00485-riaa V Verizon Complaint

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IN mE UNITED STATESDISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICTOF COLUMBIA

rnRE: VERIZON llIorrERNET SERVICES. INC. SubpoenaEnforcement Matter

RECORDINGINDUSTRY ASSOCIATIONOF AMERICA 1330ConnecticutAvenue,N.W. Ste.300 Washington,D.C. 20036

v. VERIZON ~TERNET SERVICES,INC. 1880CampusCommonsDrive Reston,VA 20191

) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )

MiscellaneousAction CaseNo.1 :O2MSOO323

MOTION TO ENFORCE JULY 24, 2002SUBPOENAISSUED BY THIS COURT TO VERIZON INTERNET SERVICES, INC. AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORTTHEREOF The Recording Industry Association of America ("RIM 'j, as authorized representativefor its member companies,respectfully submits this motion to enforce the subpoenaissuedto Venzon Internet Services,Inc. ("Verizon") on July 24~2002 by this Court under 17 U.S.C. § 512(h) of the Digital Millemlium Copyright Act ("DMCA "). The subpoenaseekslimited infoxmation relating to a computer connectedto the Verizon network that is a hub for significant music piracy. Verizon is the only entity that can identify the infringer behind this computer.

The specialsubpoenaauthorityof the DMCA. 17 U.S.C. § 512(h).imposesa.mandatory, unconditional duty on mtemet service providers such as Verlzon to provide "expeditiously," upon

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receiptof a subpoena,infOmlationsufficientto identify usersof their networkswho arepirating copyrighted works. RIM complied with all of the requirementsof the statuteand obtaineda validly

issuedsubpoenafrom this Court. Verizonhasrefusedto comply. Thus,RIM requeststhat this Court enteran ordercompellingVerizonto comply. Given the urgentneedofRIAA's copyright holders to stop the piracy of their intellectual property, RIM further requests,by a separateMotion to Expedite, that the Court expedite briefing and decide the issue as soon as possible.

LEGAL FRAMEWORK This is a straightforward subpoenaenforcementaction. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 ("DMCA'j,

Pub. L. No.l0S-304, 112 Stat. 2860, createsa special subpoenaauthority

that requires "service providers," such as Verizon, to respondto subpoenasissuedby United States District Courts at the request of copyright owners seekinginformation sufficient to identify those

committing copyright infringement. See17 U.S.C. § S12(h). The tcnns of the statuteand its requirements are clear and require little further analysis. Because,however, Verizon seeksto graft conditions and limitations on the subpoenaauthority that do not appearin the text of Section 512(h) and are inconsistentwith the purposeof the DMCA, additional backgroundon the statutory scheme

maybe of assistance to the Court. Congressenactedthe DMCA becausethe Internet has revolutionizedthe~way that copyrighted works are disseminated,both lawfully and unlawfully. Virtually any cop)lTightedwork cannow be put in a digital format) andthus canbe copied anddistnouted worldwide instantaneously.

This can be a greatbenefit,but also leavescopyrightedworks susceptibleto "massivepiracy." S. Rep. No.1 05-190, at 8 (1998). Congresswas concernedthat, unlesscopyright owners have the

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"hesitateto maketheir works readilyavailableon the Internet..' ld. Title n of the DMCA seeksto ensurethat cop.)Tightowners are able to protect their intellectual property andto give them enhancedability to quickly and effectively deal with copyright infringement on the Internet. It does so in two ways:

SubpoenaAuthority under Section 512(h). The DMCA createsa specialsubpoena provision that allows copyright ownersto obtain infonnation quickly concerningthe identity of those who are irifringing their copyrights on the Internet. Pursuantto 17 U.S.C. § S12(h), District Courts are authorized, at the requestof copyright owners, to issue subpoenasto Internet or on-line service providers ("service providers") where the copyright owner has a good faith belief that infringement is occurring and needsadditional infonnanon to identify the alleged infringer. § 512(h). The logic

behindthis provision is obvious. On the mtemet.identities can be hidden. Often the service provider through whom an individual engagingin infringement obtains network accessis the only entity that can identifj the individual. Without this critical information, the copyright owner cannot deal directly with the person trafficking in pirated worlcs. Under Section512(h), CC[ a] copyright owner or personauthorizedto act on the owner's behalf may requestthe clerk of any United Statesdistrict court to issuea subpoenato a serviceprovider for

identificationof an allegedinfringer in accordance with this subsection,"§ 512(h)(l). To obtain a subpoena.under Section 512(h). the copyright owner or its agentmust supply a "swom declaration to the effect that the purpose for which the subpoenais sought is to obtain the identity of an alleged infringer and that such information will only be used for the purposeof protecting rights under this title." § 512(h)(2)(C). The copyright owner must also file ocacopy of the notification describedin

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subsection[512] (c)(3)(A).t' § 5 12(h)(1)(H). Subsection(c)(3)(A) is a freestandingprovision of the DMCA that is referencedin several different subsectionsof the statute. It provides the elementsof an effective notification to a service provider that itS network is being usedby others for cop}Tight

infringementandtriggersthe serviceprovider'sobligationsunderthe various subsectionsof the statute. The notice provisions require, among other things, that the copyright owner, or its agent, identify the material being infringed, attestto its ownershipof the material, stateits good faith belief that the complained-ofuse is unauthorized,and provide infonnation sufficient to allow the service

provider to locate the material and, if appropriate,removeor disableaccessto the material § S12(c)(3)(A). By substantially complying with the elementsof subsection(c)(3)(A), the copyright owner or its agent has establishedthe bona fides of its ownership and claim of infringement. See § 512(c)(2)(B)(i). Upon receipt of the appropriatedocumentation,the DMCA requires that the clerk issue the

subpoena"expeditiously," § 512(hX4) {"If the notification filed satisfies the provisions of subsection(cX3)(A), the proposed subpoenais in proper Conn,and the accompanying declaration is properly executed.the clerk shall expeditiously issueand sign the proposedsubpoenaand return

it to the requesterfor deliveryto the SelViceprovider."). Onceissued.the subpoenacompelsthe service provider to disclose '4information sufficient to identify the alleged infringer of the material

describedin the notification to the extentsuchinfoImationis availableto the serviceprovider." § S12(h)(3). To achieveits PUIPOse, Section5 12(h)subpoenasmust bearfruit quickly. A copyright holder basno recourseagainsta copyriiht pirate if it cannotidentify and locatethe individual. A pirate who

is able to avoid identificationcan continueinfringing, thusimpairingthe value of the copyright

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holder's intellectual property. Given the natureof the Internet, an individual user can causeliterally tens of thousandsof infringing copies to be distributed in a single day. Thus, Congressemphasized the needfor expedition. Section 512(h) makesclear that the District Court clerk shall "expeditiously issue" the requestedsubpoenaif all of the requirements are met and that, upon receipt, the service provider "shall expeditiously disclose to the copyright owner or personauthorizedby the copyright owner the information required by the subpoena,notWithstanding any other provision of law and regardlessof whetherthe serviceprovider respondsto the notification." § 512(hX5). The legislative history of Section 512(h) describesissuanceof the subpoenaas a "ministerial" act, and emphasizes

that it mustbe"perfonnedquickly for this provisionto haveits intendedeffect" S. Rep. 105-190 at 51. The Safe Harbor Provisions. In addition to the subpoenaprovisions under Section 5 12(h),

