202 Ko Nmd Da

NMD DA DDI 08 KO Crystal Xia

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NMD DA NMD DA.................................................................................................................................................................1 1NC Shell - RUSSIA...............................................................................................................................................2 1NC Shell – CHINA................................................................................................................................................5 Uniqueness: No NMD now......................................................................................................................................7 Uniqueness: No NMD now – Poland.......................................................................................................................9 Link: NMD needs to be resolved...........................................................................................................................10 Link: Soft Power  NMD.....................................................................................................................................11 Link: GB key to NMD...........................................................................................................................................13 IL: Russia hates NMD...........................................................................................................................................14 IL: China hates NMD.............................................................................................................................................18 IL: Russia/China hates NMD.................................................................................................................................19 NMD  Reckless Wars.........................................................................................................................................20 NMD  Arms Races.............................................................................................................................................21 NMD  Instability................................................................................................................................................22 NMD Bad – Generic..............................................................................................................................................24 ...............................................................................................................................................................................24 AT: NMD Good/Solves Attacks.............................................................................................................................25 AT: NMD necessary – North Korea.......................................................................................................................26 AT: NMD necessary – Iran....................................................................................................................................27 AFF: NMD Good...................................................................................................................................................28 AFF: No US/Russia War........................................................................................................................................29

NMD DA DDI 08 KO Crystal Xia

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1NC Shell - RUSSIA 1. There is concern over NMD now but global warming is a bigger issue that could restore US credibility. Morton H. Halperin, Senior Fellow @ Council on Foreign Relations, 8-15-01, “Bush Unpopular in Europe, seen as a Unilateralist”, http://people-press.org/report/?pageid=37. [CXia] Respondents in Great Britain, France, Italy and Germany do not express knee-jerk opposition to all the policies of the Bush administration. They applaud Bush's support for free trade and his willingness to keep American troops in Bosnia and Kosovo, reversing a campaign promise to begin taking those troops out. However, echoing the views of their governments, they express concern about his overall approach as well as his positions on National Missile Defense (NMD), the Kyoto Protocol and the death penalty. The poll results on National Missile Defense may pose the greatest challenge for the Bush administration. European publics may or may not favor the principle of missile defense, but overwhelming majorities disapprove of a deployment that requires withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. More than seven-in-ten German and French respondents and about two-thirds of the Italian and British respondents share this view. This means that European governments are unlikely to yield to administration pressure to go ahead with a missile defense system if it leads to terminating the ABM Treaty. And it suggests that, if any of these governments do go along, the long dormant European antinuclear movement might come to life with a vengeance. Missile defense deployment is the quintessential post-Cold war issue because, as powerful and as rich as the United States is, it simply cannot proceed on its own. An effective layered national missile defense of the kind favored by the administration will require the cooperation of many other countries in providing bases for radar and intelligence-gathering systems, as well as for the deployment of anti-missile launchers or the support for ship-based systems. Moreover, the cooperation of other countries, including Russia and China, is necessary if states such as North Korea, Iraq, and Iran are to be prevented from developing relatively simple decoys which would neutralize any small missile defense system. This may help explain why Bush administration officials who favor giving early notice to Russia that the United States is withdrawing from the ABM Treaty have not yet prevailed. Those who give priority to negotiating an agreement with Russian President Vladimir Putin should have their hands strengthened by these poll results, which suggest serious difficulties for U.S.-European relations, and for an effective anti-missile deployment, if the administration is seen as cavalierly rejecting the treaty. These problems can only be overcome by reaching agreement with Russia both on substantially lower levels of nuclear warheads and on amendments to the ABM treaty which permit the deployment of a modest NMD against potential small missile threats. Global warming also poses a serious challenge for the Bush administration. The majorities concerned about the American policy in this area are even larger than on missile defense, and nothing can be accomplished without the cooperation of other states. To reduce tensions over the Kyoto Protocol, the Bush administration will have to fulfill its commitment to present a proposal on global warming at the next international meeting. Proponents of this position within the administration should also be strengthened by this poll, which leaves no doubt that a continuing rift over this issue will have a profound impact on the overall relationship between the United States and Europe.

NMD DA DDI 08 KO Crystal Xia

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2. NMD would completely destroy all US/Russia relations. Craig Eisendrath, Gerald E. Marsh, and Melvin A. Goodman, senior fellow at the Center for International Policy, physicist at Argonne National Laboratory, a senior fellow and director of the National Security Program at the Center for International Policy, 5-01, “Shield of Dreams: Why National Missile Defense Won’t Work”, http://www.ciponline.org/dfd/shield.htm, [CXia] Russia, which continues by orders of magnitude to be the greatest missile threat, considers national missile-defense systems as an attempt to gain "unilateral military and security advantages" as well as a violation of the ABM treaty. Russia has announced plans to dramatically reduce its nuclear arsenal from the approximately six thousand nuclear warheads deployed to under fifteen hundred by the end of the decade. But Russian leaders have warned that future reductions are highly conditioned on the United States not deploying a missile defense system. President Putin has repeatedly stated that any move to withdraw from the ABM treaty could lead Russia to treat all existing U.S.-Russian security agreements as null and void. This could lock both countries into unnecessarily large nuclear-weapons inventories for the foreseeable future unless unilateral reciprocal reductions take the place of agreements. As the 2000 NIE points out, Russia could also again deploy shorter-range missiles along its borders and return to multiple warheads for its strategic weapons, thus rejecting a major provision of START II, and could deploy additional countermeasures on its missiles to penetrate the NMD system. In maintaining a larger strategic arsenal than it can adequately support, given its ailing economy, Russia would be more prone to accidental or unauthorized launch of its nuclear ballistic missiles

3. US-Russia relations key to solve Middle East and multiple nuclear war scenarios. Yale Global, February 28, 2005, “US-Russia Relations Saved for Now”, http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display .article?id=5348, [CXia] For the United States, a declining agenda with Russia will sooner or later result in overextension of US resources and global disaster. Short- and middle-term reasons for engaging Russia lie in policy toward North Korea, Iraq, Iran, and China, and the long-term - in the broader Middle East. Russia, with its imperial history, vast experience, and readiness to invest in security, is the only US ally capable of collaborating to bring about Mideast stability- a rather imperial, but necessary mission. Neither Europe nor the southern CIS have the resources to accomplish the task. Despite an EU presence in Afghanistan and some contribution to Iraq, Europe's political culture an`d growing Muslim populations do not allow for serious investments in missions like occupation and state-building. Ultimately, Washington and Moscow must work together, despite all the difficulties and prejudices. They should strengthen those elements of agenda - creating the NATORussia Council and Russian participation in the G8 - that may still facilitate cooperation and joint action. The US-Russia foreign policy priority should be stabilization and governance promotion in the broader Middle East. Radical Islamic terrorism and nuclear proliferation are facets of one single problem: degradation of this region.

