Admin Cases 3.docx

46. Republic V. Rambuyong A Sanggunian Member cannot engage in his legal profession if the adverse party is an instrumentality of the Government.

composed of the municipal vice mayor as the presiding officer. As such, Rambuyong cannot represent himself as counsel for Chu when NPC is an adverse party, pursuant to the above-mentioned laws.

Facts: Alfredo Chu filed a case for collection against the National Power Corporation (NPC). Appearing as counsel for Chu is Atty. Richard Rambuyong who was then the incumbent Vice-Mayor. NPC then filed a motion for inhibition of Rambuyong arguing that he is prohibited under Section 90 (b)(1) of the Local Government Code. The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of Rambuyong where it argued that government-owned or controlled corporations are not included in the prohibition. Should the framers intended so, it must have explicitly stated therein. In appeal, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit. Issue: Whether or not Rambuyong can represent NPC as counsel despite being a Vice Mayor. Held: The Court ruled in favor of the Petitioner. Section 90 (b)(1) of the Local Government Code provides that Sanggunian Members may practice their profession or engage in any occupation or teach in schools except during session hours, provided when the Member is also a member of the Bar, he shall not appear as counsel before any court in any civil case where the local government unit or any office, agency or instrumentality of the government is the adverse party. Then, the Court quoted Section 2 (10) of the Revised Administrative Code which defined “instrumentality” shall include regulatory agencies, chartered institutions and government-owned or controlled corporations. With the foregoing provisions, it is clear without any ambiguity that NPC is a government instrumentality tasked in undertaking development hydroelectric generation of power and production of electricity from other sources. Further, being the Vice-Mayor, Rambuyong is deemed a Sanggunian Member because Section 446 of the LGC provided that the sangguniang bayan shall be

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47. Catu v Rellosa Facts: Complainant Wilfredo M. Catu is a co-owner of a lot and the building erected thereon located in Manila. His mother and brother contested the possession of Elizabeth C. Diaz-Catu and Antonio Pastor of one of the units in the building. The latter ignored demands for them to vacate the premises. Thus, a complaint was initiated against them in the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay. Respondent, as punong barangay, summoned the parties to conciliation meetings. When the parties failed to arrive at an amicable settlement, respondent issued a certification for the filing of the appropriate action in court. Respondent entered his appearance as counsel for the defendants in the (subsequent ejectment) case. Complainant filed the instant administrative complaint, claiming that respondent committed an act of impropriety as a lawyer and as a public officer when he stood as counsel for the defendants despite the fact that he presided over the conciliation proceedings between the litigants as punong barangay. In his defense, respondent claimed that as punong barangay, he performed his task without bias and that he acceded to Elizabeth’s request to handle the case for free as she was financially distressed. The complaint was then referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) where after evaluation, they found sufficient ground to discipline respondent. According to them, respondent violated Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and, as an elective official, the prohibition under Section 7(b) (2) of RA 6713. Consequently, for the violation of the latter prohibition, respondent committed a breach of Canon 1.

Held: Yes, but in their decision, the Court ruled that Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Ethics is not applicable because the Respondent was an incumbent Barangay Captain and not one who has already left government service. In addition, it should have been Section 90 of RA 7160 and not Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713 that was applied. The Latter is the general law which applies to all public officials and employees while the former applies to elective local government officials. In RA 7160, the elective local government officials totally prohibited to practice their profession are governors, city mayors and municipal mayors, while partial prohibition is given to members of the Provincial Council, City Council and Municipal Council. There was no prohibition given to Barangay Captains and members of the Barangay Council therefore it should be understood that they are allowed to practice their profession without prohibition. However, the Barangay Captain should still procure permission or authorization from the head of his Department, as required by civil service regulations It is in this requirement that the Respondent have failed to comply with. This non-compliance has made him liable for breaking his oath as a lawyer, to obey the laws and exact ethical standards of the legal profession. The importance of this oath has been enshrined respectively as the first canon of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the seventh canon of upholding the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. The act of the respondent meted a guilty verdict from the Supreme Court and was suspended for 6 months and is sternly warned that any repetition of similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.

Consequently, for the violation of the latter prohibition, respondent was then recommended suspension from the practice of law for one month with a stern warning that the commission of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.

Issue: Whether or not the Respondent was liable for violating his oath as a lawyer

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48. Flores v Drilon Facts: Petitioners, taxpayers and employees of U.S facilities at Subic, challenge the constitutionality of Sec. 13 (d) of the Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992 which directs the President to appoint a professional manager as administrator of the SBMA…provided that “for the 1st year of its operations, the mayor of Olongapo City (Richard Gordon) shall be appointed as the chairman and the CEO of the Subic Authority.” Issue: 1. Whether the proviso violates the constitutional proscription against appointment or designation of elective officials to other government posts. 2. Whether or not the SBMA posts are merely ex officio to the position of Mayor of Olongapo City and thus an excepted circumstance. 3. Whether or not the Constitutional provision allowing an elective official to receive double compensation (Sec. 8, Art. IX-B) would be useless if no elective official may be appointed to another post. 4. Whether there is legislative encroachment on the appointing authority of the President. 5. Whether Mayor Gordon may retain any and all per diems, allowances and other emoluments which he may have received pursuant to his appointment. Held: (1) YES, Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of the Constitution Provides: No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure. Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. The subject proviso directs the President to appoint an elective official i.e. the Mayor of Olongapo City, to other government post (as Chairman and CEO of SBMA). This is precisely what the Constitution prohibits. It seeks to prevent a situation where a local elective

official will work for his appointment in an executive position in government, and thus neglect his constituents. (2) NO, Congress did not contemplate making the SBMA posts as automatically attached to the Office of the Mayor without need of appointment. The phrase “shall be appointed” unquestionably shows the intent to make the SBMA posts appointive and not merely adjunct to the post of Mayor of Olongapo City. (3) NO, Sec. 8 does not affect the constitutionality of the subject proviso. In any case, the Vice-President for example, an elective official who may be appointed to a cabinet post, may receive the compensation attached to the cabinet position if specifically authorized by law. (4) YES, although Section 13(d) itself vests in the President the power to appoint the Chairman of SBMA, he really has no choice but to appoint the Mayor of Olongapo City. The power of choice is the heart of the power to appoint. Appointment involves an exercise of discretion of whom to appoint. Hence, when Congress clothes the President with the power to appoint an officer, it cannot at the same time limit the choice of the President to only one candidate. Such enactment effectively eliminates the discretion of the appointing power to choose and constitutes an irregular restriction on the power of appointment. While it may be viewed that the proviso merely sets the qualifications of the officer during the first year of operations of SBMA, i.e., he must be the Mayor of Olongapo City, it is manifestly an abuse of congressional authority to prescribe qualifications where only one, and no other, can qualify. Since the ineligibility of an elective official for appointment remains all throughout his tenure or during his incumbency, he may however resign first from his elective post to cast off the constitutionally-attached disqualification before he may be considered fit for appointment. Consequently, as long as he is an incumbent, an elective official remains ineligible for appointment to another public office. (5) YES, as incumbent elective official, Gordon is ineligible for appointment to the position of Chairman and CEO of SBMA; hence, his appointment thereto cannot be sustained. He however remains Mayor of Olongapo City, and his acts as SBMA official are not necessarily null and void; he may be considered a de facto officer, and in accordance with jurisprudence, is entitled to such benefits.

