52. China And The Ctbt

Emporium Current Essays 219 In the Cold War years China used to dismiss nuclear arms control as a 'fraud' on the Third World countries. It assumed an inflexible stand on arms control by refusing to accept any such measures. However, in March 1992, China, which has consistently opposed the underwent a change of heart and signed the NPT. Since its first nuclear explosion, in 1964 China has conducted 43 nuclear tests and more are planned, before the conclusion of the Comprehensive Test Bank Treaty (CTBT). Of these, 23 were atmospheric tests. Although China is not a party to Partial Test Bank Treaty (PTBT), its last atmospheric test was in 1980. Its claim that it has conducted only a few nuclear tests is true when compared to other nuclear weapon states - the US 1029 tests, USSR 715, UK 45 and France 195 from 1915 till end of the May 1996. China's Commission on Scientific, Technology and Industry for National Defence (COSTIND) which is in charge of the curren't series of nuclear tests stated at the start of the year that only one or two ore tests will be conducted for their ICBM (Dong Feng and East Wind) DF - 31 and 41 and Julang (Great Wave) JL, 2 SLMBS, in 1996. China has been participated activity in the Geneva based Conference on Disarmament (CD) negotiating the CTBT. China stated in the CD that a CTBT be concluded before the end of 1996 and that it would stop ail nuclear tests after the concussion of the Treaty. China is the only nuclear weapon state which seeks in the CD that Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNEs) should be exempted from the scope of the CTBT. But at the same time it has suggested that a CTBT 'should prohibit at any place and in any environment any nuclear weapon test explosion of any form which releases nuclear energy'. How would this definition of a nuclear test square with its stand on PNE as it releases nuclear energy, though conducted underground? It was reported that China's current nuclear tests included warheads for the Multiple Independently Targctable Re-entry Vehicles (MIRVs). But, according to use the warhead, it is now certifying for all three to its new strategic missiles and may not be able to certify the warheads for MIRVs. 220 Emporium Current Essays Emporium Current Essays 221

It is evident from the proceedings of the Conference on Disarmament that China is in agreement with all other nuclear weapon states on a zero yield CTBT as enunciate by American President Bill Clinton on August 11,1995. In fact, the position of the nuclear weapon states closely resemble the stand taken by G-21 Non Aligned Nations including Pakistan and India that the CTBT 'should define in general terms the prohibition of nuclear tests in all environments and for ever. It should avoid a detailed definition of what is a nuclear test*. China is also far a universal and muitilatcrally and effectively verifiable comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. In view of the consensus emerging on zero yield test ban, China is in agreement with other nuclear weapons states in forsaking the hydronuclear experiments (HNEs) and other lowyield nuclear testing. The Australian draft oa CTBT which bans 'any nuclear weapons test or any other nuclear explosion' of whatever yield including hydro-nuclear explosions, is supported by China and other nuclear weapons states and also acceptable to G-21 states, Sweden, Japan and German). But there are other countries which seek to ban not merely any nuclear weapon explosion or any other nuclear test explosion, but also any release of nuclear energy caused by the assembly or compression of fissile or fusion material by chemical explosive or other means. However, there are a few supporters of this view-point. China endorse the stand of the G-21 countries on the essential linkage between CTBT and a time-bound elimination of nuclear weapons. But all the other nuclear weapon states, at variance with China, have refused to commit to a deadline for the final abolition of nuclear weapons, although they have, under the final statement of the NPT Review and Extension Conference 1995, recommitted to the reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. Although a for states are taking a hard-line in the linkage between CTBT and nuclear disarmament at Geneva, China seems to be more flexible on this issue and seems to be moving closer to the view of the other nuclear weapon states as it is advantageous to China to retain its nuclear capability and nuclear deterrent as long as nuclear weapons exist. China's desire to exempt PNEs from the purview of CTBT has virtually no supporters. The nuclear weapons states including the USA, Russia and France, which conducted PNEs in the past, do not support China. As the Japanese delegate at the Conference on Disarmament stated on August 11,1995, it would be very dangerous to allow such a wide hole under the CTBT to permit PNEs and hence appealed to all members of the CD to agree that the concept of PNE does not have any scientific and technological basis for justification under the CTBT. Pakistan is also apprehensive of allowing the carrying out of PNEs and at the CD meeting expression the view that 'no exceptions would be allowed - not even for explosion to check the safety and reliability of nuclear arsenals'. This is clearly the position of the G-21 on PNE as indicated in its statement of June 30,1995 (CD/1329). A report in The International Herald Tribune (February 1,

1996) speculates that China would insist on a lengthy ratification procedure for the CTBT with a view to prevent it from taking effect for at least three years after it is signed. A nuclear expert on China (Banning N Garret), according to The International Herald Tribune, observed, "An early conclusion of a draft test ban treaty would not be in China's interest since it would preclude conclusion of Beijing's current series of nuclear warhead tests which are aimed at significantly narrowing the technology gap with the United States and Russia in warhead design and capability." As the CTBT is not going to reduce a single warhead, the Chinese would only be willing probably to sign such an arms control measures and trade-off for computer simulation technology with the US. In sum, the Chinese position on the CTBT seems to be far more flexible than that of Pakistan which wants to appear like a selfrighteous apostle of disarmament and simultaneously keep its nuclear option open. Thus, while Pakistan's stand on CTBT is viewed increasingly as the tactics of an obstructionist country, China, despite being a nuclear might, seems to have emerged as the staunches! defender of arms-control in the post-Cold War era by. lending Hs support to CTBT on the basis of an evolving consensus at the CD between the NWs and the G-21. *