United States Drug Policy -final







United
States
Drug
Policy
 Developing
a
Rational
Framework





Alec
Johnston
(ID#
25729)
–
Erfurt
School
of
Public
Policy
–
2009





A
thesis
submitted
in
partial
fulfillment
of
the
requirements
for
the
degree
of
Master
 
 of
Public
Policy
 


Thesis
Supervisor:

Dr.
Heike
Grimm
 Erfurt,
July
17,
2009
 Erfurt
School
of
Public
Policy
–
University
of
Erfurt
–
Nordhäuser
Str.
63
–
D‐99089
 www.espp.de
‐
publicpolicy@uni‐erfurt.de


ABSTRACT
 The
purpose
of
this
document
is
to
consider
the
effectiveness
of
the
current
U.S.
drug
 policy
over
the
last
30
years
and
to
offer
an
answer
to
the
question:

How
can
U.S.
 drug
policy
be
improved?

The
document
considers
drug
policy
in
light
of
the
 economic
effects
of
prohibition,
the
history
of
drug
policy
in
the
U.S.
over
the
 relevant
period,
the
policies
of
other
countries
that
have
been
more
entrepreneurial
 in
their
creation
of
drug
policies
like
the
Netherlands
and
Portugal.

The
Document
 then
discusses
the
current
events
and
discussions
taking
place
regarding
drug
policy
 in
America.

Next
the
paper
discusses
three
possible
policy
frameworks
that
could
be
 adopted
to
address
the
issue:

legalization,
decriminalization,
and
depenalization.

 Finally
a
concrete
policy
proposal
is
offered
as
a
possible
strategy
to

improve
the
 drug
situation
in
the
United
States.





ZUSAMMENFASSUNG
 
 Das
Ziel
der
vorliegenden
Masterarbeit
besteht
darin,
die
Effektivität
der
US‐ Amerikanischen
 Drogenpolitik
 zu
 verbessern.
 Die
 gegenwärtige
 Drogenpolitik
 wird
 im
 Rückblick
 auf
 die
 letzten
 30
 Jahre
 analysiert.
 Im
 Mittelpunkt
 der
 Arbeit
 steht
 demnach
 eine
 zentrale
 Frage:
 Wie
 kann
 die
 Drogenpolitik
 der
 Vereinigten
 Staaten
 verbessert
 werden?
 Die
 Arbeit
 diskutiert
 die
 Drogenpolitik
 im
 Lichte
 ökonomischer
 Effekte,
 gibt
 einen
 Rückblick
 auf
 die
 Entwicklung
 der
 Drogenpolitik
im
 relevanten
 Zeitraum
 und
 zeigt
 an
 Hand
 von
 Länderbeispielen
 –
 Niederlande
 und
 Portugal
 –
 eine
 stärkeren
 unternehmerischen
 Ansatz
 der
 Drogenpolitik
 auf.
 Im
 Anschluss
 werden
 die
aktuellen
Ereignisse
und
Diskussionen
in
 den
USA
 erörtert
 sowie
 nachfolgend
 drei
 Handlungsszenarien
 beschrieben,
 die
 realisiert
 werden
 könnten.
 In
 allen
 Szenarien
 werden
 einige
 Kernpunkte
 aufgegriffen:
Legalisierung,
Entkriminalisierung
und
Depenalisierung.
 Schlussfolgernd
 wird
 eine
 konkrete
 Handlungsempfehlung
 gegeben
 ‐
 eine
 Strategie,
zur
Verbesserung
der
Drogensituation
in
den
Vereinigten
Staaten.
 


Developing
a
Rational
Framework


2



 Table
of
Contents
 INTRODUCTION


4


1.
AN
ANALYSIS
OF
THE
EFFECTS
OF
PROHIBITION


7


1.1
FOREIGN
EFFECTS
 1.2
MONETARY
EFFECTS
OF
PROHIBITION
 1.3
SUBSTITUTION
 1.4
CORRUPTION
 1.5
ADULTERATION
AND
POTENCY
 1.6
SOCIAL
COSTS:

CRIME
 1.7
SECTION
SUMMARY


9
 10
 13
 14
 15
 16
 17


2.
RECENT
HISTORY
OF
THE
WAR
ON
DRUGS


18


2.1
FOREIGN
ISSUES
 2.2
MONETARY
COSTS
 2.3
CORRUPTION
 2.4
SOCIAL
CLASS
EFFECTS
 2.5
IMPRISONMENT
 2.6
ANALYSIS
OF
THE
EFFECTIVENESS
OF
THE
ONDCP
 2.7
SECTION
SUMMARY


25
 28
 29
 31
 34
 35
 38


3.
HARM
REDUCTION
SUCCESSES
IN
FOREIGN
COUNTRIES


39


3.1
THE
CASE
OF
HOLLAND
 3.2
THE
CASE
OF
PORTUGAL


41
 45


4.
CURRENT
ISSUES,
EVENTS,
AND
FACTORS
RELEVANT
TO
THE
DRUG
POLICY
 DISCUSSION
 49
 4.1
CURRENT
TRENDS
 4.2
MEDICAL
MARIJUANA
 4.3
FOREIGN
IMPACT
OF
DRUG
PROHIBITION:

CURRENT
DEVELOPMENTS
IN
MEXICO


50
 56
 60


5.
POTENTIAL
POLICY
FRAMEWORKS


65


5.1
POLICY
FRAMEWORK
OPTION:

LEGALIZATION
 5.2
POLICY
FRAMEWORK
OPTION:

DECRIMINALIZATION
 5.3
POLICY
FRAMEWORK
OPTION:

DEPENALIZATION


67
 70
 72


6.
POLICY
RECOMMENDATION


72


CONCLUSION


77


BIBLIOGRAPHY


78


ERKLÄRUNG


83





United
States
Drug
Policy


3


Introduction
 In
 American
 civil
 discourse
 the
 subject
 of
 drug
 policy
 is
 one
 that
 arouses
 intense
 passion
 from
 all
 sides
 involved
 in
 the
 debate
 with
 respect
 to
 which
 policy
 would
 be
 best.
 
 What
 should
 the
 objectives
 of
 a
 rational
 drug
 control
 policy
 be?
 
 Should
 drug
 use
 prevention
 or
 harm
 reduction
 be
 the
 dominant
 ideology
that
informs
national
policy‐makers?

What
are
the
full
implications
 of
 the
 current
 policy;
 how
 well
 does
 it
 achieve
 its
 objectives,
 and
 would
 an
 alternate
 policy
 be
 better
 suited
 to
 achieving
 those
 objectives
 regardless
 of
 what
 particular
 message
 we
 believe
 the
 policy
 sends?
 
 These
 are
 all
 very
 difficult
 questions
 to
 answer
 as
 Americans
 begin
 a
 new
 chapter
 of
 their
 storied
 drug
 policy
 history;
 a
 history
 we
 will
 have
 to
 unravel
 in
 order
 to
 evaluate
the
efficacy
of
the
current
policy
and
to
recommend
how
this
policy
 can
be
improved
in
light
of
the
stated
objectives.
 


The
purpose
of
this
paper
will
be
to
answer
the
question:

How
should


US
 drug
 policy
 be
 reformed?
 
 This
 question
 may
 seem
 biased
 in
 that
 it
 presupposes
that
the
current
drug
policy
is
somehow
flawed
and
in
order
to
 explain
 that
 presupposition
 we
 must
 first
 analyze
 prohibition,
 which
 will
 provide
 a
 general
 framework
 through
 which
 one
 can
 make
 certain
 assumptions
 about
 the
 likely
 effects
 of
 further
 prohibition.
 
 In
 order
 to
 accomplish
 this
 goal,
 this
 section
 will
 examine
 the
 effects
 of
 alcohol
 Prohibition
in
the
early
20th
century,
and
what
we
know
about
the
effects
of
 drug
prohibition
in
the
US,
which
actually
began
before
alcohol
Prohibition.


Developing
a
Rational
Framework


4


The
following
section
will
be
devoted
to
explaining
just
how
badly
the
 policy
needs
 reformed
 in
 light
 of
 the
 policy’s
 stated
objectives.
 
This
section
 will
focus
on
the
era
of
drug
policy
reform
that
began
after
1979,
the
year
of
 all‐time
 highs
 regarding
 drug
 usage,
 and
 for
 the
 organizational
 purposes
 of
 this
study
this
period
will
be
assumed
to
have
ended
with
the
beginning
of
the
 Obama
era.

Effects
to
be
examined
include,
but
are
not
limited
to,
the
effects
 of
prohibition
on:

crime
rates,
availability
of
prohibited
substances,
potency
 of
 prohibited
 substances,
 substitution
 of
 prohibited
 substances,
 and
 the
 continued
 use
 of
 prohibited
 substances.
 
 The
 generalizations
 made
 in
 this
 section
will
inform
our
further
discussion
and
recommendations.
 


A
study
of
US
drug
policy
would
be
incomplete
without
a
discussion
of


some
 of
 the
 practices
 of
 other
 countries.
 
 Some
 have
 criticized
 the
 applicability
 of
 country
 case
 studies
 by
 attacking
 their
 relevance
 in
 light
 of
 cultural
 differences,
 and
 the
 difficulty
 in
 gleaning
 best
 practices
 from
 such
 studies.

This
author
believes
that
the
applicability
of
country
case
studies
is
 potentially
 useful,
 at
 least
 insofar
 as
 one
 can
 see
 how
 different
 policies
 are
 administered
and
the
effects
those
policies
have
had.

The
examples
provided
 by
both
the
Netherlands
and
Portugal,
and
Switzerland
to
a
very
small
degree,
 will
be
discussed
so
that
the
reader
can
imagine
a
policy
that
focuses
on
harm
 reduction
instead
of
usage
prevention.
 


In
 the
 next
 section
 we
 will
 further
 discuss
 the
 current
 developments


regarding
drug
policy
in
the
US.

These
developments
will
include
those
from
 the
 beginning
 of
 2009
 and
 some
 information
 about
 the
 administration’s
 attitude
 toward
 the
 subject
 and
 the
 likelihood
 of
 major
 reform
 during


United
States
Drug
Policy


5


Obama’s
 presidency.
 
 Also
 in
 this
 section
 we
 will
 discuss
 information
 pertaining
 to
 various
 state
 policy
 developments,
 medical
 marijuana,
 and
 the
 international
drug
trafficking
crisis
that
is
emerging
in
Mexico.
 


The
 next
 section
 will
 provide
 an
 analysis
 of
 three
 policy
 framework


options
 that
 could
 conceivably
 be
 adopted
 by
 the
 Obama
 administration,
 along
 with
 a
 discussion
 of
 their
 likelihood
 of
 acceptance.
 
 We
 will
 further
 examine
the
various
concerned
stakeholders
in
this
section,
and
their
impact
 on
 the
 reform
 process.
 
 The
 first
 policy
 framework
 to
 be
 discussed
 is
 legalization,
 or
 the
 libertarian
 approach.
 
 This
 is
 necessary
 to
 provide
 an
 understanding
of
how
a
free
market
in
drugs
would
affect
the
various
factors
 we
are
concerned
with
such
as
violence,
drug
usage,
financial
cost
and
social
 effects.

The
next
policy
framework
to
be
examined
is
the
decriminalization
of
 presently
 prohibited
 substances.
 
 This
 option
 is
 more
 likely
 to
 be
 accepted
 because
 it
 retains
 penalties
 for
 trafficking
 and
 possession
 for
 personal
 use,
 but
these
penalties
are
redefined
as
administrative
offenses
punishable
by
the
 imposition
of
a
fine
and
a
treatment
option.
The
final
policy
framework
to
be
 analyzed
 will
 be
 also
 the
 most
 likely
 one
 to
 be
 accepted
 for
 a
 variety
 of
 reasons:
 
 depenalization,
 which
 maintains
 the
 classification
 of
 offenses
 as
 criminal,
but
precludes
prison
terms
for
possession
for
personal
use.

Each
of
 these
policies
has
its
strengths
and
weaknesses,
which
will
be
discussed.
 


The
 final
 section
 of
 this
 paper
 will
 consist
 of
 a
 concrete
 policy


recommendation,
 which
 addresses
 the
 various
 shortcomings
 of
 the
 current
 policy
and
attempts
to
ameliorate
them
in
a
way
that
is
both
bold,
considering
 the
trajectory
of
drug
policy
over
the
last
30
years,
and
possible,
considering


Developing
a
Rational
Framework


6


the
 new
 attitude
 in
 Washington
 after
 the
 election
 of
 Barack
 Obama
 and
 the
 increasing
support
for
drug
policy
reform
among
the
electorate
in
the
U.S.


1.
An
Analysis
of
the
Effects
of
Prohibition
 In
 order
 to
 begin
 a
 discussion
 about
 prohibition,
 one
 must
 first
 define
 the
 term:
 
 Prohibition
 will
 be
 defined
 for
 the
 purpose
 of
 this
 paper
 as
 a
 government
decree
against
the
exchange
of
a
good
or
a
service.1

The
goal
of
 prohibition
 is
 to
 prevent
 people
 from
 trading
 in
 the
 prohibited
 market
 by
 making
 the
 product
 scarce,
 more
 expensive,
 less
 safe,
 and
 by
 introducing
 uncertainty
into
the
market.

Thus
prohibition
is
a
supply‐side
policy,
and
it
 has
a
miniscule
effect
on
demand
because
prohibition
does
nothing
to
change
 the
actual
tastes
of
consumers.2

The
drug
war,
and
its
supporting
claims
can
 best
 be
 summarized
 by
 the
 following
 four
 points:
 
 “illegal
 drugs
 are:
 
 (1)
 always
bad;
(2)
never
acceptable;
(3)
supply‐driven;
and
(4)
must
be
fought
 through
an
ongoing
war.”3

In
practice,
however,
prohibitions
in
America
have
 often
 been
 implemented
 in
 an
 attempt
 to
 penalize
 the
 users
 when
 the
 majority
of
users
of
a
particular
substance
constitute
a
racial
minority.4

The
 prohibition
of
opium
initially
targeted
Chinese;
the
prohibition
of
marijuana
 initially
 targeted
 Mexicans;
 and
 the
 prohibition
 of
 or
 increased
 penalties
 for
 crack
 cocaine
 targeted
 African
 Americans.5
 
 In
 fact,
 while
 deliberating
 the
 























































 1
Mark
Thornton,
The
Economics
of
Prohibition
(Salt
Lake
City:
University
of
Utah
Press,


1991),
3.
 2
Thornton,
The
Economics
of
Prohibition,
74.
 3
Robinson
and
Scherlen,
“Lies,
Damned
Lies,”
9.
 4
Matthew
B.Robinson
and
Renee
G.
Scherlen,Lies,
Damned
Lies,
and
Drug
War
Statistics
 (Albany:
State
University
of
New
York
Press,
2007),
12.
 5
Robinson
and
Scherlen,
“Lies,
Damned
Lies,”
13.


United
States
Drug
Policy


7


passage
 of
 the
 Harrison
 Act
 in
 1914,
 congressmen
 argued
 that
 the
 opium
 trade
 was
 part
 of
 a
 deliberate
 effort
 of
 the
 Chinese
 to
 undermine
 American
 society.6
 
 Additionally,
 H.R.
 Haldeman,
 President
 Nixon’s
 chief
 of
 staff
 once
 quoted
the
president,
who
initiated
the
drug
war
in
1972,
as
saying
“You
have
 to
 face
 the
 fact
 that
 the
 whole
 problem
 is
 really
 the
 blacks.
 
 The
 key
 is
 to
 devise
 a
 system
 that
 recognizes
 this
 all
 the
 while
 not
 appearing
 to.”7
 
 While
 the
drug
war
may
not
be
fought
today
for
racial
reasons,
clearly
the
strategies
 used
disproportionately
affect
minorities,
specifically
African
Americans.
 The
 first
 effect
 of
 prohibition
 we
 will
 discuss
 is
 its
 effect
 on
 the
 establishment
of
a
black
market.

Black
markets
emerge
because
of
the
profit
 opportunities
 provided
 by
 state
 prohibitions
 on
 many
 products,
 including
 drugs,
 firearms,
 child
 pornography,
 and
 even
 radar
 detectors
 in
 some
 cases.

 That
there
is
a
market
for
such
products
is
indisputable;
no
state
prohibition
 can
prevent
people
from
attempting
to
maximize
their
own
personal
utility
as
 they
measure
it.

Some
might
argue
that
drug
use
is
irrational,
because
it
has
 no
discernable
benefit
to
the
user,
or
to
society,
but
this
argument
is
flawed
 because
value
is
subjective
and
also
varies
through
time.

The
argument
that
 the
irrationality
of
addicted
users
makes
prohibition
necessary
is
also
flawed
 because
 addicts
 represent
 a
 minority
 of
 all
 illicit
 substance
 users
 and
 the
 majority
of
the
population
has
rejected
this
argument
with
respect
to
alcohol
 and
 even
 tobacco,
 which
 is
 more
 addictive
 than
 heroin.8
 
 That
 drug
 























































 6
Cathy
Lisa
Schneider,
“Racism,
Drug
Policy,
and
AIDS,”
Political
Science
Quarterly
113,
no.
3


(1998):
434.
 7
Leonard
Pitts
Jr.,
“Begin
Discussion
on
Legalizing
Drugs,”
Miami
Herald
(Mar.
31,
2009
[cited
 23
Jun.
2009]):
available
from
http://www.miamiherald.com/living/columnists/leonard‐ pitts/story/978041.html
 8
Anonymous,
The
Case
for
Legalization,
2.


Developing
a
Rational
Framework


8


consumers
 use
 drugs
 is
 proof
 that
 they
 derive
 some
 benefit
 from
 the
 use
 of
 drugs:
 
 prohibition
 only
 ensures
 that
 an
 illegal
 market
 supplies
 the
 illicit
 goods.
 


In
the
Unites
States,
the
most
well
known
prohibition
is
not
narcotics


prohibition,
 which
 began
 in
 1914
 with
 the
 passage
 of
 the
 Harrison
 Act,
 but
 alcohol
 Prohibition,
 which
 began
 in
 1917
 with
 the
 passage
 of
 the
 18th
 Amendment,
 and
 ended
 in
 1933
 with
 the
 passage
 of
 the
 21st
 Amendment.9

 The
fact
that
alcohol
Prohibition
is
more
widely
discussed
may
be
indicative
 of
 the
 fact
 that
 there
 were,
 and
 are,
 far
 more
 alcohol
 users
 than
 narcotics
 users,
and
that
the
majority
does
not
view
alcohol
consumption
as
dangerous
 or
morally
wrong,
which
seems
to
be
the
majority
opinion
concerning
today’s
 illicit
 drugs.
 
 To
 be
 sure,
 alcohol
 Prohibition
 did
 in
 fact
 decrease
 the
 consumption
 of
 alcohol:
 
 Consumption
 rapidly
 decreased
 at
 the
 onset
 of
 Prohibition
 to
 about
 30
 percent
 of
 its
 pre‐Prohibition
 level.10
 
 Consumption
 increased
 over
 the
 next
 few
 years,
 however,
 to
 60‐70
 percent
 of
 its
 pre‐ Prohibition
level,
where
it
stabilized
until
the
end
of
Prohibition.11

After
the
 abolition
of
Prohibition,
consumption
levels
initially
remained
stable
and
then
 increased
to
their
pre‐Prohibition
level
over
the
following
decade.12


1.1
Foreign
Effects
 The
 black
 market
 created
 by
 Prohibition
 was
 worth
 millions
 of
 dollars
 and
 the
 long
 U.S.‐Mexico
 border
 became
 an
 ideal
 place
 to
 smuggle
 alcohol
 and
 























































 9
Robinson
and
Scherlen,
“Lies,
Damned
Lies,”
23.
 10
Jeffrey
A.
Miron
and
Jeffrey
Zwiebel,
“Alcohol
Consumption
During
Prohibition,”
The


American
Economic
Review
81,
no.
2
(1991):
242.
 11
Jeffrey
A.
Miron
and
Jeffrey
Zwiebel,
“Alcohol
Consumption,”
242.
 12
Jeffrey
A.
Miron
and
Jeffrey
Zwiebel,
“Alcohol
Consumption,”
242.


United
States
Drug
Policy


9


other
drugs
into
the
U.S.13
The
Mexican
beer
industry
flourished
and
by
1923
 it
 was
 reported
 that
 this
 industry
 was
 second
 in
 importance
 within
 the
 Mexican
 economy.14
 
 As
 the
 beer
 industry
 expanded
 to
 fill
 the
 gap
 left
 by
 previous
imported
American
beer,
hard
liquor
began
to
be
smuggled
into
the
 U.S.
 across
 the
 border
 and
 also
 along
 the
 Pacific
 and
 Gulf
 coasts,
 and
 it
 continued
to
be
throughout
the
entire
period
of
Prohibition.15

The
knowledge
 gained
 during
 Prohibition
 was
 useful
 even
 after
 1933,
 and
 the
 distribution
 channels
 still
 exist
 today;
 it
 is
 clear
 that
 substance
 prohibition
 also
 has
 profound
 effects
 on
 foreign
 countries.16
 
 During
 Prohibition
 a
 large
 quantity
 of
 alcohol
 was
 also
 smuggled
 into
 the
 United
 States
 from
 Canada,
 and
 was
 distributed
throughout
the
Northern
U.S.

One
lesson
that
can
be
learned
from
 Prohibition
 is
 that
 regulations
 adopted
 by
 one
 country
 necessarily
 have
 effects
 in
 other
 countries.
 
 In
 the
 case
 of
 a
 prohibition,
 the
 profit
 potential
 proves
irresistible,
and
foreign
smugglers
go
to
great
lengths
to
realize
those
 profits.

This
factor
should
be
considered
in
any
discussion
of
drug
policy
as
a
 negative
external
effect
in
adjacent
countries.


1.2
Monetary
Effects
of
Prohibition
 Monetary
 costs
 to
 consumers,
 producers,
 and
 to
 society
 increase
 for
 a
 number
of
reasons
in
a
prohibited
market.

Consumer
prices
in
a
prohibited
 market
reflect
increased
supply
costs,
which
are
due
to
the
fact
that
suppliers
 must
 avoid
 detection,
 and
 include
 a
 risk
 premium
 that
 is
 the
 result
 of
 























































 13
Gabriela
Recio,
“Drugs
and
Alcohol:

US
Prohibition
and
the
Origins
of
the
Drug
Trade
in


Mexico,”
Journal
of
Latin
American
Studies
34,
no.
3
(2002):
27.
 14
Gabriela
Recio,
“Drugs
and
Alcohol,”
32.
 15
Gabriela
Recio,
“Drugs
and
Alcohol,”
33.
 16
Gabriela
Recio,
“Drugs
and
Alcohol,”
42.


Developing
a
Rational
Framework


10


potential
 punishment.17
 
 In
 addition,
 competitive
 drug
 markets
 also
 include
 production
costs,
the
cost
of
dealing
or
distributing,
and
transportation
costs,
 which
 are
 associated
 with
 markets
 for
 every
 good.18
 
 Prohibition
 distorts
 supply
and
demand
equilibrium
by
shifting
the
supply
curve
upward,
and
the
 demand
curve
downward,
albeit
to
a
far
lesser
degree.19

This
occurs
because
 the
 producers
 are
 subjected
 to
 the
 increased
 transaction
 costs
 mentioned
 above,
 and
 are
 more
 likely
 to
 be
 targets
 of
 violence
 than
 casual
 users
 are.20

 Due
 to
 the
 illegal
 nature
 of
 these
 goods,
 these
 normal
 characteristics
 of
 market
 participation
 are
 more
 expensive
 due
 to
 the
 need
 to
 operate
 clandestinely.
 