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49. Jalosjos v COMELEC Doctrine: Proof required to establish domicile of a reinstated Filipino citizen running for governor of a province

Facts: Petitioner Rommel Jalosjos was born in Quezon City. He migrated to Australia when he was eight years old and acquired Australian citizenship. In 2008, he returned to the Philippines and lived in Zamboanga, he took an oath of allegiance to the Philippines and was issued a certificate of reacquisition of citizenship by the Bureau of Immigration and he renounced his Australian citizenship Jalosjos applied for registration as a voter in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay, but Private Respondent Erasmo, the barangay captain, opposed the registration. COMELEC approved the application and included Jalosjos in the voter's list. This decision was affirmed at the MCTC and at the RTC. Jalosjos then filed a certificate of candidacy (COC) for Governor of Zamboanga Sibugay for the 2010 elections. Erasmo filed a petition to cancel the COC on the ground of failure to comply with the one-year residency requirement of the Local Government Code (LGC). COMELEC held that Jalosjos failed to present ample proof of a bona fide intention to establish a domicile in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. It held that when he first moved back to the Philippines, he was merely a guest or transient at his brother's house in Ipil, and for this reason, he cannot claim Ipil as his domicile. Meanwhile, Jalosjos won the elections. Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC is correct in holding that petitioner did not present ample proof of a bona fide intention to establish domicile at Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. Held: NO. The COMELEC is incorrect. Jalosjos has successfully proven by his acts of renouncing his Australian citizenship and by living in Ipil, that he has changed his domicile to Zamboanga Sibugay.

The LGC requires that a gubernatorial candidate be a resident of the province for at least one year before the elections. For the purposes of election laws, the requirement of residence is synonymous with domicile: i.e. he must have an intention to reside in a particular place, but must also have personal presence coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. The question of residence is a question of intention. To determine compliance with the residency/domicile requirement, jurisprudence has laid down the following guidelines: 1. every person has a domicile or residence somewhere; 2. where once established, that domicile remains until he acquires a new one; and 3. a person can have but one domicile at a time. When he came to the Philippines in November 2008 to live with his brother in Zamboanga Sibugay, it is evident that Jalosjos did so with intent to change his domicile for good. He left Australia, gave up his Australian citizenship, and renounced his allegiance to that country and reacquired his old citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Philippines. By his acts, Jalosjos forfeited his legal right to live in Australia, clearly proving that he gave up his domicile there. And he has since lived nowhere else except in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. Neither can COMELEC conclude that Jalosjos did not come to settle his domicile in Ipil since he has merely been staying at his brother's house. A candidate is not required to have a house in order to establish his residence or domicile in that place. It is enough that he should live there even if it be in a rented house or in the house of a friend or relative. What matters is that Jalosjos has proved two things: actual physical presence in Ipil and an intention of making it his domicile. Addt’t Decisions of this Court holding that the second-placer cannot be proclaimed winner if the first-placer is disqualified or declared ineligible22 should be limited to situations where the certificate of candidacy of the first-placer was valid at the time of filing but subsequently had to be cancelled because of a violation of law that took place, or a legal impediment that took effect, after the filing of the certificate of candidacy. If the certificate of candidacy is void ab initio, then legally the person who filed such void certificate of candidacy was never a candidate in the elections at any time. All votes for such non-candidate are stray votes and should not be counted. Thus, such non-candidate can never be a first-placer in the elections. If a certificate of candidacy void ab initio is cancelled on the day, or before the day, of the election, prevailing jurisprudence holds that all votes for that candidate are stray votes.23 If a certificate of candidacy void ab initio is cancelled one day or more after the elections, all votes for such candidate should also be stray votes because the certificate of candidacy is void from the very beginning. This is the more equitable and logical approach on the effect of the cancellation of a certificate of candidacy that is void ab initio. Otherwise, a certificate of candidacy void ab initio can operate to defeat one or more valid certificates of candidacy for the same position.

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50. Jalosjos v COMELEC

this should not be deemed to cover cases wherein the law imposes a penalty, either as principal or accessory, which has the effect of disqualifying the convict to run for elective office.

In 2001, petitioner Jalosjos was convicted by final judgment of two (2) counts of statutory rape and six (6) counts of acts of lasciviousness. He was sentenced to suffer the principal penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal for each count, respectively, which carried the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification under Article 41 of the Revised Penal Code.

Article 30 provides that the penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification has the effect of depriving the convict of the privilege to run for elective office. This is based on the presumption that one who is rendered infamous by conviction of a felony or other base offense indicative of moral turpitude, is unfit to hold public office, as the same partakes of the nature of a privilege which the State grants only to such classes of persons which are most likely to exercise it for the common good.

Facts:

In 2007, his sentence was commuted by President Gloria. In 2012, petitioner applied to register as a voter in Zamboanga City. Because of his previous conviction, his application was denied, prompting him to file a petition for inclusion in the permanent list of voters. Pending the resolution of his petition, he filed a CoC seeking to run as Mayor of Zamboanga City in the 2013 elections. In his CoC, petitioner stated that he is a registered voter of Barangay Tetuan, Zamboanga City. The MTCC denied his Petition for Inclusion on account of his perpetual absolute disqualification which in effect deprived him of the right to vote in any election. Which was affirmed by the RTC. Five (5) petitions were lodged before the COMELEC seeking the denial and/or cancellation of petitioner’s CoC due to his perpetual absolute disqualification as well as his failure to comply with the voter registration requirement. The COMELEC granted the petition. Hence, this petition.

The use of the word "perpetual" in the aforementioned accessory penalty connotes a lifetime restriction and, in this respect, does not depend on the length of the prison term, which is imposed as its principal penalty. Section 40(a) of the LGC should be considered a law of general application and therefore must yield to the more definitive RPC provisions in line with the principle that general legislation must give way to special legislation on the same subject. Article 41 of the RPC also expressly states that the accessory penalty of disqualification remains even though one is pardoned as to the principal penalty unless the accessory penalty shall have been so expressly remitted in the pardon. In this case, the accessory penalty had not been expressly remitted in the Order of Commutation or by any subsequent pardon and, as such, petitioner’s disqualification to run for elective office is deemed to subsist.

