T5 B14 Misc Correspondence Fdr- Tab 1- 1-6-04 Letter From Andrew C Mills Re Critical Questions 166

9/11 Personal

Privacy

January 6, 2004 The Honorable Thomas H. Kean, Chair National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States 301 7th Street, SW Room 5125 Washington, D.C. 20407 Dear Mr. Kean: I am writing to bring to your attention what I believe are critical questions that the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States should address. On 9-11 and the weeks leading up to it, there appear to have been colossal failures at the highest levels in our intelligence agencies, the U.S. State Department, and the U.S. air defense network. Yet there is no record of reprimands, let alone punishment, of the officers and officials responsible. In many cases, the individuals holding primary responsibility for the failures were commended and given promotions. 1. Evidence shows that beginning in 1995 U.S. intelligence agencies received multiple credible warnings of planned terrorist attacks on U.S. soil orchestrated by Osama bin Laden. These warnings included knowledge that plans were afoot to hijack passenger airliners and fly them into key U.S. buildings in Washington, DC and New York City, including the World Trade Center. By mid-2001 these warnings began to specify that the attacks would occur sometime between early and mid-September 2001. •

If this information reached the top officials in the intelligence agencies, did they inform Administration officials? If not, then why haven't we heard of punishment or at least reprimands of the responsible intelligence agency officials by the Administration, in what would have amounted to a treasonous breach of duty?

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If this information did not reach the top officials of the intelligence agencies, why not? And why have we not heard of any punishment of field FBI, CIA and defense intelligence staff for this failure?

2. Many of the 9-11 hijackers were allowed into the country on very flimsy bases. Mohammed Atta was permitted reentry into the U.S. after a trip to Germany, despite being in violation of his visa status. He landed in Miami on January 10, 2001 on a flight from Madrid on a tourist visa, yet he told immigration inspectors that he was taking flying lessons in the U.S., for which an M-l student visa is strictly required. More importantly, a 'Visa Express' service was started in Saudi Arabia in June 2001 by the Consular Affairs office of the State Department, which permitted Saudi travel agents to fill out and process visa applications. This resulted in a very lax situation in terms of screening potential terrorists who were applying to enter the U.S. If stricter procedures (procedures required by law) had been follbwed, at least five of the 19 hijackers would not have entered the country.

The Honorable Thomas Kean, 01/06/04 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States

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Why was 'Visa Express' permitted, given the heightening intelligence information concerning an imminent terrorist attack on U.S. soil?

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Why were the responsible U.S. officials not punished for this serious departure from standard procedures? Why instead, did four top Consular Affairs officials receive a bonus of between $10,000 and $15,000 each for "outstanding performance during the period April 15, 2001 and April 15, 2002?"

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3. Strict rules regarding response to emergency situations, including hijacking of airplanes, have been established by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). These rules were not followed on September 11, 2001 in spite of four passenger airliners' being hijacked almost simultaneously that day. Either the FAA failed to notify the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), or NORAD violated the standard operating procedures requiring the scrambling of fighter planes within minutes of notification, to speed to the deviant airplanes. The fighter planes that ultimately responded, scrambled far too slowly, traveled at speeds approximately one-third or less of their design top speeds, and flew from air force bases more distant from New York City or Washington, DC, than closer bases where similar fighter jets were flight-ready. •

Did FAA officials fail to inform NORAD promptly? If so, why?

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If NORAD was contacted early about the hijacked planes, why did NORAD Commander General Ralph Eberhart and Air Force General Richard Myers postpone for 50 minutes or more implementing the standard operating procedure of immediately ordering the fighter jets into the air in pursuit of the hijacked airliners?

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In any case, because of the extensive U.S. military radar network, knowledge of the hijackings must have been known by the military soon after they occurred. Thus, why was there no major reprimand or punishment for the two officers responsible for the abysmally slow response to the hijacking—General Eberhart, commander of NORAD, and General Richard Myers, then Acting Chairman of the Joint Chief s of Staff? Why did President Bush, instead, promote General Myers on October 1, 2001 to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and then publicly commend him for his "calm manner, sound judgment, and clear strategic thinking," according to a White House press release of October 15, 2001? Why was General Eberhart, appointed in June 2002 to be the head of the new U.S. Northern Command, which focuses on homeland security for North America?

