Adam Smith, Of Sympathy, Justice, And Self-interest

Wong, Jason Social Studies 10a Nicolas Prevelakis October 17, 2007

Of Sympathy, Justice, and Self-Interest Behind enemy lines two years ago on a foreboding mountaintop in Afghanistan, four Navy SEALs were confronted with a critical moral dilemma. They had been sent behind enemy lines to kill or capture a Taliban leader who controlled between 150 to 200 fighters. However, they had just been discovered by three unarmed Afghan goat herders. Their discovery by these three Afghani goat herders jeopardized the Navy SEALs’ mission, and furthermore put their lives at stake.1 With no reliable way of guarding these goat herders, what should these Navy SEALs do? To sympathize with these goat herders and let them go would be to risk their lives if these goat herders were colluding with the enemy. To act in their self-interest would be to terminate three potentially innocent lives but, if their act were discovered, bring on domestic and international media attention which could potentially lead to criminal charges and/or political and diplomatic consequences for their country. Therefore, considering these circumstances, what action should the Navy SEALs take and how would we justify that action? In a case such as the real-life example described above, Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments leaves much to be desired in reconciling sympathy with self-interest to attain justice. When attempting to apply his theories on sympathy, self-interest, and justice, it is difficult to come to a conclusive decision on what Smith’s prescription to the individual or to society would be. In Theory of Moral

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This case is based on Marcus Luttrell’s book, Lone Survivor: The Eyewitness Account of Operation Redwing and the Lost Heroes of Seal Team 10. An interesting discussion on this case in terms of army’s rules of engagement can be found in Diana West’s article for The Washington Times titled “Killed by the rules”http://www.washingtontimes.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20070817/EDITORIAL04/1081 70016/1013

Wong, Jason Of Sympathy, Justice, and Self-Interest Page 2 of 8 Sentiments, Smith claims that the rules of justice are the “only rules of morality which are precise and accurate; that those of all the other virtues are loose, vague, and indeterminate.”2 In this manner, Smith promises more than he can deliver as justice is not necessarily as precise and accurate as he claims. Basically, Smith overreaches in trying to define justice to fit too many different parts of his theory, and this overuse confuses the reader’s understanding of justice and how to determine just actions. In the same paragraph that he describes justice as precise and accurate, Smith explains that justice can be compared similarly to the rules of grammar3. This relationship between the rules of justice and the rules of grammar is hard to understand, and consequently impinges on our understanding of what he means when he talks about justice. First of all, the comparison between justice and grammar is confusing because Smith describes justice as “precise and accurate”, but the rules of grammar are neither necessarily precise nor accurate—so this comparison does not seem to fit and should not be used if we are to understand Smith’s first claim that the rules of justice are precise. Grammar is neither necessarily precise nor accurate because often the well-written essay can circumvent the typical rules of grammar. Second, in many ways, one can argue that the rules of grammar are “loose, vague, and indeterminate” according to the special circumstances of the sentence and the paper at large. In this comparison, the rules of justice can be concerned with both the microcosmic and macrocosmic circumstances of the situation, just as the rules of grammar deal both with the 2

Smith, Adam Theory of Moral Sentiments Page 327 §1 Smith, Adam Theory of Moral Sentiments Page 327 §1 he writes “the first may be compared to the rules of grammar… which present us rather with a general idea of the perfection we ought to aim at” 3

Wong, Jason Of Sympathy, Justice, and Self-Interest Page 3 of 8 microcosmic circumstances of the sentence and the macrocosmic circumstances of the paper at large. Therefore, if the comparison between the rules of justice and the rules of grammar are apt, then Smith would mean to say (but doesn’t) that the rules of justice can vary depending on the circumstance. Since there are two ways of reading this comparison, it is hard to specifically envision what Smith sees as justifiable actions in morally ambiguous cases where sympathy and self-interest conflict. It is in these circumstances that we might need a guide on the theory on moral sentiments the most. To start from the beginning, there are two important questions that must be ascertained in order to codify a series of principles of morals, for Smith. The first, he asks, is “wherein does virtue consist?” Secondly he wonders how, and by what faculties, can we come about an answer for the first question, and prefer it to others. In other words, what is virtue, what actions are virtuous, and how do we differentiate these actions from others, which we would distinguish as wrong or unjust actions? To answer the first question, Smith declares that virtue exists either in propriety, prudence, or in benevolence4. To answer the second, Smith declares that the principle of approbation, which is “the power of the faculty of the mind which renders certain characters agreeable or disagreeable to us”5, is accounted for in three ways which are self-love, reason, and sentiment6. What does this all mean?