Issue: Whether Petitioner Romeo Jalosjos is qualified to run as Mayor of Zamboanga City Held: No. On the question of petitioner’s right to run for elective office, he submits that Article 301of the RPC was partially amended by the LGC, and thus his perpetual absolute disqualification had already been removed. The Court found this submission untenable and ruled that the provisions of law can be reconciled—while section 40(a) allows a prior convict to run for local elective office after the lapse of two years from the time he served his sentence,

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51. Aratea v COMELEC -An ineligible candidate is not considered a candidate at all. -A void Certificate of Candidacy (COC) cannot produce any legal effect. -All the votes for the ineligible candidate are stray votes. Facts: Lonzanida and Antipolo ran for Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales in 2010. Rodolfo filed a petition to disqualify Lonzanida and to deny due course or to cancel Lonzanida’s certificate of candidacy on the ground that Lonzanida was elected, and had served, as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales for four (4) consecutive terms. The COMELEC Second Division cancelled Lonzanida’s certificate of candidacy. Lonzanida’s motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc remained pending during said elections. Lonzanida and Aratea garnered the highest number of votes and were proclaimed Mayor and Vice-Mayor, respectively. Subsequently, the COMELEC disqualified Lonzanida from running for Mayor based on two grounds: (1), Lonzanida had served as Mayor for more than three consecutive terms without interruption; and (2) Lonzanida had been convicted by final judgment of ten counts of falsification under the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Second-placer Antipolo intervened and claimed her right to be proclaimed as Mayor. Issue: 1. Whether Lonzanida was disqualified under Section 68 of the OEC, or made a false material representation under Section 78 of the OEC that resulted in his certificate of candidacy being void ab initio 2. Whether the second-placer or the Vice-Mayor elect should succeed as Mayor in this case. Held: The Court ruled that Lonzanida was disqualified under Sec. 78 of the OEC. It also held that Antipolo, the "second placer," should be proclaimed Mayor because Lonzanida’s certificate of candidacy was void ab initio.

In short, Lonzanida was never a candidate at all. All votes for Lonzanida were stray votes. Thus, Antipolo actually garnered the highest number of votes for the position. Qualifications and Disqualifications The qualifications and disqualifications are laid by Sections 39 and 40 of the Local Government Code. Section 40 expressly provides, among others: . - The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position: (a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence; xxx

Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code provides: Sec. 12. Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for which he was sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty. x x x

False Material Representation Section 78 of the OEC states that a certificate of candidacy may be denied or cancelled when there is false material representation of the contents of the certificate of candidacy. The contents of the certificate of candidacy included among others a statement that the person filing it is eligible for said office. A person suffering from permanent disqualification is ineligible to run for elective public office, and commits a false material representation if he states in his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to so run. Effect of a Void Certificate of Candidacy A cancelled certificate of candidacy void ab initio cannot give rise to a valid candidacy, and much less to valid votes. Lonzanida’s disqualification is two-pronged: first, he violated the constitutional fiat on the three-term limit; and second, he is known to have been convicted by final judgment for ten (10) counts of Falsification. On election day, respondent Lonzanida’s disqualification is notoriously known in fact and in law. Ergo, since respondent Lonzanida was never a candidate for the position, the votes cast for him should be considered stray.

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(1) meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws; and (2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships before any public officer authorized to administer an oath

52. Japzon v COMELEC Facts: Both petitioner Japzon and private respondent Ty were candidates for the Office of Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar. Japzon filed before the COMELEC a Petition to disqualify and/or cancel Ty's Certificate of Candidacy on the ground of material misrepresentation. Japzon averred in his Petition that Ty was a former natural-born Filipino, migrated and became a citizen of the United States of America. That he falsely represented that he was a resident of Eastern Samar, for one year before 14 May 2007, and was not a permanent resident or immigrant of any foreign country. That after he took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, he continued to comport himself as an American citizen as proven by his travel records. He had also failed to renounce his foreign citizenship. Ty acquired the highest number of votes and was declared Mayor of the Municipality. Issue: Whether or not the defendant has complied with the residency requirement for elective positions.

Ty complied with the second requirement. By the time he filed his COC, he had already effectively renounced his American citizenship. Under Section 39 of the Local Government Code (RA No 7160), it is required that an elective official be a resident of the independent component cities, component cities, or municipalities where he intends to be elected for at least 1 year immediately preceding the day of the election His reacquisition of Philippine citizenship had no impact on his residence/domicile. He did not necessarily regain his domicile in Gen. Macarthur, but merely had the option to establish his domicile of choice therein. The length of his residence shall be determined from the time he made it his domicile of choice and shall not retroact to the time of his birth. The principle of animus revertendi has been used to determine whether a candidate has an intention to return to the place where he seeks to be elected. In order to acquire a new domicile by choice, there must concur: (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality; (2) an intention to remain there; and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile.

Held: Yes. Ty was a natural-born Filipino. Even if he became an American citizen, he reacquired his Philippine citizenship by taking his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic in accordance with RA No. 9225. He then, became a dual citizen. It was only on when he renounced his American citizenship before a notary public that he became a pure Philippine citizen again. RA No. 9225 imposes no residency requirement for the reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship; nor does it mention any effect of reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship on the current residence of the natural-born Filipino. Citizenship and residence are independently treated in RA No 9225. Residency only becomes relevant when the natural-born Filipino with dual citizenship runs for public office. He must: 1

'the intention of remaining.'

There must be animus manendi1 coupled with animus non revertendi2. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual. The COMELEC found that Ty had been a resident of Gen Macarthur 1 year prior to the elections. Ty’s intent to establish a new domicile of choice became apparent when, after reacquiring his Philippine citizenship, he applied for a Philippine passport indicating his address at Eastern Samar. He paid his community tax, securing CTCs, and registered as voter stating this address.

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‘With intention to return’

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53. Teodora Sobejana-Condon Vs. Commission On Elections, Luism. Bautista Failure to renounce foreign citizenship in accordance with the exact tenor of Section 5(2) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 renders a dual citizen ineligible to run for and thus hold an elective public office.

Facts: The petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen. She became a naturalized Australian citizen owing to her marriage to a certain Kevin Thomas Condon. She filed an application to re-acquire Philippine citizenship before the Philippine Embassy pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225. The application was approved and the petitioner took her oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. In 2006, the petitioner filed an unsworn Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship before the Department of Immigration and Indigenous Affairs, Canberra, Australia, which in turn issued the Order dated September 27, 2006 certifying that she has ceased to be an Australian citizen. She sought elective office during the 2010 elections for the position of ViceMayor and won. Private respondents sought the petitioner’s disqualification from holding her elective post on the ground that she is a dual citizen and that she failed to execute a "personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath" as imposed by Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225. Issue:

Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath. The oath is an abbreviated repatriation process that restores one’s Filipino citizenship and all civil and political rights and obligations concomitant therewith, subject to certain conditions imposed in Section 5. Section 5, paragraph 2 provides: (2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath. On September 18, 2006, or a year before she initially sought elective public office, she filed a renunciation of Australian citizenship in Canberra, Australia. Admittedly, however, the same was not under oath contrary to the exact mandate of Section 5(2) that the renunciation of foreign citizenship must be sworn before an officer authorized to administer oath. The supreme court said that, the renunciation of her Australian citizenship was invalid due to it was not oath before any public officer authorized to administer it rendering the act of Condon void. The solemn promise and the risk of punishment attached to an oath ensures truthfulness to the prospective public officer’s abandonment of his adopted state and promise of absolute allegiance and loyalty to the Republic of the Philippines. It is the operative act that restores their right to run for public office.

