12_chapter 5.pdf

ChapterV

THE EXTERNAL DIMENSION

While support to a militant group among the local populace is essential for its survival, external succour is critical to its growth and eventual success. In the case of the L TI'E, external succour has come from a variety of sources. The widespread network it has established all over the world has contributed considerably to its capacity to fight a protracted war against the State.

How the LTTE established this vast network and the extent to which it has been dependent on its overseas benefactors will be discussed in this chapter. The chapter will also examine the nature of the LTTE's complex relationship with India and Tamil Nadu and the contribution of the Tamil diaspora to its growth.

INDIA- L'ITE: A MULTI-DIMENSIONAL RELATIONSHIP The LTTE received crucial assistancP from India in the form of weapons, training, sanctuary and moral support. But its relationship with India has been marked by numerous somersaults which ultimately ended in a fierce collision. The relationship has been suspicion-filled at best and antagonistic at worst.

Moral and Political Support While India has always extended moral support to the Tamil people, it refused to extend political support to the final goal of the militants, i.e., the creation of a separate state of Tamil flam.

151

Sympathy for the sufferings of the Tamils had been expressed through official statements and public speeches by Indian leaders. 1 India drew world attention to human rights violations committed by the Sri Lankan Army against the Tamils. 2 Although it never expressed support for the militants as such, for some years India's response to their atrocities was rather muted. For

in~tance,

soon after the LTTE-TELO clash, New Delhi merely expressed

"considerab!e dismay" over the "terrible killings". 3 This together with the training of the militants in India was probably construed by the Tamils as support from India to the cause ofTamiii!:_am. This however was not so. Indian leaders repeatedly emphasised India's commitment to a political solution within the framework of a united Sri Lanka. 4 A sovereign Tamii Ifam was clearly not on India's agenda. 5

1

S.D.Muni, Pangs of Proximity: India and Sri Lanka's Ethnic Crisis (New Delhi, 1993), p.71.

2

K.M.de Silva, "Indo - Sri Lankan Relations, 1975-89: A Study in the Internationalization of Ethnic Conflict", in K.M.de Silva and R.J. May, eds., Internationalization of Ethnic Conflict (London, 1991), p.84 and ibid., pp.72-73.

3

See The Hindu (Madras), 4 May 1986.

4

In an interview, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi stressed that India 'Yanted "a settlement across the table ... within the constitutional framework of Sri Lanka". India did "not support the Eelam concept". Aroon Purie and Prabhu Chawla, "Rajiv Gandhi - 'I Am Much the Wiser'", India Today, (New Delhi), vol.12, no.12, 16-30 June 1987, p.40.

5

India did not support a separate, sovereign Tamil state in the island because international opinion would have opposed such support. Moreover, it was feared that a Tamil Jf:..am would revive dormant secessionist sentiment in Tamil Nadu. Finally, support to the goal of Tamil lf:..am was imprudent in the context of secessionist struggles in Punjab, the North-East and Kashmir. 152

Thus, any support from India whether moral, material or in the form of sanctuary was not towards achieving Tami_f Y1_am, but less. In the absence of political support to Tamil Ilam, the other forms of support, though encouraging to the militants, was of insufficient practical value.

Sanctuary The LTI'E took sanctuary in India from end-1979. Under pressure from the counterinsurgency operations of the Sri Lankan Government, the Tigers fled to India to build up the organisation. The Indian Government was aware of the presence of the militants on Indian soil but it turned a blind eye to them. 6 In India, the LTI'E established its bases, training camps, hospitals, and weapons manufacture units. (This network will be dealt with in detail later in the chapter.) Ironically, the LTTE's availing of sanctuary in India continued even when its relations with India became antagonistic. 7

Material Support and Training Of all the assistance that India gave the LTI'E, it was the supply of weapons and training which was most controversial. According to the LTTE and the other militant groups, India became actively involved in supplying arms and training from September 1983. 8 Prior to this, the militants had 6

Apparently the Tamil N adu Police informed RAW and IB of the militant training camps in Tamil N adu. But there was no response from these agencies. K.Mohandas, MGR: The Man and the Myth (Bangalore, 1992), p.77.

7

Depinder Singh, IPKF in Sri Lanka (Delhi, n.d.), pp.129-30.

8

LTI'E, Political Committee, India and Eelam Tamils Crisis: A Factual Explanation Submitted with Love and Respect to All Eelam Tamils (n.p., n.d.),p.6; L.Ketheswaran (Spokesman, EPRLF), interviewed in Colombo in June 1993 and Muni, n.1, pp.44-45. 153

organised their own training in India through retired officers of the Indian Army and through contacts in the Tamil Nadu underworld. 9 According to a Sri Lankan source, on the LTIE's insistence training of Tigers was undertaken separately in Bangalore and Uttar Pradesh. From November 1983 to July 1985 about 1351 Tigers are believed to have been trained in eight batches by RAW. 10 However, it appears that training went on upto mid-1987 for

prior to Operation Vadamarachchi, the militants

received training in the use of anti-aircraft weapons (SAM-7s). 11

For several years, the LTIE denied that it was availing assistance from India.l 2

It was only in 1988 that the LTIE accepted taking help from

India. 13 However, while conceding that it did partake of Indian largesse, the LTIE argues that it had accepted "limited scope training" only to avoid self-destruction and counter India's plan to divide the Tamil movement. It has

9

T.D.S.A. Dissanayaka, The Agony of Sri Lanka: An In-Depth Account of the Racial Riots of 1983 (Colombo, 1983), pp.37-38.

10

For details of RAW's supply of weapons and training to PLOT, TELO, EROS, EPRLF, and LTIE, see Rohan Gunaratna, Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka: The Role of India's Intelligence Agencies (Colombo, 1993), pp.35-48 and pp.406-''.

11

Muni, n.1, p.91.

12

T --

---

!

J

also maintained that it was a reluctant beneficiary. 14 This claim is belied by the fact that Nedumaran lobbied vigorously on behalf of the LTTE to procure arms and training from India. 15

The LTTE was not included in the first batch that was trained by RAW, 16

which aroused its suspicion about RAWs intentions. Sources in

RAW argue that the LTTE was not in the first batch because Prabakaran had jumped bail then and could not be contacted easily. Once contact was established with Prabakaran training of the Tigers commenced. 17 The LTTE also resented the fact that

RAW was favouring TELO.

According to the LTTE, it was with RAWs help that TELO rose from being a group of 6 men to becoming a frontline group. The LTTE feared that it would be destroyed by TELO on India's behest and to counter this, it availed of arms and training. 18

While RAW claims that there was little difference in· the amount of weapons it gave the various militant groups, 19 TELO members themselves agree that initially it was TELO which benefitted the most from India's

14

LTTE, Political Committee, ibid., p.8.

15

T.S.Subramanian, "A Role Unveiled: On India and Sri Lankan Militants", Frontline (Madras), vol.9, no.1, 4-17 January 1992, p.85.

16

ibid.

17

RAW Official, interviewed in New Delhi in March 1994.

18

LTTE, Political Committee, n.8, pp.6-8.

