(1912) Can Germany Invade England

CAN GERMANY INVADE ENGLAND?

CAN GERMANY INVADE ENGLAND? BY

COLONEL

H.

B.

HANNA

LATE COMMANDING AT DELHI AUTHOR OF "THE" HISTORY OK THE SECOND AFGHAN WAR"; "INDIAN PROBLEMS"; CAN RUSSIA INVADE INDIA?"; ".INDIA'S SCIENTIFIC FRONTIER"; "BACKWARDS OR FORWARDS"; "THE DEFENCE OF INDIA'S NORTH-WEST FRONTIER"; "A CAVALRY CATECHISM," ETC.

"

Give

me facts,

feed

me on

1

facts}' Carlyle.

"The Navy means for you your existence as an Empire it means for you the fact that you are free from invasion it means for you your daily food and daily employment. The Navy is all in all and everything therefore, though the cost is great, it is little compared with what it brings ;

;

;

back

to you."

Lord

"

Selborne, First Lord of the Admiralty in the late Government.

What

is the real basis and justification of the craven which threaten to burden this country with a sort of conscript army, which threaten to turn this country into a sort of Germany, with its millions of soldiers, and which threaten to lose us even a sort of command of the sea, for we cannot serve two masters ? " Archibald Hurd, Author of " The Command of the Sea"

fears

METHUEN & 36

ESSEX

CO. LTD. STREET W.C.

LONDON Third Edition

First published October

CONTENTS PACK

CHAPTER i.

GREAT

BRITAIN'S

STRATEGICAL

POSITION

AND SOURCES OF DEFENSIVE STRENGTH. II.

I

STRENGTH AND DISPOSITION IN EUROPEAN

WATERS OF THE ENGLISH AND GERMAN FLEETS

III.

IV.

10

THE INVASION SCARE

.

.

-

.

CONSTITUTION OF INVADING FORCE

:

TRANS-

PORT AND SUPPLY

V.

VI.

TION

vii.

viu.

60

THE SHIPPING PROBLEM MOBILISATION

....

CONCENTRATION

:

VOYAGE: DISEMBARKATION: AND

CONCLUSION

INDEX

.

.

.

.

AFTER

.

82

EMBARKA-

....... :

35

.

.

96 112

-136 .

145

Can Germany Invade England

CHAPTER

?

I

GREAT BRITAIN'S STRATEGICAL POSITION AND SOURCES OF DEFENSIVE STRENGTH " This precious stone

set in the silver sea,

Which serves it in the office of a Or as a moat defensive to a house,

wall,

Against the envy of less happier lands ; This blessed plot, this earth, this realm, this England

" !

SHAKESPEARE.

"Whosoever commands the sea commands the trade whosoever commands the trade of the world commands the riches of the ;

world, and consequently the world itself."

SIR

"Without

a

and

WALTER RALEIGH.

Navy, the would be confined to Army their own shores at home, and become powerless and unknown abroad their commerce would fall into decay and pass into other hands, and we should be once more reproached as the Britain well-appointed

and the

British

commanding

lofty spirit of Britons

;

toto

ab or be exclusa, instead of as

world."

SET

Life of

in

now

respected in every part of the

Admiral Lord Howe.

the

heart

of

stormy

seas,

often

CAN GERMANY INVADE ENGLAND

2

to

difficult

the

United

the

mist,

enshrouded

often

navigate,

of

in

athwart

lies

Kingdom

water-routes

principal

?

the

world,

Europe with and the West

not only those which connect

United States,

Canada, the

which

those

but equally

Indies,

bring to

the Northern of

European States the products South America, India, China,

Africa,

and Japan

Australia,

commands

the

North Sea,

it

;

English will

be

long as she

and, so

in

Channel

her power to seal

up the navies and mercantile of

her

neighbours

Denmark,

Germany,

Sweden,

Finland,

and the

fleets of

any

Holland,

Belgium,

Northern

Russia,

and those of

Norway,

Northern France.

And

if

position

petitors.

the

strong

Britain's

geographical

unique, her resources for defence

those of her most

surpass

of

is

Great

Small

in

strongest

extent,

countries

in the industry

powerful

com-

she

is

yet one

in

the

world

:

and ingenuity of her

GREAT BRITAIN'S STRATEGICAL POSITION 3 inhabitants fields

in

her numerous

in

;

her

of

millions

hardy

mercantile

whilst

and

thousands

to

her

people,

sailors

marine

for

and

iron-

giving food

provides her

;

her great

in

;

which,

industry,

employment

coal

navigable rivers

harbours

fine

many

fishing

and

immense

in her

;

to

skilled

national

and

strong in her splendid

;

dockyards, in which, thanks to Free Trade, she builds more quickly and cheaply than other States, with

all

the natural consequence

that she builds not only for herself but for

the world.

In her private dockyards, foreign

men-of-war are always on the stocks, ships which on the breaking out of hostilities

would go,

Navy

;

in

at

once,

her

to

public

swell

the

British

dockyards,

Dread-

noughts and cruisers, destroyers and submarines, are ever under construction or repair;

and well-stocked

carefully selected

from the

sea,

and

stand

arsenals, in positions

fortified against attack

ready to

equip

and

CAN GERMANY INVADE ENGLAND

4

new marine

victual

?

monsters, or renew the

equipment and supplies of old ones. And because Free-Trade Britain has become the rendezvous of the world's shipping, the distributing

she

is

centre

of

the

world's

strong in the self-interest of

wealth, all

countries, for which

among them can

the

even

dislocation

ruption

of this

world's trade?

or

other desire

temporary interinflow and outflow of the

Certainly not Germany, the

volume of whose yearly exchanges with her amounts to over a hundred millions sterling. Still,

since history presents

many

instances

of Governments acting in opposition to the true interests of their subjects, and others, hardly

less

numerous,

of

or

individuals

working on the passions and fears of the bulk of the people to bring about a classes

war

by which they hope to profit, incumbent on Great Britain not to

too

confidently

interest

of

to

other

the

enlightened

nations,

and,

it

is

trust self-

therefore,

GREAT BRITAIN'S STRATEGICAL POSITION

maintain,

be

accord

her

necessary,

state

of

can

she

incomparable too,

scientifically

with

and

possess

possible

of

advantage

should in

i.e.

highest

position,

Navy

should

Navy by which

the

full

natural

the

in

efficiency,

take

she

that

necessary

5

the

that

that

distributed,

principles

of

strategy.

In the next chapter

Great

Britain

and that

it

will

be shown that

does possess such a Navy,

is

judiciously that

however,

order,

it

the

distributed.

In

reader

may

lay

be able to follow the facts and figures that will be laid before him, and to understand the conclusions

know

in

consist,

what

drawn from them, he should the

principles

strategy

and be acquainted with a concrete

example of their application

No

of

to naval warfare.

better definition of strategy

can be

given than that contained in a single sentence of a his

letter

by Napoleon to ''There is a great

written

brother Joseph:

CAN GERMANY INVADE ENGLAND

6

?

between operations conducted on a well-considered system from an organised

difference

and proceeding at haphazard without such centre, and risking the loss of one's

centre,

communications." In these few words the great master of

the science and art of war described both

the

true

long,

strategy

fierce

and the

false

struggle between

and the Dutch

in

and the

;

the

English

the seventeenth century

affords a perfect demonstration of both.

long as England

So

conducted that war " on

a well-considered system from an organised centre

"

in the

Holland's

English Channel, thus severing

communications with

world, including her lysed the

"The

outer

colonies, she para-

action of the

maintained her 1

own

the

Dutch

Fleet,

own supremacy on

opinion of Sir Francis

Mr. Frobisher and others, that be

and

the sea

Drake, Mr.

l ;

Hawkyns,

men

of greatest judgment [and] experience, is that [the] surest way to meet the Spanish Fleet is upon their own [coast] or in any harbour

Lord Howard of Sir Francis Walsingham, June 14, 1588,

of their own, and there to defeat them."

Effingham

to

GREAT BRITAIN'S STRATEGICAL POSITION 7 warnings of her Admirals, she laid up her battleships and " proceeded at haphazard, without such a but

when,

against

the

" centre," thus risking the loss of her

munications,"

to

disperse

her

com-

frigates

to

1 prey upon the enemy's merchant shipping, she lost that supremacy with consequences

disastrous

A in

Dutch the

and fleet

Nore,

to

disgraceful

herself.

under de Ruyter appeared advanced unopposed up '

"This form of strategy is termed commerce destroying' a great misnomer for it is precisely the result which is not secured by the methods adopted. ... It is a cheap method of making war, and, to all but those who probe hence adherents to its to the root of matters, specious doctrines are always to be found." Gold Medal Prize " The Command of the Sea What is Essay for 1908, it?" by Major A. B. N. Churchill, Journal Royal United 1

;

;

:

Service Institution, April 1909.

Admiral Mahan also condemns " commerce destroying " in his great work, Influence of Sea Power on History. And General Bronsart von Schellendorff, in his Duties of the General Staff of the German Army^ p. 552, writes " A fleet which endeavoured to carry out its duties by destroying the :

enemy's commerce without considering the general situation would violate the most important principle of strategy that the main force should be kept concentrated to deal with the

most dangerous opponent,"

CAN GERMANY INVADE ENGLAND

8

Thames

the

boom which

to

Gravesend,

captured sixteen the

famous

the

English

British

vessels,

Fleet,

and

the

including

the

pick

of

towed

her

to

Charles,

Royal

forced

Medway, and

the

protected

?

Holland. 1

owed

Holland entirely final

Great

to

and

her

temporary

Britain's

permanent

triumph blunders, her

discomfiture

to

the

latter country's natural strategic superiority

nothing therefore but a repetition

;

of the

same blunders on a magnified scale, under conditions which render them practically unthinkable,

much

can

assure

as the chance of

to

so

Germany

emerging victorious

from a struggle with this country, not her strategical position worse Holland's, her coast-line

shorter,

for

is

than

her har-

bourage more limited, her communications with the outer world longer and more open 1

The Story of the British Navy, by E, Keble Chatterton,

pp. 213, 214,

GREAT BRITAIN'S STRATEGICAL POSITION 9 to attack

;

and

is

not the disparity between

and ours to-day far greater than the disparity between the Dutch and the her

fleet

English Fleets two hundred and

ago?

fifty

years

CHAPTER

II

STRENGTH AND DISPOSITION IN EUROPEAN WATERS OF THE ENGLISH AND GERMAN FLEETS "

The

recent activity of the invasion-monger, in spite of the fact and absolutely, the Royal Navy is now stronger than at any period of its wonderful history, is an unhealthy that, relatively

symptom."

SIR

GEORGE

Governor of Bombay,

"As

SYDENHAM

late Secretary

CLARKE,

G.C.M.G.,

of the Defence Committee.

the present position of the British Fleet, there is no of cavil. It is extremely easy to produce sophisticated possibility statistics to prove almost anything, but it will be impossible ior any to

alarmist to paint a picture of naval peril at ARCHIBALD HURD. materials at command."

" As about 42,000 men

are required to

man

present from the

the active

fleet,

and

about 7,000 of the nominal personnel are not available for purposes of war, it follows that Germany, having to exchange 15.000 men under training for trained men, could not mobilise her fleet without

an important point when we are asked to calling out the reserve believe in the possibility of a surprise attack." GERARD FIENNES.

"For

this, at least, I

thank Heaven devoutly; the hegemony of

vested, as always, in ships-of-the-Line, and when I note our position to-day (a greater ratio of superiority as against

the wider seas

is

other nations than ever

known

before

!),

and review our position in

why, I sleep right soundly in my bed." ALAN H. BURGOYNE, M.P., Editor of the "Navy League Annual"

the future

\

SHALL now

lay before 10

my

readers a

number

ENGLISH AND GERMAN FLEETS of facts and figures which

will,

I

II

think, con-

vince them that so far from Germany's being in

a position to invade England, her

fleet,

should there ever be war between the two

would

countries,

and

anchor

scarcely

venture

out

dare into

to

weigh

the

open

sea.

So

recently as six

years ago dissemina-

opposed to concentration, was Great Britain's Naval policy. Her ships-of-war

tion, as

were " scattered here and there as with a "

l

but, in 1906, Lord Fisher put pepper-box an end to this haphazard state of things, and ;

to-day

we

with the "

as

are literally in a position to talk

enemy

in

our gates.

All these small detachments scattered here

with

a

pepper-box

are

common

and there

devices,

but

are

dangerous, and proofs of extreme ignorance in military matters." Indian Misgovernment, by Sir Charles Napier, p.

408.

remarks are as applicable H. B. H.

Sir C. Napier's

to the

Army.

to the

Navy

as

CAN GERMANY INVADE ENGLAND

12

4th Squadron of the ist Fleet Battleships

Armoured Cruisers

4 4

Protected Cruisers Destroyers

.

and

No German

8

Fleet.

.10

.

A new squadron, battleships

:

.6

.

.

?

consisting of four cruiser-

two armoured

cruisers,

is

eventually to be based on Malta, a great place

whose well-protected harbour all for docking, repairing, and refitting

d'armes, in requisites

The

the largest men-of-war are provided.

Torpedo-boat Destroyer

Flotilla is to

be

creased next winter to thirty destroyers, a

base for small craft

is

to

be formed

at

in-

new

Alex-

and a squadron of six battleships is to be based on Gibraltar, which is also a first-class andria,

naval harbour.

This squadron

is,

be increased to eight battleships.

in time, to

The

criti-

cisms levelled against these changes are undeserved. will

A

great naval base at Gibraltar

ensure our communications with India 1

Brassefs Naval Annual

for 1912, p. 71.

ENGLISH AND GERMAN FLEETS

13

event of the route through the Suez

in the

Canal

being

interrupted

and

;

a

battle

squadron permanently located at the entrance " Mediterranean, a

to the "

fertile area,"

trade tends to be crowded,"

l

where

be well

will

placed either for the purpose of reinforcing the Cruiser Squadron at Malta or the Fleets in the

Home

British

waters, which, in their

any moment spare ample vessels make the Mediterranean Fleet superior to

turn, can at to

any possible combination against

TABLE

II

it.

2

ATLANTIC OCEAN (iRISH WATERS) 3rd Squadron of the ist Fleet . Battleships Armoured Cruisers .

Protected Cruisers

The

Atlantic

:

.6

No German

Fleet.

4"!

3/

Fleet

is

in

future

to

be

based on

home

and

be brought up during the year

from 1

is

to

instead of Gibraltar,

ports

six to eight battleships.

See " Attack and Defence of Trade

f Maritime Strategy^ 2

Brassey>s

p. 263,

by

Naval Annual tot

"

in

Some

Principles

Julian S. Corbett, 1912, p. 71.

LL.M.

CAN GERMANY INVADE ENGLAND

14

TABLE

IIlA

HOME WATERS

IN IN THE ENGLISH

British Fleet IN THE

CHANNEL

7th Battle Squadron of the 3rd Fleet (in commission with nucleus crews) * Battleships

ist

2

and 2nd Battle Squad-

(Fully manned) Battleships 25 Battle Cruisers 5 Armoured Cruisers 13 Protected Cruisers 16;} 29 8 Scouts

9^

Protected Cruisers io

.

.

8th Battle Squadron of the 3rd Fleet (in reserve with skeleton, or main-

.

3

.

tenance, crews) Battleships Protected Cruisers .

NORTH SEA

rons of ist Fleet, and 5th and 6th Battle Squadrons of 2nd Fleet

.11

.

Armoured Cruisers

?

.4

.

.

1 1

Eventually the 5th and 6th Battle Squadrons of the 2nd Fleet will each consist of eight battleships with full The 7th Squadcomplements of active service ratings. will be nucleus manned a ron, 3rd Fleet, crew, and by on mobilisation brought up to full strength by a new " The force to be called the Immediate Reserve." 8th Squadron will only be a reserve manned by skeleton, or maintenance, crews. Destroyer flotillas in support of ist and 2nd Battle Squadrons, ist Fleet, and 5th and 6th Battle Squadrons,

2nd

Fleet,

Rosyth

based on

:

.

20

(2nd)

.

16

Harwich (5th) 26 Portsmouth (6th) 23

(8th)

.

24

Portland (4th)

(ist)

.

.

16

Harwich (3rd) 16 Devonport (7th) 24 165 and Flotillas are driven by turbines, 4th ist, 2nd, 3rd, and not one has been launched more than five years. In full Commission .68 .

.

.

In reserve with nucleus crews 1

2

.

.

Brussels Naval Annual for 1912,

Ibid. 1912, p. 71.

3

.

97

165

p. 70.

Ibid. 1911, p. 9.

{Continued on page

1

6)

ENGLISH AND GERMAN FLEETS

TABLE IN

IIlB

GERMAN WATERS

German

Fleet

IN BALTIC SEA

IN

In Reserve

ist

Battleships

4

Protected Cruisers

2

'

and 2nd Squadrons of the

High Sea

Battleships

12

Destroyers

NORTH SEA

Fleet

.17

.

Battle Cruisers

.

2

Armoured Cruisers

i

Protected Cruisers

5

Destroyers

.

24

.

In Reserve Battleships

4

,

.

Destroyer Flotilla in support of the High Sea Fleet

Based on Wilhelmshaven

.

Kiel in Baltic (in reserve)

NOTE.

Of

the

guns, the remainder with three are

.24

.

.

12

36

30 English Battleships and Battle

Cruisers in the North Sea, three are

19,

:

1

armed with

2-inch 1

;

armed with

i3*5-inch

whereas of Germany's

2-inch guns, the remainder

with only n-inch, which gives to Great Britain a great 2 superiority in weight of metal. 1

JBrassey's 8

Naval Annual for

Fleets (Great Britain

1912, p. 71.

and Foreign Countries)

127,

May,

1912.

(Continued on page 17)

CAN GERMANY INVADE ENGLAND

l6

Abstract of British

in the

Fleets

Waters (see Tables II and

I

HA)

Home

Cruisers Protected Cruisers

.

.

.

Destroyers Total number of vessels in

A

Irish

.

51

.26 .40

...... ... ... Home

Armoured

Irish

and

:

Battleships, including Battle Cruisers

Scouts

r

Waters when

all

.

.165

and

are mobilised

290

over 18,000 men are sufficient at present to crews of the 7th and 8th Squadrons of the the complete to full commission. 1 These vessels are fully Fleet 3rd in. provisioned, and ammunition, stores, and coal laid The crews who are on shore ready to embark, can be shipped in a few hours. " nucleus crew consists of everything required to manage a ship, and to fight a ship, excepting only what maybe described as the unskilled maritime labour required for the purpose. These nucleus crews take out their ship. They practise the guns of their ship ; they are not liable to little

A

those inevitable breakdowns which people changing to new machinery for the first time always experience." A skeleton, or maintenance, crew consists of everything necessary to keep the ship, machinery, and guns :

in perfect order. Two cruisers of exceptionally high speed are attached The eight scouts (small fast to the Destroyer Flotilla. 3 or act as "mother" depot ships to the destroyers. cruisers)

The ist and 2nd Squadrons of the ist Fleet and 5th and 6th Squadrons of the 2nd Fleet are at present based on Chatham, Portsmouth, and Devonport, and the 7th and 8th Squadrons of the 3rd Fleet on Dover. When completed, Rosyth will form another base for the Fleet in the North Sea. Brasseys Naval Annual for 1912, p. 71. Mr. Balfour at Glasgow on January 12, 1905. 3 Sir William White, late Director of Naval Construction, in Nineteenth Century for July, 1911. 1

3

ENGLISH AND GERMAN FLEETS Abstract of the

German High Sea

Fleet in the North

Sea and the Baltic (see

Sea, including Reserves in that

Table Hie)

17

:

..... ..... ......

Battleships, including Battle Cruisers

Armoured

.

27

Cruisers

i

Protected Cruisers Destroyers

7

36

Total number of vessels in North Sea and Baltic Sea

when

are mobilised

all

.

71

Germany's High Sea Fleet is based on Wilhelmshaven, and her ships in the Baltic on Kiel. The canal which connects the Baltic Sea with the River Elbe sixty-two

miles

long,

knots per hour

5 '3

get through

it.

1

it

Its

and

the

at

is

about

prescribed speed of

would take a ship thirteen hours channel

to

at present, too shallow

is,

to allow of the passage of ships of the

Dreadnought

but the work of deepening the canal

is

going on,

type,

and

The alternative probably be completed in igiSroute from the Baltic by the Little and Great Belts, the 2

will

Kattegat long

;

and Skager Rak,

is

in winter often infested

from 600 to 700 miles

by

ice,

and

at all seasons

dangerous, owing to dense fogs which prevail in these shallow and contracted waters. 1

Alan H. Burgoyne, M.P., Editor of the Navy League Annual. 2 Sir William White in Nineteenth Century for July 1911.

l8

CAN GERMANY INVADE ENGLAND

?