W/N petitioner is disqualified from running for elective office due to failure to renounce her Australian Citizenship in accordance with Sec. 5 (2) of R.A 9225 Held: Yes. R.A. No. 9225 allows the retention and re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship for natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic.

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54. Cordora v COMELEC

Tambunting claims that because of his parents’ differing citizenships, he is both Filipino and American by birth. Cordora, on the other hand, insists that Tambunting is a naturalized American citizen.

Cordora filed a complaint before COMELEC against Tambunting asserting that Gustavo Tambunting made false assertion in his certificate of candidacy by claiming that he was a Natural Born Filipino and resident before the election in 2001and 2004.

We agree with Commissioner Sarmiento’s observation that Tambunting possesses dual citizenship. Because of the circumstances of his birth, it was no longer necessary for Tambunting to undergo the naturalization process to acquire American citizenship. The process involved in INS Form I-130 only served to confirm the American citizenship which Tambunting acquired at birth. The certification from the Bureau of Immigration which Cordora presented contained two trips where Tambunting claimed that he is an American. However, the same certification showed nine other trips where Tambunting claimed that he is Filipino. Clearly, Tambunting possessed dual citizenship prior to the filing of his certificate of candidacy before the 2001 elections. The fact that Tambunting had dual citizenship did not disqualify him from running for public office.

Facts:

Cordora alleged that Tambunting was not eligible to run for local public office because Tambunting lacked the required citizenship and residency requirements. Cordora presented a certification from the Bureau of Immigration which stated that, in two instances, Tambunting claimed that he is an American: upon arrival in the Philippines in 2000 and upon departure from the Philippines in 2001. According to Cordora, these travel dates confirmed that Tambunting acquired American citizenship through naturalization in Honolulu, Hawaii. Tambunting maintained that he did not make any misrepresentation in his certificates of candidacy. He presented a copy of his birth certificate which showed that he was born of a Filipino mother and an American father. Tambunting further denied that he was naturalized as an American citizen. The certificate of citizenship conferred by the US government after Tambunting’s father petitioned him merely confirmed Tambunting’s citizenship which he acquired at birth. Tambunting’s possession of an American passport did not mean that Tambunting is not a Filipino citizen. Issue: Whether or not Tambunting is natural born Filipino Held: Tambunting does not deny that he is born of a Filipino mother and an American father. Neither does he deny that he underwent the process involved in INS Form I-130 (Petition for Relative) because of his father’s citizenship.

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Under the 1987 Philippine Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of citizens of the Philippines to possess dual citizenship: (1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle of jus soli;

Dual citizenship3 is involuntary and arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. Thus, like any other natural-born Filipino, it is enough for a person with dual citizenship who seeks public office to file his certificate of candidacy and swear to the oath of allegiance contained therein. Dual allegiance on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states Under R.A. No. 9225, a Filipino who becomes a naturalized citizen of another country is allowed to retain his Filipino citizenship by swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic of the Philippines. The act of taking an oath of allegiance is an implicit renunciation of a naturalized citizen’s foreign citizenship.

(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their fathers’ country such children are citizens of that country; (3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter’s country the former are considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship.

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55. Kida v Senate Facts: Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 is the organic act that established the ARMM and scheduled the first regular elections for the ARMM regional officials. The election was reset thrice, and was to be held on the 2nd Monday of August 2005 and on the same date every 3 years thereafter. COMELEC had begun preparations for these elections and had accepted certificates of candidacies for the various regional offices to be elected. But on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting the next ARMM regular elections to May 2013 to coincide with the regular national and local elections of the country.

In Osme v COMELEC, the Court explained that in the 1987 Constitution, the terms of office of Senators, Members of the House of Representatives, the local officials, the President and the Vice-President have been synchronized on the same hour, date and year noon of June 30, 1992. It is likewise evident that the term synchronization is used synonymously as the phrase holding simultaneously since this is the precise intent in terminating their Office Tenure in the same day or occasion. This common termination date will synchronize future elections to once every three years. In this case, the ARMM elections, although called “regional” elections, should be included among the elections to be synchronized as it is a “local” election based on the wording and structure of the Constitution.

In these consolidated petitions filed directly with the Supreme Court, the petitioners assailed the constitutionality of RA No. 10153. Issue: 1. Does the 1987 Constitution mandate the synchronization of elections [including the ARMM elections]? Held: [The Supreme Court] DISMISSED the petitions and UPHELD the constitutionality of RA No. 10153 in toto.] 1. YES, the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections. While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to synchronize national and local elections, the clear intent towards this objective can be gleaned from the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution, which show the extent to which the Constitutional Commission, by deliberately making adjustments to the terms of the incumbent officials, sought to attain synchronization of elections. The Constitutional Commission exchanges, read with the provisions of the Transitory Provisions of the Constitution, all serve as patent indicators of the constitutional mandate to hold synchronized national and local elections, starting the second Monday of May 1992 and for all the following elections.

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56. Abundo v COMELEC Three Consecutive Terms may be broken or interrupted by Involuntary Interruption.

Facts: Petitioner Abelardo Abundo, Sr. (Abundo) vied for the position of municipal mayor for four (4) successive regular elections, namely, the 2001, 2004, 2007 and 2010 national and local elections. In both the 2001 and 2007 runs, he emerged and was proclaimed as the winning mayoralty candidate and accordingly served the corresponding terms as mayor. In the 2004 electoral derby, however, the municipal board of canvassers initially proclaimed as winner one Jose Torres (Torres), who, in due time, performed the functions of the office of mayor. Abundo protested Torres election and proclamation. Abundo was eventually declared the winner of the 2004 mayoralty electoral contest, paving the way for his assumption of office 2006 until the end of the 2004-2007, or for a period of a little over one year and one month. Then came the 2010 elections where Abundo and Torres again opposed each other. When Abundo filed his certificate of candidacy for the mayoralty seat relative to this electoral contest, Torres sought the formers disqualification to run. The RTC declared Abundo as ineligible, under the three-term limit rule, to run in the 2010 elections for the position of mayor. In its Resolution, the COMELEC affirmed the decision of RTC. Issue:

while he was declared winner in the protest for the mayoralty seat for the 20042007 term, Abundos full term has been substantially reduced by the actual service rendered by his opponent (Torres). Hence, there was actual involuntary interruption in the term of Abundo and he cannot be considered to have served the full 2004-2007 term. Prior to the finality of the election protest, Abundo did not serve in the mayor’s office and, in fact, had no legal right to said position. During the pendency of the election protest, Abundo ceased from exercising power or authority. Consequently, the period during which Abundo was not serving as mayor should be considered as a rest period or break in his service because prior to the judgment in the election protest, it was Abundos opponent, Torres, who was exercising such powers by virtue of the still then valid proclamation. Petition is PARTLY GRANTED.

