez, Sr., as a tax-payer, elector, and president of the Nacionalista Party. He applied for a writ of prohibition to restrain the Treasurer of the Philippines from disbursing the funds by virtue of this EO. Finally, EO 226, which appropriated P6M to defray the expenses in connection with the national elections in 1949. was questioned by Antonio Barredo, as a citizen, tax-payer and voter. He asked the Court to prevent "the respondents from disbursing, spending or otherwise disposing of that amount or any part of it." ISSUE: Whether or not CA 671 ceased to have any force and effect RULING: Yes. The Act fixed a definite limited period. The Court held that it became inoperative when Congress met during the opening of the regular session on May 1946 and that EOs 62, 192, 225 and 226 were issued without authority of law. The session of the Congress is the point of expiration of the Act and not the first special session after it. Executive Orders No. 62 (dated June 21, 1947) regulating house and lot rentals, No. 192 (dated December 24, 1948) regulating exports, Nos. 225 and 226 (dated June 15,1949) the first appropriation funds for the operation of the Government from July 1, 1949 to June 30, 1950, and the second appropriating funds for election expenses in November 1949, were therefore declared null and void for having been issued after Act No. 671 had lapsed and/or after the Congress had enacted legislation on the same subjects. This is based on the language of Act 671 that the National Assembly restricted the life of the emergency powers of the President to the time the Legislature was prevented from holding sessions due to enemy action or other causes brought on by the war. RODRIGUEZ vs. GELLA G.R. No. L-6266 | FEBRUARY 2, 1953 PONENTE: C.J PARAS FACTS: EULOGIO RODRIGUEZ, SR., ETC., ET AL. sought to invalidate Executive Orders (EO) 545 and 546 issued on November 10, 1952. EO 545 appropriated the sum of P37,850,500 for urgent and

essential public works, while EO 546 set aside the sum of P11,367,600 for relief in the provinces and cities visited by typhoons, floods, droughts, earthquakes, volcanic action and other calamities. Section 26 of Article VI of the Constitution provides that "in times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may by law authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out a declared national policy." Accordingly the National Assembly passed Commonwealth Act No. 671, declaring (in section 1) the national policy that "the existence of war between the United States and other countries of Europe and Asia, which involves the Philippines makes it necessary to invest the President with extraordinary powers in order to meet the resulting emergency," and (in section 2) authorizing the President, "during the existence of the emergency, to promulgate such rules and regulations as he may deem necessary to carry out the national policy declared in section 1." House Bill No. 727 sought to repeal all Emergency Powers Acts but was vetoed by the President. HB 727 may at least be considered as a concurrent resolution of the Congress to formally declare the termination of the emergency powers. ISSUE: Whether or not the Executive Orders are still operative RULING: EOs 545 and 546 must be declared as having no legal anchorage. The Congress has since liberation repeatedly been approving acts appropriating funds for the operation of the Government, public works, and many others purposes, with the result that as to such legislative task the Congress must be deemed to have long decided to assume the corresponding power itself and to withdraw the same from the President. CA 671 was in pursuance of the constitutional provision, it has to be assumed that the National Assembly intended it to be only for a limited period. If it be contended that the Act has not yet been duly repealed, and such step is necessary to a cessation of the emergency powers delegated to the President, the result would be obvious unconstitutionality, since it may never be repealed by the Congress, or if the latter ever attempts to do so, the President may wield his veto. If the President had ceased to have powers with regards to general appropriations, none can remain in respect of special appropriations; otherwise he may accomplish indirectly what he cannot do directly. Besides, it is significant that Act No. 671 expressly limited the power of the President to that continuing "in force" appropriations which would lapse or otherwise become inoperative, so that, even assuming that the Act is still effective, it is doubtful whether the President can by executive orders make new appropriations.

The specific power "to continue in force laws and appropriations which would lapse or otherwise become inoperative" is a limitation on the general power "to exercise such other powers as he may deem necessary to enable the Government to fulfil its responsibilities and to maintain and enforce its authority." Indeed, to hold that although the Congress has, for about seven years since liberation, been normally functioning and legislating on every conceivable field, the President still has any residuary powers under the Act, would necessarily lead to confusion and overlapping, if not conflict. The framers of the Constitution, however, had the vision of and were careful in allowing delegation of legislative powers to the President for a limited period "in times of war or other national emergency." They had thus entrusted to the good judgment of the Congress the duty of coping with any national emergency by a more efficient procedure; but it alone must decide because emergency in itself cannot and should not create power. In our democracy the hope and survival of the nation lie in the wisdom and unselfish patriotism of all officials and in their faithful adherence to the Constitution.

MUNICIPALITY OF CARDONA V. BINANGONAN GR NO. L-10202 | MARCH 27, 1917 PONENTE: MORELAND, (Tests of validity of delegation of powers)

J

FACTS: The plaintiff, Municipality of Cardona insists that section 1 of the Act No. 1748 entitled “An Act Authorizing the Adjustment of Provincial and Municipal Boundaries and Authorizing the Change of Capitals of Provinces and Sub provinces, as May Be Necessary from Time to Time to Serve the Public Convenience and Interest,” is volatile of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902 as it delegates legislative powers to the Governor-General.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 1 of Act No. 1748 is in violation of the Act of Congress of July 1, 4902.

RULING: No. Section 1 of Act No. 1748 is not volatile of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902. The contention of the plaintiff is not well-founded. Section 1 of the said Act only confers upon the GovernorGeneral the power through executive order to enlarge, contract or otherwise change the boundary of any province, sub province, municipality, or township or other political division, or separate any such subdivision into such portions as may be required, to merge any of such

subdivision with another, to divide any province into one or more subdivisions as may be required, to name any new subdivision so created, to change the seat of government within any subdivision. The delegation of the power does not involve an abdication of legislative functions on the part of the legislature with regard to the particular subject-matter with which it authorizes the Governor-General to deal. It is simply a transference of certain details with respect to provinces, municipalities, and townships. There’s no provision which is in violation of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902. PANGASINAN TRANS. COL 70 Phil. 221 PONENTE: (Tests of validity of delegation of powers)

V. |

PUBLIC JUNE LAUREL,

SERVICE 26,

COMMISSION 1940 J

FACTS: The petitioner has been engaged for the past twenty years in the business of transporting passengers in the Provinces of Pangasinan, Tarmac, Nuevo Ecija and Zambales in accordance with the terms and conditions of the certificates of public convenience. Petitioner filed with the Public Service Commission an application to operate ten additional new Brockway trucks. Public Service Commission granted the application with two additional conditions which was made to apply also on their existing business. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration with the Public Service Commission. Since it was denied, petitioner filed a petition for a writ of certiorari praying that an order be issued directing the Secretary of the Public Service Commission to certify forthwith to the Court the records of all proceedings in case No, 56641. ISSUE: Whether the legislative power granted to Public Service Commission is unconstitutional and void because it is without limitation constitutes undue delegation of power. RULING: No. The legislative power granted to Public Service Commission is constitutional and valid. It is a proper delegation of legislative power, so-called Subordinate Legislation. All that has been delegated to the Commission is the administrative function, involving the use of discretion to carry out the will of the National Assembly having in view, the promotion of public interests in a proper and manner. The Certificate of Public Convenience is neither a franchise nor a contract, confers no property rights and is a mere license or privilege, subject to governmental control for the good of the public. Public Service Commission has the power to amend, modify, or revoked at any time any certificate issued, whenever the facts and circumstances so warranted. The limitation of 25 years was never heard, so the case was remanded to Public Service Commission for further proceedings. In addition, the Court ruled that the liberty and property of the citizens should be protected by the rudimentary requirements of fair play. Not only must the party be

given an opportunity to present his case and adduce evidence tending to establish the rights that he asserts but the tribunal must consider evidence presented. When private property is affected with public interest, it ceased to be juris private or for private use only.

CALALANG 70 Phil. 726 | PONENTE: (Tests of validity of delegation of powers)

V. DECEMBER LAUREL,

2,

WILLIAMS 1940 J

FACTS: The National Traffic Commission resolved to recommend to the Director of Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmariñas Street, from 7:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. and from 1:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m. and along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague Street from 7 a.m. to 11 p.m. from a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic. A.D. Williams, the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission, recommended to the Director of Public Works the adoption of the measure proposed in the resolution, in pursuance of the provisions of Commonwealth Act 548, which authorizes said Director of Public Works to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on national roads. On 2 August 1940, the Director of Public Works recommended to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications,the approval of the recommendation made by the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission, with the modification that the closing of Rizal Avenue to traffic to animal-drawn vehicles be limited to the portion thereof extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Azcarraga Street. The Secretary of Public Works and Communications approved the recommendation that Rosario Street and Rizal Avenue be closed to traffic of animal-drawn vehicles between the points and during the hours as indicated for 1 year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic. The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and caused to be enforced the rules and regulations thus adopted. Maximo Calalang, in his capacity as a private citizen and as a taxpayer of Manila, brought before the Supreme court the petition for a writ of prohibition against A. D. Williams, as Chairman of the National Traffic Commission; Vicente Fragante, as Director of Public Works; Sergio Bayan, as Acting Secretary of Public Works and Communications; Eulogio Rodriguez, as Mayor of the City of Manila; and Juan Dominguez, as Acting Chief of Police of Manila. ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation of legislative power?

