31. Us Policy Towards Iran

  • December 2019
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•if?' <4,&« - *f>f »,* •"-^ jte y^ Emporium Current Essays 129 POLICY A useful method of reviewing US-Iran relations and Iran's impulse towards the excommunist bloc is to divide the revolutionary era into different periods. It must be born in mind that prior to the acquisition of power by the clergy. Iran was prowestern and its political and economic policies were based on a prowestern philosophy. After the Islamic revolution in 1978, bureaucratic and parliamentary apparatus of the state was occupied by proCommunist elements. Failure of the clergy and communist to come to a power-sharing agreement compelled the then government to ban all parties opposing the Islamic system in Iran. US interest in South-east Asia except for the interest of a handful of academic specialists -- began with Turkey through nineteenth century missionary efforts, sympathy for massacred Armenians and attendance at the demise of "the sick man of Europe" at the end of World War I. There was, however, no significant official US involvement in Turkey until after World War II with the formulation of the Truman Doctrine to check Soviet expansion, US involvement in Iran followed US business concerns, which only became significant in the 1980s. Traditionally, there has been no unity in the South-east Asian region, even no clear boundaries between South-east Asia and neighbouring regions. Thus Pakistan has been death with in the light of its South Asian ties and with reference to US policy towards India, and Iran has sometimes been identified with the Arab world. Afghanistan has been considered with reference to its position as a Soviet border state. The South-east Asian states have themselves recognised the difficulties in the search for a regional identity. When the Baghdad Pact, comprising Turkey, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq and the United States, was named CENTO after the Iraqi revolution in 1958, the Regional Co-operation for Development (RCD) was wet up in 1964 by the pact's regional members.

The factors decisive to South-west Asia remained serious. The Soviet presence in Afghanistan, the revolution in Iran, the late130 Emporium Current Essays Emporium Current Essays 131 1980 war between lean and Iraq, the September 1980 coup in Turkey and political instability in Pakistan continued to complicate the South-west Asian nations' international relations, while increasing the area's inability to concentrate on regional issues and the dissipation of energies needed for dealing effectively with national issues. Islamic revivalism, seemingly most virulent in Iran and Afghanistan, is of major concern to the authorities in both Pakistan and Turkey and feeds the anti-American resistance in both Iran and Afghanistan. The debate over US policy in Iran has become a major forces of political strategists, commentators and foreign policy analysts. The Iranian revolution has had a profound impact on US policy in both a regional and global sense. US support for Iran as the 'policeman of the Persian Gulf', a decision taken in the late 1960, followed Britain's announcement to withdraw all its forces from the Persian Gulf by the end o'f 1971. The US reappraisal of its military support policy towards Iran was made in the context of increased importance of Middle Eastern and South-west Asian oil to the United States and to stopped up Soviet activities in the area. After the Shah regime was overthrown in January 1979, US-Iranian relations became exceptionally tense. In November 1979, when the US embassy staff in Tehran was made hostage, the United States froze the Iranian assets in its banks introduced an embargo on trade with Iran and broke off diplomatic relations with it. On January 19, 1981, an agreement was reached to free to hostage and the US renounced measures of boycotting Iran, but left the ban on arms sales to it intact. With regard to the Iran-Iraq war the Reagan administration professedly adhered to a position of 'neutrality" and repeatedly called upon the NATO allies not to supply arms to the belligerents. When examining the motives that had led the US administration to strike a deal with Iran, the part played by Israel, which strongly recommended that Reagan start this bargaining, can not be ignored. Already in 1984, work on revising the US policy with regard to Iran had begun. Early that year, Robert McFarlane, Assistant to the President on National Security, received a memorandum frorr- Geaffrey Kemp, Senior Middle East Adviser of the National Security Council Department, which contained recommendations to change the United State's attitude toward Iran. Kemp wrote that Irtsn posed a threat to US interests and covert operations against it should be intensified. In this connection, he reported that Iranian emigrants whom he was dealing with hoped to install a pro-western government in Iran with foreign assistance. In the first half of 1985, the National Security Council continued the attempts to change the US approach towards Iran within the framework of legal channels of the state mechanism for

making foreign policy decisions. During the Iran-Iraq war in 1985, top_ranking US officials went to Israel in order to ensure Israel's assistance in improving diplomatic tics with Iran. Because, Israel had had close friendly relations with Iran in the past and Iran had already recognised Israel in the 1960s. The then Israeli government also showed great interest in re-establishing contacts with Iran through arms deliveries. From January 1985 onward, the Israeli Prime Minister repeatedly summoned The Director-General of Israel's Foreign Ministry David Kimche, Israeli counter-terrorism expert Amiran Nir and arms merchants for "councils of war". While assuring the Arab countries of its neutrality in the Iran-Iraq conflict, Washington was at the same time delivering large quantities of armaments to one of the belligerents Iran. Despite Phalvis' efforts no such deal was signed between Washington and Tehran as would commit the United States to assist the Shah against external or internal threats. The failure of the close US-Iran friendship, reinforced by the thousands of Iranians who were educated in the United States, the thousands of US citizens who lived in Iran and extensive business, social and academic ties, resulted in a profound sense of betrayal on both sides. The Americans were confused by Iranian actions against their country's interests in the Persian Gulf region. Ever since the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979, the United States has been apprehensive of the new set-up. In the eightyear Iran-Iraq war which was initiated by Iraqi aggression against Iran, the US initially supported Iraq against Iran, but actually it was playing a double role in the region. During the 1991 Gulf war, the US led an impressive alliance against Iraq and managed to deal a devastating blow to Saddam Hussein from which he has not yet recovered. Jn December 1995, the US Congress was reported to have allocated $20 million to finance covert operation in Iran, in order to destabilise the Islamic regime. Iran is seen by the United States as bent upon exporting its Islamic revolution and trying to subvert regimes friendly to it, like Egypt and Saudi Arabia. The US on the other hand is perceived by Islamists in Iran, and elsewhere as seeking dominance over the entire region. The current pressure of the US on Iran is unprecedented in history. Recently US President Bill Clinton announced sanctions against Iran, accusing it of sponsoring terrorism in the world. France has strongly disapproved of this decision. Iran condemned the US action and denial supporting terrorism.

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