Addt’l The instances wherein such consecutive terms are not considered as having been “involuntarily interrupted or broken” are as follows: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Assumption of Office by Operation of Law; Recall Election; Conversion of a Municipality into a City; Period of Preventive Suspension; and Election Protest

Whether or not Abundo has consecutively served for three terms. Held: The consecutiveness of what otherwise would have been Abundos three successive, continuous mayorship was effectively broken during the 20042007 term when he was initially deprived of title to, and was veritably disallowed to serve and occupy, an office to which he, after due proceedings, was eventually declared to have been the rightful choice of the electorate.

The declaration of being the winner in an election protest grants the local elected official the right to serve the unexpired portion of the term. Verily, 11

57. Borja v COMELEC The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position. It is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office; he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply.

Facts: Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected as Vice-Mayor of Pateros on 1988 for a term ending on June 30, 1992. He became Mayor, by operation of law, upon the death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja. Thereafter, Capco was elected and served as Mayor for two more terms, from 1992 to 1998. On March 27, 1998, Capco filed a Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Pateros in the 1998 election. Petitioner Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., who was also a candidate for mayor, sought Capco’s disqualification on the ground that Capco would have already served as Mayor for 3 consecutive terms by June 30, 1998; hence, he would be ineligible to serve for another term. The Second Division of the Comelec declared Capco disqualified but the Comelec en banc reversed the decision and declared Capco eligible to run for mayor. Capco was subsequently voted and proclaimed as mayor.

more a matter of chance than of design. Hence, his service in that office should not be counted in the application of any term limit.

The policy embodied in the constitutional provision (Art. X, §8) is not only to prevent the establishment of political dynasties but also to enhance the freedom of choice of the people. A consideration of the historical background of Art. X, §8 of the Constitution reveals that the members of the Constitutional Commission were as much concerned with preserving the freedom of choice of the people as they were with preventing the monopolization of political power. In discussing term limits, the drafters of the Constitution did so on the assumption that the officials concerned were serving by reason of election. To consider Capco to have served the first term in full and therefore ineligible to run a third time for reelection would be not only to falsify reality but also to unduly restrict the right of the people to choose whom they wish to govern them.

Issue: Whether or not a vice-mayor who succeeds to the office of mayor by operation of law and serves the remainder of the term is considered to have served a term in that office for the purpose of the three-term limit. Held: No. The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply. Capco was qualified to run again as mayor in the next election because he was not elected to the office of mayor in the first term but simply found himself thrust into it by operation of law. Neither had he served the full term because he only continued the service, interrupted by the death, of the deceased mayor. The vice-mayor’s assumption of the mayorship in the event of the vacancy is

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58. Aldovino vs. Commission on Elections Article 10, Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.

Facts: Asilo was elected councilor of Lucena City for 3 consecutive terms. During his 3rd term of office, the Sandiganbayan preventively suspended him for 90 days in relation with a criminal case he then faced. In the next election, Asilo filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position. Aldovino petitioned to have Asilo’s certificate of candidacy denied or cancelled on the ground that he had been elected and had served for three terms; his candidacy for a 4th term therefore violated the three-term limit rule under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of RA 7160 (Local Government Code). The COMELEC’s Second Division ruled in Asilo’s favour. It reasoned out that the three-term limit rule did not apply, as Asilo failed to render complete service for the 2004-2007 term because of the suspension the Sandiganbayan had ordered. The COMELEC en banc refused to reconsider the Second Division’s ruling. Hence, this petition Issues: 1. Whether preventive suspension of an elected local official is an interruption of the three-term limit rule, which would allow him to run for a 4th term; 2. Whether preventive suspension is considered involuntary renunciation as contemplated in Section 43(b) of RA 7160 Decision: Asilo’s third term was not interrupted by the Sandiganbayanimposed preventive suspension. The Constitutional limitation refers to the term, not to the service that a public official may render.

office. The elective official must have involuntarily left his office for a length of time, however short, for an effective interruption to occur. 2. Preventive suspension is – by its very nature – the exact opposite of voluntary renunciation; it is involuntary and temporary, and involves only the actual delivery of service, not the title to the office. But temporary inability or disqualification to exercise the functions of an elective post, even if involuntary, should not be considered an effective interruption of a term because it does not involve the loss of title to office; the office holder, while retaining title, is simply barred from exercising the functions of his office. The best indicator of the suspended official’s continuity in office is the absence of a permanent replacement and the lack of the authority to appoint one since no vacancy exists. Voluntary renunciation is an example of what does not constitute an interruption. In the context of the three-term limit rule, such loss of title is not considered an interruption because it is presumed to be purposely sought to avoid the application of the term limitation. “Voluntary renunciation” is more general than abandonment and resignation. The framers’ intent apparently was to close all gaps that an elective official may seize to defeat the three-term limit rule. Preventive suspension is easier to undertake than voluntary renunciation, as it does not require relinquishment or loss of office. Since it can easily be fabricated and dismissed later on, recognizing preventive suspension as an effective interruption of a term can serve as a circumvention more potent than the voluntary renunciation that the Constitution expressly disallows as an interruption. Secondary notes Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections: Involuntary severance from office when a term had been declared invalid in a final and executory judgment by COMELEC is an interruption. It is severance from office, or loss of title, that renders the three-term limit rule inapplicable.

1. Preventive suspension is not an interruption of the three-term limit. The “interruption” of a term exempting an elective official from the three-term limit rule is one that involves no less than the involuntary loss of title to

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59. Adormeo v COMELEC The two conditions for the application of the disqualification must concur: a) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post and 2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms (cited Lonzanida vs. COMELEC).

Facts: Adormeo and Talaga Jr. were the only candidates for mayor of Lucena City in the 2001 elections. Talaga Jr. was then the incumbent mayor. Talaga, Jr. was elected mayor in May 1992 (served full term) then got reelected in 1995-1998. However, in the 1998 election, he lost to Bernard G. Tagarao. In the recall election of 2000, he again won and served the unexpired term of Tagarao until June 30, 2001. Adormeo filed a Petition to Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy and/or Disqualify Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr., on the ground that Talaga Jr. was elected and had served as city mayor for three (3) consecutive terms. Talaga Jr. responded that he was not elected City Mayor for 3 consecutive terms pointing to his defeat in the 1998 election by Tagarao. Because of his defeat the consecutiveness of his years as mayor was interrupted. Respondent added that his service for 13 months and 18 days was not a full term. On, 2001, after canvassing, Talaga Jr. was proclaimed as the duly elected Mayor of Lucena City. Issue: Whether or not Talaga Jr. had already served 3 consecutive terms in office and is therefore disqualified to run for mayor of Lucena City in the May 14, 2001 elections

local office; he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply (cited in Borja Jr. vs COMELEC). The two conditions for the application of the disqualification must concur: 1. that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post; and 2. that he has fully served three consecutive terms (cited Lonzanida vs. COMELEC). COMELECs ruling that private respondent was not elected for three (3) consecutive terms should be upheld. The continuity of his mayorship was disrupted by his defeat in the 1998 elections, not by voluntary renunciation. Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which he was elected. Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three-term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. Addt’l To bolster his case, petitioner adverts to the comment of Fr. Joaquin Bernas, a Constitutional Commission member, stating that in interpreting said provision that “if one is elected representative to serve the unexpired term of another, that unexpired, no matter how short, will be considered one term for the purpose of computing the number of successive terms allowed.” As pointed out by the COMELEC, Fr. Bernas’ comment is pertinent only to members of the House of Representatives. Unlike local government officials, there is no recall election provided for members of Congress.

