Thayer Radical Islam & Terrorism In Southeast Asia

Radical Islam and Political Terrorism in Southeast Asia

Carlyle A Thayer Professor of Politics Director UNSW Defence Studies Forum School of Humanities & Social Sciences The University of New South Wales at Australian Defence Force Academy [email protected]

Winter School on Globalisation and Its Counter Forces

co-sponsored by Swedish School of Advanced Asia-Pacific Studies and Institute of Southeast Asian Studies Singapore February 23-27, 2004

2

Radical Islam and Political Terrorism in Southeast Asia Carlyle A. Thayer * ‘We must not confuse a few al-Qaeda escapades with Southeast Asian Islam as a whole’ Robert W. Hefner, March 25, 2003.

Introduction Prior to the Bali bombings of October 12, 2002, the conventional view of Islam in Southeast Asia, and Islam in Indonesia in particular, was that it was different from Islam in the Middle East, Pakistan and Central Asia. Islam in Southeast Asia was viewed not only as moderate but inward looking and tolerant. The conventional view also held that radical Islam represented a tiny minority and was not influential politically either domestically or in regional affairs.

*I

would like to acknowledge my intellectual debt to Greg Barton who provided me with copies of three of his unpublished manuscripts. This paper draws heavily on the various reports issued by the International Crisis Group and Political Islam in Southeast Asia, Conference Report, Southeast Asia Studies Program, The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies. Johns Hopkins University, Washington, D.C.. March 25, 2003. All references may be found in the bibliography.

3 The vast majority of Southeast Asia’s Muslims are Sunni. 1 In many areas Islam has become intertwined with pre-existing values and belief systems associated with folk religion, Buddhism and Hinduism. This intermixing resulted from the history of Islam’s arrival from the twelfth century. The bearers of Islam spread their views peacefully and not by force of arms. They adapted to local customs and conditions. A broad historical overview would also reveal that a tiny minority of Muslims have been drawn to more puritanical or extremist variants of the faith. The Bali bombings challenged the conventional view of Islam. The causes of terrorism were now widely perceived as closely linked to Islamic politics. The bombings exposed an extensive terrorist network in Indonesia that had wellestablished links with militant groups not only throughout Southeast Asia but internationally to al Qaeda. The reluctance of the Indonesian government to

1The

Sunni tradition is known in Arabic as the Ahl-i Sunnah (the People of Sunnah). The word ‘Sunnah’ means custom, method, or path and refers particularly to the example of the prophet Muhammed as found in the Hadith. The Sunnis are those who follow the tradition of the prophet and his companions in understanding the Islamic faith. Shia Muslims hold the same fundamental beliefs of other Muslims, with the principle addition being that they also believe in an imamate, which is the distinctive institution of Shia Islam. Islam experienced a schism about a century after death of the prophet Mohammed. The dispute centred around the appointment of a caliph. The Shias argued that only a direct descendant of the Prophet could be appointed, while the Sunni argued any person approved by the religious community was eligible. The caliph had substantial political and military power but no inherent religious authority. Sunni Muslims view the caliph as a temporal leader only and consider an imam to be a prayer leader, but for the Shia the historic caliphs were merely de facto rulers, while the rightful and true leadership continued to be passed along through a sort of apostolic succession of Muhammed's descendants, the Imams (when capitalized, Imam refers to the Shia descendant of the House of Ali). This dispute became entrenched in doctrine.

4 declare Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) a terrorist group perhaps was an indication that radical Islam had more political influence than previously accepted. The prior discovery of a regional terrorist network centred on peninsula Malaysia and Singapore also challenged conventional wisdom that political violence associated with radical Islamic groups was an internal domestic issue in states with Muslim minorities. Traditionally such groups were viewed as insurgents who advocated either autonomy or separatism. Now the picture was more alarming: radical Islamic groups were seen as advocates of a pan-regional movement to create an Islamic caliphate in Southeast Asia and beyond. Some international terrorism experts have painted a more alarmist picture. They argue that Muslims in Southeast Asia had been radicalized by the spread of Wahhabi puritanical doctrine and Jihadi extremism. They view Southeast Asia as the second front if not the global epicenter of international terrorism. Some observers argue that Indonesia might go the way of Pakistan. Country and area specialists take a more measured view, but they are in disagreement about whether radical Islam in on the rise or decline in Indonesia and throughout Southeast Asia. This paper will present an assessment of the role of radical Islam and political terrorism in contemporary Southeast Asia. The next sections discusses several important semantic issues before proceeding to a discussion of radical Islam in Indonesia, Malaysia-Singapore, the Philippines, and southern Thailand. The

5 position of radical Islam in Myanmar and Cambodia will be briefly touched upon.

Problems of Definition Any discussion of Islam and its possible connection to terrorism is fraught with peril. In April 2002, for example, the Organisation of Islamic Conference meeting in Kuala Lumpur issued a Declaration on Terrorism that stated, ‘[w]e reject any attempt to link Islam and Muslims to terrorism as terrorism has no association with any religion, civilization or nationality’. The Kuala Lumpur Declaration on Terrorism then went on to assert: We unequivocally condemn acts of international terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, including state terrorism, irrespective of motives, perpetrators and victims as terrorism poses a serious threat to international peace and security and is a grave violation of human rights; We reiterate the principled position under international law and the Charter of the United Nations of the legitimacy of resistance to foreign aggression and the struggle of peoples under colonial or alien domination and foreign occupation for national liberation and self-determination. In this context, we underline the urgency for an internationally agreed definition of terrorism, which differentiates such legitimate struggles from acts of terrorism [emphasis added]. Quite simply there is no internationally agreed definition of terrorism. Both the League of Nations and the United Nations, institutions representing the international community, have been unsuccessful in crafting a definition of terrorism acceptable to all. No doubt the view that ‘one person’s terrorist is another person’s freedom fighter’ is partly responsible for this impasse. Even the United States has not adopted a single definition of terrorism. While it is defined in the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations, the Departments of State and Defense as

6 well as the Federal Bureau of Investigation all have separate definitions. Some countries have attempted to side step this semantic problem by drafting laws defining terrorist acts. Other countries view these so-called ‘terrorist acts’ as criminal offenses. The inability of the international community to define terrorism has resulted in giving carte blanche to international terrorism experts to pick and choose which groups to include. One possible way out of this conundrum is to define a terrorist group as any group proscribed by the United Nations. A caveat needs to be entered that the UN lists only those groups associated with the Taliban and Osama bin Laden. The present UN lists three groups in Southeast Asia as terrorist organizations: al Qaeda, Jemaah Islamiyah 2 and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). There are equally vexing semantic difficulties in discussing politically active Islamic groups. There is a tendency among security analysts to lump all Islamic groups, associations and political parties together in a discussion of radical Islamic groups. As yet there is no agreed definition of key terms. A quick survey of the literature produces the following: Islamic fundamentalism, Islamisation, Islamism, Islamist, political Islam, radical Islam, militant Islam and Islamic extremism.