The

following table sets forth the total strength of the Navies of Great Britain and

Germany

:

TABLE

IV

Comparative strength of the two

Navies

(omitting

Battleships and Armoured Cruisers over 20 years GREAT BRITAIN GERMANY

Battleships Battle Cruisers .

Armoured

55\ 6o Battleships Battle Cruisers 5!

.

.

34 Armoured

Cruisers

Protected Cruisers

II-

III.

5

Grand

558

109^ 80 202 j-

13

still

Grand

total

289

appearing ;

in

England's and

and

in

these so-

called obsolete vessels Great Britain

much stronger than Germany. " :

initiative

is

also

1

page 8 of The Naval Annual for 1912, It has been a wise policy, largely due to the of Lord Fisher, to put out of the dockyards vessels

Lord Brassey,

writes

J

battleships over twenty

Germany's Naval Lists

1

6

Unprotected Cruisers

65J

.

total

old

[37

109

There are some years

26

III. ii J

179 -387 Submarines

Destroyers Torpedo Boats

9

en

I.

II.

.

26

.

Submarines

,

Destroyers Torpedo Boats

.

Torpedo Vessels

Cruisers

38 [72 I6J

Unprotected Cruisers Scouts

J35

2

.

Protected Cruisers

iS\

I.

33

.

.

old).

at

ENGLISH AND GERMAN FLEETS

19

Referring to the obsolescence of men-ofwar,

Mahan,

his

in

Strategy? writes

" :

work on Naval

latest

The

last

expression

of

foreign professional opinion, concerning these so-called obsolete ships,

when

stages of a war,

undergone

that, in the later

the newest ships have

wear

their

is

and received

their

hammering, the nation which then can put forward the largest reserve of ships of the older types will win."

Tables

I

and

II

show

Britain has twenty-four big in the

whereas Great

that,

and

little

vessels

Mediterranean and six battleships and

seven cruisers

in the Atlantic

Germany has

not a single vessel in either;

(Irish waters),

" " but he adds The hopelessly inefficient for every service be carried too far." Eleven of the policy may battleships " are similar in Japanese Navy armament, protection, and ;

:

speed to the battleships we have lately sold at nominal prices, ... all of large dimensions, powerfully armed, of good speed, with ample coal [space], and in sound See also his remarks, at p. 9, regarding the condition."

hasty scrapping of cruisers. 1

Naval

Strategy, p.

7,

by Captain A. T. Mahan, D.C.L.,

LL.D., United States Navy.

CAN GERMANY INVADE ENGLAND

20

and

Table

shows

III

that,

?

leaving

Channel Fleet out of account and Germany's small reserves in the North and Baltic Seas, Great

numerically

High Sea

Sea

North

Britain's

Fleet

is

much stronger than Germany's These,

Fleet.

reassuring facts

;

in

themselves, are

but their value

is

greatly

enhanced by the knowledge that the British ships are

much

larger than the

German

as will be seen in the following table

ships,

:

TABLE V DISPLACEMENT IN TONS OF BATTLESHIPS AND BATTLE CRUISERS OF FLEETS IN NORTH SEA (See Table

IIU)

2nd Battle of ist and Fleet, Squadrons 5th and 6th Battle Squadrons of 2nd Fleet

Great

Britain's

ist

and

.

539,450 tons.

(See Table Ills)

Germany's the

ist

and 2nd Squadrons of

High Sea Fleet

313,600

In favour of Great Britain

225,850

AVERAGE TONNAGE OF SINGLE SHIPS Great Britain

Germany

...... .

.

.

.

In favour of Great Britain

.

.

17,982 16,506 1,476

21

merely a floating the transport of men and guns

As, however, a ship platform for

is

and the displacement platform is the measure of its

to the scene of battle,

of this floating

it

carrying capacity,

follows that the British

Fleet in the North Sea can bring to the scene

much more powerful armament carried by the German High Sea Now, the broadside fire of their battle-

of battle a

than

is

Fleet.

ship

armament

the true test of the fighting

is

power of men-of-war, and, in this respect also, Great Britain's superiority to Germany is overwhelming, as shown

TABLE

in

VI

the table below

:

1

BROADSIDE FIRE OF BATTLESHIPS AND BATTLE CRUISERS IN NORTH SEA Great Britain

Germany.

..... .

.

Great Britain's superiority

1

No.

Fleets (Great Britain 127.

.

.

230,726

Ib.

131,700

99,026

,,

and Foreign Countries), May 1912,

22

CAN GERMANY INVADE ENGLAND

?

AVERAGE BROADSIDE FIRE OF THE SHIPS TAKEN SINGLY Great Britain

7,690

Germany

6,935

.

Great Britain's superiority

Or, in a

Ib. ii

755

.

of thirty battleships, practically

fleet

equivalent to three extra men-of-war.

The preponderance

in

weight of the broad-

side fire of the British cruisers in the

North

Sea as compared with that of the German cruisers in the same sea is even more marked, as Great

Britain has

cruisers, thirteen of

which are armoured, as

against Germany's six, only is

Here

armoured.

out-numbered

and

again

twenty-nine

one of which

Germany

out-classed

by

is

Great

Britain.

Since ships-of-war cannot be always at sea

and are

liable to accident

and deterioration,

the next point to be considered and com-

pared

is

the

docking

possessed by each nation.

accommodation

ENGLISH AND GERMAN FLEETS

TABLE

23

VII

DOCKYARDS FOR DREADNOUGHTS AND KINDRED CLASSES In Use

1

GERMANY

GREAT BRITAIN In

Home

Waters

29

.

Abroad

.

1 1

.

o

15

Total

.

44

.

.

Building and Projected in Building

Home

Waters 2

.1

8

.

2

3

Projected

Total

ii

.

.

ii

.

.

.

_3

Abroad Building Projected

o

3 2

.

.

o

.

.

o

Total

j>

GRAND TOTAL Great Britain

This

is

.

.

60

Germany

.

.

14

a very satisfactory state of things,

and our position of

taking

is

no

less

in

ships

regard to docks capable of

ever-increasing

satisfactory.

Two

size

floating

The Ocean Empire, pp. in, 112, by Gerard Fiennes. The Navy League Annual for 1911-12, Table X, p. 278, by Alan H. Burgoyne, M.P. 1

3

CAN GERMANY INVADE ENGLAND

24

docks suitable

for the largest vessels that at

be completed in a few one for the Medway and the other

exist

present

months

will

Portsmouth.

for

be

will

in

Early

available

January 1914

lock five

for

?

;

at

1913 a new dock

in

and three docks and the

Rosyth in 1916. private docks which at

the largest

another

Portsmouth,

vessels,

There are could

be

also

used

and two more are

1

building.

Mercantile Auxiliaries

The

difference

and number of the

between the British

size,

speed,

merchant-men that

could be used as cruisers or scouts in time of

war and the German merchant ships that might be similarly employed is as great, and as

much

the

to

advantage of the former marine, as the difference which has been

shown the

to

German

exist

between the British and

Navies.

1

Brassey>s

Naval Annual

for 1912, p. 33.

ENGLISH AND GERMAN FLEETS

TABLE

VIII

1

25

CAN GERMANY INVADE ENGLAND

26

?

they must, in course of time, suffer capture

;

and as only the Mauretania, Lusitania, and a few other vessels of the Cunard Company attain this speed, only steamers of that line

have been accepted as It is possible,

Navy.

may

miralty

Sir William

the

to

auxiliaries

however, that the Ad-

reconsider this decision,

White has pointed

for,

as

very few of

out,

the great cruiser-battleships recently built can

maintain a sea-speed approaching 25 knots, in

moderate weather,

Germany has swiftest

1 any length of time.

also subsidised

merchant vessels

reported,

but

habitually

carry

holds,

for

not

and

1

3

report

that

armaments

moment,

to

a peaceful for a warlike status. this

has been

it

confirmed,

their

ready, at any

;

some of her

need cause

2

in

they their

exchange If true,

British shipowners

Nineteenth Century and After, July 1911. The Australian Government " are doing their utmost to

ships were really equipped for immediate conversion into commerce destroyers " but the Chairman of the Norddeutscher Lloyd Company, trading with Australia, characterised the statement "as a ridiculous

ascertain whether foreign

;

ENGLISH AND GERMAN FLEETS

27

Germany has no

naval

alarm, for, as

little

bases and only two coaling-stations outside

her

own

waters,

1

such

transformed vessels

would soon run short of

fuel,

and, with the

English Channel shut against them, would fall

a prey

to

would be on

the

British

cruisers

their

track.

A

which

similar

fate

must, in the end, overtake any of Germany's

happen to be at on the ocean routes when war was de-

regular cruisers that might large

clared, though, for a time,

they might cause

and a great deal of annoyance our shippers and insurance companies.

some

loss

to

The Soul of a Skip

Having Fleets

dealt with

under

comparison,

the crews, without intelligence to

the ships of the two I

come now

whose hands,

navigate the hulls,

to

eyes,

and

set

and

was neither excuse nor justification." Morning Post, October 21, 1911. 1 At Kamaran I in the Red Sea and Swakop in the Atlantic, which, in the event of war, would at once be captured. H. B. H.

one, for which there

.

CAN GERMANY INVADE ENGLAND

28

?

keep the machinery in motion, and load and fire the guns, the finest ship in the world

so

but

is

dead l

the

only for

much

scrap-heap

;

matter,

and

here

Great Britain's numerical strength excess of that of

Germany

is

fit

too

far in

or any other nation.

TABLE IX PERSONNEL OF THE TWO NAVIES Men

on Active

Great Britain

Germany

.

.

134,000

.

60,805

of length r

l\.eserve

QpfVlPP v 11*1^ ovi 2

57904

.

2 .

1

10,000

.

^lf*l*uif*f* ocj vi\^w

3 .

12 years

.

3 years

4

4

4 5 -

"The one abiding

lesson of every great naval victory, from Salamis to Tsu-Shima, is that men are more than material ; 1

and the mistaken inferences drawn from them are mainly due to forgetfulness of the fact." The Ocean Empire^ p. 95. 2 Brassey's Naval Annual for 1912, p. 467. The Naval Estimates of both countries for this year make provision for " an increase in their active service lists, when we should have a total personnel of 137,500 as against Germany's 66,783, giving us a preponderance of more than two to one" (Parliamentary Debate on the Defence of the Empire, reported by The Morning Post of July 27, 1912). 3 Navy Estimates, 1912-13. Statement of the First Lord [Cd. 6106]. p. 96, by Gerard Fiennes. Five years are required to train a really efficient seaman, and while he is being trained he is necessarily a weak element in a fighting service." LORD CHARLES BERESFORD. 4

5

The Ocean Empire,

"

ENGLISH AND GERMAN FLEETS

2G,

and Marines are drawn

British Bluejackets

from a seafaring stock, and are on a voluntary system, for twelve

principally enlisted,

end of which they are eligible re-engagement for a second term of ten

years, at the for

years, completion of

a pension.

1

which

entitles

them

to

Two-thirds of Germany's sailors

are conscripts enrolled for three years, the

greater proportion of

whom

have never seen

2

as

and are looked upon rather "soldiers on board ship than seamen."

the

sea,

Germany's short-service system accounts for the large

number of her

adopted the same Reserve would be immense

England

system,

1 2

her

but she has

;

no need to increase

If

reservists.

since

her active-

The Ocean Empire, p. 97. Early in October the [German] Fleet

will lose at least

it,

"

one-fourth of

its

trained men, their places being taken

a like number of raw recruits, most of

whom

by

have never before set foot on shipboard." German Naval Notes from The Navy's Own Correspondent, see Number for October 1911, p. 269. J

The Ocean Empire,

p. 101.

CAN GERMANY INVADE ENGLAND?

30

service personnel, trained from

to

boyhood

middle-age on the sea, is sufficient to man 1 the whole of her war-Navy, whereas the

German High Sea cessity of

year,

going

fleet

sea for

with is

squadron its

exchange

its

"

man

The

"

the result that

the sea-

more or

and when

;

May,

of

less it it

goes is

a to

hardly

without returning to

fight

of

contingent

recruits

for

2

active-service personnel

is,

however,

the whole of our war-Navy, and that

with any foreign Power." 2

personnel

cruise in

first

trained reservists.

1

under the neits

always

condition to

in

is

changing one-third of

every

training

Fleet

is

The Ocean Empire,

sufficient to

not the case p. 98.

Ibid. pp. 100, 101.

declared [so writes Captain von Pustau in the Tdgliche Rundschau} that our men are better trained, or even more courageous, than the British. This assumption is

It

is

entirely without foundation

who has seen

British

;

seamen

on the contrary, every one at

work knows

that

they

represent the very best stock and type of their race, and will have remarked that, under the influence of glorious traditions

triumphs,

handed down from a period of continued these

men have

confidence, an independent

acquired

a

brilliant

boundless

self-

bearing, and a recklessness

ENGLISH AND GERMAN FLEETS I

have now shown

Home

her

in

:

(i)

3!

That England has

and Atlantic Fleets

51

line-

Germany's 27 in the and North Sea 66 cruisers as against

of-battleships against Baltic 8,

;

and 165 destroyers as against a very

having

serviceable

Mediterranean.

the

of the broadside

riority

German

superiority is

over

position

2

line

to

with

i.

(3)

1906

fleet

the

in

supe-

of the British

broadside

That the

fire

of

and the

2,

active-service

personnel strategical

which Nature has endowed

her has been taken such since

That

about 3 to

is

of her

active

fire

to the

line-of-battleships

the

(2)

36, besides

that,

in

full

advantage of

case of war breaking

out between the two countries, not a single

German man-of-war, merchant

ship, not a single

approaching brutality

may very

not a single

all

of

them

German

German fishing-

characteristics

which

often bring decisive victory in naval warfare, as as the best and surely German military discipline training." View of the British Seaman, see The Navy for October 1911, p. 268.

GERMANY INVADE ENGLAJ smack, could leave or enter a

German

port,

and her ocean-borne trade would cease

to

exist.

This

carries with its

and certainly it no desire on my part to see

no

is

it

fulfilment

ships

idle

boast,

the

more peaceful

there are on the

better

the

for

but facts are peoples

German

world's waters the

England includedand it is well for the

world, facts,

of both

countries

to

know them.

There are only two ways out of the North Sea one round the north of Scotland, the other through the English Channel.

German former,

Fleet tried to break through by the

would meet the British Atlantic

it

Fleet, reinforced

be attacked

their

in

by the Channel Fleet, and rear and in flank by the

Even

by some ruse part or some negligence on ours,

North Sea on

If the

Fleet.

German men-of-war

if,

did reach the Atlantic,

what could they do there, with no ports and only two coaling-stations to resort to,

ENGLISH AND GERMAN FLEETS

33

and the British Fleets that they had eluded in full chase ? And, of course, an attempt force

to

a

passage

the

through

Channel would be

a

more

still

undertaking, for that Channel a

well-guarded,

is

English hopeless

unto

like

mountain pass a position which

formidable

held by a superior force

no prudent soldier would attempt to capture

by direct attack, but would try to turn and whereas there are few positions on land that ;

cannot be outflanked, there

is

no

possibility

of turning the English Channel, and direct

would mean engaging the North Sea, Channel, and Atlantic Fleets,

attack,

in

this

case,

with the Mediterranean Fleet, called wireless

hurrying

telegraphy,

up by

north

to

pounce upon any vessel that might chance

Bay of

to reach the

Again

I

Biscay.

Nature

repeat

has

given

to

Great Britain a position which carries with it

supremacy of the sea

for

Germany

;

and

it is

to try to wrest that ..

of no use

supremacy

34

CAN GERMANY INVADE ENGLAND

from her, because

it

is

?

rooted in a natural

advantage of which she cannot be deprived. It was Great Britain's position which enabled her to reduce Holland from a

a third-class

Power,

first-class to

without once landing

an army on her shores, though the Dutch ships were as numerous, as well manned,

and and as well fought as the English Great Britain's position would tell in exactly ;

same way, and with greater force, in her favour in a war with Germany a war which the

for that

declared.

very reason

is

never likely to be

CHAPTER

III

THE INVASION SCARE "I

always said that whilst we had a Fleet in being they would make an attempt." LORD TORRINGTON, First Lord of

not dare to the

Admiralty in 1727.

"We

have endeavoured to picture to ourselves a clear issue very unfavourable to this country, and have shown, at least to our satisfaction, that on that hypothesis, unfavourable as it is, serious invasion of these islands is not an eventuality which we

which

is

need seriously consider."

MR. BALFOUR.

"Modern history does not afford a single instance of a successful invasion of this country, because our Navy has always stood directly in the path

of the

would-be invader."

ADMIRAL SIR

VESEY HAMILTON, G.C.B.

THE

and

facts

foregoing thinking

chapters

men

presented

figures

of

expectation that, at

ought the

convince

baselessness

some

some

indefinite cause, the

ment

will

of

the all

the

indefinite time, for

German Govern-

suddenly embark upon the most

venturesome of enterprises this

to

in

country. 35

the invasion of

CAN GERMANY INVADE ENGLAND?

36

Unfortunately, there are persons

who do

not think, but just pin their faith on the dicta

of some man, to

is

still

they attribute special it

will,

there-

be necessary to ascertain

who

to-day

knowledge or fore,

whom

special foresight

;

playing the part of the blind leader of the

blind,

and then

to array against his dicta the

testimony of the large number of military and

who

naval experts ever,

differ

sweeping away a traditional

has contributed not a

which

insecurity

There time

from him,

it is

little

my

first,

error,

how-

which

to that sense of

object to dispel.

a very general belief that, at a

is

when

a

huge

was waiting at hundred and fifty

flotilla

Boulogne to carry a thousand French soldiers across the Channel, England's greatest Admiral, deluded by reports, sailed to the

West

Indies,

false

leaving

his country defenceless, save for such resist-

ance as her small

Army

could offer to the

will not stop to

invaders.

I

conditions

under which

it

prove that the

was possible

to

THE INVASION SCARE

37

deceive Nelson as to the whereabouts of the

combined French and Spanish Fleet, have given place to conditions under which it is door

next

to

movements of

impossible vessels

in

to

conceal

the

any part of the

world, but content myself with affirming that, in sailing fleet

away, Nelson

left

behind him a

capable of holding the Channel against

any force that might be brought against it, and in the teeth of which no transports would

Wherever the bulk of

venture to put to sea.

Navy might

Napoleon's total

strength was

be,

he knew that

its

eighty men-of-war, and

those eighty too scattered to be capable of rapid concentration,

whereas Great Britain

had sixty ships of the more,

frigates,

notice,

so

line

and as many, or

disposed that,

be brought together in 1 of Dover. Consequently, Eng-

land was not, at this juncture, any

for

Admiral Sir Vesey Hamilton

March

short

they could

the Straits

1

at

1906.

in the

more than

Nineteenth Century

38

CAN GERMANY INVADE ENGLAND

?

any other period of her history, solely dependent on her land forces for immunity

at

from conquest.

Having history

cleared the ground so far as false

had cumbered

it,

will

I

evidence for and against the

now

call

possibility of

this country's suffering invasion in the future

a very

some

to

near future, according

people.

There

when such a to the

perhaps, never been

has,

possibility has not

a time

been present

minds of men responsible

for

Eng-

up to a recent date, France, not Germany, was the quarter from

land's

safety

;

but,

which invasion was looked

for,

and

in the

course of the last hundred years there have

been several well-developed French scares. After the last of these, to which the Fashoda incident gave

rise,

the

British

Government

of the day appointed a Royal Commission, presided over by the

Duke

of

Norfolk, to

inquire into the grounds on which the belief

THE INVASION SCARE

39

As England's vulnerability was based. the scope of this Commission's investigations in

was confined of the

land

British

one

with

to the sufficiency

the

forces,

efficiency

witnesses,

exception, were military

men

or

but their answers to the searching

civilians,

questions addressed to that,

and

them made

it

so clear

no French transports

in their opinion,

would ever put to sea so long as our Fleet the

kept

command

Mr. Balfour,

Prime

the

Channel,

double

his

in

character

Minister and President

fence Committee,

the

of

House

felt

justified

Commons

of

organised invasion of this

of the in

that

of

De-

assuring

an openly country might be that

regarded as impossible, and that a surprise

was equally out of the question, as there would be no concealing the assembling attack

of the large

needed

number of

to carry

100,000 men, allowing three

tons of shipping per

horses

a

ships that would be

figure

man

which

without counting

must

have been

CAN GERMANY INVADE ENGLA1

40

furnished to the speaker by experts in

the

business of transporting troops by sea. Balfour's assurances

Whether Mr.

would

have long been accounted satisfactory, had France remained the object of British suspicion,

had

it

impossible to say, for hardly

is

words been spoken than was given to the nation's

his reassuring

a new direction and,

fears,

Germany

an

in

incredibly

a country

with

short

which we

time,

had

good terms, and whose commercial prosperity is bound up wiih our been on

always

own

was accepted as the national

It is

this

not

my

business to trace the causes of

extraordinary change

feeling

;

foe.

suffice

it

to

say

of thought and that

it

coincided

with a struggle to establish conscription as the basis of our

military system,

and that

lurid pictures of

Germany's military strength, naval growth, and official efficiency, coupled with boldly expressed distrust of her aims

and doubts of her good

faith,

were, and are

THE INVASION SCARE

41

being, used to create in the British

sense

of

to

strong

sufficiently

insecurity

mind a

deep-rooted aversion to comIn military circles, dark service.

overcome pulsory hints of

its

danger, and whispered

threats

of

sudden action by which that danger should be but no person dissipated, were soon current ;

whose name carried weight with the general public

lent

create a in

himself to an open

German

scare

a speech delivered on

attempt to

Lord Roberts,

till

November

23, 1908,

gave to that scare the broadest possible base by declaring that he had ascertained, beyond the possibility of doubt, that vessels suitable to

the

accommodation

taking one

and a

sufficient for all

half,

of

200,000

not three, tons as

requirements

were always

available in the northern ports of that

during

200,000

men

several

men

months

Germany the

in

;

year

could be collected without any

fuss or mobilisation

arrangements and that those 200,000 could be conveyed to the ;

CAN GERMANY INVADE ENGLAND

42

selected ports

and there embarked

in

?

much

shorter time than Mr. Balfour had calculated for

French

soldiers.