Title II of the DMCA '~reservesstrongincentivesfor serviceprovidersandcopyrightownersto cooperateto detectanddealwith copyrightinfringementsthat takeplacein the digital networked environment.»S.Rep. 105-190at 40. To that end,Congressestablisheda varietyof safeharbors for service providers to limit their own liability for copyright infringement "for 'passive,' automatic actions in which the service provider's systemengagesthrough a technological processinitiated by

anotherwithout theknowledgeof the serviceprovider." ALSScan,Inc. v. RemarqCommunities, Inc., 239 F.3d 619, 625 (4~ Cir. 2001).1

lEachsafeharborappliesnarrowlyto situationswhereserviceprovidersareengagingin specificfunctions,suchasrouting or transmittingdigital networkcommunications (subsection (a)); systemcaching(subsection(b); infomlation storing(subsection(c»; andprovidingsearch tools for infonnationon the Intemet(subsection(d». S. Rep. 105-190at 19-20. Whenengaging in oneof thosespecificfunctionsandcomplyingwith the preciserequirements of the relevant subsection,the serviceprovidercannotbe held liable (asa resultof engagingin the specified -5-

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The safe harbor provisions do not alter the substantiveroles of copyright infringement or

contrary, the safeharbor provisions are designedto induce service providers to work together with copyright owners to identify infringers by providing somemeasureof certainty to innocent service providers that they-.will not .be-heldfinancially responsiblefor infringement that occurs over their

networks,so long astheycomply with the specificconditionsof the safeharbors. In orderto fall within several of the safe harbors, service providers must assistcopyright owners by, for example, removing or disabling accessto infringing materialoncethey arenotified of cop)orightinfringement.2

See,e.g.§ 512(b)(2)(E);§ 512(c)(lXC); § 512(d)(3).To qualifyforanyofthesafebarbors,a service provider must also have in place a policy "for the tenninationin appropriatecircumstances of subscribersand accountholders of the serviceproviders' systemor network who are repeat inftingers." 17U.S.C. § 5 12(i)(1XA). But the "DMCA's protection ofan innocent service provider

disappearsat the momentthe serviceproviderlosesits innocence,i.e., at the momentit becomes aware that a third party is using its systemto infringe." ALS Scan, 239 F .3d at 625.

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The scopeof the various DMCA safeharborsis not at issue in this case only the subpoena

authorityin SectionS12(h)is relevant. The safe harbor provisions, however, work together with the subpoenaauthorityin Section512(h) and all of the provisionsof the DMCA to promotethe developmentof the Internet and to ensureeffective protection for intellectual property in the digital

function) for monetary relief for copyright infringement and can be subjectedto injunctive relief only as specified in Section 5120). 2Serviceproviders must comply with their obligations under several of the safe harbors any time they have actual knowledge that infringement is occurring, regardlessof whether they have ~eived a formal notification from the cop.vnghtowner. See,e.g., § 512(d)(lXA).

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world. Nothingin theDMCA createsa shieldfor thosedirectly involvedin disseminatingpirated works or other violations of the copyrightlaws. That was not who Congresssoughtto protect; ind~d, the entiretyof the DMCA is designedto ensurethat suchinfringerscanbe identifiedand forced to face appropriate penalties.

THE VERIZON SUBPOENA On July 24, 2002, RIAA obtained a subpoena,issued by this Comt pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 512(h), ordering Verizon to disclose infolmation sufficient to Pemlit identification of an alleged copyright infringer operating from a specified IP (Internet Protocol) address. SeeJuly 24, 2002, Subpoenato Verizon h1temetService, Inc. ("Subpoena.')(Attachment A). The Subpoenarequests on!y information sufficient to identify the individual subscriberwho is trafficking in pirated material

- that is, the subscriber'sname.address,andtelephonenumber.RIM

deliveredthe Subpoenato

Verlzon in conjunctionwith the documentationrequiredby § S12(h)(2)(C),including a letter notifying Verizon that lUAA believed a computer on V erizon' s internet servicewas distributing to

thepublic for downloadunauthorizedcopiesof hundredsof copyrightedsoundrecordingsowned by RIM member companies. SeeLetter from JonathanWhitehead, Vice Presidentand Anti-Piracy CO1.UlSel ofRiAA, to Lauren K. Crowder, ContractsManager ofVerizon Internet Services,Inc., of

July 24, 2002.at 1 ("Notification Letter") (AttachmentB). The letterspecifiedthe computer'sIF addressand attacheddocumentation including a list of the recordings available for download from

that computer. RIAA also provided a declarationindicating the basisfor the issuanceof the Subpoenaand a statement,underpenaltyof peljury. that the infolmation obtainOO ftom Venzon would only be usedfor '~rotecting the [intellectualproperty]rights" of RlAA's members. See -7-

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Declarationof JonathanWhiteheadat 1 ("WhiteheadDeclaration")(AttachmentC). RIAA requestedVerlzon's ""immediateassistancein stopping this unauthorized activity." Id.