 Economists
 who
 analyze
 the
 Drug
 War
 often
 refer
 to
 the
 effects
of
enforcement
as
a
“tax”
on
consumers,
but
the
illicit
suppliers
collect
 the
 tax
 instead
 of
 the
 government.21
 
 In
 the
 case
 of
 alcohol
 Prohibition,
 economists
have
estimated
that
prices
increased
by
about
three
times,
and,
in
 the
 present
 Drug
 War,
 cocaine
 prices
 are
 at
 a
 minimum
 20
 times
 more
 expensive
than
if
the
good
was
available
in
the
free
market.22
 Some
drug
prohibition
experts
argue
that
a
drug
price
analysis
should
 compare
 black
 market
 prices
 to
 prices
 that
 would
 be
 found
 in
 a
 state
 regulated
market
because,
they
argue,
this
is
the
most
likely
alternative
to
the
 current
regime.23

While
it
is
certainly
true
that
prices
in
a
regulated
market
 























































 17
Miron
and
Zwiebel,
“Alcohol
Consumption,”
245.
 18
Kai
A.
Konrad,
“Drug
Policy
and
Federalism,”
Public
Choice
80,
no.
1/2
(1994):
57.
 19
Jeffrey
A.
Miron
and
Jeffrey
Zwiebel,
“The
Economic
Case
Against
Drug
Prohibition,”
The


Journal
of
Economic
Perspectives
9,
no.
4
(1995):
176.
 20
Miron
and
Zwiebel
“The
Economic
Case”
176.
 21
Nadelmann,
“A
Bad
Export,”
85.
 22
Miron
and
Zwiebel
“The
Economic
Case”
177.
 23
Jeffrey
A.
Miron,
“The
Effect
of
Drug
Prohibition
on
Drug
Prices:

Evidence
from
the
 Markets
for
Cocaine
and
Heroin,”
The
Review
of
Economics
and
Statistics
85,
no.
3
(2003):
 522.


United
States
Drug
Policy


11


are
higher
than
in
an
unregulated
free
market,
this
fact
does
not
preclude
the
 analytical
 value
 of
 considering
 a
 free
 market
 regime;
 both
 are
 important
 hypothetical
 scenarios
 from
 which
 hypothetical
 market
 characteristics,
 including
price
trends,
can
be
readily
deduced.

One
inevitable
characteristic
 of
a
regulated
market
for
these
substances
would
be
the
imposition
of
a
tax.

If
 the
 markets
 for
 cigarettes
 or
 tobacco
 are
 any
 indication,
 sin
 taxes
 can
 increase
 the
 price
 of
 a
 good
 by
 as
 much
 as
 three
 hundred
 percent
 without
 creating
 a
 black
 market.24
 
 However,
 as
 cigarette
 taxes
 have
 increased
 over
 the
years
a
black
market
has
developed,
and
the
Bureau
of
Alcohol,
Tobacco
 and
 Firearms
 estimates
 that
 approximately
 $5
 billion
 in
 tax
 revenue
 is
 lost
 annually
due
to
cigarette
traffickers.25

This
indicates
that
there
are
limits
to
 the
severity
of
sin
taxes
of
legal
goods
as
well,
so
the
success
of
a
liberalized
 drug
 market
 would
 depend
 on
 the
 level
 of
 associated
 taxation.
 
 In
 today’s
 black
market,
all
echelons
of
the
drug
trade
avoid
taxes
due
to
the
illegality
of
 their
 activities,
 which
 should
 be
 considered
 in
 the
 comparison
 between
 the
 different
 hypothetical
 markets.26
 
 In
 fact,
 some
 states
 like
 Kansas
 actually
 require
 drug
 dealers
 to
 purchase
 tax
 stamps
 for
 their
 products
 notwithstanding
 the
 fact
 that
 these
 substances
 are
 illegal.
 
 In
 the
 event
 that
 these
stamps
are
not
purchased
and
the
activities
are
discovered,
the
dealer
 faces
increased
penalties
for
tax
evasion.27


























































 24
Miron,
“Effect
of
Drug
Prohibition
on
Drug
Prices,”
525.


25
Elfrink,
Black­Market
Cigarettes:

Miami’s
New
Vice
 26
Miron,
“Effect
of
Drug
Prohibition
on
Drug
Prices,”
522.
 27
Anonymous,
“Drug
Tax
Stamp,”
Kansas
Department
of
Revenue
(2009
[cited
15
Jul.
2009])
 available
from
http://www.ksrevenue.org/perstaxtypesdrug.htm


Developing
a
Rational
Framework


12


1.3
Substitution
 One
 unintended
 consequence
 of
 prohibition
 is
 substitution,
 or
 substance
 displacement.
 
 Because
 a
 user’s
 utility
 is
 determined
 through
 the
 simple
 formula
of
satisfaction
derived
minus
costs,
the
use
of
a
particular
substance
 can
become
cost
prohibitive.28

In
the
event
that
one
substance
becomes
too
 expensive
or
risky,
consumers
and
suppliers
will
migrate
to
other
substances
 that
 are
 cheaper,
 less
 risky,
 and
 possibly
 even
 completely
 unknown
 to
 authorities.29

Some
evidence
suggests
that
during
Prohibition
the
use
of
both
 opiates
 and
 marijuana
 increased,
 perhaps
 because
 their
 relative
 risk
 was
 decreased
 because
 of
 the
 focus
 on
 alcohol
 enforcement.30
 
 The
 case
 of
 the
 drug
 “foxy”
 is
 illustrative:
 
 this
 drug
 was
 common
 earlier
 in
 this
 decade
 among
 young
 adults
 and
 teenagers
 for
 its
 hallucinogenic
 effect,
 but
 was
 wholly
unknown
to
enforcement
officials
until
2003
when
the
DEA
scheduled
 the
drug
as
a
controlled
substance.

In
this
way
drug
entrepreneurs
are
able
 to
 create
 new
 drugs,
 with
 effects
 similar
 to
 existing
 drugs,
 and
 avoid
 prosecution
in
the
short
run
because
these
new
drugs
are
not
yet
prohibited.

 Users
may
also
migrate
to
legal
drugs
like
tobacco
or
alcohol
in
the
event
that
 their
drug
of
choice
becomes
too
risky
or
expensive,
often
with
greater
health
 risks
for
themselves
and
for
society.


























































 28
Jonathan
P.
Caulkins,
“Zero‐Tolerance
Policies:
Do
They
Inhibit
of
Stimulate
Illicit
Drug


Consumption,”
Management
Science
39,
no.
4
(1993):
46.
 29
Anonymous,
“2008
World
Drug
Report,”
United
Nations
Office
on
Drugs
and
Crime
(2008),
 editied
by
Sandeep
Chawlap:
available
from
 www.unodc.org/documents/wdr/...2008/WDR_2008_eng_web.pdf:
21.
 30
Miron
and
Zwiebel
“The
Economic
Case,”
183.


United
States
Drug
Policy


13


1.4
Corruption
 Corruption
is
a
well‐known
effect
of
substance
prohibition.

Corruption
could
 be
considered
as
a
general
cost
of
government
intervention,
which
is
caused
 by
 the
 illegal
 sale
 of
 property
 rights
 by
 government
 officials
 to
 private
 individuals.31
 
 Drug
 traffickers
 are
 able
 to
 offer
 public
 officials,
 from
 border
 agents
 to
 federal
 judges,
 compensation
 in
 an
 amount
 greater
 than
 their
 annual
 salary
 for
 something
 as
 trivial
 as
 looking
 the
 other
 way
 or
 not
 interfering
 in
 a
 transaction.32
 
 In
 the
 event
 that
 monetary
 compensation
 is
 insufficient,
 traffickers
 may
 resort
 to
 threatening
 officials,
 their
 families
 or
 their
property
in
an
attempt
to
force
cooperation.

Not
only
direct
prohibition
 contributes
 to
 corruption:
 
 Before
 Prohibition,
 saloon
 keepers
 faced
 increasing
regulation
as
a
result
of
their
reputation
as
places
where
the
poor,
 working
 and
 immigrant
 classes
 congregated.33
 
 Saloons
 were
 faced
 with
 increasing
 annual
 license
 fees,
 which
 caused
 saloon‐owners
 to
 keep
 their
 establishments
open
on
Sundays
in
violation
of
Blue
Laws:

To
avoid
fines
for
 this
 offense
 many
 saloon‐owners
 bribed
 police
 and
 other
 elected
 officials.34

 In
 this
 way
 the
 reputation
 of
 saloons
 was
 tarnished
 and
 associated
 with
 corruption
 even
 though
 laws
 and
 regulations
 practically
 forced
 owners
 to
 break
the
law
or
to
close
up
shop.

There
are
many
theories
that
attempt
to
 explain
 corruption,
 however,
 two
 facts
 about
 corruption
 seem
 to
 be
 abundantly
clear:

first,
that
corruption
is
directly
related
to
the
price,
or
loss
 inflicted,
 of
 the
 prohibition
 and
 indirectly
 to
 the
 level
 of
 enforcement;
 and
 























































 31
Thornton,
The
Economics
of
Prohibition,
129.
 32
Ethan
A.
Nadelmann,
“U.S.
Drug
Policy:

A
Bad
Export,”
Foreign
Policy
70,
no.
25
(1988):
86.
 33
Thornton,
The
Economics
of
Prohibition,
54.
 34
Thornton,
The
Economics
of
Prohibition,
54.


Developing
a
Rational
Framework


14


second,
corruption
exists
in
all
areas
where
government
attempts
to
enforce
 victimless
crime
laws.35


1.5
Adulteration
and
Potency
 Prohibition
of
substances
tends
to
increase
their
potency
over
time.

During
 alcohol
Prohibition,
the
consumption
of
beer
and
wine
fell
dramatically,
while
 the
 consumption
 of
 spirits,
 moonshine,
 and
 white
 lightening
 skyrocketed
 because
it
makes
sense
to
buy
prohibited
substances
in
concentrated
form
as
 a
way
to
decrease
risk
per
unit
of
intoxicant.36

In
addition
to
an
increase
in
 average
 drug
 potency
 over
 time,
 another
 characteristic
 of
 a
 black
 market
 in
 illicit
 substances
 is
 increased
 uncertainty
 about
 potency
 and
 quality
 at
 any
 given
 time.37
 
 Naturally
 one
 cannot
 file
 a
 complaint
 with
 a
 consumer
 protection
 organization,
 no
 government
 quality
 regulations
 exist
 for
 these
 products,
and
a
normal
reputation
market
does
not
exist.38

Due
to
the
illicit
 and
 uncertain
 market,
 dealers
 and
 other
 members
 of
 the
 distribution
 chain
 are
 occasionally
 faced
 with
 the
 prospect
 of
 having
 to
 find
 new
 sources
 of
 product.

In
these
cases
it
is
possible
that
the
product
quality
differs
from
the
 previous
supply
and
that
consumers
are
placed
at
risk
because
of
their
lack
of
 awareness
 of
 the
 source
 of
 the
 supply
 or
 the
 production
 practices.
 
 This
 differs
from
a
free,
or
even
regulated,
market,
which
would
be
characterized
 by
increasing
certainty
and
improving
quality
over
time.


























































 35
Thornton,
The
Economics
of
Prohibition,
133.
 36
Anonymous,
The
Case
for
Legalization,
2
 37
Miron
and
Zwiebel,
“The
Economic
Case,”
179.
 38
Miron
and
Zwiebel,
“The
Economic
Case,”
179.


United
States
Drug
Policy


15


Drug
 policy
 experts
 have
 concluded
 that
 increased
 enforcement
 actually
tends
to
increase
the
average
potency
of
illicit
drugs.39

This
strategy
 is
employed
to
make
enforcement
less
effective,
and
the
strategy
is
effective
 because
 drug
 penalties
 are
 defined
 by
 the
 quantity
 of
 substance
 seized
 by
 enforcement
 officials,
 therefore,
 increasing
 the
 potency
 of
 drugs
 decreases
 the
risk
per
unit
of
intoxicant.

In
addition,
potency
increases
to
combat
any
 increase
 in
 enforcement,
 and,
 in
 this
 case,
 danger
 to
 the
 consumer
 also
 increases
 because
 their
 expectations
 for
 a
 product
 with
 a
 certain
 potency
 level
are
erroneous
causing
them
to
consume
unexpected
units
of
intoxicant
 endangering
themselves.


1.6
Social
Costs:

Crime
 Some
advocates
of
prohibition
contend
that
the
use
of
illegal
substances
leads
 to
 increased
 social
 costs
 due
 to
 crime.
 
 In
 fact,
 many
 point
 to
 crimes
 committed
by
users
of
cocaine
and
heroin
as
the
best
examples,
however,
the
 crime
caused
by
these
two
drugs
is
miniscule
compared
to
the
crime
caused
 by
 alcohol
 use.40
 
 It
 is
 true
 that
 a
 correlation
 exists
 between
 the
 price
 of
 heroin
and
crime,
but
this
crime
is
more
logically
attributable
to
prohibition
 prices,
 which
 force
 addicted
 users
 with
 an
 inelastic
 demand
 curve
 to
 occasionally
resort
to
crime
to
fund
their
addiction.41

In
addition
to
the
crime
 caused
 by
 addicts
 looking
 to
 get
 their
 fix,
 the
 very
 nature
 of
 prohibition
 encourages
 criminality.
 
 Because
 of
 the
 illicit
 nature
 of
 trading
 in
 black
 markets,
 courts
 cannot
 be
 used
 to
 resolve
 disputes.
 
 Because
 of
 this,
 in
 the
 























































 39
Thornton,
The
Economics
of
Prohibition,
56.
 40
Konrad,
Drug
Policy
and
Federalism,
56.
 41
Konrad,
Drug
Policy
and
Federalism,
57.


Developing
a
Rational
Framework


16


black
market,
where
force
must
be
used
to
protect
turf,
enforce
contracts,
and
 punish
informants,
violence
and
the
predisposition
to
committing
violent
acts
 are
valued
attributes.42
 Any
analysis
of
the
effects
of
prohibition
on
total
criminality
would
be
 incomplete
 without
 considering
 the
 opportunity
 costs
 associated
 with
 enforcement.
 
 The
 biggest
 cost
 of
 enforcing
 drug
 laws
 is
 the
 realignment
 of
 police
 priorities
 toward
 fighting
 the
 drug
 war
 at
 the
 expense
 of
 the
 prevention
 and
 investigation
 of
 other
 crimes.43
 
 Some
 evidence
 also
 exists
 that
suggests
prohibition
has
a
more
direct
effect
on
crime:

Crime
increased
 dramatically
 throughout
 the
 1920s
 as
 the
 number
 of
 prisoners
 in
 federal
 prisons,
 reformatories,
 and
 camps
 grew
 from
 3,889
 to
 13,698
 from
 1920
 to
 1932.44
 
 Analysts
 of
 this
 era
 cannot
 generally
 explain
 why
 the
 decrease
 in
 crime
 happened
 after
 1933,
 but
 the
 end
 of
 Prohibition
 is
 certainly
 a
 conspicuous
factor.45

Crime
rates
remained
low
until
the
mid‐1960s,
which
is
 another
conspicuous
time,
when
prohibitions
against
drugs
began
to
increase,
 perhaps
in
response
to
the
increased
usage
of
returning
Viet
Nam
veterans.46


1.7
Section
Summary
 In
this
section
we
have
discussed
some
of
the
general
features
of
prohibition
 with
examples
referring
to
alcohol
Prohibition
in
the
early
20th
century.

We
 saw
 that
 alcohol
 consumption
 did
 decrease,
 first
 dramatically,
 and
 then
 























































 42
John
Stossel,
“Prohibition
Spawns
Drug
Violence,”
Creators
Syndicate
[cited
24
Jun.
2009]:


available
from
http://www.creators.com/opinion/john‐stossel/prohibition‐spawns‐drug‐ violence.html
 43
Miron
and
Zwiebel,
“The
Economic
Case,”
180.
 44
Thornton,
The
Economics
of
Prohibition,
123.
 45
Thornton,
The
Economics
of
Prohibition,
124.
 46
Thornton,
The
Economics
of
Prohibition,
125.


United
States
Drug
Policy


17


consumption
 stabilized
 at
 about
 60‐70%
 of
 pre‐Prohibition
 levels.
 
 As
 we
 have
also
seen,
prohibition
is
associated
with
many
negative
unforeseen
side‐ effects,
 namely:
 
 the
 establishment
 of
 black
 markets,
 substitution,
 political
 corruption,
 adulteration,
 increased
 potency,
 increased
 crime,
 and
 external
 foreign
 effects.
 
 These
 effects
 are
 not
 exclusive
 to
 alcohol
 Prohibition
 in
 the
 United
States
in
the
early
20th
century;
they
are
effects
that
are
common
to
all
 substance
 prohibitions.
 
 They
 key
 for
 policy
 makers
 is
 to
 consider
 whether
 the
costs
of
enforcing
a
prohibition
outweigh
the
benefits,
or
if
the
effects
of
 the
prohibition
reduce
costs
to
society.

Perhaps
a
quote
by
the
great
Austrian
 Economist
Ludwig
von
Mises
on
the
subject
of
intervention
is
instructive:
 We
 are
 exclusively
 concerned
 with
 those
 acts
 of
 interference
 which
 aim
 at
 forcing
 the
 entrepreneurs
 and
 capitalists
 to
 employ
 the
 factors
 of
 production
 in
 a
 way
 different
from
what
they
would
have
done
if
they
merely
obeyed
the
dictates
of
the
 market.

In
doing
this,
we
do
not
raise
the
question
of
whether
such
interference
is
 good
or
bad
from
any
preconceived
point
of
view.

We
merely
ask
whether
or
not
it
 can
 attain
 those
 ends
 which
 those
 advocating
 and
 resorting
 to
 it
 are
 trying
 to
 attain.47


2.
Recent
History
of
the
War
on
Drugs
 The
1970s
represent
a
time
in
the
U.S.
when
drug
policy
was
more
focused
on
 treatment
rather
than
prevention
and
punishment,
but
also
a
time
when
the
 federal
 government
 greatly
 expanded
 its
 jurisdiction
 over
 all
 drug
 offenses
 beginning
with
the
Comprehensive
Drug
Abuse
Prevention
and
Control
Act
of


























































 47
Thornton,
The
Economics
of
Prohibition,
73.


Developing
a
Rational
Framework


18


1970.48
 
 This
 law
 created
 the
 drug
 scheduling
 system
 that
 divides
 all
 drugs
 into
five
categories
based
on
their:

potential
for
abuse,
accepted
medical
use,
 and
their
accepted
safety
under
medical
supervision.49

The
legal
foundation
 for
 the
 federal
 government’s
 fight
 against
 drug
 abuse,
 the
 Controlled
 Substances
 Act
 of
 1970,
 was
 also
 included
 within
 this
 act.50
 
 Soldiers
 came
 home
 from
 Viet
 Nam
 addicted
 to
 various
 drugs
 including
 marijuana,
 opium
 and
 heroin
 and
 so
 the
 strategy
 was
 to
 treat
 these
 soldiers
 rather
 than
 to
 punish
 them:
 
 It
 was
 at
 this
 time
 that
 the
 U.S.
 was
 at
 the
 forefront
 of
 innovation
in
drug
policy
having
introduced
the
policy
of
using
methadone,
a
 synthetic
 opiate,
 for
 the
 treatment
 of
 heroin
 addicts.51
 
 Between
 1970
 and
 1975,
over
65%
of
the
U.S.
drug
budget
focused
on
prevention,
education
and
 treatment;
 over
 the
 next
 five
 years
 this
 proportion
 shrank
 to
 43%;
 and
 in
 1981
the
budget
for
demand‐side
policies
was
further
reduced.52

Since
that
 time
the
U.S.
has
greatly
restricted
the
use
of
methadone.


 Two
 years
 after
 president
 Nixon
 first
 declared
 the
 War
 on
 Drugs
 in
 1971
the
Drug
Enforcement
Administration
was
formed
and
from
then
on
it
 would
 have
 the
 major
 responsibility
 for
 conducting
 drug
 seizures.53

 Following
 the
 trend
 of
 increasing
 federal
 power
 to
 fight
 the
 drug
 war,
 the
 Comprehensive
Drug
Abuse
Prevention
and
Control
Act
was
passed
in
1978,
 which
allowed
for
the
seizure
of
assets
(money,
property
and
real
estate)
in


























































 48
Robinson
and
Scherlen,
“Lies,
Damned
Lies,”
27.
 49
Robinson
and
Scherlen,
“Lies,
Damned
Lies,”
27.
 50
Robinson
and
Scherlen,
“Lies,
Damned
Lies,”
27.
 51
Ethan
A.
Nadelmann,
“Commonsense
Drug
Policy,”
Foreign
Affairs
77,
no.
1
(1998):
117.
 52
Anna
Celeste
Burke,
“Between
Entitlement
and
Control:

Dimensions
of
U.S.
Drug
Policy,”


The
Social
Service
Review
66,
no.
4
(1992):
573.
 53
Robinson
and
Scherlen,
“Lies,
Damned
Lies,”
28.


United
States
Drug
Policy


19


cases
 where
 drug
 industry
 involvement
 was
 suspected.54
 
 This
 law
 was
 a
 rather
striking
example
of
how
the
fundamentals
of
American
law
were
being
 altered
 to
 facilitate
 the
 drug
 war.
 
 The
 Fourth
 Amendment
 to
 the
 U.S.
 Constitution
 prohibits
 unreasonable
 search
 and
 seizure,
 or
 the
 exercise
 of
 these
 police
 powers
 without
 probable
 cause,
 however,
 now
 there
 is
 a
 drug
 exception
to
this
longstanding
limitation
on
police
powers,
which
is
indicative
 of
 the
 erosion
 of
 the
 people’s
 constitutional
 rights.
 
 In
 addition,
 this
 policy
 begs
the
question
of
how
one
is
to
organize
a
legal
defense
if
all
assets
have
 been
 seized
 by
 the
 state:
 
 This
 policy
 may
 in
 fact
 mean
 that
 all
 defendants
 suspected
of
drug
industry
involvement
are
automatically
relegated
to
largely
 incompetent
 public
 defenders
 and
 are
 thus
 incapable
 of
 mounting
 a
 successful
defense.

With
the
Comprehensive
Crime
Control
Act
of
1984,
the
 federal
 government
 increased
 its
 ability
 to
 seize
 assets,
 to
 invade
 privacy
 under
 the
 auspices
 of
 money
 laundering
 investigations,
 to
 lengthen
 drug‐ related
prison
sentences
while
at
the
same
time
increasing
bail
rates.55

One
 further
 example
 of
 how
 the
 government
 has
 overturned
 long‐standing
 protections
of
citizen’s
rights
regards
the
principle
of
Posse
Comitatus,
which
 until
 1981
 prevented
 the
 use
 of
 military
 forces
 for
 domestic
 police
 duties.56

 Since
1981
the
military
has
been
used
for
interdiction
of
drugs,
even
within
 the
U.S.,
and
to
provide
training
to
local
police
forces.57
 By
 1979
 drug
 usage
 had
 exploded
 in
 relative
 terms
 reaching
 all
 time
 usage
highs
when
25
million
people
indicated
that
they
had
used
illegal
drugs
 























































 54
Robinson
and
Scherlen,
“Lies,
Damned
Lies,”
28.
 55
Robinson
and
Scherlen,
“Lies,
Damned
Lies,”
29.
 56
Robinson
and
Scherlen,
“Lies,
Damned
Lies,”
29.
 57
Robinson
and
Scherlen,
“Lies,
Damned
Lies,”
29.


Developing
a
Rational
Framework


20


within
the
previous
month
according
statistics
compiled
by
the
ONDCP.58

The
 political
 reaction
 to
 this
 phenomenon
 was
 a
 movement
 determined
 to
 get
 tough
 on
 drugs,
 and
 all
 throughout
 the
 1980s
 government
 involvement
 increased
and
penalties
for
all
drug
related
offenses
stiffened.