1

Disembarkation, thanks

and modern mechanical appliances, would also, so he asserted, be much to big liners

easier than

was generally supposed, and, even

the enterprise failed as a surprise, a few

if

vessels, sent in this direction or that,

be

likely so to divert

from the

real

German

would

our Admirals' attention objective that the great

of transports, favoured perhaps by fog,

fleet

might

sail

unseen across the North Sea, and

land their living cargoes before the mistake

could be discovered, and our deluded fleets rush back to prevent an already accomplished fact.

2

Mr. Balfour's speech in 1905, on the possibility of a French invasion of this country, involved the assumption that what was impossible to the State nearest to our shores was a fortiori impossible in the case of Germany. H. B. H. 2 " If our naval forces are to be fooled by so unsurprising a surprise as this, or by so time-honoured a ruse de guerre, I confess I do not see the use of our having an Admiralty No one would do Lord Roberts the inor a Navy at all. 1

THE INVASION SCARE The

was

picture

43 but,

gloomy enough,

sanguine people might take comfort and courage from the reflection that when our

lest

would capture all the German transports and make short work of its escorting squadron, Lord Roberts Fleet did

warned the

return,

it

his hearers that, to

gain their end,

Germans might not shrink from

sacrifice,

for did not

the

General

Staff, assert that

command

of gaining the for

a

and

time,

of

loss

our

The Duties of (<

the advantage

of the sea, at least

thereby

the transport of troops the

Bronsart von

General

Schellendorf^ in his book on

this

by

own

making possible

may

sea,

fleet?"

"

justify

These

remarkable words," continued Lord Roberts, "

the

represent

best

German

two services

the co-operation of the justice of

teaching on in war,"

supposing for one single moment that he and his would allow themselves to be fooled in this

staff in the field

way on land

"

(extract

Times of November

"Modern Mariner."

from a 30,

letter

1908, in

H, B, H.

which appeared

in

large print, signed

The

by a

CAN GERMANY INVADE ENGLAND

44

?

and on the strength of a vision of a hug<

German German

escorted

flotilla,

by

Fleet, sailing cheerfully across the

North Sea,

in

a

friendly

capture or destruction, nobly

own

its

placing

fate,

two

if

it

could

hundred

to

fog,

certain

indifferent

to

succeed

in

but

thousand

German

troops in a position in which they could not

be reinforced, and from which they could not retire, he closed his speech by calling the

for

citizen I

immediate formation of a British million men.

army of a

hardly think

I

1

need assure

my

military

and naval readers that General von SchellendorfThad not the invasion of England in his mind, when he wrote the sentence which "

Lord Roberts said, " how strong and powerful our Navy is, the main preventive of invasion is a numerous and efficient Home Army. Even if our Navy 1

No

matter,''

.

.

were double as strong as it is relatively to that of other Powers, the necessity of maintaining a sufficient and efficient Citizen Army for home defence would still be an essential condition of peace and security, as well as of public " confidence." This " Citizen Army," he said, must consist of a million men," The Times^ November 24, 1908.

THE INVASION SCARE Roberts

Lord

The man who recognised port

of troops

that

in

interpreted

45

that "

The

sense. trans-

a very risky enterprise,

is

command of the sea has not been even when the troopships are gained, the

if

escorted by a Fleet which

and

that

superior to the " No force is

about

its

communications

l

enemy's ships,"

more

sensitive

than a landing-force

upon which

it

can

;

fall

it

is

has no

broad base

back, but must retire 2

upon a single point its landing-place," was incapable of recommending to his students an act of suicidal folly and no ;

one can read the operation of the

from which

chapter

on " The Co-

Army and Navy

in

War,"

Lord Roberts quoted, without

being convinced that the only circumstances

which the writer would hold

in

sacrifice

1

make

possible the

The Duties of the General Staff ,

*

lawful to

even a portion of a nation's

order to

in

it

Ibid. p. 556.

p. 554.

fleet

transport [4th edition.]

of

CAN GERMANY INVADE ENGLAND

46

troops by sea, are to be found in

-

the case

of an army whose land communications are assured, requiring

some extent

or relieved to

the landing

to be quickly reinforced,

of pressure by

of troops at some vital

point

of the enemy's coast. It

is

fortunate

me and my

for

readers

and arguments which answer Lord Roberts's speech, also answer every-

that the facts

his thing that has been said or written, from

point of view writers,

German

spread the scare, have based themselves on his

reputation.

in

in

subsequent speakers and

who have helped

assertions

long

for all

;

to

and covered themselves with

Answers

coming.

A

to that

week

his

speech were not

after its delivery,

a letter to The Times, 1 Admiral Sir Vesey

Hamilton ridiculed the Chief's

assertion that

late

Commander-in-

he had ascertained,

without the possibility of doubt, that vessels

accommodating 200,000 men were 1

November

30, 1908.

at

very

THE INVASION SCARE short notice available

waste of

German

desired

to

in

capital

47

German

ports

a

on which Sir Vesey

have the opinion of " some of

our mercantile magnates,

such

if

is

likely to

be the case," as also " the opinions of Sir A. Wilson, Lord C. Beresford, Sir

[now

the

at

opinion as to even

Sir

Compton and ask them their

Admiralty],

Domvile, and others,

W. May

100,000 troops and their

baggage having a happy time of it crossing the North Sea, being carried in transports commanded by men totally unaccustomed to sailing in

company

harassed by a host of

mosquito-boat destroyers, and of our Fleet

"

'

not decoyed

the portion

all '

away/ Another letter of the same date, signed Admiral," to which The Times accorded

the honour of large type, severely criticised

Lord Roberts's estimate of the amount of tonnage that "

"

would be

sufficient

for

all

such a serious undertaking as an invasion of England. "When preparing

purposes

in

CAN GERMANY INVADE ENGLAND? '

this statement,

so he wrote, " Lord Roberts,

and those who assisted him, appear

to

have

insufficiently taken into consideration the fact

estimating for the tonnage of an over-

that, in

sea expedition, regard must be taken not only

of the number of

men

be conveyed, but provision must at the same time be made for the huge equipment which in these days

accompanies our army of

stores

many

to

guns, ammunition,

descriptions,

provisions,

wagons, and last, but far from least, the horses, which call for a tonnage allowance far in excess of that for a man." "

No

" doubt," he continued,

quite possible for

4,000

men

not 4,000

which,

would

into

a

short

it

would be to

put

vessel,"

but

voyage

a 6,ooo-tons

men plus

on find

the equipment, without " the disembarkation, troops

themselves

in

much

the

sam<

position as ordinary passengers landing froi

a ship without luggage," whilst the equipment of

an

expedition

must,

fortunately

foi

THE INVASION SCARE

49

England, always prove an obstacle to a rapid invasion of her shores," for " the landing in a few hours of many thousands of men in any sort of boat,

from a gig to a launch,

is

matter, but not so the equipment.

a simple

Horses,

and wagons cannot descend a gangway ladder, but have to be hoisted out and guns,

then

ashore

transported

especially suitable

;

in

boats

large

weather, even though only

moderately bad, being a serious hindrance "

and possibly a stopper on operations But the best refutation of Lord Roberts's depressing predictions

is

to

be found

the

in

Book containing the evidence given

Blue

before the Norfolk Royal Commission, the chief witnesses in

before

virtue of the positions they held or

lately vacated,

a

who appeared

cool

and

probability called

on

of

were peculiarly reasoned

for it,

had

fitted to

form

on

the

judgment

our land forces ever being

to repel a foreign invasion

;

and

Lieutenant-General Sir William Nicholson, 4

CAN GERMANY INVADE ENGLAND

50

K.C.B.,

Director-General

Colonel

P.

of

?

Intelligence,

H. N. Lake, C.B.,

Assistant

Quartermaster-General for Mobilisation, and

Major-General Sir John Ardagh, K.C.M.G., K.C.I.E.,

from

Director of Military Intelligence

were unanimously of opinion that England could never be the 1896 to

1901,

subject of a surprise invasion

the very kind

of invasion which Lord Roberts would have us believe to be imminent. officer

held

the

that

The

British

first-named

Government,

under the most unfavourable circumstances f

must have the

attack

projected

preparations

men

the

;

for

'

say,

am

Now

I '

3

in

that

which the 100,000

" fourteen days,"

from the time when you

do not mind who knows [what] "

2

doing 1

" it,

second,

embarking

could be completed

as he expressed

I

1

was the period

fourteen days final

two months' warning of

at least

Blue Book,

;

the third put the

vol.

i.

Ibid. pp. 104, 105.

p.

maximum

12 [Cd. 2062] of 1904.

THE INVASION SCARE of 150,000

limit

men

51

as the utmost either

France or Germany could do from all their ports,

On

and with long preparation'' the question of the probability of an

invasion of England so long as the regular

troops were in the country, the evidence of

Lord Roberts,

may be taken

then

Commander-in-Chief,

as conclusive,

and he supposed

"

no attempt would be made at invasion of this country until we had sent all, or that

nearly

all,

of our regular troops abroad."

This answer naturally led up to the inquiry whether there was reason to suppose that the country would ever be so denuded of its ordinary defenders as to render an invasion a comparatively

easy

matter,

and on

this

point the evidence of an ex-Commander-inChief,

He

Lord Wolseley, was very

admitted that the possibility of a heavy

1

Blue Book, H. B. H. 2

satisfactory.

Ibid. p. 38.

vol.

i.

p.

119.

The

italics

are

mine.

CAN GERMANY INVADE ENGLAND

52

t

temporary absence of our Fleet from the Channel must be taken

naval defeat or

the

into account in determining the strength

of

the force that must be held ready to meet an

made

attempted invasion, which would be rapidly after the declaration

very but "

he

declared

his

conviction

Government would attempt

to

of war

;

that

no

send

our

from England, unless England was quite secure from invasion at

fighting

Army away

the moment."

What secure

"

military

was

Nicholson,

mand

explained

who

"

men understand by by

Sir

quite

William

declared that, until the com-

of the sea was indisputably in British

hands, a condition which he thought would take

from four to six months to

fulfil,

no

large military contingent could be sent out of

the country

certainly the Admiralty

;

not agree to their despatch. until

would

In other words,

every hostile vessel on the seas had been 1

Blue Book,

vol.

i.

p. 65.

THE INVASION SCARE

53

captured or destroyed, and every hostile port sealed, so that no ship could issue from it, the

Army must

British

home;

of necessity remain at

so that England would be safe from

she had obtained the com-

invasion before

mand of the

by reason of the presence of her Army, and after she had obtained that command by reason of the fact that, whether her

sea,

Army were

present or absent, no hostile 1

force could descend

Not

satisfied

upon her shores. with answers which went

to

prove that no sane nation would dream of invading this country without some prospect of making good

its

footing here, the Norfolk

Commission pushed its inquiries into those fantastic regions in which Lord Roberts was later

to

seek justification for his alarmist

campaign, Alfred

by

asking

Turner,

Major-General

K.C.B.,

Sir

Inspector-General

of Auxiliary Forces, whether, in view of the

enormous shock '

that the landing of, perhaps,

Blue Book,

vol,

i.

p. 3,

54 as

CAN GERMANY INVADE ENGLAND

much

as three

would be

Army Corps

r

on our shores

and prestige, would be worth while for an

to our national credit

he thought

it

enemy, who had temporarily obtained com-

mand of the

sea, to risk the loss of so large a

force for the sake of the moral effect

have on the country ? " I do not think," was the would I

reply,

it

would

" that they

on an hypothesis of that kind. do not think the game would be worth the risk

it

candle."

was not prepared to say that a small invasion would be out of the bounds Sir Alfred

of possibility,

but

he was sure that " no

serious invasion would take place by a foreign

Power when the Navy was because,

if so,

on the deep, communications would be cut,

and that force would be

still

in

a position that

no nation that was not absolutely insane, I may be wrongaccording to my ideas would 1

risk."

2

Blue Book,

vol.

' i.

p. 74.

Ibid. p. 75.

THE INVASION SCARE

On

this

Admiral

one

the

point

55

naval

witness,

Sir

John Ommanney Hopkins, G.C.B.,lateaNaval Lord of the Admiralty, and Commander-in-Chief of the

Mediterranean

was equally emphatic. He granted if the theatre of war was in the Mediter-

Fleet, that,

ranean and a very large proportion of the Fleet were

British

away from our

shores,

during that time a foreign force might possibly

be thrown into England

;

but,

on the

other hand, there was this to be remembered, t(

that

if

we command

the sea, directly

invasion takes place and our Fleets

the

back

fall

on our own shores, then the possibility of that force ever returning to its country is at an

end

;

it

ought to be swallowed up

in

this

l

country." Lastly, turning from the testimony to the practical invulnerability of this country

given

seven years ago, when the hypothetical vader was France, 1

let

Blue Book,

in-

us hear what the latest vol.

i.

p.

no.

CAN GERMANY INVADE ENGLAND

56

?

authoritative witnesses, Admiral Sir Cyprian

Bridge, and Admiral of the Fleet Sir Arthur

Wilson, late First Sea Lord, have to say on the subject,

now

Germany has taken

that

the

place of France in the popular mind.

In his work on The

Art of Naval Warfare,

Sir Cyprian gives a crushing reply to the

extraordinary

Lord

theory

Roberts

has

in

support

of which

General von

invoked

SchellendorfTs authority. "

Continental

soldiers

contemplating the

invasion of an island State may," so he writes, " be ready,

as

some say

that they are, to

sacrifice their escorting fleet to the

presum-

ably stronger insular Navy," but how could " they imagine that this sacrifice would render the voyage of the invading troops practic-

able?"

Even

" if,

in sacrificing itself,

escorting or protecting fleet had

put

out of action a portion

naval forces equal to of the stronger

itself,

.

the

managed

to

of the insular .

.

the survivors

Navy would have

the

now

THE INVASION SCARE entirely

unprotected

mercy."

The

57

difference

their

at

transports

between passing an

army

into a contiguous State across a frontier

often

not wider than a mere geographical

line,

"

and

passing an

army

across the sea, in

the teeth of a strong Navy's efforts to prevent

enormous," so he affirmed, adding that " The difficulties of work on the sea are

it,

is

not apparent to

men whose work

done

is

exclusively on shore, and so those difficulties

are

treated

as

non-existent."

Memorandum

In a

of

1

November

10, 1910,

1911, Sir Arthur Wilson

issued in

that the strength of our Fleet

is

showed

determined

by the necessity of protecting our commerce, and that, if it is sufficient for this purpose, it will

practically

vasion.

be

The main

employed

in

sufficient

object of a

fleet,

defence of commerce

frustrating invasion,

is

The Art of Naval Warfare^

far

in-

whether or

to prevent the

ships from getting to sea 1

to prevent

in

enemy's enough to do

pp. 170, 171, 173.

CAN GERMANY INVADE ENGLAND

58

mischief,

and any disposition

moderately successful will practically

that

in

even

is

in attaining this

be effective

?

object

preventing a

large fleet of transports, than which nothing

more vulnerable and

is

difficult

to

conceal,

Even if the from reaching our shores. enemy succeeded in drawing off half our Fleet,

the

other

half,

in

conjunction with

destroyers and submarines, would

be quite sufficient to sink the greater part of his transports, even if supported by the strongest fleet

he could

That the to

collect.

1

British Fleet is so disposed, as

be assured of success

in the

attainment of

proved conclusively in the preand having now demonceding chapter strated how scanty, and of what small value,

this object,

I

;

the evidence in support of the belief in an

is

invasion of this country,

I

might stop

because some people are not 1

See Appendix,

given verbatim.

in

;

but

satisfied until

which the Admiralty

Memorandum

is

THE INVASION SCARE

59

they have gone to the root of a subject, and the facts on which

made acquaintance with

the opinions of experts must be founded

people for I

will

whom

now

insight into

I

try to

have the greatest respect give my readers such an

that an invasion of

all

England

would involve that they may be able to judge for themselves whether there is any justification for expecting one. 1

1

The Times Correspondent for Naval Affairs puts forward,

with great plainness, statements utterly subversive of the In alarmist attitude taken up by a large part of the Press. the weekly edition of January 5 of this year he writes " The theory of the Defending Fleet the Fleet in being having been decoyed away does not really help the opposite Even if the Battleship Fleet is absent argument at all. :

.

.

.

which it ought not to be so long as invasion is within the bounds of possibility, and never will be, if those who are conducting the war know their business yet it is unthinkable that a sufficient defending force of cruisers and torpedocraft should be absent at the same time."

CHAPTER

IV

CONSTITUTION OF INVADING FORCE TRANSPORT AND SUPPLY "

Articles of provision are not to be trifled with or

left to

I

chance,

and there is nothing more clear than that the subsistence of the troops must be certain upon the proposed service, or the service must be THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. relinquished." "

The

chief necessity in

war

that supplies should be

is

abundant

and quickly delivered."

GENERAL BRONSART VON SCHELLENDORFF. "It consequently follows that armies cannot exist for any time, any rate, in the field without uninterrupted communication with home." Idem. at

" The whole question

one of commissariat

is

missariat one of transport."

that

of

com-

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON.

IN considering the possibility of an invasion of England, I will accept the conditions

under which Lord Roberts believes that will 1

be undertaken.

1

See Lord Roberts's speeches

November

23, 1908

j

April

it

3,

60

House of Lords on and February 20, 1912,

in the

1911

;

CONSTITUTION OF INVADING FORCE

These conditions are

The

first,

:

that a large part of our

half

-say

four

be

will

6l

Navy

from

absent

our

shores.

The

Force

tionary

have

been

India,

or

a

that

second, - -

despatched

some

men

100,000

say

other

expedi-

large

to

of

will

Egypt our

or

over-sea

dominions.

The

be

third, that the invasion will

in the

nature of a surprise, without a declaration

of war, and at a time with to

Germany

are

when our

such as

to

relations

give

rise

no suspicion of hostile intention on her

part.

The

fourth, that the invading

consist of

1

Army

will

50,000 troops.

These disputable conditions agreed to, let us now recall what was said in Chapter II as

to

the relative strength of the

and British Fleets Waters.

German

in their respective

Home

CAN GERMANY INVADE ENGLAND

62

?

GERMANY'S NAVAL STRENGTH IN THE BALTIC AND

NORTH SEA (See Abstract of Table Hie, p. 17.)

Lme-of-Battleships Cruisers

Armoured

Protected Cruisers

..... ..... .

.

.27

.

.

i

7

Destroyers

36

Total

71

GREAT BRITAIN'S NAVAL STRENGTH IRISH WATERS

IN

(See Abstract of Table IIlA,

THE HOME AND

p. 16.)

51

Line-of-Battleships

Armoured Cruisers Scouts

.26 .40

.

.

.

.

.

8

165

Total

290

the

A

would large

submarines

in

cruisers,

25

and 20

number of

small

of

destroyers, torpedo-boats, be in the ports of both nations ;

here too Great Britain

Table VI).

(the

deduct

1

no circumstances have been

reserve

will still

strength

armoured

cruisers

protected craft

British

13

battleships,

(see

.

Destroyers

From

1

.

.

....... ......