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Smith, Adam Theory of Moral Sentiments Page 267 §4 “If the character of virtue, therefore, cannot be ascribed indifferently to all our affections, when under proper government and direction, it must be confined either to those which aim directly at our own private happiness, or to those which aim directly at that of others. If virtue, therefore, does not consist in propriety, it must consist either in prudence or in benevolence.” 5 Smith, Adam Theory of Moral Sentiments Page 314 §1 6 Smith, Adam Theory of Moral Sentiments Page 315 §2 “Self-love, reason, and sentiment, therefore, are the three different sources which have been assigned for the principle of approbation.”

Wong, Jason Of Sympathy, Justice, and Self-Interest Page 4 of 8 Smith seems to say that components of propriety, prudence, and benevolence all exist in virtuous action, and that by reasoning through self-love, reason and sentiment, we come to realize how some actions are virtuous compared to others, and why other actions are not virtuous. I would posit that through this method, Smith can best choose an action and justify it in a case such as that of the Navy SEALs. But Smith avoids using this method to define just actions and justify them. This is most likely because of the imprecise nature of such reasoning. Propriety, prudence, and benevolence, and self-love, reason, and sentiment, are all traits of virtue that vary from circumstance to circumstance, as Smith has admitted. Rather, Smith would prefer that justice be described as the stable entity by which social cohesion can flourish. It is “the main pillar that upholds the whole edifice”7 and as such, for Smith, justice should be a rigid set of principles rather than one that is flexible and changes according to the situation. This leads to an interesting discussion on what evidence Smith uses to support his claim that justice is rigid and precise, rather than situational and flexible. In the same paragraph where Smith describes justice as a pillar, he describes men as self-centered, opportunistic animals. Thus, he posits, justice is required because a society of opportunistic men without justice would be a society of “wild beasts”. To support this claim he utilizes the example of a society of robbers and murderers which he states could not exist unless they, “according to the trite observation, abstain from robbing and murdering one another.”8 However, the foundation of this society is not on justice, or beneficence, as Smith would argue. Even if they act judiciously and beneficently to one another, the foundation of a society of robbers 7 8

Smith, Adam Theory of Moral Sentiments Page 86 §4 Smith, Adam Theory of Moral Sentiments Page 86 §3

Wong, Jason Of Sympathy, Justice, and Self-Interest Page 5 of 8 and murderers within rests on self-interest and ambition, and the concept of justice in this sense is different from the concept of justice in other societies. A society of robbers and murderers would not be a society founded upon the same ideas of justice as a peaceful state of merchants. Smith does not distinguish justice and beneficence from these two states in this sense, because he attempts to overemphasize the importance of justice in keeping a society together and therefore exaggerates the universality of justice among inherent differences such as those between criminals and citizens. Furthermore, his discussion of men as opportunistic animals conflicts with his prior discussion on the importance of sympathy and men’s desire for approbation in human society.9 The following passage emphasizes self-interest and opportunism over sympathy and other virtues in order to make the point that it is the power of justice that holds society together. Men, though naturally sympathetic, feel so little for another, with whom they have no particular connexion, in comparison of what they feel for themselves; the misery of one, who is merely their fellow-creature, is of so little importance to them in comparison even of a small conveniency of their own; they have it so much in their power to hurt him, and may have so many temptations to do so, that if this principle [of justice] did not stand up within them in his defence, and overawe them into a respect for his innocence, they would, like wild beasts, be at all times ready to fly upon him; and a man would enter an assembly of men as he enters a den of lions.10 Thus, based on this passage alone, it would appear that if Smith were to predict the

Navy SEALs’ next action, he would say that they should kill the three goat herders and complete their mission without fear of retaliation. This passage tells us that he 9

Smith, Adam Theory of Moral Sentiments Page 9 §1 Recall his passage, “How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it. Of this kind is pity or compassion, the emotion which we feel for the misery of others, when we either see it, or are made to conceive it in a very lively manner.” 10 Smith, Adam Theory of Moral Sentiments Page 86 §4 Emphasis added.