19

According to RAW, it favoured none ofthe groups though PLOT received much less than the others. RAW Official n.l7. 155

assistance. 20 However, this does not mean that LTIE was discriminated against. In fact, an examination of RAWs interaction with the miliLant groups over the years reveals that it was the LTIE which gained the most from India in the long run. Notwithstanding the fact that TELO was close to India initially, the equation underwent change by 1986. When the LTTE liquidated TELO cadres RAW did nothing to stop the LTIE. 21 It is also alleged that EPRLF and PLOT were instructed not to come to TELO's assistance. 22 Although EPRLF received arms from the beginning from RAW, it received "minimal assistance" in comparison to LTTE. 23 EPRLF was looked upon as a Marxist group and it took some time before India could be convinced that it was not anti-India. 24

As for PLOT, RAW officials regarded it as an ideologically motivated group and consequently difficult to deal with. "When Indian Customs officials confiscated a large consignment of arms meant for PLOT, RAW did little to help PLOT. 25 When PLOT started collaborating and secretly negotiating with

20

G. Srikantan (Spokesman, TELO), interviewed in Colombo in June 1993.

21

M.R.Narayan Swamy, Tigers of Lanka: From Boys to Guerrillas (Delhi, 1994), p.l95.

22

See Footnote 14 in ibid., p.198.

23

Gunaratna, n.lO, pp.l47-8.

24

Suresh Premachandran (General Secretary, EPRLF), interviewed in Colombo in June 1993. Only after EPRLF broke links with Naxalities in Tamil Nadu did RAW change its perception. Swamy, n.21, p.107.

25

Swamy, ibid., p.144 and Gunaratna, n.10, p.155. 156

Colombo the relationship between the two suffered further. 26

In contrast, the LTIE enjoyed a good relationship with RAW till 1987 for several RAW officials admired the Tigers and their spectacular operations. 27

Moreover, at RAWs behest the LTIE carried out the

Anuradhapura massacre in 1985 and was rewarded with a large amount of weapons. 28 While the LTTE did carry out some operations on RAW's request, unlike the other groups it retained its independence. In contrast, TELO turned to RAW for every move. 29 The extent to which RAW had infiltrated EPRLF is evident from the fact that it was RAW which pulled out Douglas Devananda, EPRLF's Military Commander and teamed him with PLOT's Rajan to form the Eelam National Democratic Liberation Front (ENDLF). 30 The LTTE from the beginning was cautious about Indian intelligence agencies and maintained a safe distance from them. 31 It was aware that India had its own strategic interests in extending training to it and though it made "use of the

26

Muni, n.1, p.67 and Gunaratna, ibid., p.156.

27

Gunaratna, ibid., p.148, p.405, and p.408.

28

R.Shankar (Leader, EROS), interviewed in Colombo in June 1993 and ibid., p.408.

29

Swamy, n.21, p.185.

30

Taraki, "The Importance of Pin Thalam", The Island, 29 October 1989. Reproduced in Taraki, The Eluding Peace (An Insider's Political Analysis of the Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka) (Sarcelles, 1991), p.3.

31

S.H. Venkatramani, "What Is behind the LTTE Move to Execute Mahatiya?", The Pioneer (New Delhi), 13 January 1994. 157

opportunity", 32 it also expanded and diversified its links with other overseas international contacts. 33 The nature of its arms surrender in August 1987 is again illustrative of this caution. Even though the Indian Government had assured the militants that in case fighting broke out between them and Colombo, it would return the surrendered arms back to them, the LTTE did not believe that India would keep its promoise. Hence unlike the other groups, it handed over only a fraction of its arms to India in August. 34 Divergence of Interests

The suspicion and subsequent antagonism of the LTTE towards India stemmed from the fact that their views were contradictory on three vital issues - the extent and nature of India's involvement in the crisis, the creation of flam and the status of the LTTE.

The LTTE wanted India's backing in negotiations with Colombo

35

and any material, moral or political support that it could provide. But the LTIE was opposed to the involvement of India if it betrayed Tamil interests. 36 It was also opposed to India gaining control over the movement because that

32

Prabakaran in an interview by Anita Pratap, "A Tiger Changef: Stripes", Time, vol.135, no.15, 9 April 1990,p.32.

33

Muni, n.1, p.79.

34

S.H.Venkatramani (Journalist, The Pioneer), interviewed in New Delhi in January 1995.

35

See the LTTE's Statement in The Hindu, 28 December 1986, stressing its support to India's mediatory role.

36

LTTE, Political Committee, A Nation Betrayed: Liberation Tigers' Critique on Indo-Sri Lankan Accord (n.p., 1988), p.14. 158

would reduce the LTIE's role in Tamil affairs. Moreover, the LTIE had always opposed Indian military intervention for this merely meant the replacement of the Sri Lankan Army with the Indian Army. 37 As Kasi Anandan pointed out, the LTTE was "not interested in fighting for

independence from Sri

Lanka, only to come under Indian control". 38 The LTIE therefore sought only help from India and not interference.

For India however the militants were a lever which it could control to pressurise Colombo to return to the negotiating table and to concede more to the Tamils, but

more importantly to accommodate India's security

interests. 39 The LTTE also wanted India's help to achieve Tamil fLam. But as discussed earlier, India was not in favour of the creation of a separate state. The arms and training it supplied was not to achieve TamiJ. !£am but to increase the militants' dependence on India, thereby enabling it to influence them to accept a negotiated solution, within the framework of a united Sri Lanka. 40 Finally, the LTIE wanted India to recognise the Tigers as sole spokesmen of the Tamils. India however was unwilling to do so. In fact it was unwilling to even accord LTTE the status that it had given the PLO and the 37

Viravenkai, May - June 1986, p.3. Cited in Dagmar Hellmann Rajanayagam, The Tamil Tigers: Armed Struggle for Identity (Stuttgart, 1994), p.104.

38

Kasi Anandan (Member of Political Wing, LTIE), interviewed in Madras in May 1993.

39

Subramanian, n.15, p.84 and Muni, n.l.

40

Muni, ibid. 159

South West African Peoples Organisation (SWAP0). 41

Such being the differences between India and the LTTE, confrontation and conflict between the two came to the fore often. For instance, the December 1986 proposals provided for a merger of the North, and an East excised of the Sinhala dominatedAmparai. What India described as "good" was rejected by the LTTE as "inadequate". 42 The LTTE's intransigence, repeated insistence on the indivisibility of the 'homeland', and refusal to negotiate pushed New Delhi to act. The following day, Prabakaran and Balasingham were arrested. The offices and residences of the militants in Tamil Nadu were raided and weapons and communication equipment seized. Operation Tiger and Operation Disarm served notice on the LTTE that if it was not agreeable to a political settlement then the Tigers would have to leave India immediately. This was endorsed by the Tamil Nadu Chief Minister, M.G. Ramachandran (MGR) too who told Prabakaran that if he was opposed to a negotiated settlement he would have to continue the war from Jaffna. 43 It was clear to the LTTE that if it wanted l{am it would have to fight for it on its

41

See Statement by Minister of External Affairs B.R. Bhagat in India, Lok Sabha, Debates, Eight Series, vol. 16, no.31, 9 April 1986, col.8.

42

T.S.Subramanian, "Time ofTroubles and Trial", Frontline, vol.3, no.24, 29 November-12 December 1986, pp.17-18. For the LTTE's Rei-'ponse to the Trifurcation Proposal, see the Letter dated 3 November 1986, from the LTIE to the Chief Minister of Tamil N adu. Reproduced in Frontline, vol.3 no.23, 15-28 November 1986, pp.116-17 and The Hindu, 7 November 1986.

