CIVREV.PARENTAL AUTHORITY.152 [G.R. No. 143363. February 6, 2002] ST. MARY’S ACADEMY, petitioner, vs. WILLIAM CARPITANOS and LUCIA S. CARPITANOS, GUADA DANIEL, JAMES DANIEL II, JAMES DANIEL, SR., and VIVENCIO VILLANUEVA, respondents. FACTS: Pardo, J. 1. Petitioner conducted an enrolment drive for the school year 1995-1996. A facet of said campaign was the visitation of schools from where prospective enrolless were studying. The deceased, Sherwin Carpitanos was part of the campaigning group. He, along with other high school students, was riding in a Mitsubishi jeep owned by defendant Vivencio Villanueva on their way to Larayan Elementary School in Dapitan City. James Daniel II, then 15 y/o also a student of petitioner, was the one driving the said vehicle. He allegedly drove the latter in a reckless manner and as a result the jeep turned turtle. Consequently, Sherwin died of the injuries he sustained from the accident. 2. Thus, respondent spouses Carpitanos filed a case against James Daniel II and his parents – James Daniel Sr and Guada Daniel, the vehicle owner Vivencio Villanueva, and petitioner St. Mary’s Academy for the death of their son Sherwin Carpitanos. 3. The RTC held petitioner primarily liable to the Carpitanos in the total amount of P600,000.00; while the parents of James Daniel II were only held subsidiarily liable (to pay the said amount in case of insolvency of petitioner); James Daniel II was absolved from liability for being a minor at the time of the commission of the tort and was then under special authority of petitioner; and Villanueva was was absolved of any liability.
HELD: NO. The Court of Appeals held petitioner St. Mary’s Academy liable for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos under Articles 218 and 219 of the Family Code, pointing out that petitioner was negligent in allowing a minor to drive and in not having a teacher accompany the minor students in the jeep. Under Article 218 of the Family Code, the following shall have special parental authority over a minor child while under their supervision, instruction or custody: (1) the school, its administrators and teachers; or (2) the individual, entity or institution engaged in child care. This special parental authority and responsibility applies to all authorized activities, whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or institution. Thus, such authority and responsibility applies to field trips, excursions and other affairs of the pupils and students outside the school premises whenever authorized by the school or its teachers. Under Article 219 of the Family Code, if the person under custody is a minor, those exercising special parental authority are principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor while under their supervision, instruction, or custody. However, for petitioner to be liable, there must be a finding that the act or omission considered as negligent was the proximate cause of the injury caused because the negligence must have a causal connection to the accident. “In order that there may be a recovery for an injury, however, it must be shown that the ‘injury for which recovery is sought must be the legitimate consequence of the wrong done; the connection between the negligence and the injury must be a direct and natural sequence of events, unbroken by intervening efficient causes.’ In other words, the negligence must be the proximate cause of the injury. For, ‘negligence, no matter in what it consists, cannot create a right of action unless it is the proximate cause of the injury complained of.’ And ‘the proximate cause of an injury is that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.’”
4. On appeal, the CA reduced the amount of damages, but affirmed in toto the RTC decision. Petitioner filed an MR but it was denied, hence this appeal.
In this case, the respondents failed to show that the negligence of petitioner was the proximate cause of the death of the victim.
ISSUES: 1. Is petitioner liable for damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos? 2. Who should be liable for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos?
Respondents Daniel spouses and Villanueva admitted that the immediate cause of the accident was not the negligence of petitioner or the reckless driving of James Daniel II, but the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep. Hence, the cause of the accident
was not the recklessness of James Daniel II but the mechanical defect in the jeep of Vivencio Villanueva. Respondents, including the spouses Carpitanos, parents of the deceased Sherwin Carpitanos, did not dispute the report and testimony of the traffic investigator who stated that the cause of the accident was the detachment of the steering wheel guide that caused the jeep to turn turtle. Hence, the respondents’ reliance on Article 219 of the Family Code that “those given the authority and responsibility under the preceding Article shall be principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor” was unfounded. WHO IS LIABLE FOR SHERWIN’s DEATH: Further, there was no evidence that petitioner school allowed the minor James Daniel II to drive the jeep of respondent Vivencio Villanueva. It was Ched Villanueva, grandson of respondent Vivencio Villanueva, who had possession and control of the jeep. He was driving the vehicle and he allowed James Daniel II, a minor, to drive the jeep at the time of the accident. Considering that the negligence of the minor driver or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep owned by respondent Villanueva was an event over which petitioner St. Mary’s Academy had no control, and which was the proximate cause of the accident, petitioner may not be held liable for the death resulting from such accident. Consequently, we find that petitioner likewise cannot be held liable for moral damages in the amount of P500,000.00 awarded by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant’s wrongful act or omission. In this case, the proximate cause of the accident was not attributable to petitioner.Hence, liability for the accident, whether caused by the negligence of the minor driver or mechanical detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep, must be pinned on the minor’s parents primarily. The negligence of petitioner St. Mary’s Academy was only a remote cause of the accident. Between the remote cause and the injury, there intervened the negligence of the minor’s parents or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep.