NMD DA DDI 08 KO Crystal Xia

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4. Middle East war causes extinction. Bahig Nassar, Arab Co-ordinating Centre of Non-Governmental Organizations, and Afro-Asian People’s Solidary Organization, 11/25/02, keynote paper for Cordoba Dialogue on Peace and Human Rights in Europe and the Middle East, http://www.inesglobal.org/BahigNassar.htm, [CXia] Wars in the Middle East are of a new type. Formerly, the possession of nuclear weapons by the United States and the Soviet Union had prevented them, under the balance of the nuclear terror, from launching war against each other. In the Middle East, the possession of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction leads to military clashes and wars. Instead of eliminating weapons of mass destruction, the United States and Israel are using military force to prevent others from acquiring them, while they insist on maintaining their own weapons to pose deadly threats to other nations. But the production, proliferation and threat or use of weapons of mass destruction (nuclear chemical and biological) are among the major global problems which could lead, if left unchecked, to the extinction of life on earth. Different from the limited character of former wars, the current wars in the Middle East manipulate global problems and escalate their dangers instead of solving them

NMD DA DDI 08 KO Crystal Xia

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1NC Shell – CHINA 1. There is concern over NMD now but global warming is a bigger issue that could restore US credibility. Morton H. Halperin, Senior Fellow @ Council on Foreign Relations, 8-15-01, “Bush Unpopular in Europe, seen as a Unilateralist”, http://people-press.org/report/?pageid=37. [CXia] Respondents in Great Britain, France, Italy and Germany do not express knee-jerk opposition to all the policies of the Bush administration. They applaud Bush's support for free trade and his willingness to keep American troops in Bosnia and Kosovo, reversing a campaign promise to begin taking those troops out. However, echoing the views of their governments, they express concern about his overall approach as well as his positions on National Missile Defense (NMD), the Kyoto Protocol and the death penalty. The poll results on National Missile Defense may pose the greatest challenge for the Bush administration. European publics may or may not favor the principle of missile defense, but overwhelming majorities disapprove of a deployment that requires withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. More than seven-in-ten German and French respondents and about two-thirds of the Italian and British respondents share this view. This means that European governments are unlikely to yield to administration pressure to go ahead with a missile defense system if it leads to terminating the ABM Treaty. And it suggests that, if any of these governments do go along, the long dormant European antinuclear movement might come to life with a vengeance. Missile defense deployment is the quintessential post-Cold war issue because, as powerful and as rich as the United States is, it simply cannot proceed on its own. An effective layered national missile defense of the kind favored by the administration will require the cooperation of many other countries in providing bases for radar and intelligence-gathering systems, as well as for the deployment of anti-missile launchers or the support for ship-based systems. Moreover, the cooperation of other countries, including Russia and China, is necessary if states such as North Korea, Iraq, and Iran are to be prevented from developing relatively simple decoys which would neutralize any small missile defense system. This may help explain why Bush administration officials who favor giving early notice to Russia that the United States is withdrawing from the ABM Treaty have not yet prevailed. Those who give priority to negotiating an agreement with Russian President Vladimir Putin should have their hands strengthened by these poll results, which suggest serious difficulties for U.S.-European relations, and for an effective anti-missile deployment, if the administration is seen as cavalierly rejecting the treaty. These problems can only be overcome by reaching agreement with Russia both on substantially lower levels of nuclear warheads and on amendments to the ABM treaty which permit the deployment of a modest NMD against potential small missile threats. Global warming also poses a serious challenge for the Bush administration. The majorities concerned about the American policy in this area are even larger than on missile defense, and nothing can be accomplished without the cooperation of other states. To reduce tensions over the Kyoto Protocol, the Bush administration will have to fulfill its commitment to present a proposal on global warming at the next international meeting. Proponents of this position within the administration should also be strengthened by this poll, which leaves no doubt that a continuing rift over this issue will have a profound impact on the overall relationship between the United States and Europe.

NMD DA DDI 08 KO Crystal Xia

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2. US/China relations key to solve prolif – NMD destroys relations. Phillip C. Saunders, Director of East Asian Nonprolif Program @ CNS, 10-11-01, “Can 9-11 Provide a Fresh Start for Sino-US relations?”, http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports/sino911.htm, [CXia] Nonproliferation has been one of the more persistent and contentious issues in Sino-U.S. relations for the last 15 years. The continuing presence of nonproliferation issues on the bilateral agenda has masked a considerable degree of convergence in U.S. and Chinese views and significant progress in addressing proliferation threats. The range and scope of U.S. concerns about Chinese proliferation behavior has narrowed appreciably over the years as China has joined the major arms control and nonproliferation treaties and improved its export control laws. Both countries are members of the key international nonproliferation treaties (including the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and the Biological Weapons Convention BWC)) and play an active role in international arms control negotiations. From 1995-98, the United States and China cooperated on a range of important arms control and nonproliferation issues, including indefinite extension of the NPT, the CWC, final negotiations on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and the UN Security Council resolutions in response to the 1998 nuclear tests in South Asia. This

cooperation gradually ended as Chinese concerns about U.S. ballistic missile defense plans increased. China and the United States still share numerous common interests in fighting proliferation. In terms of specific nonproliferation issues, the United States and China both oppose the introduction of nuclear weapons onto the Korean peninsula and seek to restrain India's efforts to build an operational nuclear arsenal. Both also want to avoid arms races in Northeast Asia that might lead Japan, South Korea, and even Taiwan to develop nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. Finally, both the United States and China seek ways to improve the effectiveness of the treaties banning chemical and biological weapons

3. Prolif leads to massive death. Victor Utgoff, Deputy Director of Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division of Institute for Defense Analysis, Summer 02, “Proliferation, Missile Defence and American Ambitions”, Survival, p.87-90. In sum, widespread proliferation is likely to lead to an occasional shoot-out with nuclear weapons, and that such shootouts will have a substantial probability of escalating to the maximum destruction possible with the weapons at hand. Unless nuclear proliferation is stopped, we are headed toward a world that will mirror the American Wild West of the late 1800s. With most, if not all, nations wearing nuclear ‘six-shooters’ on their hips, the world may even be a more polite place than it is today, but every once in a while we will all gather on a hill to bury the bodies of dead cities or even whole nations.

NMD DA DDI 08 KO Crystal Xia

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Uniqueness: No NMD now Other countries fear NMD, citing fears of US expansionism. Robert A Pape, Professor of Political Science at UChicago, 2005, “Soft Balancing Against the United States”, International Security 30.1, 7-45., Project MUSE [CXia] The development of U.S. NMD is creating a classic security dilemma between the United States and other major powers, especially with Russia and China. As the United States gains the capability to intercept missiles from rogue states, its efforts are increasing fears that this limited system will expand to allow it to achieve nuclear superiority. The problem is not that the United States will actually gain nuclear superiority in the near term—the inevitable technical difficulties with a new, sophisticated military system mitigate such immediate fears. Rather, it is that U.S. efforts will continue to expand, enabling Washington to pursue meaningful nuclear advantages in the long term. The United States' ambitious pursuit of NMD is giving major powers reason to doubt its intentions. U.S. nuclear retaliatory capabilities are already stronger than those of any other state; thus nuclear deterrence already provides robust security against deliberate missile attack. Moreover, the September 11 terrorist attacks demonstrated that rogue states would probably find covert attack more reliable than low-quality ballistic missiles as a means to deliver a nuclear weapon against the United States. Further, the technological infrastructure—sophisticated radars and command and control networks—for a limited ballistic missile defense system against a small number of missiles from rogue states has the operational capacity to expand the system to counter a larger number of missiles from major powers. Accordingly, major powers have a basis to fear that U.S. NMD could evolve into a serious effort to acquire meaningful nuclear superiority, an effort that would make sense only if the United States had expansionist rather than status quo aims