By
the
end
of
 the
 decade
 the
 rate
 of
 drug
 arrests
 nearly
 doubled
 from
 256
 to
 449
 per
 100,000,
and
greater
than
50%
of
all
federal
inmates
were
drug
offenders
by
 1991.59
 
 As
 the
 media
 increasingly
 reported
 various
 drug‐related
 stories,
 which
 often
 were
 violent,
 politicians
 increasingly
 demonized
 drug
 use,
 and
 actually
 began
 to
 compete
 with
 each
 other
 regarding
 which
 party
 would
 be
 toughest
on
crime.60

During
July
1986
alone
the
three
major
networks
ran
74
 stories
about
drugs,
half
of
which
were
about
crack
cocaine,
which
provoked
 the
 most
 public
 concern
 at
 the
 time;
 this
 is
 perhaps
 a
 good
 example
 of
 the
 media
 creating
 a
 moral
 panic
 that
 is
 soon
 followed
 by
 strong
 government
 action.61
 
 By
 1986,
 when
 president
 Ronald
 Reagan
 re‐declared
 the
 War
 on
 Drugs,
a
media
firestorm
erupted,
which
was
soon
followed
by
public
opinion
 polls
 that
 listed
 drugs
 as
 the
 most
 important
 problem
 facing
 the
 country,
 rising
 from
 3%
 in
 1986
 to
 64%
 in
 1989.62
 
 Also
 during
 this
 period
 Senator
 Bob
 Dole
 introduced
 a
 bill
 to
 increase
 the
 penalties
 for
 possession
 of
 crack
 cocaine
 twenty‐fold,
 the
 Democrats
 responded
 by
 demanding
 a
 fifty‐fold


























































 58
Anonymous,
“Drug
Use
Trends,”
Office
of
National
Drug
Control
Policy
(October
2002
[cited


16
Jul.
2009]):
available
from
 http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/factsht/druguse/
 59
Ellen
Benoit,
“Not
Just
a
Matter
of
Criminal
Justice:

States,
Institutions,
and
North
 American
Drug
Policy,”
Sociological
Forum
18,
no.
2
(2003):
285.
 60
Robinson
and
Scherlen,
“Lies,
Damned
Lies,”
13.
 61
Schneider,
Racism,
Drug
Policy,
and
AIDS,
435.
 62
Katherine
Beckett
“Setting
the
Public
Agenda:

“Street
Crime”
and
Drug
Use
in
American
 Politics,”
Social
Problems
41,
no.
3
(1994):
425.


United
States
Drug
Policy


21


increase
in
the
penalty;
both
finally
settled
on
a
one‐hundred‐fold
increase
in
 the
penalty
for
possession
of
crack.63
 One
 reaction
 to
 the
 trend
 of
 increased
 usage
 was
 the
 passage
 of
 the
 Anti‐Drug
 Abuse
 Act
 of
 1988,
 which
 had
 the
 specific
 goals
 of
 reducing
 illicit
 drug
 use,
 manufacturing,
 trafficking,
 drug‐related
 crime
 and
 violence,
 and
 drug‐related
 health
 consequences.64
 
 The
 major
 provisions
 of
 the
 Anti‐Drug
 Abuse
Act
of
1988
consisted
of:
 (1)
authorizing
additional
funds
for
law
enforcement
and
drug‐abuse
education
and
 treatment
 programs;
 (2)
 establishing
 new
 record‐keeping
 controls
 over
 chemicals
 used
 in
 the
 manufacture
 of
 illegal
 drugs;
 (3)
 establishing
 penalties
 for
 diversion
 of
 such
precursor
chemicals
into
illegal‐drug
manufacture;
(4)
denying
certain
federal
 benefits
to
drug
offenders;
(5)
prohibiting
awards
to
federal
contractors
who
fail
to
 maintain
drug‐fee
workplaces;
(6)
imposing
the
death
penalty
on
drug
kingpins
for
 certain
 drug‐related
 killings;
 (7)
 creating
 a
 cabinet‐level
 position
 of
 federal
 “drug
 czar”
 in
 the
 executive
 office
 of
 the
 President;
 (8)
 enhancing
 civil
 and
 criminal
 penalties
against
drug
users
(including
up
to
$10,000
in
civil
fines);
and,
overall,
(9)
 strengthening
international
narcotics
control
programs.65


In
order
to
accomplish
these
objectives,
the
newly
created
position
of
“Drug
 Czar”
 was
 to
 head
 the
 new
 Office
 of
 National
 Drug
 Control
 Policy
 (ONDCP),
 which
 now
 directs
 national
 anti‐drug
 efforts,
 and
 coordinates
 the
 various
 agencies
 on
 the
 federal,
 state
 and
 local
 levels.66
 
 Interestingly,
 since
 the
 creation
 of
 the
 ONDCP
 in
 1988,
 drug
 usage
 patterns
 have
 remained
 stable
 























































 63
Schneider,
Racism,
Drug
Policy,
and
AIDS,
435.
 64
Robinson
and
Scherlen,
“Lies,
Damned
Lies,”
3.
 65
Raphael
Francis
Perl,
“Congress,
International
Narcotics
Policy,
and
the
Anti‐Drug
Abuse


Act
of
1988,”
Journal
of
Interamerican
Studies
and
World
Affairs
30,
no.
2/3
(1988):
34.
 66
Robinson
and
Scherlen,
“Lies,
Damned
Lies,”
3.


Developing
a
Rational
Framework


22


with
no
long‐term
increase
or
decrease
in
usage.67

Because
of
the
influence
of
 the
 ONDCP,
 the
 enormous
 amount
 of
 money
 that
 is
 annually
 spent
 on
 the
 drug
war,
and
the
effect
of
the
drug
war
on
the
liberty
and
security
of
the
total
 population,
it
is
clear
that
the
effectiveness
of
the
ONDCP
must
be
evaluated
 according
to
its
stated
goals.

In
the
evaluation
of
the
ONDCP
in
this
paper,
we
 will
 consider
 the
 following
 stated
 goals
 of
 that
 organization:
 reduction
 of
 illicit
 drug
 use,
 manufacturing,
 trafficking,
 drug‐related
 crime
 and
 violence,
 and
drug‐related
health
consequences
among
other
things.
 


Upon
 assuming
 the
 presidency
 in
 1989,
 President
 George
 H.W.
 Bush


redefined
 U.S.
 drug
 war
 strategy
 within
 the
 contexts
 of
 both
 domestic
 and
 foreign
policy.

One
of
the
flagship
goals
of
the
new
policy
was
to
reduce
the
 quantity
of
illicit
substances
entering
the
U.S.
by
15%
within
2
years,
and
by
 60%
within
10
years;
needless
to
say,
this
failed.68

The
strategy
to
complete
 these
objectives
consisted
of
four
points:
 (1)
 provide
 ‐
 for
 the
 first
 time
 ‐
 support
 for
 limited
 economic
 assistance
 to
 major
 cocaine‐producing
countries;
(2)
concentrate
more
on
disrupting
the
activities
of
the
 trafficking
 organizations
 [i.e.
 on
 seizing
 processing
 labs,
 chemicals
 and
 assets]
 and
 less
 on
 disrupting
 the
 activities
 of
 farmers
 [i.e.,
 crop
 eradication];
 (3)
 encourage
 increased
 levels
 of
 Andean
 nation
 military
 involvement
 in
 counternarcotics
 operations;
 and
 (4)
 provide
 for
 enhanced
 US
 military
 support
 to
 host
 nation
 counter‐narcotics
 forces.
 Coordination
 of
 US
 international
 drug
 efforts
 ‐
 among
 Federal
 agencies,
 with
 producer
 and
 transit
 nations,
 and
 with
 the
 emerging
 international
 initiatives
 of
 other
 consumer
 nations
 ‐
 also
 receives
 greater
 policy


























































 67
Robinson
and
Scherlen,
“Lies,
Damned
Lies,”
4.
 68
Raphael
Francis
Perl,
“United
States
International
Drug
Policy:

Recent
Developments
and
 Issues,”
Journal
of
Interamerican
Studies
and
World
Affairs
32,
no.
4
(1990):
123.


United
States
Drug
Policy


23


emphasis
under
the
strategy.69


Certainly
 nobody
 questioned
 whether
 president
 Bush
 considered
 the
 drug
 war
 to
 be
 an
 international
 issue
 after
 he
 ordered
 the
 invasion
 of
 Panama
 in
 1989,
explicitly
conducted
due
to
drug
concerns.70

The
day
after
the
invasion
 he
addressed
the
public:
 Fellow
citizens,
last
night
I
ordered
U.S.
military
forces
to
Panama.
…
The
goals
of
the
 United
States
have
been
to
safeguard
the
lives
of
Americans,
to
defend
democracy
in
 Panama,
to
combat
drug
trafficking,
and
to
protect
the
integrity
of
the
Panama
Canal
 Treaty.

Many
attempts
have
been
made
to
resolve
the
crisis
through
diplomacy
and
 negotiations.
 
 All
 were
 rejected
 by
 the
 dictator
 of
 Panama,
 General
 Manuel
 A.
 Noriega,
an
indicted
drug
trafficker.71


Consistent
 with
 his
 CIA
 background,
 Bush
 sought
 high
 value
 targets
 that
 would
 disrupt
 trafficking
 operations,
 which
 would
 be
 selected
 through
 improved
intelligence
gathering
capabilities
at
all
governmental
levels
(local,
 statewide,
 national
 and
 international).72
 
 The
 Andean
 Initiative,
 also
 implemented
 during
 this
 period,
 sought
 to
 enhance
 the
 capabilities
 of
 these
 Andean
 producer
 countries
 to
 fight
 against
 traffickers
 by
 improving
 local
 economies
 and
 the
 ability
 of
 these
 countries
 to
 build
 institutions.73
 
 The
 question
analysts
of
drug
policy
need
to
ask
themselves
is
how
reasonable
are
 the
 expectations
 of
 the
 U.S.
 regarding
 other
 country’s
 domestic
 attention
 to
 the
drug
issue?


























































 69
Perl,
“United
States
International
Drug
Policy,”
124.
 70
Robinson
and
Scherlen,
“Lies,
Damned
Lies,”
31.
 71
Robinson
and
Scherlen,
“Lies,
Damned
Lies,”
31.
 72
Perl,
“United
States
International
Drug
Policy,”
124.
 73
Perl,
“United
States
International
Drug
Policy,”
124.


Developing
a
Rational
Framework


24


2.1
Foreign
Issues
 It
 is
 likely
 that
 other
 countries
 do
 not
 appreciate
 the
 persistence
 of
 U.S.
 demands
 in
 this
 area,
 especially
 when
 they
 conflict
 with
 historically
 acceptable
 local
 uses
 of
 drugs,
 like
 chewing
 the
 coca
 leaf
 in
 Bolivia,
 for
 example.

In
fact,
from
the
perspective
of
many
producer
countries,
the
best
 thing
that
could
happen
would
be
the
international
legalization
of
illicit
drug
 markets.

Even
the
current
Drug
Czar
admitted
as
much
when
he
stated
“Our
 nation’s
 demand
 for
 drugs
 fuels
 drug
 production
 and
 trafficking,
 as
 well
 as
 violence
and
corruption,
within
other
nations.”74

Presently,
many
weak
Latin
 American
governments
have
been
increasingly
strained
by
their
attempts
to
 control
drug
traffickers
at
the
behest
of
the
U.S.

Beyond
the
instability
that
is
 caused
 by
 these
 governments
 in
 their
 attempt
 to
 please
 the
 U.S.,
 further
 instability
 is
 caused
 by
 direct
 U.S.
 military
 intervention,
 as
 it
 has
 been,
 for
 example,
 in
 Bolivia,
 Panama,
 and
 Colombia.75
 
 International
 foreign
 aid
 supplied
to
these
countries
to
support
their
fight
against
the
traffickers
is
no
 match
for
the
profits
these
traffickers
reap
from
supplying
the
vociferous
U.S.
 appetite
for
these
substances.
 Latin
American
governments
are
undermined
as
symbols
of
authority
 and
 justice
 by
 the
 corruption
 the
 drug
 war
 brings
 to
 their
 countries,
 and
 through
 the
 destruction
 of
 crops
 that
 their
 citizens
 depend
 on
 for
 their
 livelihoods.76
 
 The
 U.S.
 directly
 undermines
 precarious
 Latin
 American
 governments
when
it
directly
acts
against
traffickers
with
its
military.

In
the
 























































 74
Kerlikowske,
Gil.
“Domestic
Policy
Subcommittee”
 75
Nadelmann,
“A
Bad
Export,”
83.
 76
Nadelmann,
“A
Bad
Export,”
88.


United
States
Drug
Policy


25


1990s
 the
 U.S.
 used
 an
 air
 brigade
 to
 disrupt
 traffic
 between
 Peru
 and
 Colombia,
a
producer
and
a
distributer
country
respectively,
through
the
use
 of
airstrikes
against
suspicious
planes.77

These
strikes
greatly
increased
the
 anger
and
resentment
felt
in
Latin
America
toward
the
U.S.,
but
they
were
not
 stopped
until
the
strikes
accidentally
killed
American
missionaries.78
 The
 Andean
 Initiative,
 introduced
 by
 the
 Bush
 the
 Elder’s
 administration
in
1991,
sought
to
increase
assistance
to
the
governments
of
 Bolivia,
Colombia,
and
Peru
by
attempting:
 (1)
 to
 help
 these
 nations
 strengthen
 their
 political/economic
 conditions
 and
 institutional
 capability
 to
 take
 effective
 action
 against
 the
 trafficking
 organizations;
 (2)
 to
 increase
 the
 effectiveness
 of
 their
 military
 and
 law
 enforcement
 establishments
 against
 the
 cocaine
 trade
 by
 supporting
 efforts
 (a)
 to
 isolate
 major
 coca‐growing
 regions,
 (b)
 to
 destroy
 labs,
 and
 (c)
 to
 block
 delivery
 of
 precursor
 chemicals;
 and
 (3)
 to
 damage
 drug‐trafficking
 organizations
 operating
 in
 these
 countries
 as
 much
 as
 possible
 by
 directing
 U.S.
 assistance
 to
 support
 measures
 designed
to
seize
key
traffickers
and
their
assets.79


This
 initiative
 failed
 to
 achieve
 its
 objective
 over
 the
 long
 term,
 most
 likely
 due
to
the
vast
profit
potential
that
exists
in
this
market.

In
addition
to
the
 “carrot”
of
providing
aid
to
countries
designed
to
improve
their
ability
to
fight
 trafficking,
the
U.S.
has
not
been
shy
about
employing
the
“stick”
approach
of
 applying
sanctions
to
countries
that
do
not
acquiesce
to
U.S.
demands
in
this
 area.80
 























































 77
Robinson
and
Scherlen,
“Lies,
Damned
Lies,”
33.
 78
Robinson
and
Scherlen,
“Lies,
Damned
Lies,”
33.
 79
Perl,
“United
States
International
Drug
Policy,”
124.
 80
Perl,
“United
States
International
Drug
Policy,”
133.


Developing
a
Rational
Framework


26





Farmers
in
these
poor
countries
simply
cannot
grow
another
crop
that


produces
a
similar
income.

Related
to
this
specific
point
is
the
fact
that
there
 is
 policy
 incoherence
 of
 the
 part
 of
 the
 U.S.:
 
 Available
 agricultural
 alternatives
to
growing
illicit
substances
are
further
reduced
by
the
U.S.
tariff
 barriers
 that
 these
 alternatives
 are
 subject
 to.81
 
 Attempts
 to
 encourage
 farmers
to
grow
other
crops
through
crop
substitution
programs
have
failed
 in
 the
 past,
 due
 in
 large
 part
 to
 the
 profit
 potential
 of
 the
 drug
 trade,
 while
 eradication
efforts
have
been
successful
in
destroying
crops
in
limited
areas
 only
 to
 ensure
 that
 the
 crops
 are
 planted
 in
 different
 areas
 with
 no
 discernable
effect
on
total
supply
or
price
levels.82
 One
 should
 not
 underestimate
 the
 effects
 of
 international
 institution
 building
 on
 the
 ability
 of
 countries
 to
 creatively
 solve
 complex
 problems.

 More
 than
 180
 countries
 currently
 adhere
 to
 UN
 anti‐drug
 conventions,
 at
 least
 technically.83
 
 Proponents
 of
 international
 organizations
 would
 likely
 characterize
 this
 as
 a
 success,
 as
 would
 the
 U.S.
 due
 to
 the
 nature
 of
 these
 conventions,
but
some
countries,
like
Holland
and
Portugal,
have
sited
these
 conventions
as
an
impediment
to
their
ability
to
adapt
their
policies
as
they
 wish.84

Specifically,
the
1988
Convention
requires
signatories
to
participate
 in
a
scheme
directed
against
international
money
laundering
and
to
establish
 “the
 possession,
 purchase
 or
 cultivation
 of
 …
 drugs
 …
 for
 personal
 consumption”
as
a
criminal
offense.85

The
UN,
therefore,
represents
a
serious
 























































 81
Perl,
“United
States
International
Drug
Policy,”
128.
 82
Nadelmann,
Commonsense
Drug
Policy,
113.
 83
Anonymous,
2008
World
Drug
Report,
21.
 84
Anonymous,
2008
World
Drug
Report,
21.


85
Anonymous,
2008
World
Drug
Report,
206.


United
States
Drug
Policy


27


impediment
 to
 legalization
 of
 drugs
 in
 any
 country,
 a
 fact
 that
 U.S.
 policymakers
must
also
recognize.


2.2
Monetary
Costs
 Profits
in
the
international
drug
trade
are
enormous
due
to
the
risk
premiums
 that
are
factored
into
the
price
of
these
drugs
on
all
levels
of
the
distribution
 chain.

Drug
war
proponents
argue
that
one
way
to
ultimately
decrease
usage
 is
to
drive
up
the
price
of
these
goods
through
tough
enforcement,
but
data
on
 drug
prices
do
not
necessarily
demonstrate
success
concerning
this
objective.

 In
 2001
 the
 U.S.
 Coastguard
 seized
 21
 tons
 of
 cocaine,
 which
 represented
 a
 $21
 million
 retail
 value,
 but
 this
 seizure
 had
 no
 discernable
 effect
 on
 the
 street
 price
 of
 the
 drug.86
 
 In
 fact,
 ample
 evidence
 suggests
 that
 the
 whole
 international
 drug
 trade
 may
 be
 getting
 more
 efficient,
 and
 that
 prohibition
 actually
 increases
 the
 profitability,
 and
 thus
 the
 incentives
 for
 traffickers:

 During
the
period
between
1980
and
1990
the
street
price
of
both
heroin
and
 cocaine
 fell
 by
 half.87
 
 This
 is
 certainly
 a
 failure
 from
 the
 perspective
 of
 the
 prohibitionists.

Even
so,
it
is
estimated
that
prices
for
illicit
drug
have
been
 pushed
further
above
the
cost
of
production
than
during
alcohol
Prohibition,
 most
likely
due
to
increased
enforcement.88


 America
 is
 widely
 believed
 to
 be
 the
 world’s
 most
 valuable
 drug
 market
with
an
estimated
annual
retail
value
in
excess
of
$60
billion,
a
value
 that
 is
 likely
 inflated
 by
 the
 effects
 of
 prohibition.89
 
 In
 other
 words,
 the
 























































 86
Anonymous,
The
Case
for
Legalization,
18.
 87
Anonymous,
The
Case
for
Legalization,
10.
 88
Miron
and
Zwiebel,
“Alcohol
Consumption,”
246.
 89
Anonymous,
The
Case
for
Legalization,
4.


Developing
a
Rational
Framework


28


American
 market
 represents
 20%
 of
 the
 value
 of
 the
 entire
 world
 drug
 market,
 which
 is
 valued
 at
 $300
 billion.90
 
 In
 addition
 to
 the
 price
 effects
 associated
with
prohibition,
the
opportunity
costs
of
fighting
the
drug
war
are
 large.

The
federal
drug
control
budget
has
ballooned
from
$1
billion
in
1980
 to
$16
billion
in
1997,
which
does
not
include
the
state
and
local
budgets
that
 most
 certainly
 match
 or
 exceed
 that
 number.91
 
 For
 reasons
 to
 be
 discussed
 later,
 it
 is
 currently
 difficult
 to
 estimate
 the
 present
 annual
 drug
 control
 budget.
 
 According
 to
 Jeffrey
 Miron,
 a
 Harvard
 economist,
 marijuana
 legalization
could
potentially
save
$7.7
billion,
and
drugs,
if
taxed,
could
raise
 an
additional
$6
billion
if
they
were
taxed
like
tobacco
and
liquor.92

In
times
 of
 financial
 crisis,
 when
 state
 and
 federal
 officials
 must
 tighten
 their
 budgetary
 belts,
 raising
 that
 much
 money
 is
 becoming
 an
 increasingly
 attractive
proposition.


2.3
Corruption
 As
 mentioned
 as
 a
 general
 property
 of
 substance
 prohibition
 in
 the
 last
 section,
 the
 level
 of
 corruption
 is
 a
 function
 of
 the
 price
 of
 the
 prohibited
 substance
or
the
profit
potential
of
the
substance’s
market.

As
enforcement
 has
increased
more
corruption
has
been
detected
in
the
U.S.:

between
1970
 and
1988
federal
convictions
for
corruption
have
increased
from
44
to
1067
 per
 year.93
 
 Some
 new
 law
 enforcement
 trends
 have
 also
 emerged
 since
 the
 























































 90
Perl,
“United
States
International
Drug
Policy,”
127.
 91
Nadelmann,
Commonsense
Drug
Policy,
112.
 92
David
Crary,
“Momentum
Builds
for
Broad
Debate
on
Legalizing
Pot,”
The
Associated
Press


(Jun.
15
2009
[cited
24
Jun.
2009]):
available
from
 http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5i_7aIzdypWz2A‐ dtVHeJ8VZ7vLFAD98R92S80
 93
Thornton,
The
Economics
of
Prohibition,
127.


United
States
Drug
Policy


29


strengthening
of
enforcement
began
in
the
early
1980s.

One
of
theses
trends
 is
referred
to
as
“testalying”:

this
is
when
an
officer
lies
on
the
witness
stand
 in
 order
 to
 ensure
 a
 conviction,
 for
 noble
 reasons,
 for
 instance
 to
 put
 legitimate
 criminals
 behind
 bars,
 or
 for
 not
 so
 noble
 reasons,
 for
 instance
 lying
to
put
one
group
of
criminals
behind
bars
for
the
purpose
of
protecting
 another
group
that
pays
the
officer
for
the
services.94

The
perverse
incentives
 of
the
current
legal
framework,
which
allow
police
departments
to
retain
the
 assets
 seized
 in
 drug
 busts,
 certainly
 lead
 to
 corruption
 and
 the
 further
 militarization
 of
 domestic
 police
 forces;
 even
 in
 small
 towns
 across
 the
 country
one
can
find
various
paramilitary
or
tactical
SWAT
teams.95

Recently
 a
mayor
from
Berwyn
Heights,
Maryland
filed
a
civil
rights
lawsuit
related
to
 a
raid
on
his
house
in
2008,
when
the
SWAT
team
shot
his
two
dogs
and
tied
 him
and
his
mother‐in‐law
to
chairs
and
questioned
them
for
over
two
hours
 about
a
package
of
marijuana
that
was
delivered
to
his
house
a
part
of
a
drug
 distribution
scheme
that
sends
packages
to
houses
to
be
retrieved
before
the
 homeowners
 return.96
 
 Mayor
 Cheye
 Calvo
 said
 after
 the
 event
 “"In
 some
 ways,
we
were
lucky.