Held: No, Talaga Jr. has not served 3 consecutive terms; still qualified to run for mayor. The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position. It is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective

DISPOSITION: Instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. The resolution of public respondent Commission on Elections dated May 9, 2001, in Comelec SPA No. 01-055 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

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60. Socrates v COMELEC A recall election is no longer covered by the prohibition because it is no longer an immediate re-election after three consecutive terms and the intervening period constitutes an involuntary interruption in the continuity of service.

Facts: Hagedorn had been elected and served as mayor of Puerto Princesa City for three consecutive terms: in 1992-1995, 1995-1998 and 1998-2001. Obviously aware of the three-term limit principle, Hagedorn opted not to vie for the same mayoralty position in the 2001 elections, in which Socrates ran and eventually won. However, midway into his term, Socrates faced recall proceedings and in the recall election held, Hagedorn run for the former’s unexpired term as mayor. Socrates sought Hagedorn’s disqualification under the three-term limit rule. Issue: W/N one who has been elected and served for 3 consecutive full terms is qualified to run for mayor in the recall election. Held: Yes. The three-term limit rule for elective local officials is found in Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and reiterated in Section 43 (b) of RA No. 7160. The first part of the provisions provide that an elective local official cannot serve for more than three consecutive terms. The clear intent is that only consecutive terms count in determining the three-term limit rule.

election like a recall election is no longer an immediate re-election after three consecutive terms. Second, the intervening period constitutes an involuntary interruption in the continuity of service. Based from the deliberations of a Constitutional Commission, what the Constitution prohibits is an immediate re-election for a fourth term following three consecutive terms. The Constitution, however, does not prohibit a subsequent re-election for a fourth term as long as the re-election is not immediately after the end of the third consecutive term. A recall election midway in the term following the third consecutive term is a subsequent election but not an immediate re-election after the third term. Neither does the Constitution prohibit one barred from seeking immediate reelection to run in any other subsequent election involving the same term of office. What the Constitution prohibits is a consecutive fourth term. In the case of Hagedorn, his candidacy in the recall election on September 24, 2002 is not an immediate re-election after his third consecutive term which ended on June 30, 2001. The immediate re-election that the Constitution barred Hagedorn from seeking referred to the regular elections in 2001. From June 30, 2001 until the recall election on September 24, 2002, the mayor of Puerto Princesa was Socrates. During the same period, Hagedorn was simply a private citizen. This period is clearly an interruption in the continuity of Hagedorn’s service as mayor, not because of his voluntary renunciation, but because of a legal prohibition.

The second part states that voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time does not interrupt the continuity of service. The clear intent is that involuntary severance from office for any length of time interrupts continuity of service and prevents the service before and after the interruption from being joined together to form a continuous service or consecutive terms. After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate re-election for a fourth term. The prohibited election refers to the next regular election for the same office following the end of the third consecutive term. Any subsequent election, like a recall election, is no longer covered by the prohibition for two reasons. First, a subsequent 15

61. Latasa v COMELEC Facts: Petitioner Latasa, was elected mayor of the Municipality of Digos, Davao del Sur in 1992, 1995, and 1998. He filed a certificate of candidacy for city mayor for the 2001 elections. He stated therein that he is eligible therefor, and disclosed that he had already served for three consecutive terms as mayor of the Municipality of Digos and is now running for the first time for the position of city mayor. Sunga, also a candidate for city mayor in the said elections, filed before the COMELEC a petition to deny petitioner's candidacy. The Comelec’s First Division denied petitioner's certificate of candidacy. Pending his MR, he was proclaimed winner. After the proclamation, Comelec issued a resolution that declared him disqualified. Petitioner appealed, contending that when Digos was converted from a municipality to a city, it attained a different juridical personality separate from the municipality of Digos. So when he filed his certificate of candidacy for city mayor, it should not be construed as vying for the same local government post. Issue: Is petitioner Latasa eligible to run as candidate for the position of mayor of the newly-created City of Digos immediately after he served for three consecutive terms as mayor of the Municipality of Digos? Held: No. As a rule, in a representative democracy, the people should be allowed freely to choose those who will govern them. Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution is an exception to this rule, in that it limits the range of choice of the people. An elective local official, therefore, is not barred from running again in for same local government post, unless two conditions concur: 1.) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms to the same local government post, and 2.) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.

True, the new city acquired a new corporate existence separate and distinct from that of the municipality. This does not mean, however, that for the purpose of applying the subject Constitutional provision, the office of the municipal mayor would now be construed as a different local government post as that of the office of the city mayor. As stated earlier, the territorial jurisdiction of the City of Digos is the same as that of the municipality. Consequently, the inhabitants of the municipality are the same as those in the city. These inhabitants are the same group of voters who elected petitioner Latasa to be their municipal mayor for three consecutive terms. These are also the same inhabitants over whom he held power and authority as their chief executive for nine years. The framers of the Constitution specifically included an exception to the peoples’ freedom to choose those who will govern them in order to avoid the evil of a single person accumulating excessive power over a particular territorial jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in the same office. To allow petitioner Latasa to vie for the position of city mayor after having served for three consecutive terms as a municipal mayor would obviously defeat the very intent of the framers when they wrote this exception. Should he be allowed another three consecutive terms as mayor of the City of Digos, petitioner would then be possibly holding office as chief executive over the same territorial jurisdiction and inhabitants for a total of eighteen consecutive years. This is the very scenario sought to be avoided by the Constitution, if not abhorred by it. (Latasa vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 154829, 10 December 2003) Addt’l It cannot be denied that the Court has previously held in Mamba-Perez v. COMELEC that after an elective official has been proclaimed as winner of the elections, the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to pass upon his qualifications. An opposing party's remedies after proclamation would be to file a petition for quo warranto within ten days after the proclamation. Time and again, this Court has held that rules of procedure are only tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, such that when rigid application of the rules tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, this Court is empowered to suspend their operation. We will not hesitate to set aside technicalities in favor of what is fair and just.

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62. Ong v Alegre

With the view we take of the case, the disqualifying requisites are present herein, thus effectively barring petitioner Francis from running for mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte in the May 10, 2004 elections.

Private respondent Alegre and petitioner Francis Ong were candidates who filed certificates of candidacy for mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte in the 2004 elections. Francis was then the incumbent mayor.

The herein controversy revolves around the 1998-2001 mayoral term, albeit there can also be no quibbling that Francis ran for mayor of the same municipality in the May 1998 elections and actually served the 1998-2001 mayoral term by virtue of a proclamation initially declaring him mayor-elect.

