1015-1023

G.R. No. L-21809

January 31, 1966

GIL P. POLICARPIO, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees, vs. JOSE V. SALAMAT, ET AL., defendants. VICENTE ASUNCION, ET AL., defendants-appellants. In a duly probated last will and testament of one Damasa Crisostomo, she gave the naked ownership of a fishpond owned by her to her sister Teodorica de la Cruz while its usufruct to the children of her cousins Antonio Perez, Patricia Vicente and Canuto Lorenzo. The fishpond is situated at a barrio of Hagonoy, Bulacan. The children of Antonio Perez, Patricia Vicente and Canuto Lorenzo turned out to be fourteen, namely: Maria, Pio, Fructuosa, Graciano, Vicente, Victoria, Teodora, and Juan, all surnamed Perez, Apolonio Lorenzo, Bonifacio Lorenzo, Vicente Asuncion, Francisco Lorenzo, Leoncio Perez and Servillano Perez. On the other hand, Teodorica de la Cruz, the naked owner, bequeathed in her will all her rights to the fishpond to Jose V. Salamat. The fourteen usufructuaries leased the fishpond first to one Gil P. Policarpio who used to give them proportionately the usufruct corresponding to them. During the term of the lease, however, three of the usufructuaries died, namely, Francisco Lorenzo, Leoncio M. Perez and Servillano Perez, and so, upon their death, both the naked owner and the remaining usufructuaries claimed the shares corresponding to the deceased usufructuaries in the amount of P10,714.26. Because of these conflicting claims, the lessee withheld said amount. Subsequently, on May 31, 1962, the surviving usufructuaries leased the fishpond to one Batas Riego de Dios who, after executing the contract of lease, came to know of the existing conflicting claims, and not knowing to whom of the claimants the shares of the deceased usufructuaries should be paid, said lessee was also constrained to withhold the corresponding part of the usufruct of the property. So on November 15, 1962, the two lessees commenced the present action for interpleader against both the naked owner and surviving usufructuaries to compel them to interplead and litigate their conflicting claims. Defendant Jose V. Salamat avers as special defense that he is the successor-in-interest of Teodorica de la Cruz and as such he is entitled to the shares corresponding to the three deceased usufructuaries inasmuch as the usufruct in their favor was automatically extinguished by death and became merged with the naked owner. The surviving usufructuaries, on the other hand, adhere to the theory that since the usufructuaries were instituted simultaneously by the late Damasa Crisostomo, the death of the three usufructuaries did not extinguish the usufruct, hence, the surviving usufructuaries are entitled to receive the shares corresponding to the deceased usufructuaries, the usufruct to continue until the death of the last usufructuary. When the case was called for hearing, the parties agreed to submit the case for decision upon the submission of their respective memoranda considering that the issue involved was purely legal in nature, and on March 29, 1963, the trial court rendered decision the dispositive part of which reads as follows: Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered declaring defendant Jose V. Salamat entitled to the sum of P10,714.25 representing the shares of the three deceased usufructuaries in the lease rental due from plaintiff Gil Policarpio, ordering the latter to deliver to said defendant the aforesaid amount; and likewise declaring said defendant Jose V. Salamat entitled to share with the eleven usufructuaries in the proceeds of the lease contract executed by them with plaintiff Batas Riego de Dios, ordering the latter to deliver to him such amount as would be equivalent to the shares of the three deceased usufructuaries, with the parties bearing their own costs and expenses of litigation.