We
had
the
support
of
our
community,
who
knew
we
 weren't
 drug
 dealers.
 It
 didn't
 take
 long
 for
 me
 to
 realize
 that
 many
 people
 this
kind
of
thing
happens
to
don't
have
that
kind
of
support."97

Clearly
if
this
 type
of
criminal
behavior
by
the
police
can
target
a
mayor,
anyone
could
be
 victimized
in
the
same
way.


























































 94
Anonymous,
The
Case
for
Legalization,
20.
 95
Anonymous,
The
Case
for
Legalization,
21.
 96
Radley
Balko,
“SWAT
Gone
Wild
in
Maryland,”
Reason
Online
(Jul.
13,
2009
[cited
16
Jul.


2009]):
available
at
http://www.reason.com/news/show/134734.html
 97
Balko,
SWAT
Gone
Wild
in
Maryland


Developing
a
Rational
Framework


30


2.4
Social
Class
Effects
 Poor
citizens
are
most
likely
to
become
involved
in
the
drug
industry
because
 of
 the
 income
 disparity
 that
 exists
 between
 the
 jobs
 that
 they
 can
 lawfully
 acquire
 and
 jobs
 as
 low‐level
 drug
 runners.
 
 In
 Washington
 DC,
 during
 the
 height
 of
 the
 crack
 cocaine
 epidemic
 in
 the
 1980s,
 illicit
 employment
 in
 the
 drug
 industry
 paid
 approximately
 $30
 per
 hour,
 while
 legal
 employment
 opportunities
pad
an
average
of
$7
per
hour.98

The
situation
of
the
poor
was
 further
 exacerbated
 by
 the
 focus
 of
 the
 Reagan
 administration
 on
 street
 crime,
the
most
important
part
of
which
was
drug
dealing,
and
which
focuses
 disproportionately
 on
 poorer
 citizens
 and
 minorities.99
 
 Besides
 being
 more
 likely
to
participate
in
illicit
markets,
the
urban
poor
also
find
themselves
the
 target
of
the
highest
concentration
of
police
presence;
whether
this
is
due
to
 race
 or
 class
 discrimination,
 or
 due
 to
 the
 fact
 that
 a
 higher
 proportion
 of
 illegal
activities
take
place
there,
is
unknown.100

African
Americans
represent
 12%
 of
 the
 total
 population,
 but
 account
 for
 52%
 of
 all
 drug
 arrests;
 this
 means
that
African
Americans
are
four
times
as
likely
as
White
Americans
to
 be
arrested.101

This
trend
is
also
true
for
young
African
Americans;
in
1992
 the
 proportion
 of
 juvenile
 cases
 was
 higher
 for
 African
 American
 than
 for
 other
groups,
and
nearly
five
times
as
many
Black
youths
were
taken
to
court
 for
 drug‐related
 crimes.102
 
 Current
 U.S.
 policy
 continues
 to
 punish
 these
 citizens
 after
 they
 are
 released
 from
 prison
 by
 denying
 them
 Supplemental
 























































 98
Anonymous,
The
Case
for
Legalization,
11.
 99
Beckett,
“Setting
the
Public
Agenda”,
427.
 100
Benoit,
“Not
Just
a
Matter”,
272.
 101
Janice
Joseph
and
Patricia
G.
Pearson,
“Black
Youths
and
Illegal
Drugs,”
Journal
of
Black


Studies
32,
no.
4
(2002):

431.
 102
Joseph
and
Pearson,
Black
Youths
and
Illegal
Drugs,
425.


United
States
Drug
Policy


31


Security
 Income,
 or
 welfare,
 and
 by
 preventing
 them
 from
 applying
 for
 federal
 student
 aid,
 which
 all
 but
 destroys
 the
 chances
 of
 a
 rehabilitated
 offender
 to
 achieve
 long‐term
 success.103
 
 Racial
 differences
 in
 drug
 and
 alcohol
use
disappear
as
income
increases;
however,
poor
African
Americans
 are
 more
 likely
 to
 use
 certain
 classes
 of
 drugs
 like
 intravenous
 heroin
 and
 crack
cocaine,
for
example.104

The
focus
of
many
police
departments
on
crack
 cocaine
 disproportionately
 affects
 African
 Americans
 by
 focusing
 on
 drugs
 that
they
are
more
likely
to
consume.
 


Some
 evidence
 even
 suggests
 a
 connection
 between
 increased


enforcement
and
increased
rates
of
HIV/AIDS,
especially
among
members
of
 minority
populations.

Minority
populations
are
likely
to
live
in
high‐density
 areas
surrounded
mostly
by
other
minority
citizens.

Because
there
already
is
 a
police
bias
against
areas
dominated
by
minorities
because
of
the
increased
 crime
rates
in
those
areas,
police
presence
has
been
connected
to
higher
HIV
 transmission
 rates.105
 
 Because
 of
 the
 high
 concentration
 of
 police
 and
 laws
 forbidding
the
possession
of
drug
paraphernalia,
it
is
highly
risky
to
possess
 sterile
 needles
 in
 minority
 neighborhoods.106
 
 A
 study
 conducted
 in
 Seattle
 concluded
 that
 three
 factors
 contributed
 to
 the
 racial
 disparity
 in
 enforcement
 arrests;
 the
 first
 was
 a
 focus
 on
 crack
 cocaine;
 the
 second
 was
 the
 lack
 of
 access
 to
 private
 space
 among
 minority
 users;
 and
 the
 third
 was


























































 103
Benoit,
“Not
Just
a
Matter”,
271.
 104
Kellie
E.
M.
Barr,
Michael
P.
Farrell,
Grace
M.
Barnes,
John
W.
Welte,
“Race,
Class,
and


Gender
Differences
in
Substance
Abuse:

Evidence
of
Middle‐Class/Underclass
Polarization
 Among
Blacks,”
Social
Problems
40,
no.
3
(1993):
321.
 105
Schneider,
Racism,
Drug
Policy,
and
AIDS,
432.
 106
Schneider,
Racism,
Drug
Policy,
and
AIDS,
432.


Developing
a
Rational
Framework


32


the
 focus
 on
 outdoor
 drug
 use
 and
 distribution.107
 
 It
 is
 unclear
 how
 the
 conclusions
 of
 the
 Seattle
 study
 apply
 to
 the
 rest
 of
 the
 country,
 or
 the
 reasons
for
the
adoption
of
this
strategy,
but
it
is
clear
that,
at
least
in
Seattle,
 White
users
and
distributors
have
an
advantage
because
of
the
strategy.
 Arrest
 avoidance
 strategies
 include
 the
 borrowing
 of
 syringes
 upon
 purchase
of
drugs
for
immediate
use,
and
the
underground
shooting
gallery,
 which
 are
 the
 riskiest
 regarding
 the
 spread
 of
 HIV
 due
 to
 the
 sharing
 of
 needles
and
the
exchange
of
sex
for
drugs
that
happens
there.108

Due
to
these
 factors,
as
well
as
the
increased
chances
of
contracting
HIV
in
prison,
minority
 populations
are
more
likely
than
Whites
to
contract
the
disease
in
these
ways,
 and
 for
 these
 reasons.
 
 Since
 the
 crack
 trade
 has
 stabilized
 since
 the
 1980s,
 associated
homicides
have
fallen,
but
health
risks
to
minority
populations
in
 inner
cities
have
increased.

This
is
due
to
the
substitution
effect
mentioned
in
 the
 previous
 section;
 rather
 than
 consume
 smokable
 crack,
 which
 carries
 severe
 penalties,
 new
 trends
 suggest
 that
 consumers
 in
 these
 areas
 are
 injecting
 powdered
 cocaine,
 which
 carries
 even
 higher
 risks
 of
 HIV
 contraction
 than
 heroin
 because
 of
 the
 greater
 frequency
 of
 associated
 injections.
 
 Estimates
 in
 1990,
 considering
 drug‐related
 murders,
 drug‐ related
 AIDS
 deaths,
 and
 deaths
 caused
 by
 poisoned
 or
 adulterated
 drugs,
 found
8250
annual
drug
prohibition
related
deaths
in
the
U.S.
alone.109 


























































 107
Katherine
Beckett,
Kris
Nyrop,
Lori
Pfingst,
Melissa
Bowen,
“Drug
Use,
Drug
Possession


Arrests,
and
the
Question
of
Race:

Lessons
from
Seattle,”
Social
Problems
52,
no.
3
(2005):
 434.
 108
Schneider,
Racism,
Drug
Policy,
and
AIDS,
432.
 109
Konrad,
Drug
Policy
and
Federalism,
57.


United
States
Drug
Policy


33


2.5
Imprisonment
 Mandatory
 minimum
 sentences
 and
 a
 strict
 enforcement
 policy
 in
 the
 U.S.
 have
contributed
to
a
rapid
expansion
of
the
prison
population
in
the
U.S.

The
 effect
 of
 mandatory
 minimum
 sentences
 is
 disproportionate
 in
 that,
 since
 their
 establishment
 in
 the
 1986
 Anti‐Drug
 Abuse
 Act,
 minorities
 are
 more
 likely
 to
 receive
 the
 mandatory
 minimums
 than
 Whites
 by
 a
 margin
 of
 21%
 for
Blacks
and
28%
for
Hispanics.110

Furthermore,
Blacks
and
Hispanics
are
 more
likely
to
be
sent
to
state
or
federal
prisons,
while
Whites
are
more
likely
 to
 be
 sent
 to
 county
 prisons.111
 
 Roughly
 25%
 of
 all
 prisoners
 committed
 drug‐related
crimes,
most
of
which
were
non‐violent
crimes,
and,
as
senator
 Jim
 Webb
 recently
 averred,
 the
 U.S.,
 with
 5%
 of
 the
 world
 population,
 has
 25%
of
the
world’s
prisoners,
which
costs
$68
billion
annually.112

47.5%
of
 all
 drug
 arrests
 are
 for
 marijuana
 related
 crimes,
 which
 dramatically
 contributes
to
the
$150
billion
annual
cost
of
courts
and
policing.113
 


One
unforeseen
consequence
of
mandatory
minimum
sentencing
laws


has
 been
 an
 increased
 focus
 on
 low‐level
 street
 dealers
 at
 the
 expense
 of
 investigating
upper
levels
of
the
drug
trade.114

Though
this
is
not
necessarily
 a
 racially
 motivated
 strategy,
 one
 can
 certainly
 see
 how
 this
 would
 disproportionately
affect
Blacks,
while
White
suburban
distributors
are
able


























































 110
Schneider,
Racism,
Drug
Policy,
and
AIDS,
438.
 111
Schneider,
Racism,
Drug
Policy,
and
AIDS,
438.
 112
Joe
Klein,
“Why
Legalizing
Marijuana
Makes
Sense,”
Time
Magazine
(Apr.
2,
2009
[cited
23
 Jun.
2009]):
available
from
 http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1889021,00.html?iid=digg_share
 113 
Klein,
Why
Legalizing
Marijuana
Makes
Sense
 114
Schneider,
Racism,
Drug
Policy,
and
AIDS,
440.


Developing
a
Rational
Framework


34


to
avoid
detection.115

In
addition,
the
U.S.
has
underutilized
one
policy
option
 with
proven
effectiveness:

the
drug
courts.

While
it
is
unfortunate
that
many
 addicts
 who
 need
 treatment
 are
 unable
 to
 get
 it
 unless
 they
 arrested,
 the
 recidivism
rate
for
those
who
receive
treatment
through
drug
courts
is
much
 lower
 at
 17%
 than
 the
 recidivism
 rate
 for
 drug‐offenders
 who
 receive
 no
 treatment
 at
 60%.116
 
 This
 represents
 a
 significant
 cost
 savings
 and
 a
 dramatic
 usage
 reduction,
 and
 thus
 should
 be
 considered
 in
 any
 serious
 discussion
 of
 drug
 policy
 options.
 
 Even
 so,
 according
 to
 Gil
 Kerlikowske,
 current
 Drug
 Czar,
 of
 the
 20
 million
 people
 diagnosed
 with
 substance
 dependence
or
abuse
only
10%
received
treatment
for
the
disorder.117

With
 the
high
costs
or
imprisonment
and
the
loss
of
tax
revenue
and
productivity
 incurred
 by
 keeping
 able‐bodied
 individuals
 out
 of
 the
 work
 force,
 the
 treatment
alternative
would
likely
benefit
offenders
and
taxpayers
alike.



2.6
Analysis
of
the
Effectiveness
of
the
ONDCP
 One
of
the
stated
goals
of
the
ONDCP
is
to
ameliorate
the
health
consequences
 of
drug
use.

It
is
difficult
to
discuss
the
positive
strides
the
U.S.
has
made
in
 this
area
because,
even
though
harm
reduction
is
the
focal
point
of
the
drug
 policies
of
most
countries
in
the
developed
world,
the
U.S.
has,
most
likely
for
 domestic
 political
 reasons,
 rejected
 this
 approach,
 and
 has
 domestically
 underfunded
 associated
 programs.
 
 Not
 only
 has
 the
 U.S.
 rejected
 harm
 reduction,
 but
 it
 has
 also
 actively
 attempted
 to
 affect
 the
 international
 























































 115
Schneider,
Racism,
Drug
Policy,
and
AIDS,
440.
 116
Jim
Acosta
and
Kristi
Keck,
“White
House
Tries
to
Combat
Drug
Demand
with
Rehab,”
CNN


(Apr.
18,
2009
[cited
23
Jun.
2009]):
available
from
 http://edition.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/04/18/obama.drug.war/index.html
 117
Kerlikowske,
Gil.
“Domestic
Policy
Subcommittee”


United
States
Drug
Policy


35


credibility
 of
 harm
 reduction
 by
 blocking
 resolutions
 supporting
 harm
 reduction,
 by
 suppressing
 scientific
 studies
 that
 have
 had
 positive
 findings
 supporting
 harm
 reduction,
 and
 by
 silencing
 critics
 of
 official
 U.S.
 drug
 policy.118
 
 The
 World
 Health
 Organization
 (WHO)
 conducted
 a
 wide‐ranging
 study
 on
 the
 global
 usage
 of
 cocaine,
 and
 in
 March
 1995
 they
 released
 a
 summary
document
stating
their
results.119

This
report
was
highly
critical
of
 U.S.
policies,
suggesting
that
interdiction
and
usage
prevention
strategies
had
 failed,
 and
 that
 harm
 reduction
 policies
 were
 more
 likely
 to
 achieve
 success.120
 
 Due
 to
 what
 were
 considered
 by
 U.S.
 policymakers
 to
 be
 outrageous
 and
 dangerous
 conclusions,
 the
 U.S.
 representative
 to
 the
 WHO
 threatened
to
completely
withdraw
all
funding
for
the
organization
unless
the
 WHO
 suppressed
 the
 report,
 which
 has
 yet
 to
 be
 officially
 published.121

 Furthermore,
 since
 its
 creation
 in
 1988,
 the
 ONDCP
 has
 never
 appointed
 a
 physician,
 or
 health
 care
 professional
 of
 any
 kind,
 to
 the
 top
 “Drug
 Czar”
 position
 indicating
 that
 the
 harm
 reduction
 approach
 and
 treatment
 in
 general
are
considered
to
be
extraneous
concerns.122

This
is
not
the
behavior
 of
 an
 actor
 that
 intends
 to
 use
 a
 research‐based
 strategy
 to
 decrease
 usage
 and
mitigate
the
negative
externalities
associated
with
drug
use.
 


The
ONDCP
is
not
an
independent
governmental
body;
it
is
part
of
the


executive
 branch,
 which
 subjects
 it
 to
 the
 pressures
 associated
 with
 complying
with
a
president’s
agenda.

Beyond
this
executive
influence
in
the
 























































 118
Nadelmann,
Commonsense
Drug
Policy,
124.
 119
Ben
Goldacre,
“Cocaine
Study
That
Got
Up
the
Nose
of
the
US,”
The
Guardian
(Jun.
13
2009


[cited
24
Jun.
2009]):
available
from
 http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/jun/13/bad‐science‐cocaine‐study
 120
Goldacre,
“Cocaine
Study”
 121
Goldacre,
“Cocaine
Study”
 122
Nadelmann,
Commonsense
Drug
Policy,
111.


Developing
a
Rational
Framework


36


ONDCP,
 the
 organization
 is
 subject
 to
 all
 of
 the
 features
 common
 to
 bureaucracies,
namely
the
desire
to
expand,
the
tendency
to
define
success
in
 terms
 of
 budget
 increases,
 and
 the
 struggle
 to
 maintain
 and
 expand
 its
 bureaucratic
turf.

In
order
to
facilitate
these
objectives
the
ONDCP
engages
in
 claims
making,
attempts
to
cause
moral
panic,
and
dishonestly
uses
statistics
 to
support
its
policy
positions
and
increase
its
strength.
 


The
 policy
 objectives
 of
 the
 ONDCP
 have
 been
 fluid
 over
 the
 years,


which
 may
 explain
 some
 of
 the
 ineffectiveness
 of
 U.S.
 drug
 policy.
 
 For
 example,
the
2000
ONDCP
Strategy
states
“the
1996
Strategy
established
five
 goals
 and
 thirty‐two
 supporting
 objectives
 as
 the
 basis
 for
 a
 coherent,
 long‐ term
national
effort.

These
goals
remain
the
heart
of
the
1999
Strategy
and
 will
guide
federal
drug
control
agencies
over
the
next
five
years.”123

However,
 these
goals
were
subsequently
omitted
from
the
following
ONDCP
Strategies,
 which
 may
 be
 indicative
 of
 the
 fact
 that
 policymakers
 have
 yet
 to
 reach
 a
 consensus
on
the
overall
goals
of
U.S.
drug
policy.124

The
first
step
to
creating
 a
lasting
strategy
that
can
have
success
over
time
is
to
have
clear
objective
so
 that
 policies
 can
 be
 measured
 according
 to
 the
 appropriate
 metrics.
 
 It
 is
 questionable
whether
or
not
this
is
possible
while
the
ONDCP
remains
a
part
 of
the
executive
branch,
and
thus
subject
to
political
pressure.
 


The
ONDCP
has
further
confounded
evaluation
of
the
effectiveness
by


offering
 misleading
 statistics,
 and
 by
 deliberately
 underestimating
 the
 financial
costs
of
the
drug
war.

The
first
way
it
has
done
this
is
by
omitting
 























































 123 
Robinson
and
Scherlen,
“Lies,
Damned
Lies,”
38
 124 
Robinson
and
Scherlen,
“Lies,
Damned
Lies,”
38


United
States
Drug
Policy


37


expenses
 incurred
 by
 state,
 city
 and
 county
 police
 forces
 from
 its
 budget
 statement.

This
is
inappropriate
because
all
local
and
state
police
force
have
 drug
 budgets,
 and
 by
 omitting
 these
 costs
 the
 ONDCP
 may
 be
 underestimating
 costs
 by
 as
 much
 as
 half
 in
 conjunction
 with
 the
 following
 point.125

Since
2003,
the
ONDCP
has
also
omitted
from
its
budget
all
expenses
 that
are
incurred
that
do
not
relate
to
drug
policy
judgments,
which
means
in
 practice
 that
 money
 spent
 on
 arrests,
 convictions,
 and
 corrections
 are
 not
 included
in
its
budgetary
calculations.126

In
this
way,
ONDCP
policy
obscures
 the
 true
 costs
 associated
 with
 the
 war
 on
 drugs,
 and
 confounds
 analysts,
 using
cost
benefit
analysis,
attempting
to
honestly
consider
the
effectiveness
 of
 the
 policy.
 
 In
 addition
 to
 the
 aforementioned
 effects,
 the
 policy,
 by
 decreasing
 total
 drug
 war
 costs,
 increases
 the
 proportion
 of
 the
 drug
 war
 budget
that
is
apportioned
for
treatment.127

To
have
an
effective
and
honest
 evaluation
of
current
policies
these
practices
must
be
eliminated.


2.7
Section
Summary
 This
section
provided
an
overview
of
the
conditions
in
the
United
States
over
 the
 last
 30
 year
 and
 discussed
 a
 number
 of
 problems
 including:
 
 foreign
 externalities,
 financial
 implications,
 corruption,
 social
 effects
 and
 the
 inadequacy
of
the
ONDCP.

These
are
challenging
problems,
and
they
certainly
 require
 policy
 entrepreneurialism
 to
 solve.
 
 These
 problems,
 however,
 will
 never
 be
 solved
 without
 considering
 options
 that
 have
 been
 taboo
 in
 the
 United
 States
 for
 the
 last
 30
 years.
 
 As
 we
 will
 see
 in
 section
 4,
 President
 























































 125 
Robinson
and
Scherlen,
“Lies,
Damned
Lies,”
41
 126 
Robinson
and
Scherlen,
“Lies,
Damned
Lies,”
42
 127 
Robinson
and
Scherlen,
“Lies,
Damned
Lies,”
43


Developing
a
Rational
Framework


38


Obama
seems
much
more
receptive
to
the
idea
of
drug
policy
reform
at
a
time
 when
 public
 opinion
 is
 increasingly
 in
 favor
 of
 it.
 
 These
 are
 important
 characteristics
that
will
increase
the
likelihood
of
a
successful
reform,
which,
 as
has
been
discussed,
is
necessary.


3.
Harm
Reduction
Successes
in
Foreign
Countries
 As
 we
 have
 seen
 so
 far,
 the
 strategy
 of
 the
 United
 States
 relies
 almost
 exclusively
 on
 enforcement,
 which
 is
 a
 supply‐side
 policy.
 
 Other
 countries
 have
 had
 success
 focusing
 on
 harm
 reduction,
 or
 the
 demand‐side
 policies.

 Since
 the
 early
 1980s
 the
 United
 States
 has
 been
 reluctant
 to
 take
 harm
 reduction
 strategies
 seriously
 with
 some
 deleterious
 effects,
 and
 not
 much
 success,
 even
 regarding
 the
 goals
 that
 should
 be
 easiest
 to
 accomplish,
 like
 increasing
 the
 price
 of
 drugs.
 
 This
 section
 is
 devoted
 to
 examining
 the
 specific
policies
of
other
countries,
mainly
Holland
and
Portugal,
which
have
 approached
 the
 drug
 problem
 from
 the
 harm
 reduction
 perspective.
 
 Some
 drug
policy
analysts
have
criticized
the
relevance
of
country
case
studies
on
 the
 grounds
 that
 individual
 countries’
 cultures
 and
 treaty
 obligations
 preclude
 effective
 comparison,
 however,
 this
 author
 believes
 that
 these
 studies
 are
 relevant
 because
 they
 provide
 possible
 guidance
 in
 constructing
 an
 alternative
 framework
 in
 the
 United
 States,
 and
 they
 support
 harm
 reduction
as
an
effective
alternative
to
enforcement.
 


Before
beginning
with
the
case
studies,
we
should
briefly
describe
one


key
 difference
 between
 the
 approaches
 of
 most
 Western
 countries
 and
 the
 United
 States:
 
 methadone
 maintenance
 treatment.
 
 While
 the
 United
 States


United
States
Drug
Policy


39


pioneered
 the
 use
 of
 methadone
 to
 treat
 heroin
 addiction,
 this
 practice
 has
 decreased
 in
 popularity
 and
 restrictions
 have
 increased
 since
 the
 practice’s
 development.
 
 Presently
 the
 use
 of
 methadone
 in
 the
 U.S.
 is
 restricted
 to
 a
 very
small
group
of
addicts
whose
goal
is
to
quit.

While
methadone
treatment
 can
 be
 used
 to
 achieve
 this
 objective,
 many
 other
 Western
 countries
 use
 methadone
 to
 maintain
 addicts,
 which
 means
 they
 take
 methadone
 for
 long
 periods
 to
 prevent
 the
 onset
 of
 withdrawal
 so
 they
 can
 focus
 on
 improving
 other
 aspects
 of
 their
 lives.
 
