09-08-09_dl_ch_5-11-09.pdf

MEMORANDUM OF LAWS IN SUPPORT TO: INSTRUCTIONS FOR LAWFUL EXEMPTIONS & AFFIDAVIT OF CHARACTER DERIVATION OF DUE PROCESS RESCISSION OF DRIVERS LICENSE RESCISSION OF DMV REGISTRATIONS

Legal notice of the historical derivation of the Driver License in California statutes.

Official Notice Requested (West's Ann. Cal. Gov. Code 2004), (Sections 11515) JUDICIAL NOTICE REQUIRED (West's Ann. Cal. Evid. Code (2004), sections (451, 453, 459). JOHN A. SMITH AUTHORIZED AGENT John A. Smith 123 Main Street San Diego [92015] Secured party Plaintiff/beneficiary to: The US Trust Authorized representative P.A.G. 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983 To: Department of the Motor Vehicle et al Coast Guard Stationed in California et. al Department of Transportation et. al California Governor et al Attorney General California et al

" This section [2 of the Motor Vehicle Act] provides that: '... such selfpropelling vehicles as are used neither for the conveyance of persons for hire, pleasure, or business, nor for the transportation of freight, are hereby exempted from the payment of the fees in this act prescribed. The department shall furnish, free of charge, distinguishing plates for motor vehicles thus exempt.'" Marin Municipal Water Dist. v. Chenu (1922) 188 Cal. 734, 737.

Declarant, John A. Smith, is a competent witness over the age of 18 years, has personal knowledge of the facts stated herein, and does Solemnly state that: 1.a. I am a natural born, adult white Man, one of the people of the United States of America and one of the people of California. 1.b. I am not a trained or licensed Attorney; of necessity, I am acting at all times within my fundamental right to defend my life, liberty, and property as set out in CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION (2004), Art. 1, Sec. 1 (http://www.leginfo.ca.gov./.const/.article_1 [as of May 11, 2009]): All people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy. 2. I rely upon the same materials as are available to attorneys and the court at or through the local law library. I present here the results of my research concerning the "driver license" in California here.

3.a.1. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 7th Ed. (1999), p. 931, reads (in part): License, n. 1. A revocable permission to commit some act that would otherwise be unlawful; esp., an agreement (not amounting to a lease or profit a prendre) that it will be lawful for the licensee to enter the licensor's land to do some act that would otherwise be illegal, such as hunting game. See SERVITUDE. 2. The certificate or document evidencing such permission. ... 3.b. 34 CALIFORNIA JURISPRUDENCE 3rd Ed. (Rev) Part 2 (2002), FRANCHISES FROM GOVERNMENT BODIES, sec. 2, reads (boldface emphasis added, footnotes omitted): Section 2. Franchise and license

Although a franchise is a special privilege conferred by government, not every such privilege is a franchise, particularly where the governmental body conferring the privilege is acting in its proprietary, rather than its governmental capacity. A right or privilege that is essential to the performance of the general function or purpose of the grantee, and that can be granted by the sovereignty alone, is a franchise, whereas a right or privilege that is not essential to the general function or purpose of the grantee, and is of a nature that a private party might grant a like right or privilege on his or her property, namely, a temporary or revocable permission to occupy or use a portion of some public ground, is a license and not a franchise. A license is not regarded as property in the ordinary sense and is not a contract, whereas a franchise is both. Moreover, a franchise is assignable, whereas a license, being a personal privilege, ordinarily is not. That a privilege is revocable without cause tends to show that it is a license or permit rather than a franchise, since the concept of franchise, while not requiring continuance in perpetuity, involves some degree of permanence and stability. Section 3.ch.1. The Supreme Court of the United States has held (emphasis added): It is, we think, a sound principle, that when a government becomes a partner in any trading company, it divests itself, so far as concerns the transaction of that company of its sovereign character, and takes that of a private citizen. Instead of communicating to the company its privileges and its prerogatives, it descends to a level with those with whom it associates itself, and takes the character which belongs to its associates, and to the business that is to be transacted. Thus, many states of this Union who have an interest in banks are not suitable even in their own courts; yet they never exempt the corporation from being sued. The state of Georgia, by giving to the bank the capacity to sue and be sued, voluntarily strips itself of its sovereign character, so far as respects the transactions of the bank, and waives all *the privileges of [*908] that character. As a member of a corporation, a government never exercises its sovereignty. It acts merely as a corporator, and exercises no other power in the management of the affairs of the corporation, than are expressly given by the incorporating act. The government of the Union held shares in the old Bank of the United States; but the privileges of the government were not imported by that circumstance to the bank. The United States was not a party to suits brought by or against the bank in the sense of the constitution. So with respect to the present bank. Suits brought by or against it are not understood to be brought by or against the United States. The government, by becoming a corporator, lays down its sovereignty, so far as respects the transactions of the corporation, and exercises no power or privilege that is not derived from the charter. The Bank of the United States v. The Planters' Bank of Georgia (1824), 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 904, 907-908, 6 L.Ed 244. Section 3.c.2. A California appellate court held (emphasis added):