RULING: No. There is no undue delegation of legislative power. Commonwealth Act 548 does not confer legislative powers to the Director of Public Works. The authority conferred upon them and under which they promulgated the rules and regulations now complained of is not to determine what public policy demands but merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down by the National Assembly in said Act, to wit, “to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the Philippines” and to close them temporarily to any or all classes of traffic “whenever the condition of the road or the traffic makes such action necessary or advisable in the public convenience and interest.” The delegated power, if at all, therefore, is not the determination of what the law shall be, but merely the ascertainment of the facts and circumstances upon which the application of said law is to be predicated. To promulgate rules and regulations on the use of national roads and to determine when and how long a national road should be closed to traffic, in view of the condition of the road or the traffic thereon and the requirements of public convenience and interest, is an administrative function which cannot be directly discharged by the National Assembly. It must depend on the discretion of some other government official to whom is confided the duty of determining whether the proper occasion exists for executing the law. But it cannot be said that the exercise of such discretion is the making of the law. CERVANTES V. AUDITOR GENERAL GR No. L4043 | May 26, 1952 PONENTE: REYES, J (Tests of validity of delegation of powers) FACTS: Cenon Cervantes, Manager of the National Abaca and Other Fibers Corporation (NAFCO) receiving P15,000 salary a year, assailed the decision of the Auditor General denying his claim for quarters allowance. By a resolution of the Board of Directors of NAFCO, Cervantes was granted quarters allowance of not exceeding P400 a month effective the first of August, 1949. The resolution was disapproved by the Control Committee of the Government Enterprises on strength of the recommendation of the NAFCO auditor, concurred in by the Auditor General, because of the following reasons: (1) that quarters allowance constituted additional compensation prohibited by the charter of the NAFCO, which fixes the salary of the general manager thereof at the sum not to exceed P15,000 a year, and (2) that the precarious financial condition of the corporation did not warrant the granting of such allowance.

The President promulgated Executive Order No. 93 creating the Government Enterprises Council creating the Control Committee of the Government Enterprises pursuant to Republic Act No. 51 approved by Congress authorizing the President of the Philippines, among other things, to effect such reforms and changes in government owned and controlled corporations for the purpose of promoting simplicity, economy and efficiency in their operation. ISSUE: Whether or not RA 51 is unconstitutional on the ground that it is an undue delegation of legislative power. RULING: No. The rule is that so long as the Legislature "lays down a policy and a standard is established by the statute" there is no undue delegation. (11 Am. Jur. 957). Republic Act No. 51 in authorizing the President of the Philippines, among others, to make reforms and changes in governmentcontrolled corporations, lays down a standard and policy that the purpose shall be to meet the exigencies attendant upon the establishment of the free and independent government of the Philippines and to promote simplicity, economy and efficiency in their operations. The standard was set and the policy fixed. The President had to carry the mandate. This he did by promulgating the executive order in question which, tested by the rule above cited, does not constitute an undue delegation of legislative power. PELAEZ vs. AUDITOR GENERAL 15 SCRA 569| December 24, 1965 PONENTE: CONCEPCION, J (Tests of validity of delegation of powers) FACTS: President Diosdado Macapagal, purporting to act pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, issued Executive Orders Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129; creating thirtythree (33) municipalities. petitioner Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President of the Philippines and as taxpayer, questioned the said EOs and petitioned the court to restrain the Auditor General and his representatives and agents, from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said executive orders and/or any disbursement by said municipalities. Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that said Section 68 has been impliedly repealed by Republic Act No. 2370 and constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. ISSUE: Whether or not the creation of the 33 municipalities is null and void on the ground that the President has no power to create municipalities.

RULING: Yes, the creation of the 33 municipalities is null and void as the power to create municipal corporations is solely legislative in nature. Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself — it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate — and (b) fix a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable — to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of every law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority. Hence, he could thereby arrogate upon himself the power, not only to make the law, but, also — and this is worse — to unmake it, by adopting measures inconsistent with the end sought to be attained by the Act of Congress, thus nullifying the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and balances, and, consequently, undermining the very foundation of our Republican system. Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet these well settled requirements for a valid delegation of the power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law. It does not enunciate any policy to be carried out or implemented by the President. Neither does it give a standard sufficiently precise to avoid the evil effects above referred to. WHEREFORE, the Executive Orders in question are hereby declared null and void ab initio and the respondent permanently restrained from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said Executive Orders or any disbursement by the municipalities above referred to. It is so ordered BENGZON, J.P., J., concurring and dissenting: The power to create a municipality is legislative in character. American authorities have therefore favored the view that it cannot be delegated; that what is delegable is not the power to create municipalities but only the power to determine the existence of facts under which creation of a municipality will result. The test is said to lie in whether the statute allows any discretion on the delegate as to whether the municipal corporation should be created. If so, there is an attempted delegation of legislative power and the statute is invalid. Now Section 68 no doubt gives the President such discretion, since it says that the President "may by executive order" exercise the

powers therein granted. Under the prevailing rule in the United States — and Section 68 is of American origin — the provision in question would be an invalid attempt to delegate purely legislative powers, contrary to the principle of separation of powers. VIGAN ELECTRIC LIGHT CO. V. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION GR. No. L-19850 | January 30, 1964 PONENTE: CONCEPCION, J (Tests of validity of delegation of powers) FACTS: This is an original action for certiorari to annul an order of respondent Public Service Commission ordering the reduction of rates of Vigan Electric Light Co. PSC averred that Vigan Electric making a net operating profit in excess of the allowable return of 12% on its invested capital, and that it is in the public interest and in consonance with Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3043 that reduction of its rates to the extent of its excess revenue be put into effect immediately. Vigan Electric contended that the reduction of rate is unconstitutional because it has been ordered without notice and hearing, thus issued without due process of law. In defense, PSC maintains that rate-fixing is a legislative function; that legislative or rule-making powers may constitutionally be exercised without previous notice of hearing; and that the decision in Ang Tibay vs. Court of Industrial Relations (69 Phil., 635) — in which we held that such notice and hearing are essential to the validity of a decision of the Public Service Commission — is not in point because, unlike the order complained of — which respondent claims to be legislative in nature — the Ang Tibay case referred to a proceeding involving the exercise of judicial functions. ISSUE: Whether or not the Congress validly delegated legislative power to the PSC? RULING: No. Congress has not delegated, and cannot delegate legislative powers to the Public Service Commission. Consistently with the principle of separation of powers, which underlies our constitutional system, legislative powers may not be delegated except to local governments, and only to matters purely of local concern. However, Congress may delegate to administrative agencies of the government the power to supply the details in the execution or enforcement of a policy laid down by it which is complete in itself. Such law is not deemed complete unless it lays down a standard or pattern sufficiently fixed or determinate, or, at least, determinable without requiring another legislation, to guide the administrative body concerned in the performance of its duty to implement or enforce said Policy. Otherwise, there would be no reasonable means to ascertain whether or not said body has acted within the scope of its authority, and, as a consequence, the power of legislation would eventually be exercised by a branch of the Government other than that in which it is lodged by the Constitution, in violation, not only of the

allocation of powers there in made, but, also, of the principle of separation of powers. Although the rule-making power and even the power to fix rates — when such rules and/or rates are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the Philippines — may partake of a legislative character, such is not the nature of the order complained of. Indeed, the same applies exclusively to petitioner herein. What is more, it is predicated upon the finding of fact — based upon a report submitted by the General Auditing Office — that petitioner is making a profit of more than 12% of its invested capital, which is denied by petitioner. Obviously, the latter is entitled to cross-examine the maker of said report, and to introduce evidence to disprove the contents thereof and/or explain or complement the same, as well as to refute the conclusion drawn therefrom by the respondent. In other words, in making said finding of fact, respondent performed a function partaking of a quasi-judicial character the valid exercise of which demands previous notice and hearing. WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is granted and the preliminary injunction issued by this Court hereby made permanent. It is so ordered. BIRAOGO V. PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION G.R. No. 192935 | DECEMBER 7, 2010 (Creation, establishment and abolition of administrative agencies) FACTS: During the administration of Senator Benigno Aquino III, the President signed Executive Order No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (PTC). The PTC is an ad hoc body tasked to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous administration, and thereafter to submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. Petitioners in this case argue, among others, that the creation of the PTC by the Executive branch violates the separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the Congress to create a public office and appropriate funds for its operation. Further, they contend that the provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President to structurally reorganize the Office of the President to achieve economy, simplicity and efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely new public office. Contrary, the Solicitor General contends that it does not arrogate the powers of Congress to create a public office because the Presidents executive power and power of control necessarily include the inherent power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully executed and that, in any event, the Constitution, Revised Administrative Code of 1987 (E.O. No. 292),[Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1416 (as amended by P.D. No. 1772), R.A. No. 9970, and

settled jurisprudence that authorize the President to create or form such bodies. ISSUE: Whether or not the creation of the PTC is within the power of the President RULING: The Supreme Court ruled that the President has the power to create the PTC under Article Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution, imposing upon the President the duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. Section 17 reads: Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. (Emphasis supplied). The Presidents power to conduct investigations to aid him in ensuring the faithful execution of laws in this case, fundamental laws on public accountability and transparency is inherent in the President’s powers as the Chief Executive. That the authority of the President to conduct investigations and to create bodies to execute this power is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution or in statutes does not mean that he is bereft of such authority. According to the Supreme Court, the Constitution granted full control of the Executive Department the obligation to ensure that all executive officials and employees faithfully comply with the law. It includes allowing creation of ad hoc investigating bodies to allow an inquiry into matters which the President is entitled to know so that he can be properly advised and guided in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land. LACSON-MAGALLANES CO., INC. vs. JOSE PAÑO, HON. JUAN PAJO 21 SCRA 895 | November 17, 1967 PONENTE: SANCHEZ, J (Creation, establishment and abolition of administrative agencies) FACTS: Jose Paño was an occupant of a public land which was subsequently declared as an agricultural land. Jose Paño then applied for the purchase of an area of the agricultural land. On the other hand, the Lacson-Magallanes Co. (Magallanes) also filed its own sales application of the entire area. To settle the conflict, the Director of Lands gave due course to the application of Magallanes and dismissed the claim of Jose Paño which was also affirmed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.