2Indonesia

has not yet declared JI a terrorist organization. JI’s leader, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir was found guilty of involvement with JI. But the Indonesian court said it lacked the evidence to demonstrate that Ba’asyir was JI’s amir or spiritual leader.

7 There is near unanimous agreement among the Muslim elite in Southeast Asia that Islamic fundamentalism is a totally inappropriate and inaccurate term to use in the context of political terrorism. Islamic fundamentalism is a conservative belief that sharia law should be introduced to govern daily life. 3 Islamisation is the process of religious self-awareness and spiritual renewal that has been underway among Muslims in Southeast Asia for a decade or more. It refers to the adoption of pious religious habits such as fasting during the holy months, saying daily prayers, and adopting Muslim dress (tunics for men, headscarves for women). Islamism is ‘the belief that Islam should guide social and political as well as personal life’. 4 Islamists are who want legislated recognition and a direct role for Islam as the religion of the state. Political Islam may be defined as ‘those individuals and organizations that gain their legitimacy from Islam and that seek to gain power through electoral processes and to participate in representational institutions such as parliament

3International

Crisis Group, Indonesia Backgrounder: A Guide to the 2004 Elections. Asia Report no. 71, Jakarta and Brussels, December 18, 2003, 13, note 40. 4Sheri

Berman, ‘Islamism, Revolution, and Civil Society’, Perspectives on Politics (American Political Science Association), June 2003, 1(2), 257.

8 and local assemblies’. 5 Barton argues that it is necessary to distinguish between two types of political Islamism (conservative and radical) and militant Islamism. 6 The term radical Islam is often used by international terrorism experts as a short hand equivalent for extremists and terrorists. Country specialists argue that radical Islam is more a religious than a political movement and should not be equated with terrorism. Indeed some radical Islamic groups oppose terrorism and violence. Radical Islam contains both democratic and anti-democratic elements and a diversity of beliefs including: radical, revolutionary, utopian and extreme. The sources of radical Islam in Indonesia are both internal and external. Most contemporary radical Islamic organizations in Indonesia are composed of modernist Muslims who were oppressed during the New Order. 7 Modernist Muslims argue that the true basis of Islam is the Koran and the example of the Prophet Mohammed and they believe Islam should play a greater role in government.

The

largest

modernist

organization

in

Indonesia

is

the

Muhammidiyah. In the years after independence the Masyumi party represented

5Political

Islam in Southeast Asia. Conference Report, Southeast Asia Studies Program, The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies. Johns Hopkins University, Washington, D.C., March 25, 2003, 2. 6Greg

Barton, ‘Islam, Islamism and politics in post-Soeharto Indonesia’, unpublished manuscript, December 25, 2003, 6-8.

7Generally,

orthodox Muslims in Indonesia can be divided into two very broad religious streams, the modernist and traditional. Traditionalists base their views on Islamic tradition handed down by history including even Javanese traditions. The leading traditionalist organization is Nahdatul Ulama (NU). Traditionalists accept the secular state.

9 the views of modernist Islam. Masyumi was banned by President Sukarno for its involvement in a revolt on Sumatra in the late 1950s. Members of Masyumi continued to face repression under President Suharto. They abandoned political affairs and shifted their energy to the Indonesian Islamic Faith-Strengthening Board (Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia, DDII). The internal sources of radical Islam are based on perceptions of persecution through injustice, human rights abuses and military brutality. The external sources of radical Islam in Southeast Asia lie in the intrusion of Western culture and globalisation, the impact of the Iranian Islamic revolution in 1979, the promotion of Islamic fundamentalism by Saudia Arabia, and the jihad against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. As a counter-reaction to the Iranian Revolution, Saudia Arabia promoted the spread of Wahhabism globally through the construction of mosques, religious schools (madrasah), social welfare activities and aggressive proselytizing. Wahhabism represents a narrow reformist teaching of Islam that is variously described as austere, strict and/or puritanical. It provides the ideological underpinning of the Saudi state. What was exported to Southeast Asia and elsewhere is more properly termed neo-Wahhabism, a religious ideology that far exceeds the conservatism of official Saudi Wahhabism. Finally, Islam in Indonesia has been influenced by Salafism or the pure Islam of the first century as practiced by the Prophet and his Companions. International terrorism experts fail to take note, however, that many groups that adhere to the Salafi tradition are not violent. The spread of radical Islamic beliefs and the

10 development of a plethora of radical Islamic groups was encouraged by the impact of the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 which resulted in the collapse of the New Order and the weakening of the Indonesian state. Militant Islam has two meanings. Militant Islam may be defined as the support of violence in the defence of Islam. At one level it may take the form of public displays of strength (brandishing swords) designed to intimidate rivals. The second meaning of militant Islam is the support of violence when Islam is perceived to be under attack. In its most extreme form, militant Islam supports preemptive jihad against its enemies. Islamic extremism has been defined ‘as those groups which have a fundamentalist disposition. They hold to a strict doctrinal or scripturalist view of the faith and have a conviction that Islam must be implemented in its full and literal form, free of compromise. They are trenchantly reactive, whether through language, ideas, or physical violence, to what are seen as corrosively secular, materialist or deviationist forces’. 8 Islamic extremism often views radical Islam as not going far enough. It is in this tiny fringe that modern day political terrorism (jihadi extremism) may be located. Finally, arising from the discussion above, it should be noted that there is no clear distinction between moderate and radical Islam. These groups do not

8Political

Islam in Southeast Asia. Conference Report, Southeast Asia Studies Program, The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies. Johns Hopkins University, Washington, D.C., March 25, 2003, 13.

11 represent a dichotomy so much as a continuous spectrum. Nevertheless, the use of the terms moderates and radicals is a useful shorthand way of drawing attention to differences in political outlook. Secondly, any analysis that places political Islam or Islamic politics in the context of terrorism risks distorting our analysis. There is much more going on in the Islamic community than just political terrorism and it is this activity that represents mainstream Islam in Southeast Asia. Political terrorism represents an extremist fringe within larger society.

Indonesia Indonesian Islam has been heavily influenced by domestic folk religion and Sufism. 9 Political violence is not a new phenomenon in Indonesia.