43

Mohan Ram, Sri Lanka: The Fractured Island (New Delhi, 1989), p.61;

own. 44 Developments in post-July 1987 show that both the LTTE and India were ready to resort to hostilities to protect their interests. For India, the implementation of the July 1987 Agreement was essential. Mter all, as signatory and guarantor its reputation was at stake. Further, its interests were closely linked with the successful implementation of the Agreement. Moreover, India was also under pressure from Colombo to fulfil its obligations under the Agreement. 45 For the LTIE, the Agreement involved an abjuring of TamiJ.. IJ..am, surrendering of weapons, sharing power with other Tamil groups in the future setup and above all have India control Tamil affairs.

The situation between the two deteriorated further with the arrival of the IPKF. The LTTE's hold over the people diluted significantly. It resented the fact that the IPKF had usurped its position of popularity with the masses. 46 Moreover, India's lobbying for inclusion of other militant groups in the lAC was disliked by the LTTE. India's request for broadbasing the lAC was perceived by the LTTE as backing to its rivals, especially to EPRLF. 47 This was contrary to the LTTE's insistence on recognition of its status as sole spokesman. Finally, with the L TIE resisting arms surrender and India insisting on this, the use of force to achieve it became necessary. Conflict

44

In a speech to his field commanders at Chavakachcheri, Prabakaran warned against depending on India. Daily News (Colombo), 14 January 1987.

45

Muni, n.1, p.137.

46

See Rajan Hoole and others, The Broken Palmyra: The Tamil Crisis in Sri Lanka- An Inside Account (Claremont, 1990), p.134 and p.144.

47

Panruti Ramachandran (MGR's Advisor on Sri Lankan affairs), interviewed in Madras in November 1993. 161

between the LTTE and India was now inevitable. 48

That India would back only such groups which would not be detrimental to its interests is evident from the improvement in relations between India and the EPRLF from 1988 onwards. Even during negotiations on the lAC, when India was pushing for inclusion of EPRLF, relations between it and EPRLF were "tenuous". The EPRLF was in fact upset with India. It felt that after promising all the groups equal representation in the lAC, India had finally conceded to the LTTE's demand of excluding EPRLF from the lAC. 49 However, EPRLF's consistent support to the Agreement and its willingness to contest the PC election were crucial in drawing the two together. 50 India's support to the EPRLF thereafter was motivated by this congruence of interests.

India's support to the EPRLF was evident during the NEPC election. The Indian High Commission at Colombo funded the election campaigns of the EPRLF, ENDLF and SLMC.

51

The IPKF it is alleged, prevented Tiger-

backed 'independents' from contesting. 52 Thus, the EPRLF-ENDLF combine was actively backed by India.

Cooperation between India and EPRLF was again evident during search

48

Muni, n.1, p.137.

49

Swamy, n.21, pp.262-3 and p.285.

50

ibid., pp.286-9.

51

ibid., p.289.

52

Swapan Dasgupta, "Sri Lanka: Images of Conflict", The Statesman (New Delhi), 5 August 1989 and S.Murari, "IPKF Returns Unsung and Unhonoured", Deccan Herald (Bangalore), 25 March 1990. 162

operations for Tigers, when EPRLF cadres operated from IPKF camps as informers

53

and when the TNA was created. The LTIE in fact, perceived the

TNA as an instrument India had created to protect the EPRLF, the PC Government and Indian interests. 54

The EPRLF however, failed to realise that India would give its support only till it suited its interests. This proved disastrous .for the EPRLF in the long run. Though India's support enabled the EPRLF to ride to power in the PC poll, it was, as described by Douglas Devananda, "a temporary ride on a

.

manal kutirai" (horse made of sand). 5 5 The fall came even as the IPKF was

in the process of withdrawing.

So long as it was in India's interest to back the Tigers, it did so. Building up the LTTE was useful when India wished to increase military pressure on Colombo. 56 However, it was willing to build up the militants only to the extent this would not jeopardise India's interests. Unlike the EPRLF, the LTTE had no illusions of the permanence of India's support and this in a large measure contributed to its success. 57 Pr~dently, it built up alternate

53

S.C. Sardeshpande, Assignment Jaffna (New Delhi, 1992), p.37.

54

A.S.Abraham, "Way Forward in Sri Lanka: Prospect of Warmer Ties with India", Times of India (New Delhi), 7 November 1989.

55

Douglas Devananda (Former Military Commander, EPRLF. Currently Leader, Eelam Peoples Democratic Party [EPDP]), interviewed in Colombo in June 1993.

56

Likewise TULF came in handy "to gain a legitimacy for India's diplomatic leverage", and EPRLF was used "to consolidate a legal claim for its intervention". Taraki, "The LTTE's One-Party State Dilemma", The Island, 15 April 1990. Reproduced in Taraki, n.30, p.41.

57

ibid., pp.41-42. 163

sources of support.

TAMIL NADU: THE REAR BASE Unlike its attitude towards the Indian Governme11t the LTTE's attitude towards Tamil Nadu was not ambiguous. Separated by a mere 22 miles of shallow waters at its closest point, easy accessibility to the long Tamil Nadu coastline made it an attractive and indispensable rear base. (See AppendixMap 3) Further, the influx of thousands of refugees from the North-East gave the militants a large reservoir of people from which to recruit cadres. The presence of this refugee population also gave the militants the desired anonymity. Moreover, the Tamil nationalist sentiment prevalent in the state could be easily aroused and tapped to secure support. But to function freely in this rear base, the L'ITE required patronage of the ruling political party. It solicited this patronage and received it in abundance.

Dravidian nationalist politics required political parties in the state to express their support to Tamil nationalism. In the 1980s championing the cause of the Sri Lankan Tamils was an issue on which all sections vied to show their commitment. Unlike the Central Government which was constrained in supporting I{am, Dravidian parties had less compunctions in expressing solidarity, having earlier espoused a separate Tamil state.

It is generally believed that when in office, a party was more cautious

in its stand on the Tamil crisis. 58 While this may have been so with regard to vocal support regarding creation of J{am and India's role, the material support extended to the militants was far more by the party in power.

a)

Opportunistic Alliances The LTTE was able to operate freely in Tamil N adu, primarily because

till 1991 it enjoyed the patronage of the Government of the day.

With the Tamil problem in Sri Lanka becoming an electoral issue in the state, parties like the DMK and the All India Anna DMK (AIADMK) vied with each other to project themselves as champions of the Tamil cause. While the AIADMK chose the LTTE as its protegJ, the DMK initially established close ties with TELO. Since politicians and bureaucrats backed the Tigers, the Customs Officials and police were unable and unwilling to take punitive action against the Tigers and their supporters in the state.

i)

The AIADMK and LTTE The AIADMK's patronage of the L TTE was based on a personal equation

between MGR and Prabakaran. According to Panruti Ramachandran, after his first meeting with Prabakaran, MGR seemed deeply impressed with him and praised him as "a true son of the soil, genuinely interested in and committed to his people." 59

The subtleties of international politics clearly did not

bother MGR when he decided to back the LTTE. 60 As for the LTTE, it aligned not with the more nationalist DMK with which it shared greater ideological affinity but with the more "sycophantic,

59

Ramachandran, n.47.

60

P.S. Suryanarayana, The Peace Trap: An Indo-Sri Lankan Political Crisis (Madras, 1988), p.58. 165

maudlin, MGR-fixated AIADMK". 61

Explaining the motive behind the

alliance, N edumaran observed that Prabakaran aimed at achieving Tamil Jiam at any cost and would align with anyone who helped him in his struggle. MGR was willing to do so. This was the determining factor in Prabakaran opting for the AIADMK. 62 It was utilitarian concerns then, that determined this collusion. The alliance proved beneficial to both parties. For MGR (a Malayali by birth), the alliance was testimony to his commitment to the cause of the Tamils. Further, it is alleged that the Tigers "helped keep in check the DMK cadres". 63 More important, the LTTE assisted MGR in moving his illegal wealth to Singapore and in looking after his investments abroad. 64

For Prabakaran, MGR was a godfather, who took care of all the LTTE's financial needs in Tamil N adu. Crores of Rupees were given to the L TTE by MGR out of private and Government funds. 65 In April 1987, MGR made a public donation of Rupees 4 crores to the LTTE and EROS. 66 Financial 61

Hellmann-Rajanayagam, n.37, p.106.

