372 Ko Us-eu Uniqueness
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DDI KO
US-EU relations US-EU relations...........................................................................................................................................................................................1 Inevitable......................................................................................................................................................................................................2 AT: Value Gap..............................................................................................................................................................................................3 Alt Cause: Bush...........................................................................................................................................................................................4 Alt Causalties...............................................................................................................................................................................................5 Alt Causalities..............................................................................................................................................................................................6 Alt Causalities..............................................................................................................................................................................................7
1
DDI KO
Inevitable Threats make US-EU relations inevitable – the “rift” is exaggerated Mary Elise Sarotte, Ph.D. in History from Yale, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2008, The Worst Allies, Except for All the Others: US-European relations in the age of George W. Bush, International Politics (2008) 45, 310–324. doi:10.1057/palgrave.ip.8800168, Palgrave Macmillian How worried should those who care about the transatlantic relationship be? The answer to this question provides some cold comfort. Just as the 'unprecedented' nature of the US-European rift has been exaggerated, so too has the significance of it. In true Casablanca style, reports of its demise have been greatly exaggerated. The transatlantic relationship will survive the repudiation of Ikenberry's strategic restraint model, although not as well as it might have if it had held to its tenets. Why? It will not happen for the reason offered by Timothy Garton Ash in Free World, namely because the West shares a history of freedom (Garton Ash, 2004). Rather, a darker vision (also present in Garton Ash's book) is more persuasive. There is no way to face
challenges arising from weapons of mass destruction, failing states, halting development, and even climate change as an individual nation-state. As Mick Cox has pointed out, September 11, 2001, reminded us that 'we live in an international system where the conflict between the haves and have-nots, the ins and the outs, the settled and the dissatisfied powers, continues unabated' (Cox, 2004, 468). Developed countries must work together, and there is no better alternative for the US than working with Europe. In other words, there is no way around the uncomfortable circumstance that developed nations have become targets of asymmetrical attacks. Given the weapons technology available, these have the potential to cause devastating damage. While both US and European nations face this common threat, the American public hears more about it, since the Bush Administration emphasized it so strongly during the 2004 campaign. Republicans would say that it had to do so, to keep the country safe; Democrats would say that it had to do so, to keep its electoral majority safe. Partisan views notwithstanding, the political scientist William Walker has a point when he argues that the Bush concept of international order mirrors many of the key concepts of the German political theorist Carl Schmitt (Walker, 2004). According to Schmitt, politics is
ultimately about an other, an enemy. The 43rd president has done a very successful job of creating a sense of ongoing threat to US domestic life. Leaders in European capitals do not tend to emphasize the threat in the same way as the US leadership, but it does not change the fact that a shared vulnerability is an unavoidable constant. This vulnerability is what will ultimately keep the transatlantic relationship together. Unfortunately, the US is no longer following a grand strategy that promoted and enabled cooperation. But the pressure to cooperate is there nonetheless. If Americans and Europeans are stuck with each other, what is the best way forward?
2
DDI KO
AT: Value Gap Culture doesn’t affect the transatlantic alliance Christopher Layne, Bush School of Government and Public Service, Texas A&M University, 2008, It's Over, Over There: The Coming Crack-up in Transatlantic Relations, International Politics (2008) 45, 325–347. doi:10.1057/ip.2008.6, Palgrave Macmillian Probably the best known argument that there is a cultural schism between the US and Europe is that of the neoconservative foreign policy analyst Robert Kagan. As Kagan wrote, 'It is time to stop pretending that Europeans and Americans share a common view of the world...' (Kagan, 2002b, 1; also, see Kagan, 2003a). If it is true that Europe and the US no longer hold a common worldview, then Atlanticism's champions might have cause for concern. As the fallout from the March 2003 US invasion of Iraq has made apparent, there is a culture/values gap between the United States and Europe. Yet, it is easy to exaggerate its significance. Going back even to the period before the United States achieved independence from Britain, American relations with Europe have always been complex, nuanced, and ambivalent. Historically, America's national identity has expressed itself in both the embrace, and rejection, of Europe. In some ways America and Europe are alike, and in other ways they are very different. So the fact that there are today transatlantic differences over culture and values should not surprise anyone. The real question is, does it matter? And in terms of geopolitics, the answer is: probably not. Notwithstanding transatlantic myth-making (which extends back to the late 1940s), alliances are based on common interests, not on common values and a shared culture. In assessing the future of NATO, and US–European relations, the crucial issue is whether Europe and the United States still share enough common interests to hold them together in an alliance relationship.