Violent

extremist groups have existed since independence in 1949. They made their appearance in three distinct historical periods: (1) late 1940s to early 1960s in form of Darul Islam; (2) mid-1960s to late 1990s, a period of state repression of political Islam; and (3) mid-1990s during which there was a revival of Islamic radicalism initially instigated by the Suharto regime itself. One rallying call among various Islamic groups, including radicals, is for the adoption of the

9Islamic

mysticism shaped by Persian and Indian thought; see Greg Barton, ‘Making sense of Jemaah Islamiyah terrorism and radical Islamism in Indonesia’, unpublished paper, January 14, 2004, 12.

12 ‘Jakarta Charter’ or the restoration of seven words deleted from the declaration of independence that would have required Muslims to observe their religion. 10 Clifford Geertz, an anthropologist, has popularized the terms abangan and santri to describe Islam in Java. The former is a term used to describe nominal Muslims whose belief systems are heavily infused with indigenous beliefs and folk religion. Santri refers to observant or orthodox Muslims. The vast majority of Indonesia’s santri are associated with either the Muhammadiyah (30 million members) or Nahdlatul Ulama (35 million members). As noted above, the former is a modernist Islamic association, and the latter in a traditionalist organisation. These two great streams (aliran) in Indonesian politics were represented in the country’s first free national elections held in 1995. Muhammadiyah supporters were represented by their stalking horse, the Masyumi party. Table 1 displays the results. Four parties garnered 78 percent of the total vote. The two major Muslim parties received 39.3 percent of the total vote, while the two secular parties, the nationalist and communist, received 38.7 percent. Table 1. 1955 General Elections Political Party PNI

Percent of Total Vote 22.3%

Description secular nationalist

10These words were dropped from the first of the five sila (Pancasila), ‘with the obligation for adherents of Islam to carry our Islamic law’.

13 Masyumi

20.9%

modernist Muslim

NU

18.4%

traditionalist Muslim

PKI

16.4

Total

communist

78.0%

After independence in 1949, Indonesia was wracked by the Darul Islam insurgency in West Java, which attracted support in Aceh and South Sulawesi in the 1950s. In 1958, Indonesia was also subject to rebellion in West Sumatra and other outer islands supported by elements of the Masyumi party. President Sukarno suppressed these revolts and militant Islamism was effectively neutralized through violent state repression. President Sukarno also repressed moderate Islamism. As noted, Masyumi was banned. Its successor, Parmusi, was politically constrained. 11 In 1960s and 1970s, NU avoided confrontation with the state. NU developed a network of 8,000 pesantren in Java, South Sumatra, and in Kalimantan to propagate moderate Islam. In 1973 Indonesia’s eleven legal political parties were grouped by fiat into three oganisations. All the Muslim parties were grouped into the United Development Party (PPP). Secular nationalists were grouped into the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI), while supporters of the New Order formed GOLKAR as

11In

1967 Suharto engineered an internal coup in Parmusi to block former Masyumi leaders from gaining office.

14 their political organisation. In the 1970s the NU’s pesantren system was modernized and this led to the birth of small group of Islamic liberals. In the 1980s a youth reform movement also emerged. NU reorientated itself to religious and social welfare activities. NU declared its acceptance of Pancasila as sole ideological basis of the Indonesian state (accepting belief in one God rather than Islam) and withdrew from the PPP. The New Order regime continued to view Islamism with suspicion. When the threat of communism receded, the New Order identified the danger of militant Islamism and extremist Islam as the major domestic threats to national security. The message of Islamic moderates lost ground in this environment. Embittered Islamists turned to politics to vent their grievances. They were assisted by officially funded conservative foundations who were backed by overseas Wahhabist

institutions.

Repression

resulted

in

Islamism

being

driven

underground where it became a powerful social movement among the youth on university campuses and within certain mosques and madrasah (religious day school) communities. With political space closed, the leaders of modernist Islam transferred their energies to religion. In 1967, they founded the Indonesian Islamic FaithStrengthening Board (DDII) to advance conservative Islamic beliefs. DDI leaders quickly became involved in verbally attacking their more liberal brethren who

15 chose to work with the New Order regime. The DDII became increasingly militant. In 1987, two leading conservative DDII figures founded the Indonesian Committee for Solidarity with the Islamic World (Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas dengan Dunia Islam or KISDI). KISDI operated under patronage of Prabowo Subianto, a military leader. KISDI was sympathetic to the plight of Palestinians and used this issue to recruit members. In 1990s KISDI launched campaigns to support Muslims in Bosnia, Indian Kashmir, France and Algeria. The above developments took place amidst an international resurgence of interest in Islam. For more than a decade a revival of interest in Islam had been underway in the Muslim world in general and Indonesia and Malaysia in particular. By the 1990s it was increasingly commonplace to see businessmen, bureaucrats, and public servants take time out from work to pray and to fast during Ramadan. As noted, the fall of the Shah, Saudi funding for religious proselytizing, and Muslim reaction to the perceived decadence of western culture let to the revival of Islamism, particularly among disaffected youth. In Indonesia, this process was described as the ‘santri-fication’ of society. President Suharto and elements of the New Order regime, including members of the political civilian and military elite, courted the support of Islam by providing finance, protection and patronage during their final decade in power. Most prominently, this took the form of the establishment of the Indonesian

16 Association of Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI). In 1990s, ICMI restored a sense of legitimacy to the Suharto regime. The Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 led to the collapse of the New Order and a period of great domestic political instability including the resort to violence by radical Islamic militants and extremists. After Suharto’s resignation, forty-two Islamic parties were formed, a sure sign of weakness, lack of cohesion and ideological fragmentation. One major indication that radical and militant Muslims only represented a tiny fraction of Indonesian society was the result of the 1999 national elections. These were the first free and fair national democratic elections since 1955. Table 2 below sets out these results. These results reflect a similar breakdown of communal affiliations in 1955. The two secular nationalist parties, PDI-P and GOLKAR received 56.3 percent of the total vote. The three mainstream Muslim parties received 30.4 percent of the total vote, while the two avowedly radical Islamist parties Crescent Moon and Star Party (Partai Bulan Bintang, BPP) and Justice Party (Partai Keadilan, PK) received a miniscule 3.3 percent. Even if this total were combined with the PPP’s tally, the total vote received by identifiable Islamist parties was only 14 percent. The 1999 election results clearly indicate that few Indonesian voters are attracted to any variety of political Islamism or radical Islamism. Table 2 National Elections of June 1999

17 Political Party

Percent of Total Vote

Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P)

33.8%

GOLKAR

22.5%

Description Megawati Sukarnoputri secular nationalist New Order remnants, secular nationalists

National Awakening Party (PKB)

12.6%

Abdurrahman Wahid (NU)

United Development Party (PPP)

10.72%

Islamist party

National Mandate Party (PAN)

7.1%

Amien Rais (Muhammadiyah)

Crescent and Star Party (PBB)

1.94%

Radical Islamist agenda

Justice Party (PK)

1.36%

Radical Islamist agenda

Sub-total all Islamist parties

14.02%

Total

90.02%

In the aftermath of the fall of the New Order, three prominent radical groups emerged in Indonesia: Islamic Defenders Front, Laskar Jihad and Jemaah Islamiyah. 12 It is important to note that all three had their roots in militant movements established well before al Qaeda established a presence in the region. For all that has been written by international and regional terrorism experts, the fact remains that al Qaeda has achieved only a superficial degree of coordination with local Islamic radicals in Indonesia and elsewhere in Southeast Asia. Both Laskar Jihad and the Islamic Defenders Front, for example, have distanced

12International Crisis Group, Indonesia Backgrounder: A Guide to the 2004 Elections. Asia Report no. 71, Jakarta and Brussels, December 18, 2003, 10.