Another case, that of Marin Water Dist. v. Marin Water Co., 178 Cal. 308 [173 Pac. 469, 471], demonstrates that California at least, has departed from the rule laid down by the celebrated Marshall in the case of Bank of the United States v. Planters' Bank of Georgia, 9 Wheat. (U.S.) 904, [6 L. Ed. 244, see, also, Rose's U. S. Notes], to the effect that when a government enters into business instead of communicating to the business any of its privileges and prerogatives, it descends to a level of the business in which it engages. In the California case, under the authority of a constitutional provision, it is held that a water district formed for the purpose of supplying its inhabitants with water has the right to condemn the property of a privately owned public utility theretofore engaged in the business of supplying water to the same people and that the enactment did not violate the provision of "the federal constitution prohibiting a state from depriving a person of his property without due process of law, or denying him the equal protection of the laws." The provision of the state Constitution to which we have referred is section 23a of article XII and reads as follows: "The Railroad Commission shall have and exercise such power and jurisdiction as shall be conferred upon it by the legislature to fix the just compensation to be paid for the taking of any property of a public utility in eminent domain proceeding by the state or any county, city and county, incorporated city or town, municipal water district, irrigation district or other public corporation or district, and the right of the legistature to confer such powers upon the Railroad Commission is hereby declared to be plenary and to be unlimited by any provision of this Constitution. All acts of the legislature heretofore adopted which are in accordance herewith are hereby confirmed and declared valid." Los Angeles v. South Gate (1930), 108 Cal.App. 398, 410. 3.c.3. West's ANN.CAL.CONST. (2004), Art. 12, sec. 17-23a reads (in part): Section 17 to 23a. Repealed Nov. 5, 1974. Historical Notes Section 23a, added Nov. 3, 1914, amended Nov. 4, 1924, authorized the Railroad Commission (Public Utilities Commission) to fix just compensation for takings of property for use by a public utility. See Const. Art. 12, sec. 5. Repeal of sec. 23a, proposed by A.C.A. No. 36, 1974, was approved by the electors at the general election held Nov. 5, 1974. 3.c.4. West's ANN.CAL.CONST. (2004), Art. 12, sect. 5 reads: Section 5. Additional authority and jurisdiction of commission; review; eminent domain

Sec. 5. The Legislature has plenary power, unlimited by the other provisions of this constitution but consistent with this article, to confer additional authority and jurisdiction upon the commission, to establish the manner and scope of review of commission action in a court of record, and to enable it to fix just compensation for utility property taken by eminent domain. 3.c.5. West's ANN.CAL.CONST. (2004), Art. 12, sec. 3 reads: Section 3. Classification; control by legislature; additional classes Sec. 3. Private corporations and persons that own, operate, control, or manage a line, plant, or system for the transportation of people or property, the transmission of telephone and telegraph messages, or the production, generation, transmission, or furnishing of heat, light, water, power, storage, or wharf-age directly or indirectly to or for the public, and common carriers, are public utilities subject to control by the Legislature. The Legislature may prescribe that additional classes of private corporations or other persons are public utilities. 3.d. I reasonably infer from the foregoing information that it is possible that the State of California has presumed that every person holding a "driver's license" is a public utility. However, that presumption, if extant, would place all persons so presumed against squarely within the sole jurisdiction of the Public Utilities Commission. 4.a. Stats. 1957, ch. 482, sec.1 originally created the driver's license and reads (in part). Section 1. Section 69.1 is added to the Vehicle Code, to read: 69.1 "Driver's License." "Driver's license" includes both an operator's and a chauffeur's license. Stats. 1957, ch. 482, p. 1514. 4.b. The California Legislature repealed the pre-1959 Vehicle Code in its entirety and reenacted it in 1959: An act to repeal and re-enact the Vehicle Code and to add Chapter 6.5 (commencing at Section 3067) to Title 14, Part 4, Division 3 of the Civil Code and to amend Section 11004.5 of the Revenue and Taxation Code, relating to vehicles. Section 1: The Vehicle Code is repealed. Section 2: The Vehicle Code is enacted to read: GENERAL PROVISIONS 1. This act shall be known as the Vehicle Code. Stats. 1959, ch. 3, p. 1523. 4.c. The 1959 legislation re-adopted the definition of driver's license from the former Vehicle Code, sec. 69.1 as sect. 310: 310. "Driver's license" includes both an operator's and a chauffeur's license. Stats. 1959, ch. 3, p. 1531.

4.d. A California appellate court said: The words "or other places" do not authorize such expansion because of the rule of ejusdem generis which has been defined as follows: "... where, in a statute, general words follow a designation of particular subjects or classes of persons, the meaning of the general words will ordinarily be presumed to be, and construed as restricted by the particular designation and as including only things or persons of the same kind, class, character or nature as those specifically enumerated. The general words are deemed to have been used not to the wide extent which they might bear if standing alone, but as related to words of more definite and particular meaning with which they are associated." (50 Am. Jur., (1944) Statutes, sec. 249, pp. 244, 246.) Market Basket v. Jacobsen (1955), 134 Cal.App.2d 73, 82. 4.e. My reasonable inference from the foregoing information is that a driver's license is a direct combination of ONLY the "Operator License" and the "Chauffeur License". 5.a. The statutory term "chauffeur" seems to have undergone fewer statutory amendments over the years than has the statutory term "operator", so I present my research concerning it first. 5.b. The first statutory definition I found of the term "chauffeur" is in the motor vehicle act of 1905, sec. 1(5) (emphasis added): (5) "chauffeur" shall mean any person operating a motor vehicle as mechanic, employee [sic] or for hire. Stats. 1905, ch. DCXII, p. 816. 5.c. The first change to the definition of "chauffeur" which I found is in the motor vehicle act, as amended (1913), sec. 1(8) (emphasis added): (8) "chauffeur" shall mean any person who operates a motor vehicle, and who directly or indirectly receives pay or any compensation whatsoever for such operation, or for any work or service in connection with motor vehicles, excepting only manufacturers, agents, proprietors of garages, and dealers who do not operate for hire; provided however, that an employee of a manufacturer or of a dealer whose principal occupation is that of a salesman shall be exempted from this definition and shall be designated an operator; provided, further, that a person operating a motorcycle shall not be considered a chauffeur unless such motorcycle is of greater weight than four hundred pounds unladen; Stats. 1913, ch. 325, p. 640. 5.d. The Supreme Court of California case that dealt extensively with chauffeurs reads (in part, emphasis added):

