11. Responsive Pleading.docx

TOPIC: RESPONSIVE responsive pleadings

PLEADINGS

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What

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IRENE MARCOS-ARANETA, DANIEL RUBIO, ORLANDO G. RESLIN, and JOSE G. RESLIN, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, JULITA C. BENEDICTO, and FRANCISCA BENEDICTOPAULINO, respondents

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G.R. No. 154096| August 22 , 2008| VELASCO Digested by: Casano, Diana Rola Y. / Sanchez, Alissa Anne D.

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DOCTRINE: Responsive pleadings are those which seek affirmative relief and/or set up defenses, like an answer. A motion to dismiss is not a responsive pleading for purposes of Sec. 2 of Rule 10. If there is no responsive pleading had been filed, respondent could amend her complaint as a matter of right.

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As the aforequoted provision makes it abundantly clear that the plaintiff may amend his complaint once as a matter of right, i.e., without leave of court, before any responsive pleading is filed or served. FACTS: A MTD is not a responsive pleading. Thus, Imee Marcos can amend her complaint as a matter of right. 

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Ambassador Benedicto and Benedicto Group organized Far East Managers and Investors, Inc. (FEMII) and Universal Equity Corporation (UEC), respectively. As petitioner Irene Marcos-Araneta would later allege, both corporations were organized pursuant to a contract or arrangement whereby Benedicto, as trustor, placed in his name and in the name of his associates, as trustees, the shares of stocks of FEMII and UEC with the obligation to hold those shares and their fruits in trust and for the benefit of Irene to the extent of 65% of such shares. Several years after, Irene, through her trusteehusband, Gregorio Ma. Araneta III, demanded the reconveyance of said 65% stockholdings, but the Benedicto Group refused to oblige. In March 2000, Irene thereupon instituted before the RTC 2 similar complaints for conveyance of shares of stock, accounting and receivership against the Benedicto Group with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO). Benedicto’s daughter, one of the defendants in the first case, filed a motion to dismiss and later, an amended motion to dismiss. Among the grounds are: (1) the cases involved an intra-corporate dispute over which the Securities and Exchange Commission, not the RTC, has jurisdiction; (2) venue was improperly laid; and (3) the complaint failed to state a cause of action, as there was no allegation

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therein that plaintiff, as beneficiary of the purported trust, has accepted the trust created in her favor. To the motions to dismiss, Irene filed a Consolidated Opposition, which Benedicto and Francisca countered with a Joint Reply to Opposition. Then, it was consolidated. RTC dismissed both complaints , stating that these partly constituted real action, and that Irene did not actually reside in Ilocos Norte, and, therefore, venue was improperly laid. It also declared all other issues in the Motion to Dismiss moot and academic. Pending resolution of her motion for reconsideration, Irene filed on July 17, 2000 a Motion (to Admit Amended Complaint), attaching therewith a copy of the Amended Complaint dated July 14, 2000 in which she added additional plaintiffs, and practically the same cause of action but, as couched, sought the reconveyance of the FEMII shares only. RTC admitted the amended complaint. Julita and Francisca Benedicto (wife and daughter of Ambassador Benedicto) moved to dismiss the amended complaint for there is no complaint to amend since it was dismissed; but it was denied and they were ordered to answer the amended complaint. Moreover, the RTC held that there was actually no need to act on Irenes motion to admit, it being her right as plaintiff to amend her complaints absent any responsive pleading thereto. CA granted the petition for certiorari and set aside the decision of the RTC. Hence, Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45

ISSUE: Whether a motion to dismiss is a responsive pleading HELD: NO. In Alpine Lending Investors v. Corpuz, the Court, expounding on the propriety of admitting an amended complaint before a responsive pleading is filed, wrote: “What petitioner Alpine filed in Civil Case No. C20124 was a motion to dismiss, not an answer. Settled is the rule that a motion to dismiss is not a responsive pleading for purposes of Section 2, Rule 10. As no responsive pleading had been filed, respondent could amend her complaint in Civil Case No. C-20124 as a matter of right. Following this Courts ruling in Breslin v. Luzon Stevedoring Co. considering that respondent has the right to amend her complaint, it is the correlative duty of the trial court to accept the amended complaint; otherwise, mandamus would lie against it. In other words, the trial courts duty to admit the amended complaint was purely ministerial. In fact, respondent should not have filed a motion to admit her amended complaint” It may be argued that the original complaints had been dismissed. It should be pointed out, however, that the finality of such dismissal order had not set in when Irene

filed the amended complaint on July 17, 2000, she having meanwhile seasonably sought reconsideration thereof. Irenes motion for reconsideration was only resolved on August 25, 2000. Thus, when Irene filed the amended complaint on July 17, 2000, the order of dismissal was not yet final, implying that there was strictly no legal impediment to her amending her original complaints. PETITION IS DISMISSED. TOPIC: RESPONSIVE PLEADINGS, Section 10, Rule 11

