Walking A Thin Line Hizbollah And Operation Cast Lead

Walking a Thin Line: Hizbollah and Operation Cast Lead INSS Insight No. 89, January 13, 2009 Kulick, Amir On the morning of January 8, 2009, katyusha rockets were fired at Israel from Lebanon. Hizbollah hurried to deliver an official announcement that the organization had not carried out this operation. Muhammad Fneish, Labor Minister and Hizbollah’s senior representative in the Lebanese government, even added that Hizbollah had no idea who fired the rockets. To a great extent this response contradicts the spirit of Hizbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, who in a series of speeches at the beginning of the Israeli operation in Gaza lauded the struggle against Israel and enthusiastically called for support of the Palestinians fighting the Israeli army. Indeed, as the operation continues, and the ground war in particular, the question of how Hizbollah will react emerges in sharper relief, especially in light of the growing number of pictures of destruction coming out of Gaza and the wave of protests in the Arab and Islamic world. Nasrallah, who sees himself not merely as a Lebanese figure but as an Arab and Islamic leader, must provide his supporters with his analysis of the events in Gaza. His statements during the Israeli operation hint at the logic underlying the organization’s response to the operation and perhaps the katyusha fire at Israel. Furthermore, the opinions expressed by Nasrallah likely reflect a view common among many in the Arab and Islamic world, Hamas among them. Therefore an analysis of Nasrallah’s latest pronouncements affords a glance at the way in which many in the Middle East understand the fighting in Gaza today and the strategic context affecting it. At the strategic level, Nasrallah and his supporters view the Israeli operation as part of an American-Israeli attempt to impose a humiliating arrangement on the region. According to Hizbollah’s leader, the Palestinians, Syrians, and Lebanese were left to continue the fight on their own after Egypt and Jordan signed peace agreements with Israel. Now, Israel and the United States are trying to solve the conflict with them “not in just any way, but on American or Israeli terms that will be dictated to the Palestinians.” This is what Israel is trying to achieve using brute force. In this context, in Nasrallah’s analysis the current conflict is neither a religious nor an ideological one, but rather a political conflict that centers on political interests, first and foremost the attitude to Israel and willingness to cooperate with the United States. As such, the current campaign in Gaza is being waged not only against Hamas but against the resistance in general, with the obvious objective of eliminating the resistance. Partners to this program – “true and full partners,” in Nasrallah’s words – are several Arab regimes. Moreover, according to Nasrallah, as was the case during the 2006 Second Lebanon War, now too the Israeli activity is waged with the acquiescence of Arabs, “and in some cases even on the basis of Arab demand.” This approach was well-summarized by Hashem Safi al-Din, chairman of Hizbollah’s Executive Council (“government”), when he stated that as in the Second Lebanon War, now too “the decision is American, the implementation is Zionist, and the conspiracy is Arab.” The footdragging at the Arab summit meeting and the belated Arab appeal to the Security Council strengthen these claims in the view of Hizbollah supporters. Nonetheless, despite the cooperation between the United States and Israel on the one hand and the moderate Arab states on the other, Nasrallah is certain that the conflict will be resolved in the Palestinians’ favor. In his view, the reason lies in two Israeli weaknesses: first, lack of self-confidence – as evidenced by the absence of clearly stated goals for the operation; and, second, the sensitivity of the Israeli public to casualties. This vulnerability grew after the Second Lebanon War and was at the heart of Israel’s hesitancy in launching the ground campaign. In Nasrallah’s view, this is also the key to victory, and the campaign against Israel will be decided on the ground. The longer it lasts, the more it plays into the hands of Hamas. The increased losses along with continued firing at Israel will result in victory by the resistance. In light of this, what steps does Nasrallah suggest be taken? Even more important, what options are open to him? Many of Nasrallah’s operative suggestions for resolving the situation are addressed to others. Of Egypt, Nasrallah demands the opening of the Rafiah crossing in order to supply Hamas with the means to continue the fighting. Of Lebanon’s president, Nasrallah demands efforts to convene an Arab summit; of the leaders of the Arab world, he demands a solution to the crisis; and, finally, of the Arab and Islamic street, Nasrallah demands new uprisings – intifadas – on behalf of Palestine. The fact that most of his directives for action are aimed at external elements implies the organization’s desired mode of response.

However, beyond the rhetoric, Nasrallah has three options open to him: engaging in some sort of action against Israel, doing nothing, or giving others – Palestinians or global jihadists – the opportunity to act against Israel. Each of the three options involves more risk than reward for the organization. Hizbollah’s firing rockets or carrying out attacks on Israel’s northern border seems to be a move Nasrallah is trying to avoid. Another round of fighting in the style of the Second Lebanon War is not in Hizbollah’s best interests. In the last two years, Hizbollah has reaped many victories in the local arena: it proved that it is the strongest military force inside Lebanon (the May 2008 events); it succeeded, together with its partners in the pro-Syrian coalition, in bringing about the election of a "friendly" president; it effected the formation of a government in which it enjoys veto power; and it managed to recover its military might. Hizbollah does not want to jeopardize these successes. Furthermore, Nasrallah’s failure to foresee Israel’s response to the kidnapping of its soldiers in the summer of 2006 certainly did not add to his self-confidence or to his desire to undertake another attempt at anticipating Israel’s reaction to possible events on its northern border. The gap between doing nothing and declarations can be easily explained as Nasrallah did, telling his audience that in light of the sensitive situation, Israel should not be given “an excuse to attack Lebanon, destroy it or confront it.” Doing nothing may be a reasonable option, though Hizbollah will pay a price in terms of its image and propaganda. Nonetheless, compared with the first option, this seems like the less dangerous choice. The other option open to the organization is to let a third party take action, as apparently occurred on January 8, when unknown elements fired rockets at Israel. True, since the Second Lebanon War Hizbollah has not maintained a line of outposts and positions along the border with Israel, and therefore its ability to control what happens there is limited. At the same time, it is safe to assume that the longer the ground campaign lasts and the greater the pressure from the Arab street in light of the pictures broadcast from Gaza, the more Hizbollah will be pressured to take some kind of action – possibly significant action – against Israel. There is no doubt that in this context, Nasrallah is walking a thin line, and that the risk potential to the organization outweighs any kind of anticipated reward.