CE Services
No. 1 for Quality Investments
CE Services (Riga‐Zurich) is independent Corporate Excellence research centre for systematic equity investment analysis. CE Services focuses on the following equity markets: USA, Western Europe, Japan, Switzerland, and Eastern Europe. Research findings are used in CE Asset Manage‐ ment activities. The results of Excellence inves‐ tments covering the world’s major stock exchanges are published on a monthly basis in the CE Corpo‐ rate Quality Index® and CE Corporate Excellence Index®. Our experience, enhanced by first‐hand research, is consistently leveraged in a monthly publication for clients called The Competitive Edge Perspecti‐ ve®.
CE Services
Winners and Losers under Credit Crunch
© 2009 CE Services SIA Adrese: P.Brieža 15, Rīga, LV‐1010, Latvija. Tel: +371 67 808 974, +371 67 808 975
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Healthcare
Utilites
Consumer staples
Telecom
Energy
IT
Materials
Industrials
Consumer discretionary
Only 4% of 977 European companies demonstrated an increase in their share prices over July 2007 to end of December 2009. Further 17% of companies lost less than 30% in share prices. All the other companies experienced a more than 30% decrease in stock re‐ turns; some even experienced 95% loss in their market values. There appear to be large variances in the share price reactions to the credit crunch depending on the geog‐ raphical region, size and financial performance of companies, as demonstrated by the research project in co‐operation of CE Services SIA and Tallinn School of Economics and Business Administration of the Tallinn University of Technology. This project aims to identify the typology of the winners and losers under the cre‐ dit crunch by way of studying companies’ share price performance and financial data as of December 2009 in comparison to July 2007. The sample of 977 listed companies from 32 European countries were resear‐ ched. Geographical Distribution As a consequence of the credit crunch the companies headquartered in the EU 15 old member states and in the EFTA countries lost overall less in share prices than companies registered in the CIS (Russia and Ukraine) and the EU 12 new member states. This is partly explained by the previously high growth rates in the latter regions as well as by higher political and financi‐ al instability and asset outflow from the emerging markets during the credit crunch. The best performers tend to be quoted in the developed Western Europe‐ an countries: Belgium, Switzerland, Sweden, Britain, Denmark and Portugal as well as Slovakia. Industry Distribution As expected, in general the best performing compa‐ nies were those in non‐cyclical businesses as well as traditionally good dividend payers (with the exception of financial sector): healthcare, telecoms, utilities and consumer staples. Among the best surviving industry subgroups were food and staples retailing, healthcare equipment, commercial and professional services. The worst hit industry groups were banks and consumer durables. However, considering the high intra‐industry dispersion of these results, belonging to a certain industry does not seem to have been a fundamental driver of companies’ stock price reactions to the credit crunch.
Financials
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0% ‐10% ‐20% ‐30% ‐40% ‐50% ‐60% ‐70%
Figure 1: Average performance of the industry groups (July2007‐ December2009)
Size and Style Distribution Results of the study show that companies with low market capitalisation had demonstrated highest ave‐ rage stock returns a year before the start of the credit crunch (71% in average), whereas companies with highest market capitalisation exceeding 10 bn EUR lost relatively less in their share prices after the credit crunch started (‐17% in average). 80%
40%
71%
31.07.2006 / 31.07.2007
60%
31.07.2007 / 31.07.2008
31%
30%
30%
36%
20% 0% ‐20%
large‐cap ‐17%
II quarter‐cap ‐23%
‐40%
mid‐cap ‐21%
I quarter‐cap ‐21%
small‐cap ‐20%
Figure 2: Average performance of the size groups (July2006‐ July2008)
These results partly correspond to the performance of investment styles. The companies classified as Growth companies, which are usually of a smaller size, showed better performance during the year before the finan‐ cial crisis emerged (61% in average). However, com‐ panies with lower valuation, which are considered to be of more conservative style during financial crises, evidently were not able to outperform Growth style companies: performance of ‐19% of Growth style companies versus performance of ‐21% of Value style companies. 70.0%
31.07.2006 / 31.07.2007
61.3%
60.0% 31.07.2007 / 31.07.2008
50.0%
39.3%
40.0% 30.0% 20.0% 10.0% 0.0% ‐10.0% ‐20.0% ‐30.0%
Growth Companies ‐19.1%
Value Companies ‐21.2%
Figure 3: Average performance of the investment styles (July2006‐ July2008)
© 2009 CE Services SIA Disclaimer: This document may contain confidential information that is not intended for third parties. If you are not the intended recipient of this document, you must not publish or pass on its content in any way. This document is for information purposes only and constitutes neither an offer nor a recommendation to undertake any type of transaction or to buy or sell securities or financial products in the broadest sense. CEAMS offers no guarantee of the completeness, correctness or security of this document. CEAMS accepts no liability claims that might arise from the use or non‐use of the content of this document.