The surviving usufructuaries appeal. 1äwphï1.ñët

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The important issue to be determined is whether the eleven surviving usufructuaries of the fishpond in question are the ones entitled to the fruits that would have corresponded to the three deceased usufructuaries or the naked owner Jose V. Salamat. Appellants argue that it is the surviving usufructuaries who are entitled to receive the shares of the deceased by virtue of Article 611 of the Civil Code which provides "A usufruct constituted in favor of several persons living at the time of its constitution shall not be extinguished until the death of the last survivor." On the other hand, appellee contends that the most a usufruct can endure if constituted in favor of a natural person is the lifetime of the usufructuary, because a usufruct is extinguished by the death of the usufructuary unless a contrary intention clearly appears (Article 603, Civil Code). Hence, appellee argues, when the three usufructuaries died, their usufructuary rights were extinguished and whatever rights they had to the fruits reverted to the naked owner. If the theory of appellee in the sense that the death of the three usufructuaries has the effect of consolidating their rights with that of the naked owner were correct, Article 611 of the Civil Code would be superfluous, because Article 603 already provides that the death of the usufructuary extinguishes the usufruct unless the contrary appears. Furthermore, said theory would cause a partial extinction of the usufruct, contrary to the provisions of Article 611 which expressly provides that the usufruct shall not be extinguished until the death of the last survivor. The theory of appellee cannot, therefore, be entertained. The well-known Spanish commentators on the counterpart of Article 611 we have copied above which implicitly provides that the share of a usufructuary who dies in the meantime inures to the benefit of the surviving usufructuaries, also uphold the view we here express. Thus, the following is their comment on the matter: Al comentar el articulo 469 (now Art. 564) hablamos, entre formas de constitucion del usufructo, del disfrute simultaneo y sucesivo. Ninguna duda cabe, puesto que el derecho de acrecer es aplicable a los usufructuarios, segun el Art. 987 (now Art. 1023), sobre la no extincion del usufructo simultaneo, hasta la muerte de la ultima persona que sobreviva. . . . . . . Al referirse . . . el articulo 521 (now Art. 611) al usufructo constituido en provecho de varias personas vivas al tiempo de su constitucion, parece referirse al usufructo simultaneo. Sin embargo, es indudable que se refiere tambien al sucesivo, puesto que en esta especie de usufructs el segundo usufructuario no entra en el disfrute, salvo expresion en contrario, hasta la muerte del primero, y es claro que al morir el ultimo llamado, se extingue el usufructo, que es precisamente lo que ordena el presente articulo. (Manresa, Comentarios al Codigo Civil Español, 1931, Tomo IV, par. 486). . . . refiriendonos al caso de muerte natural, ha de tenerse presente que si son muchos los llamados el usufructo simultaneamente, muerto uno, su porcian acrece a los demas, a no ser que el testador exprese lo contrario, o se infiriera asi del titulo en que se constituye el usufructo, para lo cual puede verse la doctrina de la ley 33, tit. I, lib. VII del Digesto, que habla del derecho de acrecer en el usufructo, y el tit. IV del mismo libro, en que se proponen algunos casos de excepcion.—El usufructo constituido en provecho de varias personas vivas al tiempo de su constitucion, no extinguira hasta la muerte de la ultima que sobreviviere. Cod. Civ. art. 521. (Del Viso, Lecciones Elementales de Derecho Civil, sexta edicion, Tomo I, p. 86.) Si a varios usufructuarios se les lega la totalidad de una herencia; o una misma parte de ella, se da el derecho de

acrecer cuando una de ellos muere despues del testador, sobreviviendo otro y otros?—Como dice la obra anotado, el Digesto admitio, segun un texto de Paulo, la solucion afirmativa, y Pothier reprodujo dicha doctrina. La jurisprudencia del Tribunal Supreme español ha admitido y sancionado tambien en la sentencia de 29 de marzo de 1905, aunque no por aplicacion del derecho de acrecer, y si por aplicacion de la voluntad presunta del testador, que babiendose legado el usufructo vitalicio del remanente du sus bienes, por partes iguales, a dos hermanas, debe entenderse que ellas, o cualquiera de las dos que sobreviviere a la otra, habia de disfrutar dicho usufructo, no constituyendo la separacion de partes sino una prevision del testador, para el arreglo del usufructo total durante la vida de los dos usufructuarios. (Colin and Capitant, Curso Elemental del Derecho Civil, 1957, Tomo VIII, pp. 605-606) It, therefore, appears that the Spanish commentators on the subject are unanimous that there is accretion among usufructuaries who are constituted at the same time when one of them dies before the end of the usufruct. The only exception is if the usufruct is constituted in a last will and testament and the testator makes a contrary provision. Here there is none. On the contrary, the testatrix constituted the usufruct in favor of the children of her three cousins with the particular injunction that they are the only ones to enjoy the same as long as they live, from which it can be implied that, should any of them die, the share of the latter shall accrue to the surviving ones. These provisions of the will are clear. They do not admit of any other interpretation. Wherefore, the decision appealed from is reversed. The eleven surviving usufructuaries are hereby declared to be entitled to the shares of the three deceased usufructuaries and, hence, as a corollary, appellees Gil P. Policarpio and Batas Riego de Dios are hereby ordered to pay to them the money withheld by them respectively representing the shares of the deceased usufructuaries. No costs. Policarpio v. Salamat L-218091, Jan. 31, 1966 FACTS: In her will, a testatrix constituted a usufruct (over her properties) in favor of the children of her three cous-ins. The will also provided that the said children are the only ones to enjoy the same as long as they live. Now then, if any of them subsequently dies, who will get his share? HELD: From the above-cited proviso in the will, it can be inferred that the share of the heir who subsequently dies shall ACCRUE to the surviving ones. Said proviso is clear enough, and does not admit of any other interpretation. MANUEL TORRES, petitioner-appellant and LUZ LOPEZ DE BUENO, appellant, vs. MARGARITA LOPEZ, opponent-appellee. G.R. No. L-24569 26 February 1926 FACTS: On January 3,1924, the testator Thomas Rodriquez, who was 76 years of age and was in feeble health for a long time, made his will where he made his cousin Vicente Lopez and his daughter Luz Lopez de Bueno as the only and universal heir of his properties. The probate of the will was opposed by Margarita Lopez, cousin and nearest relative of the deceased. The ground cited for the opposition was that the testator lacked mental capacity, she claimed that at time of the execution of the supposed will, the deceased was suffering from senile dementia and was under guardianship. ISSUE: Whether or not the testator was mentally capacitated during the execution of the will. RULING: The deceased testator had mental capacity to make his will during its execution. The Supreme Court held that at the time of the making of the will, the testator may be of old age, may have been physically decrepit, may have been week of intellect, have suffered a loss of memory, had a guardian over his person and property and may have been eccentric, but he still possessed that spark of reason and of life, that strength of mind to form a fixed intention, and to summon his