18 themselves from al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden. Al Qaeda established links with only two major groups in Southeast Asia, JI and the ASG, and both have been proscribed by the UN as terrorist organisations. The Islamic Defenders Front 13 (Front Pembela Islam, FPI) was founded on August 17, 1998. It soon developed the largest paramilitary organization in Indonesia. Total FPI membership has been placed at 40,000 of whom 5,000 were residents of Jakarta. The FPI is not a product of al Qaeda machinations but rather the product of patronage by factions within Indonesia’s deeply divided political and military elite. As Robert Hefner remarked, the FPI is heir to Indonesia’s tradition of elite-sponsored Islamist para-militarism dating back to the 1970s. 14 In the 1990s the FPI was used as the elite’s cats paw to mount violent attacks on pro-democracy activists. The FPT is more properly viewed as a vigilante movement because its main activity has been to harass and physically attack nightclubs, gambling dens, red-light districts, and other sites of vice and iniquity. Within days of the Bali bombings the Islamic Defenders Front suspended its activities. Laskar Jihad (Holy War Fighters) represents the second largest but best funded, coordinated and armed Islamic paramilitary group to emerge after the fall of the

13Sometimes 14Robert

translated as the Defenders of Islam Front.

W. Hefner, ‘Political Islam in Southeast Asia: Assessing the Trends’, in Political Islam in Southeast Asia. Conference Report, Southeast Asia Studies Program, The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies. Johns Hopkins University, Washington, D.C.., March 25, 2003, 8.

19 New Order. It was formed in early 2000. Laskar Jihad is the paramilitary wing of the Communications Forum of the People of the Way of the Prophet and the Muslim Community (Forum Komunikasi Ahlus Sunnah wal Jamaah,). Like the FPI, it is not an al Qaeda franchise but the creation of high-level Indonesian military and elite patronage. Laskar Jihad, like the FPI, acted as a vigilante group in attacking bars, brothels and discotheques. Although its total membership was quite small, Laskar Jihad was responsible for inflicting horrendous physical violence on Christians and their armed militias in Maluku and Central Sulawesi. Laskar Jihad may be seen as a radical Islamic militant group motivated to defend Muslim groups and people that it perceived to be under attack or threat by Christian forces. There can be no doubt that Laskar Jihad received high-level patronage from opportunistic elements of the Indonesian elite including the military who were motivated to destabilize the Wahid presidency and to maintain pressure on Megawati. 15 Laskar Jihad depended on elite patronage at every turn, such as displaying swords in front of the Presidential Palace (April 2000) or receiving military escorts as it traveled from West Java to Surabaya. Laskar Jihad was publicly given arms in Ambon City by uniformed Indonesian soldiers. Laskar Jihad’s violent activities, seemingly carried out with impunity, incurred the

15International Crisis Group, Indonesia Backgrounder: A Guide to the 2004 Elections. Asia Report no. 71, Jakarta and Brussels, December 18, 2003, 19.

20 wrath of rival political factions. Laskar Jihad clashed repeatedly with the police and military. Its leader, Jafar Umar Thalib, was arrested in May 2001. Laskar Jihad was dissolved in October 2002 three days after Bali bombings. Subsequently, however, Laskar Jihad veterans have been employed to oppose regional separatists in Papua and Aceh. In other words, far from serving the ends of ‘global Islamic extremism’ Laskar Jihad has served to support the unity of the Indonesian secular state. According to Michael Davis, the emergence of Laskar Jihad ‘reveals the low level of support for their brand of political Islam among Indonesian Muslims’. 16 Jemaah Islamiyah draws its inspiration from the Darul Islam rebellion led by Kartosuwirjo in West Java in the 1950s. Kartosuwirjo was a principle organizer of Hizbullah, a militia set up by Masjumi during the Japanese occupation in the Second World War. In January 1948 Kartosuwirjo formed the Islamic Army of Indonesia (Tentara Islam Indonesia, TII) in West Java and rebelled against the Indonesian republican government due to its negotiations with the Dutch. In mid-1949 Kartosuwirjo proclaimed the foundation of Islamic State of Indonesia (Negara Islam Indonesia, NII), covering districts in West Java controlled by his troops. Kartosuwirjo called this area Darul Islam (abode of peace). DI strength may have reached 20,000 fighters. Rebellion spread to the

16Michael

Davis, ‘Laskar Jihad and the Political Position of Conservative Islam in Indonesia’, Contemporary Southeast Asia, April 2002, 24(1), 28.

21 provinces of Aceh, South Sulawesi, Kalimantan and Central Java in the early 1950s. In 1952, for example, a Hizbullah leader in South Sulawesi refused to demobilize his forces. He made contact with Kartosuwirjo and in 1953 Sulawesi declared itself a part of the rebel Islamic state of Indonesia. Kartosuwirjo’s forces continued to clash with Indonesian republican forces even after independence was declared in 1949. In 1962, Kartosuwirjo was arrested and three years later the resistance leader in South Sulawesi was killed. The Darul Islam movement collapsed at this time. An estimated 20,000 persons, both combatants and civilians, lost their lives, another half a million persons were displaced from their homes. Little was heard about Darul Islam over the next decade. In mid-1977 Indonesia arrested 198 persons who were reportedly members of Komando Jihad. All had backgrounds in the Darul Islam movement. These events still remain murky. It is unclear if the appearance of Komando Jihad marked a true resurgence of Islamic radicalism. Some Indonesian specialists portray Komando Jihad as an elaborate military intelligence ‘sting’ operation. According to this account, the chief of military intelligence, Ali Moertopo, in an effort to flush out Islamic radicals, urged former DI members to contact their colleagues and reactivate their movement to counter communism. When they did so, they were rounded up and arrested. Whatever the case, the Komando Jihad affair had the consequence, intended or otherwise, of reforging bonds among Muslim radicals in South

