Terrorism In Pakistan Takes Aim At China Too

  • Uploaded by: Marcus sam
  • 0
  • 0
  • December 2019
  • PDF

This document was uploaded by user and they confirmed that they have the permission to share it. If you are author or own the copyright of this book, please report to us by using this DMCA report form. Report DMCA


Overview

Download & View Terrorism In Pakistan Takes Aim At China Too as PDF for free.

More details

  • Words: 1,058
  • Pages: 2
Terrorism in Pakistan takes aim at China too It would be tragic if so-called strategic competition with India blinds China to the dangers from Pakistani terrorism. China would be courting disaster by permitting such SinoIndian strategic competition to intrude into the bigger war against Pakistani terrorism. China and India encounter terrorism from nearly the same quarters in Pakistan, although the combination of groups and interests that carry out the attacks may vary. China is going down the same slippery slope of the United States in appeasing the Pakistani military in the hope to contain Pakistani terrorism. This is an insatiable beast that bites the feeding hand. Terrorism against India and China are now epicentred in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan, where the US is campaigning against Al-Qaeda and Afghan and Pakistani Taliban terrorists with reluctant assistance from the Pakistani army. The 26-28 November Bombay terror attacks were designed to provoke an Indo-Pak faceoff and halt the US campaign. Either the Pakistan army and ISI or the Al-Qaeda and the two Talibans (but chiefly the Pakistani Taliban) or them together designed the Bombay attack using the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) organisation. The growing Uighur terrorism that China faces in Xinjiang province is also radiating out from FATA, more specifically, Mir Ali, in North Waziristan (according to counterterrorism expert Rohan Gunaratna), headquarters of the smallish but deadly East Turkmenistan Islamic Movement (ETIM). ETIM is one of the oldest Uighur terrorist groups to survive tough and, what critics call, often "repressive" Chinese counterterrorism measures in Xinjiang since at least the Nineties. Trouble for China arises from the fact that ETIM has passed under protection of the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU), which is wholly influenced by the Al-Qaeda, and IJU receives the overall umbrella cover of the Tareek-e-Taliban (TTP), a cooperative platform for Pakistani Taliban leaders lead by Beitullah Mahsud, one of the most wanted men in FATA today. In other words, China faces peak terrorist threats from ETIM, Al-Qaeda and the Pakistani Taliban, and the last two employ ETIM to enable establishing a regional Central Asian caliphate that includes Xinjiang and with a second aim to undermine the rest of China. The link in all this somewhere is the Pakistan military/ intelligence establishments, which have evolved jihad so considerably since the Eighties' "mujahideen" war against the (former) Soviet Union as to threaten and squeeze the more traditional pro-Chinese and pro-US sections in them. While the US could cut away from Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal (though it couldn't escape 9/ 11), China has faced the blowback of the socalled mujahideen campaign with Uighur veterans returning to Xinjiang and opposing Chinese rule with terrorism. So bad was it in 1992 (with a failed Uighur uprising in Kashgar) that China for months closed the Karakoram highway with Pakistan because it brought in Pakistani-trained terrorists, extremist Deobandi (not to be confused with the original Indian Deobandi) ideology, smuggled opium, hashish and later heroin and AIDS. The terrorism in Xinjiang (besides the other, non-traditional threats) has only gotten worse despite massive police bundobast, military border deployments and exercises, total

1

monitoring of mosques and madrasahs funded by Saudi Arabia and Pakistan in the libertine Eighties, and almost complete absence of media coverage of the violence and casualties in the belief that publicity gives oxygen to terrorists. China is more than aware that Pakistan is a failed state and that large swathes of its territory are under terrorist control. Nor, presumably, does it entirely trust Pakistan's military any longer. Despite Pakistan president Asif Zardari's pleas on a state visit in October last and attempts to play the India card, China evaded committing to a Sino-Pak civilian nuclear deal like the Indo-US one. Within days of Zardari's visit, China put out a list of ETIM terrorists "that…were involved with similar groups and base camps" in a "South Asian country" (meaning Pakistan). One out of the list is Memetiming Memeti, ETIM head since 2003 when his predecessor, Hasan Mahsum, was killed in FATA. Bar the Mahsum incident, China has not very successfully pressured Pakistan to turn over hundreds of Al-Qaeda- and Taliban-trained ETIM and East Turkmenistan Liberation Organization (ETLO) terrorists who fought US allies during Operation Enduring Freedom. What appears to be the case is that a hierarchy of terrorism victimhood has been established, with less and less recognition of victimisation as you go down the rung. While under Chinese pressure, the US and then the UN banned ETIM. However, America still does not readily and willingly differentiate Uighur terrorism from genuine Tibetan protests, condemning China for countering both (Seventeen ETIM terrorists in Guantanamo Bay won't likely be repatriated to China, though China has demanded them, if the facility is closed). Equally, China is loath to readily and willingly accept Indian victimisation from Pakistani terrorism, despite irrefutable evidence gathered from the Bombay attacks and from earlier ones. Having blocked it before, China unwillingly agreed to the UN Security Council ban of Jamiat-ul-Dawa, LeT's parent organisation. And its official media initially regurgitated the Pakistani lie that the Bombay attackers were Hindus masquerading as Muslims. Only days ago, the Chinese foreign minister, Yang Jiechi, called his Indian counterpart, Pranab Mukherjee, suggesting that China is going beyond proforma condemnation of terrorism against India, which is a change. But a more pro-active coming together is unavoidable. No longer can terrorism raying out from Pakistan be combated singly by states (India, China or the US) or by blocs (NATO, Shanghai Cooperation Organisation), and their competition in other strategic spheres will have to be temporarily deferred or modified to overcome international jihad. Nor will the old crutches and dependencies serve any longer. For example, at the first hint of Indo-Pak trouble on Pakistan's eastern flank, the Pakistani Taliban has committed to fully back the Pakistan military and vowed hundreds of suicide attacks on Indian forces. This same Pakistani Taliban allied to the Pakistan army is behind ETIM, and China still (misguidedly) trusts the Pak army to deliver on ETIM terrorists. And this should also make it unreservedly clear to the US that the Pakistan army is growing to represent the Pakistani Taliban in uniform, and, beyond a point, they won't fight one another in FATA despite all the American threats and blandishments. The writing is on the wall for anyone to see. Pakistan is creepily becoming a jihadi state with nuclear weapons.

2

Related Documents

Pakistan And Terrorism
December 2019 25
Aim
November 2019 40
Aim
May 2020 38
Aim
November 2019 51

More Documents from ""