 Some
 examples
 of
 countries
 that
 do
 this
 are
 Australia,
New
Zealand,
Canada,
Germany,
Holland,
and
Switzerland
to
name
 a
 few.128
 
 In
 Switzerland
 a
 trial
 was
 conducted
 to
 see
 what
 the
 effects
 of
 prescribing
methadone,
heroin
and
morphine
to
addicts
were
on
crime
rates
 and
disease.129

The
results
of
the
study
were
twofold:

first,
it
became
clear
 that
 addicts
 preferred
 heroin
 to
 methadone
 or
 morphine;
 and
 second,
 criminal
 offenses
 and
 the
 total
 number
 of
 offenders
 fell
 by
 60%,
 and
 the
 percentage
 of
 the
 income
 derived
 from
 crime
 of
 people
 enrolled
 in
 the
 trial
 fell
 from
 69%
 to
 10%.130
 
 In
 addition,
 the
 use
 of
 illegal
 heroin
 and
 cocaine
 among
 the
 participants
 fell,
 and
 stable
 employment
 rose
 from
 14
 to
 32
 percent.131
 
 Finally,
 the
 study
 concluded
 with
 a
 cost‐benefit
 analysis
 that
 estimated
a
net
benefit
of
$30
per
patient
per
day
resulting
largely
from
the
 associated
 reduction
 in
 crime
 rates.132
 
 These
 findings
 are
 both
 interesting
 and
relevant
to
the
United
States
because
of
the
high
crime
rates
associated


























































 128
Nadelmann,
Commonsense
Drug
Policy,
118.
 129
Nadelmann,
Commonsense
Drug
Policy,
120.
 130
Nadelmann,
Commonsense
Drug
Policy,
120.
 131
Nadelmann,
Commonsense
Drug
Policy,
120.
 132
Nadelmann,
Commonsense
Drug
Policy,
120.


Developing
a
Rational
Framework


40


with
hard‐drug
use
and
the
necessity
to
cut
costs,
especially
during
times
of
 economic
depression,
which
the
country
is
now
experiencing.


3.1
The
Case
of
Holland
 The
basis
of
Dutch
drug
policy
is
pragmatism;
the
policy
aims
at
normalizing
 deviant
 social
 behaviors
 in
 favor
 of
 deterring
 them.133 
 
 Illegal
 drug
 use
 in
 Holland
is
viewed
as
a
limited
and
manageable
problem,
which
is
best
dealt
 with
in
a
way
that
does
not
stigmatize
users
and
reduces
the
overall
harm
to
 all
 social
 groups,
 even
 users
 themselves.
 
 Cannabis
 (marijuana
 and
 hashish)
 has
been
de
facto
decriminalized
since
the
1970s,
and,
according
to
the
Dutch
 drug‐scheduling
 scheme,
 cannabis
 is
 considered
 to
 be
 a
 schedule‐2
 drug,
 which
means
that
it
is
not
a
serious
health
threat.134

Users
of
cannabis
have
 little
to
fear
in
Holland,
but
schedule
1
drugs,
or
drugs
with
unacceptable
risk,
 are
still
illegal,
and
can
be
the
cause
of
criminal
sanctions.

What
this
means
in
 practice
 is
 that
 cannabis
 consumers
 are
 easily
 able
 to
 acquire
 cannabis
 at
 “coffeeshops”,
 where
 the
 product
 strength
 is
 reliably
 constant,
 and
 no
 other
 drugs
are
permitted
to
be
sold.135

This
has
had
the
effect
of
separating
soft‐
 and
hard‐drug
dealers
in
a
way
that
reduces
public
contact
with
suppliers
of
 hard‐drugs.

Trafficking
penalties
in
Holland
are
similar
to
penalties
in
other
 Western
countries,
and
are
likely
to
remain
so
due
to
UN
treaty
obligations.136

 The
 question
 with
 the
 most
 relevance
 for
 American
 drug
 policy
 analysts
 is
 how
 has
 de
 facto
 decriminalization
 of
 cannabis
 affected
 usage
 rates
 in
 























































 133
Ed
Leuw,
“Drugs
and
Drug
Policy
in
the
Netherlands,”
Crime
and
Justice
14,
no.
47
(1991):


230.
 134
Leuw,
Drugs
and
Drug
Policy
in
the
Netherlands,
231.
 135
Larry
Collins,
“Holland’s
Half‐Baked
Drug
Experiment,”
Foreign
Affairs
78,
no.
3
(1999):
 83.
 136
Leuw,
Drugs
and
Drug
Policy
in
the
Netherlands,
232.


United
States
Drug
Policy


41


Holland?
 
 In
 a
 survey
 conducted
 in
 1989
 considering
 the
 usage
 rates
 of
 Holland
 as
 compared
 with
 Norway,
 Sweden
 and
 the
 United
 States
 over
 the
 previous
20
year
period
concluded
the
following:
 The
 results
 of
 the
 analysis
 show
 that
 the
 prevalence
 of
 [Dutch]
 cannabis
 use
 since
 1970
 decreased,
 whereas
 the
 policy
 because
 more
 tolerant.
 
 Since
 1979
 a
 slight
 increase
 in
 the
 use
 of
 cannabis
 can
 be
 observed.
 
 A
 comparison
 with
 data
 from
 countries
 with
 a
 more
 restrictive
 policy
 reveals
 that
 the
 use
 of
 cannabis
 in
 the
 Netherlands
is
on
the
same
level
as
in
Sweden
and
Norway,
but
far
lower
than
in
the
 U.S.
 
 However,
 the
 downward
 trend
 in
 these
 countries
 since
 1984
 did
 not
 occur
 in
 the
Netherlands.137





The
 era
 of
 tolerance
 in
 Holland
 was
 ushered
 in
 by
 the
 Hulsman


Committee,
which
maintained
that
pluralism
requires
that
norms
and
values
 of
 minority
 subcultures
 should
 not
 be
 marginalized
 by
 popular
 opinion.138

 The
central
idea
is
that
state
policies
that
forbid
activities
that
affect
only
the
 individual
 are
 inappropriate,
 and
 should
 be
 resisted
 regardless
 of
 majority
 opinion.139

The
result
of
this
commission
was
a
new
Dutch
strategy
with
the
 following
 characteristics:
 “the
 prevention
 and
 amelioration
 of
 social
 and
 individual
risks
caused
by
the
use
of
drugs;
a
rational
relation
between
those
 risks
 and
 policy‐measures;
 a
 differentiation
 of
 policy‐measures
 which
 take
 into
 account
 the
 risks
 of
 legal
 recreational
 and
 medical
 drugs;
 a
 priority
 of
 repressive
 measures
 against
 [other
 than
 cannabis]
 drug
 trafficking;
 the


























































 137
Leuw,
Drugs
and
Drug
Policy
in
the
Netherlands,
237.
 138
Leuw,
Drugs
and
Drug
Policy
in
the
Netherlands,
244.
 139
Leuw,
Drugs
and
Drug
Policy
in
the
Netherlands,
244.


Developing
a
Rational
Framework


42


inadequacy
 of
 criminal
 law
 with
 regard
 to
 any
 other
 aspect
 of
 the
 drugs
 problem.”140
 


To
be
sure,
there
are
some
negative
aspects
of
the
Dutch
model
as
well.



Dutch
 decriminalization
 has
 lead
 to
 some
 negative
 externalities
 for
 the
 neighboring
countries
of
the
Netherlands.

Holland
is
considered
by
many
to
 be
the
“drug
capital
of
Western
Europe”,
even
though,
as
we
shall
see,
it
does
 not
 have
 the
 most
 liberal
 drug
 policies
 in
 Western
 Europe.141
 
 Neighboring
 counties
 estimate
 that
 many
 drugs,
 especially
 synthetic
 drugs
 like
 ecstasy
 (MDMA)
and
amphetamines,
originate
from
Holland
and
are
then
shipped
to
 its
neighbors
by
traffickers.142

According
to
French
estimates,
in
1997,
98%
 of
 amphetamines
 and
 74%
 of
 ecstasy
 tablets
 originated
 in
 Holland.143 
 
 Also,
 contrary
to
the
general
principles
of
prohibition
that
were
stated
in
the
first
 section,
potency
levels
of
cannabis
have
steadily
increased
in
Holland,
which
 has
 some
 concerned
 about
 the
 health
 risks
 of
 this
 more
 potent
 variety
 of
 cannabis
called
Nederwiet.144

These
consequences
certainly
seem
to
indicate
 a
 failure
 of
 some
 aspects
 of
 the
 Dutch
 decriminalization,
 and
 some
 ascribe
 these
failures
to
the
policy
itself
rather
than
considering
possible
alternative
 reasons.

It
is
clear
that
Dutch
policies
affect
neighboring
countries,
but
so
do
 neighboring
 countries’
 policies
 affect
 the
 Dutch.
 
 In
 fact,
 should
 a
 similar
 policy
 be
 adopted
 by
 all
 of
 Holland’s
 neighbors,
 it
 would
 be
 unnecessary
 to
 export
 drugs
 to
 neighboring
 countries,
 unless
 Holland
 possessed
 a
 comparative
 advantage
 in
 the
 production
 of
 these
 goods.
 
 The
 increasing
 























































 140
Leuw,
Drugs
and
Drug
Policy
in
the
Netherlands,
251.
 141
Collins,
Holland’s
Half­Baked
Drug
Experiment,
83.
 142
Collins,
Holland’s
Half­Baked
Drug
Experiment,
84.
 143
Collins,
Holland’s
Half­Baked
Drug
Experiment,
84.
 144
Collins,
Holland’s
Half­Baked
Drug
Experiment,
87.


United
States
Drug
Policy


43


potency
of
cannabis
produced
in
Holland
is
also
subject
to
external
pressure
 of
 neighboring
 countries.
 
 Due
 to
 the
 prohibitions
 that
 still
 exist
 in
 those
 countries,
Dutch
cannabis
potency
may
have
increased
because
about
65
out
 of
 100
 tons
 of
 cannabis
 produced
 in
 Holland
 is
 exported
 annually.145
 
 The
 increase
therefore,
could
be
due
to
the
continued
prohibition
in
neighboring
 countries
 that
 have
 markets
 larger
 than
 the
 Dutch
 domestic
 market,
 which
 would
be
consistent
with
the
previous
analysis
of
the
effects
of
prohibition.
 The
Dutch
drug
market
is
characterized
as
peaceful
in
comparison
to
 the
 market
 in
 the
 United
 States,
 though
 firearm
 use
 is
 occasional
 at
 the
 top
 levels.146

Nowadays
the
policy
is
non‐controversial
and
the
linkage
between
 soft‐
 and
 hard‐drug
 trafficking
 has
 been
 broken.147
 
 The
 positive
 effects
 on
 youth
drug
use
in
Holland
are
also
instructive:

15‐29
year
olds
smoke
50%
 less
 cannabis
 than
 American
 youth
 after
 three
 decades
 of
 decriminalization,
 and
 because
 cannabis
 distributors
 no
 longer
 additionally
 sell
 heroin,
 less
 Dutch
 youths
 experiment
 with
 heroin.148
 
 Between
 the
 ages
 of
 12‐15,
 only
 7.2%
of
 Dutch
adolescents
report
 having
tried
 cannabis,
while
in
 the
 United
 States
13.5%
reported
the
same,
however
far
fewer
Dutch
adolescents
report
 having
 used
 hard‐drugs
 than
 their
 American
 counterparts.149
 
 A
 change
 in
 marijuana
 policy
 in
 the
 U.S.
 could
 result
 in
 a
 great
 increase
 in
 resources
 because
marijuana
arrests
account
for
the
majority
of
all
drug
arrests,
as
well


























































 145
Collins,
Holland’s
Half­Baked
Drug
Experiment,
89.
 146
Leuw,
Drugs
and
Drug
Policy
in
the
Netherlands,
240.
 147
Leuw,
Drugs
and
Drug
Policy
in
the
Netherlands,
256.
 148
Frosty
Wooldridge,
“Marijuana
Prohibition
and
Public
Safety,”
The
Examiner
(Mar.
2,
2009


[cited
23
Jun.
2009]):
available
from
http://www.examiner.com/x‐3515‐Denver‐Political‐ Issues‐Examiner~y2009m3d2‐Marijuana‐prohibition‐and‐public‐safety
 149
Nadelmann,
Commonsense
Drug
Policy,
123.


Developing
a
Rational
Framework


44


as
 large
 expenditures
 on
 the
 part
 of
 local
 law
 enforcement
 and
 the
 Coast
 Guard,
which
could
be
saved
depending
on
how
the
policy
is
changed.150


3.2
The
Case
of
Portugal
 The
Portuguese
drug
policy
also
focuses
on
the
concept
of
harm
reduction.

In
 the
 late
 1990s
 Portugal
 established
 a
 commission
 composed
 of
 experts
 to
 examine
 the
 issue
 and
 to
 make
 recommendations
 for
 improving
 drug
 policy
 in
Portugal.151

The
commission’s
report,
which
strongly
advocated
the
harm
 reduction
approach
and
recommended
the
elimination
of
criminal
sanctions
 for
 drug
 use
 or
 possession,
 was
 approved
 to
 the
 surprise
 of
 the
 commissioners
and
public.152

The
decriminalization
strategy
is
believed
to
be
 the
 most
 effective
 way
 to
 reduce
 usage
 and
 social
 harms,
 and
 was
 never
 viewed
 as
 conceding
 that
 drug
 use
 was
 inevitable,
 which
 contrasts
 from
 the
 Dutch
 position.153
 
 The
 strategy
 could
 be
 described
 as
 one
 seeking
 to
 implement
 a
 Pareto
 optimal
 efficiency:
 
 This
 occurs
 when
 people
 are
 made
 better
off
without
harming
others,
and
this
is
what
the
policy
attempts
to
do.

 It
 attempts
 to
 improve
 the
 lives
 of
 all
 segments
 of
 Portuguese
 society.
 
 The
 report
 concluded
 that
 criminalization
 created
 barriers
 to
 treatment
 and
 drained
 resources,
 which
 could
 be
 more
 effectively
 allocated
 to
 reduce
 the
 problems
associated
with
drug
use.154


























































 150
Nadelmann,
“A
Bad
Export,”
106.


151
Mirjam
van
het
Loo,
Ineke
van
Beusekom,
James
P.
Kahan,
“Decriminalization
of
Drug
Use


in
Portugal:

The
Development
of
a
Policy,”
Annals
of
the
American
Academy
of
Political
and
 Social
Science
582,
no.
14
(2002):
50.
 152
Loo,
Beusekom,
and
Kahan,
“Decriminalization
of
Drug
Use
in
Portugal,”
50.
 153
Glenn
Greenwald,
“Drug
Decriminalization
in
Portugal:

Lessons
for
Creating
Fair
and
 Successful
Drug
Policies,”
Cato
Institute,
10.
 154
Greenwald,
“Drug
Decriminalization
in
Portugal,”
6.


United
States
Drug
Policy


45


Drugs
 were
 decriminalized,
 but
 not
 legalized
 in
 the
 new
 framework,
 which
 means
 that
 that
 possession
 and
 use
 are
 still
 illegal,
 but
 violations
 are
 administrative,
 not
 criminal,
 offenses.155
 
 This
 new
 categorization
 is
 consistent
 with
 Portugal’s
 international
 obligations,
 which
 under
 the
 UN
 framework
require
use
and
possession
to
be
forbidden,
and
trafficking
to
be
a
 criminal
 offense.156
 
 The
 new
 system
 has
 increased
 in
 popularity
 since
 its
 inception
because
the
scenarios
that
critics
predicted,
like
Portugal
becoming
 a
 haven
 for
 drug
 tourists
 or
 increased
 youth
 usage
 rates,
 have
 not
 occurred.157

Indeed,
95%
of
all
those
receiving
citations
are
Portuguese,
not
 foreign
 drug
 tourists.158
 
 Remarkably,
 usage
 rates
 have
 fallen
 overall,
 and
 drug‐related
 illnesses,
 like
 STDs,
 have
 decreased:
 
 Portugal
 now
 has
 one
 of
 the
lowest
usage
rates
for
drugs
and
drug‐related
illnesses
in
Europe.159 

To
 be
 more
 specific,
 usage
 of
 illicit
 substances
 among
 teenagers,
 a
 key
 target
 group,
fell,
and
HIV
infections
caused
by
the
sharing
of
dirty
needles
also
fell,
 while
 the
 level
 of
 people
 seeking
 treatment
 for
 addiction
 more
 than
 doubled.160
 
 Furthermore,
 Portugal
 now
 has
 the
 lowest
 rate
 of
 marijuana
 usage
 among
 people
 over
 15
 in
 the
 EU
 at
 10%.161
 
 Compared
 to
 the
 United
 States,
which
measures
lifetime
usage
for
those
over
12
years
old,
Portugal’s
 numbers
 are
 impressive
 because
 the
 U.S.
 rate
 for
 that
 group
 is
 39.8%.162

 Interestingly,
 a
 higher
 proportion
 of
 Americans
 have
 used
 cocaine
 than
 the
 























































 155
Greenwald,
“Drug
Decriminalization
in
Portugal,”
1.
 156
Greenwald,
“Drug
Decriminalization
in
Portugal,”
1.
 157
Greenwald,
“Drug
Decriminalization
in
Portugal,”
1.
 158
Greenwald,
“Drug
Decriminalization
in
Portugal,”
6.
 159
Greenwald,
“Drug
Decriminalization
in
Portugal,”
2.
 160
Maia
Szalavitz,
“Drugs
in
Portugal:

Did
Decriminalization
Work?,”
Time
Magazine
(Apr.
26,


2009
[cited
24
Jun.
2009]):
available
from
 http://www.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,1893946,00.html?xid=rss‐topstories
 161
Szalavitz,
“Drugs
in
Portugal”
 162
Szalavitz,
“Drugs
in
Portugal”


Developing
a
Rational
Framework


46


proportion
 of
 Portuguese
 that
 have
 used
 marijuana,
 which
 is
 the
 most
 frequently
used
illicit
substance.163
 Portugal
is
the
only
European
state
that
has
explicitly
declared
drugs
 to
 be
 decriminalized,
 which
 means
 removed
 from
 criminal
 law.
 
 Other
 European
countries
have
a
de
facto
decriminalization,
especially
for
cannabis
 use,
 but
 Portugal
 is
 unique
 in
 that
 it
 has
 a
 de
 jure
 decriminalization
 for
 all
 drugs,
 even
 cocaine
 and
 heroin.164
 
 Decriminalization
 is
 different
 from
 depenalization
because
depenalization
means
that
possession
and
usage
are
 still
 subject
 to
 criminal
 law,
 however,
 no
 prison
 terms
 are
 given
 for
 these
 offenses.165

Therefore,
under
depenalization
one
would
still
have
a
criminal
 record
if
caught,
whereas
decriminalization
precludes
such
a
record
and
the
 associated
 social
 stigma.
 
 The
 relevant
 law
 states
 that:
 
 “the
 consumption,
 acquisition,
and
possession
for
one’s
own
consumption
of
plants,
substances,
 or
preparations
…
constitute
an
administrative
offense.”166
 Those
 violating
 the
 law
 are
 subjected
 to
 so‐called
 dissuasion
 commissions
consisting
of
3
members,
one
with
a
legal
background,
and
two
 others
with
either
a
medical
or
social
services
background,
which
are
legally
 unable
to
mandate
treatment.167

They
do
have
the
ability
to
impose
a
fine
of
 no
greater
than
25
Euros,
which
can
be
waived
when
the
defendant
agrees
to
 undergo
 treatment,
 and
 can
 impose
 a
 number
 of
 other
 conditions,
 for
 example:

“suspension
of
the
right
to
practice
a
licensed
profession,
a
ban
on
 























































 163
Szalavitz,
“Drugs
in
Portugal”
 164
Greenwald,
“Drug
Decriminalization
in
Portugal,”
2.
 165
Greenwald,
“Drug
Decriminalization
in
Portugal,”
2.
 166
Greenwald,
“Drug
Decriminalization
in
Portugal,”
3.
 167
Greenwald,
“Drug
Decriminalization
in
Portugal,”
3.


United
States
Drug
Policy


47


visiting
 high‐risk
 locales,
 a
 ban
 on
 associating
 with
 specified
 individuals,
 requiring
 periodic
 reports
 to
 the
 commission
 to
 show
 there
 is
 no
 ongoing
 addiction
 or
 abuse,
 prohibitions
 in
 travel
 abroad,
 termination
 of
 public
 benefits
 for
 subsidies
 or
 allowances,
 or
 a
 mere
 oral
 warning.”168
 
 This
 contrasts
 with
 the
 American
 system
 in
 which
 an
 individual
 can
 only
 receive
 treatment
 by
 paying
 for
 it
 directly,
 which
 is
 quite
 expensive
 and
 therefore
 impossible
 for
 a
 majority
 of
 drug
 addicts,
 or
 by
 first
 being
 convicted
 in
 a
 criminal
court
of
law.
 We
 can
 learn
 a
 few
 things
 from
 the
 Portuguese
 model.
 
 First,
 destigmatization
 increased
 the
 likelihood
 that
 addicts
 will
 seek
 treatment
 because
they
no
longer
must
be
concerned
about
criminal
sanctions.

Second,
 destigmatization
 increases
 the
 need
 for
 treatment,
 and
 also
 the
 amount
 of
 money
 necessary
 to
 fund
 it.169
 
 Finally,
 and
 perhaps
 most
 importantly,
 drug
 decriminalization
does
not
always
result
in
increased
use,
especially
over
the
 long
 term.
 
 This
 last
 point
 is
 perhaps
 key
 to
 making
 progress
 in
 the
 United
 States
 and
 to
 convincing
 some
 segments
 of
 the
 U.S.
 population
 that
 liberalization
 can
 have
 positive
 effects
 that
 should
 not
 be
 dismissed
 out
 of
 hand.170


























































 168
Greenwald,
“Drug
Decriminalization
in
Portugal,”
3.
 169
Loo,
Beusekom,
and
Kahan,
“Decriminalization
of
Drug
Use
in
Portugal,”
58.
 170
Szalavitz,
“Drugs
in
Portugal”


Developing
a
Rational
Framework


48


4.
Current
Issues,
Events,
and
Factors
Relevant
to
the
 Drug
Policy
Discussion
 With
 the
 election
 of
 President
 Barack
 Obama
 in
 November
 of
 2008,
 a
 man
 who
 has
 not
 only
 admitted
 to
 drug
 use
 but
 has
 also
 stated
 that
 he
 inhaled
 because
“that
was
the
point”,
the
United
States
may
be
at
a
point
in
time
when
 drug
policy
reform
is
not
only
possible,
but
also
necessary.

There
seems
to
be
 a
perfect
storm
of
factors
that
indicate
that
this
could
be
an
appropriate
time
 to
 reevaluate
 and
 to
 reform
the
 failed
 policy
 of
the
 last
 thirty
years.

 Due
to
 the
 economic
 crisis,
 the
 federal
 and
 many
 state
 governments
 are
 reporting
 record
 budget
 deficits:
 
 the
 United
 States
 deficit
 for
 fiscal
 year
 2010
 is
 estimated
 to
 be
 as
 high
 as
 $1.8
 trillion,
 and
 some
 states
 like
 California
 have
 budget
shortfalls
in
excess
of
$20
billion.171

Policy
changes
made
earlier
this
 year
 should
 make
 things
 easier
 in
 the
 case
 of
 California
 because
 the
 federal
 government
 will
 no
 longer
 get
 in
 the
 way
 of
 the
 state’s
 medical
 marijuana
 facilities,
and
the
collection
of
over
$100
million
in
associated
tax
revenue,
as
 will
be
discussed
below.172

Beyond
the
fiscal
aspect
lies
the
foreign
relations
 aspect
of
the
current
policy:

The
Mexican
government
is
presently
in
a
fight
 for
 its
 life
 against
 traffickers
 that
 supply
 the
 American
 market,
 and
 Afghani
 militants
 derive
 a
 significant
 portion
 of
 their
 income
 from
 the
 international
 drug
trade.