22 Sulawesi, Sumatra and Java, and reviving the idea of promoting an Islamic state. The revival of DI set the scene for the emergence of Jemaah Islamiyah. The rise of JI is closely associated with two figures, Abdullah Sungkar 17 and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir. Both Sungkar and Ba’asyir joined the Masyumi party and participated in the activities of the Masyumi-affiliated Indonesian Muslim Youth Movement (Gerakan Pemuda Islam Indonesia, GPII). Both became involved in dakwah or missionary activity. In 1967, Sungkar and Ba’asyir set up Radio Dakwah Islamiyah Surakata in Solo. They both founded the Pesantren al-Mu’min (renamed Pondok Ngruki) in Ngruki in 1973. In November 1978, Sungkar and Ba’asyir were both arrested during the round up of DI members. They were put on trial in 1982 and sentenced to nine years imprisonment. This sentence was overturned on appeal and the pair were released. Sungkar and Ba’asyir returned to Pondok Ngruki and resumed teaching. They soon built up a network of supporters. Sungkar urged graduates to return to their home villages and form cells of around a dozen members and live communally. Soon Islamist cells and discussion groups sprung up in Solo and Yogyakarta. The Tandjung Priok riots in September 1984 proved a catalytic event. Government security forces shot dead dozens of Muslims. In February 1985 the

17Sungkar

was born in Brebes, Central Java in the late 1930s of Yemeni descent. He was a former officer in Kartosuwirjo’s TII.

23 government prosecution lodged an appeal against the overturning of sentences to Sungkar and Ba’asyir. In this climate, Sungkar and Ba’asyir fled to Malaysia and their network of supporters went underground. Enroute to Malaysia Sungkar stopped in Lampung, South Sumatra to establish a religious community among the tens of thousands of migrants from Central and East Java who had relocated there. While in Malaysia, Ba’asyir and Sungkar resumed teaching and maintained their links with associates in Jakarta, Central and West Java, North Sumatra and South Sulawesi. Sungkar recruited volunteers for the mujahidin in Afghanistan. The first small contingent of Indonesian recruits was sent to Pakistan in 1985. A larger group followed a year later. These recruits were first sent to Peshawar where they were processed at a paramilitary base commanded by Abdullah Azzam. Later, recruits were sent to Camp Saddah run by the Afghan mujihadin commander Sayyaf. In 1991 Camp Saddah began the first of several three-year courses of paramilitary instruction. The Indonesians recruits were now joined by volunteers from Malaysia and Singapore. Fathur Rahman al-Ghozi and Imam Samudra were among the prominent graduates of Camp Saddah. In 1992 Camp Saddah was moved to Torkham, Afghanistan. This was at a time when a Taliban coalition government was formed. Al-Ghozi played a leadership role at Torkham where he forged ties with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).

24 In 1993 a split occurred in the ranks of DI activists that led directly to the formation of JI under the leadership of Sungkar. In 1996 JI asked al-Ghozi to establish a training facility within the MILF-run Camp Abu Bakar in Mindanao. Later in the year JI shifted to Mindanao where they set up their own training facility, named Camp Hudaibiyah, within the Camp Abu Bakar complex. Camp Hudaibiyah was sub-divided into Camp Solo, Camp Banten, and Camp Sulawesi. An estimated several hundred Indonesians trained there before Camp Abu Bakar was overrun by the Armed Forces of the Philippines in 2000. JI then set up a new training camp in Poso, Central Sulawesi and also continued to train in Mindanao. The importance of the Afghanistan experience cannot be underestimated. All members of JI’s senior leadership and key operatives involved in terrorist bombings trained and fought in Pakistan and Afghanistan during the period 1985-1995. This was a formative experience. JI activists who fought in Maluku and Sulawesi and trained in Mindanao were similarly radicalized. In 1990s Sungkar and Ba’asyir came into contact with radical elements who broke away from the Egyptian Brotherhood and founded the al-Gama’at alIslamiyah. As a consequence, Sungkar and Ba’asyir shifted their goal from establishing an Islamic state in Indonesia to a pan-Iislamic vision of reestablishing an international Islamic caliphate. Sungkar and senior Afghan alumni formalized the structure of JI which they set out in a manual entitled,

25 ‘General Guidelines for the Jemaah Islamiyah Struggle’ (Pedoman Ummum Perjuangan

al-Jamaah

al-Islamiyah).

Sungkar

was

appointed

amir

or

commander/leader. After Suharto’s resignation in May 1998, Sungkar and Ba’asyir returned to Indonesia. Sungkar died shortly thereafter. Ba’asyir reestablished himself in Pondok Ngruki. Pondok Ngruki is one of five so-called ‘ivy league’ pesantren identified as being closely linked to JI and teaching a jihadist interpretation of Islam. A sixth pesantren, Lukmanul Hakiem, in Johore (Malaysia) was closed in 2001. Other jihadist pesantren are located in Java, Kalimantan and Sulawesi. Graduates from these pesantren form JI’s foot soldiers. JI’s pesantren network is but a very tiny portion of Indonesia’s 14,000 pesantren (religious boarding schools). 18

But these JI-run boarding schools nevertheless have had a major

impact on developments in Indonesia. For example, all known JI links to al Qaeda were Ngruki graduates: Fathur Rahman al-Ghozi, Hambali, Abu Jibril and Agus Dwikarna. The period after the fall of Suharto, as noted above, witnessed a sharp rise in the number of radical Islamic groups. These groups were diverse in origins, beliefs and the manner in which they operated. After his return to Indonesia, Ba’asyir moved to unite all groups committed to implementation of shariah in Indonesia.

18Pesantren are known elsewhere as madrashas. In Indonesia the term madrashah denotes a day school with a largely secular curriculum.

26 In August 2000, Ba’asyir took the initiative to organize a three-day congress in Yogjakarta of delegates representing virtually every Islamist group from across the archipelago. This congress formed the Indonesian Muslim Council (Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, MMI) dedicated to the establishment of a new international caliphate. Ba’asyir was elected Amir ul-Mujahidin or commander of MMI’s governing council. Many Ngruki alumni and ex-Afghan veterans took up key leadership roles. Ba’asyir’s assumption of the leadership of the JI and MMI provoked dissent by more radical elements. A younger group of militants gathered around Hambali. Hambali orchestrated the December 2000 Christmas Eve bombings during which attacks were made on thirty-eight churches and priests in eleven cities resulting in nineteen deaths and 120 wounded. Hambali also ordered planning for major terrorist operations in Singapore. When security authorities rounded up the JI network in Malaysia and Singapore in late 2001, Hambali ordered operations against so-called soft targets. This led directly to the Bali bombings in October 2002. Additional terrorist outrages in Medan (Sumatra), Pekanbaru (Riau), and Bandung, Sukabumi and Ciamis in West Java were conducted by other JI cells. For example, Omar al-Faruq was active in Riau. JI cells were also reportedly active in Lombok and Sumbawa. In December 2002, JI operatives assisted Wahdah Islamiyah and Laskar Jundulla in South Sulawesi.