Europe is weary of attempts at NMD now. Andrew J. Pierre. (Sr Assoc at the Inst for the Study of Diplomacy and adjunct prof in the National Security Studies Program at Georgetown U). May 2001. Arms Control Today. “Europe and Missile Defense:Tactical Considerations, Fundamental Concerns.” www.armscontrol.org/act/2001_05/pierre.asp Publics in Europe have yet to follow the missile defense issue very closely, with less than half in Britain, France, Germany, and Italy even having heard of it as of 2000, although this could change as the transatlantic debate proceeds.2 There is hardly any public sense of a ballistic missile threat either from North Korea or from Middle Eastern rogues—even though, as measured by trajectory distances, a threat from Iran or Iraq is more immediately relevant to Europe than to the United States. Indeed, polls indicate that the French public sees the two overriding foreign threats as Islamic fundamentalism and international terrorism. Sir Timothy Garden, former British assistant chief of air staff, notes, "In Europe we don't feel this sense of foreboding and threat which seems to underlie all discussions of NMD in the United States. We feel we are now safer than we can remember in anybody's lifetime. Having lived with the imminent possibility of ballistic missile attack for some 40 years, we now find it refreshing that we have to cast around on the off chance that we might find some small state somewhere that sometime might, for reasons that we can't understand, send missiles toward us."3

NMD DA DDI 08 KO Crystal Xia

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Other countries are suspicious of NMD. Robert A Pape, Professor of Political Science at UChicago, 2005, “Soft Balancing Against the United States”, International Security 30.1, 7-45., Project MUSE [CXia] Suspicion of U.S. intentions is also aggravated by the Bush administration's nuclear policies, especially its pursuit of an ambitious system of national missile defense. Although the administration views NMD as a reasonable effort to protect the U.S. homeland from the threat of ballistic missiles from rogue states, other major powers see it as a signal of U.S. malign intent.50 The Bush administration appears determined to field the first-ever operational system to intercept ballistic missiles heading for the United States. Following aborted negotiations with Russia, the administration officially abandoned the ABM treaty in June 2002, authorized more than $17 billion to construct a ballistic missile defense system in Alaska in December 2002, and plans to have the initial system operational in the early years of the second administration. The plan calls for ten ground-based interceptors and accompanying radars based in Alaska and California in the first year of operation, ten more interceptors in Alaska in the second year, and more ambitious, multilayer defenses after this point.51 Whether this system will effectively counter ballistic missiles from rogue states is difficult to assess, in part because no rogue state has yet tested an operational missile capable of hitting the United States. Concern over the potential negative international consequences among the major powers, however, is already apparent. Most NATO members, including Great Britain, Germany, and France, have been consistently opposed to U.S. NMD.52 Russia and China have gone further, explicitly stating their fears that it threatens their strategic nuclear capabilities. Although the United States has repeatedly declared that NMD is aimed only at North Korea and other rogue states, one Chinese government official stated, "That doesn't matter. The consequences are still terrible for us."53 The U.S. claim that it needs missile defense to protect itself from rogue states is, according to one Russian general, "an argument for the naive or the stupid. . . . This system will be directed against Russia and against China."54 In July 2000 China and Russia issued a joint statement declaring that U.S. NMD would have "the most grave adverse consequences not only for the security of Russia, China and other countries, but also for the security of the United States."55 Why is the prospect of U.S. ballistic missile defenses increasing the perception of insecurity among the world's major powers? In the nuclear age, the security of major powers depends on maintaining credible nuclear retaliatory capabilities. Even after the end of the Cold War, the United States, Great Britain, France, Russia, and China continue to believe that their security requires nuclear forces that can respond to a nuclear attack on their homelands. On any given day, the United States and Russia have some 6,000 strategic nuclear warheads deployed in a fashion that could retaliate in short order against a nuclear strike from any state in the world; Great Britain has several hundred and China several dozen

NMD DA DDI 08 KO Crystal Xia

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Uniqueness: No NMD now – Poland Poland will not sign an NMD agreement now. Judy Dempsey, staff writer for the NYT, 1-7-08, “Poland Signals Doubts About Planned US Missile-Defense Bases on Its Territory”, The New York Times, LexisNexis, [CXia] Signaling a tougher position in negotiations with the United States on a European antiballistic-missile shield system, Poland's foreign minister says his country's new government is not prepared to accept American plans to deploy missiledefense bases in Poland until all costs and risks are considered. ''This is an American, not a Polish project,'' Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski said in an interview published in the weekend edition of the newspaper Gazeta Wyborcza. The previous Polish government had consented in principle to accept missile-interceptor bases as part of a larger system that would include a radar station in the Czech Republic, but no formal agreement has been signed. Now Mr. Sikorski is saying that the terms under which the shield would be deployed were unclear and that the new government wants the risks to be explained, the financial costs to be set out and clarification on how Poland's interests would be defended if the bases were put on its territory. ''We feel no threat from Iran,'' he said, challenging Bush administration assertions that some of the biggest threats facing the security of Europe and the United States are from ''rogue states'' in the Middle East.

NMD DA DDI 08 KO Crystal Xia

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Link: NMD needs to be resolved Concerns about NMD need to be resolved – massive distrust between the US and Europe. Andrew J. Pierre. (Sr Assoc at the Inst for the Study of Diplomacy and adjunct prof in the National Security Studies Program at Georgetown U). May 2001. Arms Control Today. “Europe and Missile Defense:Tactical Considerations, Fundamental Concerns.” www.armscontrol.org/act/2001_05/pierre.asp The gap between Europe and the United States on missile defense remains wide. Unlike most of the great transatlantic security debates of the past, such as the controversies over the multilateral nuclear force in the 1960s, the neutron bomb in the 1970s, intermediate-range nuclear forces in the 1980s, and NATO enlargement in the 1990s—all instances in which the Europeans (like the Americans) were split among themselves—the Europeans in today's missile defense debate are generally unified. The fissures are much deeper on the American side. With a few exceptions, those Europeans who are engaged with the issue have yet to be persuaded that the United States has made a compelling case for missile defense. As we have seen, their skepticism is based upon fundamental considerations, such as the seriousness of the threat, the opportunity costs in relation to other European foreign and security policy priorities, the future of the ABM Treaty and international arms control, and the impact on relations with Russia and China. To this must be added doubts about the technological feasibility of missile defenses and the financial cost of their participation in an allied missile defense project.

NMD DA DDI 08 KO Crystal Xia

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Link: Soft Power  NMD Other countries will cooperate on NMD with increased soft power. Morton H. Halperin, Senior Fellow @ Council on Foreign Relations, 8-15-01, “Bush Unpopular in Europe, seen as a Unilateralist”, http://people-press.org/report/?pageid=37. [CXia] The poll results on National Missile Defense may pose the greatest challenge for the Bush administration. European publics may or may not favor the principle of missile defense, but overwhelming majorities disapprove of a deployment that requires withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. More than seven-in-ten German and French respondents and about two-thirds of the Italian and British respondents share this view. This means that European governments are unlikely to yield to administration pressure to go ahead with a missile defense system if it leads to terminating the ABM Treaty. And it suggests that, if any of these governments do go along, the long dormant European anti-nuclear movement might come to life with a vengeance. Missile defense deployment is the quintessential post-Cold war issue because, as powerful and as rich as the United States is, it simply cannot proceed on its own. An effective layered national missile defense of the kind favored by the administration will require the cooperation of many other countries in providing bases for radar and intelligencegathering systems, as well as for the deployment of anti-missile launchers or the support for ship-based systems. Moreover, the cooperation of other countries, including Russia and China, is necessary if states such as North Korea, Iraq, and Iran are to be prevented from developing relatively simple decoys which would neutralize any small missile defense system.