62

P. Nedumaran (Leader, TNP), interviewed in Madras in November 1993.

63

Subramaniam Swamy, (Leader, Janatha Party) interviewed in New Delhi in September 1994.

64

Verkatramani, n.34. When the Indian Government refused MGR permission to send abroad a gold chain worth lakhs of Rupees, the LTTE it is believed, helped him send it. G.C.Shekhar, "The LTTE's Indian Benefactor", Sunday (Calcutta), vol.15, no.21, 17-23 April1988, p.17.

65

Shekhar, ibid., pp.l6-17 and Mohandas, n.6, p.79.

66

A.Sivarajah, "Indo-Sri Lanka Relations and Sri Lanka's Ethnic Crisis: The Tamil Nadu Factor", in Shelton U.Kodikara,ed., South Asian Strategic Issues: Sri Lankan Perspectives (New Delhi, 1990), pp.l48-9 166

assistance continued even after the LTTE-IPKF fighting had started. Prior to MGR's death in December 1987, Rupees 7.5 crores was allegedly given to the LTTE. This payment was not known to New Delhi. 67 The LTTE leader Yogi claimed that excluding the Rupees 4 crores given in April1987, MGR gave the Tigers at least Rupees 20 crores, in direct grants. 68

MGR not only helped the LTTE directly but also did so by intervening decisively to weaken its rivals. In 1986, it was reported that weapons and communication equipment seized in Operation Tiger were returned to the militants. It was assumed then that the militants of all the groups had got back their weapons. In reality, arms were returned only to the LTTE. 69 Further, weapons belonging to the other groups were also given to the LTTE.7o

But the MGR-Prabakaran relationship was not completely free of tension. Apparently MGR was displeased with Prabakaran's obduracy during the talks in December 1986 at Bangalore. MGR was piqued that Prabakaran did not attend a briefing session called by him. 71 MGR's attitude to the LTTE toughened further in July 1987. When Prabakaran met MGR on his way to New Delhi, the latter advised him to accept the Agreement. Again, during the controversy over the composition of the lAC, MGR then under and Muni, n.1, pp.91-92. 67

Gunaratna, n.10, p.418.

68

Subramanian, n.15, p.89.

69

Mohandas, n.6, p.156.

70

K.Mohandas (Former DGP [Intelligence], Tamil Nadu), interviewed in Madras in May 1993.

71

Suryanarayana, n.60, p.62. 167

medical treatment in the US, urged the L'ITE to accept the EPRLF in the lAC.

The LTIE saw this as a betrayal and the very next day, Kittu met Karunanidhi (the DMK leader) and appealed for support. 72

MGR deeply

resented this move and told Panruti Ramachandran not to help the LTTE as it had spurned his advice. 73 When fighting broke out however, MGR relented and called for a ceasefire.

During his lifetime, MGR's policy towards the LTIE was not opposed by anyone in the AIADMK. 74 After his death both the Janaki and Jayalalitha factions opposed the IPKF operations and India's tough policy towards the LTTE. Jayalalitha in fact warned that if Prabakaran was harmed, either deliberately or accidentally by the IPKF, it would have an "adverse effect" in Tamil Nadu. 75

Her uolte face on the L'ITE came much later after Rajiv

Gandhi was assassinated.

ii)

The DMK and L TTE

With his political adversary supporting the LTIE, Karunanidhi backed TELO. However,it should be noted that while the DMK cadres were united in their sympathy for the Sri Lankan Tamil cause, they supported different militant groups depending on which one they were in contact with at the local

72

Ramachandran, n.4 7.

73

N.Ram (Editor, The Frontline), interviewed in Madras in May 1993.

74

Ramachandran, n.4 7.

75

For an account of Jayalalitha's earlier support to the LTTE and subsequent shift, see "Shifting Views on the LTTE", Frontline, vol.S, no.16, 3-16 August 1991, p.l7 and V. Suryanarayan. "India's Sri Lanka Policy: A Need for Reappraisal", South Asia Journal (New Delhi), vol.4, no.4, 1991, p.425. 168

level.

For instance, in the L TIE stronghold Madurai, local DMK cadres

sympathised with the L'ITE. 76 In the Southern districts of Tamil N adu, where again the Tigers were popular, V.Gopalaswamy's vociferous support for the LTIE was admired and endorsed by the DMK youth. Thus, despite the official anti-LTIE party line upto October 1987, significant sections of the DMK were close to the LTIE.

Even after October 1987, though the DMK was very critical of the IPKF, its policy seemed confused. This confusion was apparent, particularly after the DMK was voted into office in February 1989, when it vacillated between openly endorsing the LTIE and downplaying its support for the militant group as it feared dismissal of its ministry by the Centre. Till April 1989, Karunanidhi's statements were in line with those of the Central Government. With the possibility of dismissal diminishing, his criticism of the IPKF grew in belligerence. 77 After the National Front (of which the DMK was a part) came to power, the DMK was given a carte blanche to deal with the Tamil problem. He negotiated with all the groups but assured the LTIE of help to establish its hegemony over the North Eastern Province (NEP). He even pressurised Perumal to step down in the LTIE's favour. 78 The greatest service the DMK did for the L TIE was to instruct the

76

Taraki, "The Importance of (MK) Stalin", The Island, 25 March 1990. Reproduced in Taraki, n.30, p.37.

77

S. Murari, "DMK's Lanka Policy Marked by Vacillation", Deccan Herald, 28 July 1989. When V.Gopalaswamy visited Jaffna and met Prabakaran at the height of the IPKF-LTTE fighting (February-March 1989), the DMK distanced itself from his move. See K.P. Sunil, "The Mission", Illustrated Weekly of India (Bombay), 26 March - 1 April 1989, p.33.

78

G.C. Shekhar, "Karunanidhi's Tamil Nexus", The Telegraph (Calcutta), 8 December 1991. 169

bureaucracy and the police to ignore the LTTE's illegal activities in the state. 79 In an effort to ingratiate himself with the Tigers, Karunanidhi even boycotted the reception accorded to the last IPKF contingent returning to Madras. 80

While accusing the IPKF of killing over 5000 Tamils in Sri

Lanka, he saluted the LTTE for fighting the IPKF. Not wanting to displease the L TIE in anyway he also refused to allow Tamil refugees and militants of other groups into Tamil N adu after the IPKF pullout. 81

In addition to such support, Karunanidhi identified himself completely with the LTIE struggle, going even to the extent of making common cause with Prabakaran against India. In his novel Payum Pulip Pal!!ara Var;r;iyan (The Leaping Tiger Pantara Vanniyan), which was serialised in the Tamil weekly Kunkumam, Karunanidhi described the close relationship between Pantara, the Vanni King and Veera Pandyan, the legendary king of Tamil Nadu who resisted the European invader collectively. 82

The DMK's

relationship with the LTTE symbolised the resurrection of a pan-Dravidian nationalism.