27 International and regional terrorism experts have adopted an al Qaeda-centric paradigm in their analysis of radical Islamic groups in Indonesia and elsewhere in Southeast Asia. This paradigm depreciates the agency of local groups in setting their own agendas. In the view of terrorism experts, JI is merely an affiliate or franchise of al Qaeda. The above account demonstrates that JI has deep roots in Indonesian society extending back to the Darul Islam movement of the late 1940s. The terrorist core of JI consists of a loose network of radical Islamists associated with the Pondok Ngruki pesantren in Solo, Central Java. Many of the key leaders in JI have had military experience in Afghanistan. Some are related by marriage. The core of this group is difficult to estimate, but it may consist of a minimum of three to four hundred highly radicalized extremist militants who form part of a regional and international network with ties to al Qaeda. In addition to the three main radical groups just discussed, there are numerous other radical Islamic organizations such as Laskar Jundullah (Fighters of God), and Laskar Mujahidin (Holy War Fighters). These organizations have created armed groups who have battled Christian militia in the outer islands. These groups are purely parochial. But not all of Indonesia’s radical Muslim groups are violent. For example, Hizbut Tyahrir, which favours an Islamic caliphate and comprehensive implementation of Islamic law, KISDI (Indonesian Committee for World Islamic Solidarity), and Ikhwanul Muslimin Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim Brotherhood) all advocate an uncompromising doctrinal position and

28 stage protests and mass rallies. Yet these organizations have been careful to avoid physical violence.

Malaysia and Singapore Political Islam is a fact of life in Malaysia and reflects the communal nature of Malay society. The federal government has always been in the hands of a coalition representing Malays, Chinese and Indians. This tripartite coalition was initially known as the Alliance. After 1971 the coalition expanded and became known as the National Front. Throughout the 1980s, as in Indonesia, Malaysia was swept by the forces of Islamization emanating from the Middle East. The Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS) as been in opposition throughout most of the post-independence period. PAS engages in what has been termed ‘ethnic outbidding’, in effect challenging the Islamic credentials of the main Malaya party, the United Malays National Organization (UMNO). Political Islam has therefore tended to deepen inter-communal tensions as well as tensions among the Malay community. In recent years there has been a growing generational dissonance among Malay youths. The 1999 federal elections serve as a case in point. Due to the fall out from the Anwar Ibrahim affair, the Malay elite was split. In the 1999 elections less than half of Malay Muslims supported UMNO. Disaffected Malay Muslims supported PAS. But a detailed examination of the motivations of these voters reveals that they voted against UMNO and not in support of PAS’s brand of Islamism.

29 During the 1999 elections both PAS and UMNO vied with each other in promoting the Islamization of Malaysian society. UMNO has sought to control both public Islamic discourse and the political opposition, including PAS. In June 2001 acting under provisions of the Internal Security Act authorities arrested over 70 individuals who were charged with being members of a militant Islamic organization, KMM, 19 and Jemaah Islamiyah. In December 2001/January 2002 fifteen alleged JI members were arrested in Singapore. A second wave of arrests followed in August. Chart 1 JI's Organisational Structure

Amir

Central Command

Governing Council

Mantiqi 1 and 2 1. Malaysia-Singapore 2. Western Indonesia

Mantiqi 3 and 4 3. Mindanao, Sabah, Sulawesi 4. Papua and Australia

Disciplinary Council

Religious Council

Police interrogations revealed a regional organizational structure that divided Southeast Asia up into four regions or mantiqi (see Chart 1) with a special focus on operations in Singapore, Indonesia and the Philippines. In other words, the radical Islamic network had a regional and not a national focus. While a number of PAS members were detained in Malaysia, the majority of detainees were

19Malaysia

initially identified its alleged domestic terrorists as members of Kumpulan Mujihaddin Malaysia (KMM). Then, without explanation, redesignated the group as Kumpulan Militan Malaysia to conform to the government’s view that the detainees were domestic militants and not international jihadis. There is disagreement by analysts over whether KMM actually exists or is a term invented by the government. KMM’s membership is miniscule.

30 Indonesian veterans of the Afghan conflict or were Indonesians who sought sanctuary in Malaysia and were recruited from religious discussion groups. Nearly all detainees or suspects linked to the Bali bombings had permanent resident status and had spent years in Malaysia. Religious extremism is not a notable feature of Islam in post-independence Malaysia. There have been three notable exceptions, but these incidents are the exceptions that prove the rule: the attack on a police station in Johore (October 1980); conflict in Memali, Kedah (November 1985), and Al-Ma’unah’s seizure of arms from military depots in Grik, Perak (July 2000). After the wave of arrests of KMM/JI members, Malaysia stopped funding privately owned religious schools claiming they were breeding grounds for religious extremists. Historically, political Islam has not made any headway in Singapore where the public space for politics is tightly circumscribed by the government. One significant feature of the detainees arrested in the island state was that they were relatively well off members of society in comparative terms.

Philippines Muslims make up 17% of the population in the southern Philippines. But the Philippine Muslim community is not a single ethnic group. Philippine Muslims may be divided into three major and a number of minor ethnic groups. Each is separated by significant linguistic differences as well as geographical location. The vast majority of Philippine Muslims are traditionalists, not fundamentalists,

31 whose religion has become intertwined with local animist beliefs. The southern Philippines provides few historical examples of successful political parties based on Islam. When Islamic parties have arisen they have championed regional interests rather than Islamist causes. The Moro separatist movement is quite distinct in that is has attracted significant popular support based on local issues such as inequality in land ownership and poverty. The Moro National Liberation Front has negotiated a peace agreement with the Philippines government and is participating in regional autonomy arrangements. A break away group, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) should be viewed as a bona fide rebel force and not a terrorist organization. The mainstream MILF forces usually focus their armed attacks on sabotaging government infrastructure and conducting guerilla operations against the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). The MILF has permitted Israeli irrigation engineers to work unmolested on plantations in areas under their control. The MILF is currently observing a ceasefire with the Manila government and negotiating a possible political settlement. In 2003 the MILF condemned terrorist bombings at Davao airport (later claimed by the Abu Sayyaf Group). The MILF has offered to help apprehend international terrorists and has refrained from criticizing U.S. military support to the AFP directed against the ASG. The Philippines’ government has refrained from designating the MILF as a terrorist organization. To many observers, the MILF is a rebel group representing legitimate grievances of Muslims in the southern Philippines.

