Thayer Generational Change In Vietnam

Generational Change in Vietnam Carlyle A. Thayer [email protected]

Keynote Address to Conference on Generational Change in Indochina organized by U.S. Department of State Bureau of Intelligence and Research Asia and Economic Research Conference Series

System Planning Corporation Rosslyn, Virginia August 29, 2003

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Generational Change in Vietnam Carlyle A. Thayer1    I would like to thank the Department of State and Cora Foley in particular for the  invitation to address you.  Today  I  would  like  to  talk  about  generational  change  in  Vietnam  by  revealing  my  sources  and  methods.  This  will  include  a  discussion  of  elite  politics,  “the  politics  of  regularization,”  “sectoral”  change  on  the  party’s  Central  Committee  and  generational  change  with  reference  to  the  National  Assembly  and  the  military. I will conclude my talk with some general comments about youth and  generational change in Vietnamese society 

Elite Politics I  first  became  aware  of  the  issue  of  generational  change  in  Vietnam  during  the  war  years  after  the  death  of  Ho  Chi  Minh  in  1969  when  there  was  much  speculation  by  Hanoi  watchers  about  possible  changes  in  Vietnam.  Writing  in  1971 the late Douglas Pike offered the following assessment:   The  leadership  is  well  integrated.  It  is  forged  of  a  constant  40‐year  association.  The  members  of  the  Politburo  share  the  same  common  experiences, the same development, the same social traumas. They hold a  tightly  shared  consensus  of  what  the  society  stands  for,  where  it  should  go, what goals it should seek.2  After  noting  that  the  average  age  of  the  Politburo  members  was  62,  Pike  observed:  

1

Professor of Politics, School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Australian Defence Force Academy and concurrently Deakin University’s On Site Academic Co-ordinator for the Defence and Strategic Studies Course, Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies at the Australian Defence College. E-mail: [email protected]. 2 Douglas E. Pike, “Operational Code of the North Vietnamese Politburo,” Asia Quarterly [Brussels], 1/1971, 95.

3 There  are  few  transitional  leaders.  The  jump  will  be  across  the  generational gap. One North Vietnamese general who became a hoi chanh  [rallier  or  defector]  in  South  Vietnam,  when  asked  about  the  question  of  succession in Hanoi, replied, “You must remember, Ho Chi Minh had no  sons.  He  had  only  grandsons”.  The  Politburo  will  be  replaced  therefore  not by member’s sons but by their grandsons…  There was plenty of speculation in April 2001 that this prediction had come true  when  Nong  Duc  Manh  assumed  the  mantle  of  party  Secretary  General.3  The  western  press  reported  rumors  that  Manh  was  the  illegitimate  son  of  Ho  Chi  Minh.  This  has  not  proved  to  be  the  case  literally  speaking.4  Four  years  earlier,  when  asked  by  Australian  Ambassador  Sue  Boyd  about  his  parentage,  Manh  was  noncommittal.5  Now,  after  his  election  as  party  leader  Manh  replied  to  a  similar query, “we are all sons of Ho Chi Minh.”6  Prior  to  reunification  in  1975  it  was  extremely  difficult  to  discuss  generational  change  in  the  Vietnamese  leadership  for  a  number  of  reasons.  First,  there  was  scant biographic information on all but a handful of members of the Politburo.7  Second,  there  was  even  less  information  on members of the Central Committee  elected at the Third National Congress in September 1960. And third, the names  of Central Committee members serving in the south during the war years were  kept secret until after reunification in 1975.  Ho Chi Minh was a generation apart from the leaders around him.8 His passing  did  not  lead  to  any  generational  change  in  the  Vietnamese  leadership.  His  3

Hans S. Nichols, “Ho Chi Minh’s love child,” The Washington Times, May 28, 2001. Kay Johnson, “A New Manh” and Kay Johnson, “’We Don’t Want to Keep Secrets Anymore’,” Time Asia, August 25, 2003.. 5 Quoted in David Jenkins, “Vietnam’s aging troika,” The Sydney Morning Herald, April 3, 1997. 6 Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “One of Ho’s ‘Children’ set to Lead Vietnam,” The Washington Post, April 22, 2001, A15. 7 The most comprehensive biographical directory was the CIA’s Who’s Who in North Vietnam (November 1972), 341 pages. 8 For two recent biographies see: William J. Duiker, Ho Chi Minh: A Life, New York; Hyperion: 2000 and Sophie Quinn-Judge, Ho Chi Minh: The Missing Years 1919-1941, Singapore: Horizon books, 2003. 4

4 position as chairman of the party was left vacant. Le Duan, who was appointed  first secretary of the party in 1960, continued in office until his death in July 1986.  