According
to
the
2002
ONDCP
strategy,
of
the
28
terrorist
groups
 























































 171
Jackie
Calmes,
“Obama
Plans
Major
Shifts
in
Spending,”
New
York
Times
(Feb.
26,
2009


[cited
8
Jul.
2009]):
available
from
 http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/27/us/politics/27web‐budget.html
 172
Alison
Stateman,
“In
California
Marijuana
Truce,
a
Legal
Grey
Area,”
Time
Magazine
(Mar.
 29,
2009
[cited
23
Jun.
2009]):
available
from
 http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1888172,00.html?iid=digg_share



United
States
Drug
Policy


49


identified
 by
 the
 U.S.
 State
 Department,
 12
 are
 allegedly
 involved
 in
 drug
 trafficking.173
 
 Prohibition
 could,
 therefore,
 support
 some
 of
 the
 most
 dangerous
 enemies
 of
 the
 United
 States,
 which
 would
 be
 one
 of
 the
 most
 striking
examples
of
how
the
incoherence
of
various
policies
affect
the
United
 States’
 vital
 interests.
 
 Many
 states
 in
 the
 U.S.
 have
 passed,
 or
 will
 pass,
 medical
 marijuana
 legislation
 while
 permissive
 opinions
 about
 drugs
 are
 at
 an
 all
 time
 high,
 particularly
 concerning
 marijuana.
 
 These
 are
 just
 some
 of
 the
 factors
 that
 indicate
 now
 might
 be
 the
 right
 time
 to
 think
 about
 making
 significant
changes
to
drug
policy
in
the
United
States.


4.1
Current
Trends
 Certainly
 support
 for
 marijuana
 legalization
 has
 risen
 to
 record
 levels
 over
 the
last
few
years:

a
recently
commissioned
Zogby
poll
found
that
44
percent
 of
 likely
 American
 voters
 support
 the
 legalization
 on
 cannabis,
 and
 that
 the
 substance
should
be
regulated
and
taxed
like
alcohol
and
tobacco.174

Barring
 any
unforeseen
high‐impact
news
events,
it
is
likely
that
over
the
next
decade
 a
 majority
 of
 Americans
 will
 support
 legalization
 of
 marijuana
 at
 minimum.

 To
 be
 clear,
 the
 poll
 indicated
 that
 support
 was
 for
 legalization,
 not
 for
 medical
marijuana,
which
is
most
likely
supported
by
a
higher
proportion
of
 Americans
 because
 it
 is
 a
 less
 extreme
 measure.
 
 Some
 recognizable
 U.S.
 politicians
have
also
been
more
aggressive
lately
in
their
activities
supporting
 liberalization
of
marijuana.

Congressman
Barney
Frank
recently
introduced
a
 























































 173
Robinson
and
Scherlen,
“Lies,
Damned
Lies,”
150.
 174
Paul
Armentano,
“ABC
News:

Public
Support
for
Pot
Legalization
Has
Never
Been


Higher!,”
NORML
(Apr.
30,
2009
[cited
23
Jun.
2009]):
available
from
 http://blog.norml.org/2009/04/30/abc‐news‐publics‐support‐for‐pot‐legalization‐has‐ never‐been‐higher/


Developing
a
Rational
Framework


50


bill
called
the
Personal
Use
of
Marijuana
by
Responsible
Adults
Act
of
2009,
 which
 would
 eliminate
 federal
 penalties
 for
 possession
 of
 less
 than
 100
 grams
of
marijuana,
and
would
mandate
a
small
$100
fine
for
use
in
public.175

 When
asked
about
his
bill
he
stated
“I
think
John
Stuart
Mill
had
it
right
in
the
 1850s
when
he
argued
that
individuals
should
have
the
right
to
do
what
they
 want
 in
 private,
 so
 long
 as
 they
 don’t
 hurt
 anyone
 else.
 
 It’s
 a
 matter
 of
 personal
liberty.

Moreover,
our
courts
are
already
stressed
and
our
prisons
 are
over‐crowded.

We
don’t
need
to
spend
our
scarce
resources
prosecuting
 people
who
are
doing
no
harm
to
others.”176

In
addition
he
stated
recently
in
 an
interview,
 Announcing
 that
 the
 government
 should
 mind
 its
 own
 business
 on
 marijuana
 is
 really
 not
 that
 hard.
 There's
 not
 a
 lot
 of
 complexity
 here.
 We
 should
 stop
 treating
 people
as
criminals
because
they
smoke
marijuana.
The
problem
is
the
political
will.

 This
is
a
case
where
there's
cultural
lag
on
the
part
of
my
colleagues.
If
you
ask
them
 privately,
they
don't
think
it's
a
terrible
thing.
But
they're
afraid
of
being
portrayed
 as
soft
on
drugs.
And
by
the
way,
the
argument
is,
nobody
ever
gets
arrested
for
it.
 But
 we
 have
 this
 outrageous
 case
 in
 New
 York
 where
 a
 cop
 jammed
 a
 baton
 up
 a
 guy's
ass
when
he
caught
him
smoking
marijuana.177


This
 personal
 liberty
 aspect
 of
 drug
 policy
 is
 one
 upon
 which
 this
 paper
has
not
yet
touched.

The
main
question
to
be
considered
along
these
 lines
is
to
what
degree
can
a
government
limit
what
a
citizen
chooses
to
put
 























































 175
Anonymous,
“Barney
Frank
Files
Bill
to
Decriminalize
Pot,”
wbztv
(Jun.
19
2009
[cited
24


Jun.
2009]):
available
from
 http://wbztv.com/local/marijuana.federal.penalty.2.1052437.html
 176
Anonymous,
Barney
Frank
Files
Bill
to
Decriminalize
Pot
 177
John
H.
Richardson,
“He’s
Not
High:
Inside
Barney
Frank's
Plan
to
Legalize
Marijuana,”
 Esquire
Magazine
(Jul.
14,
2009
[cited
16
Jul.
2009]):
available
at
 http://www.esquire.com/the‐side/richardson‐report/new‐marijuana‐laws‐ 071309?src=digg


United
States
Drug
Policy


51


into
his
own
body
in
a
free
society?

If
it
is
assumed
that
such
a
power
to
limit
 consumption
 exists,
 how
 does
 that
 relate
 to
 a
 free
 society?
 
 Does
 one
 own
 one’s
 own
 body?
 
 If
 so
 then
 no
 real
 limitations
 on
 consumption
 of
 illicit
 substances
 are
 compatible
 with
 self‐ownership.
 
 If
 it
 is
 accepted
 that
 government
can
rightly
limit
bodily
consumption
of
substances
for
the
reason
 that
 this
 consumption
 has
 negative
 external
 effects,
 what
 else
 is
 acceptable
 for
 the
 same
 reason?
 
 These
 are
 all
 important
 philosophical
 questions
 to
 consider,
but
they
are
not
the
main
focus
of
this
paper,
so
we
cannot
examine
 them
here
in
greater
detail.
 


Some
 progress
 has
 already
 been
 made
 towards
 liberalization
 in


Obama’s
 young
 administration.
 
 One
 notable
 event
 occurred
 earlier
 in
 the
 year
when
the
new
Drug
Czar
called
for
the
end
of
the
use
of
the
term
“war
on
 drugs”,
reflecting
the
fact
that
views
are
changing
in
Washington
and
that
the
 administration
understands
that
the
term
has
not
been
particularly
useful
in
 framing
 the
 debate
 on
 drug
 policy.178 
 
 When
 explaining
 the
 decision
 Gil
 Kerlikowske,
 current
 U.S.
 Drug
 Czar,
 averred
 “Regardless
 of
 how
 you
 try
 to
 explain
to
people
it’s
a
‘war
on
drugs’
or
a
‘war
on
a
product,’
people
see
a
war
 as
 a
 war
 on
 them.
 
 We’re
 not
 at
 war
 with
 people
 in
 this
 country.”179

 Moreover,
 Mr.
 Kerlikowske
 made
 the
 following
 statement
 indicating
 further
 changes
in
how
Washington
might
approach
the
problem
 The
Obama
Administration
understands
addiction
is
a
disease,
and
its
 treatment
needs
to
be
addressed
as
part
of
a
comprehensive
strategy
 























































 178
Gary
Fields,
“White
House
Czar
Calls
for
End
to
‘War
on
Drugs’,”
Wall
Street
Journal
(May


14,
2009
[cited
24
Jun.
2009]):
available
from
 http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124225891527617397.html?
 179
Fields,
“White
House
Czar”


Developing
a
Rational
Framework


52


to
 stop
 drug
 use.
 Research
 shows
 addiction
 is
 a
 complex,
 biological,
 and
 psychological
 disorder.
 It
 is
 progressive
 and
 chronic,
 and
 negatively
 affects
 individuals,
 families,
 communities,
 and
 society.
 In
 2007,
over
20
million
individuals
in
our
country
(12
and
older)
were
 diagnosed
 with
 substance
 dependence
 or
 abuse.
 However,
 less
 than
 10%
received
treatment
for
their
disorder.180
 Earlier
 this
 year
 U.S.
 Attorney
 General
 Eric
 Holder
 announced
 that
 the
 administration
 will
 halt
 actions
 against
 marijuana
 dispensaries
 in
 California.181

The
logic
behind
the
decision
was
that
federal
resources
should
 not
 be
 used
 to
 trump
 state
 laws,
 and
 that
 states
 should
 be
 able
 to
 set
 their
 own
 policies
 on
 this
 issue.182
 
 This
 announcement
 has
 been
 viewed
 as
 an
 extremely
important
event
in
the
struggle
for
liberalization
of
marijuana
laws,
 and
 as
 a
 result
 several
 states
 have
 passed
 legislation
 to
 legalize
 the
 drug,
 Rhode
Island
for
instance.183

James
Pasco,
executive
director
of
the
Fraternal
 Order
 of
 Police
 recently
 stated
 that,
 while
 he
 has
 respect
 for
 the
 new
 Drug
 Czar,
“I
don’t
necessarily
disagree
with
Gil’s
focus
on
treatment
and
demand
 reduction,
 I
 don’t
 want
 to
 see
 it
 at
 the
 expense
 of
 law
 enforcement.
 
 People
 need
 to
 understand
 that
 when
 they
 violate
 the
 law
 there
 are
 consequences.”184
 
 This
 represents
 the
 policy
 perspective
 of
 the
 law
 























































 180
Kerlikowske,
“Domestic
Policy
Subcommittee”
 181
Bob
Egelko,
“U.S.
to
Yield
Marijuana
Jurisdiction
to
States,”
San
Francisco
Chronicle
(Feb


27,
2009
[cited
23
Jun.
2009]):
available
from
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi‐ bin/article.cgi?file=/c/a/2009/02/27/MN2016651R.DTL
 182
Egelko,
“U.S.
to
Yield
Marijuana”
 183
Karl
Vick,
“In
Calif.,
Medical
Marijuana
Laws
Are
Moving
Pot
Into
the
Mainstream,”
 Washington
Post
(Apr.
12,
2009
[cited
23
Jun.
2009]):
available
from
 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp‐ dyn/content/article/2009/04/11/AR2009041100767.html?referrer=digg
 184
Fields,
“White
House
Czar”


United
States
Drug
Policy


53


enforcement
 stakeholders,
 that
 they
 support
 changes
 as
 long
 as
 they
 do
 not
 affect
their
power
or
turf,
which
they
rhetorically
refer
to
as
law
enforcement.

 Prosecutions
will
continue
under
the
new
policy
only
when
dispensaries
are
 in
 violation
 of
 both
 federal
 and
 state
 laws,
 which
 means
 that
 federal
 enforcement
will
be
somewhat
of
a
grey
area
until
the
law
is
clarified.185


 In
Rhode
Island’s
case
the
legislation
had
so
much
support
among
the
 state
 house
 and
 senate
 that
 it
 was
 passed
 by
 overriding
 the
 veto
 of
 the
 governor,
who
argued
that
passage
of
the
bill
would
send
the
wrong
message
 to
children
and
invite
federal
prosecutions.186 

In
all,
ten
states
have
reduced
 penalties
 for
 possessing
 marijuana
 for
 personal
 use
 including:
 
 California,
 Colorado,
Maine,
Minnesota,
Mississippi,
Nebraska,
Nevada,
New
York,
North
 Carolina,
 and
 Oregon.187 
 
 Beyond
 this,
 13
 states
 have
 legalized
 medical
 marijuana,
 a
 trend
 that
 has
 been
 associated
 with
 holistic,
 or
 alternative,
 medicine,
 and
 six
 states,
 including
 Delaware,
 Illinois,
 Iowa,
 New
 Hampshire,
 New
 Jersey,
 and
 Pennsylvania
 are
 considering
 similar
 legislation.188
 
 Due
 to
 changes
in
public
opinion
and
state
laws,
the
federal
government
may
have
to
 change
its
classification
of
marijuana
as
a
schedule
1
drug,
which
means
that
 it
currently
has
no
accepted
medical
use,
and
that
the
danger
of
addiction
is
 high,
 to
 a
 lower
 classification
 because
 of
 increasing
 public
 support
 for
 the
 























































 185
Stateman,
In
California
Marijuana
Truce,
a
Legal
Gray
Area
 186
Nancy
Krause,
“RI
Senate
Approves
Marijuana
Stores,”
WPRI
(Jun
10,
2009
[cited
24
Jun.


2009]):
available
from
 http://www.wpri.com/dpp/news/local_news/local_wpri_providence_senate_passes_medical _marijuana_compassion_center_bill_20090609_nek
 187
Anonymous,
Barney
Frank
Files
Bill
to
Decriminalize
Pot
 188
Ray
Henry,
“RI
Becomes
3rd
State
Allowing
Marijuana
Stores,”
The
Boston
Globe
(Jun.
16
 2009
[cited
24
Jun.
2009]):
available
from
 http://www.boston.com/news/local/rhode_island/articles/2009/06/16/ri_becomes_3rd_st ate_allowing_marijuana_stores_1245192510/


Developing
a
Rational
Framework


54


liberalization
 of
 the
 policy.189
 
 Even
 this
 small
 change
 would
 be
 a
 stark
 contrast
to
the
policy
of
the
Bush
administration,
which
blocked
at
least
one
 study
by
the
University
of
Massachusetts
that
would
have
tried
to
determine
 the
 medically
 applicable
 properties
 of
 marijuana.190
 
 More
 and
 more
 people
 are
recognizing
that,
even
though
it
is
not
a
mainstream
opinion
of
physicians,
 marijuana
may
have
some
benefits,
and
at
the
very
least
should
be
researched
 so
an
answer
to
that
question
can
be
found.

Former
Seattle
police
chief,
Norm
 Stamper,
 believes
 that
 the
 momentum
 of
 public
 debate
 on
 the
 topic
 of
 marijuana
 liberalization
 has
 recently
 increased,
 and
 he
 stated
 “What
 we’ve
 seen
 in
 the
 past
 six
 months
 is
 an
 explosion
 of
 activity,
 fresh
 thinking,
 bold
 statements,
and
penetrating
questions”
while
characterizing
the
previous
20
 years
as
only
having
made
incremental
progress.191

Additional
changes
that
 are
expected
to
happen
with
the
approval
of
congress
are
the
end
to
needle
 exchange
 prohibitions
 and
 an
 increase
 in
 treatment,
 possibly
 in
 conjunction
 with
 drug
 courts.192
 
 Funding
 for
 drug
 courts
 was
 increased
 by
 250%
 in
 March,
which
represents
the
realization
of
a
campaign
promise
of
Obama,
and
 is
 consistent
 with
 a
 statement
 of
 Vice
 President
 Joe
 Biden,
 who
 said
 drug
 courts
“can
serve
as
the
light
at
the
end
of
the
tunnel,
of
a
very
long,
long
dark
 tunnel,
 for
 those
 who
 are
 stuck
 in
 the
 cycle
 of
 drug
 addiction
 and
 incarceration.”193


























































 189
Vick,
“In
Calif.,
Medical
Marijuana”
 190
Egelko,
“U.S.
to
Yield
Marijuana”
 191
Crary,
Momentum
Builds
for
Broad
Debate
on
Legalizing
Pot
 192
Fields,
“White
House
Czar”


193
Acosta
and
Keck,
“White
House
Tries
to
Combat,”


United
States
Drug
Policy


55


4.2
Medical
Marijuana
 An
 increasing,
 albeit
 controversial,
 body
 of
 scientific
 evidence
 suggests
 that
 marijuana
 should
 be
 available
 to
 patients
 afflicted
 with
 numerous
 illnesses
 including
 glaucoma,
 cancer,
 and
 AIDS.
 
 Marijuana
 has
 been
 demonstrated
 to
 be
an
effective
pain
reliever,
and
has
been
able
to
stimulate
the
appetites
of
 cancer
 and
 AIDS
 patients.
 
 During
 recent
 testimony
 in
 the
 Senate
 Health,
 Housing
 and
 Family
 Security
 Committee
 several
 people
 testified
 about
 the
 beneficial
effects
marijuana
had
had
for
their
loved
ones,
including
one
who
 stated
 her
 mother,
 a
 cancer
 sufferer,
 smoked
 marijuana
 and
 after
 “two
 minutes…and
the
violent
sickness
was
totally
gone.

An
hour
later,
Mom
was
 able
to
have
a
good
meal.

The
stomach
problems
from
the
chemo
were
totally
 gone.

It
also
helped
her
regain
a
quality
of
life
that
allowed
her
to
continue
to
 fight.”194
 
 Detractors,
 however,
 have
 pointed
 out
 some
 of
 marijuana’s
 bad
 effects,
 like
 short‐term
 memory
 loss,
 diminished
 learning
 capacity,
 and
 the
 creation
of
passive
individuals
who
lack
motivation.195 

Further,
they
contend
 that
 legalization
 increases
 use,
 which
 increases
 the
 already
 high
 associated
 social
 costs
 by
 increasing
 accidents
 and
 healthcare
 costs,
 and
 by
 decreasing
 productivity.196
 
 Clearly
 there
 are
 negative
 externalities
 born
 by
 others
 including:
 
 increased
 unemployment
 insurance
 payments,
 lower
 output,


























































 194
Andy
Birkey,
“Medical
Marijuana
Bill
Advances
in
Senate
with
Moving
Testimony,”


Minnesota
Independent
(Feb.
12,
2009
[cited
23
Jun.
2009]):
available
from
 http://minnesotaindependent.com/26340/medical‐marijuana‐bill‐advances‐in‐senate‐with‐ moving‐testimony
 195
Collins,
Holland’s
Half­Baked
Drug
Experiment,
87.
 196
Kevin
A.
Sabet,
“The
Price
of
Legalizing
Pot
is
too
High,”
Los
Angeles
Times
(Jun.
7,
2009
 [cited
23
Jun.
2009]):
available
from
http://www.latimes.com/news/la‐oe‐sabet7‐ 2009jun07,0,5717495.story?track=rss


Developing
a
Rational
Framework


56


lower
 returns
 on
 investments
 in
 human
 capital,
 and
 increased
 turnover.197

 While
 there
 certainly
 are
 negative
 effects
 associated
 with
 the
 use
 of
 marijuana,
 the
 positive
 benefits
 of
 using
 marijuana
 as
 a
 part
 of
 certain
 treatment
regimes
certainly
seems
to
warrant
a
greater
commitment
on
the
 part
of
policy
makers
to
fund
research
in
this
area,
or
at
least
to
not
prohibit
 it,
 so
 informed
decisions
 can
be
properly
 made.

 Those
 negative
 effects
may
 be
 especially
 hazardous
 for
 adolescent
 users
 and
 they
 include
 genetic
 and
 reproductive
 effects,
 and
 potential
 cancer
 effects.198
 
 It
 seems
 to
 be
 a
 consensus
 opinion
 that
 marijuana
 potency
 has
 increased
 over
 the
 last
 three
 decades,
which
is
consistent
with
the
effects
of
prohibition,
so
it
is
likely
that
 the
considerations
of
policy
makers
have
also
changed
during
this
period,
and
 any
 analysis
 of
 the
 medical
 efficacy
 of
 marijuana,
 or
 other
 currently
 illicit
 drugs
 for
 that
 matter,
 should
 therefore
 be
 reconsidered
 or
 evaluated
 on
 a
 periodic
basis.
 


After
the
recent
legalization
of
medical
marijuana
in
Oregon,
President


Obama
 was
 asked
 if
 he
 would
 “stop
 the
 DEA’s
 raids
 on
 Oregon
 medical
 marijuana
 growers”
 and
 he
 responded
 “I
 would
 because
 our
 federal
 agents
 have
 better
 things
 to
 do,
 like
 catching
 criminals
 and
 preventing
 terrorism.

 The
 way
 I
 want
 to
 approach
 the
 issue
 of
 medical
 marijuana
 is
 to
 base
 it
 on
 science,
 and
 if
 there
 is
 sound
 science
 that
 supports
 the
 use
 of
 medical
 marijuana
 and
 if
 it
 is
 controlled
 and
 prescribed
 in
 the
 way
 that
 other
 medicine
 is
 prescribed,
 then
 it’s
 something
 that
 I
 think
 we
 should
 























































 197
Jeff
DeSimone,
“Illegal
Drug
Use
and
Employment,”
Journal
of
Labor
Economics
20,
no.
4


(2002):
970.
 198
Edward
A.
Jacobs,
“Marijuana
and
Adolescents,”
The
Institute
on
Global
Drug
Policy
[cited
 on
25
Jun.
2009]:
available
from
http://www.globaldrugpolicy.org/1/1/3.php


United
States
Drug
Policy


57


consider.”199
 
 This
 statement
 reflects
 the
 opinion
 of
 a
 majority
 of
 citizens
 as
 reported
 by
 a
 Zogby
 poll
 that
 found
 that
 72%
 of
 Americans
 support
 ending
 these
 DEA
 raids
 on
 medical
 marijuana
 facilities.200
 
 This
 is
 an
 interesting
 statement
for
several
reasons:

First,
it
recognizes
that
there
is
an
opportunity
 cost
 associated
 with
 fighting
 the
 drug
 war,
 namely
 that
 enforcement
 diverts
 resources
away
from
fighting
crimes
with
actual
victims;
second,
he
claims
to
 want
policies
based
on
science,
though
it
is
too
soon
to
evaluate
his
sincerity;
 and
 finally,
 the
 statement
 makes
 clear
 that
 President
 Obama
 would
 support
 having
the
same
controls
on
marijuana
as
exist
on
other
prescription
drugs.

 All
 three
 points
 indicate
 that
 Obama
 is
 far
 more
 receptive
 to
 the
 idea
 of
 liberalization
of
drug
policy
than
any
president
in
the
last
30
years,
and
this
is
 one
 reason
 that
 there
 is
 a
 real
 opportunity
 for
 reform
 during
 Obama’s
 presidency.
 