That the occupation of a chauffeur is of this character may not be questioned and has been decided. (State v. Swagerty, 203 Mo. 517, [120 Am. St. Rep. 671, 11 Ann. Cas. 725, 10 L. R. A. (N.S.) 601, 102 S. W. 483]; Christy v. Elliot, 216 Ill. 31, [108 Am. St. Rep. 196, 3 Ann. Cas. 487, 1 L. R. A. (N.S.) 215, 74 N. E. 1035].) There are unquestionable elements of similarity, even of identity, between the driving of an automobile by a professional chauffeur and the driving of a like vehicle by a private owner, designated in this act as an "operator." ... All these matters may be conceded, and yet there are others of equal significance where the differences between the two classes of drivers are radical. Of first importance in this is the fact that the chauffeur offers his services to the public and is frequently a carrier of the general public. These circumstances put professional chauffeurs in a class by themselves and entitle the public to receive the protection which the legislature may accord in making provision for the competency and carefulness of such drivers. The chauffeur, generally speaking, is not driving his own car. He is intrusted with the property of others. In the nature of things a different amount of care will be exercised by such a driver than will be exercised by the man driving his own car and risking his own property. ... The argument of the peril attending the public at the hands of the unlicensed operator driving his own car is not without force, but it can only successfully be presented to the legislative department and not to the courts. In the Matter of Application of Stork (1914), 167 Cal. 294, 295-296, 139 P. 684. 5.e. The next change to the definition of "chauffeur" which I found is in the Motor Vehicle Act of 1915, sec. 1(8) and reads (emphasis added): (8) "chauffeur" shall mean any person who operates an automobile in the transportation of persons and who receives any compensation for such service in wages, commission or otherwise, paid directly or indirectly, or who as owner or employee operates an automobile carrying passengers for hire; provided, however, that this definition shall not include manufacturers' agents, proprietors of garages and dealers, salesmen, mechanics, or demonstrators of automobiles in the ordinary course of their business; Stats. 1915, ch. 188, p. 398. 5.f. The next change to the definition of "chauffeur" which I found is in the Vehicle Code of 1935, sec. 71 and reads (emphasis added): 71. "Chauffeur." "Chauffeur" is a person who is employed by another for the principal purpose of driving a motor vehicle on the highways and receives compensation therefor. Stats. 1935, ch. 27, p. 98. 5.g. The California court case which defines "chauffeur" reads: Section 71 of the Vehicle Code provides as follows: " 'Chauffeur' is a person who is employed by another for the principal purpose of driving a motor vehicle on the highways and receives compensation therefor."

As an abstract proposition it may be that more skill is required in the operation of a heavy truck than in the management of a pleasure vehicle, but it does not follow that the question of possession of a chauffeur's license is material in a particular case irrespective of causal connection between the violation of a statute in failing to have such license and the damage complained of. Hunton v. Cal. Portland Cement Co. (1942), 50 Cal.App.2d 684, 691. 5.h.1. The next change to the definition of "chauffeur" which I found is in Stats. 1947, First Extra Session, ch. 11, sec. 35 (emphasis added): SEC. 35. Section 381 of said code is amended to read: 381. Fee for Operator's or Chauffeur's License. Upon application for an operator's or chauffeur's license, or renewal thereof, there shall be paid to the department a fee of two dollars ($2). The surrender of a valid operator's license shall entitle a qualified person to receive a chauffeur's license upon application for the unexpired period of the operator's license without additional fee or cost. The payment of the fee for an operator's license or chauffeur's application shall entitle the applicant to three examinations within a period of six months. The terms "operator's license" and "chauffeur's license" as used in this section include all licenses of every kind issued under Division 4 of this code. Stats. 1947, First Ex. Sess., ch. 11, p. 3808. 5.h.2. I have not located a print copy of the California Vehicle Code of 1935, as amended to 1947, to determine what licenses were then included in Division 4. 5.h.3. The foregoing section required that I do further investigation, so I went back to the Vehicle Code of 1935, Stats. 1935, ch. 27, sec. 381, the original statute before the amendment thereof: 381. Fee for Chauffeur's License or Badge. Upon application for a chauffeur's license there shall be paid the department a fee of one dollar for the issuance of such license with a chauffeur's badge. Upon renewal of a chauffeur's license there shall be paid the department a fee of one dollar. Stats. 1935, ch. 27, p. 151. 6.a.1. The first mention which I have found of the term "operator" is in the motor vehicle act, as amended (1913), ch. 325, sec. 1(8) (set out in full above), 1(16), and 1(17) (emphasis added): (8) ... provided however, that an employee of a manufacturer or of a dealer whose principal occupation is that of a salesman shall be exempted from this definition and shall be designated an operator; ... Stats. 1913, ch. 325, p. 640. 6.a.2. The motor vehicle act, as amended (1913), sec. 1(16) reads (emphasis added): (16) "operator" shall mean any person other than a chauffeur, who operates a motor vehicle; Stats. 1913, ch. 325, p. 640. 6.a.3. The motor vehicle act, as amended (1913), sec. 1(17) reads:

(17) "person" shall include any corporation, association, copartnership, company, firm, or other aggregation of individuals which owns or controls any motor vehicle as owner, or for the purpose of sale, or for renting as agent, salesman or otherwise. Stats. 1913, ch. 325, p. 640. 6.b. The first change to the definition of "operator" which I found is in the Motor Vehicle Act (1915), ch. 188, sec. 1(15) and 1(16), and read (emphasis added): (15) "operator" shall mean any person other that a chauffeur who operates a motor vehicle and any person who operates, rides, drives or propels any vehicle other that a motor vehicle; Stats. 1915, ch. 188, p. 399. (16) "person" shall include any corporation, association, co-partnership, company, firm, or other aggregation of individuals; and where the term "person" is used in conjunction with the registration of a vehicle, it shall include any corporation, association, copartnership, company, firm, or other aggregation of individuals which owns or controls such vehicle as actual owner, or for the purpose of sale, or for renting, whether as agent, salesman, or other wise; Stats. 1915, ch. 188, p. 399. 6.c. The next change to the definition of "operator" which I found is in an act of 1923, ch. 266, sec. 18 and 15, and reads (emphasis added): SEC. 18. "Operator." Every person who drives, operates or is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle upon a public highway. Stats. 1923, ch. 266, p. 519. SEC. 15. "Person." Every natural person, firm, co-partnership, association or corporation. 6.d. The next change to the definition of "operator" which I found is in an act of 1925, ch. 412, sec. 1(b) and reads (emphasis added): (b) The word "operator" shall include all persons, firms, associations and corporations who operate motor vehicles upon any public highway in this state and thereby engage in the transportation of persons or property for hire or compensation, but shall not include any person, firm, association or corporation who solely transports by motor vehicle persons to and from or to and from attendance upon any public school or who solely transports his or its own property, or employees, or both, and who transports no persons or property for hire or compensation, but all persons operating freight carrying vehicles so exempted shall be required to obtain from the state board of equalization and to display exempt emblems in the manner hereinafter provided. Stats. 1925, ch. 412, sec. 1(b), p. 833. 6.e. A California appellate court held:

"To drive" is defined as meaning, "to impel the motion and quicken"; whereas "to operate" means "to direct or superintend." (Century Dictionary.) Bosse v. Marye (1926), 80 Cal.App. 109, 118. 6.f. The next change to the definition of "operator" which I found is in an act of 1933, ch. 339, p. 928, sec.1(a), and reads (emphasis added): An act imposing a license fee or tax for the transportation of persons or property for hire or compensation upon the public streets, roads and highways in the State of California by motor vehicle and providing that this act shall take effect immediately. Section 1. The words and phrases used in this act shall be construed for the purposes of said act, unless such construction be contrary to or inconsistent with the context thereof, as follows: (a) the word "operator" shall include all persons, firms, associations and corporations who operate motor vehicles upon any public highway in this State and thereby engage in the transportation of persons or property for hire or compensation, either directly or indirectly. Stats. 1933, ch. 339, p. 928. 6.g. The Supreme Court of California held (italics in original, bracketed information and emphasis added): The question thus presented is: Does the License Tax Act of 1933 [Stats. 1933, p. 928] apply solely and exclusively to common carriers and private contract carriers in the business of transporting persons and property upon the public highways for hire or compensation? ...[p. 48] Section 1 of said act provides that: "the word 'operator' shall include all persons, firms, associations and corporations who operate motor vehicles upon any public highway in this state and thereby engage in the transportation of persons or property for hire or compensation, either directly or indirectly. ......and the fact that the act expressly defines an operator as one who operates a motor vehicle for compensation, either directly or indirectly, supports the conclusion that the act was intended to have a wider application than to carriers alone.... The fact that subsequent acts enacted in 1935 which are not tax acts but regulatory acts (Stats.1935, chaps. 223, 312 and 664) deal with the transportation of property for compensation or hire as a business and contain many terms employing the words "carrier" and "in the business" or "as a business" is not persuasive that the License Tax Act of 1933 was intended to deal solely with transportation operations as a business.... ... the act was not intended to be limited to carrier service but was intended to include in addition other transportation upon the public highways for compensation.