3
DDI KO
Alt Cause: Bush Bush’s policies hurt transatlantic relations Christopher Layne, Bush School of Government and Public Service, Texas A&M University, 2008, It's Over, Over There: The Coming Crack-up in Transatlantic Relations, International Politics (2008) 45, 325–347. doi:10.1057/ip.2008.6, Palgrave Macmillian Another commonly accepted explanation for the current difficulty in the transatlantic relationship is that this is attributable to the George W. Bush administration's policies. Those who adhere to this interpretation believe that once the administration leaves office in January 2009, the wounds inflicted on the US–European relationship will heal. This is not a very convincing argument, however. Doubtless the Bush administration's heavy-handed assertion of US power has aggravated transatlantic relations. However, its unilateral policies are not the fundamental cause of widening rift between the United States and Europe, which is the product of much deeper and more fundamental factors.3 This is not to deny that the administration has acted in defiance of European policy preferences, but it hardly is the first to do so. Indeed, the idea that the United States — until the George W. Bush administration — preferred to act multilaterally is more myth than fact.4 Following World War II the United States created a web of security and economic institutions to solidify its hegemony in the non-Soviet world and promote its own grand strategic ambitions. The United States sought to avail itself of its allies' strategic resources (and keep them from drifting into the Soviet sphere) but it never intended to be constrained by them — and seldom has been.5 All post-1945 administrations 'have believed that the only way' the United States could attain its most critical grand strategic goals 'was to keep others from having too much influence' (Sestanovich, 2005, 13). In the Suez, Berlin, and Cuban missile crises, and during the Vietnam War, the United States acted unilaterally. Similarly, according to Stephen Sestanovich, it also did so during the Euromissile crisis of the early 1980s, and during the negotiations on German reunification. And although, the US-led NATO interventions in Bosnia (1995) and Kosovo (1999), may have appeared to be — and certainly were sold by Washington as — multilateral actions, in fact they were not. As Walt observes, 'America's European allies complained during both episodes, but could do little to stop the United States from imposing its preferences upon them' (Walt, 2005, 46). In truth, when they felt that US interests required doing so, preceding administrations acted no less unilaterally than has the current administration.6 On the other hand, the George W. Bush administration's policies
have driven home to the Europeans the consequences of American hegemony, and by so doing have cast a long shadow over the future of the transatlantic relationship.7
4
DDI KO
Alt Causalties US-EU relations unrevivable – multiple diverging interests Roger E Kanet, Professor at Miami, focus on postcommunist Europe, on questions of European and global security, 2008, Still Mars, Still Venus? The United States, Europe, and the Future of the Transatlantic Relationship International Politics (2008) 45, 231– 235. doi:10.1057/ip.2008.1, Palgrave Macmillian Christopher Layne, in 'It's Over, Over There: The Coming Crack-Up in Transatlantic Relations,' argues, probably most forcefully of all the contributors to this symposium, that 'Euro–American ties — and NATO — have been ruptured, and never again will be the same.' He notes that a central aspect of US policy throughout the Cold War and beyond has been to prevent the emergence of a truly independent Europe as a possible challenger to US hegemony. There are four reasons for the demise of NATO. First, the Cold War's end has deprived NATO of its essential raison d'être. Second, the EU has not only taken huge strides toward attaining political and economic unity, but now has also taken significant steps to creating the capacity to act independently of the United States in the security arena. Third, the structural effects of unipolarity are pushing the EU in the direction of counter-balancing American preponderance. And, finally, the Iraq war has highlighted the divergent geopolitical interests of the US and the EU, and many other major policy issues — from Iranian nuclear policy and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to global warming — have the potential so split the two even further.