The
 first
 state
 to
 adopt
 a
 medical
 marijuana
 policy
 was
 California


through
the
Compassionate
Use
Act
of
1996,
the
purpose
of
which
was
to:
 To
 ensure
 that
 seriously
 ill
 Californians
 have
 the
 right
 to
 obtain
 and
 use
 marijuana
 for
 medical
 purposes
 where
 the
 medical
 use
 is
 deemed
 appropriate
 and
 has
 been
 recommended
 by
 a
 physician
 who
 has
 determined
 that
 the
 person's
 health
 would
 benefit
from
the
use
of
marijuana
in
the
treatment
of
cancer,
anorexia,
AIDS,
chronic
 pain,
 spasticity,
 glaucoma,
 arthritis,
 migraine,
 or
 any
 other
 illness
 for
 which
 marijuana
 provides
 relief;
 and
 to
 ensure
 that
 patients
 and
 their
 primary
 caregivers


























































 199
Robert
L.
DuPont,
“Barack
Obama
on
Medical
Marijuana,”
The
Institute
on
Global
Drug


Policy
[cited
25
Jun.
2009]:
available
from
 http://www.globaldrugpolicy.org/3/1/commentary.php
 200
Anonymous,
“72%
Want
Obama
to
End
DEA
Raids,”
Obamawerds
(Feb
4,
2009
[cited
23
 Jun.
2009])
available
from
 http://obamawerds.com/articles/viewArticle/72_want_Obama_to_end_DEA_raids


Developing
a
Rational
Framework


58


who
obtain
and
use
marijuana
for
medical
purposes
upon
the
recommendation
of
a
 physician
are
not
subject
to
criminal
prosecution
or
sanction."201


Since
 the
 passage
 of
 this
 law
 the
 use
 of
 medical
 marijuana
 to
 treat
 various
 conditions
 has
 increased;
 the
 most
 common
 illnesses
 treated
 with
 medical
 marijuana
 are:
 
 40%
 chronic
 pain,
 22%
 AIDS
 related,
 15%
 mood
 disorders,
 and
23%
for
all
other
categories.202
 In
California
the
use
of
marijuana
as
a
medicine
has
normalized
and
is
 no
 longer
 controversial
 within
 the
 state.203
 
 Due
 to
 a
 recent
 Supreme
 Court
 ruling,
the
last
bastions
of
opposition
against
the
medical
marijuana
law’s
full
 implementation
have
been
defeated
and
dispensaries
will
soon
be
opening
in
 these
 locations.
 
 The
 1996
 law
 requires
 local
 governments
 to
 issue
 medical
 marijuana
identification
cards,
which
more
conservative
places
like
San
Diego
 have
 long
 opposed,
 that
 are
 designed
 to
 identify
 legal
 customers
 in
 the
 dispensaries
and
to
show
to
police
to
prevent
arrest.204

San
Diego
filed
suit
in
 2006
 on
 the
 grounds
 that
 the
 federal
 prohibition
 of
 marijuana
 supersedes
 state
law,
and
therefore
there
is
no
legal
requirement
for
them
to
implement
 the
 law.205
 
 San
 Diego
 lost
 the
 case
 and
 the
 appeal,
 so
 the
 city
 government
 appealed
to
the
U.S.
Supreme
Court,
which
declined
to
hear
the
case.206

This
 means
 that
 the
 ruling
 of
 the
 lower
 court
 stands
 and
 they
 must
 then
 























































 201
Anonymous,
“Medical
Marijuana,”
The
Medical
Board
of
California
(May
7,
2004
[cited
10


Jul.
2009]):
available
from
http://www.medbd.ca.gov/medical_marijuana.html
 202
Anonymous,
“California
Medical
Marijuana
Information,”
U.S.
Drug
Enforcement
Agency
 [cited
10
Jul.
2009]:
available
from
http://www.medbd.ca.gov/medical_marijuana.html
 203
Vick,
“In
Calif.,
Medical
Marijuana”
 204
Ryan
Grim,
“Supreme
Court
Hands
Medical
Marijuana
Major
Victory,”
The
Huffington
Post
 (May
18,
2009
[cited
24
Jun.
2009]):
 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/05/18/supreme‐court‐hands‐medic_n_204681.html
 205
Grim,
Supreme
Court
Hands
Medical
Marijuana
Major
Victory
 206
Grim,
Supreme
Court
Hands
Medical
Marijuana
Major
Victory


United
States
Drug
Policy


59


implement
the
medical
marijuana
identification
card
program.

Interestingly,
 since
 the
 announcement
 of
 Attorney
 General
 Eric
 Holder
 on
 February
 26,
 2009,
 new
 applications
 for
 retail
 locations
 have
 ballooned
 in
 Los
 Angeles.

 California
is
also
at
the
forefront
of
the
treatment
approach
for
dealing
with
 convicted
 offenders.
 
 In
 2000,
 California
 passed
 Proposition
 36,
 which
 mandated
that
convicted
adult
drug
offenders
be
offered
treatment
instead
of
 incarceration,
 over
 the
 objections
 of
 the
 law
 enforcement
 and
 other
 stakeholders.207

The
importance
of
California
in
this
debate
is
that
it
serves
 as
 a
 case
 study,
 and
 allows
 the
 country
 to
 observe
 the
 developments
 there.

 Citizens
can
see
that
the
state
is
not
rapidly
deteriorating
and
that
criminality
 is
 not
 increasing
 due
 to
 the
 medicalization
 of
 marijuana,
 which
 in
 effect
 can
 be
acquired
by
anyone
who
tells
his
doctor
that
he
thinks
it
would
benefit
him
 somehow.


4.3
Foreign
Impact
of
Drug
Prohibition:

Current
Developments
in
 Mexico
 Americans
 have
 watched
 in
 horror
 as
 the
 security
 situation
 in
 Mexico
 has
 rapidly
declined
since
Mexican
President
Felipe
Calderon
launched
an
all
out
 offensive
against
traffickers
in
2006,
which
has
cost
an
estimated
$6.4
billion
 and
 has
 involved
 45,000
 soldiers.208
 
 Since
 then,
 nearly
 11,000
 lives
 have
 been
 lost
 as
 the
 government
 fights
 the
 cartels
 to
 reacquire
 control
 of
 the
 country:
 
 this
 includes
 over
 6,000
 deaths
 in
 2008,
 and
 over
 1,000
deaths
 so
 























































 207
Dorie
Klein,
“Incorporating
a
Public
Health
Approach
in
Drug
Law:

Lessons
from
Local


Expansion
of
Treatment
Capacity
and
Access
under
California’s
Proposition
36,”
The
Milbank
 Quarterly
82,
no.
4
(2004):
723.
 208
Julie
Watson
“It’s
Police
vs.
Police
in
Mexican
Drug
War,”
The
Star
(Jun.
10,
2009
{cited
24
 Jun.
2009]):
available
from
http://www.thestar.com/news/world/article/648303


Developing
a
Rational
Framework


60


far
 in
 2009.209
 
 Violence
 is
 so
 bad
 in
 the
 north
 of
 Mexico
 that
 the
 U.S.
 state
 department
has
issued
travel
warnings
including
a
warning
to
students
that
 they
 should
 not
 travel
 to
 Mexico
 during
 spring
 break.
 
 Within
 Mexico
 the
 situation
is
far
more
violent
in
the
north,
with
60%
of
drug‐related
murders
 occurring
 in
 the
 northern
 states
 of
 Chihuahua,
 Baja
 California,
 Sinaloa,
 and
 Durango.210
 
 At
 the
 end
 of
 the
 Bush
 administration,
 Secretary
 of
 Homeland
 Security,
 Michael
 Chertoff,
 spoke
 about
 military
 plans
 that
 would
 provide
 a
 response
crossing
Mexico’s
border
in
the
event
that
the
violence
spilled
into
 the
 United
 States
 proper.
 
 Within
 the
 United
 States
 the
 administration
 will
 spend
 $184
 million
 to
 hire
 an
 additional
 360
 security
 personnel
 to
 bolster
 border
areas
to
increase
the
effectiveness
of
the
border
checks.211

The
United
 States
is
also
cooperating
with
Mexican
authorities
by
helping
them
conduct
 raids
 designed
 to
 capture
 cartel
 members
 and
 corrupt
 police,
 and
 by
 providing
 monetary
 assistance
 and
 military
 hardware
 to
 increase
 the
 effectiveness
 of
 the
 Mexican
 anti‐cartel
 strategy.212
 
 The
 Obama
 administration
has
pledged
$725
million
to
modernize
border
areas,
and
will
 pay
an
additional
$80
million
to
outfit
the
Mexican
forces
engaged
against
the
 cartels.213
 
 At
 the
 same
 time
 Mexican
 cartels
 have
 begun
 to
 plant
 marijuana
 crops
within
the
United
States,
often
in
state
and
federal
parks,
to
avoid
the
 























































 209
Tim
Rutten,
“The
War
We
Gave
Mexico,”
Los
Angeles
Times
(Feb.
28,
2009
[cited
23
Jun.
 2009])
available
from
http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/sunday/commentary/la‐oe‐ rutten28‐2009feb28,0,2564151.column
 210
Mary
Anastasia
O'Grady,
“A
Stimulus
Plan
for
Mexican
Gangsters,”
The
Wall
Street
Journal
 (Mar.
2,
2009
[cited
23
Jun.
2009]):
available
from
 http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123595140575504953.html
 211
Arshad
Mohammed,
“U.S.
to
Blame
for
Much
of
Mexico
Violence:

Clinton,”
Reuters
(Mar.
 25,
2009
[cited
24
Jun.
2009]):
available
from
 http://www.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSTRE52O5RF20090325?feedType=R%20SS& feedName=topNews&rpc=22&sp=true.
 212
Emilio
San
Pedro,
“U.S.
Ready
to
Aid
Mexico
Drug
Fight,”
BBC
(Mar.
2,
2009
[cited
23
Jun.
 2009]):
available
from
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7918101.stm
 213
Mohammed,
U.S.
to
Blame
for
Much
of
Mexico
Violence:

Clinton


United
States
Drug
Policy


61


need
to
smuggle
the
product
across
the
border;
in
California
alone
2.9
million
 plants
 were
 uprooted
 by
 the
 end
 of
 last
 year.214
 
 This
 indicates
 that,
 not
 unexpectedly,
 the
 cartels
 are
 responding
 to
 changing
 enforcement
 patterns
 and
are
adapting
their
operations
to
compensate
for
them.
 As
 Mexico
 and
 the
 United
 States
 have
 ratcheted
 up
 their
 response
 to
 the
 cartels
 and
 traffickers,
 so
 have
 the
 cartels
 responded
 with
 increased
 violence
and
increased
bribes,
which
is
one
remarkable
effect
of
prohibition
 enforcement
that
was
discussed
in
the
first
section.215

One
response,
which
 has
 drawn
 the
 ire
 of
 2nd
 Amendment
 advocates,
 suggested
 by
 Attorney
 General
Eric
Holder,
should
be
the
restoration
of
prohibitions
against
assault
 weapons
in
the
United
States.216

The
logic
of
this
move
would
be
to
eliminate
 these
 weapons
 in
 the
 United
 States
 to
 prevent
 their
 illegal
 exportation
 into
 Mexico;
 a
 trend
 the
 administration
 insists
 is
 large
 and
 growing.217
 
 In
 her
 recent
visit
to
Mexico
City,
Secretary
of
State
Hillary
Rodham
Clinton
said
the
 following:

“Our
insatiable
demand
for
illegal
drugs
fuels
the
drug
trade.

Our
 inability
to
prevent
weapons
from
being
illegally
smuggled
across
the
border
 to
 arm
 these
 criminals
 causes
 the
 death
 of
 police
 officers,
 soldier
 and
 civilians.”218
 
 The
 argument
 that
 about
 90%
 of
 all
 guns
 recovered
 in
 Mexico
 originate
 in
 the
United
States
has
been
increasingly
questioned.

Apparently
 the
 figure
 accounts
 for
 only
 the
 proportion
 of
 guns
 that
 Mexico
 submits
 for
 























































 214
Solomon
Moore,
“Tougher
Border
Can’t
Stop
Mexican
Marijuana
Cartels,”
New
York
Times


(Feb.
1,
2009
[cited
23
Jun.
2009]):
available
from
 http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/02/us/02pot.html?ex=1391317200&en=bd77410a2ec4 8dbd&ei=5124&partner=digg&exprod=digg
 215
Rutten,
The
War
We
Gave
Mexico
 216
Rutten,
The
War
We
Gave
Mexico
 217
Mohammed,
U.S.
to
Blame
for
Much
of
Mexico
Violence:

Clinton
 218
Mohammed,
U.S.
to
Blame
for
Much
of
Mexico
Violence:

Clinton


Developing
a
Rational
Framework


62


tracing,
and
Mexico
apparently
only
submits
those
guns
that
it
suspects
are
of
 U.S.
origin.219
 The
 increased
 violence
 has
 also
 caught
 the
 attention
 of
 the
 state
 governments
bordering
Mexico.

The
Democratic
Attorney
General
of
Arizona,
 Terry
 Goddard,
 recently
 indicated
 that
 legalization
 should
 be
 part
 of
 the
 debate
 concerning
 how
 to
 control
 violence
 and
 prevent
 it
 from
 crossing
 the
 border.220

When
asked
about
his
opinion
on
the
legalization
issue,
Attorney
 General
Goddard
said:


 “We
 need
 to
 find
 a
 better
 way
 to
 handle
 …
 right
 now
 the
 item
 that’s
 fueling
 the
 violent
 cartels,
 the
 murders
 in
 Mexico,
 the
 cartel
 wars
 that
 are
 going
 on
 right
 now
 that
 have
 resulted
 in
 over
 1,000
 deaths
 this
 year,
 I
 think
 we
 need
 to
 take
 a
 very
 aggressive
stand
on
that
and
marijuana
is
the
number
one
producer
for
the
cartels.

 Sixty
to
seventy
percent
of
their
gross
profits
come
from
marijuana.

So,
I
think
we
 need
to
look
very
hard
at
something
we
haven’t
looked
at
for
years.”221


Former
Bush
Administration
Drug
Czar
Barry
McCaffrey
recently
stated
that
 “Mexico
is
on
the
edge
of
the
abyss”
of
becoming
“a
narco‐state”
referring
to
 the
increasing
violence
in
the
country.222
 The
 Mexican
 government
 also
 estimates
 that
 the
 majority
 of
 drug
 cartel
revenue
is
raised
through
the
marijuana
trade
so
policies
that
eliminate
 or
 greatly
 reduce
 the
 money
 they
 can
 raise
 from
 marijuana
 would
 have
 a
 























































 219
Stossel,
Prohibition
Spawns
Drug
Violence
 220
David
Edwards
and
Stephen
C.
Webster,
“Arizona
AG:

Pot
Legalization
Could
Prevent


Border
Violence,”
The
Raw
Story
(Feb.
27,
2009
[cited
23
Jun.
2009]):
available
from
 http://rawstory.com/news/2008/Arizona_AG_Pot_legalization_could_prevent_0227.html
 221
Edwards
and
Webster,
Arizona
AG:

Pot
Legalization
Could
Prevent
Border
Violence
 222
Anonymous,
“Editorial:

Front
Line:

Mexico,”
The
Philadelphia
Inquirer
(Mar.
1,
2009
 [cited
23
Jun.
2009]):
available
from
 http://www.philly.com/inquirer/currents/20090301_Editorial__Front_Line__Mexico.html?re ferrer=digg.


United
States
Drug
Policy


63


strong
 effect
 on
 cartels
 as
 they
 are
 currently
 organized.223
 The
 main
 goal
 according
 to
 a
 host
 of
 U.S.
 officials
 should
 be
 to
 prevent
 the
 north
 Mexican
 violence
from
spreading
into
the
southern
United
States.

Former
Colombian
 president
César
Gaviria,
who
was
an
important
figure
in
the
drug
war
in
the
 1990s,
recently
stated,
“The
fight
against
drug
cartels
is
unavoidable.

If
you
 don’t
do
it,
they
become
too
powerful
and
may
even
pose
a
military
threat,
as
 we
saw
in
Colombia.

But
that
does
not
mean
that
such
efforts
reduce
the
flow
 of
 drugs.”224
 
 In
 fact,
 the
 Latin
 American
 Commission
 on
 Drugs
 and
 Democracy,
 which
 Gaviria
 and
 a
 number
 of
 other
 former
 Latin
 American
 presidents
 founded
 to
 create
 a
 forum
 to
 discuss
 international
 drug
 policy,
 advocates
 the
 decriminalization
 of
 all
 drugs,
 not
 just
 soft‐drugs,
 as
 the
 best
 method
 to
 increase
 international
 security
 and
 diminish
 the
 influence
 of
 the
 cartels.225
 
 The
 commission
 concedes
 that
 international
 enforcement
 efforts
 can
be
effective
in
restoring
order
to
a
country
and
expanding
the
influence
of
 its
 democratically
 elected
 government,
 however,
 the
 commission
 believes
 that
to
achieve
long‐term
stability
and
security,
demand
in
the
United
States,
 the
world’s
largest
drug
market,
must
be
reduced
or
eliminated,
and
the
most
 effective
way
to
achieve
that
goal
is
to
decriminalize
drugs.226

Beyond
these
 recommendations,
the
commission
has
advocated
a
harm
reduction
approach
 that
focuses
on
treatment
as
a
way
to
reduce
crime
and
dependency:

former
 president
 Gaviria
 recently
 stated
 that
 “if
 you
 don’t
 help
 those
 who
 are
 























































 223
O'Grady,
A
Stimulus
Plan
for
Mexican
Gangsters
 224
Constantino
Diaz‐Duran,
“America
Should
Decriminalize
Drugs,”
The
Daily
Beast
(Apr.
19,


2009
[cited
23
Jun.
2009]):
available
from
http://www.thedailybeast.com/blogs‐and‐ stories/2009‐04‐19/drug‐war‐lessons‐from‐colombia/
 225
Diaz‐Duran,
America
Should
Decriminalize
Drugs
 226
Diaz‐Duran,
America
Should
Decriminalize
Drugs


Developing
a
Rational
Framework


64


dependent,
you
are
half
way
there
because
they
are
going
to
commit
crime
to
 get
 money
 and
 pay
 for
 the
 drug.”227
 
 The
 focus
 on
 the
 demand‐side
 is
 consistent
 with
 the
 rhetoric
 of
 the
 new
 Obama
 administration,
 but
 the
 idea
 that
 legalization
 can
 be
 used
 to
 undercut
 the
 drug
 cartels
 reflects
 an
 option
 that
is
not
yet
on
the
table
according
to
Secretary
of
Homeland
Security,
Janet
 Napolitano.228


5.
Potential
Policy
Frameworks
 Thus
 far
 we
 have
 considered
 a
 wide
 variety
 perspectives
 relevant
 to
 the
 discussion
 about
 U.S.
 drug
 policy.
 
 To
 review,
 we
 have
 considered
 the
 economic
effects
of
prohibition
in
general;
we
have
reviewed
the
drug
policy
 since
circa
1979;
we
have
seen
how
the
drug
policies
of
Holland
and
Portugal
 differ
from
the
U.S.
policy
and
why
the
differences
matter;
and
finally
we
have
 learned
in
what
ways
Obama
and
his
administration
differ,
and
might
further
 differ,
from
the
administrations
of
the
last
30
years.

While
it
is
interesting
to
 consider
 trends
 and
 past
 policies,
 any
 document
 without
 some
 form
 of
 recommendation
 is
 of
 questionable
 usefulness.
 
 In
 order
 to
 achieve
 this
 objective,
 a
 discussion
 of
 3
 general
 policy
 frameworks,
 or
 perspectives,
 will
 be
discussed
that
will
give
the
reader
a
general
sense
of
what
is
possible.

The
 three
 policy
 options
 that
 will
 be
 considered
 are,
 in
 the
 order
 of
 ascending
 likelihood:

the
libertarian
model
or
legalization,
the
decriminalization
model,
 and
finally
the
depenalization
model.

The
reader
should
keep
in
mind
that
a
 























































 227
Anonymous,
“Ex‐presidents
of
Latin
America
Urge
Legal
Marijuana,”
CNN
(Feb.
11,
2009


[23
Feb.
2009]):
available
from
 http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/americas/02/11/brazil.marijuana/index.html
 228
Acosta
and
Keck,
“White
House
Tries
to
Combat”


United
States
Drug
Policy


65


certain
 generality
 will
 be
 maintained
 in
 this
 section,
 while
 the
 final
 recommendation
will
be
more
specific.
 


Before
beginning
with
the
discussion
of
policy
options
it
is
important


at
this
point
to
discuss
the
various
stakeholders
that
are
likely
to
take
part
in
 any
 deliberative
 process
 regarding
 drug
 policy,
 and
 who
 are
 perhaps
 powerful
 enough
 to
 block
 certain
 reforms
 or
 changes
 from
 happening.
 
 The
 first
 group
 to
 consider
 is
 the
 liberalization
 advocates.
 
 This
 group
 at
 a
 minimum
 supports
 medical
 marijuana,
 and
 at
 the
 maximum
 supports
 a
 complete
decriminalization
or
legalization
of
drugs.

It
contains
a
wide
variety
 of
groups
including:

left
civil
libertarians,
right
free‐marketeers,
libertarians,
 harm
reduction
advocates
within
the
government,
and
certain
compassionate
 care
 advocates.
 
 This
 group
 has
 been
 growing
 lately
 as
 has
 been
 discussed,
 but
 the
 constituent
 groups
 are
 dispersed
 across
 the
 political
 spectrum.
 
 The
 next
group
to
be
discussed
is
the
pharmacological
group.

This
group
enjoys
 its
 monopoly
 on
 drug
 creation
 and
 distribution,
 and
 will
 advocate
 against
 anything
 that
 could
 threaten
 the
 status
 quo
 in
 that
 area,
 including
 medical
 marijuana.
 
 This
 group
 is
 powerful
 and
 employs
 many
 lobbyists.
 
 The
 entrenched
 supporters
 of
 the
 present
 policy
 within
 government
 constitute
 the
next
group.

The
group
includes
members
of
the
20
or
more
agencies
that
 receive
funding
to
combat
the
drug
trade
and
are
coordinated
by
the
ONDCP;
 the
 CIA,
 which
 may
 be
 involved
 in
 clandestine
 operations
 that
 even
 directly
 support
the
drug
trade;
police
organizations
around
the
country
that
receive
 funding
and
enjoy
the
militarization
of
their
forces
and
the
increased
power
 the
 present
 policy
 gives
 them;
 and
 members
 of
 the
 federal,
 state,
 and
 local


Developing
a
Rational
Framework


66


prison
 systems,
 which
 derive
 funding
 based
 on
 their
 number
 of
 prisoners,
 and
 which
 define
 success
 in
 terms
 of
 funding
 increases.
 
 Another
 powerful
 group
against
any
liberalization
of
drug
policy
is
the
moralist
Christian
right,
 which
 believes
 that
 drugs
 are
 de
 facto
 immoral
 and
 should
 be
 prohibited
 to
 prevent
 people
 from
 engaging
 in
 immorality.
 
 This
 group
 is
 private,
 well
 funded,
and
is
politically
allied
with
the
Republican
Party
where
it
constitutes
 a
significant
wing
of
the
party.

Among
the
relevant
groups
this
group
is
most
 likely
 to
 be
 against
 liberalization
 on
 a
 fundamentalist
 level,
 as
 they
 believe
 that
it
is
their
duty
to
inspire
or
force
moral
behavior
on
the
rest
of
society.

 Among
 the
 various
 stakeholders
 there
 are
 differences;
 some
 are
 dispersed
 across
 the
 political
 spectrum
 and
 some
 are
 concentrated;
 some
 represent
 narrow
interests
and
some
represent
broad
interests;
and
some
are
likely
to
 be
 marginalized
 and
 some
 are
 powerful
 enough
 to
 influence
 the
 policy
 process
significantly.

What
is
clear
is
that
one
must
always
be
mindful
of
the
 pressure
groups
that
could
potentially
derail
a
reform,
and
that
will
certainly
 fight
against
each
other
in
an
attempt
to
monopolize
the
ability
to
frame
the
 debate
and
contribute
to
agenda
setting.


5.1
Policy
Framework
Option:

Legalization
 Legalization
is
the
most
radical
of
the
policy
options
discussed
in
this
paper,
 and
 also
 the
 least
 likely
 to
 ever
 be
 implemented
 in
 the
 United
 States.
 