Incidentally, there was no question that the registered owner of the vehicle was respondent Villanueva. He never denied and in fact admitted this fact. We have held that the registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for public service, would primarily be responsible to the public or to third persons for injuries caused the latter while the vehicle was being driven on the highways or streets.” Hence, with the overwhelming evidence presented by petitioner and the respondent Daniel spouses that the accident occurred because of the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep, it is not the school, but the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos. The Court remands the case to the trial court for determination of the liability of defendants, excluding petitioner St. Mary’s Academy, Dipolog City. -oLay!
THE COURT OF APPEALS, VICENTE CATAPUSAN, JR., CIPRIANO CATAPUSAN, GREGORIA CATAPUSAN, SEGUNDA BAUTISTA, CATAPUSAN, NICANOR T. CATAPUSAN, NARCISA T. CATAPUSAN, GREGORIO T. CATAPUSAN, BENIGNO T. CATAPUSAN, REYNALDO T. CATAPUSAN, CATALINA T. CATAPUSAN, GERTRUDES, CATAPUSAN and FLORA DIAZ CATAPUSAN, respondents. FACTS: Francisco, J. Dominga Piguing | | (1910+)Narcissa Tanjuatco—1m—Bonifacio Catapusan (1940++)— 2m (1927)—Paula Reyes |-Felix(+) |-Domingo |-Vicente(+) |-Minelio |-Benicio(+) |-Filomeno |-Loreto (Felix, Vicente and Benicio, Bonifacio's sons from the first marriage, died before the institution of this case, survived by their respective widows and children, respondents herein.) 1. Petitioners filed an action for partition of the Wawa Lot, alleging that the same belongs to their father Bonifcaio, and should therefore be partitioned among the heirs of the 1st and 2nd marriages. They presented 4 tax declarations of the adjoining lot owners which noted that they each border on one side the Wawa lot declared in the name of Bonifacio. 2. Respondents asserted that said lot was originally owned by their grand-mom Dominga and was inherited by their mother Narcissa as her paraphernal property. Thus upon her death, this lot passed to her 4 children – the predecessor-in-interest of respondents.
CIVREV. PROPERTY. 172 G.R. No. 109262 November 21, 1996 DOMINGO R. CATAPUSAN, MINELIO R. CATAPUSAN, and FILOMENO R. CATAPUSAN, petitioners, vs.
3. Said 4 children had possessed and occupied said lot, and had secured tax declarations thereon in their names. Respondents further alleged that they had been in OPEN, CONTINUOUS and UNINTERRUPTED possession of the said lot for more than 50years when the suit was filed in 1974. They invoked laches and prescription against petitioner’s action. 4. Petitioners argue that their action had not lapsed since respondents REPUDIATED the co-ownerhips only in 1968. They
questioned respondents’ lack of documentary proof (titulo real) w/regard to Dominga and Narcissa’s title as they lived during the Spanish era. 5. RTC dismissed the complaint and held respondents as the true and lawful owners of the Wawa lot. On appeal, the CA affirmed said decision. Pets filed MR but denied. Hence the instant appeal. ISSUES: 1. whether an action for partition includes the question of ownership 2. whether Bonifacio had title to the Wawa lot 3. whether petitioner's action is barred by laches and/or prescription. HELD: 1. In actions for partition, the court cannot properly issue an order to divide the property, unless it first makes a determination as to the existence of co-ownership. The court must initially settle the issue of ownership, the first stage in an action for partition. 18 Needless to state, an action for partition will not lie if the claimant has no rightful interest over the subject property. In fact, Section 1 of Rule 69 requires the party filing the action to state in his complaint the "nature and extent of his title" to the real estate. Until and unless the issue of ownership is definitely resolved, it would be premature to effect a partition of the properties. 19 Hence, on the first issue we rule in the affirmative. 2. Anent the second and third issues, it is a basic rule of evidence that the arty making an allegation has the burden of proving it by preponderance of evidence. In this case, petitioners' evidence of their father's (Bonifacio) ownership of the Wawa lot are the tax declarations of the adjacent lot owners and the testimonies of some witnesses who merely saw Bonifacio working on the lot. On the other hand, respondents presented tax declarations which indicated that the same lot is owned by their predecessors-in-interest, the children of the first marriage, evidence which carry more weight as they constitute proof of respondents' ownership of the land in their possession. The statement in the neighboring lot owners' tax declarations is not a conclusive proof that Bonifacio owned the surrounded lot. In fact, petitioners cannot show any tax receipts or declarations of their ownership over the same lot. Although tax declarations and receipts are not direct proofs of ownership, yet when accompanied by proof of actual possession for the required
period, they become strong evidence to support the claim of ownership thru acquisitive prescription. The possession contemplated as foundation for prescriptive right must be one under claim of title or adverse to or in concept of owner. Possession by tolerance, as in the case of petitioners, is not the kind of possession that may lead to title by prescription. It is the respondents' open, continuous, adverse and uninterrupted possession far beyond the 30 year extraordinary period for acquisitive prescription, 23 coupled with the tax declarations of their predecessors-in-interest, that constitutes a superior weight of evidence that clinched their claim. Moreover, petitioners bare and unsubstantiated allegation that respondents' tax declarations were fraudulently issued is insufficient to sustain the imputation of fraud considering that good faith is always presumed. Besides, respondents' tax declarations are deemed regularly issued. Being an action involving property, the petitioners must rely on the strength of their own title and not on the weakness of the respondents' claim. The instant appeal is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto. -oLay!