V won

refusedto comply with the Subpoena.SeeLetter sentby ThomasM: Dailey,

GeneralCounsel ofVerizon mtemet ServicesInc., to JonathanWhiteheadof Aug. 6, 2002 ("Verizon Letter") (Attachment D). Verizon assertedthat because"[0]0 files of the Customerare hosted,

storedor cachedby [Verizon]," it neednot respondto the Subpoena.ld. at 2. RIM respondedby letter, explaining that V erizon' s argumentsprovided no basisfor ignoring a subpoenaissuedunder Section 5 12(h). SeeLetter from Cary Sherman,GeneralCounselofRIAA, to Thomas M. Dailey of

Aug. 9, 2002 (AttachmentE). Subsequent conversations betweenofficials at RIM andVerizon have failed to resolvethis matter, and RIAA hasinfonned Verizon that it would be filing this motion. AccordinglYt RIAA invokes this Court's jurisdiction pursuantto 17 U.S.C. § 512(h)(6) and

Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(c)(2)(B) to obtain an order to compel the productionof the subpoenaed infonnation within 24 hours of the issuanceof an order from this Court.

ARGUMENT Section512(h)of the Digital Millennium CopyrightAct is crystalclear. Wherea service provider receivesa subpoenavalidly issuedunderSection512(h),"the serviceprovider shall expeditiouslydiscloseto the copyrightowner or personauthorizedby the copyright owner the informationrequiredby the subpoena,notwithstandinganyotherprovisionof law." § S12(h){5) (emphasisadded). The Subpoenaat issuein this casewas validly issuedby this Court, and RIAA

compliedwith all of the requirementsof the statute. -8-

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Venzon hasnot raisedany issuewith respectto the form or validity of the Subpoenaor alleged that compliance with the Subpoenais burdensome. Rather, Verizon has arguedthat it can never be required to provide information in a casesuch as this because,in its view, the DMCA does not allow a subpoenato be issuedunlessthe Verizon subscribercommitting copyright infringement using V erizon' snetwork is actuallystonng.iUegatmaterialon serversownedor operatedby Verizon.

That claim ignoresthe plain languageof the statute.as well as its legislativehistory and purpose, and would gut an important tool that Congressgave to copyright owners to protect their

intellectualproperty. Indeed,Verlzon's responseto the Subpoenaconfusestwo totally different things: its duty as a seIvice provider to remove or disable accessto infringing matmal upon notice

(which is required in order to maintain limitations on its own liability under the safe harbor provisions)and its obligationto respondto a validly issuedsubpoena(undersubsection(h» to providethe informationthat copyrightownersneedto addressinfringementbeingcommittedby others. The latter obligation is the only one at issuehere. It is straightfo~ ind~dent

and entirely

of whetherVerizonis eligtole for a safeharborfor itself. Uponreceiptof a subpoena

underSection512(h),the serviceprovidermustprovide the identifying information. This Court shouldcompelVenzonto do exactlythat.

L

THE DMCA REQUIRES THAT INTERNET SERVICE PROVIDERS SUCH AS VERIZON EXPEDffiOUSL Y PRODUCETHE INFORMA nON REQUESTEDBY A SUBPOENAISSUED UNDER SECTION 512(h). Statutoryanalysisbeginswith the text. United Statesv. Braxtonbrown-Smith, 278 F.3d 1348,

1352(D.C. Cir. 2002)(citati,onsomitted); Ullit~ Slaw v. Wilson.290 F.3d 347.352 (D.C. Cir. 2002). "Wh~

the languageis clear, that is the end of judicial inquiry iI1 all but the most -9-

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extraordinary circumstances." Braxtonbrown-.)mith, 278 F .3d at 1352(quotation marks and citation

omitted). The plain languageof the DMCA (reinforcedby its legislativehistory and purpose) compelsVerizon to producethe infonnationrequested in this Court'sSubpoena.