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Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A v. Dow Chemical Co., G.R. No. 179232, 179290 | August 23, 2012| Villarama Digested by: Casano, Diana Rola Y. / Sanchez, Alissa Anne D. DOCTRINE: two requisites for a court to allow an omitted counterclaim or cross-claim by amendment: (1) there was oversight, inadvertence, or excusable neglect, or when justice requires; and (2) the amendment is made before judgment

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August 11, 1995, a joint complaint for damages based on quasi-delict was filed before the RTC of Panabo City, Davao by 1,185 individuals against Del Monte, Dow Chemical Corporations and other companies. It is alleged that the companies were negligent in the manufacture, distribution and sale or in not informing the users of the hazardous effects of the chemical they used. They said that they were exposed to the chemicals since 1970s that they suffered serious and permanent injuries to their health. It was amended to implead other plaintiffs and dropped 4 defendants. The remaining defendants filed their Answer with Counterclaim. o On September 2, 1997, the Dow/Occidental defendants jointly moved for the dismissal of the complaint against them, as well as their counterclaim against the plaintiffs. They alleged that they have already entered into a compromise agreement. o The Chiquita defendants, on even date, filed their Motion for Leave to Admit Amended Answer with Counterclaims and Cross-claims, citing inadvertence, oversight, and excusable neglect as grounds for amendment. o DOLE also filed a Motion to Admit Amended Answer with Cross Claim The parties thereafter filed numerous oppositions/motions to the pleadings filed by

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each. Replies and comments were likewise filed in response thereto. Del Monte filed motion to dismiss alleging the Amended Joint Complaint be dismissed entirely with prejudice because the claimants had been paid, waived, abandoned and extinguish their rights in effect of their compromise agreement with the claimants. RTC granted and left to the cognizance of the court the case for cross claim among defendants filed by DOLE, Del Monte and Chiquita Court rendered that all other motions filed by the parties in relation to or in connection to the issues hereinabove resolved but which have been wittingly or unwittingly left unresolved are hereby considered moot and academic; likewise, all previous orders contrary to or not in accordance with the foregoing resolutions are hereby reconsidered, set aside and vacated. The Dow/Occidental defendants argue, among others, that the RTC gravely abused its discretion when it did not dismiss the cross-claims filed by the Dole, Del Monte and Chiquita defendants despite the following: (1) the cross-claims were already filed beyond the reglementary period; and (2) the complaint against them and the Del Monte and Chiquita defendants, including their respective counterclaims, were already dismissed on the basis of the compromise agreements they each had with the plaintiffs. The CA, however, ruled that the RTC gravely abused its discretion when it admitted the crossclaims against the Dow/Occidental defendants without any qualification. It held that only the cross-claims filed by the Dole defendants, the Chiquita defendants (with respect to the claims of James Bagas and Dante Bautista) and the Del Monte defendants (with respect to the 16 noncompromising plaintiffs) against the Dow/Occidental defendants can be rightly admitted by the RTC. The CA also held that the dismissal of the complaint as regards the Dow/Occidental defendants in the civil case did not carry with it the dismissal of the cross-claims filed against said defendants. Hence, consolidated petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45

ISSUE: 1) Does the dismissal of the civil case against the Dow/Occidental defendants carry with it the dismissal of cross-claims against them? (2) Is the Request for Admission by the Dow/Occidental defendants proper? Held:

Deny the petitions. There are two requisites for a court to allow an omitted counterclaim or cross-claim by amendment: (1) there was oversight, inadvertence, or excusable neglect, or when justice requires; and (2) the amendment is made before judgment. The CA correctly held that there is basis for allowing the cross-claims of the Dole, Del Monte and Chiquita defendants against the Dow/Occidental defendants as they complied with the rules. It is undisputed that the Dole, Del Monte and Chiquita defendants sought to amend their answers to include their cross-claims before judgment. More importantly, justice requires that they be allowed to do so in consonance with the policy against multiplicity of suits.

