00393-20020204 Eff Amicus Brief

I

CINDY A. COHN(SBN 145997)

2

ROBIN D. GROSS(SBN 200701) LEE nEN (SBN 148216)

3

ELEC1RONIC 454 Shotwell

4

SanFranciscoCA 94110 Telephone: (415) 436-9333xl04 Facsimile: (415) 436-9993

s

FRONTIER Street

FOUNDA

nON

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae

6

UNITED STATESDISlRICT COURT 8

NORnlERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

9

SAN JOSEDMSION

10

m..IITW STATES OF AMERICA, 12

Plaintiff,

13

VS.

.4

ELCOM LTD., a/k/a ELCOMSOFT CO.,

15 I

16

L m., AND DMITRY SKL Y AROV,

Defendant

CaseNo.: CROI-20138 RMW AMICUS BRIEF OF mE ELECTRONIC IFRONnER FOUNDAnON, ACM ~OMMIT-l'EE ON COMPlmNG LA W

~

~

TECHNOLOGY, AMERICAN

~SSOCIATION OF LAW LmRARIES, NSUMER PROJECTON CHNOLOGY, ELECTRONIC RIV ACY INFORMATION CEN~ MUSICLmRARYASSOCIATION,AND

IO.S.PUBLIC POLICY COMMITTEE OF JACM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO

17

DISMISS

~

18

19 20 21

22 23

24 25

!Amicus Brief ofEFF ct. al. 1

In ~upport of Motion to Dismiss CR-OI-2138-RMW

TABLE OF CONTENTS 2

I.

6

;

INTRODUCTION

s ll.

III. 1F1\c:1rlJJ\I~~~()~()(JI~~

..3

6

A. COPYRIGHT PROMOTESTHE FIRST AMENDMENT BY PROVIDING INCENTIVES FOR CREATING AND DIS1RIBUnNG EXPRESSION.6

9

B.

10

v

COPYRIGHT A VallS FIRST AMENDMENT

CONSllT'JTIONAL COMFLICT WIlH BECAUSE OF ITS "SAFETY VALVES"

THE DMCA PRESENTSSIGNIFICANT CONSllTUTlONAL

1HE

...

7

...8

PROBLEMS

12

1J1\~IC(JFt()~

IIV. COPYRIGHT BOrn PROMOTESAND IS CABINED BY THE FIRST AMENDMENT

8

I

11

~~s.1r

4

()~

TABLEOF AUTHORInES s.1rI\~~~

3

A. DMCA'8 CHANGESTO mE COPYRIGHrBARGAIN

13

B. UNLESS NARROWLY CONSTRUED, mE DMCA ELIMINATES MUCH OF mE PUBLIC SIDE OF mE COPYRIGHT BARGAIN

14

1. UNLESS LIMITED, THE DMCA ALLOWS PUBLISHERSTO TO CONfROL (AND EXTRACT PAYMENT FOR) WORKS

16

~THE

17

I-UBLIC

DO~

8 .12

3

2. THE GOVERNMENT'S INTERPRETAllON OF THE DMCA ALLOWS PUBLISHERS TONEGA TE CLASSIC FAIR USE. . 14

18

3. AN OVERBROAD INTERPRETATION OF mE DMCA ALLOWS EBOOK PUBLISHERS TOELIMINA TE nm PURCHASER'S

19

FIRST-SALE RIGHTS

20 21

~

4. THE GOVERNMENT'S INTERPRETATION OF THE DMCA ALLOWS CONTENT HOLDERS TO ELIMINATE nIB

22

PUBLIC'SRIGHT OF PRIVATEPERFORMANCE

.c"(

17

I8

23

5.

24

25

IAmicus

THE GOVERNMENT'S BROAD INTERPRETAllON OF THE DMCA CAN PREVENT PURCHASERS FROM ACCESSING THEIFlO~EBOOICS 19

Brief of EFF et. at. ,In Support of Motion to Dismiss CR-OI-2138-RMW

VI. THE DMCA MUST BE NARROWLY CONSlRUED OR INV ALmATED...19 2

A. WITHOUT NARROWING CONSTRUCTION, THE DMCA IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL

4

s 6

7 8 9

10 II 12

14 .$

16 17 18

19 20 21 22

,.'!Of

23 24 2S

I Amicus Brief of EFF et. a1.

I

In Supportpf Motion to Dismiss CR-Ol-2138-RMW

22

23

<:()~<:~lJ~I()~

~.

3

II

2 3 4

s 6

8 9

10 II 12 13 14

IS 16 17 18 19 20

21 22 23 24 25

1

Universalv. Corley, 273 F3d 429 (2adCir. .2001)

8, 10, 16

2 3 4 I

s

FEDERAL STATUTES 7 U.S.C.§1201

6

passim

17 V.S.C. § 106

7

9, 12

7 U.S.C. § 109(a)

,

8

17 U.S.C. §§ 101-120

9

17 U.S.C. 121

10

.7 U.S.C.

,

4, 1

12, 15, I~

§ SOl

" In

IH.R. REp.No. 94-1476,p. 66 (1976)

II

IJ

12 13

LA W REVIEW ARTICLES

14 I

IS

I

17

Free

as

the

Air

to

Common

Use:

First

on

2,8, 10,22

,

Arts 1, 8-9

20 I

0

,

21

Goldstein,Paul, "Copyright and the First Amendment,"70 Colum. L. Rev. 983 (1970) " Krarnarsky,Stephen,Copyright Enforcementin the Internet Age TheLaw and. Technology of Digital Rights Management,

23

DePaul-LCA J. Art & Ent. L.

3,22

(2001)

25

Constraints

Ginsburg,JaneC., Copyright Useand Excuseon the Internet, 24 Colwn.-VLA J.L. &

IQ

~

Amendment

Boyle, James,A Politics of Intellectual Property: Environmentalismfor the Net?, 47 Duke L.J. 87 (1997)

18

22

Yochai,

Enclosureo/the PublicDomain,74N.Y.U. L. Rev.354(1999)

16

21

Benkler,

Lemley, Mark A. & Volokh, Eugene,FreedomOf Speechand Injunctions In Intellectual Property Cases,48:2 Duke L.J.147(Nov., 1998) Amicus Brief of EFF et. al. In Supportof Motion to Dismiss I ! CR-OI-2138-RMW

IV

2 3 4 .1 6 7 8

9 10

12 13 14

IS 16 17 18

19 20

21 22

23 24 2S

IL

Statement of Interest

2.