Increased soft power could lead to concessions on NMD. David Malone and Ramesh Thakur. (president of the International Peace Academy; vice rector of the United Nations University) March 11, 2001. The Japan Times. l/n. Its top priority appears to be the further development and eventual deployment of a national missile defense system, a U.S. idea that has long unsettled not only Russia and China, but also key European allies and Canada. It could well decide, among other measures, that ratification of the CTBT had become useful to reassure allies and foes alike. Regardless of their views on NMD, U.S. allies and foes now need to consider their own strategies. Indefinitely stamping their feet on an issue that may be nonnegotiable in essence but negotiable in specifics and at the margins, would be self-defeating. NMD is not something the allies, Moscow or Beijing can stop. However, they could well influence the context within which NMD will be developed, its ultimate scope and its detailed aims. Their eventual consent can also be exchanged against concessions from Washington on related or different issues.

NMD DA DDI 08 KO Crystal Xia

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Policies that make Europe happy would cause them to get on board with NMD. William Wallace, Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics, 5-01, “Europe, the Necessary Partner”, Foreign Affairs, LexisNexis, [CXia] Terrorism is another good example of where perceptions are diverging. European governments do not underestimate the threat of terrorism; they have suffered more incidents of terrorism on their soil over the past 30 years -- from Irish Republicans, left-wing revolutionaries in Germany and Italy, Kurdish and Algerian militants, Basques, Corsicans, fundamentalist Muslims, and Sikhs -than the United States has. But rather than overestimating the threat, Europeans recognize that a political response must accompany counterterrorism and preventive measures. No European government has initiated programs comparable to U.S. ones; the marginal risks of biological or chemical weapons being deployed in European cities are just not seen as great enough to justify such a response. National missile defense (NMD) also appears to Europeans as a disproportionate response to a distant potential threat, driven by domestic psychology, entrenched economic interests, and policymakers whose underlying agenda is confrontation with China rather than North Korea. American leadership of the Western alliance depends on its ability to persuade its partners to accept its foreign policy rationale. After all, now that the Cold War is past, the United States needs NATO as much as its European allies do. The global projection of U.S. power by long-range bombers flying from U.S. home bases depends on intermediate bases in Europe for refueling. Aircraft-carrier groups benefit from forward bases; U.S. forces in Europe now serve as the basis for potential deployment across Eurasia and the Middle East. But the impression that U.S. commanders and officials have given, whether in Somalia, Bosnia, or Kosovo, is that they see no need to listen to the knowledge of their allies or of locals in assessing situations. Combined with an unwillingness to accept casualties while ordering others to take greater risks (as in the Balkans), a preoccupation with media opportunities, and a preference for high-level bombing over commitment on the ground, these traits have undermined Europeans' respect for their alliance partner. The "revolution in military affairs" has also widened the transatlantic rift. Washington's pursuit of the RMA has seemed to most European observers a domestic matter, driven by American industrial and defense lobbies rather than by any clear external threat. European governments have been pursuing a different tack, preparing to fight limited wars, contain disorder, and if necessary invest in the "nation-building" activities that George W. Bush decried in last year's presidential campaign. Shared experiences on the ground in Bosnia provided the foundation for the Franco-British defense initiative, while collaborative European engagement in Kosovo has provided a further impetus for an autonomous capability in military planning and deployment. Although no other European state has so far joined the United Kingdom in its limited peacekeeping commitment in Sierra Leone, European military planners are uncomfortably aware that restoring order within failed states, in Africa as well as southeastern Europe, is a likely contingency for which they must all prepare. Along with the 60,000 European troops being assembled for a deployable peacekeeping force, Europe is working on a reserve force of military and civilian police to take over the task of re-establishing domestic order within fragile societies as the front-line troops withdraw. The Bush administration's approach to military reform will therefore be a test case of strategic assumptions and force requirements. Greater U.S. emphasis on space and NMD, armored divisions, and large-scale carrier groups would widen the transatlantic strategic gap; more flexible forces with lighter equipment would bring American and European thinking closer together.

NMD DA DDI 08 KO Crystal Xia

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Link: GB key to NMD The UK is an essential part of NMD. Dave Webb (School of Engineering, Leeds Metropolitan University). No Date given. “The UK’s role in star wars.” www.russfound.org/consult2/papers1/webb.htm, [CXia] The UK government does not deny that RAF Fylingdales would play an important role in NMD should it go ahead. However, despite repeated questioning by the press and in the Commons, it will not pronounce on what its decision would be should the US ask permission for the changes to be made. The Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook, has said: "Until we know both the nature of the question and also the circumstances in which we are being asked that question, it would be premature for us to debate what might be, particularly since there is no commitment by the United States to ask the question." It has been said that the UK government is 'working behind the scenes' and is not willing to make public statements that might put the ABMT in danger. A number of US politicians have spoken of abandoning the treaty if it becomes too difficult to renegotiate to allow them to deploy NMD. Perhaps this explains the apparent differences of opinion in government. On the same evening in March earlier this year, Foreign and Commonwealth Office minister Peter Hain said on the BBC that, he did "not like the idea of a Star Wars programme". Meanwhile on Channel 4, Defence Secretary Geoff Hoon stated that Britain would be sympathetic to any request from the US to use Fylingdales. Officials in Washington are also confident that any such requests would not be turned down.

NMD DA DDI 08 KO Crystal Xia

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IL: Russia hates NMD Russia HATES NMD. Daily News Bulletin, 7-7-08, “U.S.-Lithuanian Talks on Nmd Are Unacceptable – Medvedev”, http://www.red orbit.com/news/politics/1466793/uslithuanian_talks_on_nmd_are_unacceptable__medvedev/, [CXia] Moscow does not tolerate any possibility of talks between the United States and Lithuania on missile defense issues, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev said. "The Russian president openly expressed serious concerns at a meeting with U.S. President [George] Bush about media reports that the U.S. and Lithuania have been in talks on a possibility to deploy a base of missile interceptors. It was stated that this is absolutely unacceptable," Russian presidential aide Sergei Prikhodko told journalists after a meeting between Medvedev and Bush. Medvedev "stated that there is no real progress in the RussianU.S. dialog on the missile defense issue,"

NMD would wreck US/Russia relations. Dr. Bruce G. Blair, senior fellow in the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution, 2k, “The Impact Of National Missile Defense On Russia and Nuclear Security”, http://www.cdi.org/dm/2000/issue8/ nmdruss ia.html, [CXia] American officials dismiss Russia's suspicions of NMD as unwarranted on the grounds that U.S. defenses are not aimed at Russia except for scenarios involving accidental Russian launches. But Americans cannot dictate Russian perceptions. Russian suspicions, while perhaps unfounded, are understandable given recent setbacks in U.S.-Russian relations. And statements such as the following, taken from a 1995 analysis prepared for Congress by the Pentagon's Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, do not help: [Defenses against the former Soviet Union ballistic missile threat] "...could augment deterrence by significantly increasing the Soviet planners' doubts that any military attack on the United States could succeed." While fielding a U.S. missile defense could redound to our grave disadvantage, disruption of U.S.-Russian relations and of strategic stability might be avoided if fully offsetting reductions in offensive forces are made. If severe constraints on offensive firepower are imposed, missile defenses may be tolerable to Moscow and, in theory, could even strengthen stability. One promising formula for striking a stable balance between offense and defense is to cut deeply the offensive missile arsenals and take all silo-busting U.S. warheads off alert and put them in long-term storage. By de-alerting most or all of the current 2,200 U.S. weapons on high alert, a U.S. national missile defense would appear less threatening to Russia. Russian strategic missiles would be far less vulnerable to a sudden attack by U.S. offensive forces and thus would be more capable of overwhelming U.S. defenses. Russia in fact would be able to de-alert its own strategic missiles and thereby greatly reduce the risk of a mistaken or unauthorized Russian missile attack. Unfortunately, neither country is presently pursuing this formula. We have instead embarked on a collision course with Russia that threatens to increase, not decrease, the nuclear peril to Americans.