A.

Section512(h) of the DMCA Applies to ServiceProviders,Like Verizon.

Section 512(h) of the DMCA provides that a copyright owner may ask any district court "to issue a subpoenato a service provider for identification of an alleged infringer in accordancewith

this subsection."§ 512(h)(1)(emphasisadded).A "serviceprovider,"for purposesof§ 512(h).is broadly defmedas "a provider of online servicesor networkaccesstor the operatorof facilities therefor." § 512(k)(1)(B); see alsoALS Scan,239 F.3d at 623 ("The Act defines a service provider broadly.'); H. Rep. No.1 OS-551(fl) at S4(1998) (definition or"service provider" includes thosewho

'~rovide Internet access,e-mail," etc.). Section512(h) appliesto all "service providers" regardless

of what functionsthe serviceprovider may be performing. Here,Verizon concedesthat it is a "service provider," V enzon Letter at 2.3 Venzon is unquestionablyproviding "network access"to the subscriberreferencedin the Subpoena. It thus is subject to the subpoenaprovisions of Section

512(h).

~e term "serviceprovider" is definedin 17U.S.C.§ 512(k). Section512(k)defines "serviceprovider" in two ways:onedefinitionwhich is applicableonly to Section512(a)'ssafe harbor,see17U.S.C.§ 512(kXIXA), anda broaderdefinitionwhich is applicableto the remainderof Section512,includingSection512(h),see17U.S.C.§ 512(k)(1)(B). The latter definition expresslyencompasses all entitiesthat fall within the fomler. See17U.S.C.§ 512(k)(1)(B);H. Rep.No. lOS-551(ll)at 54. In seekingto claim it falls within the safeharbor definedin § 512(a),Venzonnecessarilymustadmitit is a "serviceprovider." V erizonLetter at 2. That concessionmeansthat it is a "serviceprovider"for purposesof therestof Section512, includingthe subpoenaprovisionsof Section512(h). -10-

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B.

The DMCA's Procedure$For Issuing A SubpoenaTo Verizon Were Met In This Case.

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Under the DMCA, a copyright owner, or its agent, must provide three things in order for a

subpoenato issue:a notification describedin subsection(c)(3)(A), a proposedsubpoenain the proper fonn, and "a sworn declarationto the effect that the purpose for which the subpoenais sought

is to obtain the identity of an allegedinfringer andthat suchinfonnarionwill only be usedfor the pmposeof protectingrightsunderthis title," § 512(h)(2Xc).RIAA met all threerequirements. RIAA provideda proposedsubpoenain the properform, which wasissuedby the District Court clerk, aswell as a declaration addressingthe issuesdiscussedin the statute. SeeAttaclunents

A & C. RIM alsoprovideda notificationincluding all of the elementsof § 512(cX3)(A). See AttachmentB. RIAA's notification included,amongother things, a list of literally hundredsof infringing works that were being offered for download by Verizon's subscriberand the identification of the specific location from which the alleged infringer was operating - anIP addressof a Verlzon subscriber. From that.IP address,the alleged infringer is using accessobtained through Verlzon' s

networkto sendandreceiveunauthorizedcopiesof copyrightedmaterial.The infornlationRIAA provided tells Verizon exactly whereto find this computerand identifies preciselywhere the infringing material is located.4Verizon needsno additional information to identify this subscriber. The Subpoenaseeksonly a minimum amountof infonnation. It merely requiresthat Verizon

provide identifying information.suchas a name,address,and telephonenumber. Verizon can comply with the subpoenain a matter of seconds. But unless it does so, RIAA memberswill have

4RlAA alsoprovidedthe dateandtime of its evidenceof infringing activity so that there canbe no mistakeasto who the infringeractuallyis (suchas.if a differentusersubsequently obtainedtheIF addressthat hadbeenusedfor infringement). ~11.