The Electronic Frontier Foundation(EFF) is a non-profit, civil liberties

3 4

organizationworking to protectrights in the digital world. EFF actively encouragesand

.5

challengesindustry and governmentto supportfree expression,privacy, and opennessin

6

the information society. Foundedin 1990,EFF is basedin SanFrancisco. EFF has

7

membersallover the world and maintainsone of the world's most linked-to Web sites 8 9

10

(http://www.eff.org). EFF has.aninterestin this casebecauseof its longstandinggoal of ensuringthat the Constitutionalrights that Americansenjoy in the non-digital world are transferredintact into cyberspace.In furtheranceof that goal, EFF hasservedas legal

12

counselto severalindividuals and organizationsthat have facedclaims underthe DMCA.

13

The Associationfor ComputingMachinery (ACM) is a leadingsocietyof 14

computerprofessionalsin education,industry, and government.Foundedin 1947,ACM is has75,000membersin the US and aroundthe world concernedwith issuesof research, 16

developmentand deploymentof advancedinformation technology, ACM has long been 17

involved with issuesrelating to the interactionof computing,information, technology, 18

andthe law. ACM studiesand expressesits opinion on legal issuesthrough its 19

Committeeon ComputingLaw and Technology(ACM Law), which includes 20

experiencedtechnologistsand lawyers. The U.S. Public Policy Committeeof ACM (USACM) facilitates communicationbetweencomputerprofessionalsandpolicy-makers 22

23

I

I

~

on issuesof concernto the computingcommunity. The variety of expertsassociatedwith USACM study issuesof policy and then provide expertresourcesto assistpublic leaders

24

in understandingthe ramifications of their decisions 25

Amicus Brief of EFF et. al. In Support"of Motion to Dismiss CR-OI-2138-RMW

The American Associationof Law Libraries (AALL) is a nonprofit educational 2 3

organizationof over 5,000memberswho respondto the legal infonnation needsof law professorsand students,attorneys,and membersof the generalp'lblic aswell legislators,

4

s 6

judges,and other public officials at all levels of government,corporationsand small businesses.AALL's mission is to promoteand enhancethe value of law libraries, to

,..

foster law librarianshipand to provide leadershipand advocacyin the field of legal

8

infonnation and infonnation policy. Copyright andthe preservationof fair useare

9 10

12

amongthe centralpublic policy concernsof the Association. ConsumerProject on Technology(CPT) is a nonprofit startedby Ralph Nader in 1995. CPT is active in a numberof issueareas,including intellectualproperty.

13

telecommunications,privacy and electroniccommerce,plus a variety of projectsrelating

14

to antitrustenforcementand policy.

IS 16

The Electronic Privacy Information Center(EPIC) is a non-profit, public interest researchorganizationfocusingon civil liberties issuesin the field of electronic

1.7

information. EPIC works to protectprivacy, the First Amendment,and constitutional 18

19 20 21 22

23

valuesin new communicationsmediathroughpolicy research,public educationand litigation

The Music Library Associationis the professionalorganizationin the United Statesdevotedto music librarianship,and to all aspectsof music materialsin libraries. Foundedin 1931,MLA providesa forum for study and action on issuesthat affect music

24

libraries and their users,and promotesthe establishment,growth, and useof music 25

libraries. Amicus Brief of EFF et. at. In Supportof Motion to Dismiss CR-Ol-2l38-RMW

2

D.

Introd uction

2

Intellectualproperty law haslong beenunderstoodas a constitutionalbargainthat

3

.

I"involves a difficult balancebetweenthe interestsof authorsand inventorsin the control I

,

I

6

and exploitation of their writings and discoverieson the one hand,and society's competinginterestin the free flow of ideas,infonnation, and commerceon the other

1 I

hand," SonyCorp. of America v. UniversalCity Studios,Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).

8

Accordinglyt copyright hasalwaysbeenlimited by "safety valves" that prevent

9

copyright ownersfrom unduly restrictingothers' freedomto speak,thus protectingour

10

cultural commons. SeeNeil WeinstockNetanel,Locating Copyright within the First 12 Amendment Skein, S4 Stan. L. Rev, .,4 n. II (2001 (listing "the distinction between I

13

copyrightableexpressionand uncopyrightablefact and idea,the fair useprivilege, and

14

copyright's limited duration"); Yochai Benkler,Free as the Air to CommonUse:First IS

AmendmentConstraintson Enclosureof the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 354

16

(1999); Melville B. Nimmer, Does CopyrightAbridge the First AmendmentGuarantees

17

lo/Free Speechand Press?,17UCLA L. REv. 1180,1186-1204(1970)("NimrnerFirst 19

Amendment").

20 21

It is againstthis backgroundthat this casemust be understood:At the heartof this ,

caselies a simple question: canthe law can be usedto protect technologythat

22

23

undenninesthe copyright bargain? Put anotherway, if computercode allows publishers

24

to eliminate unilaterally theseconstitutional"safety valves," may the law still enforce

2S

that code? I

AmicusBriefofEFF et.al. In Supportof Motion to Dismiss CR-OI-2138-RMW

3

ThesequestionsarisebecauseCongress,throughthe Digital Millennium 2

ICopyright Act ("DMCA "), created a new kind of protection for copyrighted works: a

3

ban on manufactureand "trafficking" in technologiesdesignedto circumvent 4

"technologicalmeasures"that protecta copyright owner's rights. 7 U.S.C. §1201(b).

s

Under the government'sindictmentof Elcomsofthere,the DMCA doesnot require intent

6

7 I to aid and abetcopyright infringementor any other unlawful act, not even for the 8

imposition of criminal liability; it doesnot requirethat any copyright infringement

9

actually be facilitated. Moreover,underthe indictmentthe DMCA doesnot ensurethat

10

circumventiontechnologiessuchasAEBPR remainavailablefor fair usersor

I

11

noninfringing usersof copyrightedworks.

