Thornton - Russian Attitudes Towards Nuke Cooperation - Cissm Forum - Mar 9 2006

Engaging the Russian Government: Russian Perceptions of, and Attitudes Towards Nuclear Threat Reduction Cooperation with the United States

presented at the

CISSM/ISEP/Development Circle Forum Sponsored by The Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland The International and Economic Policy Program The Development Circle of The School of Public Policy, University of Maryland

March 9, 2006

Charles L. Thornton

Ph.D. Candidate & Research Fellow Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM) School of Public Policy, University of Maryland [email protected] http://www.cissm.umd.edu/thornton.htm Phone: +1.301.332.7869 or +1.301.840.5727 Fax: +1 (202) 318-7795 PO Box 60428, Potomac, Maryland 20859 USA

CITATION: Thornton, Charles, “Engaging the Russian Government: Russian Perceptions of, and Attitudes Towards Nuclear Threat Reduction Cooperation with the United States,” Presented to the CISSM/ISEP/Development Circle Forum, School of Public Policy, University of Maryland, College Park, March 9, 2006.

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Disclaimer The information in this essay does not represent, and may not coincide with official U.S. Government policy, nor does it represent the positions of the University of Maryland, the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland, Science Applications International Corporation, or any other organization with which the author may be affiliated. The information in this report, including the policies described and the recommendations offered – including any mistakes or omissions – are strictly the author’s.

Acknowledgements The original version of this presentation was prepared under the sponsorship of the US Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency. The research was collected under the sponsorship of the Advanced Methods of Cooperative Security Program at the Center for International and Security Studies in the School of Public Policy at the University of Maryland, with generous support from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation and the Nuclear Threat Initiative. I also appreciate Science Applications International Corporation and the U.S. Department of Defense for providing me with access to people and information, and for allowing me to help manage the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program for over six years. Finally, I appreciate the time and open discussions granted to me by many Russian officials.

Author Biography Charles L. Thornton is currently a research fellow at the Center for International and Security Studies (CISSM) in the School of Public Policy at the University of Maryland, where he is also pursuing a Ph.D. in international security policy. As an employee of Science Applications International Corporation, Mr. Thornton has spent a decade helping the U.S. Department of Defense to manage and implement the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program. He previously spent several years analyzing the motivations behind, and policy responses to international terrorism. Mr. Thornton's areas of expertise include international arms control, U.S.Russian relations, the safety and security of Russia's nuclear warheads, and global fissile material control and accounting policies. Mr. Thornton continues to consult for the U.S. and other governments on nuclear threat reduction cooperation issues.

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Oral Presentation This is a story of policy trade-offs. What is CTR? Provide summary background and objectives. I plan to focus today’s discussion on how the US Government might further engage the Russian government on programs designed to enhance nuclear security. You will see from my comments that there is probably little we can do at the technical level to advance the Russian nuclear security agenda, and less we can do without a massive restructuring of our foreign and military policies. I therefore will neither focus on the technical level nor even the policy level, but rather on the political level. Let me start by making three comments: 1.

It is remarkable that these programs have made as much progress as they have.

2.

These programs could have made more progress, but only under very different circumstances.

3.

The “blame,” if we are to use that term, for the perceived lack of more progress or more success is shared equally by both Moscow and Washington.

My remarks today will focus on the Russian side of the equation. There is, of course, much to discuss on the US side, but I’m setting that aside for today. We already are, of course, engaged heavily with the Russian government at all levels of nuclear weapons security, nuclear material security, and delivery system dismantlement. But there is an inertia associated with the CTR program dating back before 1991. If we are to make substantially more progress on these programs in the future, we will first need to overcome: 1.

Russian perceptions about the program specifically, and

2.

Russian perceptions about its security condition generally.

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CTR has always operated in a hostile environment. What I mean is not solely the hostility to the CTR programs per se, but rather the broader bilateral US-Russian relationship and the international conditions. On the US side: •

the US possesses unmistakable disparities in military capabilities compared to the Russians, compounded by Russia’s concerns about China and instabilities along its southern borders

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NATO expansion

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NATO’s out-of-area operations o Kosovo o Afghanistan

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US bases in the former Soviet space

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missile defenses

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US nuclear weapons in Europe

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F-16s in Baltics

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ASW operations against Russian boats

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overt probing of Russia’s air defense systems

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Iraq

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Iran

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North Korea

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etc.