... The history of such legislation discloses two distinct lines of statutes. One line was enacted for the purpose of regulating the business of transportation by motor vehicles of persons or property for hire or compensation upon the public highways. (Stats. 1917, p. 330, and amendments; Stats. 1935, chaps. 223, 312 and 664.) The following cases are pertinent to the subject of the regulation of such transportation operators: Western Assn. of Short Line Railroads v. Railroad Com., 173 Cal. 802 [162 Pac. 391, 1 A.L.R. 1455]; Frost v. Railroad Com., 197 Cal. 230 [240 Pac. 26]; Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Com., 271 U.S. 583 [46 Sup. Ct. 605, 70 L. Ed. 1101, 47 A.L.R. 457]; Holmes v. Railroad Com., 197 Cl. 627, [242 Pac. 486]; Haynes v. MacFarland, 207 Cal. 529 [279 Pac. 436]; Forsyth v. San Joaquin Light etc. Corp., 208 Cal. 397 [281 Pac. 620]; Landis v. Railroad Com., 220 Cal. 470 [31 Pac. (2d) 345]. The License Tax Act of 1933 was enacted as a step in the second line, that of certain acts and constitutional provisions which were primarily revenue measures, designed to secure for the state a fair return for the use of the public highways of the state in transporting persons or property for compensation. (Stats. 1923, p. 706; Stats. 1925, p. 833; Stats. 1927, p. 1708; Stats. 1927, p. 1742; California Const., art. XIII, sec. 15; Pol. Code, sec. 3664aa; Stats. 1933, p. 928.) These enactments have been before the courts of this state in the following cases: Bacon Service Corp. v. Huss, 199 Cal. 21 [248 Pac. 235]; In re Schmolke, 199 Cal. 42 [248 Pac. 244]; Los Angeles etc. Transp. Co. v. Suprerior Court, 211 Cal. 411 [295 Pac. 837]; Alward v. Johnson, 208 Cal. 359 [281 Pac. 389]; People v. Duntley, 217 Cal. 150 [17 Pac. (2d) 715]; People v. Lang Transp. Co., 217 Cal. 166 [17 Pac. (2d) 721]. An analysis of the legislative history discloses the fact that all the statutes dealing with the regulation of transportation agencies refer to persons in the business of transportation of persons or property upon the public highways for hire or compensation.... We are satisfied that the purpose of the enactment of the License Tax Act of 1933 was to secure a fair return to the state for the use of its public highways not only from carriers, both common carriers and private contract carriers, but also from the larger class of persons who fairly answer to the description of "operator" therein defined as taxable and who receive compensation, either directly or indirectly, from the use of the public highways. Although it is true that the legislature might legally have limited the application of such taxes to carriers, it evidently seemed more just and fair to the legislature, as it does to us, that all those who receive compensation directly or indirectly from the use of the public highways should bear a proportionate share of the burden of its maintenance. In Re Bush (1936), 6 Cal.2d 43, 48-53. 6.h.1. The next change to the definition of "operator" which I found is in the Vehicle Code of 1935, ch. 27, sec. 70 and 65 read together (emphasis added):

70. "Operator." "Operator" is a person, other than a chauffeur, who drives or is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle upon a highway. Stats. 1935, ch. 27, p. 98. 6.h.2. Vehicle Code (1935), ch. 27, sec. 65 reads: 65. "Person." "Person" includes a natural person, firm, co-partnership, association or corporation. Stats. 1935, ch. 27, p. 98. 6.h.3. Vehicle Code (1935), ch. 27, � 69 reads (emphasis added): 69. "Driver." "Driver" is a person who drives or is in actual physical control of a vehicle. Stats. 1935, ch. 27, p. 98. 6.i.1. A federal court in California held (emphasis added): The motor vehicle license or registration fee is a privilege tax levied in exercise of the police power to control and regulate travel on the public highways. It is not considered as a tax on the motor vehicle itself, but for the privilege of using the highways. Blashfield, Cyc. of Automobile Law, Permanent Edition, Sec. 212, Vol. 1, p. 158. A license to operate a motor vehicle is granted under the inherent right of the state or municipality to regulate its use on the public highways or streets. Ibid., Sec. 211, p. 157. The only automobiles required to be registered under the California Motor Vehicle Act are vehicles used upon the public highway (Cal. Stats. 1927, p. 1424, sec. 11; California Standard Finance Corp. v. Riverside Finance Co., 111 Cal. App. 151, 163, 295 P. 555); if the vehicles were not used, no registration fee would have fallen due under the law of California. But, in carrying on the business of Richmaid, the motor vehicles were operated upon the public highways of the state of California and license fees attached. ... California Vehicle Code, sec. 370 et seq., St.1935, p. 147 et seq., California Vehicle License Fee Act, sec. 6, as amended. The motor vehicles in question could not be operated in 1937 without incurring the license and registration fees. Necessarily, therefore, the fees were an expense of doing business and were chargeable against the estate. Ingels v. Boteler (C.C.A. 1939), 100 F.2d 915, 919; affm'd. 308 U.S. 57, 84 L.Ed. 78, 60 S.Ct. 29. 6.i.2. California Standard Finance Corp. v. Riverside Finance Company, 111 Cal.App. 151, cited in the foregoing case, reads (in part, emphasis added) Section 36 of the Motor Vehicle Act, subdivision a, defines what vehicles are to be registered under the Motor Vehicle Act, and reads as follows: "Every owner of a motor vehicle . . . which shall be operated upon the public highways of this state shall for each such vehicle owned, except as herein otherwise provided, apply to the division for the registration thereof." (Stats. 1927, p. 1423.) It appears from the said section that no registration of new automobiles is required under the terms of said act except those which are to be operated upon the public highways of this state. [p. 162]