Contrary, on appeal, the Office of the President, through the Executive Secretary, issued a decision granting the land to Jose Paño and other landless farmer claimants giving consideration to public interest. Magallanes contends that the decision of the Executive Secretary is contrary to law and has no legal effect and that the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture should be sustained. ISSUE: Whether or not the Executive Secretary has the power to decide on the case RULING: The Supreme Court ruled that the Executive Secretary’s decision is not contrary to law and has legal effect. According to the Supreme Court, the President has control of all executive departments and has the power to appoint department secretaries. Naturally, he controls and directs their acts. As such, the President is allowed to rule on the correctness of a decision of department secretary. The Supreme Court also stated that the right to appeal to the President reposes upon the President's power of control over the executive departments. Failure to pursue or resort to this last remedy of appeal may cause fatal defect, warranting dismissal of the case, for nonexhaustion of all administrative remedies. Furthermore, the Supreme Court ruled that under our constitutional setup, the Executive Secretary who acts for and in behalf and by authority of the President has an undisputed jurisdiction to affirm, modify, or even reverse any order" that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, including the Director of Lands, may issue. SIERRA MADRE TRUST vs. HONORABLE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES, DIRECTOR OF MINES, JUSAN TRUST MINING COMPANY, and J & S PARTNERSHIP G.R. Nos. L-32370 & 32767 April 20, 1983 FACTS: Sierra Madre Trust (SMT) filed two adverse claims over 12 separate lode mineral claims with the Bureau of Mines. On July 26, 1962, the SMTfiled with the Bureau of Mines an Adverse Claim against LLA No. V-7872 of the Jusan Trust Mining Company over six (6) lode mineral claims, all situated in Sitio Maghanay, Barrio Abaca Municipality of Dupax, Province of Nueva Vizcaya. The adverse claim prayed that the claims of respondent Jusan Trust Mining Company (JTMC) be denied and declared null, void, and illegal as the said lode minerals claims covered by LLA No. V7872 (Amd) encroached and overlapped the eleven (11) lode mineral claims of SMT. SMT also filed an adverse claim against J and S Partnership (JSP) over another six (6) lode mineral situated

in Sitio Gatid, Barrio of Abaca Municipality of Dupax, Province of Nueva Vizcaya on July 26, 1966, claiming that they encroached and overlapped the thirteen (13) lode mineral claims of SMT. These two (2) adverse claims were jointly heard in the Bureau of Mines, and also jointly considered in the appeal in the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources. The Director of Mines and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources dismissed the claims. They said that there exists no conflict or overlapping between the SMT's and JTMC's and JSP’s mining claims. ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of administrative bodies, the Bureau of Mines and Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources, must be overturned? HELD: No. The officers of the Executive Department tasked with administering the Mining Law have found that there is neither encroachment nor overlapping in respect of the claims involved. Accordingly, whatever may be the answers to the questions will not materially serve the interests of the petitioner. In closing it is useful to remind litigation prone individuals that the interpretation by officers of laws which are entrusted to their administration is entitled to great respect.' In his decision, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources said: "This Office is in conformity with the findings of the Director of Mines that the mining claims of the appellees were validly located, surveyed and registered. ANTIPOLO REALTY CORPORATION vs. THE NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, HON. G.V. TOBIAS, in his capacity as General Manager of the National Housing Authority, THE HON. JACOBO C. CLAVE, in his capacity as Presidential Executive Assistant and VIRGILIO A. YUSON G.R. No. L-50444 August 31, 1987 FACTS: Jose Hernando acquired prospective and beneficial ownership over Lot. No. 15, Block IV of the Ponderosa Heights Subdivision in Antipolo, Rizal, from the petitioner Antipolo Realty Corporation under a Contract to Sell. On 28 August 1974, Hernando transferred his rights over the said lot to private respondent Virgilio Yuson, embodied in a Deed of Assignment and Substitution of Obligor. However, for failure of Antipolo Realty to develop the subdivision project in accordance with its undertaking under Clause 17 of the Contract to Sell (subdivision beautification), Mr. Yuson paid only the arrearages pertaining to the period up to, and including, the month of August 1972 and stopped all monthly installment payments falling due thereafter. On 14 October 1976, the president of Antipolo Realty sent a notice to private respondent Yuson advising that the required improvements in the subdivision had already been completed, and requesting resumption of payment of the monthly installments on Lot No. 15. For his part, Mr. Yuson replied that he would conform with the request as soon as he was able to verify the truth of the representation in the notice. In a second letter dated 27 November 1976, Antipolo Realty reiterated its request, citing the decision rendered by the National Housing Authority (NHA) on 25 October 1976 in Case No. 252 (entitled "Jose B. Viado Jr., complainant vs. Conrado S. Reyes,

respondent") declaring Antipolo Realty to have "substantially complied with its commitment to the lot buyers pursuant to the Contract to Sell. A formal demand was made for full and immediate payment of the amount of P16,994.73, representing installments which, Antipolo Realty alleged, had accrued during the period while the improvements were being completed — i.e., between September 1972 and October 1976. Yuson refused to pay the September 1972-October 1976 monthly installments but agreed to pay the post October 1976 installments. Antipolo Realty responded by rescinding the Contract to Sell, and claiming the forfeiture of all installment payments previously made by Mr. Yuson. Yuson brought his dispute with Antipolo Realty before NHA. Antipolo Realty filed a motion to dismiss, which NHA denied. After hearing, the NHA rendered a decision on 9 March 1978 ordering the reinstatement of the Contract to Sell. A motion for reconsideration of Antipolo Realty was also denied. ISSUE: Whether or not in hearing the complaint of Yuson and in ordering the reinstatement of the Contract to Sell between the parties NHA assumed the performance of judicial or quasijudicial functions which it was not authorized to perform. HELD: No. It is by now commonplace learning that many administrative agencies exercise and perform adjudicatory powers and functions, though to a limited extent only. Limited delegation of judicial or quasi-judicial authority to administrative agencies (e.g., the Securities and Exchange Commission and the National Labor Relations Commission) is well recognized in our jurisdiction, basically because the need for special competence and experience has been recognized as essential in the resolution of questions of complex or specialized character and because of a companion recognition that the dockets of our regular courts have remained crowded and clogged. The Court held that under the law creating NHA it is empowered to regulate the real estate trade and business involving … specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lots or condominium units against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman… The Court held that under the "sense-making and expeditious doctrine of primary jurisdiction . . . the courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience, and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the purposes of the regulatory statute administered." THE CITY OF BAGUIO, MAURICIO DOMOGAN, and ORLANDO GENOVE vs. FRANCISCO NIÑO, JOSEFINA NIÑO, EMMANUEL NIÑO, and EURLIE OCAMPO G.R. No. 161811 April 12, 2006

FACTS: The Bureau of Lands awarded on May 13, 1966 to Narcisa A. Placino a parcel of land identified as Lot No. 10 (the lot) located at Saint Anthony Road, Dominican-Mirador Barangay, Baguio City. Francisco Niño, who has been occupying the lot, contested the award by filing a Petition Protest on December 23, 1975 before the Bureau of Lands. The Director of Lands dismissed the Petition Protest by Order of November 11, 1976. Niño appealed the dismissal all the way to the Supreme Court but he did not succeed. The decision of the Director of Lands having become final and executory, the then-Executive Director of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources-Cordillera Autonomous Region (DENR-CAR), on petition of Narcisa, issued an Order of Execution directing the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) Officer to enforce the decision "by ordering Petitioner Niño and those acting in his behalf to refrain from continuously occupying the area and remove whatever improvements they may have introduced thereto." Attempts to enforce the Order of Execution failed, prompting Narcisa to file a complaint for ejectment before the Baguio City Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC). Narcisa’s counsel, Atty. Edilberto Claravall, later petitioned the DENR-CAR for the issuance of a Special Order authorizing the City Sheriff of Baguio, the City Police Station, and the Demolition Team of the City Government to demolish or remove the improvements on the lot introduced by Niño. The DENR-CAR denied the petition, citing lack of jurisdiction over the City Sheriff of Baguio, the City Police Station, and the Demolition Team of the City Government but on July 16, 1997, the Demolition Team of Baguio City headed by Engineer Orlando Genove and the Baguio City Police, on orders of then Baguio City Police Officer-In-Charge (OIC) Donato Bacquian, started demolishing the houses of Niño and his herein co-respondents. Niño and his wife Josefina Niño thereupon filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City. The RTC denied the petition. However the Court of Appeals granted the petition on appeal. Mayor Mauricio Domogan thru the Demolition Team and City Engineer’s Office are ordered to cease and desist from enforcing the amended order of execution issued by Oscar N. Hamada, Regional Executive Director of the Department of Environmental and Natural Resources, concerning the demolition or removal of the structures made by petitioners until private respondent applied for a special order abovementioned with the proper court. ISSUE: Whether or not the enforcement of the Amended Order of Execution needs a hearing and court order which Sec. 10(d) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court requires despite the fact that an the administrative agency which is clothed with quasi-judicial functions issued the Amended Order of Execution. HELD: Yes. In general, the quantum of judicial or quasi-judicial powers which an administrative agency may exercise is defined in the enabling act of such agency. In other words, the extent to which an administrative entity may exercise such powers depends largely, if not wholly, on the provisions of the statute creating or empowering such agency. There is, however, no explicit provision granting the Bureau of Lands (now the Land Management Bureau) or the DENR (which exercises control over the Land Management Bureau) the authority to issue an order of