Facts:

Alegre filed with the COMELEC a Petition to Disqualify, Deny Due Course and Cancel Certificate of Candidacy of Francis. The petition was predicated on the three-consecutive term rule, Francis having, according to Alegre, ran in the May 1995, May 1998, and May 2001 mayoralty elections and have assumed office as mayor and discharged the duties thereof for three (3) consecutive full terms corresponding to those elections. In the May 1998 elections, Alegre and Francis opposed each other for the office of mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte, with the latter being subsequently proclaimed by COMELEC as winner. Alegre filed an election protest, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). In it, the RTC declared Alegre as the duly elected mayor in that 1998 mayoralty contest, however, the decision came out only on July 4, 2001, when Francis had fully served the 1998-2001 mayoralty term and was in fact already starting to serve the 20012004 term as mayor-elect of the municipality of San Vicente Issue: W/N petitioner Francis’s assumption of office as Mayor for the mayoralty term 1998 to 2001 should be considered as full service for the purpose of the threeterm limit rule. Held: Yes. The three-term limit rule for elective local officials is found in Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution. Section 43 (b) of the Local Government Code restates the same rule. For the three-term limit for elective local government officials to apply, two conditions or requisites must concur, to wit: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three (3) consecutive terms in the same local government post, and (2) that he has fully served three (3) consecutive terms.

We hold that such assumption of office constitutes, for Francis, “service for the full term,” and should be counted as a full term served in contemplation of the three-term limit prescribed by the constitutional and statutory provisions, supra, barring local elective officials from being elected and serving for more than three consecutive term for the same position. It is true that the RTC-Daet, Camarines Norte ruled in Election Protest Case No. 6850, that it was Francis’ opponent (Alegre) who “won” in the 1998 mayoralty race and, therefore, was the legally elected mayor of San Vicente. However, that disposition, it must be stressed, was without practical and legal use and value, having been promulgated after the term of the contested office has expired. Petitioner Francis’ contention that he was only a presumptive winner in the 1998 mayoralty derby as his proclamation was under protest did not make him less than a duly elected mayor. His proclamation by the Municipal Board of Canvassers of San Vicente as the duly elected mayor in the 1998 mayoralty election coupled by his assumption of office and his continuous exercise of the functions thereof from start to finish of the term, should legally be taken as service for a full term in contemplation of the three-term rule. The absurdity and the deleterious effect of a contrary view is not hard to discern. Such contrary view would mean that Alegre would — under the three-term rule — be considered as having served a term by virtue of a veritably meaningless electoral protest ruling, when another actually served such term pursuant to a proclamation made in due course after an election.

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63. Mendoza v COMELEC

balance of the term assumed by the newly elected local official in a recall election should not also be held to be one term in reckoning the three--term limit.

Respondent Leonardo B. Roman held the post of Governor of Bataan province a number of times:

In both situations, neither the elective local official who is unable to finish his term nor the elected local official who only assumes the balance of the term of the ousted local official following the recall election could be considered to have served a full three--year term set by the Constitution.

Facts:

a) 1986 – 1988 Appointed OIC Governor of Bataan by former Pres. Aquino and served up to 1988 b) 1988 – 1992 Elected Governor and served up to 1992 c) 1994 – 1995 Elected Governor during the recall election in 1993, assumed office on 28 June 1994 and served up to 1995 d) 1995 – 1998 Elected Governor and served up to 1998 e) 1998 – 2001 Elected Governor and served up to 2001. In 2001, private respondent Roman again filed a certificate of candidacy for the same post in the May 2001 regular elections. On 16 May 2001, Leonardo Roman was proclaimed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Bataan. Petitioners seek to declare respondent Roman’s election as governor of Bataan as null and void for allegedly being contrary to Art. X, §8 of the Constitution. Issue: Should Roman's incumbency to the post of Governor following the recall elections be included in determining the three--consecutive term limit fixed by law?

The Constitution does not prohibit elective local officials from serving for more than three consecutive terms because, in fact, it excludes from the threeterm limit interruptions in the continuity of service, so long as such interruptions are not due to the voluntary renunciation of the office by an incumbent. Hence, the period from June 28, 1994 to June 30, 1995, during which respondent Leonardo B. Roman served as governor of Bataan by virtue of a recall election held in 1993, should not be counted. Since on May 14, 2001 respondent had previously served as governor of Bataan for only two consecutive terms (1995-1998 and 1998-2001), his election on that day was actually only his third term for the same position. A recall term should not be considered as one full term, because a contrary interpretation would in effect cut short the elected official’s service to less than nine years and shortchange his constituents. The desire to prevent monopoly of political power should be balanced against the need to uphold the voters’ obvious preference who, in the present case, is Roman who received 97 percent of the votes cast.

Held: No. A winner who dislodges in a recall election an incumbent elective local official merely serves the balance of the latter's term of office; it is not a full three--year term. The law contemplates a continuous full three--year term before the proscription can apply, providing for only one exception, i.e., when an incumbent voluntarily gives up the office. If involuntary severance from the service which results in the incumbent’s being unable to finish his term of office because of his ouster through valid recall proceedings negates “one term” for purposes of applying the three--term limit, it stands to reason that the 18

64. Rivera III vs. Comelec Facts:

-term limit prescribed by the constitutional and statutory provisions barring local elective officials from being elected and serving for more than three consecutive terms for the same position.

In the May 2004 elections, respondent Morales ran as candidate for mayor of Mabalacat, Pampanga for the term 2004-2007. Petitioner Dee filed with the COMELEC a petition to cancel Morales’ Certificate of Candidacy on the ground that he was elected and had served three previous consecutive terms as mayor of Mabalacat. They alleged that his candidacy violated Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43 (b) of RA 7160.

The framers of the Constitution, by including this exception, wanted to establish some safeguards against the excessive accumulation of power as a result of consecutive terms. Therefore, having found respondent Morales ineligible, his Certificate of Candidacy dated December 30, 2003 should be cancelled. Not being a candidate, the votes cast for him SHOULD NOT BE COUNTED and must be considered stray votes.

Respondent Morales admitted that he was elected mayor of Mabalacat for the term 1995-1998 (first term) and 2001-2004 (third term), but he served the second term from 1998-2001 only as a "caretaker of the office" or as a "de facto officer" since his proclamation as mayor was declared void by the Regional Trial Court (RTC). He was also preventively suspended by the Ombudsman in an anti--graft case from January to July 1999.

2. The question now is whether it is the vice-mayor or petitioner Dee who shall serve for the remaining portion of the 2004 to 2007 term. In Labo v. Comelec, this Court has ruled that a second-place candidate cannot be proclaimed as a substitute winner, thus:

Issue: 1. Has Morales already served his 3-consecutive term?

“The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office.”

Held:

As a consequence of petitioner’s ineligibility, a permanent vacancy in the contested office has occurred. This should now be filled by the vice-mayor in accordance with Section 44 of the Local Government Code, to wit:

1. For the three-term limit for elective local government officials to apply, two conditions or requisites must concur, to wit: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post, and (2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.

Sec. 44. Permanent vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor and Vice-Mayor. – (a) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the vice-governor or the vice-mayor concerned shall become the governor or mayor.