79

Karunanidhi, his son Azhagiri, and DMK Minister Subbalakshmi Jagadeesan were some of the DMK leaders who instructed bureaucrats and police to release arrested Tigers, drop cases against them, and deny their presence in coastal areas. Moreover, the police were ordered to delay tracing the killers of the EPRLF leaders. See the Statement issued by the Former Home Secretary Nagarajan, in The Hindu, 1 December 1991.

80

The Hindu, 26 March 1990.

81

S. Murari, "Karunanidhi - A Firm LTTE Friend", Lanka Guardian (Colombo), vol. 13, no. 3, 1 June 1990, p. 11 and Daily News, 30 March 1990.

82

Taraki, "Enter Mr.Karunanidhi", The Island, 18 February 1990. Reproduced in Taraki, n.30, pp.31-32. 170

It is interesting however that despite all the patronage it received from

the DMK, the LTTE enjoyed a closer relationship with MGR. In fact, Yogi has said that neither Jayalalitha nor Karunanidhi helped the LTTE. Only MGR did so. 83 As Mohandas observed, "MGR helped the L'ITE much more than Karunanidhi ever did. The latter gave moral support and sanctuary, not money and arm~ as MGR did. "84 iii)

Congress (I) Unlike the AIADMK and DMK which had party and leadership level

links with the LTTE, the Tamil Nadu unit of the Congress (I) did not align with any group. Even though the unit was broadly sympathetic to the Tamils, the state unit's policy towards the LTTE was in keeping with that of the Central Government. It is however alleged that some Congress (I) members were close to the LTTE at an individual level. The Congress (I) Member of the Legistative Assembly (MLA) from Vedaranniyam, P.V. Rajendran has been notorious for his links with the Tamil Nadu-Jaffna smuggling network. 85 Support for the LTTE has undoubtedly cut across party lines in Tamil Nadu.

iv)

Tamil Nationalist Sections While the AIADMK and DMK were cultivated by the LTTE for their

position

m

the power structure,

links with

-

groups like

the Tamil

.

Nationalist Party (TNP), Tiravita . Kalakam (DK), and Tiravita Kalakam (Ramakrishnan) (DK[R]) were established to organise a supply network in the

83

Subramanian, n.15, p.89.

84

Mohandas, n. 70.

85

Taraki, "The LTTE's Smuggling Link", The Island, 11 August 1991. 171

rear base. The LTIE played on the rabid Tamil nationalist and secessionist sentiments of these organisations and exploited their ambitions for a 'Greater

Tamil J1am' to win their support. Perhaps the most open support to the LTTE came from the leader of the TNP, Nedumaran. Nedumaran claims that his support to the LTTE is motivated by his "belief in the Tamils' right to self-determination and the LTTE's uncompromising stand on this issue." He admits that he had played a crucial role in getting the LTTE military assistance from India. Nedumaran also helped the organisation by contributing funds and medicines. 86 He also undertook considerable propaganda work for the LTTE. 87 Moreover, his support to the LTTE has continued despite pressure from the Government. The vast dividends the LTTE reaped by investing in Tamil nationalism

IS

evident from this steadfast commitment of persons like Nedumaran.

Consistent support has also come from the DK. However its leader, Veeramani, claims that though the DK was sympathetic to the cause, it was not involved in militant activities. 88 But the DK was involved in propaganda work, transport of supplies and organisation of training for the LTTE. Several DK cadres were even believed to have joined the Tamil National Retrieval Force (TNRF).

Even more active in its support has been the DK (R). In the mid- 1980s,

86

Nedumaran, n.62.

87

See for instance, P. Nedumaran, Pirapakaran: Tamilar Eluciyin Vativam (Prabakaran: The Essence of Tamilia; Uprising) (M;idurai, 19S8), which is a biography of the LTTE leader.

88

Anirudhya Mitra, "Rajiv Assassination: Conspiracy Surfaces", India Today, vol. 16, no. 23, 1-15 December 1991, p. 59. 172

its leaders Ramakrishnan and Aruchamy formed the Vi!utalaip Pulika?

Tolamai KaJ.akam (Liberation Tigers Friendship Movement). Besides doing propaganda work for the LTIE, the DK (R) has been deeply involved in the manufacture of weapons. 89 The

TNRF was an LTIE funded and trained group. It allegedly

consisted of about 1,000 Indians, many of whom were members of youth wings of the DK and DMK. The TNRF assisted the LTIE in fighting, supplying essential commodities, and transporting arms. 90

v)

Extremist Organisations Reports in the Indian media have alluded to the LTTE's links with

extremist groups in India. 91

These claims have

however

remained

unsubstantiated and have been denied both by the LTTE and by RAW. 92 In fact, it was the other Tamil groups which had links with these extremist outfits. For instance, PLOT was close to the Peoples War Group (PWG) while the National Liberation Front of Tamileelam (NLFT) had links with Marxist-Leninist groups. 93 The LTIE however steered clear of the various

89

Syed Muthahar Saqaf, "A Political Nexus", Frontline, vol. 8, no. 17, 17-30 August 1991, p. 112.

90

Mitra, n.88, p.58; Times oflndia, 16 November 1991 and The Telegraph, 16 November 1991.

91

The Andhra Pradesh Home Minister for instance, accused the L TIE of supplying weapons to Naxalite groups in the state. Deccan Herald, 8 February 1989.

92

See LTIE Statement in ibid. Also Anandan, n.38 and RAW Official, n.17.

93

D.P. Sivaram (Former Member, PLOT), interviewed in Colombo in June 1993. 173

Marxist militants as it did

not want to antagonise either MGR or the

antimilitant 'Q' branch of the state police. 94 In 1988, when the 'Q' branch launched operations against extremist organisations in Tamil Nadu, those Tamil militant groups which had forged links with them suffered grievously. The LTTE however was not affected by this as it drew succour from "a broader Dravidian ethos, which is mainstream, and therefore safe. "95

b)

The Media The LTTE built up an enviable rapport with the press in Madras

through personal contact and pecuniary means. This media unlike that in Colombo, was of crucial importance to the organisation. 96

The LTTE funded newspapers and magazines in Madras which were on the verge of shutting because of financial problems. publications was tremendous. 97

Its influence in such

The LTTE spokespersons were articulate

94

Taraki, n.30, p.4.

95

Taraki, n.76. There have been speculations in the media that the LTTE has links with militant groups in Punjab. See for instance, The Hindu, 4 March 1995. However, since most of these links have been established since 1991, they are outside the scope of this study.

96

Mervyn de Silva observed that the Sinhala and English media in Colombo were not under any pressure from the LTTE. Publicity, even if unfavourable was welcomed by the LTTE. Mervyn de Silva (Editor, Lanka Guardian), interviewed in Colombo in June 1993. In contrast, a source in Virakecari (a Tamil daily popular among Colombo Tamils) acknowledged that Tamil papers in Colombo were "careful" in what they wrote about the LTTE. 'Venkat', interviewed in Colombo in .June 199~1.