The Politics of Regularization The second time the issue of generational change confronted me was in 1982 on  the eve of the Fifth National Party Congress. I was struck by what I considered a  significant  interview  between  Hoang  Tung,  the  editor  of  the  party  newspaper,  and a reporter for Hungarian television. The Hungarian reminded the Nhan Dan  editor  that  when  they  last  spoke  Tung  had  talked  about  the  need  to  rejuvenate  the party’s leadership. The interview proceeded as follows:  Answer: First of all, it is necessary to reduce the number of people over 60  years  of  age,  those  who  are  as  old  as  we  are.  People  of  45  to  50  must  be  brought into the Central Committee.  Question:  But  if  you  were  to  implement  this  idea,  it  would  bring  about  very serious changes in the Politburo.  Answer:  Naturally,  we  rejuvenate  the  Politburo  only  gradually  and  slowly.9  In writing about the Fifth Congress Douglas Pike observed:  For the first time top Party officials, many of them original founders still  in  power,  addressed  themselves  to  the  fact  of  their  own  mortality.  The  changes they ordered were hesitant and limited, but even so, were a start  in the generational transfer of power.  True, the individuals initiated into  the power circle are not young – most are in their 50s – but since the major  Politburo  figures  are  in  their  70s,  they  do  represent  the  next  generation. 

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Budapest Television, March 4, 1982. Persons born between 1932 and 1937 would have participated in the anti-French Resistance War, partition, and the “American War” (1965-73) as their formative experiences. Writing much later Pike argued: “After the Vietnam War the Politburo grew older, ever more selfcontained, unwilling to listen to advice even from its own Central Committee. One by one death or disability reduced the original membership. But never was there the conscious decision to replace itself in a generational transfer of political power.” See: Douglas Pike, “Vietnam: Toward the Open Society,” Paper to International Conference on Prosperity for the People of Vietnam, Paris, October 8-9, 2000.

5 Still  waiting  in  the  wings  of  power  of  course  is  the  third  generation,  the  grandsons of Ho Chi Minh.10  The  Fifth  Party  Congress  marked  what  I  have  called  the  “regularization  of  politics” in Vietnam.11 What do I mean by this? For the first time in its history the  Vietnam  Communist  Party  began  convening  national  congresses  of  party  delegates  every  five  years  in  accordance  with  party  statutes.  Prior  to  reunification  this  was  not  the  case.  The  first  congress  was  held  in  1930,  the  second in 1951 and the third in 1960. By combining the themes of “rejuventation  of  the  party”  and  “the  regularization  of  politics”  it  became  possible  to  track  change in the Vietnamese leadership. But it was only possible to do so in a crude  way because of the paucity of biographical data.   When  the  Fifth  Congress  ended  Nhan  Dan  published  a  list  of  152  persons  who  had  just  been  elected  to  the  Central  Committee.  The  format  of  this  list  differed  significantly  from  name  lists  issued  after  the  third  and  fourth  national  party  congresses.  In  these  earlier  lists  members  were  divided  into  two  groups  –  full  (voting)  members  and  alternate  (non‐voting)  members  –  listed  in  Vietnamese  alphabetical order. In 1982, however, the Central Committee list was issued in a  new format. By studying this format I discerned that the list of full members was  broken  down  into  seven  categories  with  members  listed  alphabetically  in  each  category.  The  list  of  alternate  members  was  broken  down  into  five  categories,  also listed in alphabetical order. The new format was not highlighted in any way  nor were the various categories identified. 