demolition — which the Amended Order of Execution, in substance, is. While the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands is confined to the determination of the respective rights of rival claimants to public lands or to cases which involve the disposition of public lands, the power to determine who has the actual, physical possession or occupation or the better right of possession over public lands remains with the courts. DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, represented by SECRETARY JOSE MARI B. PONCE (OIC), vs. DELIA T. SUTTON, ELLA T. SUTTON-SOLIMAN and HARRY T. SUTTON G.R. No. 162070 October 19, 2005 FACTS: The case at bar involves a land in Aroroy, Masbate, inherited by respondents which has been devoted exclusively to cow and calf breeding. On October 26, 1987, pursuant to the then existing agrarian reform program of the government, respondents made a voluntary offer to sell (VOS) their landholdings to petitioner DAR to avail of certain incentives under the law. A new agrarian law, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, also known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988, took effect. It included in its coverage farms used for raising livestock, poultry and swine. However, the Supreme Court in an en banc decision in the case of Luz Farms v. Secretary of DAR, ruled that lands devoted to livestock and poultry-raising are not included in the definition of agricultural land. In view of the Luz Farms ruling, respondents filed with petitioner DAR a formal request to withdraw their VOS as their landholding was devoted exclusively to cattle-raising and thus exempted from the coverage of the CARL. Instead of granting the request, DAR issued A.O. No. 9, series of 1993, which provided that only portions of private agricultural lands used for the raising of livestock, poultry and swine as of June 15, 1988 shall be excluded from the coverage of the CARL. In determining the area of land to be excluded, the A.O. fixed the following retention limits, viz: 1:1 animal-land ratio (i.e., 1 hectare of land per 1 head of animal shall be retained by the landowner), and a ratio of 1.7815 hectares for livestock infrastructure for every 21 heads of cattle shall likewise be excluded from the operations of the CARL. Invoking its rule-making power under Section 49 of the CARL, petitioner submits that it issued DAR A.O. No. 9 to limit the area of livestock farm that may be retained by a landowner pursuant to its mandate to place all public and private agricultural lands under the coverage of agrarian reform. Petitioner also contends that the A.O. seeks to remedy reports that some unscrupulous landowners have converted their agricultural farms to livestock farms in order to evade their coverage in the agrarian reform program. DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao issued an Order7 partially granting the application of respondents for exemption from the coverage of CARL. Applying the retention limits outlined in the DAR A.O. No. 9, petitioner exempted 1,209 hectares of respondents’ land for grazing purposes, and a maximum of 102.5635 hectares for infrastructure. Petitioner ordered the rest of respondents’ landholding to be segregated and placed under Compulsory Acquisition. Sutton’s

move for reconsideration was denied. The Office of the President also denied the request. However, the Court of Appeals declared the AO No. 9 unconstitutional. ISSUE: Whether or not DAR has exceeded its power in issuing the assailed A.O. regulating livestock farms which have been exempted by the Constitution from the coverage of agrarian reform. HELD: Yes. The A.O. sought to regulate livestock farms by including them in the coverage of agrarian reform and prescribing a maximum retention limit for their ownership. However, the deliberations of the 1987 Constitutional Commission show a clear intent to exclude, inter alia, all lands exclusively devoted to livestock, swine and poultry- raising. The Court clarified in the Luz Farms case that livestock, swine and poultry-raising are industrial activities and do not fall within the definition of "agriculture" or "agricultural activity." The fundamental rule in administrative law is that, to be valid, administrative rules and regulations must be issued by authority of a law and must not contravene the provisions of the Constitution. The rule-making power of an administrative agency may not be used to abridge the authority given to it by Congress or by the Constitution. Nor can it be used to enlarge the power of the administrative agency beyond the scope intended. Constitutional and statutory provisions control with respect to what rules and regulations may be promulgated by administrative agencies and the scope of their regulations. Administrative agencies are endowed with powers legislative in nature, i.e., the power to make rules and regulations. They have been granted by Congress with the authority to issue rules to regulate the implementation of a law entrusted to them. Delegated rule-making has become a practical necessity in modern governance due to the increasing complexity and variety of public functions. However, while administrative rules and regulations have the force and effect of law, they are not immune from judicial review. They may be properly challenged before the courts to ensure that they do not violate the Constitution and no grave abuse of administrative discretion is committed by the administrative body concerned. JESUS CABARRUS, JR. vs. JOSE ANTONIO S. BERNAS A.C. No. 4634 September 24, 1997 FACTS: On August 30, 1996, Mr. Jesus Cabarrus, Jr. filed an administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty. Jose Antonio Bernas for alleged violations of Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code and Code of Professional Responsibility. Cabarrus alleged that Bernas and his client Ramon B. Pascual, Jr. caused the preparation and filing of a criminal complaint for falsification of a public document on April 11, 1996, (three days before the filing of the aforecited Civil Case) at the AOED of the National Bureau of Investigation in violation of the ‘non-forum shopping’ rule by the Supreme Court. The gravaman of the affidavit complaint of the respondent is forgery, the same legal issue in Civil Case No. 65646. Cabarrus contended that Atty. Bernas should be disbarred for having instigated, abetted and facilitated the perversion and subversion of truth in

the said verification and certification of non-forum shopping. Contrary to Canon 1, Rule 1.01, 1.02, Canon 3, 3.01, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers. In his Comment, Bernas averred that he has not committed forum shopping because the criminal action is not an action that involves the same issue as those in a civil action and both suits can exist without constituting forum shopping so long as the civil aspect has not been prosecuted in the criminal case. He emphasized that forum shopping only exists when identical reliefs are issued by the same parties in multiple fora. ISSUE: Whether or not the filing a complaint before the National Bureau of Investigations when another action has already been filed in another court constitutes forum shopping as it is one of the courts, tribunals and agencies referred to under Circular No. 28-91, Revised Circular No. 2891 and Administrative Circular No. 04-94. HELD: No. The courts, tribunals and agencies referred to under Circular No. 28-91, Revised Circular No. 28-91 and Administrative Circular No. 04-94 are those vested with judicial powers or quasi-judicial powers and those who not only hear and determine controversies between adverse parties, but to make binding orders or judgments. As succinctly put it by R.A. 157, the NBI is not performing judicial or quasi-judicial functions. The NBI cannot therefore be among those forums contemplated by the Circular that can entertain an action or proceeding, or even grant any relief, declaratory or otherwise. The functions of the National Bureau of Investigations are merely investigatory and informational in nature. It has no judicial or quasi-judicial powers and is incapable of granting any relief to a party. It cannot even determine probable cause. It is an investigative agency whose findings are merely recommendatory. It undertakes investigation of crimes upon its own initiative and as public welfare may require. It renders assistance when requested in the investigation or detection of crimes which precisely what Atty. Bernas sought in order to prosecute those persons responsible for defrauding his client. GMA NETWORK, INC. vs. MOVIE AND TELEVISION REVIEW AND CLASSIFICATION BOARD G.R. No. 148579 February 5, 2007 FACTS: GMA Network, Inc. operates and manages the UHF television station, EMC Channel 27. On January 7, 2000, MTRCB issued an order of suspension against the network for airing "Muro Ami: The Making" without first securing a permit from it as provided in Section 7 of PD 1986. The penalty of suspension was based on Memorandum Circular 98-17 dated December 15, 1998 which provided for the penalties for exhibiting a program without a valid permit from the MTRCB. GMA moved for reconsideration of the suspension order and, at the same time, informed MTRCB that Channel 27 had complied with the suspension order by going off the air since midnight of January 11, 2000. It also filed a letter-protest which was merely "noted" by the MTRCB thereby, in effect, denying both the motion for reconsideration and letter-protest. GMA then filed with

the CA a petition for certiorari which was dismissed. The January 7, 2000 suspension order issued by MTRCB was affirmed in toto. ISSUE: Whether Memorandum Circular No. 98-17 was enforceable and binding on GMA. HELD: No. While MTRCB had jurisdiction over the subject program, Memorandum Circular 98-17, which was the basis of the suspension order, was not binding on petitioner. The Administrative Code of 1987, particularly Section 3 thereof, expressly requires each agency to file with the Office of the National Administrative Register (ONAR) of the University of the Philippines Law Center three certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Administrative issuances which are not published or filed with the ONAR are ineffective and may not be enforced. Memorandum Circular No. 98-17, which provides for the penalties for the first, second and third offenses for exhibiting programs without valid permit to exhibit, has not been registered with the ONAR as of January 27, 2000. Hence, the same is yet to be effective. It is thus unenforceable since it has not been filed in the ONAR. Consequently, petitioner was not bound by said circular and should not have been meted the sanction provided thereunder. Note: The Supreme Court held that "Muro Ami: The Making" is not exempted from the MTRCB’s power of review. The only exemptions are (1) television programs imprinted or exhibited by the Philippine Government and/or departments and agencies, and (2) newsreels. (The Second TAÑADA vs. TUVERA CASE) LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI) vs. HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President, MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, ETC., ET AL. G.R. No. L-63915 December 29, 1986 FACTS: This case is a move for reconsideration/clarification of the first Tanada vs. Tuvera case. Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding the disclosure of a number of presidential decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by law. The government argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was "otherwise provided," as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval. In the decision of this case on April 24, 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity for the publication of some of these decrees, declaring in the dispositive portion as follows: WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect. The subject of the contention is Article 2 of the Civil Code providing as follows: ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication.

ISSUES: a.) Whether or not the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without its previous publication. b.) Whether or not the publication requirement covers all laws, including presidential decrees, executive orders, administrative rules and regulations. HELD: a.) No. The clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteenday period shall be shortened or extended. An example, as pointed out by the present Chief Justice in his separate concurrence in the original decision,is the Civil Code which did not become effective after fifteen days from its publication in the Official Gazette but "one year after such publication." The general rule did not apply because it was "otherwise provided." b.) Yes. The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. Covered by this rule are: 1. Presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. 2. Administrative rules and regulations if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation. 3. Charter of a city notwithstanding that it applies to only a portion of the national territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place. 4. All presidential decrees must be published, including even, say, those naming a public place after a favored individual or exempting him from certain prohibitions or requirements. 5. The circulars issued by the Monetary Board must be published if they are meant not merely to interpret but to "fill in the details" of the Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to enforce. Not covered are: 1. Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. 2. The so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.