... It therefore appears that the only automobiles required to be registered under the California Motor Vehicle Act (Stats. 1927, p. 1424), are the vehicles to be used upon the public highway. [p. 163] California Standard Finance Corp. v. Riverside Finance Company (1931), 111 Cal.App. 151, 162-163. 6.i.3. The preceding two cases appear to be based upon the definition of "operator" in effect in 1927 which seems to be the definition of "operator" found in an act of 1925, ch. 412, sec. 1(b), set out above and repeated here (emphasis added): (b) The word "operator" shall include all persons, firms, associations and corporations who operate motor vehicles upon any public highway in this state and thereby engage in the transportation of persons or property for hire or compensation, but shall not include any person, firm, association or corporation who solely transports by motor vehicle persons to and from or to and from attendance upon any public school or who solely transports his or its own property, or employees, or both, and who transports no persons or property for hire or compensation, but all persons operating freight carrying vehicles so exempted shall be required to obtain from the state board of equalization and to display exempt emblems in the manner hereinafter provided. Stats. 1925, ch. 412, p. 833. 6.j. The next change to the definition of "operator" which I found is in an act of 1937, ch. 679, sec. 1(a), and reads (emphasis added): An act to amend section 1, 2, 3, 4, and 11 of an act entitled "An act imposing a license fee or tax for the transportation of persons or property for hire or compensation upon the public streets, roads, and highways in the State of California by motor vehicle and providing that this act shall take effect immediately," approved May 15, 1933; to add sections 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 15, and 21 to said act; to renumber and amend section 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, 14, 16, and 17 of said act; to repeal sections 10 and 15 of said act; relating to the taxing of operators engaged in the transportation of persons or property upon the public highways by motor vehicle and providing that this act shall take effect immediately. Section 1. ...(a) The term "operator" shall include all persons engaged in the transportation of persons or property for hire or compensation by or upon motor vehicles upon any public highway in this State, either directly or indirectly, but shall not mean or include the following: (1) Any person transporting his own property in his own motor vehicle; provided, however, that any person making a specific charge for such transportation shall be deemed to be an "operator" hereunder; Stats. 1937, ch. 679, p. 1919. 6.k. The next change to the definition of "operator" which I found is in an act of 1941, ch. 39, sec. 1, and reads (emphasis added):

An act to add Part 4, comprising Sections 9601 to 10501, inclusive, to Division 2 of, and to add Section 50010 to, the Revenue and Taxation Code, thereby consolidating and revising the law relating to taxation and the raising of revenue, including the provisions of "An act imposing a license fee or tax for the transportation of persons or property for hire or compensation upon the public streets, roads and highways in the State of California by motor vehicle and providing that this act shall take effect immediately," approved May 15, 1933, as amended, and repealing acts and parts of acts specified herein. Section 1. Part 4, comprising Sections 9601 to 10501, inclusive, is hereby added to Division 2 of the Revenue and Taxation Code, to read as follows: . . . 9601. This part is known and may be cited as the "Motor Vehicle Transportation License Tax Law". . . . 9603. "Operator" includes: (a) Any person engaging in the transportation of persons or property for hire or compensation by or upon a motor vehicle upon any public highway in this State, either directly or indirectly. (b) Any person who furnishes any motor vehicle for the transportation of persons or property under a lease or rental agreement when pursuant to the terms thereof the person operates the motor vehicle furnished or exercises any control of, or assumes any responsibility for, or engages either in whole or in part in, the transportation of persons or property in the motor vehicle furnished. "Operator" does not include any of the following: (a) Any person transporting his own property in a motor vehicle owned or operated by him unless he makes a specific charge for the transportation. This subdivision does not in any way limit any other exemption granted by this section. Stats. 1941, ch. 39, p. 590. 6.l. A California appellate court has held: A driver is one who "is in actual physical control of the vehicle." ( sec. 69, Veh. Code.) An operator is one who directs or superintends it. (Bosse v. Marye, 809 Cal.App. 109, 118 [250 P. 693].) Fairman v. Mors (1942), 55 Cal App.2d 216, 219. 6.m. The next change to the definition of "operator" which I found is in Stats. 1955, ch. 1905, sec. 1, and reads (emphasis added): Section 1. Section 9603 of the Revenue and Taxation Code is amended to read: 9603. "Operator" includes: (a) Any person engaging in the transportation of persons or property for hire or compensation by or upon a motor vehicle upon any public highway in this State, either directly or indirectly. (b) Any person who for compensation furnishes any motor vehicle for the transportation of persons or property under a lease or rental agreement when such person operates the motor vehicle furnished or exercises any control of, or assumes any responsibility for the operation of the vehicle irrespective of whether the vehicle is driven by such person or the person to whom the vehicle is furnished, or engages either in whole or in part in, the transportation of persons or property in the motor vehicle furnished.