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Douglas Pike, “Vietnam: The Winds of Change,” Pacific Defence Reporter 1983 Annual Reference Edition, December 1982/January 1983, 23. 11 Carlyle A. Thayer, “The Regularization of Politics: Continuity and Change in the Party’s Central Committee, 1951-1986,” in David G. Marr and Christine P. White, eds., Postwar Vietnam: Dilemmas in Socialist Development, Ithaca, N.Y.: Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University , 1988, 177-193.

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Sectoral Change on the Central Committee Having made this discovery, I had to determine the significance of each category.  I consulted by personal biographical files to find what members of each category  had  in  common.  I  came  up  with  the  following  classifications  for  full  members:  senior  party  (members  of  the  Politburo12),  central  party  and  state  officials,  new  central  party  and  state  officials,  secondary  party  and  state  officials,  new  secondary party and state officials, the military, and the new military. By “new” I  mean persons who were elected to the Central Committee for the first time.   The  1982  Central  Committee  membership  list  provided  an  authoritative  insight  into  the  composition  of  the  national  leadership.  Using  this  framework  I  went  back  and  looked  up  the  biographic  details  of  Central  Committee  members  elected in 1951, 1960 and 1976. I grouped all members into one of the categories  that I have developed. I then compared changes in what I termed the “sectoral”  composition  of  the  party’s  national  leadership.  Subsequently,  I  applied  this  methodology  to  analyze  subsequent  party  congresses  held  in  1986,  1991,  1996  and  2001.13  In  conducting  this  analysis  I  also  considered  another  variable  –  longevity of service – to track generational change over time.14  I  should  point  out  that  my  methodology  has  been  criticized  by  one  younger  scholar as being overly rigid when applied to an analysis of leadership change in  the doi moi era. This scholar has noted that there have been significant changes in  the  seven  categories  that  I  identified  in  1982  and  that  appropriate  adjustments  12

This category also included members elected to the Politburo in 1976 who retired in 1982 but were kept on the Central Committee as full members. After 1982 retiring members of the Politburo were not accorded full membership status on the Central Committee. In 1986, for example, the post of Adviser to the Central Committee was created. 13 Since 1991 Nhan Dan has listed the current positions of all members elected to the Central Committee in Vietnamese alphabetical order. In 1986 it published an alphabetical name list only. 14 In my 1982 analysis I classified each member into one of the following categories: full retained ( incumbent re-elected), new promoted (from alternate),new full, and alternate. This enabled me to track changes in each of the seven categories over time.

7 should be made. I know that Zachary Abuza has been puzzled by my definition  of  the  category  “secondary  party  and  state  officials.”  Abuza  has  analyzed  leadership  change  using  the  category  provincial  leaders.  This  is  an  important  group and one that was subsumed in my category of “secondary party and state  officials.”  If  the  Fifth  Congress  marked  the  tentative  beginning  of  generational  change  in  the  party’s  leadership,  the  Sixth  National  Congress  proved  an  historic  turning  point. According to Pike:  Since  its  inception,  communist  Vietnam  has  been  run  by  a  hermetically  sealed leadership group. A small band of not more than 200 in all started  out  together  in  1945.  They  have  continued  to  rule  through  the  years,  essentially  unchanged  except  that  their  number  is  being  slowly  diminished  by  death.  This  longtime  association  has  been  the  great  strength of the system, one that proved decisive in two wars. It created a  nearly  flawless  collective  leadership.  Now,  inexorably,  mortality  is  beginning  to  tell.  There  are  probably  50,  perhaps  as  few  as  20,  of  the  originals  left.  They  are  still  in  command,  still  together,  but  not  for  much  longer.15  Elsewhere Pike observed:  The  appointments,  retirements,  and  shifts  in  personnel  made  during  the  first  six  months  of  1987  in  Hanoi  amount  to  the  beginning  of  a  generational  transfer  of  political  power.  Almost  all  the  old  guard  is  now  gone.16  Pike was referring to  the momentous changes in the party’s top leadership and  the government’s Council of Ministers that took place in late 1986/early 1987. Six  senior  leaders  stepped  down  from  the  Politburo  including  the  redoubtable 

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Douglas Pike, Vietnam: Who Will Succeed?” (April 1987) in The World and I Educational Resource and Archive, June 1987. 16 Douglas Pike, “The Indochina Issue: Its Impact on Regional and Global Relations,” in Robert A. Scalapino, Seizaburo Sato, Jusuf Wanandi, and Sung-joo Han, eds., Asian Security Issues: Regional and Global. Research Papers and Policy Studies 26, Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, The University of California, 1988, 239.