3. Instructions issued by, say, the Minister of Social Welfare on the case studies to be made in petitions for adoption or the rules laid down by the head of a government agency on the assignments or workload of his personnel or the wearing of office uniforms. People vs Que Po Lay G.R. No. L-6791, March 29, 1954 Justice Montemayor FACTS: Defendant-appellant Que Po Lay was in possession of foreign exchange consisting of U.S. dollars, U.S. checks and U.S. money orders amounting to about $7,000. He failed to sell the same to the Central Bank through its agents within one day following the receipt of such foreign exchange as required by Circular No. 20. The appeal is based on the claim that said circular No. 20 was not published in the Official Gazette prior to the act or omission imputed to the appellant, and that consequently, said circular had no force and effect. Defendant-appellant contended that Commonwealth Act. No., 638 and Act 2930 both require said circular to be published in the Official Gazette, it being an order or notice of general applicability. The Solicitor General answering this contention says that Commonwealth Act. No. 638 and 2930 do not require the publication in the Official Gazette of said circular issued for the implementation of a law in order to have force and effect. ISSUE: whether the circular should be published first to have the force and effect of law. HELD: Yes. Section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that statutes passed by Congress shall, in the absence of special provision, take effect at the beginning of the fifteenth day after the completion of the publication of the statute in the Official Gazette. Article 2 of the new Civil Code (Republic Act No. 386) equally provides that laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. It is true that Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank is not a statute or law but being issued for the implementation of the law authorizing its issuance, it has the force and effect of law according to settled jurisprudence. Moreover, as a rule, circulars and regulations especially like the Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank in question which prescribes a penalty for its violation should be published before becoming effective, this, on the general principle and theory that before the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the people officially and specifically informed of said contents and its penalties. In the present case, although circular No. 20 of the Central Bank was issued in the year 1949, it was not published until November 1951, that is, about 3 months after appellant's conviction of

its violation. It is clear that said circular, particularly its penal provision, did not have any legal effect and bound no one until its publication in the Official Gazzette or after November 1951. People v. MACEREN G.R. No. L-32166 October 18, 1977 FACTS: This is a case involving the validity of a 1967 regulation, penalizing electro fishing in fresh water fisheries, promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries under the old Fisheries Law and the law creating the Fisheries Commission. Jose Buenaventura, Godofredo Reyes, Benjamin Reyes, Nazario Aquino and Carlito del Rosario were charged by a Constabulary investigator in the municipal court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna with having violated Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1. The lower court held that electro fishing cannot be penalize because electric current is not an obnoxious or poisonous substance as contemplated in section I I of the Fisheries Law and that it is not a substance at all but a form of energy conducted or transmitted by substances. The lower court further held that, since the law does not clearly prohibit electro fishing, the executive and judicial departments cannot consider it unlawful. As legal background, it should be stated that section 11 of the Fisheries Law prohibits "the use of any obnoxious or poisonous substance" in fishing. Section 76 of the same law punishes any person who uses an obnoxious or poisonous substance in fishing with a fine of not more than five hundred pesos nor more than five thousand, and by imprisonment for not less than six months nor more than five years. It is noteworthy that the Fisheries Law does not expressly punish .electro fishing." The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, upon the recommendation of the Fisheries Commission, issued Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1, amending section 2 of Administrative Order No. 84, by restricting the ban against electro fishing to fresh water fisheries (63 O.G. 9963). Thus, the phrase "in any portion of the Philippine waters" found in section 2, was changed by the amendatory order to read as follows: "in fresh water fisheries in the Philippines, such as rivers, lakes, swamps, dams, irrigation canals and other bodies of fresh water." ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE EXCEEDED ITS AUTHORITY IN ISSUING ADMINISTARTIVE ORDERS.

HELD: The Court is of the opinion that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries exceeded their authority in issuing Fisheries Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1 and that those orders are not warranted under the Fisheries Commission, Republic Act No. 3512. The reason is that the Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit electro fishing. As electro fishing is not banned under that law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries are powerless to penalize it. In other words, Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1, in penalizing electro fishing, are devoid of any legal basis. Had the lawmaking body intended to punish electro fishing, a penal provision to that effect could have been easily embodied in the old Fisheries Law. That law punishes (1) the use of obnoxious or poisonous substance, or explosive in fishing; (2) unlawful fishing in deepsea fisheries; (3) unlawful taking of marine molusca, (4) illegal taking of sponges; (5) failure of licensed fishermen to report the kind and quantity of fish caught, and (6) other violations. Nowhere in that law is electro fishing specifically punished. Administrative Order No. 84, in punishing electro fishing, does not contemplate that such an offense fails within the category of "other violations" because, as already shown, the penalty for electro fishing is the penalty next lower to the penalty for fishing with the use of obnoxious or poisonous substances, fixed in section 76, and is not the same as the penalty for "other violations" of the law and regulations fixed in section 83 of the Fisheries Law. The lawmaking body cannot delegate to an executive official the power to declare what acts should constitute an offense. It can authorize the issuance of regulations and the imposition of the penalty provided for in the law itself. (People vs. Exconde 101 Phil. 11 25, citing 11 Am. Jur. 965 on p. 11 32). However, at present, there is no more doubt that electro fishing is punishable under the Fisheries Law and that it cannot be penalized merely by executive revolution because Presidential Decree No. 704, which is a revision and consolidation of all laws and decrees affecting fishing and fisheries and which was promulgated on May 16, 1975 (71 O.G. 4269), expressly punishes electro fishing in fresh water and salt water areas. n examination of the rule-making power of executive officials and administrative agencies and, in particular, of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (now Secretary of Natural Resources) under the Fisheries Law sustains the view that he ex his authority in penalizing electro fishing by means of an administrative order.

Administrative agent are clothed with rule-making powers because the lawmaking body finds it impracticable, if not impossible, to anticipate and provide for the multifarious and complex situations that may be encountered in enforcing the law. All that is required is that the regulation should be germane to the defects and purposes of the law and that it should conform to the standards that the law prescribes (People vs. Exconde 101 Phil. 1125; Director of Forestry vs. Muñ;oz, L-24796, June 28, 1968, 23 SCRA 1183, 1198; Geukeko vs. Araneta, 102 Phil. 706, 712). The lawmaking body cannot possibly provide for all the details in the enforcement of a particular statute (U.S. vs. Tupasi Molina, 29 Phil. 119, 125, citing U.S. vs. Grimaud 220 U.S. 506; Interprovincial Autobus Co., Inc. vs. Coll. of Internal Revenue, 98 Phil. 290, 295-6). The grant of the rule-making power to administrative agencies is a relaxation of the principle of separation of powers and is an exception to the nondeleption of legislative, powers. Administrative regulations or "subordinate legislation calculated to promote the public interest are necessary because of "the growing complexity of modem life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulations, and the increased difficulty of administering the law" Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726; People vs. Rosenthal and Osmeñ;a, 68 Phil. 328). Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. By such regulations, of course, the law itself cannot be extended. (U.S. vs. Tupasi Molina, supra). An administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress (Santos vs. Estenzo, 109 Phil. 419, 422; Teoxon vs. Members of the d of Administrators, L-25619, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 585; Manuel vs. General Auditing Office, L-28952, December 29, 1971, 42 SCRA 660; Deluao vs. Casteel, L-21906, August 29, 1969, 29 SCRA 350). The rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into effect the law as it his been enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending or expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned. (University of Santo Tomas vs. Board of Tax A 93 Phil. 376, 382, citing 12 C.J. 845-46. As to invalid regulations, see of Internal Revenue vs. Villaflor 69 Phil. 319, Wise & Co. vs. Meer, 78 Phil. 655, 676; Del March vs. Phil. Veterans Administrative, L-27299, June 27, 1973, 51 SCRA 340, 349). BILL MILLER vs. ATANACIO MARDO and MANUEL GONZALES G.R. No. L-15138 July 31, 1961 FACTS: These appeals present one identical question of law, namely, the validity of Reorganization Plan No. 20-A, prepared and submitted by the Government Survey and

Reorganization Commission under the authority of Republic Act No. 997, as amended by Republic Act No. 1241, insofar as it confers jurisdiction to the Regional Offices of the Department of Labor created in said Plan to decide claims of laborers for wages, overtime and separation pay, etc. In G.R. No. L-15138, Manuel Gonzales filed with Regional Office No. 3 of the Department of Labor, in Manila, a complaint against Bill Miller (owner and manager of Miller Motors) claiming to be a driver of Miller from December 1, 1956 to October 31, 1957, on which latter date he was allegedly arbitrarily dismissed, without being paid separation pay. He prayed for judgment for the amount due him as separation pay plus damages. Upon receipt of said complaint, Chief Hearing Officer Atanacio Mardo of Regional Office No. 3 of the Department of Labor required Miller to file an answer. In G.R. No. L-16781, Cresencio Estano filed with Regional Office No. 3 of the Department of Labor, a complaint (RO 3 Ls. Case No. 874) against Chin Hua Trading Co. and/or Lao Kang Suy and Ke Bon Chiong, as Manager and Assistant Manager thereof, respectively, claiming to have been their driver from June 17, 1947 to June 4, 1955, for which service he was not paid overtime pay (for work in excess of 8 hours and for Sundays and legal holidays) and vacation leave pay. He prayed for judgment for the amount due him, plus attorney's fees. In G.R. No. L-15377, appellant Numerian a Raganas filed with the Court of First Instance of Cebu a complaint (Civil Case No. R-5535) against appellees Sen Bee Trading Company, Macario Tan and Sergio Tan, claiming that she was employed by appellees as a seamstress from June 5, 1952 to January 11, 1958, for which service she was underpaid and was not given overtime, as well as vacation and sick leave pay. She prayed for judgment on the amount due her for the same plus damages. In G.R. No. L-16660, Vicente B. Romero filed with Regional Officer No. 2 of the Department of Labor a complaint (Wage Case No. 196-W) against Sia Seng, for recovery of alleged unpaid wages, overtime and separation pay. Sia Seng, filed an answer. In G.R. No. L-17056, Mariano Pabillare instituted in Regional Office No. 3 of the Department of Labor a complaint (IS2168) against petitioner Fred Wilson & Co., Inc., alleging that petitioner engaged his services as Chief Mechanic, Air conditioning Department, from October 1947 to February 19, 1959, when he was summarily dismissed without cause and without sufficient notice and separation pay. The petitioners questioned the authority of the regional offices to take cognizance of the subject matter involved in their cases as provided for by paragraph 25 of Article VI of Reorganization Plan No. 20-A, which provided that: 25. Each regional office shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases falling under the Workmen's Compensation law, and cases affecting all money claims arising from violations of labor standards on working conditions including but not restrictive to: unpaid wages, underpayment, overtime, separation pay and maternity leave of employees and laborers; and unpaid wages, overtime, separation pay, vacation pay and payment for medical services of domestic help. ISSUE: Whether or not the jurisdiction to take cognizance of cases affecting money claims such as those sought to be enforced in these proceedings, is a new conferment of power to the Department of Labor not theretofore exercised by it.