NMD DA DDI 08 KO Crystal Xia

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NMD would upset Russia and undermine arms agreements. Amy F. Woolf, specialist in National Defense from the Congressional Research Service, 7-14-02, “National Missile Defense: Russia’s Reaction”, https://www.policyarchive.org/bitstream/handle/10207/1208/RL3096 7_20020614.pdf?sequence=2, [CXia] Russia claimed that the ABM Treaty is the “cornerstone of strategic stability” and that, without its limits on missile defense, the entire framework of offensive arms control agreements could collapse. Furthermore, Russia argued that a U.S. NMD system would undermine Russia’s nuclear deterrent and upset stability by allowing the United States to initiate an attack and protect itself from retaliatory strike. The Clinton Administration claimed that the U.S. NMD system would be directed against rogue nations and would be too limited to intercept a Russian attack. But Russian officials questioned this argument. They doubted that rogue nations would have the capability to attack U.S. territory for some time, and they believed that the United States could expand its NMD system easily. Furthermore, they argued that, when combined with the entirety of U.S. conventional and nuclear weapons, an NMD system would place the United States in a position of strategic superiority.

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Russia hates NMD and promises to retaliate if adopted. CBS News, 5-27-08, “Russia Warns US on Missile Defense”, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/05/27 /world/main4130043.shtml?source=related_story, [CXia] A top Russian general warned on Tuesday that the military will respond to U.S. missile defense plans with countermeasures, and said Washington's trust-building proposals have bogged down in diplomatic arguments. Lt. Gen. Yevgeny Buzhinsky told reporters that Russia was thinking about "asymmetrical" steps if the United States deploys missile defense elements in Europe. He said Moscow has no intention of building a similar missile shield, but refused to elaborate on what specific measures the military might take. Buzhinsky said Russia appreciated U.S. proposals intended to soothe Russian concerns, but added they were not enough to change Moscow's perception that the U.S. system would undermine its security. Washington has promised to delay activating the planned new sites in Poland and the Czech Republic unless Iran proves itself an imminent threat to Europe. It also offered to let Russian officers monitor the sites to make sure they are not directed against Russia.

Claims that the system could not deter Russia are false. Desmond Butler, staff writer, 10-5-07, “US Study Supports Russia’s AMD Suspicions”, Associated Press, LexisNexis, [CXia] A number of top U.S-based physicists have concluded that the United States used inaccurate claims to reassure NATO allies about U.S. missile defense plans in Eastern Europe. They say the planned Polish-based interceptors and a radar system in the Czech Republic could target and catch Russian missiles, thus threatening Russia's nuclear deterrent. That view supports Russia's criticism of the system. Russia adamantly opposes the plan and the dispute has escalated U.S.-Russian tensions to the highest point since the Cold War. The Pentagon agency overseeing the missile program, the Missile Defense Agency, rejects the scientists' claims, saying their analyses are flawed. The United States says the missile system is intended to counter a threat from Iran and could not takeout Russian missiles. U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has dismissed Russia's concerns as "ludicrous." But the six scientists - whose backgrounds include elite American universities, research labs and high levels of government- said in interviews that Russia's concerns are justified.

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NMD will change the world’s stability – Russia will lash out. Luke Harding, staff writer, 4-11-07, “Russia Threatening new Cold War over Missile Defense”, The Guardian UK, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/apr/11/usa.topstories3, [CXia] Russia is preparing its own military response to the US's controversial plans to build a new missile defence system in eastern Europe, according to Kremlin officials, in a move likely to increase fears of a cold war-style arms race. The Kremlin is considering active counter-measures in response to Washington's decision to base interceptor missiles and radar installations in Poland and the Czech Republic, a move Russia says will change "the world's strategic stability". The Kremlin has not publicly spelt out its plans. But defence experts said its response is likely to include upgrading its nuclear missile arsenal so that it is harder to shoot down, putting more missiles on mobile launchers, and moving its fleet of nuclear submarines to the north pole, where they are virtually undetectable. Russia could also bring the new US silos within the range of its Iskander missiles launched potentially from the nearby Russian enclave of Kaliningrad, they add. In an interview with the Guardian, the Kremlin's chief spokesman, Dmitry Peskov, said Moscow felt betrayed by the Pentagon's move. "We were extremely concerned and disappointed. We were never informed in advance about these plans. It brings tremendous change to the strategic balance in Europe, and to the world's strategic stability."

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IL: China hates NMD China is incredibly suspicious of America’s NMD program. Dingli Shen, professor and Deputy Director @ Fudan University’s Centre for American Studies, 6-2k, “China’s Concern over National Missile Defense”, http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2000/06 /00_shen_chinasconcern.htm, [CXia] According to the NMD plan, the US will deploy 100 interceptors in Alaska in its first configuration. Assuming a 1 in 4 rate of interception, the US could at most hit 25 incoming missiles, a more than sufficient capability to take care of the alleged threat from those “rogue” states’ said to be developing long-range ballistic missiles with which to target America. At later stages, the US would deploy further kinetic kill vehicles in North Dakoda in order to provide nationwide missiles defence. The US has stated clearly that China has not figured in its NMD calculations. However, China views the situation differently and remains strongly suspicious of the US intentions in terms of NMD development. From China’s perspective, it is untenable that the US would spend 60-100 billion dollars on a system which has only “rogue” states in mind. Such capability of intercontinental strike by ballistic missile owned by “rogue” states does not yet exist. Excluding the P5, only Israel, Saudi Arabia, India, Pakistan, DPRK and Iran are currently believed to have medium-range missiles with ranges above 1,000km. Only four of these states, India, Pakistan, DPRK and Iran, may also have active programmes to develop intermediate-range missiles with ranges of over 3,000km.[8] It is highly unlikely that any of them will acquire an ICBM capability within a decade or so. The CIA’s classified 1998 Annual Report to Congress on Foreign Missile Development recognised that the ICBM threat to the United States from so-called rogue states is unlikely to materialise before 2010, with the possible exception of DPRK.[9]

