The Blackout Of 2003 Analysis And Recommendations

UMUC HSMN 610 Homeland Security Management

The Blackout of 2003 Analysis and Recommendations 27 July 2009

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Contents 1.0 Introduction ........................................................................................................................................2 1.1 Study Summary................................................................................................................................................2 1.2 Purpose, Content/Executive Summary, Thesis................................................................................................2 1.3 Conclusions and Recommendations ...............................................................................................................2

2.0 Background .........................................................................................................................................2 2.1 What happened?...............................................................................................................................................3

3.0 Analysis ................................................................................................................................................4 4.0 Solution ................................................................................................................................................7 5.0 Conclusion ...........................................................................................................................................9 5.1 Summary of Findings and Recommendations.................................................................................................9

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1.0 Introduction 1.1

Study Summary

The blackout of August 14, 2003 was at first glance, caused by an overloaded power line that came into contact with a tree. However, this event is the tip of the iceberg as regards underlying problems with the electricity infrastructure of the United States as it stands today. The electricity infrastructure is outdated and electricity demand continues to grow. Utility companies and their employees lack adequate training about their responsibilities and lines of communication. There is already a lack of funding for the strain imposed on the electricity infrastructure from electricity demand increases, let alone to fix an old system. A “smart grid” could do what humans cannot: it could fix itself almost instantaneously. 1.2

Purpose, Content/Executive Summary, Thesis

The purpose of this report is to deduce the causes of the blackout that occurred on August 14, 2003 in the northeastern United States in order to prevent future blackouts. Information about the nation’s electricity infrastructure in presented, including how it operates, where responsibilities lie, and whether or not more blackouts can be averted. We hypothesize that increased funding for a “smart grid” could strengthen the electricity infrastructure of the United States, although much of this funding will come from the consumer. Further, such renovation of the infrastructure could take more than a decade, yet a “smart grid” is necessary. A “smart grid” would be self-correcting, and therefore limit the costs incurred from blackouts; as well, the “smart grid” would lessen the impact of natural disasters and terrorist attacks on the electricity infrastructure. 1.3

Conclusions and Recommendations

The United States needs to make upgrading the electricity infrastructure of this nation a top priority. Electricity demand is increasing with no end in sight. Even the most qualified and highly trained operators will not be able to respond to a breach in electricity continuity quickly enough to stop a blackout or contain one to the immediate area. As demand for electricity increases, fluctuations of electricity use may increase as well, making manual electricity load balancing even more challenging. Although the costs of a “smart grid” are daunting, we conclude that the costs of blackouts are even more austere. The power grid needs to be selfcorrecting in order to virtually eliminate the chances of blackouts; operators and utility providers need to be trained and held accountable regarding their responsibilities, including their communication responsibilities.

2.0 Background On August 14, 2003, at approximately 4:15 EDT, the United States experienced a blackout in which nearly 45 million people in eight states and ten million people in Canada lost electrical power (U.S.-Canada Power System Outage Task Force, 2004, p. 1). This was the worst blackout in the history of the United States in terms of people affected, geographic area, and cost. The total economic cost of the blackout was estimated to be between $7 and $10 billion dollars (Saha, 2004, p. 2). The affected states included Ohio, New York, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, Vermont, Connecticut, and Pennsylvania. In the end, at least 21 power plants in the US were taken off line or tripped due to the outage (Audet, 2003).