HELD: It is true that in Republic Act No. 1241, amending Section 4 of Republic Act 997, which created the Government Survey and Reorganization Commission, the latter was empowered — (2) To abolish departments, offices, agencies, or functions which may not be necessary, or create those which way be necessary for the efficient conduct of the government service, activities, and functions. (Emphasis supplied.) But these "functions" which could thus be created, obviously refer merely to administrative, not judicial functions. For the Government Survey and Reorganization Commission was created to carry out the reorganization of the Executive Branch of the National Government (See Section 3 of R.A. No. 997, as amended by R.A. No. 1241), which plainly did not include the creation of courts. And the Constitution expressly provides that "the Judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as may be established by law.(Sec. 1, Art. VII of the Constitution). Thus, judicial power rests exclusively in the judiciary. It may be conceded that the legislature may confer on administrative boards or bodies quasi-judicial powers involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, as incident to the performance of administrative functions. But in so doing, the legislature must state its intention in express terms that would leave no doubt, as even such quasi- judicial prerogatives must be limited, if they are to be valid, only to those incidental to or in connection with the performance of jurisdiction over a matter exclusively vested in the courts. If a statute itself actually passed by the Congress must be clear in its terms when clothing administrative bodies with quasi-judicial functions, then certainly such conferment can not be implied from a mere grant of power to a body such as the Government Survey and Reorganization Commission to create "functions" in connection with the reorganization of the Executive Branch of the Government. Adminstrative Arellano Univeristy School of Law aiza ebina/2015 MILLER vs 2 SCRA Restriction on Grant of Judicial Power

Law MARDO 898

FACTS: Manuel Gonzales filed with Regional Office No. 3 of the Department of Labor, in Manila, a complaint against Bill Miller, owner and manager of Miller Motors, claiming to be a driver of Miller from December 1, 1956 to October 31, 1957, on which latter date he was allegedly arbitrarily dismissed, without being paid separation pay. Miller filed with the Court of First Instance of Baguio a petition praying for judgment prohibiting Chief Hearing Officer Atanacio Mardo of Regional Office No. 3 of the Department of Labor, from proceeding with the case, for the reason that said Hearing Officer had no jurisdiction to hear and decide the subject matter of the complaint. He questions the validity of Reorganization Plan No. 20-A, prepared and submitted by the Government Survey and Reorganization Commission under the authority of Republic Act No. 997, as amended by Republic Act No. 1241, insofar as it confers

jurisdiction to the Regional Offices of the Department of Labor created in said Plan to decide claims of laborers for wages, overtime and separation pay, etc. Under , Reorganization Plan No. 20-A, the regional offices of the Department of Labor have been given original and exclusive jurisdiction over: (a) all cases falling under the Workmen's Compensation law; (b) all cases affecting money claims arising from violations of labor standards on working conditions, unpaid wages, underpayment, overtime, separation pay and maternity leave of employees and laborers; and (c) all cases for unpaid wages, overtime, separation pay, vacation pay and payment for medical services of domestic help Before the effectivity of Reorganization Plan No. 20-A, however, the Department of Labor, except the Workmen's Compensation Commission with respect to claims for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation law, had no compulsory power to settle cases under (b) and (c) above. Republic Act No. 1241, amending Section 4 of Republic Act 997, which created the Government Survey and Reorganization Commission, empowered the latter to abolish departments, offices, agencies, or functions which may not be necessary, or create those which way be necessary for the efficient conduct of the government service, activities, and functions. ISSUE: Whether or not Reorganization Plan No. 20-A, insofar as confers judicial power to the Regional Offices over cases other than these falling under the Workmen's Compensation on Law, invalid and of no effect RULING: Yes. The "functions" referred to in R.A. No. 1241 which could thus be created, obviously refer merely to administrative, not judicial functions. For the Government Survey and Reorganization Commission was created to carry out the reorganization of the Executive Branch of the National Government which plainly did not include the creation of courts. It may be conceded that the legislature may confer on administrative boards or bodies quasijudicial powers involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, as incident to the performance of administrative functions. But in so doing, the legislature must state its intention in express terms that would leave no doubt, as even such quasi-judicial prerogatives must be limited, if they are to be valid, only to those incidental to or in connection with the performance of jurisdiction over a matter exclusively vested in the courts. If a statute itself actually passed by the Congress must be clear in its terms when clothing administrative bodies with quasi-judicial functions, then certainly such conferment can not be implied from a mere grant of power to a body such as the Government Survey and Reorganization Commission to create "functions" in connection with the reorganization of the Executive Branch of the Government. RATIO: Restriction on grant of judicial power. The doctrine of separation of powers of government also operates to restrict the exercise of judicial functions to administrative agencies. Since the legislature cannot exercise judicial functions, it certainly is precluded from delegating the exercise of judicial functions to administrative agencies or officers.

While the legislature is powerless to confer purely or strictly judicial powers, functions, and duties to an administrative agency, it, by no means, follows that it may not perform functions which are in their nature, judicial, and possess and exercise quasi-judicial powers. It is recognized that some judicial powers may be conferred upon and exercised by administrative agencies without violating constitutional powers inhibiting the "delegation" of judicial power. However, the judicial power which may be exercises by administrative agencies is a restricted one, limited to what is incidental and reasonably necessary to the proper and efficient administration of the statutes that are committed to them for administration. Of course, arbitrary powers or uncontrolled discretion may not be conferred upon administrative agencies either in the exercise of rule-making or adjuticatory functions. RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES (RCPI) v BOARD OF COMMUNICATIONS and Diego Morales GR L-43653 RCPI v Board of Communications and Pacifico Innocencio GR L-45378 29 November 1977 | Martin, J. |Quasi-judicial – fines and penalties FACTS: In GR L-43653, complainant-respondent Diego Morales claims that while he was in Manila, his daughter sent him a telegram from Isabela informing him of the death of his wife.  The telegram, sent through RCPI, never reached him.  He had to be informed personally and had to take the trip by airplane.  Because of RCPI’s failure to transmit the message, respondent allegedly suffered inconvenience and additional expenses and prays for damages. RCPI claims that the telegram sent by respondent was transmitted from Isabela to its Message Center at Cubao but when it was relayed from Cubao, the radio signal became intermittent which made the copy received at Sta. Cruz, Manila unreadable and unintelligible. In GR L-45378, complainant-respondent Innocencio claims that Lourdes Innocencio sent a telegram from Tarlac to him at Laguna, to inform him about the death of their father.  The telegram, sent through RCPI never reached him.  Despite the non-receipt and/or non-delivery of the message, the sender has not been notified about its non-delivery; Pacifico was not able to attend the internment of their father.  Because of RCPI’s failure to deliver the telegram, he was shocked when he visited his hometown a few months later; he suffered mental anguish and personal inconveniences. Respondent Board held in both cases that the service rendered by RCPI was inadequate and unsatisfactory. A disciplinary fine of P200 was imposed in each case, pursuant to Sec 21 of CA 146, as amended. ISSUE: W/N the Board of Communications can impose such liability – NO

Petitioner argues that respondent Board has no jurisdiction to entertain and take cognizance of complaints for injury cause by breach of contractual obligation arising from negligence under Art 1170 and injury caused by quasi-delict or tort liability under Art 2176. The case should be ventilated in the proper courts of justice and not in the Board of Communications. The Court had already ruled that the Public Service Commission and its successor in interest, the Board of Communications, being a creature of the legislature and not a court, can exercise only such jurisdiction and powers as are expressly or by necessary implication, conferred upon it by statute.  The Board of Communications exercises the same powers, jurisdiction and functions as that provided for in the Public Service Act for the Public Service Commission, one of which is to issue certificate of public convenience.  Power to issue certificate of public convenience does not carry with it the power of supervision and control over matters not related to the issuance of the certificate or in the performance in a manner suitable to promote public interest. Even assuming that the Board of Communications has the power or jurisdiction to insure adequate public service, RCPI cannot be subjected to payment of fine under Sec 21 of the Public Service Act.  Sec 21 subjects to a fine every public service that violates or fails to comply with the terms and conditions of any certificate or any orders, decisions or regulations of the Commission.  In both cases at hand, RCPI is not being charged for violation of the terms and conditions of its certificate of public convenience or of any order, decision or regulations of the Board of Communications.  The complaints arose from alleged breach of contractual obligation through negligence, which do not necessarily involve RCPI’s failure to comply with its certificate. The charge does not relate to the management of the facilities and system of transmission of messages by petitioner in accordance with its certificate of public convenience. The proper forum for complainant- respondents to ventilate their grievances for possible recovery of damages against RCPI should be in the courts. In Francisco Santiago v RCPI and Constancio Langan v RCPI, the Court held that the Public Service Commission, now the Board of Communications, has no justification in imposing fines. The only power the Commisison possessed over radio companies was to fix rates. It could not take to task a radio company for any negligence or misfeasance. There is nothing in Sec 21 of the Public Service Act which empowers the commission to impose a fine. Decision: Both decisions of the Board of Communications are reversed, set aside, and declared null and void. NHA VS COMMISSION OF SETTLEMENT OF LAND PROBLEMS FACTS:

Since 1968, there has been an existing boundary dispute between the Municipality of San Jose del Monte, Bulacan (one of herein respondents) and the City of Caloocan. In order to resolve the long-challenged conflict, the Sangguniang Bayan of San Jose del Monte passed and approved Resolution No. 20-02-94 on February 10, 1994. This resolution recognizes the official boundary of respondent municipality and the City of Caloocan. On August 8, 1995, another Resolution was passed by the Sangguniang Bayan of San Jose del Monte recognizing the geographic position and plane coordinates of Tala Estate, Caloocan City contained in BM No. 11-24 as the lot lines delineating the boundary between the Municipality of San Jose del Monte and Caloocan City. This prompted the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Region III to conduct a relocation survey. On September 15, 1995, the survey team submitted a Comprehensive Report. The Comprehensive Report states that the San Jose del Monte Sangguniang Bayan Resolutions contradict the delineation embodied in SWO-41615 of the Tala Estate, a 598-hectare property allotted by the government mainly for housing and resettlement site under the administration of the National Housing Authority (NHA), pursuant to Presidential Proclamation No. 843 issued by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos on April 26, 1971. Unsatisfied with the report of the DENR, respondent municipality filed a complaint with the Commission on Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP), against petitioner NHA. Several residents of San Jose del Monte joined the municipality as complainants in the said case. They alleged that their properties are within the Municipality of San Jose del Monte; that Presidential Proclamation No. 843 does not cover their properties; and that the NHA’s Bagong Silang Resettlement Project encroaches on their landholdings.They prayed that the NHA be ordered to award them damages. Incidentally, the City of Caloocan was not impleaded as a party in their complaint. On June 22, 1998, the COSLAP rendered its Resolution ruling that the correct boundary between respondents San Jose del Monte and Caloocan City is that specified in the twin Resolutions of the Sangguniang Bayan of said respondents. The COSLAP likewise held that all other issues, such as those raised by respondents, are mere incidents of such ruling. In effect, the COSLAP ruled that the land covered by the NHA project, being within the Municipality of San Jose del Monte, encroaches upon respondents properties. On January 14, 1999, petitioner NHA, upon invitation of the Bureau of Local Government Supervision of the Department of Interior and Local Government (Bureau), attended a meeting held on January 26, 1999 between the local officials of respondent municipality and Caloocan City. The purpose of the meeting was to provide an avenue for the discussion of the territorial boundary between the two local government units. During the meeting, petitioner NHA posed strong opposition to the COSLAP Resolution, contending that the latter has no jurisdiction over the boundary dispute. Subsequently, the Bureau directed the parties to submit their respective position papers within 30 days. ISSUE: Whether the COSLAP has jurisdiction over the boundary dispute

between respondent municipality and Caloocan City HELD: None. At the threshold, let it be stated that a judgment issued by a quasi-judicial body without jurisdiction is void. It can never become final and executory, hence, an appeal is out of the question. COSLAP was created by Executive Order No. 561 issued on September 21, 1979 by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos. The Commission is an administrative body established as a means of providing a mechanism for the expeditious settlement of land problems to avoid social unrest. Its objective is to settle land conflicts among small settlers, landowners and members of cultural minorities. The powers and functions of the COSLAP are laid down in Section 3 of Executive Order No. 561. Administrative agencies, like the COSLAP, are tribunals of limited jurisdiction and as such could wield only such as are specifically granted to them by the enabling statutes.[8] In acting on a land dispute, the COSLAP may either assume jurisdiction if the matter falls under paragraph 2(a) to (e) or refer the matter to an agency having appropriate jurisdiction. There is no provision in Executive Order No. 561 that COSLAP has jurisdiction over boundary dispute between two local government units. Under Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code, the respective legislative councils of the contending local government units have jurisdiction over their boundary disputes. BONIFACIO ESPINOZA VS PROVINCIAL ADJUDICATOR OF THE PROVINCIAL AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION OFFICE OF PAMPANGA AND MARIA QUIBULOY 516 SCRA 635 G.R. NO. 147525 ; FEBRUARY 26, 2007 ( Administrative Adjudication – Rules of Procedures) STATUTE IN DISCUSSION: Section 1, Rule III of the 1989 Rules of Procedure of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (1989 DARAB Rules) - providing for conciliation proceedings before the Barangay Agrarian Reform Council (BARC) prior to initiating a case FACTS: Under review are the January 14, 1994 decision and June 01, 2000 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 502 UDK. The CA dismissed petitioner Bonifacio Espinoza’s petition for certiorari imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the provincial adjudicator of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Office (PARAD) of San Fernando, Pampanga in deciding DARAB Case No. 203-P-90.

The events leading to this petition for review on certiorari stemmed from an agrarian dispute before the PARAD, San Fernando, Pampanga. A complaint for ejectment was filed against petitioner by private respondent Maria V. Quibuloy, as co-owner and administratrix of three parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3676. She alleged that petitioner had reneged on his obligations as tenant to pay the rent and till the subject landholding. Instead of answering the complaint, petitioner moved to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. He cited Section 1, Rule III of the 1989 Rules of Procedure of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (1989 DARAB Rules), providing for conciliation proceedings before the Barangay Agrarian Reform Council (BARC) prior to initiating the case. He contended that presentation of a certification from the BARC, attesting that the dispute had been submitted to it for mediation or conciliation without any success of settlement, was a jurisdictional requirement. On that note, he concluded that the provincial adjudicator could not take cognizance of the agrarian dispute due to Quibuloy’s failure to present the required certificate. The hearing on the motion to dismiss was set on November 7, 1990. On the said date, petitioner or his counsel failed to appear, hence the motion was submitted for resolution. Without issuing a ruling on petitioner’s motion, the provincial adjudicator set the case for hearing on May 22, 1991. Again, neither petitioner nor his counsel attended the hearing. Thus, Quibuloy was allowed to present her evidence ex-parte. Thereafter, the dispute was ordered submitted for decision. Just before the decision was rendered, petitioner filed his answer assailing Quibuloy’s personality to bring suit. Petitioner also offered unsubstantiated denials of Quibuloy’s charges. As his defense, he denied allegations of non-payment of rents and non-tillage of the land for lack of knowledge and information to form a belief as to the veracity thereof. The provincial adjudicator was sufficiently convinced that Quibuloy’s allegations were true and correct. Accordingly, he decided the case against petitioner. Instead of immediately appealing from the adjudicator’s decision, petitioner allowed the reglementary period to lapse. Thereafter, he filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. The appellate court dismissed the petition as unavailing and vacuous. It reiterated the wellsettled rule that certiorari lies only in cases of errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. It stressed that certiorari cannot be a substitute for a lost appeal. ISSUE: WON the DARAB is bounded by the technical rules followed in courts of law. HELD: No. We deny the petition. 1. Special civil action of certiorari A special civil action of certiorari is an independent action, raising the question of jurisdiction where the tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of

jurisdiction. The ultimate purpose of such action is to keep an inferior tribunal within the bounds of its jurisdiction or relieve parties from arbitrary acts of courts. A petition for certiorari was never meant as a mode of reviewing errors of judgment committed by an inferior tribunal. Thus, it has been settled that the remedy of certiorari is not a substitute for an appeal lost by the party entitled thereto especially if the right of appeal was lost through negligence. When the remedy of appeal is available but is lost due to petitioner’s own negligence or error in the choice of remedies, resort to certiorari is precluded. Under the 1989 DARAB Rules, an aggrieved party may appeal the decision of a provincial adjudicator to the Adjudication Board within 15 days from receipt. In this case, petitioner allowed the appeal period to lapse and instead filed a petition for certiorari in the CA roughly three months after the assailed decision was rendered. It is evident that the CA acted on the petition properly. 2. 1989 DARAB Rules The 1989 DARAB Rules exempted parties residing in non-adjoining barangays from presenting the BARC certification. Since it is undisputed that Quibuloy resided in San Nicolas 1st, Lubao, Pampanga while petitioner stayed in San Agustin, Lubao, Pampanga, the former was not required to present the BARC certification before the adjudicator taking cognizance of the agrarian dispute. 3. Technical rules followed in courts of law Administrative agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions are not bound by technical rules followed in courts of law. The adjudicator is given enough latitude, subject to the essential requirements of administrative due process, to be able to expeditiously ascertain the facts of the agrarian dispute. While there may have been a technical lapse on the part of the adjudicator in disposing of the motion to dismiss, the assailed acts of the adjudicator did not amount to a grave abuse of discretion justifying a writ of certiorari. Considering the technical flexibility afforded to agrarian adjudicators, the order may easily be construed as a denial of the motion to dismiss. What would have been the prudent recourse under the rules was to submit an answer immediately, participate in the hearing and appeal an adverse decision. Sadly, petitioner failed to do any of these. It is now too late for him to dispute the adjudicator’s decision. 4. Petitioner’s answer to respondent’s complaint We hold that petitioner’s answer was indeed filed out of time. While the 1989 DARAB Rules provides that the non-answering respondent (petitioner) may be allowed to belatedly file his answer, it also provides that the answer should be filed before the matter is submitted for decision. Here, petitioner submitted his answer after the case was submitted for decision.