Despite the compromise agreements entered into by the parties, the civil case was not dismissed nor the amount of damages sought by plaintiffs therein reduced. Thus, if the remaining defendants are made liable to the plaintiffs for the full amount of damages sought, said remaining defendants have a right to proceed through their crossclaims.

TOPIC: RESPONSIVE PLEADINGS, when not as a matter of right

LISAM ENTERPRISES, INC. represented by LOLITA A. SORIANO, and LOLITA A. SORIANO, vs. BANCO DE ORO UNIBANK, INC. (formerly PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK),* LILIAN S. SORIANO, ESTATE OF LEANDRO A. SORIANO, JR., REGISTER OF DEEDS OF LEGASPI CITY, and JESUS L. SARTE, Respondents. G.R. No. 143264| April 23, 2012| MAKALINTAL Digested by: Casano, Diana Rola Y. / Sanchez, Alissa Anne D. DOCTRINE: A responsive pleading having been filed, amendments to the complaint may, therefore, be made only by leave of court and no longer as a matter of right. FACTS: 

We also uphold the appellate court’s ruling that the RTC gravely abused its discretion when it admitted the crossclaims against the Dow/Occidental defendants without any qualification. The Del Monte and Chiquita defendants’ cross-claims against the Dow/Occidental defendants cannot extend to the plaintiffs with whom they had settled.

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HELD: YES.

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The CA correctly held that there is basis for allowing the cross-claims of the Dole, Del Monte and Chiquita defendants against the Dow/Occidental defendants as they complied with the rules. It is undisputed that the Dole, Del Monte and Chiquita defendants sought to amend their answers to include their cross-claims before judgment. More importantly, justice requires that they be allowed to do so in consonance with the policy against multiplicity of suits. We also uphold the appellate court’s ruling that the RTC gravely abused its discretion when it admitted the cross-claims against the Dow/Occidental defendants without any qualification. The Del Monte and Chiquita defendants’ cross-claims against the Dow/Occidental defendants cannot extend to the plaintiffs with whom they had settled.

PETITION IS DENIED.

On August 13, 1999, petitioners LISAM rep by SORIANNO filed a Complaint against respondents BANCO DE ORO for Annulment of Mortgage with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order & Preliminary Injunction with Damages with the RTC of Legaspi City. Petitioner Lolita A. Soriano alleged that she is a stockholder of petitioner Lisam Enterprises, Inc. (LEI) and a member of its Board of Directors, designated as its Corporate Secretary. LEI acquired a lot in Legaspi. o On or about 28 March 1996, defendant Lilian S. Soriano and the late Leandro A. Soriano, Jr., as husband and wife (hereafter Spouses Soriano), in their personal capacity and for their own use and benefit, obtained a loan from defendant PCIB (Legaspi Branch) (now known as Banco de Oro Unibank, Inc.) in the total amount of P20 Million; o That as security for the payment of the aforesaid credit accommodation, the late Leandro A. Soriano, Jr. and defendant Lilian S. Soriano, as president and treasurer, respectively of plaintiff LEI, but without authority and consent of the board of said plaintiff and with the use of a falsified board resolution, executed a real estate mortgage on 28 March 1996, over the above-described property of plaintiff LEI in favor of defendant PCIB, and had the same registered with the Office of the Registry of Deeds, Legaspi City, copy of the Real Estate Mortgage is hereto attached and marked as Annex B,

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and made part hereof, to the prejudice of plaintiffs; o That specifically, the Spouses Soriano, with intent to defraud and prejudice plaintiff LEI and its stockholders, falsified the signatures of plaintiff Lolita A. Soriano as corporate secretary and director of plaintiff LEI, in a document denominated as board resolution purportedly issued by the board of plaintiff LEI on 6 November 1995, making it appear that plaintiff LEI's Board met and passed a board resolution on said date authorizing the Spouses Soriano to mortgage or encumber all or substantially all of the properties of plaintiff LEI, when in fact and in truth, no resolution of that nature was ever issued by the board of plaintiff LEI, nor a meeting was called to that effect, copy of the resolution in question is hereto attached and marked as Annex C, and made part hereof; o That plaintiff Lolita A. Soriano as Corporate Secretary of plaintiff LEI, had never signed a board resolution nor issued a Secretary's Certificate to the effect that on 6 November 1995 a resolution was passed and approved by plaintiff LEI authorizing the Spouses Soriano as president and treasurer, respectively, to mortgage the abovedescribed property of plaintiff LEI, neither did she appear personally before a notary public on 28 March 1996 to acknowledge or attest to the issuance of a supposed board resolution issued by plaintiff LEI on 6 November 1995; o That defendant PCIB, knowing fully well that the property being mortgaged by the Spouses Soriano belongs to plaintiff LEI, a corporation, negligently and miserably failed to exercise due care and prudence required of a banking institution. Specifically, defendant PCIB failed to investigate and to delve into the propriety of the issuance of or due execution of subject board resolution, which is the very foundation of the validity of subject real estate mortgage. Sorianos acquired a loan from PCIB in their personal capacity for P20m and as security, the Sorianos as president and treasurer but without authority, falsified a Board Resolution and executed a REM. After service of summons, TRO and Injunction were issued by the RTC.