Can’t solve US-EU relations – foreign issues overwhelm James P. Rubin, Adjunct Professor at Columbia University's School of International and Public Affairs. He served as Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs from 1997 to 2000, July/August 2008, Foreign Affairs, Building a New Atlantic Alliance, http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20080701faessay87407/james-p-rubin/building-a-new-atlantic-alliance.html On the surface, transatlantic relations are in far better shape today than they were during the run-up to the Iraq war. But it would a mistake to underestimate the depth of the wounds Washington's reputation has suffered. Today, the United
be
States lacks concrete European support on vital issues, and European confidence in U.S. leadership has collapsed. Fortunately, both the Democratic and the Republican presidential candidates recognize how much harm has been done and have vowed to restore the United States' standing in the world. The 2008 presidential election provides an opportunity for a fresh start in U.S.-European relations. The new administration should capitalize on this moment by declaring that the era of U.S. unilateralism is over and that partnership with Europe is a central tenet of U.S. foreign policy. Then, it should launch a
diplomatic initiative to win closer cooperation from European allies in exchange for substantial changes in U.S. policies toward Afghanistan and Iran and on issues such as climate change and the war on terrorism. Culture is dividing the US and Europe David Clark, Special Adviser to the ex Foreign Secretary Robin Cook and senior research fellow at the Federal Trust, 2008, International Politics (2008) 45, 276–291. doi:10.1057/ip.2008.4, European Foreign Policy and American Primacy, Palgrave Macmillian It was not always so. The
high point of Atlanticism from the 1940s to the late 1960s coincided with an extraordinary convergence of political outlook among the participating countries. The need to face a common enemy (Nazi Germany, then Soviet Russia) and the shared experience of the depression produced a consensus in favour of multilateral diplomacy and welfare capitalism that defined post-war Atlantic cooperation. The UN, NATO, the Marshall Plan and Bretton Woods were the main instruments of this consensus. It was so strong that throughout the Cold War it was common for Western policy makers and analysts to talk of Western Europe and North America as comprising an 'Atlantic community' with a common set of interests and values (Lundestad, 2003, 65–66). It is noticeable that almost no one uses that phrase today. Even the much looser notion of 'the West' has been dismissed as an artificial construct unable to survive the disappearance of a hostile 'East' (Harries, 1993). But there is surely more to this than a change of strategic context. If the Alliance had simply been one of defensive expediency in the face of a common threat, no one would have thought to coin the term 'Atlantic community'. That was made possible by the fact
that its members shared a progressive liberal outlook that embraced a range of assumptions about economic management, the organization of society and the conduct of international relations. In most respects, the countries of Europe still hold to the main features of that consensus today. Much of the story of the Atlantic community's demise concerns America's departure from it. 5
DDI KO
Alt Causalities Military and ideological differences divide US and EU David Clark, Special Adviser to the ex Foreign Secretary Robin Cook and senior research fellow at the Federal Trust, 2008, International Politics (2008) 45, 276–291. doi:10.1057/ip.2008.4, European Foreign Policy and American Primacy, Palgrave Macmillian In Robert Kagan's famous thesis 'Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus', this difference in strategic perspective merely reflects a difference in relative power (Kagan, 2003, 1). Europe's lack of hard power predisposes it to favour rules and institutions as a way of restraining those more powerful than it. America acts unilaterally and resorts readily to the use of military force because it can. But Kagan sees Europe's position as hypocritical, at least insofar as it condemns American unilateralism. 'Europeans have stepped out of the Hobbesian world of anarchy into the Kantian world of perpetual peace', but only because Americans have been willing to shoulder the burden of keeping the Hobbesian world at bay (Kagan, 2003, 57). As one author has pointed out, the experience of Iraq makes this Hobbesian nightmare look more like a self-fulfilling prophecy (Nicolaidis, 2005, 109). But Kagan is undoubtedly right when he says that Europe and America no longer share a common 'strategic culture'. The purpose of European integration, according to Francois Duchene, has been to 'domesticate relations between states', 'to bring to international problems the sense of common responsibility and structures of contractual politics which have in the past been associated with "home" and not foreign, that is alien, affairs' (cited in Nicolaidis, 2005, 109). The idea that this experience has a broader applicability outside Europe is dismissed by American policy makers as utopian. The question is why? If it really was just a question of relative power, would not we talk about differences of 'strategic interest' rather than 'strategic culture'? Culture implies, correctly, that there is an ideological factor in play. There is, in any case, nothing fixed and given about Europe's military weakness. It has the resources to match American defence spending if it chooses; it simply chooses not to. Moreover, Kagan ignores the fact that that at least one European country (Germany following unification) has spurned the opportunity to seek national advantage by breaking free of its Kantian constraints and chosen deeper integration instead. Could it be that
Europe's attachment to multilateralism and the rule of international law is something more than necessity masquerading as virtue? Could it perhaps signify a fundamental divergence in transatlantic values? The US’s power and strategy undermine US-EU relations Mary Elise Sarotte, Ph.D. in History from Yale, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2008, The Worst Allies, Except for All the Others: US-European relations in the age of George W. Bush, International Politics (2008) 45, 310–324. doi:10.1057/palgrave.ip.8800168, Palgrave Macmillian To summarize: the
current transatlantic tensions arise both from the military predominance of the US and an unwise shift in grand strategy. If there were any clear lesson that history has to offer current leaders, it is the folly of letting your stated goals outstrip your actual abilities. No political entity can possibly pre-empt every threat to it, nor rid the world of every hostile regime. The key is prioritizing and focusing energy and resources where they are needed. At a time when the US is disproportionately powerful, it has adopted a grand strategy that does not reflect this crucial lessons. The combination of the two has rightly made European political leaders very nervous about the direction that the US is heading.