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To understand the cause of the blackout it is important to understand something about the electricity, and the electricity generation, transmission, and distribution system in the United States. It is also necessary to understand how the production, distribution, and supply of electricity is managed in North America. The North American electricity system is massive, and most of it is over 50 years old. This electrical infrastructure is one large interconnected system of electricity plants, and over 200,000 miles of transmission and distribution lines. This complex system serves over 334 million people, and has approximately 211,000 miles of highvoltage transmission lines connecting over 15,000 power plants to consumers. (North American Electric Reliability Council, 2009) This system crosses state and national boundaries and is governed by a complex set of federal, state, and local laws and regulations, and also by a complex series of regional governing organizations. This massive system is known as the “power grid.” Reliable operation of the power grid is challenging because of the complexity of the system and the properties of electricity. Electricity flows at close to the speed of light and cannot be stored. It also cannot be controlled in the distribution lines by valves like water can. Electricity always flows through the path of least resistance. Because of this it must be used the instant it is produced. So, the grid and its operators must always balance power supply and demand to maintain scheduled voltages (generally 120 volts). If this balance is not maintained, power fluctuations will occur. Any significant overload of a power line, or underload/overload of a generator, can cause damage to very expensive power generating equipment, so the power grid is disconnected if a serious imbalance is detected, and this causes outages. (U.S.-Canada Power System Outage Task Force , 2004, p. 7) Many of these power generation systems linked up together become a “Balancing Area”, in which the balancing authority matches generation with customer demand, and the transmission operator monitors the flows over the transmission system and voltages at substations. These balancing areas are defined by the electricity meters at their boundaries, which measure the power flowing into and out of the area. These areas are connected to each other by “tie lines.” The North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) is the overseeing organization responsible for ensuring the reliability of the electrical power system in North America. To do this, NERC develops and enforces reliability standards; assesses adequacy annually via a 10-year forecasts and winter and summer forecasts; monitors the bulk power system; and educates, trains, and certifies industry personnel. NERC is a self-regulatory organization, subject to oversight by the U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and governmental authorities in Canada. (North American Electric Reliability Council, 2009). 2.1

What happened?

On August 14, 2003, a major power transmission line run by First Energy in Ohio was experiencing a heavy load of electricity. At around 3 PM a First Energy 345-kV transmission line tripped out of service because the lines had grown heavy with the heat and were contacting overgrown trees (U.S.-Canada Power System Outage Task Force , 2004, p. 106). Single outages such as this pose a risk because they can lead to fluctuations. As noted, fluctuations are bad because any great overload of a power line or underload/overload of a generator can cause hardto-repair and costly damage. Because of this sections of the power grid are disconnected if a

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serious imbalance is detected. Every disconnection must be accompanied by action from other members of the balancing area though to maintain the power supply to consumers and minimize dangerous fluctuations. That is why any incident which causes a disruption in any part of the grid must be reported to other members of the balancing area immediately so that they can take action to remediate the problem and eliminate any risk to the overall grid. On August 14, when First Energy’s transmission lines started to trip out of service, their monitoring system did not perform correctly and notify technicians of the issue. These monitoring systems are Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems that collect data from sensors throughout the grid and send this data to a central operating office. Shortly after this the first entire power plan went offline as a safety measure due to fluctuations. This interrupted the equilibrium of the entire grid, and a cascading effect occurred where all other members of the grid balancing area who did not disconnect in time also went offline due to massive power fluctuations. In the final analysis it was determined that First Energy was not compliant with many of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) regulations. Their operational monitoring equipment was not adequate to alert operators regarding important deviations in operating conditions and the need for corrective action, and their estimation and contingency analysis tools were not used to assess system conditions. These two failures, combined with inadequate tree trimming, led to the blackout of 2003 which caused between $6 and $10 billion in economic damage. (Saha, 2004, p. 2)

3.0 Analysis A month after the blackout occurred, NERC’s Board of Trustees issued a letter for nearterm actions to protect electricity reliability (Glotfelty, 2004, p. 4). At the time of its writing, NERC was assisting the U.S.-Canada Joint Task Force in investigating the causes of the blackout (North American Electricity Reliability Council, 2003, para. 1). The latter was the first step toward mitigating future blackouts, and it listed several practical recommendations to organizations for staying within regional reliability council standards and established good utility practices. NERC further requested that appropriate entities report back to them within 60 days regarding the status of their electrical systems as well as any necessary corrective actions (North American Electricity Reliability Council, 2003, para 3). NERC’s main recommendations included ensuring sufficient voltage support for reliable operations; improving reliability communications; reporting system failures to control room personnel and establishing automated methods for failure alerts; establishing emergency action plans to safeguard systems; training personnel for emergencies so they may react promptly and efficiently; and that high voltage transmission lines were maintained such that they were free of vegetation and other obstructions (North American Electricity Reliability Council, 2003, pp. 13). In December 2003, FERC directed FirstEnergy to evaluate the characteristics and weaknesses of its Cleveland-Akron service area since FirstEnergy and the East Central Area Reliability Council (ECAR) lacked proper understanding of how the service area operated and hadn’t operated the area at appropriate voltage levels (Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 2004, pp. 6-8). FERC was also aware of faulty vegetation management as a contributing factor to the August 2003 blackout and shared that information with FirstEnergy and ECAR (Federal