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On September 25, 1999, Lillian Leandro Sorianos filed an Answer. In September 28, PCIB filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint on grounds of lack of legal capacity to sue, failure to state a cause of action, and litis pendencia. On November 11, 1999, the RTC issued the first assailed Resolution dismissing petitioners' Complaint. Petitioners then filed a Motion for Reconsideration of said Resolution. While awaiting resolution of the motion for reconsideration, petitioners also filed, on January 4, 2000, a Motion to Admit Amended Complaint. RTC denied both. Hence, Petition for Review under Rule 45.

ISSUE: Whether or not an amendment to the complaint may still be filed after a responsive pleading is filed HELD: YES. Respondents Lilian S. Soriano and the Estate of Leandro A. Soriano, Jr. already filed their Answer to petitioners' complaint, and the claims being asserted were made against said parties. Thus, a responsive pleading (Answer) having been filed, amendments to the complaint may, therefore, be made only by leave of court and no longer as a matter of right. Since, as explained above, amendments are generally favored, it would have been more fitting for the trial court to extend such liberality towards petitioners by admitting the amended complaint which was filed before the order dismissing the original complaint became final and executory. It is quite apparent that since trial proper had not yet even begun, allowing the amendment would not have caused any delay. Moreover, doing so would have served the higher interest of justice as this would provide the best opportunity for the issues among all parties to be thoroughly threshed out and the rights of all parties finally determined. Hence, the Court overrules the trial court's denial of the motion to admit the amended complaint, and orders the admission of the same. With the amendment stating that plaintiff Lolita A. Soriano likewise made demands upon the Board of Directors of Lisam Enterprises, Inc., to make legal steps to protect the interest of the corporation from said fraudulent transaction, but unfortunately, until now, no such legal step was ever taken by the Board, hence, this action for the benefit and in behalf of the corporation, does the amended complaint now sufficiently state a cause of action? PETITION IS DISMISSED. TOPIC: RESPONSIVE PLEADINGS, when allowed to file even after the reglementary period for filing the answer expires

HEIRS OF PACIANO YABAO, Represented by REMEDIOS CHAN, petitioners, vs. PAZ LENTEJAS VAN DER KOLK, respondent.

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G.R. No. 207266| June 25, 2014| MENDOZA

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Digested by: Casano, Diana Rola Y. / Sanchez, Alissa Anne D. DOCTRINE: The trial court permits the filing of the responsive answer and to be heard on the merits even after the reglementary period for filing the answer expires. The answer should be admitted where it is filed before a declaration of default and no prejudice is caused to the plaintiff. FACTS: 

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A complaint for ownership against Van der Kolk was filed by the heirs of Yabao on March 08, 2001. o That despite demands to vacate the lot in Calbayog City, Van der Kolk still refused and continued to occupy the lot. o Copies of summons and complaints were served to the lawyer of Vander Kolk, Ma. Narcisa Fabregas-Ventures. o It was noted in the Return of Service that Van der Kolk was in Netherlands On April 02, 2001, Van der Kolk filed a motion to dismiss for o (1) lack of jurisdiction by the MTCC over her person due to defective service of summons; and o (2) lack of cause of action. The Heirs of Yabao filed their opposition to the said motion and moved to declare Van der Kolk in default contending that the motion to dismiss was filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period and no answer had been filed. The MTCC denied the motion to dismiss and held there was proper service of summons. It also denied to declare Van der Kolk in default since the motion to dismiss was seasonably filed. The MTCC further directed Van der Kolk to file an answer within 10 days from receipt of the aforesaid resolution. On September 6, 2004, Van der Kolk's counsel, Atty. Felidito Dacut, filed a Manifestation with Motion praying that he be relieved as her counsel because she never contacted him about the case after he was informed that she had revoked the authority of Ventures and, thereafter, asked for the documents in his possession On December 20, 2004, there was no answer yet from Van der Kolk. The heirs of Yabao filed again a motion to declare Van der Kolk to be on default. On March 07, 2005, Van der Kolk filed an answer through her new counsel.