Protected Cruisers

l

will

H. B. H.

and but

be greatly superior to Germany

CONSTITUTION OF INVADING FORCE reduced), and

we

shall

be

left

with a

63 fleet

weaker by one battleship than Germany, but stronger by 12 armoured cruisers, 13 cruisers,

protected destroyers,

against

and

scouts for

adapted

specially

conveying

transports sufficient

superiority

137

to justify

and

acting

a

troops

Arthur

Sir

Wilson's confidence that, with half our

Home

Fleet away, " the other half, in conjunction

with

destroyers

and

would

submarines,

be quite sufficient to sink the greater part of

his

[the

enemy's]

transports,

supported by the strongest

fleet

even

if

he could

collect."

Having

established

the naval conditions

under which a German invasion would be carried out,

parison

we must next

between

the

institute a

attacking

and

comthe

defending military forces.

According to Lord Roberts's last condition, the former is to consist of 150,000 troops,

and we may assume that they

" \

will

CAN GERMANY INVADE ENGLAND

64

?

be picked troops, the best Germany can put into the field. What will Great Britain be able to oppose to

The

strength

them of

?

our

home, irrespective of troops the Colonies, Regular

is

Army

as follows

in

India and

129,503

.

Departments, Army Reserve

etc.

2

138,531 2

Special Reserve (old Militia)

60,93

Royal Marines Coast Guard

17,200

.

....

Reserve

Territorial Force

54,48i

1,6^

Men

264,91

2

1

.... .... Staff

.

.

2,786

j-

268,3532

656;

Total

General Report of the British Army,

[Cd. 6065],

4

:

sioned Officers and

Permanent

1

3 3

Non-Commis-

Officers,

Reserve

i,86o

205J

.

1

3,048

.

National Reserve

Militia

l

2,474^

.

Militia

at

:

.

Staff,

force

fighting

676,381

War

Office 1912

p. 34.

3

Ibid. p. 26.

3

First Lord's Statement

on Navy Estimates [Cd. 6106],

p. 10. 4

General Report of the British Army, H. B. H. to-day is 78,000.

p.

125.

Strength

CONSTITUTION OF INVADING FORCE

Of

the above

we

65

suppose the following to be out of England, on garrison duty, or on board ship. will

Force

Expeditionary

of

100,000

men,

consisting of: Regular

Army

.

Regular Reserve Royal Marines on

.

.

50,000^

.

.

50,000)

>

.... board

ship,

garrison duty National Reserve on garrison duty

on garrison duty Territorial Force on garrison duty Militia

.

or

for

17,200 24,481

.

.

1,860

.

68,353

.

Total.

Leaving

IOO 000

211,894

the

active

defence

of

country:

Regular Staff,

Army

.....

Departments,

Army Reserve

.

.

etc.

.

Special Reserve (old Militia)

Coast Guard

...

National Reserve Territorial

Total.

Force

.

.

.

.

.

....

.

.

.

.

.

.

79>53 2,474

88,531 60,931 3,048

30,000

200,000 464,487

the

CAN GERMANY INVADE ENGLAND

66

Of

this

number 264,487 would be

?

in

all

respects the equals of any troops that might

be pitted against them, while the 200,000 Territorials,

Reservists,

stiffened

by 30,000

fighting side

Regulars, and working in like

England,

would,

National

by side with the an enclosed country

even

to-day,

be

a

formidable foe to an invading force, whose

long scattered lines would be open to attack at a

our

thousand vulnerable points.

Army Scheme

1

But since

provides for their embodi-

ment on the despatch of the Regular troops from the country, they will have been in training and under full discipline for a considerable time before their services can be required, for

can

1

I

will

not admit that

make her arrangements

The

for

Germany

an over-sea

Territorials should be taught to take up strategical

points, and when the enemy had deployed, or had partially deployed, to disperse and fall on his flanks and rear. These were the tactics which the Duke of Wellington

recommended to his Peninsular War. H.

half-trained

B.

H.

Spanish

allies

in

the

CONSTITUTION OF INVADING FORCE war

67

a moment's notice, however accom-

at

modating

may be

I

as regards her success in

concealing those arrangements.

Of

we

be able to pur the whole of our strength into the field, but then no more can the Germans both sides but course

shall not

;

specially

make

the attacking

side

will

have to

large deductions for the guarding of

its

base and line of communications, V*

for

rear,

and baggage guards,

hospital,

flanking and

also

reconnoitring

observation posts,

and

for

parties,

for

patrols,

casualties

from

and wounds both among men and whenever or wherever the

death, sickness,

and horses

;

encounter which invasion

numbers

takes will

is

to decide the

place,

be on

the

fate

of the

the

advantage in British side, even

without the Territorials, overwhelmingly so if

we

shall

take them into our calculations, as

be justified

we

in doing.

Having compared the two Forces as a whole, we will now consider the relative

68

CAN GERMANY INVADE ENGLAND

value of the units of which each

?

composed

is

not the regiments, but the individual men.

Since Germany's astonishing military successes in 1866 and 1870, the

German

has been looked on as the best

in the

soldier

world

;

but, without wishing to disparage either his

physical

or

mental qualities,

his

I

doubt

whether he would prove the superior of the British soldier firstly, because he is a con;

and

script

British rival

short-service is

man,

1

voluntarily enlisted

whilst

his

and serves

seven years, sometimes eight, before passing into the Reserve and, secondly, because for ;

forty years fighting,

the

in

English regiments Indian Frontier Expedi-

invaluable experience for any kind of

warfare, and 1

has seen no

whereas most

have taken part tions,

German Army

many

of the non-commissioned

Service with the Colours

is

three years with the Cavalry

Artillery, and two years with other arms."and Organisation of the Armies of France Strength Germany and Japan. See Journal of the Royal United

and Horse

',

',

Service Institution for February 1912.

CONSTITUTION OF INVADING FORCE officers

in

still

saw service

the Reserve

Then,

our ranks and most

this

men of

South Africa.

in

country must be entered

on would place the German soldier with

disadvantage soldier, against

good

whom

he

the

;

will

long,

voyage, terribly trying to of

whom

the (for will

will

I

have

am

the

;

make

the hurried

:

stormy

the majority

catastrophes

;

witnessed

not assuming that our reduced Fleet

be hoodwinked to the

yet that

a

British to

probably

men

at

never before have been at sea

run

risks

the

to

regard

his footing in this island

embarkation

1

under which

too, the special conditions

an invasion of

69

it

or cowards)

;

incapables,

the difficult landing from the

transports that

disablement,

moment, nor

commanded by

be

will

last

all

had escaped destruction or these things

will, at least at

the outset, impair his morale and diminish his physical efficiency. There may have been many " regrettable incidents " in the Boer War, but in its hard and difficult school many lessons were learnt, lessons not yet forgotten. H. B. H. 1

CAN GERMANY INVADE ENGLAND

7O

But where Germany in

of

no equal

really has

her military organisation

;

now

this admission, let us

?

is

and, in the light inquire into the

composition of the Force which

is

presently

to descend

upon our shores. The German Peace Establishment consists

of twenty-three

Army

Corps, and each

when placed on

Corps,

composed of

a

war

is

:

.... ......

......

Vehicles, including artillery wagons

Its

footing,

1

Troops Non-Combatants Horses

Guns

Army

nominal formation

is

25,000 16,000 13,000

144 2,200

l :

Battalions of Infantry Squadrons of Cavalry Batteries of Artillery

and

its

.

l

fighting strength

Men Horses

Guns

.... ....

:

25,000 1,900

144

The Duties of the General Staft\ pp. 272, 273, by General Bronsart von Schellendorff.

CONSTITUTION OF INVADING FORCE

J1

Therefore, for the invasion of England on

what Lord

Roberts considers a scale com-

mensurate to i.e.

prise

the

of the

difficulty

enter-

Germany must

150,000 soldiers

mobilise and

send out of the country six Army Corps a risky step to take, seeing that to the east of her lies Russia, with twenty-three

Corps, and to the west,

Army

France, with twenty, and that in neither of these neighbours has she complete confidence.

However, as we have already granted so much to our alarmists, we will concede that, in this particular also,

Germany

allow

will

hatred of England to out-weigh respect for her

own

safety,

Six

and continue our investigations.

Army

1

Corps,

as

we now

see,

mean

Lord Roberts sees no reason why the invading army " Army Corps Considering, my Lords [so he said], that in all the large Continental ports steamers each capable of carrying 10,000 to 15,000 soldiers for a short voyage can always be made available, 70,000 multiplied by two, or even by three, would require quite a 1

should not consist of nine

small

number

:

of vessels for their transport."

House of Lords, February

20, 1912.

Speech

in

the

CAN GERMANY INVADE ENGLAND

72

?

not only six times 25,000 fighting men, but six times

16,000 non-combatants, six times

13,000 horses, six times 144 guns, and six times 2,200 vehicles, or Troops Non-Combatants Horses

Guns

can

received 41

....

150,000 96,000

78,000

......

864

.

Vehicles I

:

13,200

imagine that this table will be with an outcry of protestation.

What, 96,000 non-combatants

to

1

50,000

troops! 78,000 horses, 13,200 vehicles

thing

is

monstrous

!

We

!

The

never allowed for

such superfluities!

True, the in

men who have found

terrifying

themselves

visions of 150,000

on

our coast one

London

the

next,

and

German

satisfaction

others

with

soldiers landing

and marching on never have made any day,

allowance for non-combatants, nor for carts

and wagons, nor for horses to draw them yet non-combatants and carts and wagons ;

CONSTITUTION OF INVADING FORCE

73

have to accompany every army, and, without them, it can neither march, nor fight, nor live.

non-combatants

thousand

Ninety-six

150,000 troops

too large a propor-

not

is

when one remembers

tion

that

have

they

all

the

three

field

hospitals,

and

each

to

Corps, and of the attendants

forty-eight

duties

Think of the

fulfil.

bearer-companies,

eighteen

Army

to

to

the

in

the

clerks

and the telegraphists and the store-keepers, and the surgeons and their assistants, and the veterinary surgeons,

and the bakers, and to all

these and

headings the

too

drivers

officers'

many

servants,

others, falling

numerous

of the

and the mechanics

to

and

under

enumerate, add

13,200 vehicles,

some,

needing only one man to look after them, but some would be wagons with four and six horses, calling for two two-horse

carts

or three men's care

hear what General dorff,

;

and as

for the vehicles,

Bronsart von Schellen-

whose teaching

is,

as

we know,

the

74

CAN GERMANY INVADE ENGLAND

last

word

in

about them " This

vehicles

unavoidable,

if

of

the troops are to

all

The

they need.

transport with the troops and the

for

say

number

enormous

be kept supplied with

tion

to

:

apparently is

has

science,

military

?

ammuni-

columns 1 enable the troops to be ready battle.

tool

carts,

the

field

The

telegraph carts, pontoons,

etc.,

increase

bakery,

supply

their

and

efficiency

transport

columns, assure their being fed under culties

;

;

diffi-

wagons of the medical units are for the sick and wounded, and

the

required

allow of the erection of field hospitals."

But the scaremongers, who have not lowed for non-combatants and vehicles carry an

Army's

supplies,

al-

to

nor yet for the

supplies themselves, are not likely to have

considered such

1

trifles

ammunition H. B. H.

Seventy-two

Army 2

Corps.

The Duties of the General

as

telegraphs

and

twelve

each

columns, Staff^ p. 273.

to

CONSTITUTION OF INVADING FORCE

75

In their dark and hospital wagons. dreams the enemy is to live on the country, tools

carts

commandeered food and forage in provided and horsed by the inhabitants,

and

either

carry his

use

wagons and and wounded to

hospital

have no sick

hospitals, or

impede

our

their

triumphant advance,

casualties being, presumably,

all

on our

the

side.

Listen again to General von Schellendorff.

Treating of the possibility of equipping men with horses in an enemy's country, he writes

" :

Few

remounts

branches are obtainable "

forage

:

"

for the l

As, moreover,

;

combatant

and of food and

all

such supplies,

both as regards quantity and quality, must

always be of a doubtful character, any organisation intended to maintain the efficiency of

Armies

in

the

field

must

depend

on

communications with home being properly maintained." 1

*

Duties of the General Ibid. pp. 528, 529,

Staff, p. 528.

CAN GERMANY INVADE ENGLAND

76

Why

properly maintained

?

Because

?

it

is

from home that the supplies must come and since the German Army, on the morrow

;

of

its

in

landing

communications

cut,

of supplies that the

first

and

last

it

Corps

it

to

:

is

dependent

must bring with

instance

In the foregoing

one item

England, will find its what will be the amount

usual

have omitted

I

four

to attach

Cavalry

in

?

tables

every

it

German Army one or two

divisions,

1

each

in-

com-

posed of three brigades of two regiments, and these three each of four squadrons ;

brigades,

Horse

together

with

Artillery, a light

two

batteries

of

Ammunition Column,

and an Engineer detachment, require 5,000 horses. My reason for omitting the two independent Cavalry divisions which ought 1

"

With a

peace establishment of twenty-two Army which would Corps, probably in case of war be organised as five or six Armies, each Army must consist of about four Army Corps, and one or two Cavalry divisions}'' Duties of the General Staff, p. 235. (The italics are mine. H. B, H.)

CONSTITUTION OF INVADING_FORCE

77

accompany the invading Army from my calculations, is solely due to my desire not

to

complicate further a problem which, as

to I

have stated

for

I

am

each

it,

is

already difficult enough,

not satisfied

that

six

squadrons

prove equal to the many duties that Cavalry are called on and I am quite in agreement to perform to

Army Corps

will

l

;

with Sir John French,

who

told the Norfolk

answering the question whether an invader would bring only " a Commission,

small

in

number

[of

mounted men], but very

<( he [the good what he did bring," that enemy] would bring his proper proportion

of Cavalry,

would be

Probably the railways and he would not be able to

think.

I

cut,

"

As a matter of fact, it sometimes happens, as experience has shown, that both sides remain watching each other till nightfall. Any one who has experienced this knows the frightful tension of the nerves which such a state of affairs

produces.

The remedy

lies,

indeed, in having a

Cavalry superior to that of the enemy, either in numbers or skill, and being able to be beforehand in getting an insight

into

his

and intentions."

position,

numbers, strength, movements,

Duties of the General Staff,

p. 480.

CAN GERMANY INVADE ENGLAND

78

use them at

He

first.

?

would have nothing

but Cavalry to rely upon for information."

Doubtless

I

be reminded that Sir

shall

John French spoke before the dawn of the aeroplane age, and that the Germans would not

rely

only

upon Cavalry, but upon a

body of airmen for information. That the hypothetical invading

Army

be equipped with aeroplanes I do not question, but, in view of their frailness and will

their

dependence on weather conditions, no

sensible

them

commander

will

information

for

discover the

enemy

is

which Cavalry are

the

Army also

another,

bring 1

needed

so as to secure

one the

with

and

;

of

their

scouting

it

:

to

what

of

screening

against surprise

functions,

collection

them

upon

solely

only one of the objects

for

is

rely

2

and

supplies

they

;

may,

yet

and, the

Report of the Norfolk Commission, vol. i. p. 91. Napoleon held that the most reliable information was to be obtained from prisoners. Aeroplanes could not hope to make prisoners. H. B. H. 2

CONSTITUTION OF INVADING FORCE

Germans day,

still

the local

all

lay their I

will

79

need to pick up, day by food and forage they can

hands on.

emphasise

men who,

because there are

this point

smooth the way our German invaders, would have

before

in their desire to

" us believe that they will not be

over-much

by

difficult to

hampered or Cavalry, arms

Artillery

employ

enclosed country,"

in

l

and

who go yet farther, and assure us that will come without horses, and may so

others

they

confidently reckon in

provisions

on finding that,

England

horses

soon

and after

landing, they will be as well horsed as our

own

Territorial Cavalry

2

innocently ignorant

of the fact that horses are

needed to capture

horses and unearth provisions.

No, our alarmists cannot have 1

The

late Sir

Problem and

its

it

both

"The Real Military The National Review for

E. Collen's article on Solutions "

in

April 1911. 8

see

Speech by Lord Ellenborough The Times, April 4, 1911.

in the

House

of Lords,

CAN GERMANY INVADE ENGLAND

80

ways

either

Germans

will

they

must

allow

?

that

the

bring their supplies with them,

and the vehicles

to carry those supplies

and

the horses to draw the vehicles, or else that

they will bring Cavalry

numbers of

large

Cavalry to hunt for supplies and for horses and carts, and to cover the Infantry that will be needed to bring their booty into camp.

German Generals and German

Staff Officers

are not magicians, but sensible, well-informed

men, who

conduct war

will

in this

country

and with the same precautions, as they would recognise to be and if they essential in any other country on the same

lines,

;

know

that this cannot

home, and not

be done,

will stay at

gratify their English admirers

by such a display of military recklessness as the world has never yet witnessed.

They may,

or

the despatch in

be acquainted with which Sir Arthur Wellesley

may

not,

refused to lead an imperfectly equipped force to

Egypt

;

but they

know

as well

as that

CONSTITUTION OF INVADING FORCE great

commander

that

"

Articles

vision are not to be trifled with or

of

8l Pro-

left

to

nothing more clear than that the subsistence of the troops must be chance, and there

is

upon the proposed service, or the service must be relinquished." certain

1

Despatch, dated February

18, 1801.

CHAPTER V THE SHIPPING PROBLEM "In war nothing is to he done but hy calculation. Whatever not profoundly considered in its details produces no good results."

is

NAPOLEON.

is

" For the transport of a force of any size considerable preparatior required even by Great Britain." Lecture on Transport

Troops by Sea, by

MAJOR

H. CLARKE, C.M.G.,

F. C.

Frofessoi

at the Staff College.

"

Preparations for oversea invasion were never easy to conceal, owing to the disturbance of the flow of shipping that thej

Some Principles of Maritime CORBETT, LL.M.

caused.''

IN

the

foregoing chapter

constitution of a

be adequate

in point of :

command

described

that

for the

numbers

in the

shall inquire into the

of the shipping

I

JULIAN

S.

th<

German Army supposed

of invading England I

Strategy, by

t<

to the tasl

present chaptei

amount and natun

Germany has

at

hei

conveyance of that arm;

to our shores. 82

THE SHIPPING. PROBLEM Now,

83

we must ask

the

first

ourselves

is

this

Force

from one port or several ? and to we must consider what would be

sail

answer

it

the effect on our

of

influx

question that the

Will

:

own

great ports of a sudden

men

246,000

non-combatants.

96,000

Expeditionary

150,000

troops,

would

nearly

It

double the population of Newcastle-on-Tyne

double

Hull

or

(285,000)

the

treble

Portsmouth

of

population

and

(217,989),

more than

(280,000);

the

population

of

or Plymouth Southampton (127,159), (126,265) and whereas these figures include ;

men, women, and children, down to infants in

arms, the quarter of a million newcomers

would

be strong young

all

men who, hard

at

work from morning till night, would require full rations to keep them in proper condition, and the

same would be

Now,

I

assert

true of the 78,000 horses. that,

within

a

few days

of the descent of this multitude upon castle,

Hull,

New-

Portsmouth, Southampton, or

CAN GERMANY INVADE ENGLAND

84

?

Plymouth, both it and the original inhabitants of any one of those towns would be brought to the verge of starvation, for no town has

more than a few the railways,

and

days' food in hand,

blocked

with

troops,

horses,

guns, military carriage and stores, would be

unable

to

let

supplies,

up even the usual

bring

alone

demanded by the

additions

the

increase in the

to

daily

them

number of

mouths requiring to be filled and as German towns are unlikely to be better stocked than ;

no better

ours, strain

able,

would

that

if

resources,

the

therefore, to bear the

thrown

be

attempt

upon their were made to

embark the whole of the Army destined

for

the invasion of England from a single point,

we may up,

safely

probably

assume into

that

three

it

will

parts,

be broken sailing

re-

spectively from the Rivers Elbe, Weser, and 1

Jahde Bay. 1

Port on the Elbe

and on the Jahde

Hamburg

;

on the Weser

Wilhelmshaven.

Bremen

;

THE SHIPPING PROBLEM

85

Has Germany sufficient tonnage of her own to carry six Army Corps and their equipment across the North Sea second question to which answer. 1

gross, in

That

?

we must

Her total ocean tonnage

one-third of which

is

is

is

find

estimated to be

the remaining 766,666 tons in

none of

ready for use

many

;

ing or unloading

;

an

2,300,000

foreign ports, one-third on the sea,

but, practically,

the

home

this third

and

waters

;

would be

vessels would be load-

some

just arriving,

ready to weigh anchor* some

some

dock being overhauled, a few even stripped and underin

going a thorough examination of their boilers

and machinery. 2 1

L. G. Chiozza "

hand

A

Of

course there are always

Money, M.P.

liner arriving at in preparation for

her home port is forthwith taken in her next trip, which involves much

labour. Her machinery is all opened out for examination and adjustment, her boilers are emptied and overhauled, her tubes swept, her coal-bunkers replenished, her bottom

surfaces cleansed

and coated with composition

dry dock. crew are discharged while she is in port, and do not sign on again till she is ready for sea." " Invasion from the Nautical Standpoint," by " Master Mariner," Contemporary Review for March 1911, p. 280. In the majority of cases her

in

CAN GERMANY INVADE ENGLAND

86

number

a

German

of

vessels

sailing

in

?

every

harbour, but as they would need to

be towed by steamers, they would be quite unsuitable for employment in a surprise invasion.