97

M.R. Naryan Swamy (Special Correspondent, Agence France-Presse), interviewed in New Delhi in August 1993. 174

and affable and made a strong and positive impact on the press in Madras. This in turn was reflected in the coverage it received from the Madras media. 98

The investment the LTI'E made in the Madras media earned it high dividends for even newspapers like The Hindu and Indian Express were 'soft' on the LTTE. In fact, the Anuradhapura massacre and the decimation of TELO went uncondemned in the editorials of The Hindu. 99 It was only after the collapse of the Agreement that The Hindu turned against the LTTE. The Tamil media however continued to back the Tigers. Even as late as 1991, some of the most virulent criticism of the IPKF was churned out by the Tamil press.

c)

The LTTE Network in Tamil Nadu With contacts established in high places and a committed, fiercely

motivated network in Tamil N adu, the LTTE developed a vast base in the state. Its freedom of movement was so high that it seemed that the LTTE was treating Tamil N adu as an extension of 'TamiJ

i)

IJam' .100

Propaganda The most overt activity of the L TIE in the state was propaganda. For

many years the LTTE propaganda office operated from Madras, even issuing statements critical of India. Several Tiger booklets like Liberation Tigers and

98

This was evident during conversations with journalists from Madras who seemed overawed by the Tiger leaders.

99

The only media person who was consistently critical of all the militant groups was Cho Ramaswamy, editor of Tuklak (Madras).

100

For an account of the LTI'E's use of Tamil Nadu as its rear base, see Manoj Joshi, "A Base for All Seasons: How LTI'E Used T. Nadu", Frontline, vol. 8, no.16, 3-16 August 1991, pp.21-23. 175

Tamil Eelam Freedom Struggle and Satanic Forces were published from here. In addition, the Tamil Information Centre (TIC) and organisations like the DK, DK (R) and TNP too published extensive propaganda on the Jiam struggle. Audio cassettes with speeches by Tiger leaders and the LTTE's patriotic songs were freely available in Madras. 101

ii)

Training The LTTE ran training camps at Kulathur (near Mettur), Sirumalai

(near Dindigul), Tiruparankunram and Azhagarmalai (near Madurai). Some of these camps were sponsored by Nedumaran and DK activists Kulathur Mani, Ramakrishanan, and Aruchamy.l 02 These camps were wound up in January 1987.

iii)

Manufacture of Ammunition and Other Supplies In addition to sponsoring training camps, the pro-LTTE sections in

Tamil Nadu also assisted the Tigers in building up their manufacturing infrastructure in the state. Coimbatore was the centre for manufacture of ammunition because skilled technical

labour was

available here. 103

Explosives, detonators, and medicines were procured in Tiruchirapalli 104

101

For instance, the cassette Kalattil Ketkum Kanahkal (Songs Heard on the Battle Field), produced in "1988 has songs sung by leading singers of Tamil Nadu.

102

Subramanian, n.15 and Saqaf, n.89.

103

For details, see V. Padmanabhan, "The Arms Base: Militant Activity in Coimbatore", Frontline, vol. 8, no.l7, 17-30 August 1991, pp.110-11.

104

In Karur, the LTTE bought explosives from quarrying agencies. The Hindu, 23 November 1991. Also, seeS. Ramanarasu, "Over to Tiruchi". Frontline, vol.8, no.17, 17-30 August 1991, p.l14. 176

and wounded Tigers were brought here for treatment. 105 The LTTE's uniforms were tailored at Erode. 106

The Tigers were also involved in a number of ventures in the state which would give them financial returns and facilitate transport and communication. Consequently, they invested in real estate,

shopping

complexes, tourist taxis, and telephone booths. 107

iv)

Transport Since the LTTE and its supporters owned transport services, taking

supplies to the coast was not difficult. Weapon consignments from Coimbatore were taken to Tiruchirapalli in vans and from there to Vedaranniyam through local lorry services. 108 The Tamil Nadu coast also served as an important transit point for weapons and supplies from overseas. 109

The coastal area from Tanjavur down to Ramanathapuram was virtually controlled by the LTTE and there was no evidence of Government authority in

105

Apparently, Tigers would approach unemployed doctors with offers to invest in a clinic. Injured Tigers would then avail treatment there. Sam Rajappa, (Journalist, The Statesman), interviewed in Madras in May 1993.

106

Pushpa Iyengar, "LTTE Down but Not Out in Tamil Nadu", Times of India, 8 September 1991.

107

ibid and Mitra, n.88, pp.58-59.

108

The Hindu, 6 August 1991.

109

S.H. Venkatramani, "A Closed Sanctuary" Economic Times (New Delhi), 3 June 1991.

177

the area. 110 Besides the rank and file of the state police being sympathetic to the LTTE, local DMK, AIADMK and DK leaders also ensured that no punitive action would be taken. 111 Moreover, surveillance was hampered as it was difficult to differentiate the local fishermen from the Tigers.

Fishermen and smugglers supplied the LTTE with daily necessities and diesel. The LTTE used coercion, intimidation, bribes and purchase of goods at lucrative prices to get help from the local people. A regular supplier admitted that profits from selling goods to the Tigers was phenomenal -an amount he would never make in any other smuggling operation. So lucrative and irresistible was the trade with the "generous Tigers" that he was willing to continue the business, whatever the risk. 112

The complete dependence of entire villages on this trade, its lucrativeness in an otherwise economically backward region makes it highly unlikely that the well entrenched network can be broken easily.l 13

The LTTE's base in Tamil Nadu therefore covered the entire spectrum. At the lowest level they had villagers depending on them financially and at the highest level they enjoyed political patronage cutting across party lines. In contrast, the other militant groups did not recognise the importance of Tamil

110

See V.Ganapathi, "Smuggler's Paradise: The Thanjavur Coast's Dubious Record", Frontline, vol. 8, no.16, 3-16 August 1991, pp.18-21.

111

V.R. Mani, "Tiger Tales from Coastal Tamil Nadu", Times of India, 6 May 1990.

112

'Murugappa' (Indian Shopkeeper), interviewed in Nagappattinam November 1993. Also Ganapathi, n.llO, p.20 and Taraki, n.Sf>.

113

This is examined in Taraki, "The LTTE's Smuggling Connection", Island International (Colombo), 3 July 1991. 178

111

N adu to their struggle. PLOT antagonised the two most powerful men in Tamil Nadu- MGR and K.Mohandas (the Director General of Police). Maheswaran in fact, initially enjoyed MGR's patronage but squandered it by supporting S.D.Somasunderam, who parted ways with MGR in 1984.

Further,

Maheswaran's antagonism towards Mohandas sealed PLOT's fate with the Tamil Nadu police as well. 114 The EPRLF regarded the Tamil parties with contempt. It had links with the Communist Party of India (CPI) 115 but this was of no benefit to the EPRLF. Consequently, the LTIE was the only group which made full use ofTamil Nadu as a rear base in its protracted struggle for

Tamil l£am. THE EXPATRIATES The Tamil ll_am cause has enjoyed considerable support from the expatriates. They and especially those who left years ago have a romanticised vision of the organisation and are hence very supportive of the LTTE. 116 However those Tamils who emigrated in the 1980s feel differently. They have witnessed the internecine fighting among the groups and also the persecution by the LTTE. Some of them have been critical of the LTIE. 117 However, since their continued stay abroad and their refugee status depends on the situation in the North-East, the war and the LTIE come in useful. The LTIE has successfully exploited such feelings among the refugees by using them to

114

Swamy, n.21, p.130.

115

Hellmann-Rajanayagam, n.37,p.108.

116

Taraki, "The Tamil Disapora and Its Implications", The Island, 19 January 1992.

117

ibid. 179

build its network abroad. 118 Numerous Tamil organisations which coordinate activities across continents have been established. In Europe and North America, the Tigers have operated under the name of World Tamil Movement (WTM). LTTE cells operating under names like Tamil Coordinating Committee (TCC) and World Federation of Tamils (WFT) have been established in many countries. The 'International Secretariats' of the LTTE in London and Paris have played a significant role by issuing statements and giving interviews m

the

international media. They have also organised arms purchase for the LTTE. 119 a)

Propaganda and Lobbying

Pro-LTTE periodicals and pamphlets such as Tamil Nation, Erimalai,

.