6
DDI KO
Alt Causalities Can’t solve – 7 alt causes Charles C. Pentland, Queen's University faculty, Political Studies, Centre for International Relations, 2008, Review of The Atlantic Alliance under Stress: US–European Relations after Iraq, David M. Andrews, ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp. x, 293., Canadian Journal of Political Science (2008), 41:488-489 Cambridge University Press Geir Lundestad's opening chapter sets the stage, and in many ways the tone, for the volume. The
diplomacy of the run-up to the Iraq war, he writes, “suggests a break with the practice of the past fifty years.” American unilateralism, based less on strength than on a new sense of vulnerability, encountered a creatively obdurate France, a united Germany increasingly liberated from Cold War constraints and a broader Europe whose integration had gained momentum and which had new capacities and new members to show for it. As he reminds us, however, the Atlantic alliance is a serial crisis-survivor; while it is reasonable to ask if the US and Europe are capable of a “balanced relationship,” this crisis need not render us pessimistic about the “more distant future.” Elizabeth Pond's account of transatlantic relations from early 2002 onward is a study in the failure of diplomacy. While she places the greatest portion of blame on the usual suspects in the Bush administration, she reserves some for Germany's Chancellor Schroeder. The “wary rapprochement” she observes by the end of 2003 is not yet, in her view, a reconciliation. The third chapter in this section, by David Andrews, draws attention to the muted or delayed effects of post-Cold War changes in the structure of the international system as the backdrop—not the full explanation—of the alliance's current trials.
7
US-EU relations US-EU relations...........................................................................................................................................................................................1 Inevitable......................................................................................................................................................................................................2 AT: Value Gap..............................................................................................................................................................................................3 Alt Cause: Bush...........................................................................................................................................................................................4 Alt Causalties...............................................................................................................................................................................................5 Alt Causalities..............................................................................................................................................................................................6 Alt Causalities..............................................................................................................................................................................................7
1
DDI KO
Inevitable Threats make US-EU relations inevitable – the “rift” is exaggerated Mary Elise Sarotte, Ph.D. in History from Yale, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2008, The Worst Allies, Except for All the Others: US-European relations in the age of George W. Bush, International Politics (2008) 45, 310–324. doi:10.1057/palgrave.ip.8800168, Palgrave Macmillian How worried should those who care about the transatlantic relationship be? The answer to this question provides some cold comfort. Just as the 'unprecedented' nature of the US-European rift has been exaggerated, so too has the significance of it. In true Casablanca style, reports of its demise have been greatly exaggerated. The transatlantic relationship will survive the repudiation of Ikenberry's strategic restraint model, although not as well as it might have if it had held to its tenets. Why? It will not happen for the reason offered by Timothy Garton Ash in Free World, namely because the West shares a history of freedom (Garton Ash, 2004). Rather, a darker vision (also present in Garton Ash's book) is more persuasive. There is no way to face
challenges arising from weapons of mass destruction, failing states, halting development, and even climate change as an individual nation-state. As Mick Cox has pointed out, September 11, 2001, reminded us that 'we live in an international system where the conflict between the haves and have-nots, the ins and the outs, the settled and the dissatisfied powers, continues unabated' (Cox, 2004, 468). Developed countries must work together, and there is no better alternative for the US than working with Europe. In other words, there is no way around the uncomfortable circumstance that developed nations have become targets of asymmetrical attacks. Given the weapons technology available, these have the potential to cause devastating damage. While both US and European nations face this common threat, the American public hears more about it, since the Bush Administration emphasized it so strongly during the 2004 campaign. Republicans would say that it had to do so, to keep the country safe; Democrats would say that it had to do so, to keep its electoral majority safe. Partisan views notwithstanding, the political scientist William Walker has a point when he argues that the Bush concept of international order mirrors many of the key concepts of the German political theorist Carl Schmitt (Walker, 2004). According to Schmitt, politics is
ultimately about an other, an enemy. The 43rd president has done a very successful job of creating a sense of ongoing threat to US domestic life. Leaders in European capitals do not tend to emphasize the threat in the same way as the US leadership, but it does not change the fact that a shared vulnerability is an unavoidable constant. This vulnerability is what will ultimately keep the transatlantic relationship together. Unfortunately, the US is no longer following a grand strategy that promoted and enabled cooperation. But the pressure to cooperate is there nonetheless. If Americans and Europeans are stuck with each other, what is the best way forward?