The

1

next step to the correct solution of

the problem of sea-transport by -which the

German Government the determining the

be needed

will

will

be confronted

amount of tonnage

for the

conveyance of

Men

is

that

:

246,000

Horses

78,000

Guns

864

Vehicles

13,200

According to Lord Wolseley (see Soldiers Pocket-book,

We have

pp.

1

80,

181),

i|

tons

net

made use

of sailing vessels towed by In the transport of troops and to the Crimea 24 steamers 64 sailing vessels were employed. In the China War of 1860, out of 200 ships a 1

steamers

large

frequently

in over-sea expeditions.

number were

sailing vessels.

The

sea-transport in the

Abyssinian Expedition was made up of 75 steamers and 205 In 1878 the Indian contingent was carried to sailing ships. Malta in 12 steamers and 15 sailing-vessels, but in none of H. 13. H. these cases were secrecy and speed essential.

THE SHIPPING PROBLEM per

man and 2^

tons net

be allowed " for very

per

tons

2

per horse

week

"

man and

Channels" 6

net

per

for

voyages not exceeding

'

in

horse must

short voyages, such

as crossing the English or Irish

and

87

duration.

The

1

latter

tons net

2

a

estimate

includes "space for one month's forage provisions,"

;

and

a reasonable and prudent allow-

ance with which to meet the needs of an

army during the voyage and the period of debarkation, and to fill up the supply and transport columns,

and stock the magazines

base on landing.

at the

The

length of the

'Another authority writes " (i) For a short voyage of a few hours, a man requires an allowance of i^ tons, a horse 2 1 tons (2) for a voyage under a week, 2 tons per man, :

;

6 per horse. ... In these calculations are included arms, ammunition, stores, ist Line transport complete, together with provisions and forage for one month in the second case .

.

.

but not tents or other 2nd Line transport.

When

a

amount of transport-vehicles accompanies, additional tonnage must be added. For 2nd Line transport, extra stores, hospital ships and food beyond the aforesaid provision, large

be required." Staff Duties^ by Major F. C. H. Clarke, Professor at the Staff College, p. 226. * Wolseley's Soldiers* Pocket-book^ p. 181,

other vessels will

CAN GERMANY INVADE ENGLAND

88

passage from the coast

German

being uncertain,

?

ports to the British

but

in

circum-

all

stances likely greatly to exceed what Lord

Wolseley understands by a very short voyage, we will take his second estimate as the basis of our calculations, with

all

the

more assurance

because, as Colonel Furse says, "It

is

not

considered prudent ever to base the calculations

on short voyages,

for the alertness of

the enemy, or unfavourable weather for land-

might keep the troops on board a longer time than was anticipated, or might make it necessary to steam away to attempt the landing,

ing

in

some

place

other

than

the

one

1

originally contemplated."

As, however, Lord Wolseley calculates in net tonnage, whilst the tonnage of

shipping has been

given

in gross,

begin by ascertaining the relation

German we will in

which

by

Colonel

the one stands to the other. ^Military Expeditions Beyond the G. A. Furse, C.B., vol. i. pp. 207, 208.

Seas,

THE SHIPPING PROBLEM Now,

net tonnage

means

vessel's carrying capacity

89 part of a

that

which remains

for

the accommodation of passengers and freight after all its

own requirements have been

a large allowance having always to be

met,

made

such spaces as engine room, crew room,

for

Lord Wolseley's rule for gross for merchant steamers is

coal bunkers, etc.

raising net to to

add 53 per

cent, to the former,

1

but Major

Clarke considers that an addition of about

66

per

2

cent,

is

G. A. Furse, perhaps a is

in favour of/

my

custom

still

greater authority,

70 per cent.

of under,

estimating Germany's tent myself with

and Colonel

necessary,

3 ;

but, faithful to

rather

difficulties,

than I

adding 50 per cent,

will

over,

con-

in arriv-

amount of gross tonnage that she require to accommodate her Invading

ing at the will

Force.

1

3 :<

The Soldiers Pocket-book, 1

p.

i8r.

Staff Duties, p. 266.

Military Expeditions Beyond the Seas,

p. 208.

CAN GERMANY INVADE ENGLAND

90

For 246,000 men

...

man

at

For 78,000 horses horse

per

673.334 tons

492,000 net

.

at 6 tons per

Nine hundred and 50

tons per

468,000

....

Total

plus

2

?

sixty

cent.

=

960,000

thousand tons

1,440,000

gross,

excess of the amount

in

be found at any one time

in all the

net

or to

German

ports.

The

following examples of our Admiralty's

estimates for over-seas expeditions, quoted

book Military Expeditions Beyond the Seas, p. 209, will show how careful I have been to avoid anything by Colonel Furse

like

exaggeration

in his

in

my own

estimates.

First Estimate "

Independently of warlike materials, stores

and provisions," sea transport of 260,047 tons would have to be taken up for an English Army Corps which consists of :

THE SHIPPING PROBLEM Men, and Non-Combatants Horses and pack animals

Officers,

.

.

QI

.

35,087

.

10,121

Carriages

1,736

Multiplying 260,047 tons by

we

6,

obtain

my estimate of Germany's six Army Corps

1,560,282 tons, as against

1,440,000 for

;

my readers will remember that a German Army Corps [41,000 men], is considerably and

larger than in

being

an English one [351087 men],

the proportion of nearly six to five.

Second Estimate hundred and

Four one

fifty-seven

and twelve tons

hundred

required for an

army

Men

would

Carriages

35,087

10,121

1,736

6,700

6,677

454

Troops for Lines of Communication 11,959

3,278

401

20,076

2,591

Cavalry

.

Division

Total

.

53,746

And Furse remarks

be

consisting of: Horses

Army Corps

thousand

=45 7,1 1 2

tons

that the provision

of

suitable ships for the transport of this force

CAN GERMANY INVADE ENGLAND

92

would

"

tax

the

all

?

of

energies

the

Transport Department of the Admiralty." But if there is no escape from the law that reckoning sea transport one must calculate on a net basis, the only way in which in

Germany can provide herself with she

the tonnage

will require, is to seize all foreign vessels

lying in her ports

all

of them, of course, in

the same state of unreadiness as her own. I

whether

doubt

suffice,

and

hesitate to

I

am

this

would

expedient

certain

that

she would

commit such a breach of

inter-

national law at the risk of embroiling herself

with

all

the maritime nations of the world

;

argument's sake, I have not refused to attribute to her other impossible but

as,

for

and discreditable

acts,

I

am

ready to allow

that she will confiscate the foreign shipping in

her harbours, and that

for her I

needs

;

nay,

I

it

will

will

go

have assumed that she

conceal

the

transformation

be

sufficient

further,

will

of

and as

be able to her

own

THE SHIPPING PROBLEM merchant vessels into transports, will

grant that she

will

succeed

in

93

so,

now,

I

so sealing

her harbours, and in so controlling her post-

and telegraphs, that no whisper of

offices

high-handed proceeding will reach the outer world. But here a new difficulty presents this

itself

the greater part of

:

vessels,

the impressed

whether native or foreign,

fully or partially loaded.

with their cargoes say.

all

But where

?

?

"

What

is

to

be done

Land them," you

At each of the

be

will

will

three ports

of embarkation the quays must be kept free

from obstruction of every kind, to

make room

and baggage, horses and wagons, guns and stores, and I greatly fear that, as a preliminary to preparing merchant ships for for troops

their

new

duties, their cargoes will

flung overboard.

have to be

There might be unpleasant-

ness with their crews, especially with foreign crews, but they could be overpowered

placed by

German seamen,

and

re-

of whom, of course,

there would be the necessary reserve at

hand

!

CAN GERMANY INVADE ENGLAND

94

We

?

have

determined the tonnage that we have still to Germany will require ;

estimate the

number of

ships

among which

tonnage will be divided. She has 109 ships of about 5,000 tons, but as two-thirds that

1

of these will be abroad or at sea, she will

only have about 36 vessels at home, and as

she would need 288 steamers of that capacity

accommodate

to

six

Army

Corps, or 418

2 ships between 2,000 and 5,000 tons, each of

her three

flotillas

would consist of 1 39

vessels,

To be

absolutely correct, 109 ships between 4,000 and H. B. H. 5,000 tons. 2 As a matter of fact Germany possesses no such mercantile 1

but for the sake of argument, I will suppose she does. has She 489 steamships, varying between 2,000 tons and

fleet,

30,000 (see

chap.

ii.

p.

25),

whose carrying capacity

approximately 2,485,500 tons gross. third of these steamers will be in

is

As, however, only onehome waters the re-

mainder being

at sea or in foreign ports there will only be tons the three Army available the of for 828,500 conveyance across the North As Sea. Corps 1,440,000 gross tons are required for the invasionary army, provision must be made

between 1,440,000 and 828,500, tons and namely 611,500 gross, Germany will therefore have to press into her service a sufficient number of foreign

for carrying the difference

vessels to

make good

the deficiency in steamers.

H. B. H.

THE SHIPPING PROBLEM

95

a few very large, some of moderate

number that I

size,

a

and of such varying speeds the Admiralty Memorandum, from which small,

quoted

a previous chapter, was over-

in

liberal in attributing to the

invading

fleet

an

average of 10 to 12 knots an hour, for certain conditions, to be mentioned later, will tend to

make

its

progress very slow.

Having now provided our army with seawe will follow its movements transport, through their various stages concentration,

kationand

embarkation,

after.

mobilisation,

voyage, debar-

CHAPTER

VI

CONCENTRATION EMBARKATION

MOBILISATION

'

When we

sea with

at

wagons, and time." ,

"It

:

cannot embark at proper wharves or

a

is

fact

the

beyond dispute that the war materials, and

troops,

attention

provisions

expedition beyond the sea will always reveal itself of disembarkation arrives." Idem.

MOBILISATION

and

operations

when

concentration

former

the

;

war

to

a

its

different units together

tration begins as

a

few

operations

the

footing,

;

in

for

an

are

dis-

consists

in

but

in

army

bringing

as concen-

soon as the mobilisation

units

go

latter

paid

the hour

raising the peace establishments of an

of

bu

or less motion, the shipping of horses, guns, military carriages must always occupy a considerable

COLONEL G. A. FURSE, C.B.

embarking

tinct

jetties,

more

is

on

completed,

the

simultaneously,

from the beginning. 96

two

almost

MOBILISATION

97

Mobilisation In are

times

ordinary

their

reputed

strength

are

hostilities

imminent,

on leave or

absent

below

reasons,

but

;

armies

standing

economical

for

kept,

all

the

officers

furlough

moment and men their

rejoin

the departments reserves are called out, and all reservists

regiments,

corps,

pronounced

fit

medical

strict

or

;

active

for

purchased,

and owners

and wagons

horses

authorities

civil

heavy penalties

to

are

are

rejected,

several

;

of registered

by the them, under

for disobedience

and the

branches

of

fit

the

remounts

required

deliver

at certain indicated points,

a

furnished

are

examination,

with clothing, arms, and equipment are

after

service,

or

delay,

where the passed Service,

unfit

into

the

to

the

work of which they are best suited, the accepted horses and those purchased being with

fitted

7

saddles,

harness,

etc.

Artillery

CAN GERMANY INVADE ENGLAND

98

ammunition

trains,

columns, are

transport

trains

hospitals

equipped,

?

and

supply

field

organised,

bearer

corps

brought

up to war strength, provisions for the troops and forage for the horses collected at convenient places along the lines of railway

and

at the final point of concentration,

arrangements made sheltering of

point

and

likely to

of

men and

at

occur

locomotive

the

beasts both at that

immense and

engines

of every kind are brought stations

where

and

billeting

towns where

whilst

;

the

for

and

regiments

halts

are

quantities

stock

rolling

together at

the

and

are

corps

ordered to entrain.

Lord Roberts believes of the General

preliminary

that,

under cover

Autumn Manoeuvres,

steps

can

be

taken

these

" without

by which he means, without but even the exciting remark or suspicion lay reader will have his doubts as to the

any

fuss,"

;

probability of concealing the object of such

MOBILISATION extraordinary

extent

from

mobilisation mobilisation

possibility

war,

successfully practised,

differs

pronounce

we accept

if

being

deception could

enumerated

measures

the

to

it

will

but

;

such

of

great an

manoeuvres

for

for

experienced

how

to

knowing

such secrecy impossible the

and

measures,

men,

military

99

only extend

above

;

no

General Manoeuvres could account for the of

activity

naval

the

preparations must keep their

military

and

authorities,

whose

pace with those of

civil

if

colleagues,

England be the object that the German Government has in view. It would be their business to take up shipping their

in

ping

prepare

it

respective

all

ports

for the reception of

guns, ammunition,

the ship-

and

to

men, horses,

1

artillery

wagons, supply

and transport carriage, provisions, stores, etc. It takes six days to fit a merchant steamer 1

H.

For ammunition special arrangements must be made.-

B

H

CAN GERMANY INVADE ENGLAND

100

conveyance of men

for

the

ten

days to put

the

in

and

?

material,

necessary

fittings

whose use the larger vessels

for horses, for

must be reserved, as the only proper place for them is on the main deck, where in small vessels there would

the

without

stalls,

to ensure their

them

in

good

be no room

which

it

or

to

safety

condition.

1

is

for

impossible

hope

Placed

to land

on

the

upper deck they add greatly to the rolling of the ship, and in heavy weather the horses and stalls are in danger of being washed overboard.

of the

2

This occurred on the voyage

Queen

number

of

to

Natal

horses

were

reached St. Vincent.

in

1881,

lost

when

before

a

she

After the Abyssinian

Expedition, in which he was disembarkation officer,

Lord Roberts was so convinced

of

the necessity of the horse transports being

1

Military Furse, C.B. 2

Transport^ pp.

158,

160,

by Colonel G. A.

Staff Duties, p. 230, by Major F. C. H. Clarke, C.M.G.

MOBILISATION provided

with

strongly

recommended

do

to

was

matter

of

during

injured

Government

the ;

animals

the

"

since

indifference

the

he

that

fittings,

themselves

whether

owners or

work

the

a

proper

IOI

to

ship

were

voyage,

it

lost

and

the

most careful inspection would not prevent their putting up the stalls as cheaply and as badly as possible."

No

doubt the German Admiralty

is

alive

1

need of proper fittings, but it may be doubted whether they will have the skilled to the

labour at their short notice, that will

in

command the large

to install them, at

number of

ships

be needed to carry 78,000 horses,

or to ensure to those horses the ventilation

without which they suffer severely from seasickness, a 1

"To

erected.

bad preparation

carry a

These

for active service

number

of horses, horse fittings must be are of an elaborate nature, and consist of

with padded breast boards and breech boards, slings, and other special fittings." The Duties of the General stalls

by General von Schellendorff,

p. 2.

CAN GERMANY INVADE ENGLAND

102

?

1

But transforming merchant ships into transports will not exhaust the demands on the resources of the German the

in

field.

dockyards.

To make

landing possible, every vessel

must be provided with at least six boats and a steam tug, each boat capable of carrying from forty to sixty men, or ten horses, or one gun, or one wagon and those intended ;

for the

landing of artillery and

shallow water, must be

and fall-down

sterns.

fitted

On

with inclined

the voyage, the

be stowed away on board, and

boats will

tow by the A cumberattached.

steam launches taken

the

vessel to which

it

is

in

some and awkward arrangement of times, and in 1

"

The heat

and apoplexy

cavalry in

at the best

bad weather quite out of

very distressing to horses on board ship, one of the prevailing diseases still, on the

is

is

;

whole, horses suffer more at sea from the motion of the ship than from heat. Sea-sickness, the result of the motion, causes congestion of the brain, ending in madness, which

proves rapidly fatal. "--Military Colonel G. A. Furse, C.B.

Transport,

p.

164,

by

MOBILISATION

103

question, yet so essential to rapid dis-

the

embarkation

is

an ample supply of landing-

boats and small steamers to tow them, that, at

all

hazards,

or

troopships,

as

tion,

a

must accompany the

they

of the

success

the

surprise

expedi-

be

will

invasion,

1

jeopardised.

the

In

sufficient

Expedition of 1856,

Persian provision

of

landing-boats

in-

had

been made, especially of landing-boats for horses, and in consequence it took three days and two

men and

nights

to

1,500 animals.

disembark

And

disembarkation experiments in

Sea,

1904,

it

took

10,000 men, and though hours,

twenty-four still

"

the

delay was

the

again in the

Clacton-on-

at

two days it

is

to

land

true that, for

weather

largely

9,500

due

was

bad,

to the fact

One

of the chief points to be attended to is the of suitable boats and flats for landing men and provision Each horses, and material for the construction of piers. 1

ship should be

amply provided therewith and also with a Staff' Duties, p. 239, by Major F. C, H,

steam pinnace." Clarke,

C.M.G,

CAN GERMANY INVADE ENGLAND

104

that there

work.

were too few steam tugs

?

for the

1

Concentration

Concentration can road and

rail,

only a single

line.

corps that can be

both

effected

the former being

short distances,

for

be

by

preferable

where the railway has For example, an army

moved seventy-two

miles

by a double line in three days needs seven days to do the same distance by a single But even line, and only six days by road. where

are

lines

move

advisable to

double,

it

is

frequently

a portion of an

army by

road to leave the railway free for the conLieutenant

A.

C. Dewar, R.N., advocates in his work, Is Invasion Impossible ? p. 53, providing every of 5,000 tons with twelve landing-boats-six transport for horses and six for wagons and two steam launches, the 1

little

former to be carried on deck, the latter to be taken in tow. He admits that the launches present a difficulty, but they are a necessity for rapid disembarkation, and two of them must be assigned to each transport, " the weather being assumedly calm." But if these tugs are necessary and the

weather

is

stormy

what then

?

H. B. H,

CONCENTRATION

IO5

veyance of military supplies of all kinds, and to prevent a total suspension of its ordinary

on which the existence of the

traffic,

civil

population depends.

German

railways are not specially adapted

Like those of our

the use of troops.

to

own

meet

country, they were constructed to

the requirements of peace, not those of war,

and by some even of the double certain defects,

to

hour.

Under the

ditions,

complete second each

of

takes

it

army

given station,

1

for,

out,

to

train

troop

favourable

per con-

days to despatch with

transport,

or sixty

fifty

dorfT points

corps,

of

lines

most

five

owing

hardly possible

more than one

despatch 1

is

it

lined,

first

its

in

118

and

trains

carriages, from

a

2

any

as General von Schellen-

"entraining and

These defects " are often connected with

detrain-

difficulties of

an engineering or technical nature as regards the laying out of the line, and, consequently, are by no means easily The Duties of the General Staff, pp. 332, 333, remedied."

by General Bronsart von Schellendorff. This includes six supply trains. Ibid. !

p. 340.

CAN GERMANY INVADE ENGLAND

106

?

ing troops, and especially unloading trains conveying baggage or supplies, are operations,

should be remembered, requiring no

it

amount of

considerable

Germans

the

force

of

1

time."

In

in-

1870,

did actually mass a combatant

16,000

and

135,000 horses,

French frontier

men,

440,000

officers,

14,000 guns,

in sixteen days,

on the

and we

will

assume that they can do the same to-day

an invasion

but, so far as concentration for

of

England

is

;

concerned, such speed would

rather be deprecated than desired, for there

would be no use

in

overcrowding the ports

with troops and material, until such time as the ships on which they are to

ready

to

Infantry should be in the tedious task

1

"

In

adapted

some

cases,

A

them.

receive

first

embark are

part

of

the

on the spot to help

of unloading the trains

where

oi

arrangements are ill may be so great as question to be practically

local

for the purpose, the difficulties

to cause the railway station in excluded, or at any rate only considered as available at long The Duties of the General Staff, p. 339, intervals of time."

CONCENTRATION

107

horses and baggage, and clearing the stations

of the contents of each train as to

make room

after.

Horse

for those that

trains should

arrives,

it

are following

have precedence

of trains carrying stores, baggage, transport vehicles, etc., for the sooner living creatures

are

taken

out

of

the

trucks

the

better.

Indian officers have had plenty of experience of horses and transport animals of

all

kinds

dying in trains from exposure, hunger, and thirst,

owing

and accidents

to perhaps unavoidable delays

and even

in

Germany

delays

and accidents are not unknown, and

in all

;

countries the difficulty of feeding

ing animals on trains

is

and water-

great.

