T7 B7 Letters From Citizens Fdr- 3-26-04 Aley Allen Letter Re Pre-9-11 Planes As Missles Threat 698

MBasHKean CHAIR

Date:

7

1H. Haniltoii

VICE CHAIR bard Ben- Veniste

TO:

TEAM

FROM:

Dianna Campagna

(s> - h.-T

cdeland IF. Fielding

(_/

ie S. Gorelick e Gorton

The attached correspondence from

i Lehman

is being forwarded to you for information and consideration. A copy has

othyj. Roemer

also been sent to Team(s) __./___ for their information. If you

K R. Thompson

have any questions, please call me on 331 -4082. Thank you.

pD. Zelikw arnvE DIRECTOR

TEL (202) 331-4060 FAX (202) 296-5545 www.9-1 Icommissioagov

F. Aley Allan 825 Lenton Avenue Baltimore, MD 21212

March 26, 2004 The Honorable Thomas H. Kean National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States 301 7th Street S.W. (Room 5125) Washington, DC 20407 Dear Governor Kean : In his testimony before your Commission Secretary Rumsfeld said he knew of no intelligence prior to 9/11 suggesting that aircraft might be used as missiles. What was missing was plainly imagination, not intelligence. Brain-storming by a group with varied interests has proved effective,-in non-governmental circles at least,- to stimulate imagination in dealing with difficult issues. I wonder if the use of aircraft as weapns would not have been forseen by a brain-storming group within the government. For example, the Energy Department representative in such a group would have known that nuclear power stations are specifically designed to withstand the impact of an aircraft flying, into a reactor; intentionally or otherwise. It would only have been a short step from that well-recognized risk to conceive of aircraft being deliberately used by terrorists against reactors and other strategic targets, -provided that terrorism risks had been put before a brainstorming group. What concerns me is that use of the brainstorming technique may still not be a practice of the government with respect not only to terrorism but other critical risks to the country. Don't you think that in these dangerous times such an approach should be a standing practice of the government? Should there not be a small but senior interdepartmental group, with ever changing representation depending on the issue, to study and report from time to time on critical issues directly to the President and his cabinet, rather than leaving critical issues closeted within single departments with necessarily limited points of view ? Such a group^ for example, starting from the inference that railroads must be a prime target for terrorists these days might readily imagine that trains could also be used a weapons^iust like airliners. What's to keep terrorists from ramming a train at full speed into the Washington DC station, or Grand Central, or some critical industrial facility, perhaps with explosives added to attain maximum effect ? I hope some member of the Commission will ask questions to ascertain whether some such guided imagination facility now exists. Respectfully yours,

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