Kalattil, Tamil Forum, Ulakat Tamilar, Vitutalaip Pulikal and Virauenkai are

.

-

.

regularly brought out by the LTTE and its sympathisers abroad. Anti-LTTE organisations' periodicals like Tayakam and Tamil Guardian have been unable to match the professionalism of this Tiger propaganda.

The expatriates also highlight the LTI'E's cause through seminars. For instance, the WFT conducts annual International Tamil Conferences which reaffirm its suppor-t for the LTTE. Some of the resolutions passed by the Conference include recognition of Prabakaran and LTIE as "true leaders" of

118

Rajan Hoole, "Tamil Refugees in Sri Lanka and the West", Tamil Times (Surrey), vol.12, no.7, 15 July 1993, p.18.

119

'Sekar' (Tamil Expatriate in Canada), interviewed m Madras m September 1992. 180

the struggle and UN consultative status for WFT .120 The significance of such seminars is that the LTTE is projected as the sole representative of the Tamils, enjoying support of Tamils across the world. In addition, pro-LTTE views of several eminent persons is also highlighted which gives the L TTE struggle intellectual sanction. 121

There are also organisations like the TELF which justify the L TIE's actions and praise its heroism. They not only support the cause of Tamil !lam but also equate it with the LTTE struggle and hence justify the LTTE's actions as "necessary means to an end." 122

Moreover pro-Tiger expatriate associations actively lobby on behalfofthe LTTE in places like the US, Britain, Canada, the Scandanavian countries and Australia. The Tamil lobby in Australia for instance was responsible not only for the Australian Government starting a Commonwealth peace initiative but also for winning support from the Australian Democrats for the establishment of a "democratic-quasi state" in the North-East. 123

120

For details of the Resolutions, see N .Seevaratnam, ed., The Tamil National Question and the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord (Delhi, 1989), pp.2308 and Sunanda K.Dutta-Ray, "Appeal from Eelam: Indirect Victory for Tigers?", The Statesman, 21 May J 989.

121

Some of the papers presented in one such seminar are reproduced in Seevaratnam, ibid.

122

M.K. Eelaventhan (General Secretary, TELF), interviewed in Madras in September 1992.

123

See Tamil Nation (Surrey), vol. 1, no. 5, 1 November 1990, p. 12. For more examples of work done by these expatriate lobbies, see Tamil Nation, vol. 1, no. 1, 1 September 1990, p. 12; vol. 1, no. 2, 15 September 1990, p. 1 and vol. 1, no. 4, 15 October 1990, p. 12. 181

Moreover, Tamil expatriates also lobby vigourously with Aid donors to the Government to cut back funds. Their success is evident from the fact that by 1986, US Aid to Sri Lanka was half what it was six years earlier. 124

For many of these expatriates, the LTTE can do no wrong and nobody should dispute the Tiger leadership.

They do nothing to achieve a Tamil

consensus or to bring together diverse opinion. Their rhetoric is sometimes more strident and more secessionist than that expressed by the Tiger fighters themselves! Even at a time when the Tigers were negotiating with Colombo these expatriates living thousands of miles away, were making belligerent speeches. 125

h)

Financing the War

The expatriates have also helped the LTTE with financial contributions. The L TTE raises funds through voluntary donations, extortions, and trade in narcotics. i)

Contributions

According to the LTTE it is a must for expatriates to contribute atleast financially because the cadres are sacrificing their lives back home for the cause. Consequently, the expatriates are forced to pay what is described as "conscience money". 126

124

This was acknowledged by the Sri Lankan Finance Minister Ronnie de Mel. See The Hindu, 6 June 1986. For details of attempts by expatriates to bring economic pressure on Colombo, see Sinha Ratnatunga, Politics of Terrorism: The Sri Lanka Experience (Canberra, 1988), pp.280-95.

125

Rita Sebastian, "From the Safety of Foreign Homes", Indian Express (New Delhi), 26 May 1989.

126

Sekar, n.119.

While the LTTE maintains that these donations are voluntary, several expatriates accuse the organisation of extortion. In Germany, the Tigers are known to have collected 200,000 Marks per month from expatriates, threatening them that their relatives would suffer if they did not contribute. 127

Similar

extortion

has

also

been

reported

from

the

Netherlands, Norway and Sweden.

ii)

The Narcotics Trade However generous expatriates are with their donations the amount is

unlikely to be sufficient for financing a war. This logic has raised suspicions of the LTTE's involvement in illegal transactions.

The LTTE claims that the only illegal activity it is involved in abroad is purchase of weapons. 128 For a long time in India too, it was argued that while TELO and PLOT were involved in drug deals and kidnapping, the LTTE being a "disciplined outfit by and large" stayed out of the narcotics trade. 129 Sources in RAW argue that though there is no concrete evidence available as yet indicating the definite involvement of the organisation an involvement of individual Tigers in the narcotics trade cannot be ruled out. 130

Of late, however, reports have surfaced which allege that the L TTE has been operating a well organised drug network, trafficking heroin from Bombay 127

C.H.S. Jayewardene and H. Jayewardene, Terror in Paradise: The Battle for Eelam (Ottawa, 1987), p.209 and Sri Lanka Monitor (London), vol.2, no.10, January 1990, p.4.

128

'Sekar', n.119.

129

Anita Pratap, "Kidnapped!", Sunday, vol. 14, no. Hi, 1-7 March 1987, pp. 40-41.

130

Raw Official, n.17. 183

to Europe and America since 1985. Tiger representatives in Europe negotiate deals with buyers and

local Tiger cells supervise the delivery of the

consignments. 131 Links between the LTIE and Colombia's Medellin Cartel have been mentioned in the international media. It is alleged that in return for pushing drugs in Europe, the LTTE was to receive training at a military tactics school in Antigua. 132

However, the only Tiger leader who accepts the LTTE's nexus with the drug trade is Sooriyakumaran Selvadurai, a notorious drug dealer and the head of the LTIE cell in Germany. He defends the LTTE's involvement in the drug trade as it is for buying arms to "fight for justice" and not for "personal profit" _133

iii)

Havala Transactions Most Sri Lankans prefer remitting their money through LTIE contacts

to relatives at home or in India. The LTTE keeps the foreign exchange, uses it to purchase weapons and delivers the equivalent in Rupees at home. 134

iv)

Channeling of Foreign Goverrunent Funds Expatriate associations have also helped procure funds from foreign

131

Mazher Mahmood, "Inside the Tamil Tigers Drug Racket", 'lhe Times (London), 30 August 1987.

132

Walter Jayawardhana, "Guns for Drugs", Sunday, val 17, no. 43, 4-10 November 1990, pp. 82-84 and Shekhar Gupta and others, "LTIE: Cyanide Warriors", India Today, val. 16, no. 12, 16-30 June 1991, p. 50.

133

Mahmood, n.131.