Embarkation Organise and work as the Germans may, they will find it hard to avoid a great accumulation of men, beasts, baggage, and stores in

the ports, for until the

are completed

fittings of a ship

those fittings including fresh-

CAN GERMANY INVADE ENGLAND

108

water tanks

holds

the

in

?

rigged out with

l

no baggage must go on board, not only because its arrival causes inconvenience

pumps

at the time,

but because, unless the process

of embarkation

is

orderly, systematic

embarkation

will

carried

through

an

in

way, the process of disbe attended with such

confusion as

may prove

dition.

impossible to give the order of

It is

embarkation

in detail

;

fatal

suffice

to the expe-

to say that

it

each unit occupying a troopship, whether

it

be a regiment or a battery, or a portion of such corps, must be complete in itself, i.e. it must have with it everything of which on landing

it

ammunition, 1

"

Few

stand

will

in

need

camp equipment,

ships have sufficient

baggage,

stores,

arrangements

for

ani-

stowing

away such a large quantity of water as is required for a large number of troops, and no point demands greater attention than the furnishing of transports with a plentiful supply of fresh water." Military Transport, pp. 162, 163.

A

man's allowance

horse's eight gallons. 10 per cent, for waste,

per diem.

H. B. H.

one gallon of water per diem, a At this rate six army corps, allowing would consume over 400 tons of water is

EMBARKATION mals,

carts,

wagons,

etc.

;

log

that

the reserve

and provisions should be sent on board advance that regimental equipment and

stores in

;

transport must

come

going into the hold, the

men

and wagons then the horses and

next, carts

charge of them

in

;

and

last,

the

main body of troops. evident that for the proper carrying

It is

out of this complicated process a very large

body of thoroughly staff officers will staff officers

that

is

to

instructed, experienced

be required.

Now, German

may be thoroughly instructed say, may have learnt all about

embarkation that books can teach

may have

practised

or a battery

;

and a few

embarking a regiment

but no officers in the world

have had experience of putting 50,000 troops the ports

number assigned and

to each of the three

on shipboard. have never had to deal with

their belongings

English officers an oversea expedition numbering more than a few thousand men, and in all such expe-

CAN GERMANY INVADE ENGLAND

110

?

group of vessels, has put to sea as soon as its equipment was complete, leaving its place at the quay to be ditions each vessel, or

taken by another, or others harbour, no hostile

fleet

;

for,

outside the

has been waiting to

and however many thousand miles of water lay between it and the coast for capture

which

it,

it

was bound, wind and weather were

the only foes

Contrast with

things

it

had to

fear.

this leisurely,

that

conditions that

which

demand

1

care-free state of will

that

prevail under

139 ships shall

be got ready simultaneously and steam out of Only a small proportion of port together. those

1

39 could be loaded from the wharves

;

men, horses, guns, ammunitransport of all kinds, must be

to the majority, tion, stores,

conveyed in lighters and troop-boats, out of which the horses must be slung on board, The

British contingent of the Expeditionary Force to the Crimea, consisting of 33,500 men and 3,350 horses, 1

escorted by 34 warships, is the largest organised body of H. B. H. troops that ever left these shores.

EMBARKATION

loaded and on wheels, ready

and the wagons for immediate

on

use

and,

long

operation

;

yet,

in

bad

success

England,

into the holds,

weather,

dangerous

good weather or bad, the

work must go forward, whole

disembarkation

down

hoisted up and lowered

a

III

of

according

a

for

does not the

German to

the

invasion

prophets

warn us

to prepare against

secrecy,

and secrecy upon speed

it,

of

who

depend upon ?

CHAPTER VOYAGE

:

VII

DISEMBARKATION

;

AND

AFTER

''As in a caravan, the speed is regulated by the pace of the slowest animal, so to keep transports together the rate of steaming should not exceed that of the slowest vessel."

COLONEL G. A. FURSE, "

A

mass of transports and warships vulnerable engine of war ever known."

is

JULIAN "

If

he [the enemy] have little

will

the most

S.

C.B.

cumbrous and

CORBETT, LL. M.

sighted by any of our destroyers at night, difficulty in avoiding the men-of-war and is

they torpedoing the transports."

ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET SIR "

A. K. WILSON, G.C.B., V.C.

Directing your chief attention to the destruction of the ships, having men, horses, or artillery on board, and in

vessels, or boats

strict execution of this important duty losing sight entirely of the possibility of idle censure for avoiding contact with an armed force, because the prevention of debarkation is the object of primary importance to which every other consideration must give way."

the

ADMIRAL VISCOUNT KEITH " But

in 1803.

at this instant to rush into the interior of

Spain [England] without any organised centre or magazines, with hostile armies on one's flank and in one's rear, would be an attempt without precedent in the history of the world.

.

.

.

According

to

the laws of

war, every general who loses his line of communication deserves NAPOLEON. death."

HOWEVER much

the desire'to take 112

England

VOYAGE, DISEMBARKATION, AND

AFTER

by surprise may necessitate rapidity execution of a

will

itself

plan

beforehand

;

is

culties of will

fair

only

of to

the

plan of invasion, the

have been prepared long

and, having regard to the

thoroughness it

German

in

1 13

German ways and assume

that

all

known works,

the

diffi-

such an unprecedented undertaking

have been

ascertained

and

carefully

weighed before the details of that plan were worked out. No access to it is possible,

but the geographical and nautical facts

on which inquirer,

must be based are open to the and in studying them we shall be it

able to form an opinion as to

ought, or, at least, what It is

evident that the

German Government

it

what that plan

ought

first

not, to be.

point on which a

desirous

of invading

England must make up its mind, is the place where its army shall land. London, of course, will

be

its

objective, for only by seizing the

centre of Great Britain's

paralyse 8

British

life

resistance

;

can

it

hope

therefore,

to

the

CAN GERMANY INVADE ENGLAND

114

nearer to

London

that

landing place,

?

the

This conclusion points to the south

better.

coast of England, but the Straits of

Dover

bar the way, for whatever our despondent

prophets

may be

pleased to predict,

German

naval authorities will never trust so implicitly

and stupidity of ours, as send an enormous fleet of trans-

to the carelessness

to dare to

ports, escorted

all

by

Germany's warships,

through a passage only twenty-four miles We may be fools, but it is part of the wide. alarmist creed that the

our south coast

Germans

mav be reckoned 4

are not, so as safe from

attack.

The

east coast

of Scotland and the east

coast of far

England north of the Wash, as too from London, must also be ruled out, and

we

have, therefore, to find a landing-place

for

our invaders between the

Straits of

Dover.

this district,

"

Of

Lieutenant

the estuaries and

flats

Wash and

the

the southern part of

Dewar of the

tells

us that

Thames have

VOYAGE, DISEMBARKATION, AND

AFTER 115

been used by some novel-writers for landing troops, but it is doubtful whether any one else

would use them

The

for this purpose,

ap-

proach to the small rivers is difficult, and Sheerness and Harwich, with their quota of torpedo craft a couple of hours

off,

would

loom over any attempt in that area." This verdict, and it is one that every experienced

officer,

naval

or

military,

will

confirm, further limits our choice to the portion of the coast lying

between the Witham,

on the north side of the

Wash, and the

" there are beaches Stour, along which

small

harbours

such as Yarmouth

and

suitable

enough, but still rather too close to Harwich 2 to be comfortable." I

to

doubt the epithet suitable

any of the harbours,

shallow rivers

difficult

really applying

for they all

to navigate

lie

up

even by

small ships at low water, inaccessible to large 1

2

Is

Invasion Impossible?

Ibid. p. 36.

pp. 35, 36.

CAN GERMANY INVADE ENGLAND

Il6

vessels at

all

states of the tide,

and as

experienced embarkation officers

Dewar

Lieutenant

with

that

will

"it

all

agree

is

very

doubtful whether a force of any size would

ever attempt to land on a beach," that

the

outset,

German Government,

must have found

horns of a dilemma,

itself

since

l

follows

it

the very

at

impaled on the its

choice

between a suitable harbour which

it

lay

could

not discover, and an open beach on which no

experienced officer would counsel its

troops

;

and even

if

it

a suitable

to land

harbour

could have been found, there was the probability

that

it

would be so defended with

mines as to render a rapid coup de main almost impossible.

2

It looks, therefore,

for

as

if

Germany's plans an invasion of England must be lying in

Is Invasion Impossible? p. 35. " Mines, again, tell almost entirely in favour of defence, so much so indeed as to render a rapid coup de main 1

2

against any important port almost an impossibility.'' Principles of Maritime Corbett,

LL.M.

Strategy,

p.

260,

Some

by Julian

S.

VOYAGE, DISEMBARKATION, AND pigeon-hole with

a

written large across

and

easily deceived

the

to

the

full

assume

the word it

given their voice

but to help a timid

of

folly

in

impracticable

British public to realise

German

that

;

AFTER 117

its

naval

fears,

we

officers

will

have

favour of landing on a

beach, and do our best to find one suitable to the purpose.

To accommodate

246,000

men,

78,000

864 guns, 13,200 vehicles, such a beach must be, at least, from 12 to 15 miles horses,

long;

it

should have a firm sandy bottom,

good water at intervals whole length, and it should be in

plentiful supplies of

along

its

the vicinity of a good-sized town, the larger the

better,

skilled

where fresh food and

labour,

and unskilled, and the hundred and

one things that an army, cut off from its own country, would soon find itself in need of, could be procured, and where the sick and

wounded could be word, a town

properly

fitted to

housed

in

a

serve as a base for

CAN GERMANY INVADE ENGLAND

Il8

?

There should subsequent land operations. also be a strong position at a convenient from the beach, the occupation of which would give some security to the army,

distance

whilst

engaged

in the

complicated process of

landing.

Now, no beach England answers

German army first

32

1 ;

of

coast

east

to this description

;

but a

corps on the march, with

and second miles

on the

its

lines of transport, stretches

consequently each

would require a road

to

army corps and what itself, 2

On a good high-road, a German Army Corps in ordinary order of march would cover 32 miles, exclusive of intervals 1

between echelons, that is, intervals between the larger units of the Army, and those between the combatants and the first and second lines of transport :

25 Battalions of Infantry, 6 Squadrons of Cavalry, . and 24 Batteries of Artillery cover . .

........

First line of Transport,

15^ miles

Ammunition and Supply

Columns Second Line of Transport

.

See Duties of the General

Staff,

.

.

.

I2|

,,

4f

,,

by General Bronsart von

Schellendorff, pp. 349, 350. *

Without taking into transport, which would be

account

the

left in rear,

second

line

of

an army corps with

VOYAGE, DISEMBARKATION, AND our invaders must discover

not one beach

long, but six beaches

fifteen miles

a half miles

long,

detailed

attributes

is

AFTER IIQ

two and

each possessing above, and,

in

all

the

addition, "

for, no good anchorage in deep water, matter what may be the advantages offered

on shore, unless there

deep water

near

no place can be the disembarkation of

for

l

Assuming places

good anchorage and

shore,

deemed a good one an army."

is

that these six suitable landing-

we

exist,

will

now

turn to the con-

sideration of the difficulties that will be

met

with in the attempt to reach them.

There first

its

is

line of

any one can see

the weather transport

that

is,

with

its

ammunition

columns and trains

would, 'when advancing by one road, require from twelve to twenty hours, according to circumstances, to march a distance of fourteen miles, and deploy "

This, then, at once gives us the maximum be moved by one road [the troops being at full war-strength], if it is at once to engage the enemy, or to be drawn up in position ready for battle." Duties of the General Staff, by General Bronsart von SchellendorfF, pp. into line of battle.

force that should

353, 3541

Lord Wolseley's Soldiers* Pocket-book,

p. 223,

CAN GERMANY INVADE ENGLAND

120

that o oood

weather

of

success

movement

be essential to the

will

combined

enormous

an

such

?

as that of three fleets, sailing from

three ports, timed

point over

to

arrive together at a

250 miles away

yet

;

who

can

guarantee that the weather will be fine The North Sea has a bad reputation according to Colonel

H. N. Lake,

P.

summer and autumn one day would be a swell or other

"

in five

?

;

in

there

of the

difficulties

sea to prevent a disembarkation, and about

one day is

in

seriously

care to right

lie

twenty, in addition,

rough,

with him

it

will

sailors

"

1 ;

will,

I

and

if

he

German

there are fogs

is

think, agree

be no easy matter to

starting-day for the

Then

the sea

and vessels would not

off a lee-shore

and most

when

fix

a

Expedition.

fogs, of course,

go with a smooth sea, and, as we know, Lord Roberts reckons them as a factor favourable 1

p.

:

Evidence given before the Norfolk Commission, 103 [Cd. 2062, 1904].

vol.

L

VOYAGE, DISEMBARKATION, AND our

to

invaders,

but

captains

AFTER 121 and crews

regard them with hearty disfavour single ships

go

;

and

cautiously, feeling their

if

way

through their blinding veil, and giving notice of their whereabouts by incessant blowing of

how much more

their horns,

alarming must that of vessels sailing in

bewildering and

be to a large number company, and how loud

veil

the notes of warning by which each would try to

keep clear of

all

the rest

;

and even

if

they succeed in this endeavour and escape

each other

running

must wait

till

down, disembarkation

the veil

lifts.

Those foghorns would not tend

to

the

maintenance of that secrecy on which the of the

success

expedition

there were no fog, " as

all

depends,

and

if

the ships will be

obliged to carry lights for mutual safety, they will

be visible nearly as

day.

How "

far

by night as by

can they hope to escape

l

?

covery 1

Admiralty Memorandum, see Appendix.

dis-

122

CAN GERMANY INVADE ENGLAND

The answer enough

the

to

this

question

expedition

?

clear

is

would not escape

discovery, and as both sides to the Invasion

Controversy agree that, if its coming were known it would come in vain, we are once again driven to the conclusion that no such expedition

will

ever threaten

our

shores

;

nevertheless, for the sake of the lessons to be learnt from following

we

its

fortunes to the end,

will allow the three

German

flotillas

to

from their respective ports, pass safely through the sand-banks and shallows which

sail

shut in Germany's coast, 1 and issue out into the North Sea.

Here the troopships must

be got into something

like

a compact form.a-

On this coast the sands are constantly shifting and the courses of the rivers changing, which " explain, in conjunction with the frequent bad weather, the dense fogs, and the severe 1

numerous accidents reported in the Press which occur in our German North Sea river-mouths, but they afford at the same time most valuable protection to the trade centres and naval ports situated on them." "The Defence of the German Coasts," translated from Die Grenzboten, No. 3, of January 17, 1912. See Journal Royal United storms, the

.

Service Institution for June 1912.

.

.

VOYAGE, DISEMBARKATION, AND ti

AFTER 123

a difficult matter, having regard to their

on

and powers, and to the rule that the speed of the slowest must determine the Not being a sailor, I shall not attempt pace. different sizes

1

to decide

into

whether the three

one,

cruisers,

protected destroyers,

fleets will all

by and

merge

Germany's

torpedo-boats,

or whether each fleet will sail independently,

escorted

by

own quota

its

of warships of

every kind.

But most naval with

General

officers will,

Bronsart

that a troopship to-day

when

opposed which can sink

to it

a

"

von is

I

think, agree

Schellendorff

quite defenceless

modern man-of-war,

without

difficulty.

Troop-

must therefore keep outside the range For this of an enemy's guns or torpedoes. ships

reason

it

is

very inadvisable that a

fleet

of

"

It will be borne in mind that a body of transports is always a tactical weakness in the day of battle, and will probably lower the fleet speed of a number of high-powered 1

Mahan,

Naval

Strategy^ p. 265, by Captain A. T. D.C.L., LL.D., United States Navy.

ships-of-war."

CAN GERMANY INVADE ENGLAND

.24

?

transports should be escorted by the battle fleet to protect

A

it

against the enemy's ships.

naval engagement under these conditions

would be the more would

be

serious, as the battle fleet

deprived

manoeuvre by the decisive naval

fleet

of

of transports.

of

The

engagement must be fought

out by the battle fleet alone."

But

freedom

its

whatever

the area will be

the

very

l

formation large,

adopted,

and the

diffi-

adequate defence to the whereas correspondingly great

culty of affording

troopships

;

far

more

numerous destroyers and other small

craft,

the

British

attack,

delivered

by

though only supported by half the men-ofwar that ought to be on guard, would be The Duties of the General Staff, pp. 553, 554. On the " Conduct of Expeditions," Julian Corbett writes Against an enemy controlling the line of passage in force, the welltried methods of covering and protecting an over-sea expedition will no more work to-day than they did in the past. Until his hold is broken by purely naval action, combined work remains beyond all legitimate risk of war." Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, p. 310. 1

"

:

VOYAGE, DISEMBARKATION, AND very strong, since

it

AFTER 125

could be concentrated on

any point or points that should appear most vulnerable.

know

I

the

that

assumption

underlying the whole discreditable scare,

be no attack

there will

that

be blind,

sailors will

admirals

exceeding

dupes in

which found

reach those

invisible.

I

all

and that an armada,

;

grave

in

that

Spanish

it

came

same shores

know,

too,

our

far

Fleet

northern seas, flying

from the shores of the land will

that

our captains and

all

strength

its

;

is

to conquer,

intact,

because

that the reverse of

these anticipations would be true.

all

A

would certainly be made there might, or might not, be a great general British attack

engagement, or might but

in

;

such engagement our Fleet

suffer as heavily as the

German

with the transports spread

over

Fleet

;

many

square miles, one after the other would find itself

cut off from

its

defenders, and go to the

bottom, sunk by cannon shot or torpedo, disabled and leaking, would

lie

or,

helpless, look-

126

CAN GERMANY INVADE ENGLAND

?

ing to friend or foe to bring them into safety, whilst those that escaped destruction or dis-

ablement would steer

for

German

not for an English beach, since

it is

expeditionary force, not a part of land, if the

before

it

That

march on London

has begun.

is

the whole that

must

not to end

1

what would

is

it,

harbours,

happen,

really

but

once again, accepting the impossible, we will assume that, one summer's morning, six

German

each

flotillas,

carrying

an army

corps, will be lying at anchor, offthelanding1

Marshal Saxe's Army threatened these John Norris's plan for frustrating the " As I think it [so he wrote to the invasion was as follows Admiralty] of the greatest consequence to His Majesty's

When,

in 1744,

shores, Admiral

Sir

:

service to prevent the landing of these troops in any part of determined to anchor without the the country, I have sands of Dunkirk, where we shall be in the fairest way for .

keeping them

and pass

in.

.

But

.

if

they should unfortunately get out

and go north ward, I intend to detach a to overtake and destroy them, and force to endeavour superior with the remainder of my squadron either fight the French Fleet now in the Channel, or observe them and cover the in the night

country as our circumstances will admit of or I shall pursue the embarkation [that is, the transports conveying the troops] with all my strength." ;

VOYAGE, DISEMBARKATION, AND

AFTER 12;

places assigned to them, and ask ourselves

what next

?

Certainly not what the scare-

mongers would have us believe a landing one day, a rush on London the next. There can be no flinging of

shore

;

men and

slowly, laboriously,

in

horses on

carefully

ar-

ranged order of precedence, the contents of the transports must be conveyed to the beach.

The main body

of Infantry

first,

to protect the

landing of the horses, guns, wagons, stores,

hope of concealment has vanished, and every step will be taken as in the presence of an enemy, beginning with now, at

for

etc.

last, all

the position taken up by the troopships, which

must

lie

well out of range of field Artillery,

though every furlong farther off land a handicap. It

will

will

be

1

be no

light

task

to

put 41,000

men, at each of the six landing-places, nearly '

The greater range

transports

to

of modern artillery compels the anchor further away from the shore than

obtained in past days." Military Expeditions Beyond the Seas, by Colonel G. A. Furse, C.B., p. 289,

QAN GERMANY INVADE ENGLAND?

128 half of

about

them in

undisciplined, into boats tossing

a restless sea, but that

will

be easy

work compared to the labour of the lowering into them of horses and guns and wagons, with no

mechanical

appliances

save

those

which the ships can furnish and that labour and those difficulties will be multiplied a ;

hundred-fold

when

it

comes

to transferring

the contents of the boats to the beach, with

no appliances of any kind, only ropes and men's hands to carry out the operation. Terrified, sick, shaken, the horses

be

coaxed,

or

swimming ashore

how

coerced ;

but

are the wagons, to

into

how be

are

may

wading

yet or

the guns,

lifted

out and

dragged through the shingle and sand, into which the wheels of the latter will sink up to their axles

?

And how, five

when "

"

if

the day proves the one out of

a swell or other difficulties of the

would prevent a disembarkation, or " vessels would the one day in twenty when sea

VOYAGE, DISEMBARKATION, AND not care to

lie

off a lee-shore," or

should enshroud them

be eliminated vasion,

in

?

AFTER

when

a fog

Such accidents may

l

planning a hypothetical

but assuredly they

taken into account

in

will

in-

have been

the planning of a real

2

one.