Wong, Jason Of Sympathy, Justice, and Self-Interest Page 6 of 8 would not only say that the Navy SEALs should kill the three goat herders in order to protect their mission and potentially their lives, but also because the Navy SEALs are opportunistic. So, in the absence of law and the unlikelihood of being caught, they would leap upon this opportunity “like wild beasts”, for they “may have so many temptations to do so”. But this line of reasoning conflicts with the rest of Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments because throughout the rest of the book (those passages which do not emphasize the importance of justice), he emphasizes pity, compassion and other forms of sympathy as the foundation for human interaction. This is Smith’s major contradiction with his own philosophy, for sympathy would require that the men spare the goat herders because they were unarmed and potentially innocent. If the goat herders came back armed that would be another matter, but as of their unfortunate meeting, those three goat herders had not apparently wronged the SEALs. Smith could even argue that without sympathy, more instances such as the My Lai massacre in Vietnam may occur.11 In this way sympathy would be a good thing, in that it would prevent civilian deaths in a time of war. However, when looking at sympathy in a different light, Smith also seems to argue that one can be too sympathetic when justice is concerned. For example, suppose that you were a juror or a judge casting judgment on a thief. Smith would say that since the thief were caught, disarmed, and are now at your mercy; you might sympathize with their condition, and be less inclined to lay punishment.12 In this situation the juror’s sympathy may be too much, and society may be cheated out

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An article on this incident may be found on http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/My_Lai_Massacre Smith, Adam Theory of Moral Sentiments Page 91 §11 we can use the example of the centinel for comparison, “He looks upon the centinel as an unfortunate victim, who, indeed, must, and ought to be, devoted to the safety of numbers, but whom still, in his heart, he would be glad to save; and he is only sorry, that the interest of the many should oppose it.” 12

Wong, Jason Of Sympathy, Justice, and Self-Interest Page 7 of 8 of the justice it should receive. Again, Smith’s conceptions of the interaction between justice and sympathy leave much to be desired, since there seems to be no hard and fast rule on rectifying the differences of the two concepts when they conflict. Smith is also wrong when he states that we should consider justice to be the only precise virtue in our moral considerations. If justice were the only precise virtue, then it would seem that all the other virtues would not be required because all unjust acts would be punished, and just acts would be rewarded. But society is more complicated than that, and thus it is not enough for Smith to say that that justice is the one virtue that is required for harmonious social cohesion, as he does on page 86 §4 where he states: Though Nature, therefore, exhorts mankind to acts of beneficence, by the pleasing consciousness of deserved reward, she has not thought it necessary to guard and enforce the practice of it by the terrors of merited punishment in case it should be neglected. It is the ornament which embellishes, not the foundation which supports the building, and which it was, therefore, sufficient to recommend, but by no means necessary to impose. Justice, on the contrary, is the main pillar that upholds the whole edifice. Justice cannot be the main pillar that upholds the whole edifice because there are

many pillars that uphold society, of which justice is a complex component. I say this because there are certain instances, such as in the case of the Navy SEALs, where justice is in doubt and there is no precise measure of justice. Who is to say whose lives are more valuable, the American soldier’s or the unarmed goat herders? Who is to say that if the positions were reversed, we would not feel differently about a particular outcome in this situation? Finally, does Smith give us moral guidance, if we have to make necessary decisions where the only options are that which are

Wong, Jason Of Sympathy, Justice, and Self-Interest Page 8 of 8 distasteful in any other circumstance? How do we tell a wrong from an extreme wrong in that case? Ultimately, in the case of the Navy SEALs, the Leading Petty Officer decided to spare the goat herder’s lives. The SEALs release the goat herders and in less than an hour, a sizable Taliban force attacked them. All but the Leading Petty Officer are killed. In the battle, approximately a hundred Taliban forces were killed or wounded, along with sixteen additional dead Navy SEALs and Army special ops forces whose helicopter was shot down. It seems that sympathy for the goat herders trumped the Navy SEALs’ self-interests. These soldiers sacrificed their lives to live up to an ideal that the innocent should be spared the violence of war as much as possible. The actions of the soldiers are not compatible with Smith’s passage stating his theory on animalistic instincts. The actions of the soldiers are compatible, however, with Smith’s main theory that even in the toughest situations, human sympathy may rein supreme. This is the message that Smith should have continued to concentrate on, rather than over-emphasizing the importance of justice. How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it. Of this kind is pity or compassion, the emotion which we feel for the misery of others, when we either see it, or are made to conceive it in a very lively manner.13

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Smith, Adam Theory of Moral Sentiments Page 9 §1