In other words, over the last 15 years the US has increased the pressure on Russia – increased Russia’s security burden – not relieved it. On the Russian side: •

we see an internal mismatch of security commitments and resources o Russia is allocating an increasing, but still very small budget attempting to fund a large standing army, still massive strategic forces, international commitments, lingering interests in the former Soviet space, and of course wars in Chechnya Charles L. Thornton

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a process of disintegrating internal coherence within the Russian military o although this trend may have slowed and in some sectors even reversed, it is a psychology that is difficult to overcome

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a serious case of paranoia: o protests in the street against Americans “taking control of Russia’s nuclear arsenal;” remarkable; who was stirring the pot? o last year the Duma queried FM Lavrov by linking the arrest of former Minister of Atomic Energy Adamov to US attempts to access its sensitive nuclear facilities

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given the process of globalization, coupled with modern technologies, Russia maintains an unreasonable grip on secrecy over discussion and access to its sensitive nuclear facilities o their names and locations are public knowledge, including commercial satellite imagery o and yet, Russia officials still refuse to disclose this information and delude themselves into thinking that site names and locations are not officially published, then no one will know what’s hidden in the forests

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a defense industry that is incapable of maintaining the existing nuclear arsenal and unable to modernize the forces in under 20 years

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a real concern about China

There have been raging debates among Russia experts over the last two years concerning the nature of the threats that Russia faces, how Russia should position itself to meet those threats, and in particular the most appropriate structure of Russia’s strategic nuclear forces. Russian military theorists and national security professionals have evolved their threat perceptions away from large-scale war, to a focus on terrorism, and most recently to the notion of large-scale or regional conflicts arising from local sparks. In this context, more than one Russian has suggested to me that maintaining a veil of secrecy over their nuclear facilities is like holding back the last crown jewel. A problem these Russian theorists have confronted is that their perceived threats have continually changed. Russian threat perceptions have not remained stable long enough to allow Russia to realign itself before the next threat evolved.

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Many Russian experts are looking at their security situation out to 2012 and beyond. Just as we here in the US can’t fully discount the possibility of changing political winds in Russia and a future conflict with that country, Russian political and military planners can’t responsibly discount a future conflict with the US. Since we have not created the structural mechanisms that could prevent this kind of backsliding, talk of good relations remains rhetorical. On balance, we continue to impose on Russia an operational burden that it is hard pressed to meet. I am not making a value judgment here. I am merely pointing to the myriad of reasons why CTR, under these conditions, will never be allowed to achieve the full extent of its potential. So, what are Russian perceptions about CTR specifically? As you might expect, there is no consensus. Here are a few issues that seem to have the most universal subscription: •

the Americans have put their priorities first and disregarded Russian interests o not surprising that they would think this

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very little of the funding has reached Russia, going instead to American firms and American consultants o that this perception has such traction is baffling to me o “10% - 25%” of US allocations reach Russia o MFA’s flawed methodology – but, they’re publishing and disseminating

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the heyday of the CTR program was during the withdrawal of the warheads from the republics back to Russia – American assistance was crucial for this effort o the irony here is that very little assistance had arrived by that time o so, it must have been the promise of the assistance that was so crucial – what does that mean?

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the most effective technical cooperation has been between the RF MOD and US DoD on warhead security o again, this is ironic given that 11 years into that effort we are just barely starting to address the core mission

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Russia is a new country, and now in a position to assert its own interests and to turn down assistance if those interests are not met o this is, perhaps, Russia’s most important self-perception

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Other perceptions are more divergent: •

CTR is intended only to dismantle Russia’s military capabilities [versus]

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Russia is more at risk for WMD terrorism than the US, and so these programs are critical for Russia

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individual personalities and personal relationships make or break projects [versus]

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bureaucratic inertia and/or momentum are difficult to alter

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CTR needs to continue expanding into new areas [versus]

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CTR needs to re-focus on dismantlement and not worry as much about nonproliferation

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the US imposes unnecessary links on the use of its aid, for example on human rights, that have nothing to do with dismantlement [versus]

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it is important the Russia participate in institutions such as the G8 so that it can be considered a modern, western polity

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Russia is facing an increased terrorist threat, and therefore it has been more willing to deepen cooperation and allow access [versus]

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Russia can handle security issues on its own and has been dedicating more of its own resources for this purpose

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the US’s sole purpose is to further subjugate Russia so that it can never again pose a threat [versus]

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the US doesn’t care about Russia Charles L. Thornton