But something worse than the fear of unfriendly weather will overshadow the work of

disembarkation,

and

spur

to

a

haste

which can only create confusion that something, the certainty that the alarm has been 1

A sudden fog occurred during the Invasion Test at the Man-

July 1912. "Meanwhile Red had made a dash and was near shore, protected from sudden attack by a screen of cruisers, when down came a thick fog, render-

ojui'rcs in

for Filey,

ing the landing

Oj

the expeditonary force impossible?

Naval Correspondent of Daily

News and

The

Leader^ July 22,

1912. ''

The German

accidents,

and

in

Military Authorities are quite alive to such planning an invasion of this country would

certainly not overlook risks

could avert.

which neither foresight nor

Mark what General Bronsart von

says on the subject upon the point that

"

skill

Schellendorff

necessary to be clear on an open coast is so any landing dependent upon the weather, that the attempt may not only be undesirably delayed, but may even have to be given up The Duties of the General Staff, p. 554. altogether." :

9

Further,

it

is

CAN GERMANY INVADE ENGLAND

130

?

given, and that every British battleship and

every British destroyer, torpedo boat, and submarine that wireless telegraphy can cruiser,

summon,

hurrying towards the east coast,

is

and may,

any moment, come into

at

German

sight.

soldier

has

on land, one by one they will above the horizon, and the transports

rise

before

Long

the

last

set foot

find

themselves

in

they been attacked

will

worse plight than had in

sea

the open

;

for,

caught between the British Fleets and the shore, they can no longer disperse in all

How many

directions.

of these

unhappy

vessels will sink with troops and horses on

board

how many

;

their escape, leaving troops

good

Fleet,

thing find

is

it

us

still

Germany

and horses

;

impossible to predict

certain, the

is

in

with

;

but one

end of the struggle

command no

make

how many British destroying the German

behind them on the beach ships will perish in

or

suffer capture,

second

of the fleet

will

sea,

and

in

her

VOYAGE, DISEMBARKATION, AND

AFTER 131

harbours to send to the help or rescue of the remnants of her expedition. their base,

and no

with no hope of reinforcements

the

to

enormously superior

be brought against them

that will

forces

those remnants can

line of retreat,

surrender

but

Cut off from

;

however much the friends of conscrip-

for,

tion

arrangements, they

464,487

our

belittle

may

a

are

with

Army.

Fortunately

for

fortunately for ourselves,

incapable

and

broken

dealing

military

hardly contend that

will

men

fighting

present

the

we

of

disheartened

Germans and shall

never be

upon to deal with a stranded German army, for even the slight indications of the difficulties attendant on an oversea expedicalled

tion

my

on a vast scale that readers, prove

I

that at

have

laid before

no state of

its

development could it and its objective have been concealed from the knowledge of the whole world, and such knowledge is all that is

needed

to

ensure

its

failure.

Every

CAN GERMANY INVADE ENGLAND

132

concession

forces

enemy's

I

have made

to

to

our shore

has

that

denial of that enemy's foresight,

and common sense

qualities

in

?

bring an

been a

knowledge which the

German people are not deficient. The difficulties and dangers which authorities see clearly, to

theirs

;

not

must be equally

one of these

our

visible

difficulties,

of

we may be sure, has been overlooked and we may be equally certain that the German Government, with the reports of its that

;

experts before

it,

will

never run the risks of

which we are asked to believe they think so lightly.

To sum up 1.

England

:

a

holds

perfect

strategical

which nothing can deprive her. The half of her battleships and cruisers

position, of 2.

in

Home

the

and

Irish waters,

than the whole of the

same Baltic

class of ships ;

and

is

stronger

German Navy

in

of the

the North Sea and

in the small craft

specially useful

VOYAGE, DISEMBARKATION, AND for intercepting transports

and

for

and

harbour

superiority

is

conveying troops, defence

coast

nearly as 2 to

AFTER 133

i

her

.

All experts agree that so long as her

3.

Army

regular

at

is

home, no foreign Power

will

venture to invade her, also that her

will

never be sent abroad

full

command

a position

till

of the sea,

to seal

Army

she has o gained till

i.e.

she

in

is

up* the harbours of any

would-be invaders. 4.

Only a

surprise expedition could hope

to reach her shores. 5.

Neither

Germany nor any

other

Power

can take her by surprise, because the organisation of an oversea expedition

and no other has a chance of success-

scale is

a lengthy and

action

attempt in

on a large

difficult business,

involving

which could not be concealed to

;

hide what would be going

her ports

being

in

itself

the

on

a betrayal of

hostile intentions. 6.

Germany

cannot

organise

such

an

CAN GERMANY INVADE ENGLAND?

134

expedition, either openly or in secret, because

she has not sufficient shipping to convey

246,000

men

with their impedimenta, and

all

the guns, and horses, and military carriage across

North Sea

the

organise

because her Government knows

it,

the facts on which deal

great

seem this

to

and she will not

;

better

I

base

than

my

conclusions a

many Englishmen

and because, though

do,

may

country,

contain

she, like

a sprinkling of

foolish or unscrupulous persons, her people as

a whole are sensible and honest. live

in

harm us

terror if

of a

she would, and who,

has no wish to do

may

Why, then, neighbour who cannot

so,

in

my opinion,

though her Government

play upon our fears for the sake of

some

advantages which it thinks she can extort from them ? If that is Germany's policy, surely ours tain

is

no fears

to convince her that

we

for her to play on, that

enter-

we know

our strength, and that, however far from desire to use

it

to her detriment,

we

all

can and

VOYAGE, DISEMBARKATION, AND will

maintain

our

AFTER 135

Naval

supremacy on which,

supremacy, a as the world is at

present constituted, our whole national

life

Germany's Fleet may, or may not, be a luxury ours is the condition on which

depends.

;

we hold bread.

not only our Empire, but our daily

CHAPTER

VIII

CONCLUSION " There be many examples where war, is at

.

but this

much

is

sea-fights have been fina in the that he that commands the sea certain,

and may take as much and as little of the war as whereas those that be strongest on land are many times,

great liberty,

will

lie

.

.

;

nevertheless, in great straits."

BACON.

"

No armed millions can save her, no matter under what conditions they are raised and trained ; nothing can save Great Britain but her Navy, and on that rests what may be called her credit-note, not only in Europe, but throughout the world."

The United Service "

We,

Gazette^ Tune 27, 1912.

the British Isles, must keep ourselves free from entangling first, because they would involve us in the

alliances in Europe,

Powers and deflect our policy from normal course, and secondly because such alliances and their responsibilities would be an obstacle to closer Imperial Federation."

military rivalries of Continental its

ARCHIBALD HURD.

THE

foregoing pages have been written

in

no

of boasting or national arrogance, but in the hope of dissipating an illusion which is

spirit

doing incalculable harm both to England and Germany, and of giving the conp de grace to 136

CONCLUSION schemes

ambitious

certain

137 which,

dimly

suspected by the people of both countries, tend to destroy and embitter relations that, in

the true interests of each, should always

be open and friendly.

With

object in view,

this

have stated

I

frankly and fully the strategical advantages

inherent

in

position,

and

Great

Germany

to rival us futility

geographical

set forth her great superiority in

ships, sailors, to

Britain's

and armament.

to

show her

on the

sea,

It is

that she cannot

and

insult

hope

to point out the

of her attempts to create a

Navy

equal

due not to any her people, to any weakness in her

to ours, since

defect in

no

her inferiority

is

Government, but to the limitations imposed

upon her by Nature.

On

the other hand,

the jingo spirit in

it

is

not pandering to

my own

countrymen

to

compel them to recognise their great naval strength,

which

I

for

the

facts

and arguments by

have disproved the *

possibility of a

138

CAN GERMANY INVADE ENGLAND

German

?

invasion of England, demonstrate

our weakness for attack, and the

futility ot

cherishing the ambition ot playing an active part on

People

land in any future European war.

may

talk glibly of creating a Striking

Force, Ministers

may adopt

thing itself can never

come

the term, but the into existence, for

the simple reason that long before such a force

could be thrown into the scales of war, the decisive

would

battle

unless, indeed,

have

been

were so small as

it

fought, to

be a

negligible quantity. It is

this

well that France, too, should recognise

fact

and cease

British military aid in

Germany

;

and

Germany, and

it

is

well

to

hope

for

effective

any future struggle with well for

for her, well for

England, to under-

stand that in sealing Germany's ports only helpful step

we

the

could take as France's

we should be drying up a large part of our own trade, and creating a fierce reaction

ally

against engagements by which

we

stand to

CONCLUSION lose

much, and

spect should

to gain

advanced nation

am

nothing

we be the

of a great and, in

139 ;

for in

what

re-

better for the crippling

many

in the

the most

directions,

world

?

who believe that this earth was intended by God to be a cockpit to the end of time but I know that so long as I

not one of those

;

the

view

cockpit

dominant, there the

of the world continues

will

nations pitted

be constant changes against

each

in

other.

I

therefore deprecate any policy based on the

assumption that France friend

will

always be our

and Germany always our

foe,

and

I

desire to see a return to that independent position in which

all

our arrangements can

be based upon our own needs

safety for

our island home, protection for our trade,

and

uninterrupted,

nication with India

The Navy

uninterruptible

commu-

and our Colonies.

necessary to the maintenance

of such a position would not necessarily be a

menace

to

any other nation,

ancl

it

is

not

140

CAN GERMANY INVADE ENGLAND

demanding too much of Germany to recognise that,

are

managed on

prevailing at

?

to ask her

the affairs of the world

till

better principles than those

the

present

have the supremacy

time,

of the sea,

we cannot

on which the

conditions of our national existence depend,

wrested from

us,

nor allow

it

to slip from our

hands.

Such a recognition would do much to bring her people and ours into stable relations, and pave the way to a relaxation of the cruel pressure put upon both countries by a rivalry

which, however far

it

may be

carried, will

do

nothing to alter their relative naval strength.

APPENDIX THE ADMIRALTY MEMORANDUM OF NOVEMBER IQTH,

THE

IQIO,

ON THE RISK OF INVASION

really serious

to guard against in

ruption

of

our

country has not invasion, but inter-

danger that

war

trade

is

and

this

destruction

of

our

Merchant Shipping.

The

strength of our Fleet

is

determined by what

necessary to protect our trade, and, if it is sufficient for that, it will be almost necessarily sufficient is

to prevent invasion, since the

same

disposition of

the ships to a great extent answers both purposes.

The main for the

pose,

is

object aimed at

by our

Fleet,

whether

defence of commerce or for any other purto prevent any ship of the enemy from

getting to sea far enough to do any mischief before she is brought to action. Any disposition that is

even moderately successful in attaining this object will almost certainly be effective in preventing a large fleet of transports, than which nothing is more vulnerable or more difficult to hide, from reaching

our shores. 141

APPENDIX

142

To have

realise the difficulty that anin

bringing such a

fleet of

coast and disembarking an army,

enemy would

transports to our it is

necessary to

the ships operating in Home waters, whether they are in the North Sea, the

remember

that

all

Channel, or elsewhere, are in wireless communication with the Admiralty and the Commander-ina

of transports is sighted anywhere by a single cruiser, or even by a merchant ship if she is fitted with wireless, every ship which Chief, so that

if

fleet

happened to be in a position to intercept the transports would at once get the order to concentrate as necessary for the purpose, whether she was at sea or in harbour. It is further

necessary to remember that, even

supposing that by some extraordinary lucky chance the transports were able to reach our coast without being detected, their presence must be

known when

they arrive there; and long before half the troops could be landed, the transports would be attacked

and sunk by submarines which are stationed along the coast for that purpose.

Besides the submarines there would be always a large force of destroyers, either in the ports along the coast or within wireless

those that

may

call, as, in

be definitely detailed

addition to for

coast

defence, the system of reliefs for those acting over

APPENDIX sea will ensure a large

143

number being

actually in

harbour at their respective bases, or within while going to or returning from their stations.

call

These destroyers, though not specially stationed with that object, will always form, in conjunction with submarines, a very effective second line of defence in the improbable event of such a second line

being required. understand thoroughly the small chance of

To

an invasion from the other side of the North Sea being successful, it is necessary to put oneself in the place of the officer who has to undertake the responsibility of conducting

His

first difficulty will

it.

be to consider how he

is

to get his great fleet of transports to sea without

any information of

it

leaking out through neutral

nations or otherwise.

Next, he

will

wireless call

battleships

a

consider

that somevyhere within

we have nearly double

and

the

number of

cruisers that he can muster, besides

swarm of destroyers.

He

probably very vague and unreliable information as to their positions, which are conhas

stantly changing.

His unwieldy fleet will cover many square miles of water, and as all the ships will be obliged to carry lights for mutual safety, they will be visible

APPENDIX nearly as far by night as by day.

hope

to escape discovery

ITovv can he

?

of his transports will have speeds of not than ten to twelve knots, so that there will

Many more

be no hope for escape by

flight if

he

is

met by a

superior force.

he

sighted by any of our destroyers at night, they will have little difficulty in avoiding the menIf

is

of-war and torpedoing the transports. Is it possible to entice part of our Fleet

away by

any stratagem ? Possibly. But even if he succeeds in drawing off half our Fleet, the other half, in conjunction with destroyers and submarines, would be quite sufficient to sink the greater part of his transports,

even lect.

supported by the strongest Fleet he could colThe Fleets would engage each other while the

if

destroyers and submarines torpedoed the transports. Finally, even if he reached the coast in safety, he

would see that

was quite impossible

guard his transports against the attacks of submarines while he was landing the troops and that it was quite it

to

;

certain that a superior force

attack

would be brought

to

him before the landing could be completed.

Taking all these facts into consideration, he would probably decide, as the Admiralty have done, that an invasion

70,000

men

is

on even the

moderate scale of

practically impossible.

INDEX " Admiral"

Times, Novem-

(

77/6'

ber 1908),

on

the

invasion

Admiralty (British), of tonnage required Army Corps, 90

estimates

scare,

andum

to

convey

MemorNovember 1910

of

risk of invasion,

141-4

prise invasion of

England, 50

Armoured

Cruisers, British, 12 cl seq, ;

number number

of

97

;

76;

barkation, 107 road required by

Ocean

Atlantic

statistics

13, 16,

;

;

German, 118

compared, 21 with

number

operation

dis-

cussed, 104-7

Corbett, Julian S., LL.M., on mines, 116 ; on the conduct

39

TO

for sea-

64

Concentration,

in, 15, 17,

duties of, 78 A. B. N., on ;

transport of troops, 87 n, ; on material required for landing

of,

Balfour, Mr. A. J., on invasion,

Fleet

force,

invading

necessity for, 77

troops, 103 ;/. Coast Guard, British,

in,

62

Baltic Sea, statistics of,

"

Admiral Sir Cyprian, on invasion, 56 Broadside fire of British and German Fleets in North Sea

on tonnage allowance

of

(Irish waters),

of British Fleet

"

on

"commerce destroying," 7 n, Clarke, Major F. C. H., C.M.G.,

em-

length

Charles, seamen, 28 n.

Churchill, Major

mobilisation,

concentration, 104

Lord

Brassey, Lord, on scrapping war- vessels, 18 n.

Cavalry ;

Corps, strength of Ger70,

efficient

of

German, 15 ct seq, Army, British, strength of, 64 Reserve, number of, 64 man,

Beresford,

Bridge,

Ardagh, Major-General Sir John, K.C.M.G., K.C.I.E., on sur-

Army

number of British, number of German,

15 et seq,

47

;

on

Battleships, 1 2 ^/ seq. ;

German

62

of expeditions, 124 !

;/.

INDEX

146

number of British, 12 number of German,

Cruisers, ct seq. 1

;

tonnage of, in North Sea, 20 broadside fire of, in North ;

Sea, 21

5 et seq.

;

force

Defending

(British),

strength of, 64, 65 Destroyers, number of British, 12 et seq. ; number of Ger-

man,

15 et seq.

use

',

of,

in

repelling invasion, 143

Devvar, Lieutenant A. C.,R.N., on boats required for landing

104 n.

forces,

on landing-

;

place for invading force, 1 14-6 Displacement of British and

German

North Sea

Fleets in

compared, 20 Dockyards (for Dreadnought class) of Great Britain and

Germany compared, 23 Embarkation,

object, 141. British

dis-

cussed, 107-11 England, invasion scare, 35-59 ; presumable conditions under

which invasion

will

Sec

taken, 60. Britain

Great

10-34 ; in Baltic Sea, 62 in North Sea, 15, ;

of

62

British Fleet in, 14, 16,

15, 17,

17,

See

21.

Sea,

also

Navy,

Furse, Colonel G. A., C.B., on

allowance

tonnage

5

waters),

13,

16,

English Channel, in

North Sea,

14,

placement and

62;

14, 16,

16

;

in

62

;

dis-

average

sea-

for

transport of troops, 88, 90 ; on sufferings of horses at sea,

on fresh-water supply,

102 n,

08

n.

Germany, 8

strategical

position,

Navy compared with Great

;

Britain's,

yard

statistics,

23

dock-

62;

18-34, ;

merchant-

ship statistics, 25 ; personnel of Navy, 28 ; military force

seq.

;

Army 76

;

63

British,

et

her soldiers compared British,

68

Peace

;

Establishment, strength

10-34 i n Mediterranean Sea, 12; in Atlantic Ocean (Irish

;

German. Fogs in North Sea, 120

with

Fleet, British, strength and disposition in European waters,

62

and average displacement in North Sea, 20 ; tonnage of, broadside fire of, in North

compared with statistics

Channel,

English

be under-

also

Navy, German, strength and disposition in European waters,

Fleet,

1

operation

See

its

also

of,

70;

Corps, strength of, 70, of shipping statistics

tonnage, 85

tonnage required convey invading force, 90 ; mobilisation difficulties, 98 ;

to

;

concentration

difficulties,

embarkation

difficulties,

105

;

107 ; of invasion presumable plan

INDEX choice of

its

discussed, 113; a landing-place

for

ex-

its

Invading Force, constitution of, 6o-8l number of troops ;

peditionary force, 113; reasons for believing an invasion of also Fleet,

required,

German

1-9

2-4

defence, II

resources

;

;

naval

Germany's, 18-34, 62 dockyard statistics, 23 merchant;

;

1

strength of defending force, 64 ; her soldiers scq,

compared 68;

effect

vading

with

Germany's, on ports of in-

to

83

convey

Army

sumable landing-place of invading force, 113; reasons for believing invasion impossible, See also Fleet, British 132.

46

Admiral

Sir

John Ommanney, G.C.B., on in-

vasion of England, 55

Horses, transport

of,

by

sufferings of, at sea,

Howard

of

;

probable landing-place,

;

presum-

Lake, Colonel P. H. N., C.B., on surprise invasion of Eng-

on weather land, 50 North Sea, 120 ;

sea,

Land-transport

102 u.

Effingham, Lord, on strategy (1588), 6 n.

and supply wf

invading force, 70

et scq.

Mahan, Captain A. T., D.C.L., LL. D., on obsolete vessels, 19

;

on

battle,

* '

Master

in

naval

British,

num-

transports

I23.

Marines, Royal, ber of, 64

pomry 100 ;

in the

Landing-place of invading force, the presumable, 113; accommodation required in a, 1 1 7

Hamilton, Admiral Sir Vescy, on Lord Koberts's invasion scare,

on

shipping

Scare, The, 35-59

tonnage

;

Corps, 90 ; presumable plan for invasion of, 113; pre-

Hopkins,

sea-

;

force,

required

02

be undertaken, 60

J

et

;

;

effect

able plan for, 113; summary of difficulties to be met, 143

35~59 military force compared with Germany's,

63

set/. >

113 Invasion of England, presumable conditions under which it will

ship statistics, 25 ; personnel of Navy, 28 ; and the invasion scare,

et

required for, 90; boats required for landing,

policy,

Navy compared

;

land-transport

70

tonnage

for

with

;

of,

transport of, 82-95 British ports of, 83

Great Britain, strategical pooition,

63

and supply

Sec

England impossible, 132.

147

Mariner Kevie;vt

" (

Content -

March 1911)

on preparation of ships sea, 85 Mediterranean Sea,

for

;/.

statistics of

British Fleet in, 12

INDEX

48 Memorandum

of

Ad-

British

miralty on risk

of invasion,

Fleet in, 14, 16; statistics of Fleet in, 15, 17, 62

German

;

and

141-4

Merchant

ships,

statistics

of

and German, 25 ; reported to carry armaments, 26 British

number

Militia, British,

of,

64

;

Reserve, 64 Mobilisation,

dis-

operation

cussed, 97-104

average displacement tonnage of British and Ger-

man fire

Fleets in, 20

Fleets in, 21 ; ditions in, 1 20

German

weather con-

" Nucleus crew," Mr. Bal four's description

"Modern Mariner" The Times, November 1908) on invasion

broadside

;

of British and

of,

16

(

42

scare,

;/.