2. If so, who should then take his position?

Respondent Morales was elected for the term 1998-2001. He assumed the position. He was mayor for the entire period notwithstanding the Decision of the RTC in the electoral protest case filed by petitioner Dee ousting him (Morales) as mayor (because the trial court’s ruling was promulgated only after the expiry of the 1998-2001 term). Respondent Morales is now serving his fourth term. He has been mayor of Mabalacat continuously without any break since 1995. In just over a month, by June 30, 2007, he will have been mayor of Mabalacat for twelve (12) continuous years. His assumption of office for the second term constituted “service for the full term” and should be counted as a full term served in contemplation of the three-

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65. Dizon v COMELEC Facts: Dizon, a resident and taxpayer of Mabalacat, Pampanga, filed a case with the COMELEC to disqualify Morales, the incumbent mayor of Mabalacat on the ground that the latter was elected and had fully served three previous consecutive terms. Dizon alleged that Morales was municipal mayor in 1995, 1998, 2001 and 2004. Thus, Morales should not have been allowed to have filed his Certificate of Candidacy on March 2007 for the same position and same municipality. Morales contended that he is still eligible and qualified to run because he was not elected for the said position in the 1998 elections. He averred that the COMELEC affirmed the decision of the RTC declaring Dee as the duly elected Mayor of Mabalacat in the 1998 elections. His term should be reckoned from 2001. He added that his election in 2004 is only for his second term. COMELEC Second Division ruled in favor of Morales and denied the petition. It took judicial notice of SC’s ruling in the Rivera case promulgated on May 9, 2007 where it was held that Morales was elected as mayor of Mabalacat in 1995, 1998 and 2001 (notwithstanding the RTC Decision in an electoral protest case that the then proclamation of Morales was void). The SC ruled in that case that Morales violated the three--term limit under Section 43 of the LGC. Hence, Morales was considered not a candidate in the 2004 elections, and this failure to qualify for the 2004 elections is a gap and allows him to run again for the same position in 2007 elections. Issues: 1. WON the period served by Morales in the 2004--2007 term (although he was ousted from his office as Mayor on May16, 2007) should be considered his fourth term 2. WON the 2007--2010 term of Morales is his 5th term Held:

Both Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of the Local Government Code state that the term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, shall be three years, and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Except in case of Voluntary renunciation. There should be a concurrence of two conditions for the application of the disqualification: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post and (2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms. In the Rivera case, we found that Morales was elected as mayor of Mabalacat for four consecutive terms. Hence, we disqualified Morales from his candidacy in the May 2004 elections because of the three-term limit. Our ruling in the Rivera case served as Morales’ involuntary severance from office with respect to the 2004-2007 term. Involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. The vice mayor assumed the office of the mayor, and such assumption, no matter how short it may seem to Dizon, interrupted Morales’ continuity of service. Thus, Morales did not hold office for the full term of 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2007. (4th term) 2. Dizon claims that the 2007-2010 term is Morales’ fifth term in office. NO. Morales occupied the position of mayor of Mabalacat for the following periods:1995-1998, 1998-2001, 2001-2004, 2004-2007. However, because of his disqualification, Morales was not the duly elected mayor for the 2004-2007 term. Neither did Morales hold the position of mayor of Mabalacat for the full term. Morales cannot be deemed to have served the full term of 2004-2007 because he was ordered to vacate his post before the expiration of the term. Morales’ occupancy of the position of mayor of Mabalacat from 2004-2007 cannot be counted as a term for purposes of computing the three-term limit. Indeed, the period from 17 May 2007 to 30 June 2007 served as a gap for purposes of the three-term limit rule. Thus, the present 1 July 2007 to 30 June 2010 term is effectively Morales’ first term for purposes of the three-term limit rule.

1. NO. In our decision promulgated on 9 May 2007, this Court unseated Morales during his fourth term, cancelled his Certificate of Candidacy which disqualified Morales from being a candidate in the May 2004 elections. The votes cast for Morales were considered stray votes.

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66. Bolos, Jr. v COMELEC

After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate reelection for a fourth term. The prohibited election refers to the next regular election for the same office following the end of the third consecutive term.

Petitioner was elected as the Punong Barangay in Bohol for 3 consecutive terms (1994, 1997, 2002). In May 2004, during his incumbency, he ran for Municipal Councilor and won. He assumed office leaving his post as Punong Barangay. After serving his term as a councilor he filed his candidacy for the position of Punong Barangay in the 2007 Barangay Elections.

The Court held that two conditions for the application of the disqualification must concur: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same government post; and (2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.

Facts:

Cinconiegue, then incumbent Punong Barangay and also a candidate for the same office, filed a petition for disqualification on the ground that Bolos Jr. has already served the maximum limit of three term hence no longer eligible to run and hold the position in accordance with Sec. 8, Article X of the Constitution and Sec. 43 (b) of RA 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991. Cinconiegue contended that Bolos’ relinquishment of the position of Punong Barangay in July 2004 was voluntary on his part, as it could be presumed that it was his personal decision to run as municipal councilor in the May 14, 2004 National and Local Elections. He added that petitioner knew that if he won and assumed the position, there would be a voluntary renunciation of his post as Punong Barangay.

In this case, petitioner was elected as Punong Barangay for three consecutive terms, satisfying the first condition for disqualification. What is to be determined is whether petitioner is deemed to have voluntarily renounced his position as Punong Barangay. The Court agrees with the Comelec that petitioner’s relinquishment of the office of Punong Barangay in Bohol, as a consequence of his assumption to office as Sangguniang Bayan member is a voluntary renunciation.

Issue:

When petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for the Office of Sangguniang Bayan, he was not deemed resigned. All the acts attending his pursuit of his election as municipal councilor point out to an intent and readiness to give up his post as Punong Barangay once elected to the higher elective office. He knew that his election as municipal councilor would entail abandonment of the position he held, and he intended to forego of it. Abandonment, like resignation, is voluntary.

Whether or not there was a voluntary renunciation of the office of Punong Barangay by Bolos when he assumed the post of Municipal Councilor so that he is deemed to have served for three consecutive terms.

Petitioner erroneously argues that when he assumed the position of Sangguniang Bayan member, he left his post as Punong Barangay by operation of law; hence, he did not fully serve his third term as Punong Barangay.

Held:

The term "operation of law" is defined by the Philippine Legal Encyclopedia as "a term describing the fact that rights may be acquired or lost by the effect of a legal rule without any act of the person affected."

The Comelec resolved the petition in favor of Cinconiegue.

The term of barangay officials and members of the sangguniang kabataan shall be for five (5) years, which shall begin after the regular election of barangay officials on the second Monday of May 1997. Socrates vs. Comelec held that the rule on the three-term limit, embodied in the Constitution and the Local Government Code, has two parts: x x x The first part provides that an elective local official cannot serve for more than three consecutive terms. The second part states that voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time does not interrupt the continuity of service.

In this case, petitioner did not fill or succeed to a vacancy by operation of law. He instead relinquished his office as Punong Barangay during his third term when he won and assumed office as Sangguniang Bayan member of Dauis, Bohol, which is deemed a voluntary renunciation of the Office of Punong Barangay.

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67. COMELEC v Cruz

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