8 General Vo Nguyen Giap.17 According to one account, General Giap attended a  Politburo  meeting  to  discuss  leadership  change.  When  Giap  suggested  that  the  oldest members should retire immediately, everyone else remained silent.18  In  2001,  following  the  Ninth  National  Congress,  I  prepared  an  analysis  of  changes  on  the  Central  Committee  and  Politburo  since  1976.19  One  of  my  key  findings  was  that  on  average  nearly  one‐third  of  Central  Committee  members  are  routinely  retired  at  each  national  party  congress.  In  recent  years  “rejuvenation  of  the  party”  has  meant  achieving  consensus  on  the  number  of  persons aged in their 40s, 50s and 60s to be elected to the Central Committee. In  recent years party members have argued for age restrictions for members of the  Central  Committee  seeking  re‐election  or  promotion  to  the  Politburo.  This  has  resulted  in  the  breakdown  of  collegial  decision‐making  by  the  Politburo  whose  members  no  longer  reflect  the  hermetically  sealed  experiences  mentioned  by  Pike.20   Turnover  on  the  Central  Committee  and  Politburo  has  ended  the  era  of  the  “strongman”  as  party  leader.  Since  Le  Duan’s  death  no  party  secretary  general  17

Recent biographical studies include: John Colvin, Giap: Volcano Under Snow, New York: Soho Press, 1996; Cecil B. Currey, The Genius of Viet Nam’s Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap, London: Brassey’s Inc., 1997; and Peter Macdonald, Giap: The Victor in Vietnam, London: Fourth Estate, 1993. 18 I cannot locate the source but believe it was written by Gareth Porter in the now defunct Indochina Issues. 19 Carlyle A. Thayer, “Vietnam’s 9th Party Congress: A Preliminary Analysis of What the Figures Show,” April 25, 2001. 20 Writing in advance of the Ninth Congress, Pike observed “the Congress will go down in history as the true beginning of a generational transfer of political power in Vietnam. All of the originals – that ‘set of old masters’ as one French observer expressed it – are now gone. All the ‘jungle fighters’ from the Viet Minh and Vietnam wars are now gone. Their replacements wait impatiently in the wings.” See: Douglas Pike, “Leadership in Vietnam: Key to Economic Improvement,” Paper to Conference on Vietnam in 2001: Prospects for Economic and social progress, sponsored by the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, l’Association des Technicens Vietnamiens d’Outre-Mer and the Vietnamese Professionals of America, Johns Hopkins University, November 17-17, 2000. I would argue that this generational transfer occurred much earlier. In 1991 at the Seventh Congress there were only four members of the Central Committee who could trace their tenure back to the 1951 Second Congress. By the Eighth Congress in 1996 their number had fallen to one. The last “old master”, Do Muoi, stepped down as party leader in late 1997.

9 has served two full terms. The role of secretary general has evolved into one of  power  broker  among  factions.21  In  short,  managed  generational  change  at  the  national leadership level in Vietnam has been underway since the 1980s.  But  leadership  change  is  not  even  across  all  sectoral  groups  represented  on  the  Central  Committee.  At  the  Sixth  Congress,  when  the  party  adopted  major  economic  reforms,  it  decentralized  membership  on  the  Central  Committee  by  expanding  the  numbers  of  secondary level  party and  state officials.  These were  mainly provincial leaders and those serving in other local party and government  posts. In 1991, following the collapse of socialism in Eastern Europe, instability in  the  Soviet  Union  and  anxiety  in  Vietnam  about  these  developments,  Vietnam’s  party  leaders  attempted  to  reassert  central  control.  More  central  level  officials  were appointed to the Central Committee and a rough equilibrium was reached  between central and secondary level officials. The trend towards recentralization  reached  its peak  at the  Eighth Congress in 1996 when  the previous  equilibrium  gave way to the predominance of central level party and state officials. Military  representation  fell  steadily  between  1976  and  1986;  after  rising  in  1991  it  has  fluctuated slightly subsequently.  The  Ninth  Party  Congress  marked  a  distinct  generational  shift  at  the  highest  echelons  of  the  party.  Le  Kha  Phieu,  an  interim  figure,  was  replaced  as  party  leader by Nong Duc Manh.22 For the first time the three top leadership posts in  Vietnam – party secretary general, prime minister and head of state – were held  by  individuals  who  received  their  higher  education  in  the  Soviet  Union.  The 