2
DDI KO
AT: Value Gap Culture doesn’t affect the transatlantic alliance Christopher Layne, Bush School of Government and Public Service, Texas A&M University, 2008, It's Over, Over There: The Coming Crack-up in Transatlantic Relations, International Politics (2008) 45, 325–347. doi:10.1057/ip.2008.6, Palgrave Macmillian Probably the best known argument that there is a cultural schism between the US and Europe is that of the neoconservative foreign policy analyst Robert Kagan. As Kagan wrote, 'It is time to stop pretending that Europeans and Americans share a common view of the world...' (Kagan, 2002b, 1; also, see Kagan, 2003a). If it is true that Europe and the US no longer hold a common worldview, then Atlanticism's champions might have cause for concern. As the fallout from the March 2003 US invasion of Iraq has made apparent, there is a culture/values gap between the United States and Europe. Yet, it is easy to exaggerate its significance. Going back even to the period before the United States achieved independence from Britain, American relations with Europe have always been complex, nuanced, and ambivalent. Historically, America's national identity has expressed itself in both the embrace, and rejection, of Europe. In some ways America and Europe are alike, and in other ways they are very different. So the fact that there are today transatlantic differences over culture and values should not surprise anyone. The real question is, does it matter? And in terms of geopolitics, the answer is: probably not. Notwithstanding transatlantic myth-making (which extends back to the late 1940s), alliances are based on common interests, not on common values and a shared culture. In assessing the future of NATO, and US–European relations, the crucial issue is whether Europe and the United States still share enough common interests to hold them together in an alliance relationship.
3
DDI KO
Alt Cause: Bush Bush’s policies hurt transatlantic relations Christopher Layne, Bush School of Government and Public Service, Texas A&M University, 2008, It's Over, Over There: The Coming Crack-up in Transatlantic Relations, International Politics (2008) 45, 325–347. doi:10.1057/ip.2008.6, Palgrave Macmillian Another commonly accepted explanation for the current difficulty in the transatlantic relationship is that this is attributable to the George W. Bush administration's policies. Those who adhere to this interpretation believe that once the administration leaves office in January 2009, the wounds inflicted on the US–European relationship will heal. This is not a very convincing argument, however. Doubtless the Bush administration's heavy-handed assertion of US power has aggravated transatlantic relations. However, its unilateral policies are not the fundamental cause of widening rift between the United States and Europe, which is the product of much deeper and more fundamental factors.3 This is not to deny that the administration has acted in defiance of European policy preferences, but it hardly is the first to do so. Indeed, the idea that the United States — until the George W. Bush administration — preferred to act multilaterally is more myth than fact.4 Following World War II the United States created a web of security and economic institutions to solidify its hegemony in the non-Soviet world and promote its own grand strategic ambitions. The United States sought to avail itself of its allies' strategic resources (and keep them from drifting into the Soviet sphere) but it never intended to be constrained by them — and seldom has been.5 All post-1945 administrations 'have believed that the only way' the United States could attain its most critical grand strategic goals 'was to keep others from having too much influence' (Sestanovich, 2005, 13). In the Suez, Berlin, and Cuban missile crises, and during the Vietnam War, the United States acted unilaterally. Similarly, according to Stephen Sestanovich, it also did so during the Euromissile crisis of the early 1980s, and during the negotiations on German reunification. And although, the US-led NATO interventions in Bosnia (1995) and Kosovo (1999), may have appeared to be — and certainly were sold by Washington as — multilateral actions, in fact they were not. As Walt observes, 'America's European allies complained during both episodes, but could do little to stop the United States from imposing its preferences upon them' (Walt, 2005, 46). In truth, when they felt that US interests required doing so, preceding administrations acted no less unilaterally than has the current administration.6 On the other hand, the George W. Bush administration's policies
have driven home to the Europeans the consequences of American hegemony, and by so doing have cast a long shadow over the future of the transatlantic relationship.7
4
DDI KO