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On December 04, 2006, Vander Kolk was declared in default by the MTCC for failure to submit an answer within the fresh period of 10 days from July 27, 2004 Resolution. Van der Kolk filed an appeal to the RTC but it was dismissed. Van der Kolk then filed a Petition for Review under Rule 42 before the CA, one of the grounds is that the MTCC abused its discretion in declaring Van der Kolk in default. CA granted the petition. Hence, Petition for Certiorari

ISSUE: Whether or not the MTCC should have admitted the answer filed by Van der Kolk HELD: YES. The MTCC should have admitted Van der Kolk's answer, which was appended to her motion for allowance to belatedly file answer, filed on March 7, 2005 instead of declaring her in default. Record shows that the MTCC rendered the judgment of default only on December 4, 2006 and thus, it slept on Van der Kolk's said motion for 1 year and nine months, just as it also slept on the petitioners' motion to declare her in default for almost 2 years. This is procedurally unsound. It is within the sound discretion of the trial court to permit the defendant to file his answer and to be heard on the merits even after the reglementary period for filing the answer expires. The rule is that the defendant's answer should be admitted where it is filed before a declaration of default and no prejudice is caused to the plaintiff. In this case, Van der Kolk filed the answer beyond the reglementary period but before she was declared in default, and there was no showing that she intended to delay the prompt disposition of the case. Consequently, her Answer should have been admitted. PETITION IS DENIED. TOPIC: RESPONSIVE PLEADINGS, failure to file within reglementary period RODANTE F. GUYAMIN, LUCINIA F. GUYAMIN, and EILEEN G. GATARIN, petitioners, vs. JACINTO G. FLORES and MAXIMO G. FLORES, represented by RAMON G. FLORES, respondents. G.R. No. 202189 | April 25, 2018| DEL CASTILLO Digested by: Casano, Diana Rola Y. / Sanchez, Alissa Anne D. DOCTRINE: The party failing to file the responsive answer within the reglementary period of 15 days will be declared in default. FACTS:

In 2006, respondent Flores filed a complaint for Recovery of Possession against petitioners Guyamins et al.

period of 15 days even if the petitioners refused to sign the service of summons

They alleged that:

HELD: YES.

they are the registered owners of the disputed lot in Cavite; that petitioners were occupying the lot for years by mere tolerance of the respondents; that they reminded their relatives petitioner Guyamins et al to vacate the property because they will be selling it; and that petitioners still failed to vacate despite several attempts to settle in the conciliation before the Punong Barangay. On September 25, 2006, summons and a copy of the Complaint were served upon petitioners through Eileen GATARIN (PETITIONER), who nonetheless refused to sign and acknowledge receipt thereof. This fact was noted in the court process server's Return of Summons dated September 26, 2006. On January 9, 2007, respondents filed a Motion to Declare Defendants in Default, arguing that despite service of summons on September 25, 2006, petitioners failed to file their answer. On May 28, 2007, petitioners filed their Answer with Motion to Dismiss. On June 5, 2007, respondents filed their Reply to Answer, arguing that petitioners' Answer was belatedly filed, which is why they filed a motion to declare petitioners in default; and for this reason, they prayed that the Answer be stricken off the record. On December 26, 2007, the RTC declared the petitioners in default for failure to file responsive answer within the reglementary period. Petitioners moved to reconsider, but the trial court was unmoved. It proceeded to receive respondents' evidence ex parte. RTC resolved the pending case in favor of the respondent Flores. The Guyamins were ordered to vacate. The court reiterated that the denial of the answer with motion to dismiss was due to the late filing of the answer with motion to dismiss. That if indeed having a good defense, could have been vigilant in this case instead of resorting to delays in the prosecution thereof. Petitioners filed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, and which the court ruled that the lower court did not commit any error declaring them in default because they filed their answer 8 months after receiving the summons. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners were in default for not filing the responsive answer within the reglementary

The SC held that “The filing of petitioners' answer prior to respondents' motion to declare them in default, and the latter's filing of a reply, do not erase the fact that petitioners' answer is late. Respondents' reply filed thereafter is, like the belated answer, a mere scrap of paper, as it proceeds from the said answer.” The reply to the late answer was not a cure to the defective answer contrary to petitioner’s argument. The service of summons was presumed regular as per the court process server's Return of Summons dated September 26, 2006. PETITION IS DENIED.