I

12

The DMCA assumesthat contentownerswill apply technologicalmeasuresto

13 14

restrict the useof copyrightedwork. It attemptsto createa new level of protection for the

IS

technologicalmeasuresthemselves,insteadof for the underlyingworks, aspart of an

16

overall goal of preventingcopyright infringement. What the government'sapplication of ~

the public the rightful benefitsof the copyright bargain.As they havedonethroughout

19 20

the DMCA hereoverlooks,however,is that thosesametechnologicalmeasurescan deny

I

18

I the history of

21

American copyright law, courtsmust act hereto ensurethat the copyright

bargainretainsmeaningful"safety valves."

22

m.

23

Factual/technological background The technologiesat issuein this caseexemplify the problem createdby an

24 I

uncheckedinterpretationthe DMCA. Adobe's eBook Readertechnologyis one example

25

ora new breedof technologiesknown as digital rights managementor "ORM." The Amicus BricfofEFF ct. al. In SuPPC'rt of Motion to Dismiss CR-OI-2138-RMW

4

eBook Readerwas designedto give e-bookpublishersnearly perfectcontrol over what 2

lawful ownersof copiesof e-bookscan do with their copies. As Adobe hassaid:

3

"Lending, printing, copying, giving andtext-to-speecharepennissionsenabledby the

I

4

publisher.'" SeeStephenKramarsky,CopyrightEnforcementin the Internet Age: The

s I

6

Law and Technologyof Digital RightsManagement,

I

DePaul-LCA 1. Art & Ent. L. I,

7

14 n. 43 (2001) (DRM systemsgive publishers"the ability to restrict the numberof times

8

I a work can be played or copied,the kinds of usersor machinesthat can accessi~ whether

9

it can be given away or resold and whetherit will eventually'expire,' amongother

10

Ithings"). The consequenceof this, of course,is that the publisherdecideswhich

12 13

"pennissions"are allowed to the purchaserof an eBook. Thus, e-bookpublishersmay

14

(and most do) useAdobe's eBook Readertechnologyto prevent lawful purchasersfrom

IS

printing or copying any of the text for fair usepurposessuchas commentary,review or

16 I

even a schoolproject, from "space-shifting"the copy onto a computerother than that on

17

which the copy was originally downloaded,2from exercisingfirst-salerights to lend or

18

19 20

1

21

January28, 2002) 12Cf RecordingInd: Assoc.of America v. DiamondMultimedia Systems,Inc., 180F.3d 1072, 23 (9th Cir. 1999). At issuein Diamondwas the legality of a consumerdevice that storesand plays digital music recordingsunderthe Audio Home RecordingAct. 17 U .S.C. § 1001et seq. The 22

I

24

Ninth Circuit said: "The [device] merely makes copies in order to render portable, or 'spaceshift,' those files that already reside on the user's hard drive. . . Such copying is paradigmatic noncommercial personal use entirely consistent with the purposes of the Act." Id. at 1079 (citing

2S I

Sony,464 U.S. at 455).

AmicusBrief of EFFet. al. In Supportof Motionto Dismiss iCR-OI-2138-RMW

5

Thus this casepresentsthe core constitutionalquestionarising from the DMCA 2

;quite plainly: can the creationand publicationof a computerprogramthat permits both

3 I

Constitutionally protectedand unlawful usesof copyrightedworks be banned?Or must

4

s restrictionson suchprogramsbe tailored to allow constitutionallyprotecteduses?5 This court shouldconstruethe DMCA to protectconstitutionaland noninfringing

6

1 I usesof copyrightedworks. This may be accomplishedby allowing usersaccessto the 8

tools necessaryto makethoseusesexceptwhen the distributor aids and abetsin copyrigh1

9

infringementor engagesin a conspiracyto commit copyright infringement.Under this 10

construction,Elcomsoft'spublication of AEBPR doesnot violate the DMCA. Without

II

this sort of limiting construction,however,the DMCA must be declaredunconstitutional.

12 13

IV.

Copyright Both Promotes and Is Cabined by the First Amendment.

14

U.S. copyright law is boundup with the First Amendmentin two ways. On one

IS 16

I

11 I

18 I

hand,the economicincentivescreatedby copyright law encouragethe production and disseminationof First Amendmentprotectedexpression.On the other hand,copyright law andjurisprudencehavealwaysensuredthat copyright interestsdo not unduly impair

19

the First Amendmentrights of the public. 20 A.

'-I

Copyright promotesthe First Amendmentby Qrovidingincentivesfor creatine:and distributing exQression.

22

23 24

5 Another core constitutional question arises from the constitutional protection afforded to the I

25

computerprogram itself. Elcomsoft hasexploredthoseissuesthoroughly in its motion. Accordingly, this brief will focus on the constitutional issues raised by the uses of the AEBPR. AmicusBriefofEFF et.a1. 7 In Supportof Motionto Dismiss CR-OI-2138-RMW

Copyright protectsauthors' rights in order to servethe public welfare Twentieth 2

Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S

3

51, 156(1975) ("The immediateeffect of our

copyright law is to securea fair return for an 'author's'creativelabor. But the ultimate

4

aim is

to stimulateartistic creativity for the generalpublic good."); Sony464 U.S. at

6

429 ("The copyright law . . makesrewardto the owner a secondaryconsideration")

7

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

8

A major aspectof this public good is a rich and vibrant public commonsof culture

9

and infonnation. Accordingly, copyright was intendedto serveasthe "engine of free

10

expression"by providing economicincentivesfor creativeactivity while ensuringthe 12

i

II

public accessto thesecreations. Harper & Row Publishers,Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,

13 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985); id. at 546; Neil WeinstockNetanel,Copyright and a 14 Democratic Civil Society, 106YALEL.J. 283, 288 (1996) Thus the fundamentalbargain IS 16

r7 18

19 20

that underliescopyright law To encourageauthorsto createand disseminateoriginal expression, [copyright law] accordsthem a bundleof proprietaryrights in their works. But to promotepublic educationand creativeexchange,[copyright law] invites audiencesand subsequentauthorsto useexisting works in every conceivablemannerthat falls outsidethe province of the copyright owner's exclusiverights. Copyright law's perennialdilemma is to detenninewhere exclusiverights shouldend andunrestrainedpublic accessshouldbegin.