NMD seems to target China specifically – wrecks relations. Dingli Shen, professor and Deputy Director @ Fudan University’s Centre for American Studies, 6-2k, “China’s Concern over National Missile Defense”, http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2000/06 /00_shen_chinasconcern.htm, [CXia] From China’s perspective, the US national missile defence would cause even worse strategic relations between Beijing and Washington. Though China has not publicly made its nuclear capability transparent, its CSS-4 ICBM force, capable of reaching the US with a range of 13,000 kilometres, is largely believed by the Western strategic analysts to number around 20.[11] China’s concern over the US national missile defence in violation of ABM has been expressed through various channels many times.[12] Primarily China is concerned about two issues. One is that the NMD will destabilise the world order, and harm the international relations. The other is that NMD will undermine China’s strategic deterrence, undermining China’s confidence in its strategic retaliatory capability. A limited anti-ballistic missile capability, as allowed by the existing ABM Treaty, would be enough to defend the strategic assets of the US against potential missile threats from outside the P5. Indeed the one-site base of anti-ballistic missile deployment under ABM framework cannot immunise the whole US from being hit. It is exactly this reason that has given Russia (as well as other nuclear weapons states) a confidence that they retain a credible nuclear deterrence vis-à-vis the US. Theoretically, part of the US would thus be exposed to some missile threat from “rogue” states. However, either that threat has been too remote, or the overwhelming strength of the US in both nuclear and conventional weapons will be powerful enough to deter potential adversaries from initiating hostilities. Also the envisaged NMD cannot stop an all-out Russian nuclear attack, considering the thousands of strategic weapons at Russia’s disposal. Therefore, Beijing can only take the view that US NMD has been designed to effectively neutralise China’s strategic deterrence.

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IL: Russia/China hates NMD NMD would wreck relations with China and Russia and lead to a major confrontation. Craig Eisendrath, Gerald E. Marsh, and Melvin A. Goodman, senior fellow at the Center for International Policy, physicist at Argonne National Laboratory, a senior fellow and director of the National Security Program at the Center for International Policy, 5-01, “Shield of Dreams: Why National Missile Defense Won’t Work”, http://www.ciponline.org/dfd/shield.htm, [CXia] Rather than seeing its own missile system as offensive, China, like Russia, believes that deployment of U.S. missile defenses would be an offensive move. In reaction, China would likely expand its nuclear-weapons arsenal, building more missiles, equipping some with multiple warheads, adding decoys and other countermeasures, and placing them on full alert. China's principal concern is not simply the deployment of U.S. national missile defense but the strengthening of Taiwan through the possible sale or deployment of theater defenses and the sale of U.S. cruisers equipped with Aegis radar. Such moves, in Chinese eyes, could lead to Taiwanese independence. China's chief arms negotiator, Sha Zukang, has suggested that if Washington went ahead with an NMD deployment designed to intercept "tens of warheads" -- a figure suspiciously close to China's eighteen to twenty single-warhead ballistic missiles -- this would "lead to serious confrontation" and a renunciation of previous undertakings barring nuclear or chemical weapons proliferation and nuclear testing. The 2000 NIE suggests that China might well increase its ICBM arsenal from twenty to two hundred within a few years. Thus, instead of providing security, a deployed NMD system could provoke responses from Russia and China that would actually exacerbate the threat. Meanwhile, Sino-Russian joint opposition to either a U.S. effort to deploy a national missile defense system or to reinterpret the ABM treaty has led to improved bilateral relations between them. NMD has also given President Putin the opportunity to travel to Europe, China, and North Korea and to suggest a regional defense for Europe, although his ideas are still quite vague.

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NMD  Reckless Wars NMD leads to a reckless US foreign policy – leads to unnecessary wars. Ivan Eland, director of defense policy studies at the Cato Institute, 2k, “Lets Make National Missile Defense Truly ‘National’”, http://www.cato.org/pubs/fpbriefs/fpb-058es.html, [CXia] If a thicker and wider missile defense causes U.S. policymakers to feel more secure against a direct missile attack and less vulnerable by threatened attacks to its allies, they may be more tempted to engage in reckless overseas military adventures against potential regional adversaries possessing WMD and long-range missiles. Such interventions would actually reduce U.S. security. Even a thicker, wider missile defense offers only a probability of killing incoming warheads, not an airtight defense against them. So it is possible that overconfident U.S. policymakers might get into unnecessary scrapes with WMD-armed regional powers that could lead to at least one warhead getting through the shield. In other words, a catastrophic attack on U.S. soil (a failure of the first magnitude in U.S. security policy) could originate from a country that would not have threatened U.S. security if it had been left alone. An apt analogy can be found in attempts to swat a wasp at a picnic. If the wasp is left alone, it will probably not sting any of the picnickers; but the picnickers will probably be stung if they threaten the wasp by attempting to swat it.

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NMD  Arms Races NMD will spark massive arms races around the world. Noam Chomsky, professor emeritus at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 7-18-08, “National Missile Defense System”, The American Prospect, http://www.chomsky.info/letters/20000718.htm, [CXia] I would prefer to respond to a slight reformulation of the question. The most hopeful prospect for the NMD [National Missile Defense], I think, is that the tests fail; and very clearly, because in the domain of nuclear strategy, appearance is likely to be interpreted as reality, for familiar reasons. If a system is developed that seems feasible, China will respond by strengthening its deterrent, which will impel India to do the same, and Pakistan, and . . . According to press reports, a new National Intelligence Estimate predicts that NMD deployment will trigger buildup of nuclear-armed missiles by China, India, and Pakistan, with a further spread into the Middle East. Russia will assume that such a system can be quickly upgraded and will therefore also regard it as a first-strike threat. As many have observed, Russia's "only rational response to the NMD system would be to maintain, and strengthen, the existing Russian nuclear force" (Michael Byers), undermining hopes for nuclear disarmament. The president of the Stimson Center, Michael Krepon, comments that the difference between Russian and U.S. stockpiles is so great that "the Russians are looking at a U.S. breakout level" and will be likely to react accordingly. U.S. negotiators have encouraged Russia to adopt a launch-on-warning strategy to alleviate their concerns and to induce them to accept the NMD and revision of the ABM treaty, a proposal that is "pretty bizarre," one expert commented, because "we know their warning system is full of holes" (John Steinbruner). At the UN [United Nations] conference on the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in May, there was broad condemnation of the NMD on the grounds that it would undermine decades of arms control agreements and provoke a new weapons race.

Arms races lead to nuclear war. Steven Lee, Professor, Ethics, Hobart and Smith College, Morality, Prudence, and Nuclear Weapons, 1993, p. 299 First, nuclear war could result from the behavior of other states, especially those that had formerly seen themselves as receiving protection from the nation's opponent under the nuclear umbrella. Some of theses states might well seek to acquire nuclear weapons, or to enlarge their arsenals if they were already nuclear powers, in order to provide better protection of their own against the opponent. Were such armament to occur, the uncertainties on all sides may make major nuclear war more likely that it was prior to the nation's unilateral nuclear disarmament

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NMD  Instability NMD would destroy the world order. Yuriy KAPRALOV, Director of the Department for Security Affairs and Disarmament, 1-18-01, “Effects of National Missile Defense on Arms Control and Strategic Stability”, http://www.armscontrol.ru/start/pu blications/kapralov020601.htm, [CXia] The deployment of a National Missile Defense by the United States would ruin this legacy and a hope for better and safer world. Eliminating both conceptual and physical foundation of strategic stability the deployment of NMD would have a lasting and spreading negative effect not only on arms control efforts, but at much larger scale on military, political, economic situation and generally on international security, both regional and global. It is highly indicative that while the deployment of an NMD has not even started, the plans for such defense for the US territory already now adversely affect arms control process. Suffice it to mention the situation around the prohibition of the production of fissile material for weapon purposes at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva (FMCT, or a "cut-off" Treaty). Even the START III negotiations, with its universal popularity, has fallen victim of NMD plans: the outgoing US administration during its last months established a linkage between the official negotiations on START III and an agreement on the part of Russia to NMD deployment by the US. No wonder the START-III negotiations have not even started. The most direct and potentially dangerous effect the NMD deployment, irrespective of its scope, would exert on strategic situation and nuclear forces. The deployment of NMD would result in undermining the strategic stability and a sharp increase in uncertainty and unpredictability. For the military it would mean heightened alert and readiness (who dreamed of dealerting and greater transparency at a recent NPT Review Conference?); for a population it would mean a much greater risk of serious accidents and use of nuclear weapons. Among other things, it would turn upside down the present correlation of offensive and defensive strategic arms, nullify the tested and proved effective "rules of the game", greatly complicate and toughen conditions of functioning for Strategic Forces Command and Control Centers.