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Energy Regulatory Commission, 2004, p. 7). FERC’s direction to FirstEnergy for remedial evaluation and action was to be completed by June 20, 2004 (Glotfelty, 2004, p. 4). Then, in February, 2004, NERC issued fourteen requirements to the electric industry that modified existing operating rules and practices to make them “clearer, less ambiguous, and more enforceable” (Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 2004, p. 7). The final Blackout Report was issued on April 14, 2004. Per the report’s recommendations, FERC held a technical conference with the Department of Energy and Natural Resources Canada in order to improve electricity reliability standards (Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 2004, p. 8). The meetings surrounding the aftermath of the blackout resulted in the identification of several issues that needed correction, including improved operator training with an emphasis on emergency preparadness; clarification of roles, responsibilities, and authorities regarding operations; NERC monitoring capabilities; vegetation management; minimum requirements for real-time tools and operators; and technical upgrades necessary for future power-grid efficiency (Glotfelty, 2004, p. 5). Unfortunately, comprehensive training of electricity utility employees, clarification of current electricity policy, and clearing of vegetation from power lines will not be enough to ensure the reliability of our nation’s power supply and avoid future blackouts. Even if operators are highly skilled in balancing electrical loads, they will not be able to act quickly enough to avert another blackout by shifting loads to lines that can handle them. Our electrical infrastructure is being taxed to the limit; there has been a 20% increase in demand for electricity since 1999, with only a 7% increase in transmission capacity (Amin & Schewe, 2007, p. 63). The Energy Policy Act of 2005 was the first Congressional legislation toward the modernization of the U.S. electrical grid. It requires that states consider the use of “smartmetering technologies for residential and small commercial customers” (Nahigian, 2008, p. 14). According to Amin and Schewe (2007), the rapid increase in demand for electricity on a 50-yearold electrical grid will inevitably lead to more blackouts; that is, unless smart-grid technology is implemented (see Figure 1). The likelihood of another blackout is high. Although steps have been taken toward fixing weaknesses in the electrical system, such as improved training and physical maintenance, the nation’s growth and demand for electricity is exceeding the capabilities of the current grid. Increased vigilance on the parts of FERC, NERC, and utility companies may temporarily lessen down-time due to power failures, however, the aging electrical grid must be updated such that the system itself can monitor loads and switch them almost instantaneously as needs arise. In 2007, Congress pushed for the modernization of the energy grid in the Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA) by providing private industry “with the confidence needed to invest in and work toward the realization of the Smart Grid and the optimization of its capabilities” (Nahigian, 2008, p. 14). The Act also indicates that the federal government would provide incentives to private industry in the form of funding (Nahigian, 2008, p. 14). According to Nahigian (2008, p. 14), however, private industry players are apprehensive about undertaking the overhaul in light of legislation for a carbon tax, which if passed, will place them under heavy financial burdens. The Smart Grid initiative could, in that case, provide tax incentives to utility companies and private industry for down-stream carbon reductions, such as those resulting from plug-in electric cars (Nahigian, 2008, p. 14).

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Though Jeffrey Daigle, chief electrical engineer at the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory calls the blackout a “once in 10 years event,” other experts note that the rising demand for electricity and declining money spent on US transmission lines could result in more frequent blackouts (see Figure 2) (Amin & Schewe, 2007, p. 63; Walsh, 2008, para. 4).