Alt Causalties US-EU relations unrevivable – multiple diverging interests Roger E Kanet, Professor at Miami, focus on postcommunist Europe, on questions of European and global security, 2008, Still Mars, Still Venus? The United States, Europe, and the Future of the Transatlantic Relationship International Politics (2008) 45, 231– 235. doi:10.1057/ip.2008.1, Palgrave Macmillian Christopher Layne, in 'It's Over, Over There: The Coming Crack-Up in Transatlantic Relations,' argues, probably most forcefully of all the contributors to this symposium, that 'Euro–American ties — and NATO — have been ruptured, and never again will be the same.' He notes that a central aspect of US policy throughout the Cold War and beyond has been to prevent the emergence of a truly independent Europe as a possible challenger to US hegemony. There are four reasons for the demise of NATO. First, the Cold War's end has deprived NATO of its essential raison d'être. Second, the EU has not only taken huge strides toward attaining political and economic unity, but now has also taken significant steps to creating the capacity to act independently of the United States in the security arena. Third, the structural effects of unipolarity are pushing the EU in the direction of counter-balancing American preponderance. And, finally, the Iraq war has highlighted the divergent geopolitical interests of the US and the EU, and many other major policy issues — from Iranian nuclear policy and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to global warming — have the potential so split the two even further.
Can’t solve US-EU relations – foreign issues overwhelm James P. Rubin, Adjunct Professor at Columbia University's School of International and Public Affairs. He served as Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs from 1997 to 2000, July/August 2008, Foreign Affairs, Building a New Atlantic Alliance, http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20080701faessay87407/james-p-rubin/building-a-new-atlantic-alliance.html On the surface, transatlantic relations are in far better shape today than they were during the run-up to the Iraq war. But it would a mistake to underestimate the depth of the wounds Washington's reputation has suffered. Today, the United
be
States lacks concrete European support on vital issues, and European confidence in U.S. leadership has collapsed. Fortunately, both the Democratic and the Republican presidential candidates recognize how much harm has been done and have vowed to restore the United States' standing in the world. The 2008 presidential election provides an opportunity for a fresh start in U.S.-European relations. The new administration should capitalize on this moment by declaring that the era of U.S. unilateralism is over and that partnership with Europe is a central tenet of U.S. foreign policy. Then, it should launch a
diplomatic initiative to win closer cooperation from European allies in exchange for substantial changes in U.S. policies toward Afghanistan and Iran and on issues such as climate change and the war on terrorism. Culture is dividing the US and Europe David Clark, Special Adviser to the ex Foreign Secretary Robin Cook and senior research fellow at the Federal Trust, 2008, International Politics (2008) 45, 276–291. doi:10.1057/ip.2008.4, European Foreign Policy and American Primacy, Palgrave Macmillian It was not always so. The
high point of Atlanticism from the 1940s to the late 1960s coincided with an extraordinary convergence of political outlook among the participating countries. The need to face a common enemy (Nazi Germany, then Soviet Russia) and the shared experience of the depression produced a consensus in favour of multilateral diplomacy and welfare capitalism that defined post-war Atlantic cooperation. The UN, NATO, the Marshall Plan and Bretton Woods were the main instruments of this consensus. It was so strong that throughout the Cold War it was common for Western policy makers and analysts to talk of Western Europe and North America as comprising an 'Atlantic community' with a common set of interests and values (Lundestad, 2003, 65–66). It is noticeable that almost no one uses that phrase today. Even the much looser notion of 'the West' has been dismissed as an artificial construct unable to survive the disappearance of a hostile 'East' (Harries, 1993). But there is surely more to this than a change of strategic context. If the Alliance had simply been one of defensive expediency in the face of a common threat, no one would have thought to coin the term 'Atlantic community'. That was made possible by the fact
that its members shared a progressive liberal outlook that embraced a range of assumptions about economic management, the organization of society and the conduct of international relations. In most respects, the countries of Europe still hold to the main features of that consensus today. Much of the story of the Atlantic community's demise concerns America's departure from it. 5
DDI KO