21 22

23 24

[d. at 285 B

CoDVri2ht avoids constitutional conflict with the First Amendment because of its "safety valves"

2S

Amicus Brief of EFF et. al. In Supportof Motion to Dismiss CR-QI-2138-RMW

8

I

Copyright law is potentially in tensionwith the First Amendment.SeeMark A. I

2 3

Lemley & EugeneVolokh, FreedomOf Speechand InjunctionsIn Intellectual Property Cases,48:2 Duke L.J.147, 165(Nov., 1998)("Copyrlghtlaw restrictsspeech").The

4

original English copyright regimewas foundedasa powerful instrumentof state

.1

Icensorship.The booksellershelpedthe Crown suppressundesirableideas;the Cro~

6

~

7

in

protectedthe booksellers'monopolies.L. Ray Patterson,Understandingthe

i Copyright I

Clause,

47

J.

Copyright

Sac

'y

365,

378-79

(2000).

Over

time,

copyright

shed

8

I

9

I creationof new works. The Framerswere well awareof this history, and intendedthe

its censorialhistory, becominga systemaimed at preservinga limited incentive for the

10

Intellectual PropertyClauseto serveboth an anti-censorshipfunction and an anti-

I

monopoly function. Patterson,supra, at 383.

12

Accordingly, copyright law haslong found it necessaryto accommodatethe First Amendmentrights of individuals to useexpression.Copyright law strikesthis balancein

i

13

14

I

severalways. Both the idea/expressiondichotomy and the uncopyrightability of facts limit copyright's scope.Seee.g. Netanel,First AmendmentSkein,supra, at 2. Copyright

15

must be of limited durationso that all copyrightedworks eventuallyenterthe public

16

i domain.And while copyright law grantsauthorscertainmonopoly rights over their 17

works, eachof thoseis limited by the reservationof rights by the public, regardlessof the 18

copyright owner's wishes.The public's rights serveindispensablefunctions for both the

I

19

First Amendmentand the copyright bargain.As explainedfurther below, these 20

!imitations are severelyreduced,if not outright eliminat~ throughthe broad

21

interpretationof the DMCA reflectedin the government'sindictment.

22

v.

23

The DMCA presents significant constitutional problems

24

A

25

I

DMCA's Chan2esto the CoRmght Bargain

Amicus Brief ofEFF ct. al. In Supportof Motion to Dismiss 'CR-OI-2138-RMW

9

If copyright law is to continueto be true to the First Amendmentand its 2

constitutionalroots,6the grant of additionalrights to copyright holdersshould foster

3 4

expansionof copyright law. To comprehendits scope,and the First Amendment .s

6

concentricrings of liability to copyright holders.8The chart below illustratesthis

7

8

I

metaphor. 9

9

10

12

13 14 15

16 11

18

19 20

6 Seege~erally Melville B. Nimmer First Amendment;Paul Goldste~, "Copyright and the First Amendment," 70 Colum. L. Rev. 983 (1970).

21 22

23

7 Benkler, supra, at 386-89(1999); J~s Boyle, A Politics o/Intellectual Property: , , .. !Environmentalism/or the Net?, 47 DulCeL.J. 87, 89 (1997). :

,

8 SeeBenkler,supra at 358

24

19All threeof the chartsusedin this brief (seealso pages_& -> were developedby the ACLU 2S for the amicusbrief in the 2nd Circuit Appeal in Universalv. Corely. (visited January29, 2002). I

IAmicus Brief of EFF et. al. In Supportof Motion to Dismiss

:CR-OI-213S-RMW

10

~

Pre-DMCA Liability Links

2

TraffICking

3

\

Circun,vcnt

4

/~;7'

Above the lire: no fair use: an infrin~ing act: and - a sufrlCientrelationship bet\\'ccn Infringer and dcfel\danl

-

s 6 7

"'--~

~"'C

8

lklow the Ii\e: .:itl1\.'f lair use: no inlhniina acl:or insumci~ relati()nship bel\veen

-

/'

/

/

-

infrin~er and defendant

9 I directinfringer

10

..

Shading liability ..

11

At the core is direct liability for copyright infringement.I 0 In the next ring are the

12

indirect liability doctrinesof contributory infringementand vicarious liability that courts

13

haveread into copyright law. SeeSony,464 U.S. at 434-435 Thesefirst two rings of

14

liability accommodatefree speechconcernsby recognizingfair userights

IS

The DMCA addsa third ring of indirect liability for circumventingtechnical

16

:7 measuresusedto protect accessto copyrightedworks ("the anti-circumvention 18

provision"),ll and a fourth ring for making or trafficking in circumventiontechnology

19

("the anti-trafficking provision").12 In addition to holding that the third and fourth rings 20

21 22

1017 U.S.C. § 106, § 501

23 24

ill 17 V.S.C. §1201(a)(I)(A) "No personshall circumventa technologicalmeasurethat I

25

effectivelycontrolsaccessto a workprotectedunderthistitle." 12 17 V.S.C. §1201(b)(I). "No personshall manufacture,import, offer to the public, provide, or otherwisetraffic in any technology,product,service,device,component,or part thereof,that Amicus BriefofEFF et. at. In Supportof Motion to Dismiss CR-Ol-2138-RMW

of liability do not allow fair userights, the SecondCircuit in Universalv. Corley, 273 2

F.3d 429, 455 (2nd Cir. 2001), supportedby the Governmentin its role as Intervener,13

3

addeda fifth ring of indirect liability basedon merelinks to sitescontaining 4

s circumventiontechnology. As the circles of indirect liability expandoutward,the quantumof free speech

6

shrinks- unlessthe law incorporateslimiting principlesto preservea robust domain for

7 8

free speech interests.14

9

Courtshave imposedindirect liability for copyright infringementin situationsin

10

which third partieshaveknowingly and materially participatedin illegal behavior.If 1

indirect liability is expandedwithout regardto (I) whethertherewere any underlying acts