Figure 1 (Adapted from Amin & Schewe, 2007, p. 63).

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Figure 2 (Adapted from Amin & Schewe, 2007, p. 62).

4.0 Solution A blackout of the same magnitude of the one in 2003 appears to be imminent, judging from the data already mentioned. Therefore, possible solutions are already circulating among agencies and leaders in the federal government. The most popular among these is the “smart grid”, which is being heavily championed by the Obama administration. At first glance, the proposed plan for implementing a “smart grid” seems to be an obvious and simple solution. However, it is much more complex than simply upgrading a control system or installing new software. The evolution of the current power grid has been slow and nearly nonexistent; therefore, a major transition such as this will be sure to have severe growing pains. One of the main advantages of the “smart grid” is that it will be a self-healing infrastructure. The current grid system is heavily reliant upon operators reacting to information

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being streamed to them on a delay. The new grid would be able to react to power overloads, nearly instantaneously, without waiting for a human operator to close off the affected area before it spreads. Delayed flow of information in the currently grid frequently results in a chain reaction that overloads surrounding grids when one grid is in peril, and subsequently, a blackout. According to Scientific American, “A self-healing smart grid- one that is aware of nascent trouble and can reconfigure itself to resolve a problem- could reduce blackouts dramatically, as well as contain the chaos that could be triggered by terrorist sabotage,” (Grant, Starr & Overbye, 2007, p. 62). The new grid would not only eliminate more of the human error affecting the current grid system, but also allow the nation to be better protected from outside attack. With real time information and look-ahead simulations the “smart grid” would arm operators with the tools to better prevent blackouts. As previous terrorism attacks have proven, it is not always wise or possible to wait for a person to make the decision that stops a breach (Grant, 2007). The “smart grid” is not just a theory, as it has been tested in a small, controlled area. The experiment has been a huge success. The smart grid itself does not pose a problem as most critics can agree that this new technology is exceedingly more reliable and more secure than the currently outdated system in place. The true opposition lies in the economic cost and the difficult transition that would surely become an issue when making the switch. From a technical standpoint the transition could be managed, however, from the industry’s perspective the change would be going against 50 years of what they know. It would involve extensive re-training of nearly the entire workforce currently in place. Also, historically, the power industry has not made large investments in research and new technologies. “EPRI estimates that that testing and installation across the entire U.S. transmission and distribution system could run $13 billion a year for 10 years- 65 percent more than the industry is currently investing annually,” (Grant, 2007, p. 67). From the industry’s point of view, the only option would be to raise rates for consumers. This would result in the American people paying for the grid in two ways; their taxes and their electric bills. The implementation of a “smart grid” is likely to be at least a decade in the future, however, there are several changes that can be made much sooner with significantly less cost to consumers and citizens. In the Final Report on the August 2003 Blackout produced by the U.S.Canada Power System Outage Task Force numerous actions were outlined that can be taken that would require the industry to act responsibly and improve the current grid system. First, the authors call the U.S. congress to action by urging them to enact legislation that would better enforce the current regulations in place by invoking financial penalties on offenders, (U.S. – Canada Power System Outage Task Force, 2004, p. 148). They also request a more structured funding system for NERC; commissioning independent bodies to monitor reliability standards; and to “commission an independent study of the relationships among industry restructuring, competition, reliability,” (U.S. – Canada Power System Outage Task Force, 2004, p. 149) to name a few. Although it is apparent that there are a significant number of improvements that can be made on the current grid system, they are only temporary solutions. In an age when the U.S. has numerous enemies it is unwise to leave such a critical part of the nation in a vulnerable state. Although the investment in a “smart grid” is a hefty one, it pales in comparison to the economic losses incurred from blackouts and the potential security risk to the nation. Immediate action

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should be taken on improving the current grid as recommended by the task force, but the best long term solution presented thus far is the “smart grid”. It is time for the country to no longer be reactionary, but to be proactive and innovative by implementing a “smart grid” that would improve the quality of service for consumers, the condition of the environment, and protect one of its most valuable infrastructures.