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Secretary General Do Muoi (1991-97) was described by one Hanoi diplomat as a “Confucian referee.” See: Carlyle A. Thayer, “Political developments in Vietnam: The Rise and Demise of Le Kha Phieu, 1997-2001,” in Lisa B. W. Drummond and Mandy Thomas, eds., Consuming Urban Culture in Contemporary Vietnam, London and New York: Routledge Curzon Press, 2003, 21-34 and Thayer, “Vietnam: The Stewardship of Nong Duc Manh,” in Daljit Singh and Chin Kin Wah, eds., Southeast Asian Affairs 2003, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003, 313-326. 22

10 present  Central  Committee  is  similarly  composed  of  individuals  who  have  received their education primarily in Vietnam or, in the case of those with higher  qualifications,  in  the  former  Soviet  Union,23  Eastern  Europe  and  China.  Except  for a few high profile government officials,24 this group generally does not speak  English fluently. 

The National Assembly and the Military Generational change is more apparent and more easily measured with reference  to  Vietnam’s  National  Assembly.25  The  overwhelming  majority  of  deputies  are  members of the party (nearly 90% in the current legislature). My study of trends  in national elections held in 1992, 1997 and 2002 indicate that the average age of  deputies is dropping and that they are a much more highly educated group than  their counterparts on the Central Committee. For example, 11% of the deputies in  the current legislature are under 40 and 93% have been educated at tertiary level  (a quarter of whom hold postgraduate qualifications).26   Finally, let me turn briefly to the military. In late 1999 Vietnam adopted a Law on  Military Officers that set out specific age limits and educational qualifications for  rank in service.27 Prior to the adoption of this law there was no regular system of  retirement  and  aged  generals  stayed  on  the  books  because  there  was  no  mandatory retirement age. This is no longer the case. If an officer fails to achieve  a certain educational level or promotion by a certain age, he/she will be retired.  23

In assessing qualifications of teachers trained in the former Soviet bloc one should be aware of the award of so-called “friendship degrees.” 24 For example, Deputy Prime Minister Pham Gia Khiem studied English in Australia. 25 Vietnam routinely makes available the biographies of all candidates for election to the National Assembly. The National Assembly maintains a website which gives the biographies of current members including birth dates and level of education. See: http://www.na.gov.vn/vietnam/index.html. The party has not released a similar list for members of the Central Committee. 26 “List of Winning Candidates to National Assembly Announced,” June 28, 2002. http://www.cpv.org.vn. 27 Carlyle A. Thayer, “Vietnam: The Many Roles of the VPA,” in Muthiah Alagappa, ed., Military Professionalism in Asia: Conceptual and Empirical Perspectivess, Honolulu: East-West Center, 2001, 137-149.

11 A small number of Vietnamese officers are being exposed to military education  and training in the United States (at the Asia‐Pacific Center for Security Studies  in  Hawaii)  and  at  the  Australian  Defence  College  (at  both  the  Command  and  Staff  College  and  the  Centre  for  Defence  and  Strategic  Studies).  These  individuals,  plus  those  associated  with  the  MIA‐POW  full  accounting  process,  have  begun  to  push  for  change  within  the  Ministry  of  National  Defence.  As  Vietnam  gradually  embarks  on  military  diplomacy  in  the  region,  its  younger  officers are pushing for a more normal profile including participation in ASEAN  Regional  Forum  activities.  Some  younger  officers  reportedly  support  Vietnam’s  participation  in  the  International  Military  Education  and  Training  (IMET)  program with the United States. 