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NMD leads to arms races that would ultimately result in a US/Russia nuclear war. Catharine Field, correspondent for the New Zealand Herald, 1-24-01, “Europe Braces for US Defense Moves”, The New Zealand Herald, LexisNexis, [CXia] Bush made the NMD, launched by President Bill Clinton in 1999, a key plank of his election campaign, declaring it essential for thwarting rogue states such as Iraq, Iran and North Korea which have missile capability and the perceived intent to acquire nuclear weapons. But as well as stirring hostility from China and Russia, the project is under fire in Europe, reviving memories of the wave of anti-US protests of the mid-1980s. The NMD "could overturn the foundations of defence policies around the world," says Georges Le Guelte, director of research at France's Institute for International Strategic Research. "This upheaval could have the gravest consequences for Western Europe, first and foremost." The NMD, with a pencilled cost of $NZ175 billion, is a scaled-down version of Ronald Reagan's "Star Wars" initiative. It entails building space and ground-based sensors to provide early warning; ground-based radar to spot incoming missiles, and 100 missile interceptors, based in Alaska, to smash into the warheads while they are still in the air. But the NMD would in effect destroy the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty, signed by the US and the Soviet Union, which limited their anti-missile defences. It would be designed - at least in its first phase - to protect only the US, not its allies. But for it to work, two radar bases in Britain and Greenland would have to be updated. Politicians in Britain, Denmark, France and Germany have already warned it could be impossible to sell the NMD to their public. Unlike the 1980s, when the US was able to deploy new medium-range missiles in five Nato countries despite big protests by the left wing, there is no proof of a similar threat to Europe today. A parallel programme, the Theatre Missile Defence, is being designed to protect US forces abroad from medium-range missiles, which would conceivably help to shield the countries where the troops are deployed, but this is not the case for the NMD in its current design. Most damaging of all though, are the fears that the ABM treaty will be torn up and another arms race will begin. Western Europe could again become a strategic battlefield, as the radar sites would presumably be first-wave targets in any nuclear war between Moscow and Washington. The European Union's top representative for security and foreign affairs, Javier Solana, a former Nato secretarygeneral, said it was "questionable" whether the NMD could be effective against rogue nations and terrorists and warned of "difficult discussions within Nato."

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NMD Bad – Generic NMD poses a great threat to US allies and the American people. Ivan Eland, director of defense policy studies at the Cato Institute, 2k, “Lets Make National Missile Defense Truly ‘National’”, http://www.cato.org/pubs/fpbriefs/fpb-058es.html, [CXia] Although a missile defense would undoubtedly make the United States more willing to intervene overseas, the allies should be skeptical that U.S. interventions would always serve their interests. If the United States—protected by a missile defense— moved against a regional adversary possessing WMD and long-range delivery systems, the adversary, having a lower probability of successfully attacking the United States, might instead threaten a missile strike against a U.S. ally. In effect, the adversary— betting that the United States would care more about the safety of its economically developed allies than about intervening in the developing world—would hold U.S. allies hostage to persuade the United States to desist from meddling in its business. U.S. allies should be wary that they might be exposed to the consequences of U.S. recklessness overseas. The allies should conclude that without missile defense they could be left “holding the bag” for risky U.S. foreign interventions. But the United States should refuse to cover wealthy allies—nations that spend too little on their own defense and already benefit from significant U.S. security guarantees—with a missile shield. (For example, Germany spends only about 1.5 percent of its gross domestic product on defense, and Japan spends less than 1 percent.) Instead, President Clinton recently proposed a superior approach: sharing missile defense technology with the allies.1 1 Using that technology, allied nations could unilaterally or collectively build their own missile defenses. In contrast, protection by a U.S.-directed missile shield would deepen and perpetuate the unhealthy dependence of allies on the United States. The dangers of U.S. interventions overseas do not accrue only to allies. Comprehensive missile defenses may inadvertently increase the risk to those they are ostensibly intended to protect—the American people. In addition to creating a wider defense by protecting allies, adding sea- and space-based missile defenses to a limited land-based system also increases the probability that warheads will be intercepted before they strike U.S. soil. That increased protection (a “thicker” defense) could do more harm than good if it spurred more dangerous activism in U.S. foreign policy.

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AT: NMD Good/Solves Attacks NMD will be an epic failure. Craig Eisendrath, Gerald E. Marsh, and Melvin A. Goodman, senior fellow at the Center for International Policy, physicist at Argonne National Laboratory, a senior fellow and director of the National Security Program at the Center for International Policy, 5-01, “Shield of Dreams: Why National Missile Defense Won’t Work”, http://www.ciponline.org/dfd/shield.htm, [CXia] None of the national missile defense systems proposed over the past twenty years has ever proven in tests to be technically feasible, and those currently under development are far from promising. The United States is many years away from conducting the kinds of realistic tests that could provide military and political leaders with the confidence they should have in these weapons to deploy them. An example is the rigged test of October 2, 1999, in which the target followed a preprogrammed flight path to a designated position; the interceptor missile also flew to a preprogrammed position; the decoy had a significantly different thermal temperature from the target; and a Global Positioning Satellite receiver was placed on the target to send its position to ground control. Inadequate testing also constitutes a problem. The Clinton system faced this problem, as illustrated by the finding of the GAO in 1997 that "Because of the compressed development schedule, only a limited amount of flight test data will be available for the system deployment decision in fiscal year 2000." Inadequate testing is also cited in the Coyle report of January 2001, and flight tests are way behind schedule. In fact, only fifteen intercept attempts outside the atmosphere have been conducted by the Department of Defense since 1982. In only four, or 26 percent, did the anti-missiles actually hit their targets, and none demonstrated an ability to distinguish warheads from realistic decoys. Other missile-defense systems being discussed by the Bush administration have failed to pass their tests or remain seriously undertested

NMD is only used for offensive reasons. Ivan Eland, director of defense policy studies at the Cato Institute, 2k, “Lets Make National Missile Defense Truly ‘National’”, http://www.cato.org/pubs/fpbriefs/fpb-058es.html, [CXia] The main objective of conservatives in supporting more robust missile defense systems does not seem to be defense of the U.S. homeland. Instead, their aim seems to be to create a stronger shield behind which the United States can move against potential regional adversaries possessing weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles to deliver them. The reasoning is that, if such adversaries cannot threaten the United States or its allies with catastrophic retaliation, U.S. policymakers will feel more confident in intervening militarily. But because any missile defense system cannot guarantee that all incoming warheads will be destroyed, that reasoning is a dangerous illusion that could actually undermine U.S. security. Thus, development of a missile shield should be confined to the more limited land-based system that the Clinton administration has proposed.