Alt Causalities Military and ideological differences divide US and EU David Clark, Special Adviser to the ex Foreign Secretary Robin Cook and senior research fellow at the Federal Trust, 2008, International Politics (2008) 45, 276–291. doi:10.1057/ip.2008.4, European Foreign Policy and American Primacy, Palgrave Macmillian In Robert Kagan's famous thesis 'Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus', this difference in strategic perspective merely reflects a difference in relative power (Kagan, 2003, 1). Europe's lack of hard power predisposes it to favour rules and institutions as a way of restraining those more powerful than it. America acts unilaterally and resorts readily to the use of military force because it can. But Kagan sees Europe's position as hypocritical, at least insofar as it condemns American unilateralism. 'Europeans have stepped out of the Hobbesian world of anarchy into the Kantian world of perpetual peace', but only because Americans have been willing to shoulder the burden of keeping the Hobbesian world at bay (Kagan, 2003, 57). As one author has pointed out, the experience of Iraq makes this Hobbesian nightmare look more like a self-fulfilling prophecy (Nicolaidis, 2005, 109). But Kagan is undoubtedly right when he says that Europe and America no longer share a common 'strategic culture'. The purpose of European integration, according to Francois Duchene, has been to 'domesticate relations between states', 'to bring to international problems the sense of common responsibility and structures of contractual politics which have in the past been associated with "home" and not foreign, that is alien, affairs' (cited in Nicolaidis, 2005, 109). The idea that this experience has a broader applicability outside Europe is dismissed by American policy makers as utopian. The question is why? If it really was just a question of relative power, would not we talk about differences of 'strategic interest' rather than 'strategic culture'? Culture implies, correctly, that there is an ideological factor in play. There is, in any case, nothing fixed and given about Europe's military weakness. It has the resources to match American defence spending if it chooses; it simply chooses not to. Moreover, Kagan ignores the fact that that at least one European country (Germany following unification) has spurned the opportunity to seek national advantage by breaking free of its Kantian constraints and chosen deeper integration instead. Could it be that
Europe's attachment to multilateralism and the rule of international law is something more than necessity masquerading as virtue? Could it perhaps signify a fundamental divergence in transatlantic values? The US’s power and strategy undermine US-EU relations Mary Elise Sarotte, Ph.D. in History from Yale, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2008, The Worst Allies, Except for All the Others: US-European relations in the age of George W. Bush, International Politics (2008) 45, 310–324. doi:10.1057/palgrave.ip.8800168, Palgrave Macmillian To summarize: the
current transatlantic tensions arise both from the military predominance of the US and an unwise shift in grand strategy. If there were any clear lesson that history has to offer current leaders, it is the folly of letting your stated goals outstrip your actual abilities. No political entity can possibly pre-empt every threat to it, nor rid the world of every hostile regime. The key is prioritizing and focusing energy and resources where they are needed. At a time when the US is disproportionately powerful, it has adopted a grand strategy that does not reflect this crucial lessons. The combination of the two has rightly made European political leaders very nervous about the direction that the US is heading.
6
DDI KO
Alt Causalities Can’t solve – 7 alt causes Charles C. Pentland, Queen's University faculty, Political Studies, Centre for International Relations, 2008, Review of The Atlantic Alliance under Stress: US–European Relations after Iraq, David M. Andrews, ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp. x, 293., Canadian Journal of Political Science (2008), 41:488-489 Cambridge University Press Geir Lundestad's opening chapter sets the stage, and in many ways the tone, for the volume. The
diplomacy of the run-up to the Iraq war, he writes, “suggests a break with the practice of the past fifty years.” American unilateralism, based less on strength than on a new sense of vulnerability, encountered a creatively obdurate France, a united Germany increasingly liberated from Cold War constraints and a broader Europe whose integration had gained momentum and which had new capacities and new members to show for it. As he reminds us, however, the Atlantic alliance is a serial crisis-survivor; while it is reasonable to ask if the US and Europe are capable of a “balanced relationship,” this crisis need not render us pessimistic about the “more distant future.” Elizabeth Pond's account of transatlantic relations from early 2002 onward is a study in the failure of diplomacy. While she places the greatest portion of blame on the usual suspects in the Bush administration, she reserves some for Germany's Chancellor Schroeder. The “wary rapprochement” she observes by the end of 2003 is not yet, in her view, a reconciliation. The third chapter in this section, by David Andrews, draws attention to the muted or delayed effects of post-Cold War changes in the structure of the international system as the backdrop—not the full explanation—of the alliance's current trials.
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