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no ability to seekredressfor the infringing activity that Verizondoesnot - andcannot- deny is occurringover its netWork.

c.

The DMCA RequiresVerizon ExpeditiouslyTo ProduceThe Information Requested In The Subpoena.

Upon receipt of a subpoenaand theno.tification.undersubsection(c)(3)(A), disclosureof the requestedinfonnation is not optional. Under the DMCA, the serviceprovider "shall expeditiously disclose to the copyright owner or personauthorizedby the copyright owner the infonnation required by the subpoena.notwithstanding any other provision of law and regardless of whether the service

provider respondsto the notification." § S12(h)(S)(emphasisadded). The words of the statute could not be more explicit. Thus, regardlessof whether Verizon could itselfbe liable for copyright

infringementor regardlessof whetherVerizon must take other stepsin order to maintain the limitations on liability in the safeharbor provisions of theDMCA. V erizonmust nonethelesscomply with the Subpoena. Moreover. pursuant to Rule 45(c)(2)(B) and Section 512(h)(6), this Court has

the authorityto enforcethe termsof the SubpoenaandcompelVcnzon to producethe requested infomlation. Compliancewith the subpoenawill requireonly a simple and ministerial act by

Verizon,puttingvirtually no burdenon them. The Court should order Verizon to comply immediatelyin orderto allow the rightful cop}rlght ownersthe opportunityto bring a halt to the unlawful disseminationof their copyrightedworks.

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REFUSING TO

COMPLY WITH A SUBPOENAVALIDL Y ISSUED BY THIS COURT. In its letter to RIM, Verizon raisesa number of issuesthat it claimsjustify ignoring a validly

issuedsubpoena.SeeAttachmentD. All ofVerizon's argumentsstemfrom its interpretationof the

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various safeharbor provisions in the DMCA, but thoseprovisions all of which relateto Verizon's own liability for copyright infringement - have nothing to do with Verizon's obligation to respond to a subpoenaissuedpursuantto Section S12(h). Moreover, all ofVerizon's argumentslack merit.

Limitation of Liability under Section512(a).Verizonarguesthat,becauseit believesthat it qualifies for a safe harbor under Section 512(a),5it is entitled to ignore a subpoenaissuedunder Section 512(h). Verizon Letter at 2. That c!aim finds no support in the text 0f the statuteand makes

no sense.A selViceprovideris plainly obligatedto complywith a subpoenaevenif it canvalidly claim the protectionof a DMCA safeharbor. "

.

Whether a serviceprovider qualifies for the safeharbor in Section S12(a) has nothing to do

with whethera providermust comply with a subpoenaissuedby a court under Section512(h). Thoseprovisionsare completelyunrelated.SectionS12(a),in conjunctionwith §§ Sl2(b) - (d), defines the activitie$ orfunctions of service providers which may qualify such service providers for

potential safe harbof$from being held .'liable for monetaryrelief. Of, exceptas provided in subsection(j), for injunctiveor otherequitablerelief,for infringementof copyright." ~ 512(a); S Rep.105-190at 55. Section512(a)th~on1yprotectsa serviceproviderftom liability for its own

'RlAA takes issuewith Verizon's claim that it falls within the tcrms of the safe harbor defined in Section S12(a). That issue,however, is for another day becauseit is wholly irrelevant to Verizon's obligation to respond to a subpoenaissued under Section S12(b).

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actionsthat may constitute cop)Tight infringement, notfrom respondingto a valid subpoenaseeking information about another party's alleged copyright infringement. In contrasttSection S12(h) appliesto all serviceproviders. whether or not they fall within the safe harbor provisions of subsection (a)-(d), and fCiardless of what functions the service provider

is perfOllning. The safeharborprovisionsof subsections(aHd) and the subpoenaauthority of subsection(h) eachcreatetools to combatpiracy- the folmer by encouragingservice providers to cooperatewith copyright owners by disabling accessto infringing material in exchangefor receiving liabilitypl'Otection and the latter by giving copyright ownersthe ability to uncover information from serviceprovidCli that will allow them to pursueappropriateaction againstdirect infringers. To read the safeharbors as restricting the scopeof the subpoenaprovision would make hashof the statutory

design.