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Financials Quality investors evidently were in the winning positi‐ on as according to the investment style philosophy they mostly consider enterprises with strong balance sheet and solid financials. Study results proved that the healthier were the financials of the company the better average performance during the period it could demonstrate. This is applicable to the major profit ratios such as ROE as well as capital structure ratios such as debt/equity ratio (see figure 4) – companies with less risky capital structure outperformed compa‐ nies with more risky capital structure. 55.1%
60.0% 50.0%
53.6%
47.5%
47.5%
40.0%
31.07.2006 / 31.07.2007 31.07.2007 / 31.07.2008
30.0% 20.0% 10.0% 0.0% ‐10.0% ‐20.0% ‐30.0%
D/E > 0,9 ‐22.6%
D/E 0,6‐0,9 ‐19.1%
D/E 0,3‐0,6 ‐21.3%
D/E < 0,3 ‐16.7%
Figure 4: Average performance of the companies according to Debt/Equity ratio (July2006‐July2008)
Interestingly, differences in companies’ working capi‐ tal position do not appear to have been substantial drivers of share price performance under the credit crunch. Typology of Winners Most of the winners (positve share price performance) tend to be large companies belonging to the EU 15 old member states. The winners show a relatively low average P/E ratio, high average profit margin and relatively moderate return on assets. In contrast, companies having experienced biggest losses in share prices are the ones with highest P/E ratios and relatively high return on assets. In this way the study shows a clear contrast between the overly optimistic expectations of shareholders and companies’ actual ability to increase value. There were only 38 winning companies (i.e. compa‐ nies with positive price performance) of the total number of companies analyzed, which is not substan‐ tial to make logical conclusions and to find patterns in order to set a strategy for winning equity portfolio. Positive share price performance was caused by cor‐ porate events in the majority cases (e.g. Volkswagen).
Thus, systematic approach to creating stock portfolio with the emphasis on Quality, including also defensive industry and size choice, could be able to beat the general market but most probably wouldhave lost in absolute value during the global setback of major stock indices. CE Services Team in cooperation with Tallinn University of Technology The research project “Survivors of the credit crunch” was carried out in co‐operation of CE Services SIA and a group of Master students at the Tallinn School of Economics and Business Administration of the Tallinn University of Technology (TUT) from January to May 2009. The Master students conducting the research were Mari Männiste, Maksim Golovatjuk and Signe Uustal. They were supervised by Aaro Hazak, PhD, Senior Researcher at TUT. Tallinn School of Economics and Business Administration is the largest institution of research and higher education in economics and business administration in Estonia, offering internationally accredited study curricula at bachelor, master and doctoral level, including programs for fo‐ reign students.
© 2009 CE Services SIA Disclaimer: This document may contain confidential information that is not intended for third parties. If you are not the intended recipient of this document, you must not publish or pass on its content in any way. This document is for information purposes only and constitutes neither an offer nor a recommendation to undertake any type of transaction or to buy or sell securities or financial products in the broadest sense. CEAMS offers no guarantee of the completeness, correctness or security of this document. CEAMS accepts no liability claims that might arise from the use or non‐use of the content of this document.