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The Honorable Thomas Kean, 01/06/04 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States

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I hope that these questions will receive major attention by your commission, so that the public may receive a thorough explanation for the colossal failures of the several agencies and services. Thank you for your attention. Sincerely,

Andrew C. Mills, Ph.D. cc:

The Honorable Lee Hamilton Senator Ted Kennedy Congressman Joe Hoeffel Congressman Dennis Kucinich

9/11 Personal Privacy

October 24, 2003 The Honorable Lee H. Hamilton Vice Chair National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States 3017th Street, SW Room 5125 Washington, D.C. 20407 Dear Mr. Hamilton: I am writing to you again to bring to your attention what I believe is another important aspect of the 9-11 attacks—the likely foreknowledge of intelligence agencies about the 9-11 attack. Evidence shows that at least some of the rank-and-file of the intelligence agencies not only knew of the likelihood of such an attack but they also knew the time period when the attack would likely occur. As a result of this knowledge, these lower-level staff attempted to increase their intelligence gathering activities with regard to the suspected terrorists. One must then ask the question: What prevented this vital information from reaching the heads of these agencies and the Administration? «

Western intelligence agencies had been aware of plans for terrorist attacks using commercial passenger airplanes as early as 1995. Robert Novak reported in the September 27, 2001 edition of the Chicago Sun-Times, "Actually elements of the hijacking were known to the FBI as early as 1995, and, if coupled with current information, might have uncovered the plot." Did the intelligence agencies discourage their staff from uncovering the plot?

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The World Tribune (9/19/01) and Newsbreak Weekly (11/15/01) described how a plot termed Project Bojinka by Al-Qaeda was discovered in January 1995 by Philippine police who were investigating a possible attack against Pope John Paul El on his visit to Manila. What was discovered at that time about Project Bojinka, was that it involved two alternative plots: (1) to blow up 11 airplanes over the Pacific Ocean all in a 48-hour period; or, (2) to crash 11 planes into selected targets in the U.S., with the World Trade Center, the White House, and Sears Tower in Chicago mentioned specifically as targets. Project Bojinka became known to the CIA and the FBI through a number of channels, one of them being the court documents in the trial in New York of Ramzi Yousef and Abdul Hakim Murad for their participation in the bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993. In light of this, how can the heads of the intelligence agencies and the Administration claim that the idea of using a commercial jet as a bomb against buildings was a completely new idea before 9-11?

(Letter

to Lee Hamilton, 10/24/03 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States

Six months before the 9-11 attacks, U.S. agencies became aware through authoritative intelligence warnings that bin Laden was planning to implement Project Bojinka soon. Newsbytes, an online division of the Washington Post reported on 9-13-01 that Echelon, the vast intelligence collection system capable of monitoring all the electronic communications in the world, gave warnings of an impending attack on U.S. soil. Germany's daily Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) reported on 9/13/01 that three months before 9-11 U.S. and Israeli intelligence agencies received warning signals that Middle Eastern terrorists were planning to hijack commercial aircraft to use as weapons to attack important symbols of American and Israeli culture. What prevented information of such an impending attack from reaching heads of relevant government agencies and the Administration itself? Prior to 9-11, terrorists in the U.S. known to have connections to Osama bin Laden were neither thoroughly investigated nor forced to leave the country. For example, the Islamic militant Zacarias Moussaoui was arrested after a flight instructor at the Pan Am International Flight Academy in Egan, Minnesota tipped off the FBI that Moussaoui wanted to learn how to fly a 747 but wasn't interested in takeoffs or landings. However, despite confirmation of Moussaoui's involvement in bin Laden's terrorist network, a special counterterrorism panel of the FBI and CIA reviewed his case and concluded there was insufficient evidence that he represented a threat. U.S. Congressman James Oberstar reported that the flight instructor tried apparently in vain to call someone in the FBI who would listen to him say, 'Do you not realize that a 747 loaded with fuel can be used as a bomb?' The German public TV channel, ARD, reported on 11/23/01 that Mohamed Atta, the apparent lead hijacker, was subject to telephone monitoring by the Egyptian secret service. They also reported that the FBI had been monitoring Atta's movements for several months in 2000, when he traveled several times from Hamburg to Frankfurt and bought large quantities of chemicals potentially usable in making explosives. In spite of this, as noted by PBS's Frontlines, the INS failed to stop Atta from entering the U.S. three times on a tourist visa in 2001, even though officials knew the visa had expired in 2000 and Atta had violated its terms by taking flight lessons. What prevented the CIA and FBI from taking action against such known foreign terrorists, and why did the INS permit such a drastic relaxation of their rules concerning entry of foreign nationals and the granting of visas?