Vietnamese Youth and Society So far I have been talking about the party political elite of Vietnam. What about  society  in  general?  It  is  quite  clear  that  Vietnam  has  a  youthful  demographic  profile.  According  to  the  UN  Country  Team  in  Vietnam,  “Nearly  16  million  of  Viet  Nam’s  population  of  80  million  are  young  people  aged  15‐24.”28  Probably  two‐thirds of the population is under the age of 26 and 85% of the population is  under 40. Those in their twenties grew up after the end of the Vietnam War when  opportunities  to  study  abroad  were  extended  beyond  the  former  Eastern  bloc.  Perhaps  the  largest  single  number  studied  in  Australia,  others  went  to  France  and Sweden. Smaller numbers studied in Germany (post‐reunification), Canada,  the  United  Kingdom,  and  Norway.  In  the  1990s,  Vietnamese  students  resumed  studying  in  China.  After  1995,  when  the  US  lifted  its  embargo  and  Vietnam  became  a member  of ASEAN,  educational  opportunities  opened  up in America 

28

United Nations Country Team in Viet Nam, “Tap the Energies of Youth,” UN Message on International Youth Day, August 12, 2003.

12 and Singapore and to a lesser extent in Thailand and Malaysia. New Zealand has  also become an important destination for Vietnamese students in recent years.  If  the  Vietnam  Communist  Party  retains  its  managed  process  of  generational  change, persons born between 1965‐75 are likely to enter the Central Committee  in  2011  at  the  eleventh  congress.  Vietnam’s  post‐war  generation  will  not  reach  this level until after 2016 or thirteen years from now. Given the  patterns I have  just outlined, the post‐war generation will not dominate the Central Committee’s  leadership ranks until 2021 (or eighteen years from now).29 Tran Dinh Hoan, the  head of the party’s Commission on Organization and Personnel, has indicated it  may  become  possible  for  persons  under  forty  years  of  age  to  head  provincial  administrations.30  This  would  mean  that  the  post‐1975  generation  could  conceivably take provincial office prior to 2015.  Membership in the Vietnam Communist Party is 2.4 million or nearly 3 per cent  of  the  total  population  and  is  unlikely  to  increase.  The  party  has  experienced  difficulties  in  recruiting  young  people  in  recent  years.  In  2000,  for  example,  41.5%  of  the  party’s  grassroots  level  organizations  failed  to  admit  any  new  members.31  According  to  official  figures,  only  7,347  students  joined  the  party  during  the  past  five  years  (1996‐2000).  Although  the  number  of  high  school,  college  and  university  students  entering  the  party  has  risen  each  year,  they  represented  only  1.87%  of  new  members  in  2000.32  At  the  prestigious  Hanoi  Economic  College  only  52  of  1,200  students  or  4.3%  became  party  members  in 

29

At the Ninth Congress, for example, 22% of the delegates were under the age of 40 while 60% were in their 50s. Nearly two-thirds of the 1,168 delegates were war veterans while only 440 had joined the party since the end of the Vietnam War in 1975 or 3.8%; see: Agence France Presse, April 19, 2001. 30 Tran Dinh Hoan, “Qua Mot Nam Thuc Hien Nghi Quyet Cua Bo Chinh Tri ve Luan Chuyen Can Bo,” Tap Chi Cong San, no. 12, April 2003. 9. 31 Vietnam News Agency, October 4, 2001 citing figures released by the party’s Organization Commission. 32 Figures released by the party’s Central Commission for Sciences and Education, Vietnam News Agency, August 24, 2001.