Napier, Sir Charles, quotation

from his Indian Mismanagement II Napoleon I. on strategy, 5 National Reserve, British, num',

ber

of,

Navy, ct

64

British,

seq.

;

strength

personnel,

of,

28.

strength of, 15 ct See also personnel, 28.

German

Fleet,

German,

15 et seq.

Captain von, on British seaman, 30 n.

the

Pustau,

on invasion of England, 41-4, 51 on main-

Roberts,

Earl,

;

- German, ;

Navies compared. 28 Protected Cruisers, number 01 British, 12 et seq, ; number of

12 See.

also Fleet, British

seq.

Peace Establishment, German, 70 Personnel of British and German

tenance

44

n.

;

of

Citizen

Army,

conditions under which

he presumes England will be

William, K.C.B., on surprise

invaded, 61, 71 //. ; on transport of horses by sea, 100

invasion of England, 49, 50 ; on security of England from

Royal Commission on the risk of invasion, 38, 49 el set/., 77

Nicholson,

Lieut.-General

invasion, 52 Non-combatants,

Sir

Marines, British, number statistics

re-

their duties, 73 garding, 72 Norfolk Royal Commission, 38. 49 et seq., 77

of,

64

;

Norris,

Admiral

Sir John, plan

for frustrating invasion

( 1

744),

and

Sailors, statistics of, British

German

Navies, 28

Schellendorff, General Bronsart

12611.

North Sea,

Sailing vessels, British use of, in over-sea expeditions, 86 n.

statistics

of British

von,

on

strategy,

7

;/.

;

on

INDEX the

transport

of troops, requisite

for

attacking force,

73

on

re-

;

Territorial Force, British,

43,

44; on vehicles

mounts, food, and forage, 75

ber

64 Times Correspondent Affairs on invasion

5

on constitution of an army, on the necessity for 76 11. on transport cavalry, 77 n. on of horses by sea, 101 w. ;

;

;

difficulties

of

concentration,

on time and length of road required by Army on ; Corps to deploy, 105, 106

;

n8.

troopships

on

123;

in

the

naval

battle,

necessity

for

good weather when landing troops, 129

of British,

in

home

waters, 14, 16 Sea-transport of invading force,

82-95 Skeleton, or maintenance, crew, description of, 16

comparison of British and German, 6S

Soldiers,

Submarines, number of British, j

8

number of German,

;

use

of,

in

18

;

repelling invasion,

H3 Supply

and

invading force, 70

et

seq.

of

for

Naval

scare, 59

Tonnage of Germany's shipping, amount required for in85 ;

vading

force,

86

;

relation of

net to gross, 89

number or Boats, 18 ; number of Ger-

Torpedo British,

man, 18 Sir Major-General invasion on Alfred, K.C.B.,

Turner,

of England, 54

United

Kingdom,

See Great

Britain

Weather conditions required by invading force, 119

Weight of armaments of the rival Fleets in the North Sea, 15 Sir Arthur, on suffiof our Fleet to prevent ciency

Wilson,

invasion, 57 Wireless telegraphy,

its

use in

repelling invasion, 142

Wolseley, Lord, on risk of invasion, 51

land-transport

num-

of,

;/.

number

Scouts,

149

ance

for

troops, 87

;

on tonnage allowsea-transport

of

PRESS OPINIONS ON

THE FIRST VOLUME

OF "THE SECOND AFGHAN WAR" "

Now that opinion in regard to Indian frontier policy has undergone a marked change, Colonel H. B. Hanna's careful study of the events which led up to the Second Afghan War is distinctly THE

TIMES.

opportune. every one avoided."

.

.

.

who

From

first

to last, the

cares to understand

THE OBSERVER.

"We

know

book

will well

repay study by

how wars can be made

and

of no one better qualified to deal

with events in Afghanistan than Colonel H. R.

Hanna."

PALL MALL GAZETTE. " Colonel Hanna's tremendous care, completeness and clearness, with his intense conviction, make him a very powerful writer."

ATHEN/EUM. considerable,

and

"

The

it is

ability

with which his case

probable that in his

main

is

line his

presented is view is a well-

founded one.'

MORNING LEADER. " Colonel Hanna is peculiarly well fitted to handle the multiplicity of questions political, military, financial, and social that arise in connection with the Second Afghan War."

MANCHESTER GUARDIAN. -"Colonel Hanna calls his book, of which the first volume has now been published, The. Second Afghan War; but its scope is wider than the title. . The present volume .

.

work when completed

will possess the Colonel Hanna brings to his task a mind highest political value. imbued with Liberal principles, as well as an almost unrivalled knowledge of the frontier-problem in its military and political

justifies

the hope that the

aspects."

LEEDS MERCURY." Colonel Hanna's work promises to be the standard authority on the history of the Second Afghan War. It is

PRESS OPINIONS, SECOND AFGHAN

152

WAR

written with conspicuous ability, and with a manifest desire to state the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, regarding one of

the most senseless wars of aggression recorded in the annals of the British

Empire."

ADVOCATE OF INDIA. " Colonel Hanna shows clearly and forcibly, and with the aid of unimpeachable authorities, that on the brink of war the army was found thoroughly incapable of effectual warfare." UNITED SERVICE MAGAZINE. " This is a remarkable, an excellent, and the second volume and a most interestingly instructive work ;

when

appears will be eagerly seized upon by all readers of that The volume before us is a most which has now been published. of the with which it deals, and cannot be masterly exposition subject too strongly recommended." it

.

MANCHESTER COURIER. moment

of the advance, continuation of the story.

.

.

"The

and we

present

volume

ends

at

the

shall therefore look eagerly for the

If it is continued in the same exhaustive and manner as it has commenced, Colonel Hanna will have made a notable and valuable contribution to modern Indian history."

judicial

INVESTORS' REVIEW. " Nothing is set down in it haphazard, nothing from mere impulse or passion. It is a calm and almost colourless narrative of facts based upon documents accessible .

.

.

.

to all."

GLASGOW HERALD. knowledge of the subject

"The ;

author writes with a very thorough marshalled with remarkable

his facts are

argumentation is exceptionally vigorous. These qualities mark his book as a valuable contribution towards the adequate understanding of a question which has not yet lost its importance.' skill,

and

his

WESTERN MAIL, CARDIFF. style that

makes

character that one

"Colonel Hanna tells his story in a interesting reading, whilst the sidelights are of a would not miss willingly. As it is, we think there

should be a hearty welcome for the volume issued because of

its

general

interest."

THE ARMY AND NAVY GAZETTE."

Colonel Hanna's book, the volume of which was published on Thurs'day last, has come opportunely. It fairly shows that we have, as regards Afghan affairs, consistently done what we ought not to have done, and left undone or first

left

unsaid

many

things that belonged to our peace,"

WAR

PRESS OPINIONS, SECOND AFGHAN "

THE LITERARY WORLD. specially

the student,

to

A

work

particularly

like

to

153

Colonel Manna's appeals the political

and military

student."

SHEFFIELD DAILY TELEGRAPH. "All who take an earnest and continuous interest in British operations on the North- West Indian will do well to get Colonel Hanna's book." Frontier . .

.

WESTERN MERCURY. "This bulky volume is a, crushing and Forward Policy.' Colonel Hanna . . remorseless exposure of the has, in addition to military knowledge, tireless industry and a firm grip of facts." '

.

We

PUBLIC OPINION." heartily recommend this very able history of events that have proved so costly to England in lives and money. The work is well written, and should be widely read."

NEWCASTLE LEADER. " Such a task as Colonel Hanna has undertaken requires not only the faculty of the historian, but the special training of the soldier for its effective treatment; and Colonel Hanna has lx>th this historic ability and this special training." " Colonel Hanna has already won his spurs as a writer and publicist of no mean renown, on questions relating to the Afghan and North-West Frontier politics, and he has well l>een described by one leading London journal as peculiarly fitted to handle the multiplicity of questions political, social, and military in connection with the Second Afghan War,' and by another as bringing to his task care, clearness, completeness and conviction.

THE CHAMPION, BOMBAY.

'

'

We

entirely

concur

in these views."

THE WORLD.

"The first volume ... is now published, and conand interesting account of the various events which led to the genesis and growth of the Forward Policy, and so to the outbreak of war, which the next volume is to chronicle." tains a full

POST."

LIVERPOOL Especially valuable is Colonel Hanna's analysis of the circumstances attending the Russian Mission to Kabul, under General Stolietoff, which have been put forward by apologists of Lord Lytton arid the Beaconsfield Government as an ample Afghan War."

tion of the

justifica-

154

WAR

PRESS OPINIONS, SECOND AFGHAN

THE SECOND VOLUME OF "THE SECOND AFGHAN WAR"

PRESS OPINIONS ON s,

" Colonel Hanna may be congratulated on an extremely accurate, painstaking, and clear account of a very unHis criticisms are, we believe, generally sound." satisfactory war.

PALL MALL GAZETTE.

.

MORNING history of

it

.

.

"No one could be more capable of writing a POST. than Colonel Hanna." "

EDINBURGH EVENING NEWS.

Few books have

ever given a better

description of mountain warfare and its perils, and how a rough country tends to dislocate military movements, while there are some life-like passages descriptive of the frequent raids on the British lines of

communications by the wild tribesmen." " This volume effectively brings up a valuable military history which has already in its first half gained a high reputation among the studious soldiers best capable of weighing its merits."

SCOTSMAN.

"A

INDIA. historical

searching, uncompromising

and illuminating

piece of

work." "

SHEFFIELD DAILY INDEPENDENT. this tangled

campaign

no easy matter

is

;

To give a lucid account of but Colonel Hanna has been

successful."

MORNING LEADER." The

tale

is

told,

both from the military and

the political points of view, with a moderation, a

and a scrupulous regard

for accuracy

strict

impartiality^

which win and hold the con-

fidence of the reader."

MANCHESTER COURIER." The no extraneous matter

is

story

is

clear

and

sufficient

and

included."

TELEGRAPH." Most chapters of the narrative close 'Observations' or criticisms, which, uhether justified or not, cannot but make a soldier think out carefully the problems set before SHEFFIELD

with

This is a work which could only be done by one who is himself him. a scientific soldier, and is well acquainted with the country about which he writes." HUDDERSFFELD EXAMINER. " The combination of soldier and historian,

that

is

still

more of the

soldier

and liberal-minded

only too rare in the annals of publication."

historian,

is

one

PRESS OPINIONS, SECOND AFGHAN

WAR

155

LITERARY WORLD." Colonel Hanna writes clearly and effectively, more especially in the descriptive parts of his narrative, we are

and,

he writes with sufficiency and knowledge." " For soldiers the volume is full of instruction. THE SPEAKER. Besides containing a clear account of each action and expedition, to most of the descriptive chapters is appended a series of observations, each of which is a carefully considered criticism on the events dis-

impressed by the

faet that

cussed in the preceding pages,"

THE SATURDAY REVIEW." Military students will thank Colonel Hanna most for his analyses, and will enjoy his sound and judicial Colonel Hanna has weighing and comparison of means to an end. .

.

.

written a very able book and has the courage of his convictions, a welcome trait in these days when robust opinions are largely out of fashion.'

THE THIRD VOLUME OF "THE SECOND AFGHAN WAR"

PRESS OPINIONS ON

" That the author, an actual participator

MALL GAZETTE.

PALI.

long-protracted struggle of thirty and more years ago, has been pared to complete the work to which he has devoted his great abilities and his infinite capacity for taking pains/ is an event upon which in the

'

Colonel Hanna himself, but also his countrymen in general, must be heartily congratulated. ... In any case, the volume itself requires to be read, word for word, in order to be properly appreciated. It will,

moreover, fully repay the most careful study.

"

MANCHESTER GUARDIAN. " Colonel Hanna, the ablest and the soundest of military writers on the Indian Frontier, has now completed his work on the 'Second Afghan War.' For its political wisdom .

and the sureness of

.

.

judgments the book will take a high English military literature, and the last volume is the most Few passages in our miliinteresting and absorbing of the three. tary history are so full of instruction and varied interest as the events its

technical

place in

.

.

.

between the first occupation of Kabul and the evacuation of Kandahar. There are several fine victories, some lucky ones, and the one serious dpff at of

Colonel

Maiwand, a

Hanna now.

.

battle often described, but never so well as .

of military history.

.

But Colonel Hanna's work It

by

not merely a has, as good military history should have. is

156 PRESS OPINIONS, SECOND AFGHAN rich political meaning. '

fallacies of the "

It is

WAR

a deliberate and detailed dissection .of the

Forward Policy

'

and

the search for the

'

Scientific

Frontier."

" In the third volume of his historical study of the events of the Second Afghan War,' Colonel Hanna successfully carries on, upon its established lines, a book already accepted as an authority

SCOTSMAN.

'

by close students of the history of ment of Indian Frontier Policy.

British India,

and of the develop-

'*

THE LIVERPOOL DAILY POST AND MERCURY.

" In Colonel

Hanna

the country possessed a soldier, and now possesses an historian the ablest and soundest of them all. Technical judgment, political wisdom,

and

utter fearlessness characterise every chapter of this vivid work,

and

although very many years are sped since the Afghan campaign was undertaken, the public are as liable to accept the rose-coloured official reports as ever and men like the author are, indeed, the only safe;

political intrigues having for their object the subjugation of races we should do all in our power to strengthen and convert into friends and allies." DAILY GRAPHIC. " The impression made by the first two volumes, that the work would be a valuable contribution to the history of British

guard they possess against

rule in India,

is

confirmed by

this,

the concluding volume, which shows,

as did the others, that Colonel Ilanna was well fitted to deal with the complex problems, political and military, which beset our relations with

the great India."

and always perturbing Power on the North-west Frontier of

HENRY COTTON

IN " INDIA."

" Colonel Hanna

is no mere he describes. He took his part in them as an officer on the staff, and writes, therefore, from first-hand knowledge. We have in these pages a minute account of the vicissitudes of the campaign, illustrated by strategical maps of perfect lucidity and accuracy, and illuminated by observations recorded by the author from a military point of view, which award praise or blame with an almost

SIR

historian of the events

icy impartiality."

WESTMINSTER GAZETTE. "For the student of British military history there is in these three volumes a wealth of invaluable information, and if the work finds readers to anything approaching the number it

deserves,

War

it

may be

that the bitter experiences of the second

Afghan

Every statesman, every soldier, and every politician owes it to his country that he should study with the utmost care Colonel Hanna's admirably written and most convincing will

pages,."

not be wasted.

,

.

.

WAR

PRESS OPINIONS, SECOND AFGHAN

it

H

"But though we

anna's entirely agree with Colonel his history is in the main a military work, . . will certainly become a text-book for the training of officers.

NATION.

political criticism

and

157

.

.

.

still

.

present volume of this remarkable work is, on the whole, the most generally interesting, since it contains exact and dramatic accounts of the destruction of the Cavagnari Mission to Kabul, the siege of the

The

cantonments of Sherpur just outside the city, the overwhelming disaster of Maiwand, and the marches between Kabul and Kandahar already referred to."

THE CALCUTTA ENGLISHMAN."

Hanna

Colonel

certainly pos-

and a thorough knowledge of his His observations are almost always pertinent and instrucsubject. The historical part of the narrative is lucidly told, and perhaps tive. nobody is better able than himself to handle the Afghan question. The printing of the book is beautifully clear. The maps there are nine of them in this volume alone will contribute not a little to the value and importance of the work, and what also goes much in its sesses the courage of his convictions '

'

.

favour

is

good indexes

the fact that there are

.

.

to each of the three

volumes."

" Colonel Hanna's history of the Afghan War is worth a whole series of books which claimed to tell It is lucid, the story of the more recent South African campaigns. in a sense reader to the and informed, convincing, plain ordinary that military books often are not. There are many plans and maps, while the clearness of the printing merits a word of appreciation."

EDINBURGH EVENING NEWS.

" Colonel

Hanna a soldier of the intelcan wield his pen exceedingly well, and his history of which now reaches its completion with Second Afghan War third volume will undoubtedly take high rank in our military

CHURCH GUARDIAN. lectual type

the this

'

'

literature."

" The book INDIA. (writes an Indian correspondent) is as interesting a layman as to the military expert. It is full of lessons for the statesman in England no less than for the administrator on the to

Indian frontier.

.

.

.

Apart from the military and

of the book,

its

human

throughout

is

admirably

political interest

of pathetic lessons. vigorous, and the personal

side

is

full

The

style

narrative

touching."

MANCHESTER COURIER.

"Colonel Hanna has,

notable and valuable contribution three

volumes which

1878-79-80.'"

tell

to

the story

indeed,

modern Indian of

the

made a

history in the

'Second Afghan War,

WAR

PRESS OPINIONS, SECOND AFGHAN

158

INVESTOR'S REVIEW." Colonel Hanna has now completed his and authoritative history. The third volume, now published, is the largest of the three, and in some respects the most fascinating but the whole book is well and conscientiously written, packed with information, and suffused with political wisdom a book, therefore, not only to be read, but to be bought and kept for reference." excellent

.

.

.

;

WESTERN PRESS." The skill and intelligence which Colonel Hanna has shown in compiling such a masterful and heavy work stamps him as a man of brilliance, and the work should prove a valuable asset to and

political

military students.

MORNING LEADER." The

third

and

final

volume of Colonel

Ilanna's masterly history of the 'Second Afghan War.' This well-planned and well-executed history (furnished, we may add, with excellent maps)should be the standard work on its subject." .

"

DAILY NEWS.

Colonel Hanna's work

gular mastery of his subject, both on

the

.

.

one which reveals sinmilitary side and on the is

political."

NEW

AGE.

"

Written in good English, printed on good paper, and it is a book for all . containing clear and adequate strategical maps readers, from the soldier to the politician." .

.

"The history has run into three volumes, has been done with great elaborateness ot a valuable book."

FREEMAN'S JOURNAL. and

this

detail.

.

the last.

is .

This

.

is

It

UNITED SERVICE GAZETTE.

" Colonel Hanna is an officer with He has been a determined oppo-

considerable Indian experience. . nent of the forward policy in India, and certainly the discouraging experience we have always met with in our trans-frontier wars shows .

that Colonel

and

theory,

.

Ilanna's premises are based on something more than is one of those keen, far-seeing soldiers who were

that he

capable of correctly gauging the results of our interference with Afghanistan, and of indicating that we were laying up a store of future " trouble for ourselves.

" This work, an elaborate account of the operations the strategist and military student, is now complete." TIMES.

for

" The opinions of the author, as expressed in are instructive and illuminating, and he ends a great " the words, ' Progress founded on Peace.'

MILITARY MAIL. the

final chapter,

work by

OBSERVER. ritative

work."

"

The concluding volume

of a lucid, able, and autho-

PRESS OPINIONS, INDIAN PROBLEMS

1.59

INDIAN PROBLEMS No. No.

II.

No.

111.

I.

CAN RUSSIA INVADE INDIA? INDIA'S SCIENTIFIC FRONTIER is IT?

WHERE

is

IT

?

WHAT

BACKWARDS OR FORWARDS?

OPINIONS OF THE PRESS "Colonel I-Ianna has given in a comwith admirable clearness, such a conspectus small and paratively space, of recent frontier policy in India as can hardly be found elsewhere, and such a demonstration of its real meaning and too probable consequences as should have an effect, even at this eleventh hour, onxvery mind not

MANCHESTER GUARDIAN.

obstinately closed against conviction."

SATURDAY REVIEW. "These problems are all of the highest interest and importance they dominate our foreign policy, both in Europe and Asia; while for our Indian Empire, their proper interpretation and decision involve the gravest issues of prosperity and safety, bankruptcy and ruin." ;

THE SCOTSMAN.

"Colonel Hanna's Indian Problem, 'Backwards

quite as remarkable as his first and second for its of conviction, thorough knowledge of his subject, and force of strength reasoning. There seems to the inexpert reader no escape. He not only

or Forwards

'

?

is

advances an opinion, but proves

THE DAILY GRAPHIC. striking

''

it

almost like a proposition in Euclid.''

Colonel

number of weighty utterances

Hanna has in

certainly collected

a

favour of his main contention.

briefly stated, is, that the Indian Government ought never to have advanced beyond the Indian Frontier at the foot of the mountains, and ought, as speedily as possible, to retire to that frontier.'

That contention,

BROAD ARROW. " Colonel Hanna may be accomplished excellent and enduring work."

LONDON

:

CONSTABLE & 10,

satisfied that

CO.

ORANGE STREET, LEICESTER SQUARE, W.C.

he has

PRINTED BY HAZE IX, WATSON AND VINUY, LD., LONDON AND AYLESBUKY.

BINDING SECT.

JUN 9

1982

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TORONTO LIBRARY

Hanna, Henry Bathurst Can Germany invade England?