Topic: Presumption of Constitutionality Case: Perez vs People Mnemonic: PeraPerezakapatid(peraparasakapatid) and Perezumption of Constitutionality Prepared by Renan Lasala Facts: 􏰂 Zenon Perez is the Municipal Treasurer of Tubigon, Bohol on 1988. 􏰂 In a recent audit made on his office, it was found that the public funds that he was entrusted to is short of Php72,784.57. 􏰂 When he was asked regarding the shortage of funds, he confessed that he used them to pay for the loan of his brother, and that he also spent it for his family's food and his medicine. 􏰂 When the case is filed to the Sandiganbayan, petitioner retracted his previous statement as he claimed that he was mentally and physically weak at that time, as he was suffering from Diabetes Miletus. 􏰂 He was found guilty of Malversation of Funds by the Sandiganbayan, and is imposed a penalty of 10 years and one day for prision mayor (min), up to 14 years 8 months of reclusion temporal (max). Upon appeal at the SC level: 􏰂 Peitioner claims that he was violated the right to a speedy trial and due process, as over 13 years had passed, before the case had been filed against him. 􏰂 He claims that the sentenced imposed upon him is cruel and violates section 19 of Article III of the Constitution. Ruling: 􏰂 The right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried. 􏰂 There is strong presumption of constitutionality accorded to statutes.It is presumed that the legislature has acted within its constitutional powers. So, it is the generally accepted rule that every statute, or regularly accepted act, is, or will be, or should be, presumed to be valid and constitutional. 􏰂 He who attacks the constitutionality of a law has the onus probandi to show why such law is a violation to the Constitution. Failing to overcome its presumption of constitutionality, a claim that a law is cruel, unusual, or inhumane, like the stance of petitioner, must fail.

􏰂 Court affirms the decision of the Sandiganbayan and found petioner guilty of malversation of funds. With the modification of the penalty to 4 years 2 months and 1 day of prision correccional (min) to 10 yrs and 1 day of prision mayor (max), with perpetual special disqualification. NG TIBAY v COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 69 Phil 635 LAUREL; February 27, 1940 FACTS - The respondent National Labor Union, Inc. prayed for the vacation of the judgment rendered by the majority of this Court and the remanding of the case to the Court of Industrial Relations for a new trial. The union avers that: Teodoro's claim that there was shortage of leather soles in ANG TIBAY making it necessary for him to temporarily lay off the members of the union is entirely false and unsupported by the records of the Bureau of Customs and the Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather; that the National Worker's Brotherhood of ANG TIBAY is a company or employer union dominated by Teodoro, the existence and functions of which are illegal; that the employer Toribio Teodoro was guilty of unfair labor practice for discriminating against the National Labor Union, Inc., and unjustly favoring the National Workers' Brotherhood; that important documents attached are inaccessible to the respondents. ISSUE WON the union was denied procedural due process by the CIR HELD NO. The CIR, a special court created under CA 103, is more an administrative than a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation. It is not intended to be a mere receptive organ of the Government. Unlike a court of justice which is essentially passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases that are presented to it by the parties litigant, the function of the CIR is more active, affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasijudicial functions in the determination of disputes between employers and employees but its functions in the determination of disputes between employers and employees but its functions are far more comprehensive and expensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter controversy or dispute arising between, and/or affecting employers and employees or laborers, and regulate the relations between them. It may appeal to voluntary arbitration in the settlement of industrial disputes; may employ mediation or conciliation for that purpose, or recur to the more effective system of official investigation and compulsory arbitration in order to determine specific controversies between labor and capital industry and in agriculture. There is in reality here a mingling of executive and judicial functions, which is a departure from the rigid doctrine of the separation of governmental powers. The CIR is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and the Act requires it to "act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable." It shall not be restricted to the specific relief claimed or demands made by the parties to the industrial or agricultural

dispute, but may include in the award, order or decision any matter or determination which may be deemed necessary or expedient for the purpose of settling the dispute or of preventing further industrial or agricultural disputes. And in the light of this legislative policy, appeals to this Court have been 71 Administrative Law A2010 Dean Carlota especially regulated by the rules recently promulgated by the rules recently promulgated by this Court to carry into the effect the avowed legislative purpose. The fact, however, that the CIR may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in justifiable cases before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative character. There are primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this character: (1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. The liberty and property of the citizen shall be protected by the rudimentary requirements of fair play. (2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented. (3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached. This principle emanates from the more fundamental is contrary to the vesting of unlimited power anywhere. Law is both a grant and a limitation upon power. (4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but the evidence must be substantial. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial evidence. (5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. Only by confining the administrative tribunal to the evidence disclosed to the parties, can the latter be protected in their right to know and meet the case against them. It should not, however, detract from their duty actively to see that the law is enforced, and for that purpose, to use the authorized legal methods of securing evidence and informing itself of facts material and relevant to the controversy. Boards of inquiry may be appointed for the purpose of investigating and determining the facts in any given case, but their report and decision are only advisory. (6) The CIR or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. (7) The CIR should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decision rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it. - In the right of the foregoing fundamental principles, except as to the alleged agreement between the Ang Tibay and the National Worker's Brotherhood, the record is barren and does not satisfy the thirst for a factual basis upon which to predicate, in a national way, a conclusion of law. - This result, however, does not now preclude the concession of a new trial prayed for the by respondent National Labor Union, Inc. The interest of justice would be better served if the movant is given opportunity to present at the hearing the documents referred to in his motion and such other evidence as may be relevant to the main

issue involved. The legislation which created the CIR is new. The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to the parties adversely affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial is granted, and the entire record of the case shall be remanded to the CIR.

Evangelista vs Jarencio 68 SCRA 99 Topic under: IV. Investigatory Powers D. Importance of administrative investigations E. Executive power to investigate, source Facts: Evalengista, petitioner, is head of the Presidential Agency on Reforms and Government Operations (PARGO) created by Executive Order No. 4, which, among others, provides: “The agency is hereby vested with all the powers of an investigating committee under Sections 71 and 580 of the Revised Administrative Code, including the power to summon witnesses by subpoena duces tecum, administer oaths, take testimony or evidence relevant to the investigation.” Respondent Manalastas (Asst. City Public Service Officer of Manila) was issued a subpoena ad testificandum commanding him to appear as witness at the office of the PARGO to testify in a certain investigation pending therein. Instead of obeying it, he filed a petition with the CFI of Manila for prohibition, certiorari and restraining order assailing its legality. Judge Jarencio issued a restraining order. Hence, this action. Issue: WON the PARGO enjoys the authority to issue subpoena in its conduct of fact-finding investigation Held: YES (1) Agency is with authority to enforce subpoenas issued. “Rightly, administrative agencies may enforce subpoenas issued in the course of investigations, WON adjudication is involved, and WON probable cause is shown and even before the issuance of a complaint. It is enough that the investigation be for a lawfully authorized purpose. The purpose of the subpoena is to discover evidence, not to prove a pending charge, but upon which to make one if discovered evidence so justifies. Because judicial power is reluctant if not unable to summon evidence until it is shown to be relevant to issues on litigations, it does not follow that an administrative agency charged with seeing that the laws are enforced may not have and exercise powers of original inquiry” (2) Authority delegated by statute. “The administrative agency has the power of inquisition which is not dependent upon a case of controversy in order to get evidence, but can investigate merely on suspicion that the law is being violated or even just because it wants assurance that it is not. When investigative and accusatory duties are delegated by statute to an administrative body, it too may take steps to inform itself as to whether there is probable violation of the law.

In sum, it may be stated that the subpoena meets the requirements for enforcement if the inquiry is: (a) within the authority of the agency (b) the demand is not too indefinite (c) the information is reasonable relevant” (3) Information sought reasonably relevant to the investigations. “There is no doubt that the factfinding investigations being conducted by the PARGO upon sworn statements implicating certain public officials of the City Govt of Manila in anomalous transactions fall within the PARGO’s sphere of authority and that the information sought to be elicited from respondent Manalastas of which he is claimed to be in possession, is reasonably relevant to the investigations.” Masangkay G.R. No. L-13827. Sept.28, 1962

v.

COMELEC

Facts: Masangcay was the provincial treasurer of Aklan designated by the COMELEC in its resolution to among others, take charge of the receipt and custody of the official ballots, election forms and supplies, as well as of their distribution, among the different municipalities of the province. He and several others were charged before the COMELEC with contempt for having opened three boxes containing official and sample ballots for the municipalities of the province of Aklan without the presence of the division superintendent of schools of Aklan, the provincial auditor, and the authorized representatives of the Nacionalista Party, the Liberal Party and the Citizens' Party, in violation of the instructions of said Commission and which are punishable under Section 5 of the Revised Election Code and Rule 64 of the Rules of Court. He was subsequently convicted by the COMELEC as guilty and sentenced to suffer three months imprisonment and pay a fine of P500, with subsidiary imprisonment of two months in case of insolvency, to be served in the provincial jail of Aklan. Masangkay contended that, even if he can be held guilty of the act of contempt charged, the decision is null and void for lack of valid power on the part of the Commission to impose such disciplinary penalty under the principle of separation of powers. Issue: W/N COMELEC can exercise the power to punish contempt. Held: NO. The COMELEC, although it cannot be classified a court of justice within the meaning of the Constitution (Section 30, Article VIII), for it is merely an administrative body, may however exercise quasi-judicial functions insofar as controversies that by express provision law come under its jurisdiction. However, when the Commission exercises a ministerial function it cannot exercise the power to punish contempt because such power is inherently judicial in nature. In the instant case, the resolutions which the Commission tried to enforce and for whose violation the charge for contempt was filed against petitioner Masangcay merely call for the exercise of an administrative or ministerial function for they merely concern the procedure to be followed in

the distribution of ballots and other election paraphernalia among the different municipalities. Thus, the COMELEC cannot exercise its power to punish contempt.