134

V. Jayanth, "Sailing into Trouble: Vigil on Sea Adds to Militants' Worries", Frontline, vol. 8, no. 24, 6 December 1991, p. 120; The Hindu, 19 June 1991 and Gupta and others, n.132. 184

Governments. In Canada for instance, associations like Tamil Eelam Sangam (TES) and Society of Aid for Ceylon Minorities (SACEM) are known to be recepients of vast funds from the Canadian Government, ostensibly for social and cultural activities. Influential persons in such organisations are often Tiger sympathisers and it is they who decide how these funds are going to be spent. It is alleged that the WTM is also a recipient of Canadian funds. 135

But notwithstanding the contribution of the emigre, the LTTE looks upon them with contempt. Tiger cadres resent the expatriates as they live in comfort while they die fighting. 136

THE ARMS SUPPLIERS The LTTE is extremely secretive about its arms suppliers. The LTTE uses numerous types of weapons indicating that it has not been able to find a single, reliable supplier 137 or has cautiously diversified its sources to reduce dependence. In addition to India, the LTTE's external suppliers of arms, equipment and training could be broadly classified into the international arms market, other militant organisations, Israel and Pakistan.

a)

The International Arms Market It is believed that the LTTE purchases weapons, ammunition, explosives

and communication equipment in the open market in Singapore. Rocket

135

Special Correspondent, "Ethnic Conflict - The Overseas Dimension", Counterpoint (Colombo), vol. 2, no.4, October- November 1994, pp.12-14.

136

Anandan, n.38.

137

Rajesh Kadian, India's Sri Lanka Fiasco: Peace Keepers at War (New Delhi, 1990), p.23. 185

launchers, anti-aircraft weapons and ammunition come from

Europe. 138

More recently the L'ITE has been buying weapons and essential commodities from Mauritius and South-East Asia.

Prabakaran's

cousin

Kumar

Padmanabha is incharge of this network. He operates from bases in Geneva, Cyprus, Honduras, and Nigeria. 139

b)

Other Militant Organisations In 1984, Balasingham claimed that the L'ITE had links with South

Mrican militant groups but did not elaborate on the nature of these links. 140 It seems likely that this claim was made more to project the L TTE as a progressive liberation movement.

Militants from major Tamil groups received training from the PLO and the People's Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) in the 1970s and the early 1980s. Some of the LTTE fighting core was also trained by the PLO. But as terrain and conditions differed, this training was not found to be very beneficial by the Tigers. 141

But arms linkages between the L'ITE and PLO are known to exist. Uzi machine guns manufactured by Israel have been found among Tiger weaponry

138

Lanka Guardian, vol.13, no.23, 1 April 1991, p.6.

139

Anirudhya Mitra, "LTTE: Back in Business", India Today, vol.17, no.7, 1-15 April 1992, p.46.

140

Shekhar Gupta, "Sri Lanka Rebels: Ominous Presence in Tamil Nadu", India Today, vol.9, no.6, 16-31 March 1984, p.90.

141

For details of the links between the Tamil militants and PLO, see Swamy, n.21, pp.97-101 and ibid. 186

and it is likely that the Tigers procured these from the PL0. 142 However, recent revelations of LTTE - Israel links indicate that it is likely that the LTTE may have bought them directly from Israel.

c)

Israel and Pakistan The LTTE's links with Israel came to light in 1990. Apparently, Mossad

trained the militants in mines penetration techniques, communication and sabotage of Dvora class boats which Israel had earlier sold to the Sri Lankan Navy. 143 The LTTE also purchased Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs), flares and mines from Israel. Most of the mines had been captured by Israel during fighting against the PLO and Syria. For long no one suspected that these mines were supplied by Israel since these had Soviet markings. The LTTE paid for all weapons in hard currency. 144

In July 1989, Israel used the LTTE as a cover to put money in the hands of the PLO. It paid the LTTE $8 million to purchase arms from the PL0. 145 142

Jayewardene and Jayewardene, n.127, p.196.

143

Claire Hoy and Victor Ostrovsky, By Way of Deception: An Insider's Devastating Expos~ of the Mossad (London, 1990), pp. 129-30. Also, see Mervyn de Silva, "Just What Premadasa Needed", Deccan Herald, 4 October 1990 and "Mossads Connection with Sri Lanka", Times oflndia, 11 October 1990.

144

Indian Express, 18 October 1990.

145

The "donation" to the LTTE was part of a complex plan to secure the release of three Israeli soldiers held hostage in Lebanon. In a deal struck at Tunis in 1989, Arafat of the PLO agreed to help secure their release. In return, Israel was willing to make a donation to the LTTE to purchase arms from PLO. Simultaneously, Israel used the Sri Lankan Government as a conduit for C-130 aircraft meant for Iran for information on the whereabouts of the hostages. Neither the LTTE nor Colombo was aware that the other was also acting as a conduit. Ari Ben-Menashi, Profits of War. Excerpts reproduced in The Island, 00 187

Lankan Army

146

and links betw1~en the LTTE and the Pakistani

Intelligence have grown since 1990. 147

THE TRANSPORT NETWORK The LTTE has an elaborate network to transport weapons and equipment to the North-East. According to reports, the LTTE has floated shipping companies abroad to facilitate clandestine transport of arms. A fleet of vessels including Tongnova and M.V. Golden Bird or Sea Bird have been used in these operations. 148

The major transit points in this network are Bangkok and Singapore. All cargo is routed via these ports. With a large, sympathetic expatriate population and a flourishing arms bazaar here the LTTE is assured of a regular flow of supplies.

INTERNATIONAL STATUS OF THE LTTE Despite its reputation as one of the foremost guerrilla groups in the world, the LTTE has not yet received the political recognition and status that the PLO has achieved. With the exception of India, Israel and Pakistan, few other Governments have had substantial links with the LTTE. This is mainly because of its adversarial relations vis-a- vis not only

May 1993. 146

John Kaniyalil, "The Pak-Lanka Connection", Strategic Analysis (New Delhi), vol.9, no.11, February 1986, pp.1069-75.

147

Afsir Karim, Transnational Terrorism: The Danger in the South (New Delhi, 1993).

148

V. Jayanth, "A Note of Warning to the Gunrunners", The Hindu, 17 November 1991 and Jayanth, n. 134, p. 119. 188

Colombo but also India. Prior to July 1987, when India was perceived to be supporting the militants, Pakistan, China and Israel helped Colombo with arms and training to combat the LTIE. Most countries were however reluctant to get involved overtly as the conflict was recognised as being in India's sphere of influence. Help, if any, went covertly to Colombo. When the IPKF - LTIE hostilities broke out, other countries were even more unwilling to give arms to the Tigers.

Nevertheless, North American , European and South East Asian countries have turned a-blind eye to LTTE activities on their soil. It was only after Rajiv Gandhi's assassination that some Governments took action against the LTIE. The LTI'E on its part has been cautious not to antagonise these Governments too much. Internecine fighting for instance, is not so common among the Tamil groups operating in the West.

APPRAISAL That the LTTE has received considerable succour from overseas is evident from the above discussion. Although it has tried to reduce its dependence on one source by diversifying its material suppliers and stepping up indigenous manufacture, its need for external support continues. For one, the military nature of the struggle has necessitated arms and communication equipment. With the Army's weapons growing in sophistication, the LTIE has no option but to import. Its land mines despite all their lethality are insufficient against the Air Force.

Further, the island lacks geographical space for the Tigers to withdraw in the face of an offensive. For this they need Tamil N adu as their rear base. Even if they were to procure supplies from South East Asia, the Tigers need a nearby sanctuary which only India can give.

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India's support to the L TTE is crucial not only for the survival of the group but for the viability of Tamil IJ:..am if and when formed. If India does not recognise

l!am,

it is unlikely that the donor countries will provide economic

aid.

Hence, a major failure of the LTTE's external dealings has been that it has not succeeded in gaining recognition from any country despite being in de facto control of some Tamil areas for many years. Despite all its propaganda,

it has not been able to alter its international reputation of being a fascist, military outfit.

190