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How We Got to This Point CONVENTIONAL WISDOM: All of these programs have enjoyed some success ... At the same time, the limits to the success of US efforts have also become more evident ... Limitations on US access to Russian nuclear facilities have hindered the effectiveness of nuclear safety programs and efforts at verification. Corruption, bureaucratic inefficiency, anti-Western suspicions and fears have all plagued the implementation of additional safeguards. These points are all true, but they are not the whole truth. Russian perceptions about the CTR program have changed over time. The changes were due in part to a normal evolution. Russia is a very different country now than it was 10 years ago. During that chaotic transition period in the early 1990s, CTR assistance – though little physical assistance had been delivered – was a tangible symbol of international support. Today, Russia feels like it is back on its feet politically, economically, financially, and even militarily. Some of the changes in Russian perceptions of CTR were due to acute events. NATO actions in Kosovo, for example, deeply shook many Russian perceptions of US intentions. My own interviews with Russian officials suggest that there is no one tactic nor a single strategy that would help these programs successfully achieve their full potential. It is not clear that solving the acute problems inherent to the program (e.g., liability; access) would trigger a much more successful effort. In fact, some Russian inside players consider these issues to be like a “test lamp”: how far can the US push Russia? In 2004, Putin reorganized his government by reducing MinAtom’s status and placing it under a larger ministry, and shuffling the responsibilities of several other CTR implementing agencies. The efficiencies and results of that reorganization remain unclear. MFA was hoping that it would give it more control over and insights into many of the CTR programs – did that happen? Is there now better/more effective internal coordination within the RF government? How has the

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process of discourse on these programs evolved within the RF government? How deep is decision-making authority vested – in other words, are policy entrepreneurs allowed to exist at the implementation level? Answers to these questions would inform our policy prescriptions. Concurrently with that government reorganization, we've now had a number of CTR visits to 12th GUMO sites over the past year. It seems that one reason the Russian government resisted site access in the pass was the possibility of a public perception that MOD would be handing over the control keys to the Americans. All of the press and public demonstrations surrounding the Bratislava Summit a year ago must have been their worst nightmare come true. Generals Valynkin and Verkhovtsev had to react internally within MOD and externally to the administration, legislature, and press to these protests. In sum, the indications are that there is no short term cure nor any long term end to the grounds for concern over Russia’s nuclear programs and safeguards. The task for policymakers now is to put this concern into context, determine its place in US priorities (especially in the war against terrorism), specify the steps most likely to succeed in alleviating that concern (taking account of likely Russian resistance, inefficiency as well as deliberate hindrance), and identify the political levers that offer the best chance of convincing the Russians to address the question more seriously and strenuously than they have been. Engaging the Russian Government CONVENTIONAL WISDOM: The Russian government does not seem to view the possibility of nuclear theft or illegal transfer to be as serious a threat as the US does; how can we change Moscow’s perception and convince the Russians to take WMD security more seriously? Here we encounter another perception problem. Russians are happy to accept foreign assistance to meet its international treaty obligations. This relieves the burden on the Russian treasury. However, Russia is very uncomfortable with the notion that it is a source for proliferation. I’ve

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been told several times by senior officials that we should think of CTR as a DISMANTLEMENT program and not a NONPROLIFERATION program. This is an important point when thinking about how to engage our Russian friends. Our focus should not be on the plant managers and base commanders – they are willing to engage. But, they are constrained by their political environment. Given that nuclear warheads and material have not been flowing freely to terrorist groups as predicted in 1991, it is not productive to publicly accuse the Russian government of shirking its security responsibilities. On the contrary, it should be praised for having maintained an adequate level of security throughout those chaotic years. At the same time, it should be clear to everyone that post 9/11, post Beslan and Nord-Ost, and post Iraq and Chechnya, that ADEQUATE is INSUFFICIENT. What are US Policy Options? I go back and forth in my mind on a key thought: maybe we should get "back to basics." The CTR agenda and list of programs has grown dramatically since its inception; perhaps it is now too unwieldy and too ambitious; the program might be better off and more fruitful if it were to recede back to the objectives established by the initial legislation and originally envisioned by its founders. That is, make more progress in the narrow core elements of the program. On the other hand, I like to view CTR not as an isolated initiative but rather as a process for transforming the bilateral security relationship. That would suggest that a constantly expanding set of objectives, all couched in the principles and processes of the CTR framework ("concept" if you will), would facilitate broader and deeper interaction between the two players. It would view CTR as a beachhead into the transformation process. I don't know which way I'll eventually come down. So here is a little trick I like to ask an audience: envision the ideal CTR program. Given what we now know, how would an ideal CTR program be designed and implemented? Then ask yourselves how far away we currently

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are from those ideal notions. Can we get there? What steps would we need to take to move in that direction? How close can we get, and is worth the effort to try? If we were to design this ideal CTR program, do you think: 1.

That we would first need to create the conditions under which this program could thrive, or

2.

That the program itself could generate its own positive conditions by serving as a beachhead for the transformation of the broader security relationship?

I think BOTH is the right answer. Conclusion Like I said at the outset, this is a story of policy trade-offs. The fact is, CTR is 14 years old. It has likely gone as far as it can on its own. If we decide that our policy priority is to further develop CTR, then it will need some external help in the form of broader security accommodations for Russia.

Charles L. Thornton