12

of infringement;(2) whetherany relationshipexistsbetweenthe actual infringers and the

13

14

.,

(A) is primarily designedor producedfor the purposeof circumventinga technological measurethat effectively protectsa right of a copyright owner underthis title in a work or a portion thereof; (B) hasonly limited commercially significant purposeor useother than to circumvent a technologicalmeasurethat effectively protectsa right of a copyright owner underthis title in a work or a portion thereof; or (C) is marketedby that personor anotheracting in concertwith that personwith that person'sknowledgefor usein circumventingprotectionaffordedby a technologicalmeasure

16 17 18

19 20 21 22

23 24 2S

I

thateffectivelyprotectsa right of a copyrightownerunderthis title in a work or a portion thereof. 17 V.S.C. § 1201(a)(2) similarly prohibits trafficking in technology"for the purposeof circumventingprotectionafforded by a technologicalmeasurethat effectively controls accessto a work protectedunderthis title" 13 Seee.g. (visited January26, 2002). 14SeeBenkler, supra, at 393 ("An increasein the amountof material one owns decreasesthe communicativecomponentsfreely availableto all others."). AmicusBriefofEFFet.at. 12

iIn Supportof Motion to Dismiss CR-OI-2138-RMW

1

personthe plaintiff seeksto hold indirectly liable; and,most importantly, (3) whethera

2

fair useor other free speechright applies,that expansionpresentsgraveconstitutional

3

problems.Unfortunately,this casetriggersthoseconcerns.

4

Government Interpretation of DMCA Liability

s 6

Abo\e the line; no fair use; an infriniing act; and - a sufficient relationshipbctw\.'Cn infrinaer altd delendant

-

7

-

8 9 10

Below the linc: either fair u~: no infrin~ing act; or - illsuflicieJUrelationshiphet'\lcell infringer and defendant

II

-

12 13 14

I direct infrinser Shading liability ""

='

The governmenthereseeksto hold Elcomsoft criminally liable for activities in the

16

17 18

i

bottom half of the "trafficking" circle in the chart above.This is becausethe indictment containsno allegation,much lessevidence,that the posting of the programcausedany

19 20

21

underlying actsof infringement.Nor is thereallegationthat the defendanteither substantiallycontributedto copyright infringementor had any ability to control the acts

22

of any usersof AEBPR as indirect liability standardswould require. Finally, AEBPR is a

23

tool that facilitates,and in somecasesmakespossible,fair usesand noninfringing uses011

24

eBooks,aswell as usesof works that are not protectedby copyright.

2S

Amicus BriefofEFF et. al. I In Supportof Motion to Dismiss I CR-OI-2I38-RMW

13

The government'sbroadinterpretationof the DMCA therebylays the legal 2

foundationfor eliminating the public benefitsof the copyright bargain,replacing

3

traditional copyright law with a systemthat givespublisherstotal control over how works

4

can be experienced.IS Under that interpretation,the DMCA' s anti-trafficking provisions

s 6

permit copyright ownersto nullify the public's ability to access,use,and copy expression

1

wheneverthat expressionis shieldedby technology.As a result, they presenta

8

tremendousthreatto free expressionby negatingthe limiting principles designedto

9

I

preservethe copyright bargain.

10

B. UnlessNarrowly Construed.the DMCA EliminatesMuch of the Public Sideor the CoRmgbt Bargain

I'

The Copyright Act, of course,grantscontentownerscertain"exclusive" powers 13

over in their works. 7 U.S.C. § 106. But theseare limited in many ways. 7 U.S.C. §§

14

107-120. Copyright hasneveraccordedthe copyright owner completecontrol over all

IS

possibleusesof his work. Sony,464 U.S. at 432. A useora copyrightedwork doesnot

16

infringe copyright unlessit conflicts with one of the specific, exclusiverights enumerateu

17

in the Copyright Act. Twentieth-CentwyMusic, 422 U.S. at 154-155. As explained

18

further below, the government'sinterpretationof the DMCA effectively eliminatesmuch

19

of the public side of the copyright bargain,or, at best,puts the public's ability to exercise

20

it's

rights

into

the

exclusive

control

of

the

content

owners.

This ~hift, if not restrainedby

-.

a narrow interpretationof the statute,runs afoul of the Constitution.

21 22

(~

23

15 SeeDavid Nimmer, A Riff on Fair Usein the Digital Millennium CopyrightAct, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 673, 727-39(2000) (providing examples);PamelaSamuelson,Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy: Whythe Anti-CircumventionRegulationsNeedto Be Revised,14 BerkeleyTech. L.J. 519, 536-57(1999).

24 25

I

Amicus Brief of EFF ct. al. In SuPPOrt. of Motion to Dismiss CR-oI-2138-RMW

14 ~

1. UnlessLimited. the DMCA Allows PublishersTo Control (And Extract PavmentFor) Works In The Public Domain. 2 J 4

s

Under the Intellectual PropertyClause,copyright must be limited in time such all works eventuallypassinto the public domain. "[Copyright] is intendedto allow the public accessto the productsof their geniusafter the limited period of exclusivecontrol hasexpired." Sony,464 U.S. at 429; seeJessicaLitman, ThePublic Domain, 39 Emory

6

L.J. 965 (1990).Although the DMCA purportsto protectonly copyrightedworks, unless 7 8 9 10 11

12

limited its prohibitions reachmuch further, including into the public domain. SeeDavid Nimmer, A Riff on Fair Use in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 148 U. fA. L. REv.

673,727-32 (2000) (presentingcasestudiesshowinghow DMCA could renderillegal otherwiselegal activity)("Nimmer Riff'). Consider,for instance,a Shakespeare play with a new introductionpublishedin eBook Readerformat.Nimmer Riff, supra, at 712 (compilation of 19th-century

13 :cookbooks given new introductions "considered as a whole[] would be subject to 14

copyright protection") (footnoteomitted). But while the new compilation as a whole

I'

would be copyrightable,only the new material is actually protectedby copyright;

16

Shakespeare's words are in the public domain. Copying or printing thosewords is not

17

infringement. Despitethis, eBook Readertechnologypermitsthe publisherto deny the

18

lawful owner of the eBook the ability to print or copy any of Shakespeare's unprotected

19

expression.