32 Some elements of the MILF, however, have been implicated in international terrorism. The MILF provided training facilities at Camp Abu Bakar to the JI during 1996-2000. Recent reports indicate that JI members continue to train MILF militants and that JI members are still undergoing paramilitary training on Mindanao. 20 The Abu Sayyaf Group represents an exception to this picture. It was formed in 1993 by Filipino veterans of the Afghan conflict. But the ASG has failed to grain traction among the majority of the Muslim community in Sulu, Tawi Tawi and Basilan. The ASG quickly degenerated into criminal behaviour to such an extent that al Qaeda may have distanced itself and sought out ties with the MILF instead. The ASG’s links with al Qaeda were tenuous at best and atrophied if not were extinguished in 1995 with the death of its founder. The ASG is an atypical Muslim separatist group in that includes new converts to Islam and non-Muslims among its members. The ASG today may total around 200 fighters, divided between eighty percent common criminals and twenty percent Islamic militants. Prior to 1995, the ASG was probably the only Islamic group in the Philippines to have espoused global Islamic demands (eg. freeing those convicted in the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center). The ASG is the

20Oliver

Teves, Associated Press, ‘Terror group members from Indonesia training rfecruits in Philippines’, November 26, 2003; Kimina Lyall, ‘Manila admits JI training continues’, The Australian, December 12, 2003; Kimina Lyall, ‘JI grows terror in Philippines’, The Weekend Australian, December 13-14, 2003; and Karen L. Lema and Friena P. Guerrero, ‘Gov’t says no large JI presence in Mindanao’, Business World, December 17, 2003.

33 only Islamic extremist group to employ kidnapping, murder and general terror as its main tactics. The ASG claimed responsibility for the March 2003 Davao airport bombing. In summary, Muslim political activity in the southern Philippines, both peaceful and violent, has been and remains overwhelmingly concerned with Muslim ethnic nationalism rather than fundamentalist Islamic goals. The roots of Muslim grievances extend back hundreds of years; the factors that led to the emergence of the MNLF and MILF predate al Qaeda’s arrival in the region by several decades.

Southern Thailand Thailand has a Muslim minority representing about five percent of the total population. One half of all Thai Muslims live in the south where they constitute the majority in four provinces: Pattani, Narathiwat, Yala and Satun. Thai Muslims form a heterogenous ethnic community. Southern Thailand has a long history of violence, extremism and irredentism. Islamic separatism was especially rife from the late 1960s until the mid-1980s. The Patani United Liberation Organisation (PULO) and its armed wing, the Patani United Liberation Army (PULA), were the most visible Muslim separatist organizations with a peak strength of 20,000 fighters. As a result of a government amnesty in 1987 most gave up arms.

34 In 1995 a dissident faction known as New PULO broke away from the main body. In 1997, PULO and New PULO formed a tactical alliance and operated under the name Bersatu (Solidarity). This alliance suffered a set back the following year as a result of joint Thai-Malaysian police operations. An estimated 900 militants voluntarily joined a government rehabilitation programme. Over the last decade, due to Thai government policy, the influence of separatist groups and security problems in the south greatly declined. As a result of Thailand’s transition to democracy Muslims were given greater political opportunities. For example, southern Muslims currently hold eight seats in the Senate and the present Interior Minister, Wan Muhamad Nor Matha, is a Muslim. There are unconfirmed reports that KMM/JI remnants from Malaysia fled to southern Thailand after the Malaysian government initiated a security crackdown. However, no established connections linking southern Thai Muslim separatists to al Qaeda have been discovered. At most, JI has used Thailand as a meeting place. For example, there are unconfirmed reports that JI terrorists may have planned the Bali bombings at a gathering held in Thailand. 21 The arrest of Hambali, a leading JI figure, indicates that Thailand may also have served as a temporary safe haven.

21These claims have been discredited by Indonesian police that targeting of Bali was decided in Indonesia around July-August 2002.

35 There has been a marked upsurge in violence since late 2001. An estimated fiftysix security personnel have been killed since then. In January 2004 there was unexplained spate of violent attacks in southern Thailand. In the most serious incident, a military camp was attacked and over one hundred assault rifles were stolen from its armory; at the same time eighteen schools were set on fire. Thai government authorities have been unable to identify the attackers. Speculation is rife that this violence may be linked to criminal activity, police-military rivalry or the revival of separatism. Police and security officials have identified Gerakan Mujahideen Islam Pattani (GMIP) as the most likely perpetrator, but Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), PULO, and New PULO have been implicated as well. 22 A key GMIP leader fought in Afghanistan and GMIP may have had links with KMM in Malaysia. 23 GMIP has been described by ‘observers’ as a ‘loose gathering of gangs’ with ‘no real political ideology’ and should not be equated with the BRN and PULO. 24

22‘Barrack

raided, 20 schools torched in South’, The Nation [Bangkok], January 5, 2004; ‘Wanted rebel leader a key suspect’, The Straits Times Interactive, January 6, 2004; ‘Bt1m reward for top suspect’, The Nation, January 7, 2004; ‘New command post to be set up Defence minister wants full-scale force’, The Bangkok Post, January 6, 2004. Rohan Gunaratna has also identified Jemaah Salafiah as a Thai extremist group; see: Patrick Goodenough, ‘Thailand Gov’t Urged to Get Serious with Terrorists’, CNSNews.Com, January 9, 2004.

23Alisa

Tang, Associated Press, ‘Terrorist group helping insurgents, Thailand says’, January 9,

2004. 24‘Attackers

had “outside help”’, The Nation, January 9, 2004.

36

Cambodia and Myanmar The exact size of the Muslim community in Cambodia, mainly ethnic Chams, is unknown but may number several hundred thousand. There is little historical evidence of Islamic militancy or extremism among this group. But in 2003, the police made a number of arrests of both Cambodian citizens and foreigners on charges of links to international terrorism and JI. 25 At least twenty-eight foreign teachers have been expelled. Three of those arrested were associated with the alMukara school which taught Wahhabi religious beliefs and received funding from Saudi Arabia. Another detainees was associated with an Islamic school outside Phnom Penh funded by a Kuwaiti charity. Myanmar is host to a Muslim minority totaling 3.8 percent of the population. The Rohingyas are an Islamic minority group located in the western state of Arakan. An estimated 200,000 Rohingyas fled to Bangladesh as refugees/displaced persons. Militant Rohingyas were reportedly present at a regional planning meeting held under JI auspices. Extremist Rohingyas reportedly have also made contact with

terrorist groups based in Afghanistan (under Taliban rule),

Bangladesh and Kashmir. 26

25Ker

Munthit, Associated Press, ‘3 Muslim Foreigners Arrested in Cambodia’, The Guardian, May 28, 2003; Michael Kitchen, Voice of America, ‘Cambodian Linked to Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Group’, June 12, 2003; Ek Madra, Reuters, ‘Cambodia, Thailand Take Aim at Militant Islam’, June 12, 3003; ‘JI cell members may be set free in Cambodia’, Radio Australia, December 19, 2003; and Ek Madra, Reuters, ‘Cambodia to Try Egyptian, Thai Militant Suspects’, January 5, 2004. 26Zachary

173-175.