5.0 Conclusion 5.1

Summary of Findings and Recommendations

The blackout that took place on August 14, 2003 was not the first of its kind nor will it be the last if significant changes are not made quickly. The blackout was not a result of the error of one person or one electrical company, but rather a culmination of relaxed compliance standards, inefficient maintenance, and a lack of investment in new technologies. Despite the fact that the blackout was initially sparked by a branch touching a sagging electrical line, another incident similar to this is inevitable because the current grid system is extremely outdated. The United States can no longer rely on private industry to maintain or revive the current electricity infrastructure. It has been neglected for too long, and it is now necessary for the government to take action. A properly functioning power grid is not merely a matter of convenience, but more importantly, a matter of national security and a vital part of the national and global economy. Although the federal government has taken several steps towards more closely regulating and analyzing the current grid system, a newer smarter grid is necessary to bring the electrical industry into the modern world. The proposed “smart grid” is the newest and best option available to the country. Although the financial cost will be somewhat daunting, the benefits of a significantly better functioning grid greatly outweigh the burden on national spending. Over time if the “smart grid” lives up to its expectations it can pay for itself. It is impossible to accurately measure the benefits of a smart grid as safety from a cyber attack is not easily quantifiable. The benefits to the environment and electricity consumers are much easier to predict. By implementing a “smart grid” America will take a step towards maintaining her place as a global leader. In today’s world one must be an innovator to stay ahead, and when a clear opportunity for improvement presents itself it should not be passed over. The federal government and private industry need to join together the make the country a leader in conservation, technological innovation, and prevention and security. The smart grid should merely be the first step of many to make the United States a safer and more resilient nation.

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References Audet, J. (2003, August). The Power Factor, Retrieved July 18, 2009, from http://www.quarterly-report.com/energy/blackout_2003.html Amin, M., & Schewe, P. F. (2007, May). Preventing blackouts. Scientific American, pp. 60-67. Electripedia (2004). Power Plants Retrieved June 30, 2009, from http://www.electripedia.info/power_plants.asp Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. (2004). Report to the United States Congress from the Federal Energy Regulatory staff: FERC use of the grid reliability appropriation for fiscal year 2004. Retrieved June 25, 2009, from http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indusact/reliability/reliability-rpt-fnl.pdf Glotfelty, J. (2004). Electric reliability: A national priority. Retrieved June 26, 2009, from http://www.hks.harvard.edu/hepg/Papers/glotfelty.reliability.1.Mar.04.pdf Grant, P. M. , Starr, C., & Overbye, T.J. (2007). Blackout. Scientific American, pp. 61-67. Nahigian, K. R. (2008, June 30). The smart alternative: Securing and strengthening our nation’s vulnerable electric grid. The Reform Institute, Reform Brief. Retrieved June 28, 2009, from http://www.reforminstitute.org/uploads/publications/Smart_Grid_Final.pdf North American Electric Reliability Corporation. (2003). Near-term actions to assure reliable operations. Retrieved June 28, 2009, from http://www.nerc.com/docs/docs/blackout/NERC-Quick-Actions-List-BOT-FINAL.pdf North American Electric Reliability Council. (2009). Understanding the Grid. Retrieved July 17, 2009, from http://www.nerc.com/page.php?cid=1|15 Saha, B. (2004). (2004). The Economic Cost of the Blackout An issue paper on the Northeastern Blackout, Retrieved July 1, 2009, from http://www.icfi.com/Markets/Energy/doc_files/blackout-economic-costs.pdf United States Department of Energy. (2008). The smart grid: an introduction. Retrieved July 5, 2009 from http://www.oe.energy.gov/smartgrid.htm U.S.-Canada Power System Outage Task Force. (2004). Final report on the August 14, 2003 blackout in the United States and Canada: Causes and Recommendations. Retrieved July 5, 2009, from https://reports.energy.gov/BlackoutFinal-Web.pdf Walsh, B. (2008, August). Can we prevent another blackout? Retrieved June 28, 2009, from http://www.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,1831346,00.html

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