20

21

circumventionfor non-copyrightedworks is not itself unlawful undercopyright law or 22

the DMCA. In order to accomplishthis legal act, however,the userwill needa software 23

tool. Yet underthe government'sview of the trafficking prohibition, thesetools may not 24

be distributed.This is becausethe governmentassertsthat the DMCA prohibits the

2S

Amicus Brief of EFF et. al. In Supportof Motion to Dismiss CR-O 1-2 I 38-RMW

15

creationor "providing" of circumventiontechnologies,even if the goal is to allow access 2 I

3

and

copyright

circumvention

of non-copyrighted

works.

The result is the sameevenif the e-bookincludesonly Shakespeare's play. So long

4

as the book is protectedby eBook Readerand the publisherchoosesnot to "permit"

s j legitimateuses,suchusesare effectively impossiblebecauseof the lack of suitabletools 6

By the sametoken, a copyright owner can effectively preventan e-book from ever

.,

effectively enteringthe public domain,despitethe expirationof copyright. Oncethe I book hasbeenplacedinto the eBook fonna~ the tools necessaryto circumventthe eBook I

8

"permissions"are prohibited.

9

10

2. The Government'slntemretationOf The DMCA Allows Publishers

II

To Ne2ateClassicFair Use.

12

One key elementof the copyright bargainis fair use. "Any individual may

13

reproducea copyrightedwork for a 'fair use'; the copyright owner doesnot possessthe

14 I

IS I

16

exclusiveright to sucha use." Sony,464 U.S. at 432 ("all reproductionsof the work. . . are not within the exclusivedomainof the copyright owner; someare in the public

I domain.").

Fair use includescopying all or part of anothercopyrightedwork in order to

17

18 : engagein

critical commentary,newsreporting,and other free speech-relatedactivities.

19 RosemontEnterprises,Inc. v. RandomHouse,Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966)(fair use 20

to reproduceportions of article in critical biographyof Howard Hughes);Triangle Pub.,

21

Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 626 F .2d

22 23

I

I

'71 (5th Cir. 1980) (fair use to

reproducecover ofTY Guide in comparisonof competingguide); Sony,464 U.S. at 425 (copy of entire work may be fair use) Fair use is rootedin the constitutionalpurposeof copyright. Campbelv. Acuff-

24

RoseMusic, 510 U.S. 569 at 575 (1994) ("some opportunity for fair useof copyrighted

25 I

materialshasbeenthoughtnecessaryto fulfill copyright's very purpose"); id. at 577 (fair Amicus BriefofEFFet. al. In Supportof Motion to Dismiss CR-QI-2138-RMW

16

use"pennits [and requires]courtsto avoid rigid applicationof the copyright statute 2

when, on occasion,it would stifle the very creativity which that law is intendedto

3

foster") (internal quotationmarksand citation omitted).

4

The fair usedoctrinehasalsoensuredthat copyright laws are consistentwith the

,

First Amendment. SeeHarper & Row,47

u.s.at 560 (suggestingconstitutional

6

dimensionof fair usedoctrinein mediatingbetweencopyright and First Amendment

1

interests,althoughruling againstnewsmagazinethat had not madefair usein publishing

8

key excerptsof a not-yet publishedmemoir);Nihon Keizai Shimbunv. ComlineBusiness

9

Data, 166F.3d 65,74 (2d Cir. 1999)(First Amendmentconcernsprotectedby fair use) Although the First Amendmentis often reference~courtshavegenerallynot

10

neededto rely explicitly on tf.e constitutionalbasisfor fair usebecauseof its 12

longstandingdoctrinal homein Americancopyright law See,e.g., Time, Inc. v. Bernard

13

GeisAssocs.,293 F.Supp.130(SD.N. Y. 1968)(fair useto reproduceframesof Zapruder film in order to explain author'stheory of Kennedyassassination)

14

When Congressfinally codified fair usein the Copyright Act of 1976,it identified

IS

severalcategoriesof favoreduses,i.e., for "criticism, comment,newsreporting,

16

teaching , scholarship,[and] research,"all of which are free speech-relatedusesof

11

copyrightedworks. 7 U.S.C.§ 107 The codification of fair usewas meant"to restate the presentjudicial doctrineof fair use,not to change,narrow or enlargeit in any way 19

SeeH.R. REp.No. 94-1476,p. 66 (1976). Congressintendedthat fair usecontinueto

20

evolve, "especially during a period of rapid technologicalchange." Ibid ("courts must be

21

free to adaptthe doctrineto particularsituationson a case-by-casebasis

22

Tme to Congress'sintent, courtshavesince 1976frequently invoked fair useto

23

mediatetensionsbetweeninterestsof copyright ownersand subsequentusersof

24

copyrightedworks in casesinvolving new technologiesthat posedchallengingquestions

25

for copyright law See,e.g.,Sony,supra (time-shift copying of television programsheld I

fair use);SegaEnterprises,Ltd. v. Accolade,.Inc., 977 F.2d 510 (9th Cir. 1992)(fair use

j Amicus Brief of EFF et. al.

1 In Support of Motion to Dismiss

- CR-OI-2138-RMW

I,

2 3 4

, 6 '7

8 9

10 II 12 13

14 IS 16 7 18 19 20 21

22 23 24

25

Amendmentinterestsby ensuringthereare alternativedistributorsfor creative 2

Iexpression.Having only a single sourceavailablefor obtainingparticular infontlation i

3 Ibreedsprivate censorship.Allowing severalindividuals to learn from one copy of a work 4

helpsspreadknowledgeand infonnation. Libraries and usedbook storesfunction almost

5 I

solely

6

from

the

privileges

conferred

by the

first

sale

doctrine.

Under the first saledoctrine,oncea personhaslawfully acquireda copy of a book-

., I

he or sheis free to lend, sell, or give that copy to anyoneelse. 17 V.S.C. § 109(a). But

8

technologicalmeasurespennit publishersto preventany transferof a work For instance

9

the eBook Readertechnologyallows publishersto preventlending (temporarily forgoing

10

! one's I

II

I

own

use

of

the

copy)

or

giving

(pennanently

relinquishing

the

ability

to

use

the

copy) of an e-book by tying the purchasede-bookto the particular deviceon which it was

Idownloaded.