NMD is not only expensive, but will be ineffective. Fred Kaplan, columnist, 3-12-04, “Bush’s Latest Missile Defense Folly”, http://www.slate.com/id/2097087/, [CXia] Bush's budget for next year includes $10.7 billion for missile defense—over twice as much money as for any other single weapons system. This summer, he's planning to start deploying the first components of an MD system—six anti-missile missiles in Alaska, four in California, and as many as 20 more, in locations not yet chosen, the following year. Yet, except by sheer luck, these interceptors will not be able to shoot down enemy missiles. Or, to put it more precisely, Bush is starting to deploy very expensive weapons without the slightest bit of evidence that they have any chance of working.

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AT: NMD necessary – North Korea North Korea poses no threat. Craig Eisendrath, Gerald E. Marsh, and Melvin A. Goodman, senior fellow at the Center for International Policy, physicist at Argonne National Laboratory, a senior fellow and director of the National Security Program at the Center for International Policy, 5-01, “Shield of Dreams: Why National Missile Defense Won’t Work”, http://www.ciponline.org/dfd/shield.htm, [CXia] Yet, it is important to realize how small and economically weak North Korea is -- a country intermittently hit by famine with a GNP only 4 percent of Taiwan's. It has only tested two longer-range missiles (it has not tested since 1998), its test facilities are quite primitive, and its missile system is not capable of sustaining multiple launches of missiles. Moreover, its recent moves, including historic exchanges between the heads of state of North and South Korea in June of 2000, indicate it is coming out of its self-imposed isolation and acting constructively to improve its international position. Continued negotiations between the United States and North Korea could well yield a diplomatic resolution, including a verifiable agreement to end its missile and nuclear programs. Negotiations have worked in the past. The 1994 Agreed Framework provided a way to verify allegations of missile development; without it, Western observers would not have been allowed to investigate North Korea's Kumchon-Ni facility when suspicious activity took place in 1998. Despite this impressive record, during his March 7, 2001 meeting with South Korean president Kim Dae Jung, President Bush squandered the opportunity to conclude a verifiable, permanent end to North Korea's long-range missile program. He stated that talks started in the Clinton era would not resume soon but at "some point in the future." This is perhaps risking the best opportunity to defeat potential, long-range North Korean missiles -- by resuming talks with North Korea. It should also be noted that the threat of military retaliation has deterred North Korea from launching a full-scale attack on South Korea for fifty years, and would most certainly prevent it from launching a missile attack against either the United States or South Korea. Ironically, the United States is focusing on North Korea as the raison d'etre for NMD at the very time that Pyongyang is moderating its policies, improving its relations with South Korea and Japan, and looking for ways to moderate its modest strategic programs.

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AT: NMD necessary – Iran Your Iran args are wrong AND Russia sees NMD as a threat. Daily News Bulletin, 7-11-08, “Iran’s Testing of Missile with Range Below 2000 Km Proves NMD Not Needed in Europe – Lavrov”, http://www.istockanalyst.com/article/viewiStockNews+articleid_2389995&title= Irans_Testing_of.html, [CXia] Iran's testing of missiles with a range below 2,000 kilometers is proof that Russia was right in asserting that it is irrational for the U.S. to deploy elements of its missile defense shield in Europe, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said. "As to missile defense, the tests that took place in Iran just confirmed that Iran now has missiles with a range below 2,000 kilometers," Lavrov told a news conference after a meeting with his Jordanian counterpart Salah Eddin Bashir in Moscow on Friday. "This confirms what we have been saying: the current idea to deploy the third positing district of the U.S. missile defense system in Europe is not necessary to monitor and react to these missiles," Lavrov said. "We are still convinced that talk about the Iranian nuclear threat as the reason behind the deployment of the third positing district is unsubstantiated," the minister said.

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AFF: NMD Good There is growing international cooperation on NMD – it solves against threats. Bureau of International Information Programs, 4-6-06, “International Cooperation on Missile Defense Capabilities Growing”, http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/library/news/2006/space-060404-usia01.htm, [CXia] Growing international cooperation in building missile defense capabilities represents a new, forward-looking consensus on defending against current and future threats, says Paula DeSutter, assistant secretary of state for verification, compliance and implementation. “We can’t continue to use 20th-century tools to meet 21st-century challenges,” DeSutter said in April 4 remarks at a Washington seminar sponsored by the National Defense University Foundation. DeSutter said that missile defense systems are “a reasonable insurance policy to purchase in today’s international security environment,” because they strengthen deterrence while also serving a contingency need should a hostile regime launch ballistic missiles -– possibly carrying nuclear, chemical or biological weapons –- against the United States or its allies. At the same time, she said, missile defense is more than an insurance policy -– it is an essential component of America’s goal to support international nonproliferation efforts and build a “layered” defense against weapons of mass destruction

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AFF: No US/Russia War Arms race over NMD is unlikely. Warnings are diplomatic. AFP, 5-31-07, “Russia can’t rival US in arms race: analysts”, LexisNexis, [CXia] Russia may have test-fired a new rocket and warned of an "arms race" due to US missile shield plans in Europe -- but analysts say a repeat of the Cold War bomb scramble is unlikely. "I doubt very much ... that the Russians are going to rush ahead and build a whole bucket load of these kind of missiles," Theresa Hitchens, director of the Center for Defense Information in Washington, told AFP. She was referring to Moscow's announcement on Tuesday that it had successfully tested a RS-24 rocket, a new multiple warhead ballistic missile designed to overcome air defense systems. "I think they would like to show the United States and the rest of the world that they are not impotent in the face of US missile defense," she added, saying Russia was "posturing" on the "political issue" of missile defense. Russia is locked in a diplomatic battle over US plans to expand its missile defense shield into central Europe.

Russia can’t challenge the US. AFP, 5-31-07, “Russia can’t rival US in arms race: analysts”, LexisNexis, [CXia] "Russia's nuclear forces will continue to shrink, even with this new missile and its warheads," said Michael Krepon, cofounder of the Henry L. Stimson Center, a specialist security think-tank in Washington. The Russian ministry of defense refused to reveal the characteristics of the new missile but said it was designed to replace the Soviet-era RS-18 and RS-20 rockets. "This test clarifies the message that Moscow has minimal assured destruction capabilities even with US military dominance and missile defenses," Krepon said. Political scientists Keir Lieber of Notre Dame University in Indiana and Daryl Press from the University of Pennsylvania detailed what they said was Russia's declining post-Cold War military clout last year in the journal Foreign Affairs. "Even as the United States' nuclear forces have grown stronger since the end of the Cold War, Russia's strategic nuclear arsenal has sharply deteriorated," they wrote. "What nuclear forces Russia retains are hardly ready for use." "Unless they reverse course rapidly, Russia's vulnerability will only increase over time," they added. "With the US arsenal growing rapidly while Russia's decays and China's stays small, the era of MAD (mutual assured destruction by nuclear weapons) is ending -- and the era of US nuclear primacy has begun."