3. Municipality Of Lemery Vs. Provincial Board Of Batangas.docx

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3. MUNICIPALITY OF LEMERY vs. PROVINCIAL BOARD OF BATANGAS No. 36201, October 29, 1931 FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari on the action of the Provincial Board of Batangas through Board Resolution no. 289 disapproving Municipality of Lemery’s Council Resolutio No. 18 s. 1931. The said council resolution pertains to the abolition of the office of the court porter and due to economic and budgetary reason, to allocate a single janitor; thus, consolidating its function as porter, janitor and messenger of the Office of the Justice of Peace, Office of the Municipal President and the Office of the Municipal Secretary. The Council forwarded the Resolution 18 to the Provincial Board for concurrence and apporval, but the said resolution was disapproved through Board Resolution 289 directing the Municipal Council to reinstate a dedicated janitor to the office of the justice of peace and to provided the necessary funding for the post. The Council, due to economic reasons, appealed to the Board by a petition to reconsider Resolution 18. However, this appeal was denied and the Council was instructed to set aside Resolution 18 and provide the necessary funding or else face administrative sanctions. For fear to be subjected to an administrative sanction, the Council instituted a petition for certiorari questioning the decision of the Provincial Board to be in excess of their authority and the praying that a injuction be issued to prevent the implementation of Board Resolution 289 and to declare the Board Reso null and void. The Council contends that the Provincial Board abrograted upon itself the power to judge on the Council’s action to legislate and allocate limited resources. The Board on the other hand contends that in the exercise of its supervisory function, it can strike actions of the Municipal Council and it such manner it is neither judicial nor quasi-judicial, inasmuch as the petition does not allege that the Board acted in the exercise of Judicial or QuasiJudicial functions. 1st ISSUE: function.

Whether or not the Board exercised judicial or quasi-judicial

RULING: The Board exercised QUASI-JUDICIAL function in reviewing Council Resolution No. 18 s. 1931. The power execised by the Provincial Board in approving or disapproving a muncipal resolution or ordinance is in the nature of a Quasi-Judicial function. In disapproving resolution No. 18, series of 1931, of the municipal council of Lemery, which consolidated the position of janitor for the office of the municipal president, of the municipal secretary, and of the justice of the peace court, this action being within the legislative powers of said municipal council, the provincial board of Batangas exceeded its quasijudicial powers. "The precise line of demarkation between what are judicial and what are administrative or ministerial functions is often difficult to determine. The exercise of judicial functions may involve the performance of legislative or administrative duties, and the performance of administrative or ministerial duties may, in a measure, involve the exercise of judicial functions. It may be said generally that the exercise of judicial

functions is to determine what the law is, and what the legal rights of parties are, with respect to a matter in controversy; and whenever an officer is clothed with that authority, and undertakes to determine those questions, he acts judicially." " The only ground upon which a provincial board may declare any municipal resolution, ordinance, or order invalid is when such resolution, ordinance, or order is "beyond the powers conferred upon the council or president making the same" (Administrative Code, sec. 2233). Absolutely no other ground is recognized by the law. A strictly legal question is before the provincial board in its consideration of any municipal resolution, ordinance, or order. The provincial disapproval of any resolution, ordinance, or order must be premised specifically upon the fact that such resolution, ordinance, or order is outside the scope of the legal powers conferred by law.' " In vesting provincial boards with power to annul resolutions, and ordinances, passed by municipal councils in excess of their powers, the law granted such provincial boards quasi-judicial powers, for the determination of whether an act is legal or no, is an essentially judicial function. 2nd ISSUE: Whether or not the Board has exceeded its jurisdiction in dispproving Council Resolution no. 18. RULING: YES. The said board in disapproving resolution No. 18, series of 1931, of the municipal council of Lemery, relies not upon the basis that the municipal council acted in excess of its legislative powers. It follows that the municipal council of Lemery acted within its legislative powers and duties in consolidating the positions of janitor for the office of the municipal president, of municipal secretary, and of justice of the peace. And the provincial board of Batangas, respondent herein, exceeded its quasi-judicial powers in disapproving resolution No. 18, series of 1931, of said municipal council of Lemery. The Court ruled: (1) That the power exercised by the provincial board in approving or disapproving a municipal resolution or ordinance is in the nature of a quasi-judicial function; (2) that in disapproving resolution No. 18, series of 1931, of the municipal council of Lemery, which consolidated the position of janitor for the office of the municipal president, of the municipal secretary, and of the justice of the peace court, this action being within the legislative powers of said municipal council, the provincial board of Batangas exceeded its quasi-judicial powers; and (3) that there is no plain, speedy and adequate administrative remedy, for the Administrative Code does not permit of an appeal from the decisions of the Chief of the Executive Bureau to the Secretary of the Interior.

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