12 13

4.

14

IS

The Government'slntemretationof the DMCA Allows Content HoldersTo Eliminate The Public's Rigi!t QfPrivate Performance.

Similarly, while copyright ownershavethe right to control public display and

16

perfonnanceof their works, private perfonnancesare deliberatelybeyondthe control of

17 the copyright owner. Sony,464 U.S. at 468. One may, without any authorization,sing a 18 I copyrightedlyric

in the shower(Twentieth-CenturyMusic v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 155at 155

19 1(1975);or usea book for private reference.cf Stoverv. Lathrop, 33 F. 348 (C.C.D. Colo. 20

1888)("The effect of a copyright is not to preventany reasonableuseof the book which

21

is sold. may usethe book for reference,study,reading,lending, copying passagesfrom

22

it at my will."). Through the useof technologicalprotectionsystemsand the legal protection of the

23

DMCA, however,copyright ownerscan go beyondcontrol of public performancesto

24

usurpcontrol over certainprivate perfonnances.For instance,individuals use"text-to-

25 I

speech"softwareso that their computerscan readelectronicfiles aloud to them.

I Amicus Brief of EFF ct. al. In Supportof Motion to Dismiss I

CR-o1-2138-RMW

19

Assumingthe file hasbeenlegitimately obtainedandthat no additional reproductionsare 2

required,suchreadingaloud which constitutesa privateperfonnanceof a literary work

3

for which no pennissionis required.But in the face of restrictionsbuilt into the Adobe

4

eBook Readertechnology,individuals will no longerbe able to usetheir own "text to

s speech"tools to exercisetheir private performancerights. 6

1

5.

8

The Government'sBroad Intemretationof the DMCA Can PreventPurchasersfrom Accessine:Their Own Books.

9

10

Given the realitiesof modembusiness,an inflexible interpretationof the DMCA 11

Can also preventlawful purchasersof eBooksfrom readingtheir own books. In January, 12

2002,MightyWords, one of the premiereBook publishers,ceasedbusinessoperations.16

13

As a result, noneof the lawful purchasersof thoseeBookshasany further ability to repair 14

a broken eBook or transferthe book to a new Machine(somethingallowed witch

t,

individual pennissionby MightyWords while it was in operation). In essence,due to the

16

businessfailure of Might Words, its eBooksaretimed out - becomingcompletely

:7

inaccessibleto userswho undergoany significant changesin their computersystems. A

18

programsuchasAEBPR could allow ownersof Might Works eBooksto accessand use 19

their books despitethe fact that the companyno longerexists, Yet underthe 20

government'sinterpretation,providing AEBPR to a MightyWorks customeris a criminal 21

violation of the DMCA. Thus directly contraryto the goalsandpurposesof the copyright

22

bargain,the DMCA effectively makestheseeBooksinaccessiblenot only to the public,

I

23

but to someof thosewho havebought andpaid for them. 24

25

16 See (noticeofshutdown of company); See also I

AmicusBriefofEFF et. al. 20 In Supportof Motionto Dismiss CR..QI-2138-RMW

VI.

2

The DMCA Must Be Narrowly Construed Or Invalidated

3 4

I

There is anlple evidencethat Congressdid not intendto eliminate fair or noninfringing usein the 1201context. Firs~ and most importantly,with regardto fair userights, the

oS

6

statuteitself states:"Nothing in this sectionshall affect rights, remedies,limitations, or

7

defensesto copyright infringement,including fair use,underthis title." 1201(c)(1). As 8 I

9

the Registrarof Copyrightssaid: [T]his legislationclarifies existing law and expandsspecific exemptionsfor laudablepurposes.Thesespecific exemptionsare supplementedby the broaddoctrine of fair use. Although not addressedin this bill, fair useis both a fundamentalprinciple of the U.S. copyright law and an important part of the necessarybalanceon the digital highway. Thereforethe applicationof fair usein the digital environmentshouldbe strongly reaffinned." 17

10 II 12 13 14

.,

Fortunately,the DMCA is susceptibleto a constitutionalinterpretation.18

16

Revisiting the chartsusedabove,the interpretationwould be as follows:

17 18 19 20

21 22

17 TestimonyofMc.rybeth Peters,Registrarof Copyrightsand AssociateLibrarian for Copyright Servicesp. 40. (H.R. 2441 and S. 1284).Joint Hearingbeforethe Subcommitteeof Courts and Intellectual Propertyof the HouseCommitteeon the Judiciaryand the SenateCommitteeon the Judiciary - - NIl Copyright ProtectionAct of 1995.

23 24

18 This sectionof the brief incorporatesargumentsfrom the amicusbrief of the ACLU, et. aI. in the 2nd Circuit Appeal in Universal v. Corely, (visited January29, 2002).

2$

I

Amicus Brief of EFF et. a1.

In Supportof Motion to Dismiss 'CR-O1-2138-RMW

21

~

Constitutional

Interpretation of Liabilif.'.' llnder DMCA

2 3 4

s

/

""./""-'~~~~~~~~"'~"'."

/

/~-~

"

i\~V~ t~ line:

nolair u~:

-

an inrringing &11:1: and a surr~ient rl.'lationship hctwcl.'n

-

Circumvent

6

-

inlringer and dcfend&lnl

Contrib.

7

8 9 10

\

'"

'I.