"Operator" does not include any of the following: (a) Any person transporting his own property in a motor vehicle owned or operated by him unless he makes a specific charge for the transportation. This subdivision does not in any way limit any other exemption granted by this section. (f) Any registered owner of a pleasure vehicle who, while operating the vehicle, transports persons to his work or to a place through which he passes on the way to his work, whether for or without compensation, if he is not in the business of furnishing such transportation. Stats. 1955, ch. 1905, p. 3515-3516. 6.n. West's ANN.CAL.REV. & TAX. CODE (2004), sec.9601 reads: sec. 9601 to 9606.1. Repealed by Stats. 1972, ch. 563, sec. 1, effect. Aug. 4, 1972, operative July 1, 1973. 7.a. It appears that the foregoing definitions of "chauffeur" and of "operator", respectively, are the ones which were in effect and in legal context prior to the Legislature's repeal and re-enactment of the Vehicle Code in 1959 (emphasis added): An act to repeal and re-enact the Vehicle Code and to add Chapter 6.5 (commencing at Section 3067) to Title 14, Part 4, Division 3 of the Civil Code and to amend Section 11004.5 of the Revenue and Taxation Code, relating to vehicles. Section 1: The Vehicle Code is repealed. Section 2: The Vehicle Code is enacted to read: GENERAL PROVISIONS 1. This act shall be known as the Vehicle Code. 2. The provisions of this code, insofar as they are substantially the same as the existing provisions relating to the same subject matter, shall be construed as restatements and continuations thereof and not as new enactments. . . . 250. A "chauffeur" is a person who is employed by another for the principal purpose of driving a motor vehicle on the highways and receives compensation therefor. . . . 310. "Driver's license" includes both an operator's and a chauffeur's license. . . . 450. An "operator" is a driver of a motor vehicle other than a chauffeur. Stats. 1959, ch. 3, pp. 1523-1535. 7.b.1. West's ANN. CAL. VEH. CODE (2004), sec. 310 reads: sec. 310. Driver's license A "driver's license" is a valid license to drive the type of motor vehicle or combination of vehicles for which a person is licensed under this code or by a foreign jurisdiction. 7.b.2. West's ANN. CAL.VEH. CODE (2004), sec. 250 reads: sec. 250. Chop Shop

Historical and Statutory Notes ... Former sec.250, enacted by Stats.1959, c. 3, p. 1530, sec. 250 ... which defined chauffeur, was repealed by Stats.1961, c. 1615, sec. 1. 7.b.3. West's ANN.CAL.VEH. CODE (2004), sec. 450 reads: sec. 450. Oil well production service unit ... Historical and Statutory Notes Former sec.450, enacted by Stats.1959, c. 3, p. 1535, � 450 ... defining "operator", was repealed by Stats.1961, c. 1615, p. 3453, sec. 1. 8.a. A California appellate court held in 1935 (emphasis added): As we pointed out, the legislature in 1923, enacted the present California Vehicle Act, which definitely and in language not susceptible of misunderstanding made its provisions applicable to the state and its agencies, particularly in section 144 thereof, stating, "The provisions of this act applicable to drivers of vehicles upon the public highways shall apply to the drivers of all vehicles operated by the state or any political subdivision thereof, or any incorporated city, subject to such specific exemptions as are set forth in the act," a declaration of legislative intent that the provisions of California Vehicle Act should apply to governmentally owned and operated vehicles. Lossman v. City of Stockton (1935), 6 Cal.App.2d. 324, 329, 44 P.2d 397. 8.b. The Supreme Court of California held in 1960 (emphasis added): Section 453 was first enacted in 1923 (Stats. 1923, ch. 266, p. 563, � 144), and consisted of what is now subdivision (a). Section 453 in its entirety provides as follows: "(a) The provisions of this code applicable to the drivers of vehicles upon the highways shall apply to the drivers of all vehicles while engaged in the course of employment by this State or any political subdivison thereof or any municipal corporation or district therein including authorized emergency vehicles subject to those exemptions granted such authorized emergency vehicles in this code. Yarrow v. State of California (1960), 53 Cal.2d 427, 440, 2 Cal.Rptr. 137, 348 P.2d 687 8.c. The Attorney General of California has consistenly held at various times (emphasis added):

The provisions of the Vehicle Code applicable to drivers upon the highways are applicable generally to public officers and employers engaged in driving vehicles in the course of their employment (Vehicle Code sec. 453). 17 Ops. Cal. A.G. 121, 121, 51-32 (1951). However, division 11d of the Vehicle Code is expressly made applicable to employees of the State. Section 453 of the Vehicle Code provides that: "The provisions of this code applicable to the drivers of vehicles upon the highways shall apply to the drivers of all vehicles while engaged in the course of employment by this State or any political subdivision thereof or any municipal corporation or district therein...." (Italics added.) Thus the general rule that when the State is exempt from compliance with statutes, employees of the State, while engaged in the course of their employment, need not comply with such statute, is not applicable in this case, for section 453 of the Vehicle Code expressly makes the provisions of the Vehicle Code applicable to State employees. 31 Ops.Cal.A.G. 66, 69, 57-267 (1958). Publicly owned vehicles and their operators are expressly mentioned throughout and made subject to various requirements of the Vehicle Code. "Registration under this Code shall apply to any vehicle owned by the United States government, the state, or any city, county, or political subdivision of the state...." (sec. 4155.) Public entities are exempt from the usual vehicle registration and licensing fees. (sec. 9101, 9103.) The statutory requirements for vehicle equipment (sec. 24000-28114, 29000-31540) are made applicable "to all vehicles whether publicly or privately owned when upon the highways, including all authorized emergency vehicles." (sec. 24001.) Public entities are liable for injuries caused by their employees "in the operation of any motor vehicle." (sec. 17001; see sec. 17002-17004.) The requirements applicable to the driving of vehicles apply equally to drivers "while engaged in the course of employment by this State, any political subdivision thereof, any municipal corporation, or any district, including authorized emergency vehicles subject to those exemptions granted such authorized emergency vehicle in this code." (sec. 21052.) In analyzing these various statutes so as to resolve the question presented, we are cognizant of several well established principles of statutory construction. As summarized by the Supreme Court in Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1379, 1386-1387:

"Pursuant to established principles, our first task in construing a statute is to ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law. In determining such intent, a court must look first to the words of the statutes themselves, giving to the language its usual, ordinary import and according significance, if possible, to every word, phrase and sentence in pursuance of the legislative purpose. A construction making some words surplusage is to be avoided. The words of the statute must be construed in context, keeping in mind the statutory purpose, and statutes or statutory sections relating to the same subject must be harmonized, both internally and with each other, to the extent possible. [Citations.]" We are also directed "to produce a reasonable result," while "avoiding those constructions which lead to mischief or absurdity." (People v. Jeffers (1987) 43 Cal.3d 984, 997-998.) 75 Ops.Cal.A.G. 75, 77-78, 91-804 (1992). 8.d. West's ANN.CAL.VEH. CODE (2004), V. 65B, p. 11, shows that Section 453(a) of the 1935 Code has been renumbered to Section 21052 of the 1959 Code, as Amended. 8.e. West's ANN.CAL.VEH. CODE (2004), sec. 21052 reads (emphasis added): The provisions of this code applicable to the drivers of vehicles upon the highways apply to the drivers of all vehicles while engaged in the course of employment by this State, any political subdivision thereof, any municipal corporation, or any district, including authorized emergency vehicles subject to the exemptions granted such authorized emergency vehicles in this code. 8.f. I note that Vehicle Code sec. 21052 specifically does not contain the word "also", i.e., "The provisions of this code ... [also] apply to the drivers of..." 8.g. I have no known duty or obligation to "read-in" such a non-existent "also" into Vehicle Code sec. 21052. 8.h. I reasonably infer from the rules of construction of statutes and of legislative intent as stated above, that the statute effectively reads: "The provisions of this code applicable to the drivers of vehicles upon the highways [only] apply to the drivers of all vehicles while engaged in the course of employment by this State,...." 9.a. 49 U.S.C.A (2004), sec. 30102(a)(6), part of Ch. 301, Motor Vehicle Safety, reads: Sec. 30102. – Definitions (a) General Definitions. -In this chapter(6) "motor vehicle" means a vehicle driven or drawn by mechanical power and manufactured primarily for use on public streets, roads, and highways, but does not include a vehicle operated only on a rail line.

9.b. 49 U.S.C.A. (2004), sec. 30301(4) defines "motor vehicle" for the purposes of the National Driver Register: (4) "motor vehicle" means a vehicle, machine, tractor, trailer, or semi-trailer propelled or drawn by mechanical power and used on public streets, roads, or highways, but does not include a vehicle operated only on a rail line. 9.c. 49 U.S.C.A. (2004), sec. 30301(5) defines "motor vehicle operator's license" for the purposes of the National Driver Register: (5) "motor vehicle operator's license" means a license issued by a State authorizing an individual to operate a motor vehicle on public streets, roads, or highways. 9.d. I have found no information that would cause me to believe that the "driver's license" as defined in the California Vehicle Code and the "motor vehicle operator's license" as defined in 49 U.S.C.A. are, or intended to be, the same or synonymous license.

10.a. I found the following information at the website of the AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF MOTOR VEHICLE ADMINISTRATORS [http://www.aamva.com/about/index.asp (as of May 19, 2004)]: The American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators is a tax-exempt, nonprofit organization striving to develop model programs in motor vehicle administration, police traffic services and highway safety. The association serves as an information clearinghouse for these same disciplines, and acts as the international spokesman for these interests. Founded in 1933, AAMVA is a voluntary, nonprofit, tax exempt, educational organization. AAMVA represents the state and provincial officials in the United States and Canada who administer and enforce motor vehicle laws. The association's programs encourage uniformity and reciprocity among the states and provinces, and liaisons with other levels of government and the private sector. Its program development and research activities provide guidelines for more effective public service. 10.b. More information from a AAMVA related website AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF MOTOR VEHICLE ADMINISTRATORS: [http://www.aamva.com/drivers/drv_commercialprogram.asp (as of May 19, 2004)] reads: The CDL [nt: Commercial Driver License] Program has three federally defined classes, depending on the configuration of the vehicle the driver intends to operate. Not sure what CDL Class a driver should be licensed in? This flowchart will help you. There are numerous endorsements and restrictions that may also be added to the license, some of which are federally prescribed.

Jurisdictions may assign their own endorsements to their CDLs as long as they are explained on the license document. Please refer to your jurisdiction for specific information on additional classifications, endorsements, restrictions and licensing requirements.

MEMORANDUM IN LAWS SUPPORT TO: INSTRUCTIONS FOR LAWFUL EXEMPTIONS & DOT 1877402 AFFIDAVIT OF CHARACTER DERIVATION OF DUE PROCESS RESCISSION OF DRIVERS LICENSE RESCISSION OF DMV REGISTRATIONS

JOHN A. SMITH AUTHORIZED AGENT John A. Smith 123 Main Street San Diego [92015] Secured party Plaintiff/beneficiary to: The US Trust Authorized representative P.A.G. 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983 To: Department of the Motor Vehicle et. al Coast Guard Stationed in California et. al Department of Transportation et. al California Governor et al Attorney General California et al