SubsectionS12(c)(3)(A)NoticeProvision. Verizon also contendsthat it need not comply with SectionS12(h)becausethat provision is limited to situationsin which a serviceprovideris

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storing infringing material on its network. In Verizon .s view, where asis believedto be the case here

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the allegedinfringer maintainsfiles on his or her own computer.rather tlw1 on servers

owned and controlled by the service provider. and usesthe serviceprovidats network to distn"bute the inftinging material, a subpoenaunder Section 512(h) can never issue. Verizon Letter at 2. That argument- which seeksto transfonn the notice provisions ofsubsectiOD(c)(3XA) into a substantive limitation that would evisceratethe subpoenaauthority createdunder Section 512(11)- has no basis in the statutory text and is antithetical to the policies Congresssought to advancein the DMCA.

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As an initial matter.Verizon erroneouslyassumesmat a copyrightownercan detennine whether the infringing material that is being offered fur download resides on a computer or server owned andoperatedby Verizon. SeeVerizon Letter at 2-3. But only Verizon knows what computer and what subscriberis at the IP addressthat is offering unauthorizedmaterial fur download; indeed,

only VerizonknowswhetherVerlzonitself ownsor controlsthatcomputez:-RIAAknowsonly the unique IP addressof the computer; it provided that information in its Notification Letter to Verizon. Verizon's suggestionthat RIM

should provide more specific infonnation ignoresthe fact that only

Verlzon is in possession of the infomlationthat is soughtby the Subpoenaandthat it unilaterally claimsit shouldnot haveto provide. More importantly,however,the text of the DMCA refutesVerizon's statutoryarguments. Section 5 12(h) does not limit subpoenasonly to situations where the allegedly infringing material

physicallyresideson the serviceproviderstnetwork. SectionS12(h)authorizessubpoenas""for identification of an alleged infringer" and saysnothing about where the alleged infringing material

resides.§ 512(h)(1).In~

disclosureis mandatory"notwithstandinganyotherprovisionoflaw."

§ S12(hX5). This broadreadingis confumedby the legislativehistory, which makesclearthat Section 512(h) was designedto permit "identification of allegedinfringers who areusersof a service

providers'systemor network." H. Rep.No. 105-551(D) at 60. That is exactlywhat RIAA seeks here. Further, nothing in subsection512(c)(3)(A) suggeststhat the notification provisions create

substantivelimitations on the scopeof any other section.Congressexplainedthat subsection (c)(3)(A) establishes "proced~,"

not substantivelimitations. H. Rep.No.1 OS-S51(II) at 55. The

contours of the safeharbors and any limitations on the subpoenaauthority are to be fouud in those ~15-

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subsections,not in the notification provisionsto which they all refer. Moreover,Congressmade clear that strict compliance with the notification provisionswas not required; substantialcompliance

was sufficient to trigger all of dle setViceproviders' obligations under the DMCA.

See

§ S12(c)(3)(A). CongTCSs expected serviceproviders and copyright owners "will comply with the functional requirementsof the notification provisions." H. Rep. No.1 OS-551(ll) at 56. So long as

copyrightownersfurnish infonnation that would assistserviceproviders"in understandingthe natureand scopeof the infringement"and in taking appropriateaction,suchas identifying the infringing user or disabling accessto infringing material,the copyrightowner bas fulfilled its obligations./d. Finally t the two snippetsof statutorylanguagethat Verizon cites for its claim do not remotely support its argument Verizon suggeststhat subsectionS12(c)(3XA) appliesonly to situations where

the allegedinfringementinvolves "material that resideson a systemor network controlled or operatedby or for fa] serviceprovider," VerizonLetterat 2 (emphasisandbracketin original). That language,quoted and cmphasizedin Verlzon's letter, does not appearin subsection 512(c)(3)(A) or in Section 512(h). Rather.that languageappearsin subsectionS12(cXl) and defines the terDlSof one of the safeharbor provisions. Thus unmasked,Verizon' s argumentis truly bizane