'"

""

11

Bclow Ih~ line: ~ilher

',,---,

;

/'

'~=::::/

I ,/

-

rair u~;

-

no inrrin~ing act; or in)"Umc~nlr~lation~hip~Iwcen in tnngcr and dcfcndanl

-

12 13

In other words, liability underthe DMCA occurswhen a Court has found

14 IS

1. That there is no noninfringing use,fair useor free speechright to offer the program.

16 17

2. That a sufficient relationshipexist betweenthe publisherof the program and infringers underthe aiding and abettingor conspiracystandardsl9;and

18

19 20 21

3. That the programwas usedto infringe copyrightsor that an imminent dangerof copyright infringementexistsunderthe First Amendment stiindards.20

22

23 24 2S

19 Seee.g. Central Bank of DenverN.A~~.First InterstateBank of Denver.NA., 511 U .S: 164, 190(1994)(aidingand abettingrequiresintentionalacts); United Statesv. Superior Growers Supply,Inc., 982 F.2d 173, 177-78(6th Cir. 1992); UnitedStatesv. Campa,679 F.2d 1006, 101 (1st Cir. 1982)(aiding and abettingrequiresthat underlyingoffensein fact be committed); Direct SalesCo. v. United States,319 U.S. 703 (I 943)(conspiracyrequirements). 20 Under traditional First Amendmentstandards,speakerliability even for subsequentviolent acts is not allowed "unlessthat speechis capableof producingimminent lawlessaction." AmicusBriefof EFFet.al. 22 In Supportof Motionto Dismiss

CR-Ol-213'8-RMW

f

2

One way to do this within the statutoryschemeis throughthe definition of the

3

tenDsof the statute. §1201(b) carefully is, by its very terms,limited to technologiesthat

4

"effectively protect a right of a copyright owner." If the phrase"right of a copyright

s 6

I owner" is limited to the list of exclusiverights grantedan owner undercopyright law (the I

8 I

9

top half of the chart above),then actsdonefor purposesthat are outsidethe copyright owner'srights (the bottom half of the chart),are simply outsidethe scopeof the statute. Alternately, the court could rely on the statute'sexpresspreservationof free

10 I

speechand fair use,seenin §1201(cXl) and (cX3).21 No matterhow the constructionis

12

accomplished,creationof "safetyvalves" in the DMCA to matchthe longstandingones

13

that exist in copyright law, is necessaryfor the statuteto remainwithin the boundsof the

14

constitution.22

IS

A.

Without a Narrowin2 Construction.the DMCA is Unconstitutional.

16

If this Court finds that the DMCA is incapableof narrowing constructionssuchas 18

thoseoutlined above,the statutemust be voided.SeeVirginia v. AmericanBooksellers

19

Assoc.,484 U.S. 383, 397 (1988); Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410, 419 (1971). Without free

20

21 I

22

Brandenburgv. Ohio,395U.S.444,447(1969). 21 SeeJaneC. Ginsburg,Copyright Useand Excuseon the Internet, 24 Colwn.-VLA J.L. & A,rts 1,8-9 (discussionof how §1201(c)(3)can be readto allow fair useunderthe DMCA). 22 "[T]here is no questionthat the copyright law is far more nuancedand containsfar more exceptionsthan the Digital Millenniwn Copyright Act. The technologicalprotectionsare much more rigid than the law they are intendedto protect." Commentsof JonathanBan~ 50 Am. U. L. Rev. 363 American University Law Review December2000SymposiumPANEL ONE: THE ROAD TO NAPSFER:INTERNET TECHNOLOGY& DIGITAL CONTENTWashingtonD.C. Thursday,November 16, 2000. AmicusBriefofEFFet.al. 23

23 24

25

I

ln Supportof Motion to Dismiss CR-QI-2138-RMW

speechsafeguardsthe expansionof indirect liability into a fourth ring of liability for 2

trafficking in circumventiontechnologyunconstitutionallyrestrictsspeechthat was

3

'iclearly in the public domain or otherwiseprotectedby the First Amendmentprior to the

.

DMCA. SeeBenkler,supra, at 385-429;see,e.g.,Nimmer Riff at 739 (noting the

s 6

"consciouscontractionof userrights" by Congress).As a result, the broadly construed

'7

anti-trafficking provision operatesas an effective ban on a variety of expressive

8

technologiescapableof substantialnoninfringing uses.Unlessnarrowly construed,such

9 J

an effective ban on protectedspeechviolatesthe First Amendment.SeeACLU I, 521

10

u.s. 844 (1997) (striking down the CommunicationsDecencyAct becauseit operatedas an effective ban on speechprotectedfor adults).AEBPR is, of course,only one of

12

I countlesstechnologiescoveredby the statute.Without a narrowing construction,the

13

Istatutehashad and will continueto havea substantialchilling effect on the development

14 IS

I

of new technologiescapableof importantnoninfringing uses.23

16 17

VII.

18 19

"Once encryptionbecomesthe norm, the rights-holders,not Congress,will dictate what usescan and cannotbe madeof their properties." Kramarsky,supra, at 43.

20

In askingthat the DMCA be construednarrowly, we do not questionthe right of

21 22

I

23 I

24 25

Conclusion

I

eBook

publishers

to

protect

their

works.

We

do

not

question

their

fears

that

digital

23 This includesreverseengineeringa Sony AiboPet to teachit new tricks and the threatsto a

Princeton/Rice/Xerox team of researchers led by Professor Feltenconference. who soughtSee to publish .the resultsof analysisof technological protection measuresEdward at a scientific e.g. I (visited January26, 2002) and

(visited January27,2002). I Amicus Brief of EFF et. a1. In Supportof Motion to Dismiss CR-OI-2138-RMW

24

publishing underthe prevalentbusinessmodel presentsincreasedrisks of copyright

I

2

Iinfringement.We only claim that when publisherschooseto publish copiesof their work~

3

in digital form, their ability to control consumerusesof thosecopiesbe subjectto

4

,

limiting principles long establishedin copyright law, someof which derive from the

I

Constitution. Even if codemay protectworks more completelythan the law, the law may reinforce that code only to the extentthe Constitutionallows.

I 5 I

6 7 8

Respectfullysubmitted:

9 10

Dated this 4d1day of February, 2002

,:::::~~~ii~~~[~~:===

II

B

C Y A. CO ROB D.GROSS LEE TlEN

13

ELECTRONIC FOUNDATION

14

FRONTIER

454 Shotwell Street SanFranciscoCA 94110 Telephone:(415) 436-9333 FacsImile: (415) 436-9993

IS 16 17 18

19 20 21 22 23 24 2S

I Amicus Brief of EFF et. aI. In Supportof Motion to Dismiss 'CR-QI-2138-RMW

25