enfeebled thoughts to enforce that intention which the law terms “testamentary capacity.” TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSE EUGENIO RAMIREZ, MARIA LUISA PALACIOS, Administratrix, petitioner-appellee, vs. MARCELLE D. VDA. DE RAMIREZ, ET AL., oppositors, JORGE and ROBERTO RAMIREZ, legatees, oppositors- appellants.

G.R. No. L-27952 February 15, 1982 FACTS: J ose Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino national, died in Spain on December 11, 1964, with only his widow, Marcelle Demoron de Ramirez as compulsory heir. His will was admitted to probate by the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch X, on July 27, 1965. Maria Luisa Palacios was appointed administratrix of the estate.The administratrix submitted a project of partition as follows: the property of the deceased is to be divided into two parts. One part shall go to the widow 'en pleno dominio" in satisfaction of her legitime; the other part or "free portion" shall go to Jorge and Roberto Ramirez "en nuda propriedad." Furthermore, one third (1/3) of the free portion is charged with the widow's usufruct and the remaining two-thirds (2/3) with a usufruct in favor of Wanda, the companion of the deceased. Jorge and Roberto opposed the project of partition on the grounds: (a) that the provisions for vulgar substitution in favor of Wanda de Wrobleski with respect to the widow's usufruct and in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horacio V. Ramirez, with respect to Wanda's usufruct are invalid because the first heirs Marcelle and Wanda) survived the testator; (b) that the provisions for fideicommissary substitutions are also invalid because the first heirs are not related to the second heirs or substitutes within the first degree, as provided in Article 863 of the Civil Code; (c) that the grant of a usufruct over real property in the Philippines in favor of Wanda Wrobleski, who is an alien, violates Section 5, Article III of the Philippine Constitution; and that (d) the proposed partition of the testator's interest in the Santa Cruz (Escolta) Building between the widow Marcelle and the appellants, violates the testator's express win to give this property to them Nonetheless, the lower court approved the project of partition in its order dated May 3, 1967. It is this order which Jorge and Roberto have appealed to this Court. ISSUE:Whether or not the testamentary dispositions in favor of the heirs are valid and how should the estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez be partitioned. RULING: YES.The dispositions to the widow, Marcelle Demoron de Ramirez as compulsory heir is valid.The Court also upheld the usufruct in favor of Wanda because a usufruct, albeit a real right, does not vest title to the land in the usufructuary and it is the vesting of title to land in favor of aliens which is proscribed by the Constitution.Hence the estate of the deceased shall be distributed as follows: One-half (1/2) thereof to his widow as her legitime; One-half (1/2) thereof which is the free portion to Roberto and Jorge Ramirez in naked ownership and the usufruct to Wanda de Wrobleski with a simple substitution in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace V. Ramirez. The distribution herein ordered supersedes that of the court a quo. No special pronouncement as to costs.