 That
 being
 said
 this
 author
 believes
 it
 is
 worth
 considering
 as
 an
 ideal
 type
 that
 can
be
compared
to
the
other
‘hybrid’
policy
reform
possibilities
that
will
be
 subsequently
 considered.
 
 Legalization
 entails
 the
 complete
 elimination
 of
 prohibitions
 against
 a
 certain
 substance
 or
 substances.
 
 For
 example
 one


United
States
Drug
Policy


67


could
 consider
 legalizing
 a
 certain
 drug,
 marijuana
 for
 instance,
 or
 all
 currently
illicit
drugs.

This
policy
is
likely
to
have
the
opposition
of
most
of
 the
 aforementioned
 stakeholder
 groups,
 but
 there
 are
 many
 benefits
 of
 a
 legalization
policy,
even
from
the
perspectives
of
the
various
opponents
of
the
 policy.


 


From
 a
 fiscal
 perspective
 legalization
 would
 be
 the
 most
 beneficial


policy
 because
 the
 widest
 variety
 of
 drugs
 would
 be
 available
 to
 the
 public
 and
could
therefore
be
taxed
and
regulated.

The
tax
dollars
used
to
fund
the
 enforcement
of
prohibition
would
be
saved
and
revenue
could
be
raised
from
 a
 sin
 tax
 on
 these
 mind‐altering
 substances,
 assuming
 the
 tax
 remains
 reasonable
 enough
 to
 prevent
 the
 emergence
 of
 a
 black
 market.
 
 The
 black
 market
in
this
case
would
either
be
drastically
reduced
or
totally
eliminated,
 which
benefits
the
whole
society.

One
could
use
the
current
examples
of
the
 tobacco
or
alcohol
markets
as
evidence
of
the
lack
of
black
markets;
assuming
 taxes
 remained
 reasonable
 the
 black
 market
 would
 disappear
 in
 all
 cases
 perhaps
with
the
exception
of
those
seeking
particularly
potent
supplies
of
a
 given
drug.

On
average
the
potency
of
drugs
would
remain
constant
or
slowly
 fall
 over
 time
 due
 to
 regulatory
 controls,
 and
 due
 to
 the
 elimination
 of
 the
 trend
of
increasing
potency
under
a
prohibitionary
regime
as
discussed
above
 as
a
general
effect
of
prohibition.

Again,
evidence
of
this
can
be
found
in
the
 historical
analysis
of
what
happened
in
the
period
of
Alcohol
Prohibition.


 


The
 elimination
 of
 the
 black
 market
 would
 be
 perhaps
 the
 most


important
 effect
 of
 drug
 legalization,
 which
 would
 have
 national
 and
 international
 implications.
 
 The
 first
 effect
 would
 be
 the
 elimination
 of
 the


Developing
a
Rational
Framework


68


negative
 external
 effects
 on
 neighboring
 countries.
 
 This
 would
 especially
 benefit
 Mexico,
 which
 is
 currently
 in
 a
 life‐or‐death
 struggle
 against
 drug
 cartels,
and
the
Andean
nations,
which
have
economies
heavily
reliant
on
the
 production
 of
 coca
 products.
 
 In
 one
 way
 legalization
 in
 the
 U.S.
 would
 hurt
 local
 farmers
 in
 some
 areas
 of
 these
 countries
 by
 reducing
 the
 price
 they
 could
 get
 for
 their
 crops,
 but
 legalization
 would
 also
 greatly
 improve
 the
 security
 of
 these
 countries
 by
 integrating
 production
 and
 transport
 of
 these
 substances
 into
 the
 existing
 legal
 framework.
 
 The
 black
 market
 within
 the
 U.S.
 would
 also
 be
 destroyed
 by
 legalization,
 which
 would
 have
 domestic
 security
implications
as
well.

The
current
illegal
distribution
network
would
 be
eliminated,
and
the
inner‐city
gangs
would
also
have
difficulty
maintaining
 themselves.
 
 It
 is
 possible
 that
 they
 could
 earn
 enough
 revenue
 to
 stay
 in
 existence
from
illegal
gambling
or
prostitution,
but
this
possibility
only
exists
 because
of
other
prohibitions
that
could
be
eliminated
as
well.

The
incentives
 to
commit
violence
would
disappear
as
the
entirety
of
the
drug
trade
would
 now
 fall
 under
 the
 jurisdiction
 of
 the
 legal
 system
 and
 contracts
 would
 be
 able
 to
 be
 enforced
 without
 sending
 in
 strongmen.
 
 Those
 with
 business
 acumen
would
be
attracted
to
the
market
rather
than
those
willing
to
commit
 violence
 to
 expand
 or
 maintain
 their
 distribution
 monopolies
 on
 certain
 territories.
 


The
final
effect
worth
mentioning
in
this
section
is
the
effect
on
public


health.
 
 Clearly
 drug
 use
 in
 a
 legalized
 regime
 would
 increase,
 especially
 initially,
and
possibly
fall
over
a
period
of
decades
to
reach
a
new
equilibrium.

 That
being
said
more
options
would
be
available
for
drug
users
to
receive
the


United
States
Drug
Policy


69


treatment
 they
 need
 because
 the
 fear
 of
 incarceration
 inherent
 in
 a
 prohibitionary
regime
would
be
eliminated.

Due
to
legalization
drug
quality
 would
improve
and
purity
would
stabilize,
as
people
would
be
able
to
rely
on
 the
 reputation
 building
 features
 of
 legal
 market
 transactions
 to
 regulate
 distributers
 who
 are
 looking
 to
 maintain
 their
 customers
 by
 supplying
 a
 consistent
product.

This
product
reliability
would
improve
public
health
over
 time.
 
 The
 effect
 of
 legalization
 on
 the
 spread
 of
 communicable,
 especially
 sexually
transmitted,
diseases
would
be
positive
as
addicts
would
be
able
to
 carry
 sterile
 needles
 without
 the
 fear
 of
 being
 incarcerated
 for
 drug
 paraphernalia
charges.

Additionally,
the
need
for
high‐risk
shooting
galleries
 would
be
reduced,
as
the
criminality
of
their
activities
would
be
eliminated.


5.2
Policy
Framework
Option:

Decriminalization
 Decriminalization
 is
 an
 option
 best
 exemplified
 by
 the
 Portuguese
 implementation
 discussed
 in
 section
 3.2.
 
 Under
 a
 decriminalization
 regime
 drug
possession
is
removed
from
the
realm
of
criminal
law
and
becomes
an
 administrative
 offense.
 
 One
 major
 advantage
 of
 such
 a
 system
 is
 that
 it
 removes
 the
 social
 stigma
 associated
 with
 drug
 use
 by
 removing
 criminal
 citations
 from
 the
 public
 records
 of
 individual
 users.
 
 The
 destigmatization
 caused
by
such
a
reform
is
likely
to
result
in
increased
demand
for
treatment
 because
 the
 fear
 of
 arrest
 is
 eliminated
 by
 the
 reform.
 
 In
 a
 decriminalized
 regime
 the
 state
 can
 still
 incentivize
 users
 to
 get
 treatment
 through
 dissuasion
 committees,
 or
 similar
 constructions,
 that
 can
 be
 empowered
 to
 waive
 fines
 if
 the
 offender
 agrees
 to
 attend
 a
 drug
 treatment
 program.

 Additionally,
through
the
adoption
of
this
kind
of
policy
the
government
at
all


Developing
a
Rational
Framework


70


levels
 can
 save
 money
 on
 enforcement,
 which
 can
 be
 redistributed
 to
 other
 areas
 like
 treatment
 or
 simply
 be
 remitted
 to
 the
 taxpayers,
 and
 police
 can
 again
focus
on
crimes
that
cause
damage
to
person
or
property.
 


One
 advantage
 of
 decriminalization
 over
 legalizations
 is
 that
 through


its
 adoption
 the
 country
 can
 remain
 within
 the
 framework
 of
 international
 agreements
 like
 the
 1971
 Convention
 on
 Psychotropic
 Substances
 and
 the
 1988
 United
 Nations
 Convention
 against
 Illicit
 Traffic
 in
 Narcotic
 Drugs
 and
 Psychotropic
Substances,
which
only
require
possession
of
drugs
for
personal
 use
 to
 be
 prohibited;
 the
 classification
 of
 the
 offense
 as
 an
 administrative
 offense
rather
than
a
criminal
offense
satisfies
the
obligations
required
under
 international
 law.
 
 Possession
 with
 intent
 to
 distribute,
 drug
 trafficking,
 and
 providing
 drugs
 to
 children
 and
 mentally
 ill
 remain
 criminal
 acts
 in
 a
 decriminalization
regime,
which
also
satisfies
international
obligations.
 


A
 disadvantage
 of
 decriminalization
 compared
 to
 legalization
 is
 that


the
 effect
 on
 the
 international
 and
 domestic
 black
 markets
 is
 uncertain.
 
 In
 Portugal
 the
 total
 consumption
 of
 drugs
 across
 all
 demographic
 groups
 has
 fallen,
 which
 would
 seem
 to
 imply
 that
 demand
 is
 down
 and
 trafficking
 should
have
diminished
as
a
result.

One
thing
that
remains
unclear
though,
is
 how
Portugal
is
being
used
now
as
a
distribution
point
for
other
countries.

It
 could
be
that
usage
is
down
but
trafficking
activities
are
up,
as
Portugal
has
 become
 an
 international
 hub
 of
 the
 drug
 trade,
 unfortunately
 no
 relevant
 information
on
this
subject
exists.


United
States
Drug
Policy


71


5.3
Policy
Framework
Option:

Depenalization
 Depenalization
 is
 a
 policy
 that
 maintains
 the
 illegality
 of
 drug
 offenses
 including
 possession
 for
 personal
 use,
 and
 responds
 to
 these
 offenses
 with
 criminal
 sanctions.
 
 However,
 possession
 for
 personal
 consumption
 would
 remain
 a
 crime
 that
 is
 punished
 only
 through
 the
 imposition
 of
 a
 fine
 and
 a
 criminal
record
indicating
the
offense.

This
policy,
while
the
least
dramatic
of
 the
three
discussed
in
this
section,
still
provides
significant
advantages
over
 the
 current
 system.
 
 The
 biggest
 of
 these
 advantages
 is
 the
 cost
 savings
 associated
with
reduced
prison
populations
and
reduced
judicial
costs.

This
 savings
could
be
reallocated
or
passed
on
to
the
taxpayer.

If
reallocated,
one
 can
 certainly
 imagine
 the
 efficacy
 of
 redistributing
 the
 funds
 to
 treatment
 programs,
 which
 have
 been
 proven
 to
 reduce
 usage
 and
 addiction
 to
 a
 far
 greater
degree
than
prison
terms.

Another
advantage
of
depenalization
that
 should
 not
 be
 discounted
 is
 that
 this
 policy
 remains
 consistent
 with
 international
obligations
designed
to
reduce
trafficking.


6.
Policy
Recommendation
 In
 the
 previous
 section
 we
 discussed
 possible
 policy
 frameworks
 for
 reforming
U.S.
drug
policy,
and
in
this
section
we
will
elaborate
by
providing
 a
 concrete
 policy
 recommendation.
 
 To
 reiterate,
 in
 the
 U.S.
 different
 policy
 levels
 influence
 the
 total
 drug
 policy
 of
 the
 country;
 these
 level
 are
 federal,
 state
and
local.

The
federal
policy,
as
presently
articulated
by
the
ONDCP,
is
 the
most
influential
as
it
serves
to
coordinate
the
policies
on
all
three
levels.

 The
 problem
 with
 this
 is
 that,
 as
 we
 have
 seen,
 the
 state
 and
 local


Developing
a
Rational
Framework


72


governments
have
been
encapsulated
within
the
failing
strategy
of
the
federal
 government,
 the
 laws
 of
 which
 supersede
 those
 of
 the
 state
 and
 local
 governments.
 
 In
 the
 past,
 as
 in
 the
 case
 of
 the
 California
 marijuana
 dispensaries,
federal
officials
have
arrested
individuals
in
violation
of
federal
 drug
laws
in
states
where
those
activities
were
legal.
 This
 policy
 has
 undermined
 one
 of
 federalism’s
 key
 advantages,
 that
 power
be
dispersed
geographically
so
that
the
various
states
or
regional
areas
 can
 serve
 as
 a
 kind
 of
 policy
 laboratory.
 
 Therefore
 one
 recommendation
 is
 the
decriminalization
of
marijuana
at
the
federal
level,
which
would
eliminate
 the
danger
of
federal
field
operatives
from
undermining
central
objectives
by
 “going
local”
and
remove
barriers
that
presently
prevent
states
from
adopting
 a
more
entrepreneurial
policy.229

Decriminalization
would
allow
the
federal
 government
 to
 raise
 revenue
 from
 individuals
 found
 to
 be
 in
 possession
 of
 marijuana,
however,
the
policy
should
allow
the
federal
enforcement
officials
 to
 impose
 these
 fines
 only
 in
 addition
 to
 other
 federal
 crime
 enforcement.

 Decriminalization
 would
 also
 allow
 states
 to
 act
 as
 policy
 laboratories
 that,
 over
 time,
 will
 be
 able
 to
 find
 policy
 approaches
 that
 work
 well,
 while
 not
 overturning
 the
 convictions
 of
 the
 more
 conservative
 states
 that
 wish
 to
 maintain
prohibition.

Americans
have
seen
California
at
the
forefront
of
drug
 policy
 since
 1996;
 altering
 federal
 policy
 would
 encourage
 other
 states
 to
 adopt
a
more
experimental
approach
to
drug
policy,
in
which
policies
can
be
 adopted,
 evaluated,
 and
 changed
 if
 found
 to
 be
 ineffective.
 
 In
 addition,
 the
 financial
costs
of
prohibition
would
shift
to
the
taxpayers
in
those
states
that
 























































 229
Andrew
B.
Whitford,
“Decentralized
Policy
Implementation,”
Political
Research
Quarterly
 60,
no.
1
(2007):
17


United
States
Drug
Policy


73


wished
 to
 maintain
 that
 policy,
 which
 would
 serve
 to
 readjust
 incentives.

 States
 would
 also
 be
 encouraged
 by
 this
 policy
 change
 to
 experiment
 with
 different
approaches
to
dealing
with
the
drug
problem
without
the
fear
that
 the
 federal
 government
 will
 overturn
 their
 laws
 whenever
 they
 feel
 it
 is
 justified.
 The
reason
for
only
recommending
marijuana
decriminalization
is
the
 unlikelihood
of
passage
of
a
federal
legalization
for
all
drugs,
which
would
be
 more
 likely
 to
 reduce
 the
 negative
 externalities
 associated
 with
 prohibition
 even
 further
 while
 allowing
 states
 to
 have
 their
 own
 policies.
 
 In
 addition,
 cannabis
should
be
targeted
because
it
is
the
world’s
top
illegal
drug
in
terms
 of
 quantity
 produced
 and
 number
 of
 users,
 and,
 in
 terms
 of
 quantity
 seized,
 between
the
United
States
and
Mexico
59%
of
the
total
cannabis
seized
comes
 from
 these
 two
 countries.230
 
 With
 any
 policy
 recommendation
 one
 must
 consider
possible
methods
for
measuring
success
or
failure.

I
recommend
a
 10‐year
trial
policy
period,
or
a
federal
law
that
would
have
a
10‐year
sunset
 provision.
 
 The
 reason
 for
 this
 is
 to
 force
 an
 evaluation
 period
 that
 would
 serve
 to
 refute
 the
 policy,
 justify
 the
 policy,
 or
 justify
 an
 expansion
 of
 the
 policy
 to
 other
 drugs
 if
 there
 was
 enough
 success
 to
 justify
 it.
 
 One
 current
 method
for
gathering
data
on
drug
use
is
through
surveys
like
the
Monitoring
 the
Future,
and
the
National
Household
Survey
on
Drug
Abuse,
which
should
 be
continued
after
the
implementation
of
the
new
policy,
which
is
likely
even
 though
 there
 are
 questions
 about
 reporting
 bias
 because
 they
 are


























































 230
Anonymous,
2008
World
Drug
Report,
102


Developing
a
Rational
Framework


74


administered
 by
 private
 organizations.231
 
 The
 ONDCP
 should
 be
 the
 organization
responsible
for
the
evaluation
of
the
policy,
which
is
required
in
 response
to
the
proposed
sunset
provision.

However,
in
order
to
ensure
that
 the
 evaluation
 is
 unbiased
 and
 not
 subject
 to
 political
 pressure,
 the
 ONDCP
 should
 be
 removed
 from
 the
 executive
 branch.
 
 Additionally,
 its
 mission
 should
 be
 changed
 from
 strong
 advocacy
 of
 the
 drug
 war
 to
 conducting
 an
 analysis
 of
 policy
 that
 apolitically
 advocates
 strategies
 that
 would
 improve
 the
 situations
 of
 all
 segments
 of
 society.
 
 As
 an
 independent
 governmental
 body
it
would
be
able
to
fulfill
this
goal;
as
an
executive
organ
it
can
not.
 The
 aforementioned
 stakeholders
 are
 likely
 to
 influence
 the
 agenda
 setting
 and
 policy
 formulation
 parts
 of
 the
 policy
 cycle
 more
 than
 the
 implementation
or
evaluation
parts;
these
groups
realize
this
and
are
likely
to
 make
 their
 stand
 during
 these
 phases.
 
 While
 the
 enforcement
 stakeholders
 are
likely
are
likely
to
oppose
the
proposed
policy,
it
is
clear
that
it
is
possible
 to
 overcome
 this
 group’s
 pressure
 as
 evidenced
 by
 the
 reform
 in
 California,
 Oregon
and
Massachusetts.

The
proposed
policy
is
unlikely
to
draw
as
much
 resistance
from
this
group
as
full
scale
liberalization,
but
their
power
to
derail
 a
 reform
 should
 not
 be
 underestimated.
 
 The
 proposal
 is
 likely
 to
 garner
 significant,
 albeit
 incomplete,
 support
 from
 liberalization
 advocated
 divided
 along
 the
 spectrum
 of
 possible
 liberalization
 reforms.
 
 To
 clarify,
 the
 proposed
policy
is
likely
to
go
too
far
to
please
some,
and
not
go
far
enough
to
 please
others,
as
it
is
a
relatively
moderate
reform
considering
liberalization
 as
 the
 point
 of
 departure.
 
 As
 this
 group
 is
 also
 politically
 dispersed
 it
 is
 























































 231
Denise
B.
Kandel,
“The
Social
Demography
of
Drug
Use,”
The
Milbank
Quarterly
69,
no.
3
 (1991):
317.


United
States
Drug
Policy


75


unlikely
that
it
will,
without
external
support,
be
able
to
significantly
engage
 in
 a
 concerted
 effort
 to
 influence
 either
 the
 agenda
 setting
 or
 policy
 formulation
phases.

The
pharmacological
stakeholder
is
well
funded
and
able
 to
influence
both
agenda
setting
and
policy
formulation,
but
its
disadvantage
 is
that
it
is
known
to
be
a
biased
lobby
group.

This
fact
could
help
to
diminish
 the
 influence
 this
 group
 has
 if
 such
 a
 large
 scale
 and
 far
 reaching
 reform
 is
 considered.

It
is
likely
to
oppose
the
proposal
due
to
the
fact
that
the
reform
 would
 introduce
 a
 modicum
 of
 competition
 against
 the
 products
 of
 this
 stakeholder.
 
 Finally,
 the
 Christian
 Right,
 or
 moralist,
 stakeholder
 group
 would
 no
 doubt
 oppose
 the
 proposal
 on
 moral
 grounds.
 
 The
 group
 represents
a
powerful
wing
of
the
Republican
Party
that
is
able
to
influence
 the
platform
of
that
party.

Its
influence
may
be
somewhat
confounded
by
the
 free
market
proponents
within
the
same
party,
but
the
group
still
represents
 a
 threat
 to
 the
 proposed
 policy.
 
 At
 present
 count
 we
 have
 listed
 several
 stakeholders
who
would
oppose
the
policy
proposal,
and
only
one
politically
 dispersed
 group
 that
 would
 support
 it.
 
 It
 is
 evident
 that
 in
 order
 for
 the
 proposal
to
become
a
reality
much
public
support
would
be
necessary,
and
it
 seems
likely
that
the
Obama
administration
would
have
to
be
at
least
neutral.

 As
 public
 support
 has
 been
 steadily
 increasing
 for
 some
 time
 it
 seems
 possible
for
a
degree
of
pressure
to
be
applied
by
this
group,
and
the
question
 of
the
administration’s
support
remains
unanswered.


Developing
a
Rational
Framework


76


Conclusion
 Drug
 policy
 is
 a
 difficult
 policy
 area
 because
 there
 are
 a
 variety
 of
 interests
 that
need
to
be
balanced
while
ensuring
that
the
resulting
policy
is
effective
at
 reducing
 harm
 caused
 by
 the
 use
 of
 drugs.
 
 There
 is
 much
 demagoguery
 surrounding
the
issue
from
all
sides,
and
through
time
concern
for
the
usage
 has
 waxed
 and
 waned
 hinging
 on
 the
 rhetoric
 of
 these
 demagogues.
 
 In
 the
 last
 10‐15
 years
 public
 opinion
 has
 shifted
 from
 one
 of
 fierce
 opposition
 to
 usage,
 to
 one
 that
 recognizes
 the
 possible
 medical
 use
 of
 marijuana
 and
 is
 more
 compassionate
 towards
 drug
 addicts
 in
 general
 as
 addiction
 has
 increasingly
 been
 recognized
 as
 a
 legitimate
 disease,
 much
 like
 alcoholism
 has
 been
 recognized.
 
 While
 it
 is
 clear
 that
 Obama
 is
 not
 willing
 to
 legalize
 currently
 illicit
 substances,
 his
 more
 liberal
 attitude
 toward
 drug
 policy
 combined
 with
 increasingly
 tolerant
 public
 opinion
 may
 be
 the
 best
 opportunity
for
substantial
reform
in
recent
history,
and
for
the
foreseeable
 future.
 


United
States
Drug
Policy


77





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Erklärung
 


gemäß
§
25
Abs.
1
der
Prüfungs‐
und
Studienordnung
des
weiterbildenden
 Studiums
„Public
Policy"
an
der
Universität
Erfurt.
 
 Ich
 versichere,
 dass
 ich
 die
 vorgelegte
 Arbeit
 selbstständig
 und
 ohne
 unerlaubte
Hilfe
Dritter
angefertigt
habe.
Alle
Stellen,
die
ich
wörtlich
oder
 annähernd
wörtlich
aus
Veröffentlichungen
jeglicher
Art
entnommen
habe,
 sind
als
solche
kenntlich
gemacht.
Ich
habe
mich
keiner
anderen
als
der
an‐ gegebenen
 Literatur
 oder
 sonstiger
 Hilfsmittel
 bedient.
 Diese
 Arbeit
 hat
 weder
in
gleicher
noch
in
ähnlicher
Form
einer
anderen
Prüfungsbehörde
 im
In‐
oder
Ausland
vorgelegen.
 
 I
affirm
that
the
work
I
have
submitted
was
done
independently
and
without
 unauthorized
assistance
from
third
parties.
All
parts
which
I
took
word­for­ word
or
nearly
word­for­word
from
any
sort
of
publication
are
recognizable
 as
such,
l
did
not
use
any
means
or
resources
other
than
the
literature
I
have
 quoted.
 This
 work
 was
 not
 submitted
 in
 this
 or
 any
 similar
 form
 to
 an
 examination
committee
in
or
outside
of
Germany.
 
 


Erfurt,
 _17.07.2009
 Datum
/
Date



_______________________
 Unterschrift
/
Signature





______Alec_S._Johnston_____
 Name
(Blockschrift
/
block
letters)



 


United
States
Drug
Policy


83