- in essence,V crizon arguesthat becauseboth Section S12(h) and subsectionS12(c)(l)

refermce

the notificationprovisionsof(c)(3)(A), the limitationsof subsection512(cXl) shouldbe readinto Section512(h). Thatmakesno sense. V enzon'8 attemptto graft one of the limitationsof the safeharborprovisionsonto the 8Ubpoenaauthority ignores that the DMCA createsseparateand distinct obliptions on service providers - they must respondto valid subpoenasan~ if they wish to Im13in within the safe harbor

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to the notification"). Verizon also seeksto dressup the samepoint in different clothing by claiming that, because

..

VenzonLetterat 3. As an initial matter, Verlzon's claim that it cannot locate the material rings hollow.

of."the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of infringing activitY and that is to be removed or accessto which is to be disabled, and information reasonablysufficient to pel'IIlit

can the service provider to locate the material"} (emphasisadded). That Verizonunquestionably do, oncea copyrightownerprovides- asRIAA has- the IP addressof the inftinger.

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Moreover, the DMCA expresslyprovides that subsection512(cX3)(A)"snotification provisionsapply in myriad situations,includingthosein which the infringing material doesnot resideon the serviceprovider'snetwork. Subsection512(c)(3)(A)providesthe generai-elements of notice that are required for three of the safeharbors- subsections(b), (c). and (d), as well as the safeharbor for educationalinstitutions (subsection(g»

- and for the subpoena..provisionof Section

Sl2(h). Under subsection(d), a copyright owner may give notice pursuant to s.ubsection(c)(3)(A)

where infringing material is not on the provider'snetworkbut is accessiblethrough use of an infomlation location tool or searchengine. See§ 512(d)(3). Similarly, subsection(c)(3)(A) notice

is applicablewherethe cop)right owneris notifyina a serviceprovider that it has or is caching infringing material, whether or not that material is still being stored by the provider. See § 512(b)(2)(E).The draftersof the DMCA wouldnot havereferencedthe notification provisions of subsection(c)(3) in eachof thesesubsections(aswell asthe subpoenaprovision found at Section S12(h» if they were not a freestandingprovision defining the elementsof effective notice, applying with equal force to situations where the seIViceprovider was not storing infringing files (as alleged

necessary by Vcrizon).6

6verizon'sletterraisesoneadditionalafglDIlentthat is not an objectionto the subpoena. See Verizon Letter at 3. ft 4-5. V~n

arguesthat it is not required to tenninate the subscriber's

accessto the hltemct underS~tion 512(i).Id. at 3. Onceagain.whetheror not that obligation existsis irrelevantto whetherVerizonis obligedto revealto thecopyrightownerthe nameof a personpursuantto a valid subpoena. -18-

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CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons.RIAA respectfully ~uests that the Court enteranorder requiring

Verizonto complywith the subpoenaissuedby this Courton July 24, 2002,andgrantsuchother relief as is just and appropriate

Respectfully 8ubmitted,

~B

BY:-+~ Of Counsel: MatthewJ- Oppenheim StanleyPierre-Louis RECORDINGINDUSTRY ASSOCIAnON OF AMERICA 1330 Connecticut Ave., N. W.

Ste.300 Washington. D.C. 20036

~.f4A-;,;"p

DonaldB. Vem11i.Jr., D.C. BarNo. 420434 ThomasJ. Perrelli,D.C. BarNo. 438929 CynthiaJ. Robertson,D.C. BarNo. 472981 JENNER& BLOCK, u..c 601Thirteenth StI'cet,NW, Suite 1200 Washington,D.C. 20005 Phone: (202) 639-6000 Fax: (202)639-6066 Attorneysfor the RecordinghldustryAssociationof America

Dated:August20, 2002

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