13 2001.33  Figures  issued  for  the  period  1993‐June  2002  indicate  that  students  accounted for 3.6 per cent of the new membership intake into the party.34 Figures  for 2001 and 2002, however, indicate a marked rise in educational levels of new  party recruits.35 This means that only a very tiny number of educated youth, and  an  even  smaller  number  of  overseas‐educated  youth,  will  be  recruited  into  the  party’s ranks. There they will make their greatest impact as researchers in party  and  state‐sponsored  think  tanks,  such  as  the  Ho  Chi  Minh  National  Political  Academy, or as policy advisers to key leaders.  Let me give two examples. At least 76 Vietnamese earned postgraduate degrees  from  the  National  Centre  for  Development  Studies  at  The  Australian  National  University  (ANU).36  Many  now  hold  top  positions  in  leading  universities,  research  institutes  or  are  working  for  international  agencies  and  non‐ governmental organizations in Vietnam where they exert a strong influence. The  second  example  concerns  the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  affiliated  Institute  of  International  Relations.  Its  staff  comprises  those  with  degrees  from  Australia,  America and China or specialist education in Sweden and Norway.  Vietnam’s up and coming new generation of leaders will largely be the product  of  the  Vietnamese  educational  system.  Only  a  small  proportion  of  youth  will  receive  a  tertiary  education  and  even  fewer  will  have  been  educated  overseas.  Those educated abroad will have incredibly diverse educational backgrounds. It 

33

David Thurber, Associated Press, Hanoi, October 23, 2001. Vietnam News Agency, December 2, 2002. 35 The party claims that nearly 80 per cent of new members admitted in 2001 had completed high school, marking a “qualitative improvement” over previous years; see; Deutsche Press-Argentur, January 24, 2002 quoting Vietnam News. In 2002, the number of new party members aged between 18-30 increased by 9.55 per cent over the previous year. Fifty per cent of the new members reportedly completed senior secondary high school, of whom 9.28% graduated from college, 17.7% from university and 0.55% were postgraduates; see: Vietnam News, March 5, 2003. 36 This includes 16 PhDs and 60 MAs – in economics, development administration and environmental studies. 34

14 is  my  assessment  that  when  the  present  generation  reaches  national  leadership  positions  on  the  party  Central  Committee  those  who  received  an  education  in  Vietnam will tend to dominate in secondary level party and state positions, the  military  and  to  a  lesser  extent  central  level  party  positions.  Those  educated  overseas will tend to dominate mainly in central level state posts and to a lesser  extent central level party positions. 

Conclusion Over  a  decade  ago  a  study  of  Vietnamese  youth  noted  that  “a  yawning  generational  gap”  had  appeared  in  Vietnam  as  a  by‐product  of  “a  market  economy,  and  the  simultaneous  opening  to  diverse  foreign  influences.”37  Vietnamese youth have taken to foreign music and movies, clothing fashions and  consumer products to the chagrin of their elders who exhort youth to remember  their  cultural  roots  and  reject  “poisonous”  foreign  culture.  Despite  the  obvious  problem of communication between generations, this study found:  Some young people deliberately defy their elders on matters ranging from  dress  to  the  choice  of  occupation.  A  much  smaller  group  tries  to  expand  the  limits  of  political  and  cultural  discourse,  often  in  quiet  alliance  with  alienated intellectuals from earlier generations. But few are “rebels”, and  for  the  most  part  the  younger  generation  cannot  be  considered  at  odds  with  or  a  disappointment  to,  their  elders.  In…  Vietnam…  the  young  people  [are  not]  totally  preoccupied  with  self‐aggrandizement  or  unconcerned  with  group  achievement.  Most  importantly,  they  generally  continue  to  accept  family  discipline  on  vital  questions  of  education,  vocation  and  major  financial  obligations.  They  are  acutely  aware  of  how  much their elders expect from them and, compared to young people in the  West,  show  much  less  inclination  to  confront  or  shock  their  elders  directly.38  37

David Marr and Stanley Rosen, “Chinese and Vietnamese Youth in the 1990s,” in Anita Chan and Benedict J. Tria Kerkvliet, eds, Transforming Asian Socialism: China and Vietnam Compared, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, Publishers, 1999, 176. Foreign influences also include Chinese popular music, television, film and novels primarily from Hong Kong and Taiwan. 38 Marr and Rosen, “Chinese and Vietnamese Youth in the 1990s,” 197.