Abuza, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2003,

37

Conclusion This paper began by raising two main issues: (1) whether the conventional view of Islam in Southeast Asia needed to be modified in light of the events of the Bali bombings in October 2002 and (2) whether Southeast Asia has become the second front or global epicenter of international terrorism. This paper argued that radical Islam has deep historical roots in the region, especially in Indonesia. But political Islam has not generally been politically influential. Radical Islamist groups have had a significant impact on politics and security out of proportion to their numbers largely through their use of violence and intimidation. This paper also argued that developments in Middle East remain crucial to our understanding what is occurring not only across the Muslim world but in Southeast Asia as well. In this respect, political Islam in Southeast Asia has not been as insulated from external influence as is commonly believed. Influences from the Middle East when combined with the forces of globalization serve to reinforce radical Islam because they undermine state sovereignty and encourage the formation of overarching rather than national (or parochial) identities. Al Qaeda training and funding have enabled radical Islamic organizations to execute acts of violence and terrorism on a scale out of proportion to their numbers in society. But al Qaeda’s assistance has not succeeded in convincing any major radical Islamic group in Southeast Asia to hitch its domestic struggle to al Qaeda’s internationalism. The appeal of al Qaeda has largely fallen on deaf

38 ears. Al Qaeda has not succeeded in creating a seamless Islamist International, nor has it establilshed a ‘network of networks’ under al Qaeda’s effective control. Islamic extremism represents only a miniscule proportion of the entire Muslim community and it lies on the fringes of radical Islam. The dominant influences on radical Islam do not emanate from overseas or al Qaeda but from domestic and regional influences such as diminished state capacity, ethno-religious tensions, elite instigation of sectarian conflict, the role of paramilitary jihadis and economic crisis. Theologically conservative Islam is here to stay but it will be one of many competing strands in Southeast Asian society. With these modifications, the conventional view that Islam in Southeast Asia is moderate, inward looking and generally lacking in political influence still holds. The theses that Southeast Asia is international terrorism’s second front or the epicenter of global terrorism are untenable on empirical grounds. Southeast Asia’s Muslim community is not homogenous, it is extremely diverse. Different patterns are evident in each country. In Singapore, Islamic politics are confined to the ruling party. In Malaysia some sections of Islam have developed a more radicalized and conservative disposition than their Indonesian counterparts due to their experiences under colonialism and rivalry with ethnic Chinese. More recently there has been a closing of the democratic space in Malaysia and a shift towards Islamic conservatism. But Islamic extremism and terrorism has failed to gain traction. Thailand has followed a more inclusive path in its southern

39 provinces, but the upsurge of violence recently casts a question mark over the success of this process. Muslim extremists in Malaysia and Singapore are motivated by regional and global rather than local factors. Throughout the region, radical Islam still remains deeply divided. What about the situation in Indonesia? First, this paper has noted that militant Islam has been an attractive ideology to a small minority of Indonesian Muslims for several centuries. Radical Islamic groups have used violence to further their aims since the early years of independence. Over the past decade there has been a change in the dynamics of Islamic radicalism towards a greater degree of internationalization and a marked tendency by militant groups to employ violence and physical destruction. This is partly the result of the Afghan experience and regional networking. But domestic factors appear to weigh more heavily. This paper has identified three key drivers of radical/militant Islam in Indonesia: intra-elite conflict, military orchestration, and weakened state capacity to control extremist groups. In sum, the most important influence on Islamic violence in Indonesia has been the collapse of local governance, loss of elite cohesion, and incitement to sectarian violence. Is Islam a rising or declining force in Southeast Asia? Greg Barton argues that the initial stages of regime change has allowed small groups of Muslim radicals to influence Indonesian society and politics out of all proportion to their true size

40 and that this process will continue. 27 Barton notes that Indonesia’s lower classes are becoming increasingly disenchanted with President Megawati’s brand of secular-nationalism and could be receptive a program that fuses Islam and economic populism (eg. morality, social justice and economic nationalism). Barton also argues that there is a real possibility Islamist political parties will enjoy considerable leverage after the 2004 elections when they can expect to enjoy strong party-political and military connections and support. In these circumstances, radical Islamists would have a catalytic effect on influencing Muslim society especially if they employed violence. The long term trends indicate that the secular political traditions dating back to the colonial era in countries with Muslim populations are eroding. There is a growing belief in the region that Islam should not be confined to the private sphere. In sum, there is clear evidence that Islamisation has spread in Southeast Asia. But this process has not resulted in the rise of political Islam as a major force. The Indonesian case is instructive. In the post-Suharto era, the major Islamic parties have been riven by factionalism and personality disputes. As noted, there was a decline in electoral support for Islamist parties between 1955 and 1999. There is also evidence that public support for the constitutional recognition of Islamic law has dropped markedly.

27Greg

Barton,. ‘Indonesia at the Crossroads: Islam, Islamism and the Fraught Transition to Democracy’, Paper presented to the Conference on Islam and the West: the Impact of September 11’, organized by Monash University and The University of Western Australia, Melbourne, August 15-16, 2003, 27.

41 In the future, the influence of radical Islam in Southeast Asia will have little to do with al Qaeda and more to do with state-society relations, the development of a civil society (non-violent political competition) and expansion of participation in politics and economic life. Success on these fronts will undercut the appeal of radical Islam and its links with political terrorism in Southeast Asia.

42

Appendix A - Muslim Populations in Southeast Asia Country

Total Population

Percent of Muslims

Muslim Population

% of Total Southeast Asia’s Muslim Community

Indonesia

212,195,000

87.0

184,609,605

89.50

Malaysia

22,229,040

55.0

12,225,972

5.93

Philippines

82,841,518

4.6

4,142,076

2.00

Thailand

61,797,751

3.8

2,348,315

1.14

Myanmar

41,994,678

3.8

1,679,787

0.81

Singapore

4,300,419

14.0

602,059

0.29

Vietnam

79,939,014

0.7

531,000

0.25

Cambodia

12,491,501

2.4

299,796

0.14

343,653

67.0

230,248

0.10

5,635,967

1.0

57,000

0.10

Brunei Laos Southeast Asia

468,011,411

206,725,858

43 Source: Political Islam in Southeast Asia. Conference Report, Southeast Asia Studies Program, The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies. Johns Hopkins University, Washington, D.C.., March 25, 2003, 3.

44

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