Letter to Lee Hamilton, 10/24/03 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States

In March 2002, the conservative New American magazine interviewed a former FBI official who stated, "I don't buy the idea that we didn't know what was coming," referring to the extraordinary speed with which the FBI had produced detailed information on the hijackers responsible. He said, "Within 24 hours [of the attack] the Bureau had about 20 people identified, and photos were sent out to the news media. Obviously this information was available in the files and somebody was sitting on it." He concluded, "It's terrible to think this, but this must have been allowed to happen as part of some other agenda." Why were the heads of the intelligence agencies, and even perhaps the Administration, 'sitting on' information about such an imminent and ghastly attack? Were high-level blocks placed on the FBI field staff prior to 9-11 such that they were prevented from concluding their investigations of the 9-11 terrorists? and I hope that these questions will be among the many that your commission will investigate ii report on thoroughly. horoughly. Thank you for your attention. Sincerely,

Andrew C. Mills, Ph.D.

9/11 Personal Privacy

November 19,2003 The Honorable Thomas H. Kean Chair National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States 301 7th Street, SW Room 5 125 Washington, D.C. 20407 Dear Mr. Kean: I am writing to you to bring to your attention my understanding of what happened, or didn't happen, as a result of the hijacking of the four airplanes on September 1 1, 2001 . I enclose a copy of the chronology of events on that day, based on the facts available to me. The enclosed chronology raises certain questions about the happenings of that day. The primary concern is the poor response, or complete lack of response, of federal agencies and departments to the hijacking. I hope that these questions will be among the many that your commission will investigate and report on thoroughly. Thank you for your attention. Sincerely,

Andrew C. Mills, Ph.D. Enclosure cc: Mr. Lee Hamilton Senator Ted Kennedy Congressman Dennis Kucinich Congressman Joe Hoeffel

Chronology of September 11, 2001 7:69 to 8:14 AM

Four commercial airliners involved in the attacks take off—American Airlines (AA) Flight 11, AA Flight 77, United Airlines (UA) Flight 93 and UA Flight 175

8:20 AM

Flight 11 bound for L.A. makes a hard left turn and heads toward NYC

8:30 to 8:45 AM

President Bush and the Secret Service learn about the four hijackings

8:40 to 8:50 AM

President Bush goes to Booker Elementary School in Sarasota, FL. He gives no orders of any kind regarding the hijackings. Why didn't he give at least some kind of order?

8:44 AM

[Second Official Version released days later.] F-15 Fighter jet pilots at the Otis Air National Guard Base on Cape Cod, MA receive orders to scramble. Why were fighters ordered to scramble from Otis air base, which is 180 miles from NYC, instead of McGuire Air Force Base in New Jersey, which is only 71 miles from NYC?

8:45 AM

Flight 11 slams into the north tower of the World Trade Center (WTC).

8:52 AM

[Per Second Official Version] Two F-15 fighter jets from Otis air base take off. (The normal time per SOP, from orders-to-scramble to 29,000 feet altitude, is 2.5 minutes, not 8 minutes.)

8:58 AM

The two F-15 jets should have arrived at NYC, if they had been going their design speed of 1,875 miles/hour.

9:03 AM

Flight 175 slams into the south tower of the WTC.

9:30 AM (approx) The two F-15 jets from Otis air base approach NYC (Average trip speed = 300 miles/hour). 9:40 AM

Flight 77 crashes into the Pentagon.

9:41 to 9:50 AM

[First Official Version:] Fighter jets, AWACs, and radar aircraft are ordered to scramble from Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, which is 129 miles from D.C. Why didn't they order fighter jets from Andrews Air Force Base in MD, which is only 10 miles from D.C.?

10:05 AM

The south tower of the World Trade Center collapses, about which Van Romero, Vice President for research at New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology, said "The collapse of the buildings appears 'too methodical' to be a chance result of airplanes colliding with the structures. ... [B]ased on the videotapes, ... after the airplanes hit the World Trade Center there were some explosive devices inside the buildings that caused the towers to collapse."

10:28 AM

The north tower of the WTC collapses. (Same comment as above.)

11:26 AM

Flight 93 crashes near Shanksville, PA. This airliner had been off its flight plan for a while. Why were no fighter jets scrambled to intercept or assist it?

8:20 to 9:41 AM (1st official version)

Standard Operating Procedures that are required by FAA rules were not obeyed by the U.S. Air Force or the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). This involves scrambling fighters and intercepting any aircraft -whenever an aircraft clearly deviates from its flight plan. This must be done, and does not require a Presidential order. Shooting down an aircraft does require a Presidential order. [Compare the inaction of the FAA and the military in this case to what happened when golf professional Payne Stewart's incapacitated Lear jet missed a scheduled turn on 10/25/99 and began heading north instead of west to Texas. In that case, the FAA immediately contacted the military and F-16 fighter jets were quickly dispatched.] A. Mills, 11/15/03