15 More  recent  studies  of  the  impact  of  globalization  and  foreign  influences  on  Vietnam’s  youth,  conclude  that  these  forces  have  served  to  reinforce  a  sense  of  Vietnamese cultural uniqueness and national identity.39   The biggest problem facing Vietnamese youth is employment, and for educated  youth, suitable  employment. Youth  unemployment figures are generally higher  than  the  national  average.  According  to  UN  figures,  “It  is  estimated  that  5%  of  young  people  are  out  of  work  and  26%  are  underemployed.  And  around  1.4  million young job seekers enter the labor market each year.”40 Evidence suggests  job  seekers  are  not  being  trained  in  skills  required  by  the  labor  market.41  Job  opportunities  are  not  increasing  at  the  same  rate  as  the  number  of  job  seekers  entering  the  labor  market.  Current  efforts  to  reform  the  state‐owned  enterprise  (SOE) sector, by streamlining and downsizing, pose a threat to the employment  prospects  for  young  people.  According  to  the  UN,  youth  unemployment  could  lead to a loss of dignity and self‐respect and result in drug abuse, social problems  and  perpetuate  a  vicious  cycle  of  exclusion  and  poverty.  Such  a  combination  could pose a threat to social stability.42  Vietnam’s educated youth are making and will continue to make a major impact  in  the  private  sector.  For  example,  as  a  result  of  the  adoption  of  the  Enterprise  Law in 2000 almost 60,000 private companies have been created providing 1.3‐1.5  million  new  jobs  mainly  in  urban  areas.  Nearly  70%  of  small  and  medium  enterprises are family run affairs. According to one Vietnamese college student,  39

Mandy Thomas and Lisa B. W. Drummond, “Introduction,” in Drummond and Thomas, eds., Consuming Urban Culture in Contemporary Vietnam, 6-7 and Alexander Soucy, “Pilgrims and PleasureSeekers,” in Drummond and Thomas, eds., Consuming Urban Culture in Contemporary Vietnam, 131134. 40 United Nations Country Team in Viet Nam, “Tap the Energies of Youth.” 41 A recent report noted, for example, that “barely 1,500 of the 10,000 or so fresh information technology graduates each year have the software skills needed to find employment in the industry.” See: Van Bao, “Plenty of IT Graduates, But Few Can Make the Cut,” The Saigon Times Daily, August 1, 2003. 42 United Nations Country Team in Viet Nam, “Tap the Energies of Youth.”

16 “Most people think there isn’t much reason to join the party. It’s helpful mainly if  you  want  to  get  a  government  job,  and  these  days  most  people  are  more  interested in private business.”43  The  growth  of  the  private  sector  will  have  a  profound  impact  on  Vietnam’s  political system. Vietnam has tentatively started down the road taken by China  in  admitting  private  entrepreneurs  into  the  party  –  but  only  those  who  are  in  SOEs  that  have  been  privatized.  It  is  only  a  matter  of  time  before  an  enlarged  private sector is given a political voice in the National Assembly. The rise of the  private  sector  as  the  main  productive  force  in  Vietnamese  society  will  create  a  contradiction (to use a Marxist term) between the economic base and the political  superstructure.  This  contradiction  can  only  be  resolved  by  admitting  private  entrepreneurs into the party, thus altering the class character of the party itself.   Vietnam’s youth generation is unencumbered by the legacy of the Vietnam War.  They  are  curious  about  the  United  States  and  American  society;  the  warm  reception they gave President Bill Clinton during his visit in 2000 was genuine.  In recent years crowds of Vietnamese youths have swarmed through city streets  after  international  soccer  matches  involving  the  national  team.  This  year  youth  leaders took part in anti‐Iraq war demonstrations. The participants in one recent  public  protest  used  the  opportunity  to  demonstrate  their  exuberance  by  taking  their  motor  cavalcade  where  they  pleased  while  the  police  just  stood  by  and  watched.  What  we  are  witnessing  is  the  demonstration  of  national  pride  and  patriotism  tinged  with  a  dose  of  impatience  at  not  being  allowed  to  assume  greater responsibility.   

43

Quoted in David Thurber, Associated Press, Hanoi, October 23, 2001.